‘PHILOPONUS’

On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1-8

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‘PHILOPONUS’On AristotleOn the Soul

3.1-8

Translated by William Charlton

LON DON • NEW DELHI • NEW YORK • SY DN EY

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First published in 2000 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.Paperback edition fi rst published 2014

© 2013 William Charlton (Preface, Richard Sorabji)

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Typeset by Ray DaviesPrinted and bound in Great Britain

The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the Humanities Research Board of the British Academy; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; The Netherlands Organisation for Scientifi c Research (NWO/GW).

Contents

Preface vii

Introduction 1

Textual Emendations 17

Translation 19

Notes 153

English-Greek Glossary 167

Greek-English Index 183

Subject Index 207

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Preface

Richard Sorabji

In On the Soul 3.1-8, Aristotle first discusses the functions common to allfive senses, such as self-awareness, and then moves on to Imagination andIntellect.

This commentary on Aristotle’s text has traditionally been ascribed toPhiloponus, but William Charlton argues that it should be ascribed to alater commentator, Stephanus (the quotation marks used around hisname indicate this disputed authorship). ‘Philoponus’ reports the postula-tion of a special faculty for self-awareness, intended to preserve the unityof the person. He disagrees with ‘Simplicius’, the author of another com-mentary on On the Soul (also available in this series), by insisting thatImagination can apprehend things as true or false, and he disagrees withAristotle by saying that we are not always free to imagine them otherwisethan as they are. On Aristotle’s Active Intellect, ‘Philoponus’ surveysdifferent interpretations, but ascribes to Plutarch of Athens, and rejects,the view adopted by the real Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle’sOn Intellect that we have innate intellectual knowledge from a previousexistence. Instead he takes the view that the Active Intellect enables us toform concepts by abstraction through serving as a model of somethingalready separate from matter. Our commentator further disagrees withthe real Philoponus by denying the Idealistic view that Platonic forms areintellects.

Charlton sees ‘Philoponus’ as the excellent teacher and expositor thatStephanus was said to be. The second half of this commentary (‘Phi-loponus’: On Aristotle On the Soul 9-13) is translated by Charlton in acompanion volume which also includes a translation of Stephanus’ com-mentary on Aristotle On Interpretation.

June 1999 Richard Sorabji

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Introduction

1. The problem of authorship

The commentary on de Anima 3 translated here appears in the manu-scripts as a continuation of commentaries on de Anima I and 2 by JohnPhiloponus. In a later hand, however, in the twelfth-century codexParisinus 1914, and in the fifteenth-century Estensis 3 F 8, it is said tobe ‘from the voice of Stephanus’, and Michael Hayduck in the Prefaceto his 1897 edition attributes it, though with some diffidence, to theStephanus of Alexandria who is the author of a commentary on the deInterpretatione. We have a Latin translation by William de Moerbeke ofa lost Greek commentary on de Anima 3, chapters 4-8 (referred to belowas the de Intellectu) which is generally agreed to be by Philoponus, andwhich is completely different from the commentary on these chaptersin our Greek in de Anima 3. This tells against Philoponus’ authorshipof the latter, though not decisively. For Philoponus could at differenttimes have written two different commentaries on the same work, andif the Greek in de Anima 3 is by someone else, it is a mystery whathappened to that other author’s in de Anima 1 and 2, for the commen-tary on the third book does not begin as if it were a work standing onits own.

Since 1897 the issue has been the subject of a fair amount of discussion.Among those who are substantially of Hayduck’s opinion are:

Raymond Vancourt, Les derniers commentateurs alexandrins d’Aristote.L’école d’Olympiodore. Étienne d’Alexandrie, Lille 1941.

H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries’,Phronesis 31 (1976), reprinted in Aristotle Transformed.

H.J. Blumenthal, ‘John Philoponus and Stephanus of Alexandria: twoNeoplatonic Christian commentators on Aristotle?’ Neoplatonism andChristian Thought, ed. D.J. O’Meara, Albany 1982.

L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, Amster-dam 1962.

Wanda Wolska-Conus, ‘Stephanus d’Athènes et Stephanus d’Alexandrie.Essai d’identification et de biographie’, Revue des Études Byzantines 47(1989).

Mossman Roueché, ‘The definitions of philosophy and a new fragment ofStephanus’, The Philosopher, Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantin-istik 40 (1990).

Among dissentients are:

É. Évrard, L’école d’Olympiodore et la composition du ‘Commentaire à laPhysique’ de Jean Philopon, Ph.D. dissertation, Liège 1957.

W. Bernard, ‘Philoponus on self-awareness’ Philoponus and the Rejectionof Aristotelian Science, ed. R. Sorabji, London and Ithaca NY 1987.

P. Lautner, ‘Philoponus, in de Anima III: quest for an author’, ClassicalQuarterly 42 (1992).

In the Introduction to my translation of the Latin version of the deIntellectu I argue that the author of the Greek commentary on de Anima3, G3 for short, is not Philoponus. To my arguments there I shall add onlyone point. G3 twice refers to observations on the de Anima by Ammonius(473,10; 518,32). The only recorded commentary by Ammonius is the onewritten up by Philoponus. If these references are to Philoponus’ commen-tary, and G3 calls the author of that commentary Ammonius, G3 canhardly himself be Philoponus. But is he Stephanus?

2. Stephanus

Philoponus was a prolific polymath. His surviving commentaries on Aris-totle run to more than three thousand pages of the Commentaria inAristotelem Graeca. He also produced an abundance of works of his own onmedicine, astronomy, cosmology, theology and grammar. For a shortaccount of his life and work, the reader may be referred to RichardSorabji’s chapter ‘John Philoponus’ in Philoponus and the Rejection ofAristotelian Science, ed. R. Sorabji, London 1987. Stephanus, by compari-son, is a shadowy figure. I know of little that has been written about himin English, though there are secondary sources in Latin and French:Hermann Usener, De Stephano Alexandrino Commentatio, Bonn 1880,Kleine Schriften Bd 3, Leipzig 1914, pp. 247-323; and two works citedabove, R. Vancourt, Les derniers Commentateurs, and W. Wolska-Conus,‘Stephanos d’Athènes et Stephanus d’Alexandrie’.

The name Stephanus appears a number of times in sources for thehistory of philosophy in the sixth and seventh centuries. John Moschus(Migne, PG 87 2929d) reports attending lectures by a ‘sophist’ Stephanusin Alexandria between 581 and 584. The ninth-century Syrian authorDionysius Telmahrensis refers to a ‘sophist’ Stephanus who was encoun-tered in Alexandria at about the same time by Probus and John Barburand who held controversial views on the Hypostatic Union (see J.-B.Chabot, Historiae Ecclesiae auctore Dionysio Telmahrensi Fragmentum, inE.W. Brooks, Historia Ecclesiae Zarachariae Rhetori vulgo ascripta, Lou-vain 1953, pp. 151-4; K.-H. Uthemann, ‘Stephanos von Alexandrien undder Konversion des Jacobiten Probus, des späteren Metropoliten vonChalcedon’, in C. Laga, J.A. Munitz and L. van Rompay (eds), After

2 Introduction

Chalcedon. Studies in Theology and Church History. Offered to ProfessorAlbert van Roey for his Seventieth Birthday, Leuven 1985, pp. 381-99.) Theprologue of the seventh-century Theophylact Simocatta to his Historybears witness to a restoration of higher education at Constantinople afterthe death of Phocas in 610, and Usener (op. cit. p. 251) makes theconjecture (accepted by many scholars, including Richard Sorabji in hisGeneral Introduction to the Commentators) that to revive philosophy theEmperor Heraclius summoned Stephanus from the chair of philosophy inAlexandria and gave him an official title, a salary, and a dozen assistants.Certainly in the later years of Heraclius’ reign there was at Constanti-nople a Stephanus of Alexandria who wrote on astronomy, astrology andalchemy. The commentary on the de Interpretatione mentioned above isattributed to a Stephanus in the sole manuscript of it that we possess(Parisinus Graecus 2064) and so is our commentary on de Anima 3 in thetwo manuscripts to which I have referred. Mme Wolska-Conus attributescommentaries on the Categories and Prior Analytics to the author of thede Interpretatione commentary on the basis of his 2,11-12; 30,17; 45,23-4and 54,1-2, and although I do not think that these passages need be takento refer to actually existing commentaries on these works by Stephanus,she assembles evidence of various attributions to a Stephanus of commen-taries not only on them but on the Sophistici Elenchi, the de Caelo andPorphyry’s Isagoge (op. cit. pp. 9-10, notes). Finally commentaries on somemedical works, notably the Prognosticon and Aphorisms of Hippocratesand the Therapeutic of Galen, are attributed to a ‘philosopher’ Stephanuswhom one manuscript (Ambrosianus S 19) calls ‘Stephanus of Athens’.

There is wide consensus that our commentaries on de Anima 3 and thede Interpretatione are by the same man, and that this man is identical withthe writer on astronomy and astrology who was in Constantinople in thetime of Heraclius and who is given in manuscripts referred to by Usener,op. cit. pp. 248-9, as ‘great teacher’, ‘catholic teacher’ and ‘ecumenicalteacher’. Mme Wolska-Conus wants to show that he is identical also withthe Alexandrian sophist of John Moschus and Dionysius Telmahrensis,with the medical Stephanus of Athens, and with Pseudo-Elias, the authorof the commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge formerly attributed, it is nowthought wrongly, to the sixth-century Alexandrian commentator Elias.This single individual, she thinks, came originally from Athens, between580 and 610 lived in Alexandria, where he was called ‘Stephanus ofAthens’, and after 610 lived in Constantinople where he was called‘Stephanus of Alexandria’.

