philosophical perspective

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7Philosophical Perspectives

Kathy L. Schuh

University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa

Sasha A. Barab

Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana

CONTENTS

Introduction ............ ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ............... ............ 69Background........................................................................................................................................................................70

Epistemology ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ............... .............. ............ 70Ontology ..................................................................................................................................................................70Unit of Analysis.......................................................................................................................................................70Dualisms ..................................................................................................................................................................70Categories Summarized...........................................................................................................................................71

Philosophical Perspectives ............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ............... .............. .............. ... 71Objectivism... ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ............... ............ 71Realism ....................................................................................................................................................................71Empiricism...............................................................................................................................................................71Rationalism and Idealism .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ........ 71Relativism............ ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ............... .............. ..... 72Pragmatism ..............................................................................................................................................................72Philosophical Views: Summarized .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ........ 72

Psychological Perspectives Distinguished .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ...... 72Behaviorism.............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .73

Ontology/Epistemology .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .73Unit of Analysis ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ............... ............ 73Dualism Perspective.......................................................................................................................................73

Cognitivism..............................................................................................................................................................73Ontology/Epistemology .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .73Unit of Analysis ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ............... ............ 74Dualism Perspective.......................................................................................................................................74

Cognitive Constructivism .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ........ 74Ontology/Epistemology .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .74Unit of Analysis ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ............. 74Dualism Perspective.......................................................................................................................................74


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Sociocultural/Historicism .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ........ 74Ontology/Epistemology .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .74Unit of Analysis ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ............... ............ 75Dualism Perspective.......................................................................................................................................75

Situativity Theory ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ............... .............. ..... 75Ontology/Epistemology .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .75Unit of Analysis ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ............. 75

Dualism Perspective.......................................................................................................................................75Psychological Views: Summarized..........................................................................................................................76

Implications for Learning Theory and Instructional Methods .............. .............. .............. .............. ................ .............. ... 76Behaviorism.............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .77Cognitivism..............................................................................................................................................................77Cognitive Constructivism .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ........ 78Sociocultural/Historicism .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ........ 78Situativity Theory ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ............... .............. ..... 79Implications for Learning Theory and Instructional Methods: Summary..............................................................79

Concluding Remarks.........................................................................................................................................................80References .........................................................................................................................................................................80

ABSTRACT

Philosophical perspectives are worldviews that denethe nature of the world, the individuals place in it, andthe possible relationships to that world and its parts.Learning and instructional theories are developed withrespect to a particular set of assumptions regardingwhat it means to know and learn. It is our contentionthat when situational variables require some decisionon the part of the educator (and we believe this isalways the case), an underlying set of assumptions(whether they be tacit or explicit) will, and should,drive the decision. In this chapter we provide overviewdescriptions of ve psychological perspectives, con-trasted in terms of epistemology, ontology, unit of anal-ysis, and whether they suggest dualist relationships.These theories (behaviorism, cognitivism, cognitiveconstructivism, sociocultural/historicism, and situativ-ity theory) provide frameworks for describing learningand designing instruction. It is the goal of this chapterto clarify these distinctions and the underlying assump-tions so instructional designers, teachers, and research-ers may make pedagogical decisions more explicitly.

KEYWORDS

Behaviorism: An objectivist and monist perspectivewith regard to individual actions and decisions.

Cognitive constructivism:

A form of realism thatstresses the reorganization of mental structures of an individual making sense of the world.

Cognitivism:

An objectivist and rationalist perspectivewith regard to individual cognitive structures.

Dualism:

When two apparently related items aretreated as separate and distinct (e.g., mind/body orindividual/environment).

Empiricism:

An epistemology that states that knowledgecomes from experience and through the senses.

Epistemology:

How we come to know about whatexists.

Idealism:

A view of reality as mental, implying thatthe world is not separate from the mind.

Objectivism:

An ontological and epistemological viewthat contends that reality exists outside of the indi-vidual and consists of specic entities.

Ontology:

What exists in the world.

Pragmatism:

The view that knowledge is derived frominteraction among groups of individuals and theartifacts in their environment, which together cre-ate a reality.

Rationalism:

An epistemological view where reason isthe principle source of knowledge.

Realism:

A form of objectivism that assumes that thereis some sort of reality that is separate from the mindand that knowing involves a correspondencebetween the world and the mind.

Relativism: A general principle that places the meaningof experiential and physical events in the relation-

ships that exist among them.

Situativity theory:

A form of realism that stresses anindividuals direct perception of events and phe-nomena.

Sociocultural/historicism:

A relativist perspective thatemphasizes relations and processes between theindividual and society.

Unit of analysis:

Boundaries of the phenomena of interest.


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INTRODUCTION

Theoretical perspectives such as behaviorism, cogni-tivism, cognitive constructivism, sociocultural/histori-cism, and situativity theory provide frameworks fordescribing learning and designing instruction. Findingroots in philosophy, these perspectives differ withrespect to their ontological and epistemologicalassumptions. Learning theories and instructional the-ories are developed and linked to a particular set of assumptions, supposedly consistent with one of thetheoretical perspectives. Duffy and Jonassen (1992)argued that instructional strategies and methods areclearly inuenced by the philosophical assumptionsand that theories of knowing and learning are implicitin the instructional design. If not implemented entirelyby a cookbook approach, then when situational vari-ables require some decision on the part of the educatoran underlying set of assumptions (whether they be tacitor explicit) will drive the decision (Barab and Duffy,2000). It is inconceivable that a teacher or instructionaldesigner would advocate a particular lesson or activitywithout at least a tacit theory of how students thinkand learn.

In the literature, we see various classications forthese different perspectives; for example, Greeno et al.(1996) described behaviorist/empiricist, cognitivist/rationalist, and situative/pragmatist-sociohistoricalperspectives. Prawat and Floden (1994) used world-views to dene their classications: mechanistic(including information processing approaches), organ-ismic (including radical constructivism), and contex-

tualist (including social constructivism). Wood (1995)grounded his categories in the application of learningtheory to technology: Skinner and neo-behaviorism,Piaget and constructivist theory, Vygotsky and socialconstructivism and situated cognition.