To show that Stephanus of Alexandria and Stephanus of Athens are thesame, she says: ‘Different as are their subject-matters, the medical com-mentaries on Hippocrates and the philosophical commentaries on Aris-totle raise questions in the same manner, have the same formulas forintroducing and closing a discussion, use the same modes of reasoningwith pedantic exact repetitions, both have frequent recourse to the posing

Introduction 3

of problems to which they offer several solutions, and finally reproduceeach other in several places in their teaching and interpretation’ (p. 34).And she illustrates this claim by comparing what is said in the commen-taries on the Prognosticon and on de Anima 3 about sleep, locomotion inanimals and imagination. She also cites a number of passages from thecommentary on de Anima 3 (588,10-12; 452,32-453,1; 462,15-17; 487,9-12;501,1-26; 595,20-2) to show the author’s interest in medicine. While I havenot examined the medical commentaries very thoroughly, my first impres-sion is that the commentary on the Prognosticon, at least, shows the sametraits of personality and style as the in de Anima 3 and the in de Interpre-tatione.

The identification of the commentator on Aristotle with the sophistvisited by John Moschus and the theologian mentioned by Dionysiusseems to me plausible enough, though Mme. Wolska-Conus’ positive evi-dence for it is slight. As to Pseudo-Elias, she claims that Stephanus is theauthor, not only of the commentary on the Isagoge which we possess, butalso of a variant commentary on the same work which is among the sourcesof the Dialogues of Severus bar Sakku (op. cit. p. 69). Unfortunately sheoffers no external evidence for these last identifications. MossmanRoueché (op. cit.) finds a difficulty for them in the inferior philosophicalcapacity revealed in Pseudo-Elias.

Mme Wolska-Conus proposes the following biography for her compositefigure. Stephanus was born in Athens in 550-55, when the city was stillechoing with the philosophy of the closed Platonic school. On completinghis secondary education at the age of seventeen or thereabouts, he went toAlexandria, where Olympiodorus has just been succeeded in the chair ofphilosophy by Elias, and Philoponus, long occupant of the chair of gram-mar, may still have been alive. He followed Philoponus both in the breadthof his interests and in adopting monophysite views, though he laterreturned to the orthodox theological fold. After 610 he removed to Constan-tinople, perhaps summoned by the Emperor as Usener suggested. Hetaught, among others, Tychikos, teacher of the Armenian Ananias ofShirak (whose autobiography is translated by H. Berberian, in Revue desÉtudes Arméniennes 1 (1964), pp. 189-91), and died before 638. This story,though conjectural, seems to me perfectly credible.

Of those who dispute the attribution of in de Anima 3 to Stephanus,Bernard does not offer any arguments, limiting himself to a long scepticalfootnote, but Évrard and Lautner are more expansive.

Évrard points out that the arguments of Hayduck are inconclusive. If,he says, there were differences in doctrine and not just in form betweenthe Greek and the Latin commentaries on de Anima 3, they could not beascribed to the same thinker, but Vancourt has shown there are no suchdifferences. And resemblances of style between in de Anima 3 andStephanus’ in de Interpretatione would have probative force, but no suchresemblances have been identified. Blumenthal in his 1982 article men-

4 Introduction

tioned above and I in my introduction to the de Intellectu try to meet thedemand for differences in doctrine, and I shall speak below about resem-blances in style, but Évrard draws the conclusion that the authorship ofin de Anima 3 remains uncertain.

Lautner’s conclusions are more decisive. Against Stephanus’ author-ship he marshals the following considerations. (1) At 541,24-6 G3 seemsto speak of the pre-existence of the human soul. An Alexandrian Christianof Philoponus’ time could have accepted this doctrine, but Stephanus,writing after Justinian’s edict of 543, and teaching in Constantinople,centre of theological orthodoxy, could not. (2) At 457,24-5 we read: ‘Theunit is not a number, as was demonstrated in the arithmetical discourses.’There is no evidence that Stephanus wrote on arithmetic, as distinct fromastronomy and astrology. (3) G3 alludes to work of Philoponus and Am-monius without mentioning them by name (458,25-6; 481,27-9; 571,17-18;528,35), which shows that he was in close contact with them, to say theleast, whereas Stephanus at in de Interpretatione 5,13; 21,38; 66,1 and67,17 refers to Ammonius by name or as ‘our teacher’. (4) Blumenthalargues that G3 is other than Philoponus on the ground that he refers moreoften to other commentators by name than does the author of in de Anima1-2. If G3 is Stephanus, ‘why do we not find any sign of this attitude in hisin de Interpretatione as well?’ (p. 515) These ‘items of evidence’, Lautnersays, ‘are perhaps sufficient to establish that Stephanus cannot be theauthor of the in De Anima 3’. Furthermore, (5) G3 postulates a pneumaticbody in which the common sense-ability resides (481,18-20; 482,11-12); thesame doctrine appears in Philoponus’ commentary, 52,6; 158,7-34; 161,19-21; 201,31; 433,34-5. Lautner concludes that G3 is either Philoponushimself or a pupil of Philoponus other than Stephanus.

I am not convinced. Talk of pneumatic body (5) is not peculiar toPhiloponus; it pervades Neoplatonic commentaries (for some references,see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentar-ies’, in Richard Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Transformed, London 1990, pp.310-11), and the whole Alexandrian school was influenced by Neoplaton-ism. At 541,24-6 (1) the pre-existence of the soul appears as somethingpresupposed not by G3 but by unnamed difficulty-raisers. The referenceat 457,24-5 (2) may be to Aristotle’s Metaphysics 14, not to some latertreatise. (3) Similarly 458,25-6; 481,27-9; 571,17-18 and 528,35 need notrefer to anyone beyond Aristotle. (Incidentally ‘our teacher’ in in deInterpretatione 5.13 is surely contrasted with Ammonius.) (4) Stephanus’commentary on the de Interpretatione contains plenty of references toother writers by name: Theophrastus, Galen, Iamblichus, Porphyry, Pro-clus and, as Lautner himself observes, Ammonius.

Evrard and Lautner are right that we cannot say that G3 is theStephanus responsible for our in de Interpretatione, simply on the groundthat both divide their commentaries in Divisions (tmêmata) and Lectures(praxeis), and both employ the technique of double exposition, first a

Introduction 5

continuous exposition (theôria) of a substantial length of text, and thencomments on particular gobbets of this text (lexis). These practices go backto Philoponus if not to Ammonius, and seem to be standard in Alexandriafrom the time of Olympiodorus (head of the philosophy school roughly from540 to 565). But I think that anyone who reads the two commentaries inGreek will, like Hayduck, feel there is a strong similarity of personal style.The in de Interpretatione is said to be ‘from the voice of Stephanus’. Thismeans that it is written by someone who attended his lectures, not byStephanus himself, and the in de Anima is given a similar proximatesource. We do not know at what speed the lectures were delivered. C.Hignett used not only to dictate his lectures on Greek History in the Hallof Hertford College, Oxford, but to walk up and down between the tablesto make sure everyone was taking him down correctly. It must not bethought that unless lecturers at Alexandria did likewise, no inferences canbe drawn from style. Even if a lecturer speaks fast, some idiosyncrasies ofvocabulary and sentence-structure are likely to be preserved in notes, andthe general cast of the lecturer’s mind ought to come through.

Perhaps the most prominent trait of G3 is a liking for order and clarity.This appears in several ways. He tells us what he is going to do before hedoes it, sometimes sketching the plan of a theôria in advance, and impos-ing a tight structure on texts that in themselves are loose or discursive(477,23-31, 506,20-507,9; 553,22-4; 594,27-32), and he also tells us whenhe has finished doing something he has been engaged in – ‘that is theproblem’ he will say, having stated it, and ‘that is the solution’ e.g.448,29-30 and 449,6; 455,18 and 455,25). He lists and numbers points(kephalaia, 534,20-535,1), problems (aporiai), differentiations (diakriseis,494-6), arguments (epikheirêmata), things had in common (koinôniai509,9; 516,22-517,3), pleas (sunêgoriai, 563,22-564,18) and so forth. Heprovides ‘divisions’ (diaireseis), systematic classifications of things thatfall under concepts, of cognition (gnôsis) 490,20-34, the indivisible(adiaireton) 544,4-15, imagination (phantasia) 589,35-590,4, cf. 500,23-5.No doubt he used the work of predecessors for these divisions (see, e.g.,Sophonias 116,30-117,36, possibly preserving Philoponus), but he prob-ably made them neater and shows a strong taste for them. And we haveexplicit remarks like these: ‘Such is the whole problem, but because of thelack of clarity, let us go over it again briefly’ (527,18-19). ‘We raised certainother matters in the theôria but since we looked at them superficially itseems best to take up the discussion again. It is better to cover the sameground twice than to miss anything out’ (570,5-7). ‘See how, though thetext looks like a single continuum, we have cut it into four proofs’ (582,27-9). As it happens, de Anima 3 contains some of the least clear chapters inAristotle. The whole section on the intellect (chapters 4-8) is extremelydifficult, and modern readers despair of finding a consecutive train ofthought in chapters 6 and 7, but regard them as collections of jottings. The

6 Introduction

regimentation which G3 imposes on them in the theôriai 542,21-547,22;553,19-556,7 and 562,18-563,7 is truly impressive.

Of a piece with this enthusiasm for clarity and order is a fondness forlogic. There is a logical digression at 590,17-20. He readily uses logicalterminology like lêmma (‘assumption’ 474,16), sunêmmenon (‘conditionalproposition’ 447,20 etc.), prosdiorismos (literally ‘further differentiation’,i.e. ‘quantifier’ 476,3-4). He makes frequent use of the tactic of casting anargument into fairly rigorous syllogistic form: so 447,16-19; 485,25-9;487,21-2; 494,19-22; 496,29-497,2; 500,12-17; 502,10-12; 579,25-6; 580,1-3;586,20-2; 590,22-4; 593,26-8; 603,2-12; 603,28-604,2. Occasionally hestates a syllogism that is plainly fallacious, e.g. 603,29-30, but there is noreason to think he is unaware of the fallacy.

Next, G3 likes direct speech. His commentary is peppered with thewords ‘look!’ and ‘see!’ (idou, hora). He presents the debate on whether theheavenly bodies have sense-perception (597,2-598,6) almost as a dialogue.He apostrophises Aristotle (464,13; 563,27.34), Alexander of Aphrodisias(471,2; 537,19; 537,33-4), Empedocles (487,25), Marinus (537,19), Plato(575,1) and an unnamed objector (526,2), and he makes Empedocles(452,7) and Homer (486,23) address Aristotle. This produces a pleasant airof briskness and vivacity.

These three traits contribute to making a good teacher, and so does G3’stendency to make a meal of what is readily intelligible, and keep awayfrom conceptual morasses. He deals briefly and firmly (note especially535,1-2) with the notoriously difficult chapter 5; he explains with limpidclarity (576,8-577,32) why purposive movement cannot be due to thepowers of the vegetable soul, but not how it can be due to the soul at all;and he lingers affectionately on such intriguing but slightly unphilosophi-cal topics as heavenly bodies (595,33-598,6), zoophytes (600,13-601,3), thelethal potentialities of various kinds of sense-object (602,7-20, cf. 472,4-20,476,18-25) and the psychology of animals (488,34-489,6, 496 27-497,10),but avoids confusing us with such questions as how Aristotle can hold thatthe intellect comes to be identical with the objects of thought. 564,25-565,6skirts delicately round the hard sayings at 431b21-4. If he had set anexamination on de Anima 3 for his pupils, even the dimmest of themshould have got good marks. Could this be why the titles associated withthe name Stephanus (see Usener, op. cit. pp. 248-9) speak of him as ateacher and not just as a philosopher?

A final personal trait I think we can discern is an interest in grammar.He uses words like ‘hyperbaton’ (514,16; 531,1; 548,28; 568,11; 606,1) andmakroapodotos (‘with the main clause long delayed’, 582,32) which wouldstartle a philosophical audience in the English-speaking world today, andsee 474,34-475,5; 475,29-476,7; 490,15-16.

To turn to more linguistic points, G3’s Greek seems to me easier andmore transparent than that of other ancient commentators on the deAnima, and it has certain idosyncrasies. He likes adverbs which are fairly

Introduction 7

uncommon formations from nouns or adjectives, and might be comparedwith the ‘-wise’ formations that were popular some years ago, for instance:anupokritôs, holikôs kai kosmikôs, holotelôs, kentrikôs, morphôtikôs,horikôs, spermatikôs, toioutotropôs, tupôtikôs. He also likes unusual com-pound verbs: anakhlizein, katamathêmatikeuein, kuriolektein, pareistrek-hein, prokharattein, prophantazesthai, prothesaurizein, sunupakouein,hupainittesthai. The words dusthêratos, laburinthôdês, homokhronos,philenklêmôn, têlaugôs, are also characteristic of him. He uses the wordexôthen, literally ‘from outside’, to say that an argument is taken fromoutside Aristotle’s works: 503,9; 525,25; 526,29; 578,6; 578,34; 583,6.When he wants to say that Aristotle attends to a point later he usesparakatiôn; 493,24; 519,6; 519,13; 522,7; 563,12. He favours the wordgumnazein for trying out or setting out an argument, 463,34; 467,15;472,21-7; 480,20-4; 481,8, and also likes to flag porismata, ‘corollaries’:470,19; 472,4(bis); 475,9; 475,11; 475,14; 476,8; 547,15; 566,20. Someconstructions are conspicuous too. ‘Whence is it clear?’ pothen dêlon, heoften asks, that something claimed is in fact the case: 447,23; 450,4; 450,6;454,13-14; 494,30; 496,28; 496,32; 497,2; 603,5; 603,8. He often introducesa further reason for something with the words ‘and because’, kai hoti:478,11; 483,7; 519,5; 535,24; 535,26; 537,21; 546,22; 571,8; 573,2; 575,31;577,37; 578,10; 578,20; 591,18; 596,3-4; 601,30, cf. 584,15.

G3’s love of order and clarity is conspicuous in Stephanus’ in de Inter-pretatione. Stephanus sketches the plan for a coming theôria at 24,13-18,39,28-32 and 53,4-10. He likes numbering sections, reasons, arguments,proofs etc., and telling us when he has come to the end of each, for example26,21-32; 31,12-26; 34,34-5; 63,22-65,26. We are given ‘divisions’ of predi-cates (11,9-21), of sentences (17,29-18,3), of kinds of potentiality (61,8-21).The pat lists of things from which it is clear that names are not naturaland of things signified by onoma (9,27-9; 11,26-8) recall G3’s list of waysin which an opinion can come unstuck at 502,27-33. Aristotle is told whathe ought to have said at 60,1 in tones like those of G3 at 451,7-15.

A commentator on the de Interpretatione may be assumed to have someinterest both in logic and in grammar. Stephanus, however, shows particu-lar affinity with G3 in setting out arguments with syllogistic rigour (e.g.1,15-17; 15,29-30; 67,35-68,2) and in raising certain gratuitous linguisticpoints, for instance at 23,37-24,6 (on the lack of a word antiprotasis, withwhich we may compare 474,32-475,5) and 26,35-27,9. He also thinks itworthwhile to point out a difference between the usage of philosophers andthat of grammarians at 12,9-13, and between the interests of grammariansand rhetoricians at 19,3-6.

The de Interpretatione does not provide much opportunity for enlargingon unphilosophical topics (though a dry text does not prevent theStephanus who commented on Hippocrates’ Prognosticon from telling along, racy story about Antiochus’ love for his stepmother at 58,21-62,5); butStephanus shows himself pupil-friendly by the amount of space he gives

8 Introduction

to determining the full number of formally different propositions that arepossible at 24,37-25,39, 39,32-40,17 and 54,13-55,22 and by his enthusi-asm for tables; he offers three tables of modal propositions, where no oneelse provides more than two. We hear little about animals, but camelsappear as an example at 10,11, as they do at 450,7.

The in de Interpretatione does not reveal the free use of apostrophe soconspicuous in the in de Anima 3 but that should rather be counted adifference in literary style than an indication of a difference in the author’spersonality. We have the occasional idou (14,39; 25,16 etc.) and othertraces of plain speaking, e.g. ‘But that is not true’ (21,32).

The two commentaries show linguistic similarities, but these are lim-ited. Hayduck in his Preface to the in de Anima (p. v) says: ‘Whereas in thefirst two books Philoponus’ painstaking verbosity (verbosia industria) iseverywhere apparent, there is peculiar to the third book a certain ascetic,attenuated conciseness (ieiuna quaedam et exilis brevitas).’ This does notseem to me an apt description of in de Anima 3; I think Mme Wolska Conusis nearer the mark when she speaks of ‘pedantic exact repetitions’ (‘dessymmetries pédantes et répétitives’); and I suspect Hayduck was applyingto the in de Anima 3 the impression he received from the in de Interpreta-tione which is indeed closely pruned, especially in comparison with thecommentary on the same book by Ammonius. The in de Interpretatione isconsiderably more concise than the in de Anima. The lectures (praxeis) areless than half the length. But this may well be because it was taken downby a different student who preferred to be concise. (Mme Wolska-Conusventures the surmise that students at Constantinople were not of the samecalibre as students at Alexandria; if that is right, one might assign the inde Anima to Alexandria, and the in de Interpretatione to Constantinople.)

But although the in de Interpretatione differs from the in de Anima 3 inthese ways, there is not such a dearth of stylistic resemblances as wouldconstitute a reason for thinking it has a different source. We have pothendêlon questions at 5,16; 35,9; 66,29 and 67,34. Stephanus uses parakatiônat 3,6; 16,25; 18,27; 20,1; 21,35; 30,38; 43,13; gumnazein at 44,18; 45,8;64,35-65,1; 67,28. He begins a sentence kai hoti at 3,9, and derives aporisma at 32,25. Considerations drawn from outside Aristotle’s works arecalled exôthen (34,34; 36,9). There are some noticeable compounds, e.g.sunupakouein (19,17), prosupakouein (13,32; 19,16), arkhoeidesteros(13,33), aperilêptos kai akatalêptos (53,15) and (a word that caughtStephanus’ eye in Ammonius) dusantibleptotatos (66,7-8).

The de Interpretatione and de Anima 3 are so different in subject matterthat one cannot expect to find in commentaries on them many significantagreements or disagreements in philosophical doctrine. It may be worth-while, however, to note that imagination, which according to Philoponus(de Intellectu 61,84-5; 62,9-63,23) impedes contemplation of God and isgenerally a nuisance, is given an important role in acquiring knowledge ofGod by G3, at 563,38-564,14, and by Stephanus at 35,27-8; and Stephanus,

Introduction 9

though a Christian, shares (38,29-30) G3’s realism about universals,mentioned below.

While I must repeat Hayduck’s warning that from these things a certainconjecture cannot be made (certam ex his rebus de illo scriptore coniec-turam capi non posse), I personally am persuaded that G3 is the Stephanusof the in de Interpretatione, and will take the liberty of referring to him asStephanus below.

3. The in de Anima 3

It is difficult for scholars today to imagine what academic life was like inthe sixth and seventh centuries. In Britain, perhaps, it was non-existent.Stephanus was a contemporary of St Augustine of Canterbury, and thesociety which Bede describes Augustine as finding in Kent was certainlynot one in which commentaries on Aristotle were in high demand. Howdifferent things must have been in Alexandria. For nearly nine hundredyears it had been the greatest centre of higher education in the world.Endowed by the Ptolemys with its Library and Museum, it had includedamong its teachers Euclid, Aristarchus the astronomer and his namesakethe grammarian, and among its pupils Archimedes and Galen. It hadfounded geometry, edited the classics, and measured the Sun and theMoon. Under the Roman Empire it became famous first for Jewish andthen for Christian theology: the home of Philo and Origen, the see ofAthanasius and Cyril. But by the sixth century the fires seem to have beenburning low, both in Alexandria and in Greece, and in Alexandria theywere destined to be finally and violently extinguished when the city fell tothe Arabs in 640.