Unfortunately, when considering theoretical per-spectives and the learning theories that have developedwithin them, it is not always clear what the underlyingphilosophical roots are. In fact, it becomes confusingwhen considering the descriptions from authors distin-guishing differently among theoretical perspectives.Driscoll (1994), for example, stated that Piagets devel-opmental theory and constructivism were interpretivist

based. Cobb (1994), when distinguishing among thecognitive and socioconstructivists, aligned the cogni-tive constructivist with the views of von Glasersfeld(1989), who used Piaget as his example; yet, von Gla-sersfeld described the basis as pragmatist. Greeno andcolleagues (1996), Cobb (1994), and Driscoll (1994)placed the socioconstructivist or sociohistorical per-spective under the roots of pragmatism as well, callingon the views of Vygotsky. Phillips (1995) distin-

guished among the various sects of constructivism,placing the perspectives by Piaget and Vygotskytogether based on the unit of analysis. Greeno andcolleagues (1996) classied constructivism along withcognitivism, nding roots in rationalism. Ertmer andNewby (1993) located cognitivism and behaviorismwithin the objectivist perspective, with cognitivism aswell as constructivism being rationalism.

To further confound things, Garrison (1995)equated contemporary social constructivism with whathe dened as pragmatic social behaviorism based onthe work of Dewey, indicating a relationship betweenconstructivism and adaptations of behaviorism. Garri-son also stated that situated cognition (classied withinthe situative/pragmatist-sociohistoric category byGreeno et al., 1996) has made an important contributionto social constructivism. Greeno (1998) stated that thesituative perspective could subsume both the behavior-ist and the cognitivist perspectives. Whereas Prawat andFloden (1994) combined social constructivism and sit-uativity perspectives, Derry (1992) distinguishedbetween constructivist and culturally situated learningviews. Among situated perspectives, Lave (1997) fur-ther divided what she termed cognition plus, interpre-tivist views, and her situated social practice view.

What factors are being used to distinguish theabove theoretical perspectives? Epistemological orontological assumptions? For seasoned theorists in theeld, these distinctions may be trivial to sort out, ormaybe some believe that these distinctions have littlepractical signicance. For those beginning their schol-arship in the eld, confusion seems to reign. Further,

for those interested in designing practical applicationsof instruction and seeking the grounding that a theo-retical foundation can provide, it may be difcult tounderstand the foundation on which they are building.

It is in response to these questions, and with thegoal of providing sharper boundaries among these cat-egories to inform learning architects, that we havewritten this chapter. We describe theoretical perspec-tives as subsumed under ve categories and clarifythese categories by dening the mind/body relations,epistemology, ontology, and the unit of analysis. Then,we turn to the instructional implications of these vecategories. It is important to recognize that these dis-

tinctions are situated within the context of providingsharper boundaries and stimulating discussion. Assuch, we have drawn lines among perspectives thatmay seem overly dened and may not even exist withinother contexts and for other purposes; for example,some theorists would not separate situativity and con-structivist perspectives or would not build connectionsbetween objectivism and cognitivism. In writing thispaper, therefore, we have made epistemological and


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ontological commitmentsa process that we suggestis useful for instructional designers and educationalpsychologists to undertake.

This is not to imply that we have simply constructedthese distinctions based on our fancy; in fact, we havealigned each conjecture with citations from colleaguesin the eld, stacking our allies if you will (Latour,1987). Our hesitancy in forwarding these categories isthat readers will take these brief and overly simpliedcategories as xed and rigid rules or, even worse, assubstitutes for involved study of the particular philo-sophical works discussed. It is our intention that thesecategories should not be used for compartmentalizingbut should serve as a backdrop for continued discussionand for broader discourse among our colleagues.

BACKGROUND

Epistemology

Epistemology and ontology are within the founda-tional realm of philosophy and mutually support oneanother (Lombardo, 1987; Reber, 1995). Epistemologyaddresses the origins, nature, methods, and limits of human knowledge (Reber, 1995, p. 256), focusing onquestions about knowledge and the nature of knowl-edge (Everitt and Fisher, 1995). Those interested inlearning and instruction thus have an epistemologicalpurpose (i.e., supporting learners in coming to know)regardless of the perspective with which they chooseto be aligned. Understanding how a learner comes to

know and how that process can be facilitated forms abasis for research in learning and instruction.

Ontology

Ontology is a branch of philosophy (within metaphys-ics) that addresses the nature of being and reality (Lom-bardo, 1987; Reber, 1995); in other words, an ontologydenes what is real in the world, whether physical orabstract structures. Those interested in learning andinstruction indicate their ontological preference by spec-ifying what are considered truths about knowledge,information, and the world. To be redundant, yet suc-

cinct, ontology refers to what exists while epistemol-ogy is concerned with how we come to know aboutwhat exists (Barab et al., 1999; Jonassen, 1991).

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis, from an assessment perspective,refers to the phenomenon of interest or, more speci-cally, the boundaries of the phenomenon that one is

attempting to measure (Young et al., 1997). Salomon(1991), for example, distinguished between the ana-lytic approach, in which units are studied in isolationbecause they are considered to be discrete, and thesystemic approach, in which the units are consideredto be interdependent and inseparable. Units of analysisare not objective features that are selected indepen-dently of a theoretical perspective; rather, the bound-aries of the phenomenon that one is attempting tomeasure are inuenced by a theoretical perspective(Barab and Duffy, 2000). If one views knowledge asstructures existing in the brain, then a viable unit of analysis would be to examine the individual (or thecognitive structures of that individual) in isolation,whereas one who views knowledge as situationallyconstructed would pay more homage and would nec-essarily expand the unit of analysis to include thesurrounding context in which thinking is occurring.This is not to imply there is a one-to-one correspon-dence between unit of analysis and philosophicalassumptions; instead, the unit of analysis is inuencedand constrained by underlying ontological and episte-mological assumptions. In this chapter, we describewhat is an appropriate (viable) unit of analysis givena particular set of assumptions.

Dualisms

The Cartesian dualism, in which the mind is consid-ered distinct from the body, has been talked about inphilosophy and psychology since the inception of these two disciplines. Turvey and Shaw (1995) iden-

tied four dualisms that have been central to psychol-ogy: mindbody, symbolmatter, subjectiveobjec-tive, and perceptionaction. They claim that theorganismenvironment dualism subsumes these otherfour. In this dualism, the organism or knower is con-sidered to be independent of the environment or whatis known. Nowhere have these dualisms been moreapparent than in theories regarding perception (Barabet al., 1999; Reed, 1996). Various theories have beenforwarded in an attempt to explain how the mindperceives objects based on the meaningless points of light reaching the eye; for example, in addition to thedualist theory of the structuralists and the monist the-

ory of the materialists, functionalism has been for-warded in which it is postulated that mental statesexist as a function of a system. In other words, theway the system is put together is what is critical,rather than the material that the system is made of,thus allowing that a system, and not necessarily thehuman brain, can give rise to mental states (Fodor,1994). From a functionalist lens, the mind and brainare viewed as one, with the mind being viewed as


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the brain looked at from the inside and the brain asthe mind looked at from the outside (Turvey andShaw, 1995, p. 146).

Categories Summarized

It is these categories that will provide a basis for dis-

tinguishing among philosophical perspectives. Table7.1 provides a summary of these categories.

PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES

Philosophical perspectives reect certain assumptionswith respect to the nature of the world and how we cometo know about it; however, these are sets of beliefs andare not open to proof in the positivist sense of the word:There is no way to elevate one over another on thebasis of ultimate, foundational criteria (Guba and Lin-coln, 1983, p. 108). This does not mean that we submitto a radical relativist posture (Bereiter, 1994a; Guba,1992). These perspectives represent certain sets of assumptions and commitments with respect to world-views, and advocates of a particular perspective mustrely on persuasiveness, assemblage of allies (other col-leagues) (Latour, 1987), and utility rather than proof inarguing their position (Bereiter, 1994b). In this section,we present our interpretations (again, citing our col-leagues to ground and add credibility to our conjectures)on the dening characteristics of these categories.

Objectivism

Objectivism is described as both an ontology and epis-temology (Lakoff, 1987). Ontologically, all realityconsists of entities, which have xed properties andrelations holding among them at any instant (Lakoff,1987, p. 160). The world consists of these entities,their properties, and the relations that exist amongthem. Reality exists through the structures of theseentities and is independent of any human understand-ing (Lakoff, 1987); thus, the world is real and exists

outside of the individual (Bednar et al., 1995; Driscoll,1994; Jonassen, 1991; Jonassen et al., 1993). Episte-mologically, the mind functions as a mirror of nature,creating representations of the real world that requirea correspondence to the external world. To know is tohave these correct representations (Lakoff, 1987).

Realism

Realism is an ontological view of which objectivism isone form (Lakoff, 1987). Both realism and objectivismsupport the existence of a real, physical world that isexternal to individuals and includes human experience.Although objectivism provides a specic description of what the real world must be, in terms of entities andproperties, realism merely assumes that there is a real-ity of some sort (Lombardo, 1987, p. 159). From thispoint of view, the physical world is a separate realityfrom perception and the mind (Mackay, 1997; Reber,1995) and truth or knowledge is ascertained as havinga correspondence between the structures of the mindand what is present in the world (Prawat, 1995).

Empiricism

As typied by Locke and Thorndike, [empiricism]emphasizes consistency of knowledge with experi-ence (Greeno et al., 1996, p. 16). It is an epistemo-logical perspective that holds that knowledge buildsfrom experience, more specically, from the senses(Driscoll, 1994; Ertmer and Newby, 1993; Gardner,1985; Lombardo, 1987; Reber, 1995; Traiger, 1994).

Empiricism rejects the notion that the human mindenters the world with a priori

ideas and concepts thatexist independently of personal experience (Reber,1995); thus, what is learned comes from interactionswith the environment (Ertmer and Newby, 1993). Anempiricist would choose actual data over theoreticalconjectures and would formulate an argument basedon the evidence of experience.

Rationalism and Idealism

Rationalism is generally discussed from an epistemo-logical view. From a rationalist perspective, reason is

the principle source of knowledge (Lombardo, 1987;Reber, 1995; Traiger, 1994). This reasoning powerimposes upon the sensory experience that arises in theworld, thus creating the world itself (Gardner, 1985).Early versions of rationalism posited that everythingexisted in ones mind a priori

, and a learners task wasto discover what was already there, as in Platos Meno

(Plato, 1977). The ontological base of idealism, morepronounced than what might be implied by rationalism,

TABLE 7.1Characteristics for Differentiating amongPhilosophical Perspectives

Factors Denition

Ontology What exists in the world

Epistemology How we come to know about what existsUnit of analysis Boundaries of the phenomenon of interestDualisms When two items are treated as separate (e.g. ,

mind/body or individual/environment)


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holds that reality is psychological and all knowledgeand experience are formed by these mental representa-tions (Reber, 1995); thus, a separate world of physicalentities or matter is not supported (Lombardo, 1987).

Relativism

Relativism, a general principle rather than specicallya philosophical perspective, puts the meaning of expe-riential and physical events in the relationships thatexist among them. In this, there is no intrinsic meaningthat is independent of other events (Reber, 1995). Real-ity from this perspective is socially and experientiallybased, being local and specic to observer and context(Guba and Lincoln, 1983). There is no absolute truthto the world; instead, there are individual constructionsthat are highly dependent on the individual buildingthe constructions.

Pragmatism

Based on an Aristotelian heritage, a line of thoughtemerged that challenged the analytic, static, and seg-mented thought of absolute dualism. This was partic-ularly evident in the natural sciences, where the struc-tures and capacities of animals were described relativeto their ways of life within an environment; in turn, theenvironment was described relative to the ways of lifeof animals (Lombardo, 1987, p. 5). In psychology, thepragmatists (also called functionalists) were less con-cerned with the inherent structure of the mind than withwhat the mind could do. The central focus of pragma-

tists (C.S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey)was on what adaptive purposes justify the existence of mind (Turvey and Shaw, 1996). Rorty (1991) statedthat pragmatism requires neither a metaphysics[ontology] or an epistemology. They [pragmatists]view truth as, in William James phrase, what is goodfor us

to believe (p. 22, emphasis in original). Thetruth, or knowledge, is equivalent to the consequencesthat derive from these interactions (Reber, 1995). Whatmakes a particular stance count as a truth is not somecorrespondence with the real world but its appropriate-ness in terms of whether it is progressive (functional)(Barab and Squire, 2004; Bereiter, 1994b).

Philosophical Views: Summarized

The above by no means accounts for all philosoph-ical perspectives. We have chosen to dene those thatwill be most salient to our discussion of psycholog-ical perspectives as they relate to learning andinstruction. Table 7.2 contains a summary of thesephilosophical perspectives.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVESDISTINGUISHED

Considering ontological and epistemological assump-

tions, units of analysis, and the mindbody relation, wepropose a classication model that includes ve maincategories of current psychological perspectives whichhave provided a foundation for learning and instruc-tional theories. It is not our intent to add to the myriadof terms used to describe theoretical categories; con-sider, for example, the many names of various typesof constructivism: information-processing constructiv-ism (Prawat and Floden, 1994), cognitive informationprocessing, (Derry, 1992), radical constructivism orcognitive constructivism (Cobb, 1994; Derry, 1992;Duffy and Cunningham, 1996; Prawat and Floden,1994; von Glasersfeld, 1995), and sociocultural con-

structivism (sociohistorical) (Cobb, 1994; Duffy andCunningham, 1996; Prawat and Floden, 1994).