Stephanus was perhaps the last senior scholar of Alexandria. The in deAnima 3 gives us a view, as through a narrow window, of a world in whichthere is no presentiment of impending disaster, but something of a sunsetatmosphere. An intense conservatism prevails. Literary quotations aremostly from Homer, and never from anyone later than Euripides. And asthere might have been no literature in the last thousand years, so historymight have stood still. There is no mention of any historical event after thetime of Plato or reference to any social or political institution, such as theRoman Empire, the Byzantine civil service, or the Christian Church, thatwas unknown to the fourth century BC (being dragged to court, 582,18-19was a classical phenomenon). Stephanus often discusses other commenta-tors from Alexander of Aphrodisias onwards, and takes issue with them ina way recognisably similar to that in which a modern writer takes issuewith rival interpretations. But about what lies outside the limits of theprofessional study of Plato and Aristotle, his lips are sealed.

This conservatism shows itself particularly in the examples, as if therewere a strong preference for examples that had been used many timesbefore, and a convention not to seek examples outside certain areas. When

10 Introduction

there is a moral conflict, with reason advocating one course and passion,or the lower side of our nature, another, the only thing that passion findspleasant is sex (560,5-6; 576,12); the other deadly sins are all eclipsed bylust; and the sole object of lust envisaged is a prostitute (pornê, 583,26;590,14). The only alternative attractions reason can offer are philosophytutorials and prayer (590,14; 579,4; cf. also 555,19-20; 562,13-14). There isno mention of politics or commerce as possible fields of moral conflict, andonly a brief and unrealistic mention of war (578,15-16). If Stephanus hadbeen lecturing to clerical students at a seminary, this narrow range ofexamples might have seemed appropriate, but I suspect that showing acloser knowledge of the world would have been thought undignified in aphilosopher. The most a philosopher could do was to modify an example tosuit his auditors; if you wanted an example of forethought and delibera-tion, making a coat to protect onself against the cold (Sophonias 142,20-5)might be less convincing for Egyptians than contructing a roof to shelterfrom the sun (585,8-13).

The tradition of the Alexandrian school was Neoplatonist (for detailedjustification of this statement, see essays 1, 13 and 14 in Aristotle Trans-formed), and although Stephanus himself was a Christian, his departuresfrom Neoplatonism are minimal. He retains, for instance, the Neoplatonicdoctrine that we have three bodies, one ‘of luminous form’ (597,18), one ofpneuma (481,20) and one earthy or shell-like (482,12). Westerink says(Aristotle Transformed, p. 340): ‘he accepts unquestioningly the authorityof Christian dogma and of the Bible’, but the passages he cites do notprovide strong support for these claims. To show Stephanus’ unquestion-ing acceptance of Christian dogma, he refers us to 527,29-32, which runs:‘But since that God is intellect is the view neither of Plato nor of piousdoctrines [eusebesi dogmasin] – for God is superior to intellect, for whichreason he is also called ‘Providence’ [pronoia], as coming before intellect,– come, let us resolve the problem in another way.’ The unquestioningacceptance of the authority of the Bible is supposed to appear from547,11-14: ‘That is why it is said “He said, and it came to be”. But thissaying [logion] may be interpreted in two ways: what he knows, he alsosays, and this also comes about [sc. we have three independent facts]; orbecause his activity is all at once, and that is why it is said “He said, andit came to be”.’ Westerink is also a little misleading when he says (ibid.)that the ‘old tenets’ of the eternity of the world and the fifth substance, thepre-existence of the human soul, and the rationality of the heavenly bodies‘continue to reappear’ in him; he certainly does not commit himself to theirtruth. Westerink is right, however, that ‘there is no attempt at a wholesalerevision of the traditional material from a Christian point of view’ andStephanus seems happy to accept a Neoplatonic psychology with threebodies, a heavenly, a spiritual or pneumatic and a material or shell-like,and a division of the soul that attaches sense and imagination to thepneumatic body. He also seems to take a Neoplatonically realistic view of

Introduction 11

universals, whether transcendent (467,3, cf. in de Interpretatione 38,29-30) or in re (481,14).

But although Stephanus’ Christian beliefs do not have much obviouseffect on his philosophy, the passages in which he reveals them, e.g.528,13; 536,11-13; 537,26-7; 538,19-21; 545,27; 547,9-11; 586,5; 587,11, histalk of the Creator (for whom he uses the Platonic term ‘demiurge’,dêmiourgos, 474,2 etc.) of divine illumination (486,38), and divine Provi-dence (564,1), contribute to our picture of philosophy in the sixth andseventh centuries. They show that it was being done by people close intheir view of the world to philosophers of the mediaeval West and tophilosophers today who adhere to their ancestors’ faith. Such latter daybelievers will find it easier to imagine themselves in the same pew withStephanus than with Philoponus or any earlier philosopher who fails tomake it into Migne. A certain credulity about astrology (attested by 526,36as well as by the treatise for Timotheus) only brings him closer to ourfin-de-siècle croyants.

We see, then, first in Alexandria and then in Constantinople, a man ofclassical education and Christian beliefs, with little to say about the rougherside of secular life, but a good teacher. He is scrupulously loyal and warmlydevoted to the academic tradition in which he is schooled; well read in theliterature of his subject; a master of the formal logic and the linguistics of hisday. If we think of him as trying to give a course on de Anima 3 which willleave his pupils with some clear ideas about it and enable them to impress anexternal examiner, we may judge that he has done an excellent job.

Of course, that is a highly anachronistic view. What if we enquire intohis originality, or ask what fresh insights he offers into the philosophicalproblems which Aristotle discusses in de Anima 3? He is certainly capableof being critical; he mounts spirited defences, for instance, of Empedoclesand Homer against Aristotle’s attacks at 486,6-487,5, and puts Aristotleright about imagination at 488,21-30. The founder of the Lyceum is owednursling’s dues (450,20; 467,4), not slavish assent. And if not the origina-tor, he is a lucid and forceful expositor of an idea which is absent fromclassical philosophy but appealing to the heirs of Descartes and Locke, theidea that we are conscious of the functioning of our senses by a specialattentive faculty, prosektikon, an intellectual capacity for reflecting orturning in (epistrophê) on ourselves (464,30-467,12).

4. The in de Interpretatione

The de Interpretatione was a popular text in sixth-century Alexandria.Besides the commentary of Stephanus we have that of Ammonius (towhich I refer, by page and line of Busse’s 1897 CAG edition, simply as‘Ammonius’), fragments of a commentary by Olympiodorus, and most of ananonymous commentary, the two last edited by Leonardo Tarán under thetitle Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, Meisen-

12 Introduction

heim 1978. In the Supplementary Preface to his edition of Ammonius,Busse describes a second anonymous commentary, apparently later indate but still representing the Alexandrian tradition, which survives inmanuscript but has not been printed, and Philoponus and Elias appear tohave written commentaries which are now lost.

Tarán’s anonymous commentator resembles Stephanus in making ex-tremely free use of Ammonius, and also in being much briefer thanAmmonius, writing in a simple, direct style. He is, in fact, clearer and lessambitious philosophically than Stephanus. He is independent ofStephanus; at 16,12-15 (Tarán), for instance, he uses material aboutAchilles from Ammonius 63,10-13 which is missing from the parallelStephanus 16,1-12. And he does not agree with Stephanus on any of thepoints which Stephanus makes against, or independently of, Ammonius.

Athough Stephanus refers to Ammonius by name only at 5,13; 21,38;66,1 and 67,17, he depends heavily upon him, even helping himself tofelicitous turns of phrase like suntomias erastês, ‘enamoured of brevity’(12,32, taken from Ammonius 47,21; the Anonymous Commentator fan-cied it too: see Tarán 103,5). Hayduck in his Preface to his 1885 CAGedition goes so far as to say: ‘He brings forward hardly anything that is notexpounded more carefully and copiously (diligentius et uberius) by Am-monius’ (p. vi). A more sympathetic editor might have said that Ammoniusbrings forward hardly anything of value that is not more clearly andconcisely expounded by Stephanus. In fact, though Stephanus omits a fairamount of material in Ammonius, he also provides material Ammoniusdoes not. Tarán (p. ix) mentions 12,1-6, where he refers to Galen. Thefollowing are other passages I have noticed in which he goes his own way.

5,13-19: rejection of Ammonius’ distinction between gramma and stoik-heion.

12,9-13: difference between grammarians and philosophers in their use ofptôsis.

17,17-28: solution to the question whether ‘statement’ is univocal orequivocal in terms of ‘focal meaning’.

19,13-21: definition of a sixth form of sentence, additional to declarative,interrogative etc.

22,9-11: Aristotle needs a small preliminary assumption (lêmmation) forhis account of contradiction.

23,38-24,6: why no word antiprotasis?35,34-36,8: divine foreknowledge and the problem of evil.47,17-50,3; 57,15-21; 65,27-32; 68,5-9: attempt to demolish the distinction

between ‘is-not a just man’ (simple denial) and ‘is a not-just man’(assertion from transposition).

63,12-66,34: various amendments to Ammonius’ treatment of the argu-ments in de Interpretatione, ch. 14.

67,17-27: the definite article and the universal quantifier.

Introduction 13

Stephanus also does some discreet depaganising. He never refers, asAmmonius does, for instance, at 38,27-39,2 to gods in the plural, ormentions oracles as Ammonius does at 135,3-7 and 137,12-23, and whenshowing how language is conventional he omits the religious and sexualmaterial in Ammonius 35,21-36,21. Stephanus’ contribution, mentionedjust now, to the problem about future contingents, would hardly have beenpossible for a pagan: ‘If the Divine knows that a human being is going todo something, in the case of the good it is reasonable not to prevent it. Butwhy not in the case of the evil? For instance if it knows that the infant isgoing to be a sorceror, a scourge, a murderer. Can the Divine prevent it ornot? To say “It cannot” is most impious. So it can. But if it can prevent it,but does not wish to, that is characteristic of someone malevolent andmaleficent. To this we say that the Creator has given self-determinationfor the sake of future goods.’ Vancourt says of his Christianity ‘certainlyon reading the commentary on the de Interpretatione one could not divineit’ (p. 29); I find this surprising.