With that in mind, we have chosen the followingcategories: behaviorism, cognitivism, cognitive con-structivism (to keep in the forefront the focus on indi-vidual mind), sociocultural/historicism (to keep in theforefront the focus on interactions among individualsand among individuals and society), and situativity the-ory (to keep in the forefront the focus on interactions

TABLE 7.2Philosophical Perspectives Summarized

PhilosophicalPerspective Denition

Objectivism Ontological and epistemological view thatcontends that reality (the world) exists outsideof the individual and consists of specic entities;to know is to have a mirroring of this world

Realism Form of objectivism that assumes that some sortof reality is separate from the mind (ontology);to know is to have a correspondence betweenthe word and the mind (epistemology)

Empiricism Epistemology that states that knowledge comesfrom experience and through the senses

Rationalism Essentially an epistemological view wherereason is the principle source of knowledge

Idealism Denes reality as mental, meaning that the worldis not separate from the mind (ontology)

Relativism A general principle that places the meaning of

experiential and physical events in therelationships that exist among themPragmatism Neither an epistemology or an ontology;

knowledge is derived from interaction amonggroups of individuals and the artifacts in theirenvironment, both of which create a reality


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among individuals and the situations in which they areacting). As Greeno and colleagues (1996) stated aboutthe boundaries for the three perspectives they outlined,boundaries are, of course, relatively arbitrary. The cat-egories we discuss are not intended to dene singleboundaries among perspectives but rather to illuminatedistinctions that become clear only by looking at the

jigsaw that emerges as one variable (ontology, episte-mology, unit of analysis, dualism) provides a distinc-tion among two perspectives while another variablesuggests their similarity.

Behaviorism

Behaviorism was the predominant psychologicalschool of thought during the rst half the 20th century.Proponents of the eld were Pavlov, Thorndike, Wat-son, Tolman, Hull, and Skinner.

Ontology/Epistemology

There seems to be much agreement that behaviorismsontological roots are objectivist (Driscoll, 1994; Duffyand Jonassen, 1992; Ertmer and Newby, 1993; Greenoet al., 1996; Jonassen, 1991). The world is real andexists outside of the individual. To come to knowsomething within a behaviorist framework is to cometo engage in specic behaviors in the context of par-ticular stimuli. Burton et al. (1996) summarize threetypes of learning through which this can occur: respon-dent learning (e.g., use of classical conditioning whereinvoluntary actions are elicited), operant conditioning

(development of a relationship between a stimulus andresponse), and observational learning (change of behavior brought about by experience of observingothers, of which Banduras work is an example). Thus,the epistemological framework for behaviorism alsonds roots in empiricism (Ertmer and Newby, 1993;Greeno et al., 1996).

Unit of Analysis

To illuminate the focal point of knowledge, from abehaviorist perspective the unit of analysis is thebehavior of an individual and the stimuli that elicit it.

The mind is considered beyond inspection and notrelevant to explaining behaviorno need to open upthe black box (Gardner, 1985).

Dualism Perspective

Because of its objectivist ontological roots, behavior-ism supports a type of dualism that distinguishesbetween knower and world; however, behaviorism is

considered an anti-Cartesian school of psychology, asall mentalist terms can be redened in terms of observable, physically describable behavior (Gareld,1995, p. 336), thus nothing can have a mental propertywithout a physical property. Rather than dualism,behaviorism is a form of monism.

Cognitivism

Cognitivism, as we describe it here, is that whichinitially emerged with the cognitive revolution duringthe 1950s, stressing a renewed focus on mind. Asdescribed by Bruner (1990, p. 1), the revolution wasintended to bring the mind back into the humansciences after a long cold winter of objectivism.They were not out to reform behaviorism, but toreplace it (1990, p. 3). Cognitivism grew from struc-turalism, where mental states are viewed as the com-putational states of a Turing machine or as the time-evolving states of a connectionist (neural network)machine (Turvey and Shaw, 1995, pp. 146147).This focus on mind, in which the mind was viewedas an information-processing system as exempliedby the mind-as-computer metaphor that emerged,sought an understanding of the organization, encod-ing, and retrieval of knowledge. We consider sym-bolic information processing as described by Greenoet al. (1996) and cognitive symbolic processing(Derry, 1992) to be synonymous and exemplify thisview.


Although, as Bruner (1990) stated, the cognitive rev-olution was a reaction to the cold winter of objectiv-ism, cognitivism still nds roots in objectivism as anontological base. As stated by Ertmer and Newby(1993), behaviorism and cognitivism are both prima-rily objective, and the world is real and external to thelearner. Duffy and Jonassen (1992, p. 3) stated thatmuch of the information-processing view in cognitivepsychology is based on an objectivist epistemology,supporting this statement by citing the independentexistence of information and the acquisition of thatinformation. A direct mapping of the world, a knowl-

edge base of expert information, can be accomplishedthrough learning. Although this acquisition of a knowl-edge structure does underlie the cognitive perspective,we feel that a rationalist epistemological base providesthe distinction required to dene a meaningful bound-ary between behaviorism and cognitivism (Ertmer andNewby, 1993). Greeno and colleagues (1996) theoret-ical conceptualization is based on issues about thenature of knowing, essentially epistemology, as well


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as learning, transfer, motivation, and engagement, anddescribes behaviorism as objectivism and cognitivismas rationalism as well.

Unit of Analysis

Like the behaviorists, the unit of analysis remains withthe individual; however, rather than behavior, it is ananalysis of an individuals mind structure and the rep-resentations developed.

Dualism Perspective

With cognitivisms roots in rationalism, mind and envi-ronment would not be separated, the world existingonly through mind; however, this is an extreme inter-pretation of rationalism as applied to cognitivism.Bredo (1994) itemized a number of dualisms that arisewithin this view: language and reality, mind and body,and individual and group. For our discussion, we alignmore with Turvey and Shaw (1995), who describedcognitivism as growing out of 19th-century structural-ism, where the mind and body are seen as separate andinteractive.

Cognitive Constructivism

Cognitive constructivism is generally aligned with thework of Piaget. This link to Piaget synthesized thevarious names that had been applied to this perspec-tive: radical constructivism (Derry, 1996; von Glaser-sfeld, 1995), cognitive constructivism (Cobb, 1994;

Duffy and Cunningham, 1996), psychological con-structivism (Prawat, 1995), and constructivism (Bed-nar et al., 1995). This view, we believe, has emergedas an entity separate from cognitivism and social con-structivism based on ontological differences on the onehand and the unit of analysis on the other.


From the cognitive constructivist perspective, thereis a real world that we experience (Duffy and Jonas-sen, 1992), thus appearing to nd an ontological basein objectivism; however, this world cannot be

directly known (Derry, 1992; von Glaserfeld, 1995),which broadens the nature of the ontology to realism.That reality exists is not denied; however, what weknow of the world is only an interpretation based onour experiences (von Glasersfeld, 1995). As such,cognitive constructivism is subjective and relativist,providing for no absolute in what is right or wrongand also has a base in empiricism (Bednar et al.,1995). Cognitive constructivism also nds its epis-

temological basis largely in rationalism (Greeno etal. 1996). The emphasis in knowing is in the cogni-tive activity of an individual as they make sense of the world (Cobb, 1994).

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis within the cognitive constructiv-ist perspective remains with the individual as in cog-nitivism but focuses on the conceptual reorganizationof ones knowledge rather than on the extant structureof an individuals knowledge. Looking at the cogni-tive self-organization of the individual, Cobb (1994,p. 15) stated that constructivists are typically con-cerned with the quality of individual interpretiveactivity.

Dualism Perspective

As described by Cobb (1994), the cognitive construc-tivist perspective places the mind in the head of theindividual. Culture and context play a role in the mean-ing making of each individual. The individual mind,although inuenced by social context, is not one withthe social context (Bereiter, 1994b); thus, mind is sep-arate from environment (Prawat and Floden, 1994).

Sociocultural/Historicism

Socioculturalism is often distinguished from cognitiveconstructivism (Cobb, 1994; Duffy and Cunningham,1996; Phillips, 1995; Wood, 1995). Generally, this dis-

tinction is noted either through the name of construc-tivism as socioconstructivism, sociocultural construc-tivism (Cobb, 1994), social constructivism, orsociohistoricism (Strauss, 1993) or by distinguishingamong the proponents of the perspective. Sociocon-structivism, as we will identify it, has traditionallybeen aligned with the views of Vygotsky.


Distinguishing among the forms of constructivism islargely an epistemological distinction (Cobb, 1994;Phillips, 1995). In this perspective, knowing is dis-

tributed in the world, among objects and individuals.Knowledge creation is a shared rather than an indi-vidual experience (Prawat and Floden, 1994) andevolves through social negotiation (Savery andDuffy, 1995). Phillips (1995) described this empha-sis on sociopolitical processes or consensus as atendency toward relativism, where meaning was onlyincurred with respect to relationships, thus providingan epistemological distinction among constructivist


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theoretical perspectives. Prawat and Floden (1994)discussed socioconstructivism from a contextualistworldview, supporting the notion that from this per-spective knowledge by verication is linked toactions and events that occur. Thus, ontologically, aswith the cognitive constructivists, reality existsthrough interpretations; however, from the sociocul-tural perspective, society and an individuals rela-tionship to society have a primary role in the shapingof that reality (Prawat and Floden, 1994).

Unit of Analysis

Socioculturalists are distinctive in their insistence thatknowledge creation is a shared rather than an individ-ual experience (Prawat and Floden, 1994). It is thisprocess, rather than the mental structures of the indi-vidual or the environment, that is the unit of analysis(Strauss, 1993); thus, the mind is placed in society,and the individuals cognitive structure as a unit of analysis is essentially meaningless.

Dualism Perspective

To understand the view on dualism from this perspec-tive, we nd Bakhursts description on the nature of thought as cited in Cobb (1994, p. 14) to be helpful:

[T]hought should be viewed as something essentially onthe surface, as something located on the borderlinebetween the organism and the outside world. For thought has a life only in an environment of socially consti-tuted meanings.

Thus, a type of dualism is supported between individ-ual and environment. Although a thought may onlyexist in the socially constructed world, the individualand environment are not one and the same.

Situativity Theory

Young (1993) and Greeno (1998) have discussed theecological tenets of situativity theorythat is, thenotion of direct perception without the need formediating variables that exist in ones head. Other

roots to situativity theory can be found in the workof various anthropologists such as Lave and Wenger(1991), describing learning and cognition in theeveryday world (Kirshner and Whitson, 1997). Forour discussion, we will not distinguish among theseperspectives of theory, choosing features of eachwhich, to us, clarify the essence of situativity theoryand distinguish it from the other psychological per-spectives discussed above.


Lombardo (1987) described the ontological roots of ecological psychology as ecological reciprocity, thedynamical relationships that occur among aspects of the environment. The environment, in this perspective,is not distinct from the individual; the individual is

merely a part of a highly interconnected system of relationships (Barab and Roth, 2006). Within this envi-ronment, we perceive and act based upon the affor-dances and constraints of the environment and thesituations that arise within it. The epistemologicalbasis of situativity, although seemingly not distin-guishable from its ontology, was described by Lom-bardo (1996) as direct realism, which was foundationalto the work of Gibson. Rather than viewing experi-ences as constituting the mind, the issue becomes whatadaptive purposes exist to justify the existence of themind (Turvey and Shaw, 1995).

A fundamental notion for the situativity theorist

from the anthropological view is that cognition mustbe viewed as an integral part of the physical, social,and cultural contexts to which it belongs (Barab andPlucker, 2002; Derry, 1996, p. 416). Learning, or com-ing to know, has a dening characteristic of an indi-vidual involved in legitimate peripheral participationwithin the practices of a community (Lave and Wenger,1991). From this perspective, knowing, identity, andcontext stand in dialectic, not dualistic, relations andare all constituted in the learning process (Barab andDuffy, 2000; Lave, 1997). Not only does this learningtake place within the practices of the community, butalso the social practices of the world are developedthrough this process. Thus, a reciprocity emerges asalso dened from the ecological view.