Readers will judge for themselves how far, when Stephanus departsfrom Ammonius, he carries them with him. Two points of difference maybe mentioned between him and a modern writer on the topics in the deInterpretatione. First, when he wants to prove a logical theorem – to prove,say, that one proposition is logically equivalent to another or that oneproposition is not the negation of another – he never tries to do this bynatural deduction from axioms: his method is always to give examples toshow that the propositions are true or false together. See, for instance,27,15-34; 31,11-20 and, most notably, 47,33-49,2. This apparently rigor-ously extensional approach relies on the notion of a ‘materiality’, see 22,23and note and 53,3-7, which is a kind of modality de re.

Secondly, he never uses symbols, and though variables were availablein his time, he had no perspicuous means of indicating scope. This affectshis treatment of the problem of future contingents. The Alexandriansolution of this problem, the solution which appears if we put Ammonius152,33-155,8, the Anonymous Commentator 64,7-66,15 and Stephanustogether, is that while necessarily (if p then p) it is not the case that if pthen necessarily p; and while necessarily (either we shall reap or we shallnot reap) it is not the case either that we shall necessarily reap or that weshall necessarily not reap. They express this, however, very awkwardly.The Anonymous Commentator speaks of disjuncts neither of which isnecessarily true or necessarily false as true or false ‘indefinitely’ (aoristôs,67,1-2; though perhaps he means only, like Ammonius 139,14-15, thattruth and falsehood are divided in an indefinite way between them,1 notthat they are possessed in an indefinite way).2 And all three writers try tomake the point in terms of a distinction between what is necessary simply,haplôs, and what is necessary hypothetically, ex hupotheseôs. They saythat (where p is a proposition in the ‘materiality’ of the contingent), if p isthe case, then hypothetically necessarily p. This terminology is particu-

14 Introduction

larly unfortunate because Aristotle himself uses ‘necessary hypothetically’not for what is implied or entailed by something, but for what is necessaryif some benefit is to be achieved or evil to be averted. If your sister fallsoverboard it may be necessary hypothetically to dive in after her: notbecause ‘She fell’ implies ‘You dive’, but because your diving is necessaryif she is not to drown or be devoured by aquatic carnivores. Aristotle’shypothetical necessity is a moral or practical necessity.

The absence of means of indicating scope may also be responsible forthe dubious argument of 47,17-49,12, see my note to 47,25. And it is veryapparent in the examples of propositions of various kinds given in theappendix. Hayduck says that this appendix is not by Stephanus, becausethe positioning of the negative ‘not’ is often inconsistent with what is laiddown in the body of the commentary (p. viii). In my notes I say that theGreek is ambiguous, and can be taken to conform with Stephanus’ canons.The ambiguity could be removed if there were a way of showing whetherthe scope of a negative is a proposition or a part of a proposition.

I should like to record my gratitude to Henry Blumenthal, Paolo Criv-elli, Peter Lautner, and the galaxy of anonymous commentators who havevetted parts of my translation in a most helpful and constructive spirit; toSylvia Berryman, who has been far more than a copy editor and to whomI owe many corrections and improvements; and to the patient and tactfulEditor in Chief, whose Olympian overview of the whole field of ancientcommentary on Aristotle and Plato is always at the service of contributors.

Notes

1. i.e. that while one is true and the other false, it is not determined (hôrismenon)in advance which is which. I take it that this is not a solution, but something agood solution should entitle us to say.

2. Mario Mignucci in ‘Ammonius’ sea battle’ (Ammonius on Aristotle On Inter-pretation 9 with Boethius on Aristotle On Interpretation 9, translated by DavidBlank and Norman Kretzmann, London and Ithaca NY 1998, pp. 53-86), claimsthat Ammonius too thinks that of ‘We shall reap’ and ‘We shall not reap’ one isindefinitely true and one indefinitely false. He has to work hard to make the notionsof indefinite truth and falsehood intelligible, and I do not think Ammonius’ textforces us to attribute them to him.

SiglaIn de Anima 3

Text: Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Vol. 15, see Hayduck below.D: Codex Parisinus Graecus 1914.Hayduck: Michael Hayduck, Joannis Philoponi in Aristotelis de Anima libros

commentaria, Berlin 1897.OCT: Aristotelis de Anima, ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1956.Philoponus, de Intellectu: Jean Philopon, commentaire sur le de Anima d’Aris-

tote, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, ed. G. Verbeke, Louvain 1966.

Introduction 15

Ross: Aristotle, de Anima, ed. Sir David Ross, Oxford, Clarendon 1961.Sophonias: Sophoniae in de Anima paraphrasis, ed. M. Hayduck, CAG 23.1,

Berlin 1883.t: Commentaria in Aristotelis de Anima, ed. Victor Trincavellus, 1535Themistius, in de Anima paraphrasis, ed. R. Heinze, CAG 5.3, Berlin 1899.

In de Interpretatione

Text: Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Vol. 18.3, see Hayduck below.Ackrill: J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle’s Categories and de Interpretatione, translated

with notes, Oxford 1963.Ammonius: Ammonius in de Interpretatione, ed. A. Busse, CAG 4.5, Berlin 1897.Anon: Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle’s de Interpretatione (Codex Paris-

inus Graecus 2064), ed. L. Tarán, Meisenheim 1978.Hayduck: Michael Hayduck, Stephanus in librum de Interpretatione, Berlin

1885.OCT: Aristotelis Categoriae et liber de Interpretatione, ed. L. Minio-Paluello,

Oxford 1949.P: Codex Parisinus Graecus 2064

16 Introduction

Textual Emendations

450,28 Reading sumbebaiousthai for sumbolaiôsasthai458,25 Deleting interrogation mark in Hayduck (which is not in t)460,26-7 The quotation marks here, omitted by Hayduck, are present in t462,20 Reading dusgnôstotera for dusgnôsta, as Hayduck suggests466,33 Reading epanalabôn for enapolabôn466,34 Punctuating before nun as Wolfgang Bernard suggests469,32 Reading legontos for legontes470,14 Correcting tês to tou 472,4 Reading sunêgageto for eisêgageto473,27 Reading akoên, which, as Hayduck says, has dropped out483,30 Reading toutesti asômatos for esti sômati486,6 Reading mêtin for aisthêsin, as Hayduck suggests492,9 Reading hautê for autê with the OCT492,10 Reading hautê for autê and phantasian before legô493,4 Reading akontes for hekontes497,9 Reading prosklisei instead of prosklêsei, as Hayduck suggests531,21 Reading to euthu tou euthei einai for to euthu einai following

Hayduck538,6 Reading graphei with D instead of grapheiôi544,8-9 Accepting Hayduck’s insertion of ê kai dunamei kai energeiâi

amerês548,10 Rejecting Hayduck’s unnecessary insertion of oion 560,11 Retaining the MSS’ krustalloeidê in place of Hayduck’s emen-

dation en tôi 564,31 gar is inserted by Hayduck568,24 Inserting ê after enuloi as Hayduck suggests568,28 Reading trita in place of tria

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‘Philoponus’On Aristotle

On the Soul 3.1-8Translation

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[Concerning Soul Book III]

[FIRST DIVISION]

[LECTURE 1]

424b22-4 That there is no sense1 besides the five, by these Imean sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch, one might beassured from the following.

Having directed his labours in the foregoing to the vegetative andnon-rational souls, now he wants to speak to us of the rational soultoo, and to enquire after its substance and powers and the featuresthat differentiate its powers from one another, and from the superiorpowers of the non-rational soul. He enquires what differentiatesimagination and opinion from thought and thought from intellect. Foropinion, though a power of the rational soul, seems to have somethingin common with the common sense and with imagination; and on thataccount he enquires what differentiates them. So the aim of thepresent work remains to discuss the rational soul. The aim in thepresent book is not, as some think, to complete the discussion of thenon-rational soul. For even if he makes mention of the common senseand the imagination, it is not that he has this as his principal aim,but it is in order that he may present the features that differentiatethe powers of the rational soul from those of the non-rational, it is forthat purpose that he mentions the non-rational soul. So the aim ofthe whole book is to treat of the rational soul and not at all of thenon-rational.

But those who like to find faults raise a problem here. They saythat in that case he ought to have discussed only imagination andcommon sense; he should not have continued to discuss sense too;whereas in fact we see that at the beginning of the book he immedi-ately speaks of the number of senses, enquiring if they are five ormore. There was no need to do that enquiry now if he really intendedonly to make mention of the superior powers of the non-rational soulwith a view to setting out what differentiates them from the lesserpowers of the rational. For the superior powers of secondary sub-stances always have something in common with, some relation to, theinferior powers of primary substances, as happens, indeed, here. Thesuperior powers of the non-rational such as common sense and

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imagination have something in common with opinion, which is thelowest of all the rational powers.

That is the problem. We shall meet it by saying that even if hemakes mention of the five senses, he does not do this for no purpose,but lest anyone should think that there is some sense other than theparticular ones which discerns the sense-objects of the five senses.For if he did not now show that there are five senses only and neithermore nor less, perhaps someone would think that there are not onlyfive but another sixth particular sense which discerns at the sametime objects of sight, hearing and smell, and there is no need of acommon sense. In order, then, that no one should suppose this, onthis account he now shows that there are five senses only, and thatwhich discerns them is not another particular sense, so there is a needfor the common sense. So even if he does enquire into the number ofthe senses, it is not for the sake of the senses themselves that he doesthis, but for the sake of the common sense. And he makes mention ofcommon sense and imagination not for their own sake but for the sakeof what differentiates them from the rational powers. So we mayconclude that the aim is still to discuss the rational soul.

That is the aim. He shows, then, from the very beginning that thereare only five senses, using the following hypothetical syllogism. Hesays this: if there were a sense missing, there would be a sense-organmissing too; but there is no sense-organ missing; so neither is therea sense missing. That is the demonstration. But since the conditionalpremiss is disputable (for why, in reality, if there were a sensemissing, would there be a sense-organ missing too?), and the minorpremiss which says ‘but there is no sense-organ missing’, so neitheris there a missing sense, is disputable too (for what makes it clear ifthere is no sense-organ missing?) come, let us demonstrate both, theconditional premiss and the minor.