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis in this perspective is the socio-cultural setting in which the activities are embedded(Kirshner and Whitson, 1997, p. 5). More so, it is theecosystem that exists of which the learner is one part,and it is the individualecosystem interactions thatmust be captured from this perspective (Barab andKirshner, 2001)

Dualism Perspective

The situative perspective requires unication of cogni-tion and nature (Turvey and Shaw, 1995). In this, thereis not a dualism of mind and environment; instead,there exists, as described by Turvey and Shaw, organ-ism environment mutuality and reciprocity. Thus, wend a distinction between the situative perspective and


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the social constructivist perspective. Situativity theorydenes no borderline between an organism and theenvironment as did Bakhurst; instead, from a situativ-ity perspective they are one.

Psychological Views: Summarized

We have outlined ve categories of psychological per-spectives that provide a basis in describing learningand instruction. Epistemology, ontology, unit of anal-ysis, and the position on mindenvironment relation-ships dene these categories as we see them. Table 7.3provides a summary.

IMPLICATIONS FORLEARNING THEORY ANDINSTRUCTIONAL METHODS

Theoretical perspectives have been used as a founda-tion for learning theories and, in turn, instructionaltheories and their associated methods. Learning theo-ries are descriptive (Prawat, 1992; Reigeluth, 1999b),describing how learning occurs within a particularinstance. An example of a learning theory within thecognitive perspective is schema theory, whichdescribes how learning occurs through accretion, tun-ing, and restructuring (Rumelhart, 1981). In contrast,instructional theories are prescriptive and provideguidance about how to design instruction to facilitatelearning. An instructional theory identies methods to

be used and, more importantly, identies situations inwhich these methods should or should not be used.

The elaboration theory (Reigeluth, 1999a) is anexample of an instructional theory identifying howinstruction should be sequenced so the learning pro-cess can be meaningful and motivational for learning,allowing for simplication of content without decon-structing the learning task into meaningless, decontex-tualized pieces. An instructional theory

is probabilis-

tic, rather than deterministic, increasing the chancesof achieving learning goals rather than guaranteeingthem. The methods identied within an instructionaltheory provide specic ways in which to support andfacilitate learning. The simplifying conditions method

provides a means to analyze, select, and sequence thecontent of what is to be learned for an instructionaldesigner who is subscribing to the elaboration theoryin designing a learning activity (Reigeluth, 1999a).

Instructional theories and their associated methodsare based on learning theories, providing an importantlinkage between how learning occurs and how to facil-itate that process. Learning theories reect the theoret-ical perspective, dening learning in terms of the natureof knowledge of the world and how one comes to knowabout these; however, the linkages among psychologi-cal perspective, learning theory, and instructional the-ory and associated methods are not necessarily simpleand direct. Historically, learning theories may havebeen conned to a single psychological perspective (C.M. Reigeluth, pers. comm., August 24, 1998); forexample, there is little question that operant condition-ing is aligned with behaviorism. Yet, this clear distinc-tion may not be the norm as psychological perspectivesare further delineated and new and existing theories areconsidered in light of those perspectives; for example,Reigeluth (pers. comm., August 24, 1998) stated thefollowing about his theories:

While the cognitive perspective provides rationale formany of the prescriptions in the elaboration theory, con-structivism provides rationale for others, and behavior-

ism could even provide rationale for some. Also, theelaboration theory can be used in different ways depend-ing on the philosophical orientation of the user. Forexample, it could be a central part of self-directed, prob-lem-based learning, or it could be used to sequencebehaviorist instruction. I think we often do a disserviceby trying to pigeon-hole particular methods into differentphilosophical and descriptive-theoretical orientation. Ind that the real world is a bit more complex than suchsimplistic categorizations.

TABLE 7.3Psychological Perspectives: Epistemology, Ontology, Unit of Analysis, and Dualism Perspective

Epistemology/Ontology Unit of Analysis Dualism Perspective

Behaviorism Objectivism Behavior of the individual MonismCognitivism Objectivism

RationalismCognitive structures of the individual Mind/environment

Cognitive constructivism RationalismRealism

Reorganization of mental structures of an individual makingsense of the world

Mind/environment

Sociocultural/historicism Relativism Relation (and processes) between the individual and society Individual/environmentSituativity theory Ecological realism Ecosystem of which the individual is a part Mutualism


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We agree with Reigeluths concern about categorizingparticular theories and methods with particular philo-sophical perspectives; however, we also believe thatthose who are designing instruction (instructionaldesigners as well as classroom instructors) will benetfrom a discussion of the differences in learning theo-ries and instructional theories. What these theoriesimply about the nature of the world, knowledge, andthe learning unit that is of interest provides a theoret-ical basis for designing instruction.

In the following paragraphs, we discuss the learn-ing and instructional implications of each of the veidentied theoretical perspectives. For each theoreticalperspective, we identify a learning theory and instruc-tional theory or method that we feel is an exemplargiven our description of the psychological perspective.The description provided of each exemplar is brief,allowing the reader to rely on his or her own resourcesfor a more involved description of the theories. It isimportant, again, to keep in mind the fragileness andcontextual nature of the boundaries we have dened.

Behaviorism

Because of its objectivist roots, those basing instruc-tion on the behaviorist theoretical perspective nd itappropriate to dene the learning that will occur,describing specic observable outcomes that are indic-ative of the learning. Because of the role of knowledgeas a mirror of the world, instructional content can bepreplanned, organized, and programmed with specicoutcomes dened. An exemplar learning theory that

aligns with this perspective as we have described it isSkinners operant conditioning. In this theory, learningis viewed as conditioning where behavior that is fol-lowed by a reinforcer will increase in frequency orprobability. Ways of arranging the contingenciesbetween the desired behavior and the reinforcer as wellas schedules for determining the effects of reinforcersare specied (Barker, 1994; Goetz et al., 1992).

From this learning theory, programmed instructionprovides an example of an instructional method thatfacilitates learning by utilizing reinforcement andfeedback. The content is analyzed and preplannedbased on an objective ontology, providing the learner

with a direct map of what specically is to be learned.Teaching machines and computer-aided instruction,descendants of programmed instruction, provide tech-nological vehicles to facilitate this reinforcement pro-cess. Although technology has facilitated the processof this instructional method, the important aspect of these methods is the arrangements of the materials sothat the student could make correct responses andreceive reinforcement when the correct responses were

made (Saettler, 1995, p. 294). Given the focus of mapping correct responses to the learner, this theoryand method align well with behaviorisms objectivetradition. The behavior of the learner, that of providingcorrect responses, provides the unit of analysis we haveidentied.