First we shall demonstrate the conditional which says that if asense is missing, a sense-organ is missing too. We demonstrate thisby three arguments. This is the first. A sense and a sense-organ arerelatives. For a sense perceives through a sense-organ, and a sense-organ is an organ of a sense. But if two things are relatives, as one is,so is the other. Clearly, therefore, if a sense is missing, a sense-organis missing too, by the necessity that governs relatives. That is the firstargument.

Second argument. The sense is something that uses, and thesense-organ is what is used, if it is not going to be to no purpose. Soif a sense is missing, a sense organ is missing too, unless it is to nopurpose, which would be absurd, since it is absurd to say that naturemakes anything to no purpose. That is the second argument.

Third argument. Senses can never intuit sense-objects immedi-ately; they always intuit them through sense-organs as intermediar-

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22 Translation

ies. Where there is a sense, then, there is every need for a sense-organthrough which the sense intuits its sense-objects. If a sense is miss-ing, then, clearly there is also missing a sense-organ through whichthe sense intuits the sense objects. These, then, are the argumentsthat establish the conditional premiss.

Let us next add those that establish the minor. These are twoinductive arguments, of which the first is this. From everything fromwhich sense organs ought to arise, they already do. That being so, nosense-organ is missing. [Proof of the first point.] There are fourelements, and there is the fifth heavenly body. From the fifth bodythere arises no sense-organ; for the fifth body is eternal, as somepeople say, whereas the sense-organs are destructible. Next, nosense-organ could arise from fire; for fire is destructive, and how coulda sense-organ arise from that which destroys? Again, no sense-organcould arise out of earth all on its own; for on its own it resists imprintsand would not readily receive the imprints of the sense-objects. Butif it is mixed with other things earth can make sense-organs; andindeed the sense-organ of touch and taste has a large share of earth,for the sense-organ of touch and taste is flesh, which has a large shareof earth. Fire, as he says himself [425a6], is in all the sense-organs.So it is possible to find fire and earth in sense-organs, but neither firenor earth ever makes sense-organs on its own, for the reasons stated.There remain air and water, which can make sense-organs [sc. ontheir own]. And indeed, water makes that which is of crystallineform,2 which is what the organ of sight is. And air is the organ ofhearing and smell. For the air which is built into the nose and theears is itself the organ of hearing and smell. Well then: if fromeverything from which a sense-organ can arise, a sense-organ hasarisen, no sense-organ is missing. That is the first inductive argu-ment establishing the minor premiss.

But Aristotle raises two difficulties about this argument. First,why does he say that there is no sense-organ missing? Look! Sense-organs are missing. There are five senses but only three sense-organs,water, air, earth. So the inductive argument has established nothing;rather it has augmented the problem. How can the minor premiss say‘No sense-organ is missing’? See! Two are missing. That is thedifficulty.

To this we shall reply that in name there are only three sense-or-gans, but in fact there are five. For even if the organ of touch andtaste involves earth, it is not the same earth. If the same earth werethe sense-organ of touch and taste, in whatever part there is touchthere should be taste too, since the non-rational soul with all itspowers is in all parts of the animal, and we say it is because of theunsuitability of the organ that it does not exercise all its powersthroughout the animal. There should [be taste], if the same earth is

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the sense-organ, and the power is present – lest anyone should holdthat responsible. But in fact there is not taste in everything. Why, atleast, does not the hand taste, though it has touch? So it is not thesame earth. You see that it is the same in name but different in fact.Again, even if there is air in hearing and smell, it is not the same. By‘air’ I mean not the air outside – for all the air outside serves to carryboth odours and sounds – but I mean the air that is built into hearingand nose and is peculiar to them. This is not the same but different.For the air in hearing cannot carry odours or that in the nose sounds.So even if in name there are three sense-organs, in fact there are five.That is the solution of the first difficulty.

The second difficulty starts from the contrary of the first, and isthis. There are more sense-organs than senses, which is absurd. Ifthe sense-organs come to be on account of the senses, there ought tobe as many sense-organs as senses, and no more. But as it is, we seethere are more sense-organs than senses. At least, there are twosense-organs for one sense. Air is the sense-organ for smell in footedand winged animals, water in those that live in water. They say, atleast, that fish have some moisture in their nostrils which serves tocarry odours. So there are two sense-organs for one sense.

We resolve the difficulty by saying that there are not two sense-organs for the same animal, but for one, water is the sense-organ forsmell, and for another, air. So the sense-organs are neither more norfewer.

The first argument for establishing the minor is inductive3 anddoes not carry necessity. For first, there are two sorts of fire, onedestructive, the other life-giving. So even if it was impossible for asense-organ to arise from the destructive sort, it could from thelife-giving. Furthermore, we see that the air outside the body carriesodours and colours and sounds, but nevertheless for animals thathave only three senses, I mean touch, smell and taste, it does not carrycolours, though it is no less such as to carry them, but it does not,because there is not the power. So what absurdity is there in sayingthat in the same way even for us who have five senses, there arefurther sense-organs, but they do not lay hold of anything becausethere are not senses in them?4 So the first argument is inductive andnot genuine.

Aristotle’s second inductive argument is this. If a sense-organ ismissing, a sense-object is too. But a sense-object is not missing. Forthis is the conditional premiss,5 and it too needs demonstration. This,he says, is clear from induction. We lay hold of things that are at adistance, namely sounds, colours and odours, and also of things close,I mean objects of touch and flavours. If, then, we lay hold both ofthings at a distance and of things near, clearly we lay hold ofeverything. So no sense-object is missing. And if a sense-object is not

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missing, clearly neither is a sense-organ. This is shown by conversionwith negation.6

This is Aristotle’s second argument, and it does not carry necessity.Granted that we lay hold of things at a distance, whence is it clearthat we also lay hold of all things near? For granted that we perceiveall objects of touch, do we perceive all flavours? Whence is it clearthere are not objects of taste that escape our notice? Some of us, atleast, have not eaten the flesh of camels. So some sense-objects aremissing.

Since the arguments of Aristotle are on the inductive side, it isbetter to use the argument of Themistius which he gives in theCommentary.7 He says it would not be possible for the rational soulto come in if the animal were not already adorned with all the powersof the non-rational soul. For in objects below the Moon, where thereis the better there is also the worse. Clearly, then, if we have rationalsouls, we shall also have all the powers of the non-rational. So if manhas only five senses, it is clear that there are only five. There are onlyas many as man has, and neither more nor fewer, since man has all,in that he also has what is superior to them, I mean the rational soul.He would not have it unless all those that were more deficient werepresent. So he has all, and since he has five, there are five only.

That is Themistius’ argument, and paying our nursling’s dues toAristotle we shall show that this proof too belongs to him. In the text[425b10-11] he asks why the blind rat, which has motion, does nothave sight; for it is odd that where there is the superior there shouldnot be the inferior. And he offers the solution that it has sight, indeed,but it is covered over by a membrane – it has to be, since the blindrat feeds underground, and would be sure to be blinded if it were notcovered. So nature gave its first thought to nourishment. If he shows,then, in the case of this soul with motion, that there are five senses,he knows this proof that there must be only five of them. For wherethere is the better there is also the worse.

It is possible also to confirm8 the conclusion in a Platonic way. Thesimple bodies are five – there are four elements and the ether – andthe regular solids are five because of the simple bodies – there ispyramid, cube, octahedron, dodekahedron and eikosahedron. Just,then, as because the simple bodies are five the solid shapes too arefive, so, clearly, the senses also are five and not more. That completesthe continuous exposition with God’s help.

424b22 That there is not a further sense besides the five9

At the end of the second book he enquired whether touch was onesense or many; so now he shows that there are five senses, and thatis all, in order that, this being shown, it will be clear that touch is a

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single sense. He is right to do this, since of animals some have twosenses, and some three; that is why he enquires how many sensesthere are. For if all animals had the five senses, enquiry about thiswould be superfluous.

424b24 For if of everything of which touch is the sense, [we havesense even now]

Without stating either the conditional premiss or the minor, heestablishes the minor, and being conscious of the lack of clarity, hestates the conditional premiss in the middle, and then after thisestablishes the rest of the minor premiss. He should have said: ‘If asense is missing, a sense-organ is missing too. But a sense-organ isnot missing. So neither is a sense.’ And he should have establishedthe minor, that a sense organ is not missing, and shown this from theproposition that every sense lays hold of its objects either immedi-ately or through an intermediary (for we have both, the immediateand also the mediated). But he passes over everything else and startsfrom this, showing that we have sense without an intermediary. ‘Forif ’, he says, ‘in the case of all those objects the sense for which istouch’, we act without an intermediary (for the objects of touch areaffections of touch and are immediate sense-objects,) and we havetouch, then we have sense without an intermediary. He says this out oforder in that, though he should establish that we also have sense withoutan intermediary, he passes this over and says: ‘It is necessary, wherethere is a sense missing, that there is also a sense-organ missing.’ Forrecognising the lack of clarity he has put the conditional premiss in themiddle. Then he turns and establishes the minor premiss, saying, as hasbeen stated, that we lay hold of objects of touch immediately, but thereare other things that we lay hold of through a medium.

424b29-30 And such things as we perceive through a mediumand not by touching the things themselves, we perceive by thesimple [bodies]10

He establishes the minor premiss [saying] that there are also in usthings that lay hold of their objects through an intermediary, such assight, hearing, smell; these lay hold through the simple bodies asmedia. He calls water and air ‘simple’ because they are elements. Itis through these that the three [distance] senses lay hold of theirobjects.

424b31-2 And the situation is, that if several sense-objectsdifferent from one another in kind are perceived through one

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[intermediary, what has a sense-organ of this sort must beperceptive of both]

He resolves an unspoken difficulty. He resolves a difficulty he has notraised, and the fullest thanks are due to those who have thus divinedthe thought of the ancient writer. He should have raised the difficultythat though there are two sense-organs, air and water, still, thesense-objects are three, colour, sound and odour, and then after thishe should have resolved it, but he speaks as if he had already raisedit. The solution goes like this. Through one sense-organ we lay holdof several sense-objects, which sense-objects, he says, differ in kind.For sound and odour are heterogeneous. It is necessary, he says, thatair, being in [the organs of] hearing and smell, should lay hold of bothsound and odour. And though he should have said ‘odour’ he says‘colour’ instead of ‘odour’ in order not to depart from what is safe.