Cognitivism

Cognitivism retains the objectivist ontological look atthe world, thus having some of the same design goalsas behaviorism. Material is analyzed and sequenced,again often in a simple to complex or hierarchical typeof organization (Gagn et al., 1992). The rationalistepistemology guides the focus on the study of learnersknowledge structures, thus providing for their cogni-tive structures as a meaningful unit of analysis. Withthis focus on rationalist knowledge building, it is pos-sible to detach the learner from the environment, thussupporting a dualist view.

Learning theories within this perspective focus onthe organization of the information to facilitate itsacquisition by the learner. In his discussion of mean-ingful reception learning

, Ausubel (1977) described acognitive structure in learners where ideas were orga-nized hierarchically and which contained inclusiveconcepts under which were subsumed subconcepts andother information. The cognitive structures were exist-ing, were organized for stability and clarity, and inu-enced learning and retention (Ausubel, 1963), andlearning was the process of subsuming new meaning-ful material into this structure. Instructionally, content

was presented in its nal form (Ausubel, 1961), andthe learner [was] required to internalize the informa-tion in a form that will be available for later use(Driscoll, 1994, p. 115), thus aligning with the objec-tivist ontology while at the same time acknowledgingthe role of cognitive structure as needed for the ratio-nalist epistemology.

Gagns (1985) theory of instruction provides anexemplar within the cognitive perspective. In his Con-ditions of Learning

, he described ve types of learningcapabilities: intellectual skills, verbal information,cognitive strategies, motor skills, and attitudes. Withinthese comprehensive categories he denes the condi-

tions by which learning can be facilitated; for example,within cognitive strategies, internal conditions for thelearner require an encoding strategy. As with thebehaviorists, the resulting learning objective or out-come can be made explicit and objective. The instruc-tional process is designed to align with the componentsand stages central to an information-processing typeof learning theory, an early learning theory in the cog-nitive perspective.


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Within this theoretical perspective encoding andretrieval strategies align with the rationalist epistemol-ogy, the objective ontological view found in the explic-itly dened skills and knowledge that the learner willproduce. Although the learning outcome may be abehavior, the unit of analysis is the learners knowl-edge structure formed through a mapping of well-structured information to the learner.

Cognitive Constructivism

With its realist roots, cognitive constructivism supportsthat the world exists, with learning proceeding froman individuals uniquely and individually constructedinterpretation of that world. As with the cognitivist,the rationalist epistemology provides for the impor-tance of the development of cognitive structures; how-ever, in contrast to the cognitive view, information isnot prestructured and presumed to be mapped into anindividuals mind.

Von Glasersfeld (1995) identied Piagets workas providing a learning theory that is consistent withthe cognitive constructivist perspective as we havedescribed it. Von Glasersfeld (1989, p. 125), describ-ing Piaget as the most prolic constructivist in ourcentury, stated that Piagets schemes were adaptableconceptual structures and could never be represen-tations of the real world, always being based on theindividuals experiential world. Piagets scheme pro-vided a means for individuals to construct theirworld using assimilation, a process by which anindividual ts an experience into an existing concep-

tual structure. Should the experience and scheme nott together well, perturbation develops, and the newexperience will not be assimilated into the existingstructure. Accommodation then occurs, and a newscheme is developed. In Piagets scheme, bothassimilation and accommodation are based on sub-

jective experiences where the individual is construct-ing a personal interpretation of the world (von Gla-sersfeld, 1995).

Instructionally, sense-making opportunities areprovided for learners to experience and thus constructnew understandings. Teachers take a more interactive,less directive role in the instructional process of learn-

ers (Greeno, 1998). Discovery methods of instructionprovide for this type of learning. Ausubel (1961)described the difference between reception learningand discovery learning; in the former, all the contentis given to the learner, whereas in the latter the learneris to rearrange the information to integrate it into hisor her own existing cognitive structure (i.e., discoverit). Bruner (1961) described discovery learning in hisearly work. He included in discovery not just nding

out something that was unknown to mankind, but [to] include all forms of obtaining knowledge for one-self by the use of ones own mind (Bruner, 1961, p.22). His view of learning was that it was an activeprocess of imposing organization or order on experi-ence (Goetz et al., 1992, p. 313). From this, discoverylearning was intended to support the experience thatallowed learners to explore new concepts and developnew skills. The realist ontology provided that what wasdiscovered or made sense of did exist, and a corre-spondence was developed between the world and themind. Of interest was the development of the structuresof the learner, the order that a learner imposed uponthe experience, thus supporting the restructuring of cognitive structures of the learner as a unit of analysis.

Sociocultural/Historicism

The unit of analysis provides the most informativedistinction between cognitive constructivism andsocioculturalism. Seeking to understand learning fromthis perspective required a look at the process by whichit occurred among individuals. Although other per-spectives also support interaction and peer collabora-tion as ways of constructing or acquiring knowledge,socioculturalism requires that this process occur; thus,the knowledge developed is not with the individual butin the interactions among individuals.

For a learning theory within this perspective wedraw on the work of Vygotsky. According to Vygotsky(1978), learning, in particular good learning, takesplace in advance of development in what he termed

the zone of proximal development

. The zone of prox-imal development is the distance between the actualdevelopmental level of the learner and what he or sheis capable of performing with the assistance of an adultor more capable peer. Learning was also not an indi-vidual endeavor, relying on the interactions in whichthe child participates (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 90):

[L]earning awakens a variety of internal developmentalprocesses that are able to operate only when the child isinteracting with people in his environment and in coop-eration with his peers. These processes are internalized,they become part of the childs independent developmen-

tal achievement.

Knowledge exists in the interactions between thelearner and adult, although the interaction is internal-ized by the learner, becoming a new function for thelearner. This internalization of knowledge from inter-action is termed appropriation

(Wertsch, 1998).An instructional strategy within this perspective

that focused on the zone of proximal development is


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the use of instructional scaffolding as described byCollins et al. (1989). The idea is that instructionalsupports are provided that allow the learner to developincreasing competence, at which time the extra sup-ports can be removed. It is in this way that the learnercan engage in activities at the upper limit of his or herzone of proximal development. This support allows thetasks to remain complex and motivating yet still withinthe learners level of functioning.

Situativity Theory

The learning theory that we identify for the situativ-ity perspective draws on the work of Lave andWenger (1991). In contrast to the internalization pro-cess, which was evident in the other perspectives,learning, from this perspective, involves the wholeperson and the role of that person as he or shebecomes a fully participating participant of a com-

munity (Barab et al., 1999). Based on a theory of social practice, the emphasis is on the relationalinterdependencies of agent and world, activity,meaning, cognition, learning, and knowing (Baraband Duffy, 2000, p. 50). Learning as a legitimateperipheral participant is an evolving form of mem-bership where the learner also reproduces and trans-forms the community of practice of which they seekmembership. The unit of analysis is thus the entiresystem of which the learner is a part, with knowledgeresiding in the dynamic relationship of the system.Becoming knowledgeably skillful involves appropri-ating the practices of the community, emphasizing

community-dened practices that wed individuals toa community, instead of cognitive processing.

Instructionally, the situated perspective is oftengrouped with the sociocultural view. In fact, Garrison(1995) described situated cognition as making animportant contribution to social constructivism. Forour purposes, we draw on the work of the Cognitionand Technology Group at Vanderbilt (1993) to providean instructional theory (method) for this perspective,

focusing on characteristics that distinguish it fromsocioculturalism. Anchored instruction situates learn-ing activities in information-rich video environments.Within the environment, learners are presented com-plex, realistic problems that they solve using informa-tion that is embedded within the anchoring story pre-sented. To solve the problem, learners will engage ina number of problem-solving activities such as math-ematical problem solving as presented in the

JasperWoodbury Problem Solving Series

.As an example of ecological realism, the anchor

on which the instruction is built is viewed in termsof affordances as described by Gibson; the anchorsare designed to support certain types of teaching andlearning activities. That is, the learning opportunitiesemerge as a result of the learners problem-solvingrole within the instruction; the anchor is designed toset up a rich macrocontext in which conceptual toolscan be used to address the anchor problem (CTGV,

1993). Although the Jasper

series lacks the authen-ticity of a problem-solving encounter that exists inthe real world, it provides the opportunity for thelearner to participate in a simulated type of world.Thus, even in this technology-based world, the unitof analysis rests not with the learner but with thelearner as a part of the system in which the problemsolving takes place.

Implications for Learning Theory andInstructional Methods: Summary

We have identied an exemplar learning theory and

instructional theory or method that captures the char-acteristics of each of the ve theoretical perspectivesoutlined above. Within each perspective there is ampleroom for debate and discussion about the merits of including these theories within a perspective as wellas what other theories and methods might better exem-plify the characteristics. Table 7.4 provides a summaryof the learning theories and instructional theories ormethods used in our discussion.

TABLE 7.4Psychological Perspectives: Exemplars of Associated Learning Theories and Instructional Theoriesor Methods

Psychological Perspective Learning Theory Instruction Theory or Method

Behaviorism Skinners operant conditioning Programmed instruction and computer-aided instruction

Cognitivism Ausubels meaningful reception learning Gagns conditions of learningCognitive constructivism Piagets scheme theory Discovery learningSociocultural/historicism Vygotskys zone of proximal development Reciprocal teaching or scaffoldingSituativity theory Lave and Wenger s legitimate peripheral part icipant Anchored instruction


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CONCLUDING REMARKS

Philosophical perspectives are worldviews that denethe nature of the world, the individual's place in it, andthe possible relationships to that world and its parts.These perspectives form the foundation for any line of inquiry, including those associated with a particular dis-cipline. As such, it is essential before beginning a lineof inquiry or the profession of teaching that individualsexamine their ontological and epistemological commit-ments. In this article, we presented ve main categoriesof psychological perspectives and contrasted them interms of epistemology, ontology, unit of analysis, andwhether they suggested dualist relationships.

In terms of the domain of psychology, we haveseen the emergence of psychological perspectives aris-ing from varying philosophical commitments. It isimportant to acknowledge that philosophies withrespect to epistemological and ontological assump-

tions are not instructional methods and that methodsare not philosophies. It has been argued, however, thatinstructional strategies and methods are clearly inu-enced by the philosophical assumptions and that the-ories of knowing and learning are implicit to theinstructional design (Barab and Duffy, 2000; Duffyand Jonassen, 1991; Reigeluth, 1999b). We nd itinconceivable that a teacher or instructional designerwould advocate a particular lesson or activity withoutat least a tacit theory of how students think and learn.In this article, we have differentiated among philo-sophical perspectives and suggested alignmentsbetween assumptions associated with various perspec-

tives and learning and instructional theories. Obvi-ously, these alignments only scratch the surface andmay not be consistent with those advanced by others;however, we have found these alignments useful in thatthey begin to capture some of the relationships andserve as beginnings for discussion.

We hope this chapter pushes educators to examineand question their ontological and epistemologicalassumptions and whether or not their instructionalpractices are consistent with those assumptions. If there is incongruency between philosophical assump-tions and instructional practices, then, we argue, it isimportant to ask oneself Why the inconsistency? andHow do I best resolve it? We have found this reec-tive practice to be most useful in terms of our ownteaching and research. At times, this has meant chang-ing teaching practices and at other times challengingphilosophical assumptions (see Glaser and Strauss,1967, for a discussion of grounded theory develop-ment). Some educators have advocated for eclecticismin which one draws from various philosophies and

learning and instructional theories depending on thetask at hand (Ertmer and Newby, 1993; Reigeluth,1999b; Sfard, 1998). In spite of the merit of not gettingtrapped and closed-minded, we have found it useful inmoving forward with a research and teaching programto make ontological and epistemological commit-ments. From here, we as researchers and reectivepractitioners can then empirically examine the meritsof such a commitment; that is, we can consider howour theoretical assumptions align with empirical obser-vation and adjust accordingly.

We have noted that the categories and descriptionsforwarded in this article are not hard and fast rules orsocially negotiated truths agreed upon by the commu-nity; rather, they are based on our understandings andon a review and interpretation of the literature and werewritten in the context of this paper. There is no wayto prove, in the conventional positivistic sense, thatone theory is better than another. This is partly becausethe methods one would use to make such argumentsare based on a set of ontological and epistemologicalcommitments as well (Greeno, 1997). As such, weexpect theoretical debates to remain an important prac-tice in the eld. We have aligned our categories withcolleagues in the eld and, at the very least, argue thatmuch of our conjectures are consistent with some of the socially negotiated meanings and inconsistent withothers. But, again, our goal is for this chapter to pro-vide a springboard for discussion and to prompt edu-cators to question the relationships among philosoph-ical assumptions, psychological perspectives, learningand instructional theories, and instructional practice,

not to suggest indisputable facts.

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