That is how some expound the passage.11 Others say he is ratherspeaking against Empedocles. Empedocles says: ‘If it is not possibleaccording to you, Aristotle, for a sense-organ to arise either out of fireor out of earth on its own, produce sense-organs by which they maybe laid hold of, and like known by like.’ Aristotle then replies to himthat if through one intermediate perceiving thing and sense-organseveral sense-objects are known, as through air, for instance, bothcolour and sound are, because we can both see through it and hearthrough it, why is it odd that one sense too should know severalthings?

424b34-425b2 And if several things are [intermediaries] for thesame object, as air and water are for colour, for both aretransparent, [what has either of them will perceive what isperceived through both]

He raises the other difficulty. He says that there is a sense-organmissing, for there are several that share the one. Air and water bothshare the transparent, which he calls ‘colour’. So there is an organmissing because there are two things that carry colour, but sight isone. He resolves this too. Through a single sense-organ we lay holdof both. He who has the one, he says, that is, the wet, by which hemeans the pupil, knows both transparents.

425a3-4 And of the simple bodies, sense-organs are composedof only these two, air and water

He establishes the minor, that the sense-organs that have an inter-mediary must be three, since they can be composed only of air andwater, and sight, hearing and smell have these [materials].

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425a5 And smell is of one or the other12

Some say that he says this because smell has a share of one or theother, that is, of each of the two, air and water, of air in us and ofwater in aquatic animals. Others take ‘one or the other’ to mean ‘oneof them’, that is, it has a share of one of them, for instance of air.13

425a5-9 Fire is either [the material] of none, or common to all

He does well to say ‘common to all’. For every sense is nourished. Ifit is nourished, it digests. All digestion is through the hot. Fire, then,is needed as hot by every sense.

425a6-7 Earth is either [the material] of none or is in touch14

Even if the earthy is set apart for touch, he does ill to bring in touchjust now, because the discussion is of senses that operate through anintermediary.

425a8-9 [Whence it would remain that there is no sense-organapart from water and air,] and some animals have these evennow

Some animals, he says, have the five senses, if they are complete andnot deformed. And in order that someone may not say to him ‘Look!The blind rat is a complete animal, but does not have sight’, he saysthat it does have eyes, but nature has protected them with a mem-brane, in order that, when digging earth, it may not easily be blinded.In general, as many animals as have change in respect of place havethe five senses. For change is better than sense, and where there iswhat is better there is what is worse. If there are some animals thathave change in respect of place but not the five senses, such asmussels and grubs, well, nature has made up the full measure of whatthey lack in some other way. See, then: this is clearly his ownargument, that where there is the better there is also the worse. Thisis not just a peculiarity of the commentators.

425a11-13 So if there is no other body, nor any affection thatbelongs to none of the bodies here, no sense is missing.

He says ‘body and affection’, that is, bodily affection. What does hemean? He is drawing the conclusion to what went before. If, he says,there is no bodily affection outside of the elements (he says thisbecause of the fifth substance) to make a sense-organ (for he certainlywants it to be capable of being affected, whereas that [the fifth

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substance] is unaffected) it follows that there is no sense-organmissing. That completes the lecture with God’s help.

[LECTURE 2]

425a14-16 But neither can there be a special sense-organ forthe common objects, which we perceive incidentally by eachsense, such as change, staying unchanged, shape, size, number,[one]

Having shown in the preceding lecture that there is no sixth sensebesides the five, he now shows the same thing again. Since he said inthe second book of this treatise that there are common sense-objects,such as size and shape, number, change, staying still (size and shapeare common to sight and touch, and the other three, change, numberand staying still, are common to all five), perhaps someone mightthink that there is a sixth sense besides these five which discernsthese common sense-objects. So he now shows in the present continu-ous exposition that there is not any other sixth particular sense thatdiscerns the common sense-objects.

This he shows in the following way. If the common sense-objectsare proper to this special sense, then they are incidental objects ofthese five. For if a thing belongs to two things, and is proper to one,clearly it belongs to the other incidentally. If it were proper to theother too, it would no longer be proper to the first. For look, it belongsto the other too. So if the common sense-objects are proper to the sixthsense, then they are sense-objects to these five incidentally. But theyare not sense-objects to these five incidentally, as I shall show. Itfollows that there is no sixth sense, to which these so-called commonsense-objects are proper.

That the common sense-objects are not sense-objects incidentallyto five senses, this too is established by hypothetical reasoning, asfollows. Things that are sense-objects incidentally do not produce anaffection in the sense, as I shall show. But these produce an affectionin the sense. Therefore they are not sense-objects incidentally.

Whence is it clear that things perceived incidentally do not producean affection in the sense? This too he shows, as follows. He says thatthere are two sorts of thing perceived incidentally: that which fallsunder a different sense, as sight discerns the sweet from colour – atleast, if we see something wet and yellow, we say that this is honey,and this is said to be perceived incidentally, when from the coloursight recognises the sweet. Either, then, what is perceived inciden-tally is this, or it is what falls under no sense, like substance.Substance falls under no sense, but it becomes known from the thingsincidental to it. For we recognise Cleon’s son not because he is Cleon’s

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son, not, that is, because he is a substance, but from the things thatare incidental to him, say because he is pale, because he has apot-belly, or the like. These two things, then, are sense-objects inci-dentally. And neither of these two things that the expression signifiesproduces an affection. A sense-object of one sense does not producean affection in another even if it is recognised from it. The sweet, atleast, does not produce an affection in sight, even if it is recognisedby sight through the mediation of yellow colour. Neither does thatwhich is a sense-object of no sense produce an affection in sight, evenif it is recognised by it. So it has been shown that incidental sense-objects do not produce an affection in that sense by which they areperceived incidentally.

So in brief the force of the whole argument is this. The commonsense-objects are not objects proper to any sixth sense other than thefive. If they were proper sense-objects of some sixth sense they wouldbe incidental objects of these five. For as colours, which are properobjects of sight, are incidental objects of taste, so shape, size and therest, <if> they were proper objects of another sixth sense, wouldtherefore be incidental objects of these five. But they are not inciden-tal objects of these five. For incidental objects do not produce anaffection in the sense, but the common sense-objects do produce anaffection in the senses. He showed this by saying that there are twothings perceived incidentally. There is that which is recognised byone sense of itself and by another incidentally, and that which of itselffalls under no sense, like substance. Neither of these produces anyaffection in the sense. But the common sense-objects do produce anaffection, as is shown in the second book of this treatise. Continuouschange and small letters produce a blunting of sight. Clearly, then,the common sense-objects are not objects of perception incidentally.This is the whole structure of the argument, which consists of twohypothetical syllogisms and one categorical.15 That completes thefirst section.

In the second section [425a30] he raises a problem that goes likethis. How on earth is it that the senses do not attend each to its ownbusiness and know each what is its own, but sometimes one knowswhat belongs to another? For if sight and taste, at least, act togetherwith regard to a thing, say honey, and we simultaneously see andtaste honey, if the following day honey falls under our sight, it tendsnot only to know what is its own, e.g. that it is yellow, but jumps aheadof taste also and knows that it is sweet. That is the problem. We giveits solution like this. It sometimes happens that two senses acttogether, for instance sight and taste at the same time in connectionwith honey, the one tasting that it is sweet, the other seeing that itis yellow, and then these two are brought to their termination at thecommon sense and there leave their imprints; and then the next day

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when honey appears and yellow colour, imagination stirs up theimprints in it of sweet and yellow which it received at the same timethe preceding day, and it declares that this sort of thing is sweet. That,then, is the solution of this problem: the common sense received bothimprints, the one from taste and the one from sight, and the followingday when the imprint from sight is stirred up by our having seenhoney, thereupon the imprint from taste too is stirred up, and the oneimprint is, so to speak, réchauffé by the other, and thereby werecognise that it is sweet, even though we do not taste it. And indeed,error too arises from this, and a person who has not tasted Colo-phonian resin, but only seen it, may say it is honey because itresembles it in colour.

Having resolved the difficulty he then raises another that is moreacute: so far as it does this, the common sense knows the sweet ofitself and not incidentally.16 For it has the imprints of both, of sight,that it is yellow, and of taste, that it is sweet. Clearly, then, thefollowing day, even if we have not tasted, but only seen the honey, wesay non-incidentally that it is sweet. For the common sense has theimprints of taste, and stirring them up again says that it is sweet. If,then, being stirred with respect to the imprints of sweet it says thatit [sc. what is seen] is sweet, the common sense does this of itself, andnot incidentally. That is the problem. We reply that even if it has theimprints of sweet things, still it is not by themselves that they arestirred. For the supposition was that we did not taste the honey, butonly saw it. So it is incidentally that it declares that it is sweet. Forit was the imprints of sight that were stirred of themselves; for it sawthat it was yellow. But incidentally the imprint of taste was stirredbecause the imprint of sight was. So much in reply to the seconddifficulty, and that completes the second section.

In the third section [425b4-11] he raises the problem why we havetwo or more senses laying hold of one and the same thing, for instancesight and touch of shape and size, and all five senses lay hold ofnumber. So why is this? Why does not each sense lay hold [only] ofits own object? That is the problem. Aristotle replies that severalsenses lay hold of the same things on this account, that there may becommon sense-objects. And having said this, Aristotle ends thistext.17

But if anyone asks why there is any need for common sense-objectsat all, we may say to him what Plato says in Republic 6 and theTimaeus. We say that these common sense-objects are the subjects ofthe mathematical sciences. Shapes, numbers, changes, magnitudesand stayings still are the common sense-objects, and these are thesubjects of the mathematical sciences. Since, then, we need to get toknow the subjects of mathematics accurately, and they are known

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accurately through being known by more senses than one, for thisreason there are common sense-objects.

But if that is so, Aristotle contradicts himself. For in the secondbook of this work he says that the proper sense-objects are knownmore accurately [418a11-19, cf. 428b17-25]. How is it that he nowsays the common sense-objects are more accurate? We reply that hedoes not contradict himself. The proper sense-objects are known moreaccurately than the common by their own senses. For instance whiteis proper to sight, and size is a common object of sight; and sightknows white more accurately than size. So in relation to each sense,the proper sense-object is known more accurately than the common.Sight knows the common object dimly, and touch too knows it dimly,and, in a word, each sense knows it more dimly than its proper object.But the knowledge of the several senses, when it comes together,makes accurate the knowledge of the common object. So too saysHesiod: ‘If you add little to little and do this often, soon somethinglarge will arise.’18 But it should be known that even if the knowledgeof the proper sense-objects and that of the common are both accurate,still, that of the proper is more accurate than that of the common. Forsight knows both of them, the common and the proper, of itself, butsense knows the proper more. That is the continuous exposition.

425a14-16 But neither can there be a special sense-organ forthe common objects which we perceive incidentally by eachsense, such as change, staying unchanged19

Again without stating the conditional premiss or the minor he refutesthe minor. He should have said: ‘If no sense [sc. out of the five] layshold of the common sense-objects as its proper objects, and if, whenno sense lays hold of things as its proper objects, these are the subjectsof another sense, then the common sense-objects are the subjects ofanother sense, and there will be a sixth sense-organ and sense.’ Heshould have said this, and established the negative point that thereis no sixth sense. But he starts from here and shows that there is nota sixth sense. There is not, he says, a special sense-organ for thecommon objects, since [if there were] the other senses would lay holdof them incidentally. But in fact they are affected by them. And seehow unclearly he uses ‘incidentally’. He ought to have said ‘since theother senses would perceive them incidentally’. But he actually says‘which we perceive by each sense incidentally’. For if there were inreality a sense-organ for the common objects, then the five senseswould perceive them incidentally; but they do not perceive themincidentally, as we demonstrated in the continuous exposition. There-fore there is no sense-organ proper to them.

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425a16 Number, one20

Note that he contradistinguishes one from number. For the unit isnot a number, as was demonstrated in the arithmetical discourses.21

425a16-17 For we perceive all these by change, [for instancemagnitude]

Here is the resolution of the difficulty. What does he say? That thecommon sense-objects are not sense-objects incidentally because weperceive them by change. By ‘change’ he means the affection, thealteration.22 The common sense-objects, he says, produce an affection,whereas no sense-object perceived incidentally produces an affection.

Perhaps someone will raise the problem: why does he say that thecommon sense-objects get to be known through change, that is,through causing change? For see! Staying still is itself one of thecommon sensibles, yet it does not cause change in the sense-organ,since it is staying still. To resolve this difficulty the philosopherPlutarch23 says that it is by discerning it from the opposite kinds ofchange that we get to know staying still, and because of this one mightbe said to be changed. And every change is a kind of state, and everystate is as it were a kind of affection. So we are properly said to beaffected in a way and to be in a state by staying still also.

People raise another difficulty here. Why, they ask, do we say thatthe proper sense-objects do something with regard to the sense, thatis, things perceived of themselves come to be [perceived] throughchange, and things perceived incidentally not through change? For Ihave seen, as it might be, some yellow thing, and this imprint ofyellow has stirred the other imprint in me of sweet, and I have saidthat this is honey. So see! I got to know this too by a kind of change.Plutarch has a reply to this too. When we say that we perceive thecommon sense-objects by change we ought to draw a further distinc-tion which Aristotle omits in the present text, though he plainly statesit elsewhere. We perceive the common sense-objects by change, butnot in the way distinctive of sense. For even if the imprint of sweetin me is stirred, still, it is not in the way peculiar to sense. For thesweetness is not stirred in me through the tongue. I get to know theproper sense-objects through the way distinctive of sense itself. I seewhite, and I taste sweet things, and the same with the others.

Note that he has given it out that the five common sense-objectsare common to the five senses. But there are not more than threecommon, as was said,24 unless you should say that he means magni-tude in each sense, and not [just] in quantity, for instance a greatsound, or a great white. Then it is common to all. And shape – if youwere to take it as covering the smooth and the rough, and say that

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the smooth is pleasant and the rough painful – this too will be foundan object common to every sense.

425a18 [And so shape too,] for shape is a kind of magnitude25

Some people say ‘Look! He says that shape too is a kind of magnitude.Why did he say in the Categories26 that magnitude is a species ofquantity but shape is a species of quality? See! He says that magni-tude and shape are the same.’ We reply that Aristotle is not even nowsaying that magnitude and shape are the same. It is because magni-tude always attends shape, and it is not possible to conceive of shapeapart from magnitude, that he says ‘shape is a kind of magnitude’,that is, what has shape is a magnitude, not shape itself.

He says that we lay hold of ‘what is staying still by its not changing’[425a18-19] for this reason, that he said above that an affection is achange. Now, since we see things that are remaining as they are, withthe affection neither diminishing nor increasing because they areremaining as they are, whereas we see things that are changing beingnow in one way and now in another with the affection diminishing orincreasing according to their change, for this reason he says that weperceive what is staying as it is unchangingly, that is, in the same way.

425a19 Number by denial of the continuous and by the properobjects

He says that number is [perceived] from denial in that it is notcontinuous, since number is one of the things that are discrete. Butwhat does he call ‘continuous’? The unit, which he refers to above[a16] in ‘one, number’. He calls it this because it is undivided. Weknow numbers greater than one, he says, through their not being one.And that is well said.

This getting to know by denial occurs not only with commonsense-objects but with proper sense-objects too. The proper sense-objects become known of themselves and primarily, the commonsense-objects of themselves but secondarily. For instance we get toknow not just ten things, but also the proper objects in them, ten whitethings or ten ochre things or ten red ones. So the common sense-objects must also contain some proper sense-objects. Number, then,comes to be known in two ways, either by denial of the continuous orby our coming to know the proper sense-objects.

425a20 For each sense perceives one thing

Each sense, he says, lays hold of some one thing (and he means someone sense-object), that is, of a unit. He wishes to show by this that

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number falls under the five senses. And if that does, it follows thatthe other common sense-objects do too. That he means this, he himselfshows in the text when he says:

425a20-1 So it is clear that there cannot be a sense proper toany of these whatever [for instance of change; for then it will beas we now perceive sweet by sight]

It is as if he said that it has become clear that there cannot be a sixthsense which lays hold of the common sense-objects. And he mentionschange as an example of the common sense-objects. If, he says, therewere some other sixth particular sense which lays hold of the commonsense-objects as its proper objects, these common sense-objects willbe things we get to know by the five other senses incidentally. Andhe gives the example of getting to know the sweet by sight. It becomesknown to it incidentally. He then states the two things signified by‘incidental sense-object’.

425a22-4 That is because we happen to have perception of both,by which we know when they coincide

He expresses the idea of how it is possible from yellow to get to knowsweet. It is because we have perception of both earlier (‘earlier’ isomitted in the passage, as Plutarch says), of sweet, perhaps, and ofyellow. The common sense, he says, is of both. For since, he says, wehave sense both of sweet and of yellow, [that is,] sight and taste,because of this when yellow colour comes along the imprint of sweetis stirred and we come to know that it is honey from the imprint whichwas taken when sight and taste acted together.

425a24-5 Otherwise we should perceive only incidentally27

This joins on to what is above. If, he says, you say that the commonsense-objects are subjects of another sense, you are saying nothingelse but that the other senses perceive them incidentally, which is notthe case.

425a25-6 As we perceive the son of Cleon, not because he is theson of Cleon [but because he is white]

As an example of one thing that is incidental to perception, he givessubstance. This is not the subject of any sense. Cleon’s son, he says,is seen not as a substance but insofar as he is white. White isincidental upon Cleon’s son.

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425a27-8 But of the common objects we already have commonsense which is not incidental

The common sense-objects, he says, have common sense. By ‘commonsense’ he does not mean the common sense of which he speaks next,but he calls the five senses ‘common sense’. So what he says is this.The common sense-objects have another common sense which layshold of them non-incidentally. For this he has shown, as we also haveshown in the continuous exposition.

425a28-30 So there is no proper sense. For we should notperceive them at all except in the way it has been said that wesee the son of Cleon28

He here gives the conclusion of the argument, and says that thereforethere is no proper sense for the common sense-objects. ‘Except in theway it has been said we see the son of Cleon’,29 that is, incidentally.But it has been shown that the five senses lay hold of the commonobjects non-incidentally. For they lay hold of them through change,and this does not belong to things perceived incidentally.

425a30-2 But the senses perceive one another’s proper objectsincidentally,30 not because they are the particular senses theyare, but because they are one, when perception occurs at onetime31 [in relation to one thing]

The second case signified by ‘incidental’, he says, is that of the subjectof another sense, as when sweet is known from yellow. For above hegave the other case, the incidental object which is not subject to anysense. What is he saying now? That the senses lay hold of each other’sobjects incidentally, not <insofar as> they are the senses they are, butbecause they have one common [power of] sense. This infers inciden-tally from the colour concerning sweet. He does well to add [425b1]‘in relation to one thing’: it must be of one single thing that thecommon [power] discerns the colour and the flavour through the twosenses. That is when the common sense discerns what is incidental,when earlier through two senses it has had the imprints of the samething. But see what he says, that the common sense knows inciden-tally how to differentiate white and sweet. We said in the continuousexposition that this belongs to it of itself. We say that the differentia-tion belongs of itself to the common sense, whereas drawing infer-ences from colour about sweet things belongs incidentally, since onething is inferred from another.

425b2-4 For it does not belong to either of them to say that both

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are one.32 That is why people fall into error too, and if somethingis yellow it is thought to be bile

He says it belongs to the common sense, and not to one particularsense, to say that the honey is one thing, even if sweet is an object oftaste and yellow is a colour. For the particular sense falls into error,and thinks that everything yellow it sees is honey.

425b4-5 Someone might enquire for the sake of what benefit wehave more senses than one33

But why is it that, given we have several senses, we do not lay holdof the common sense-objects with one sense? The solution offered is:in order that we may not have less grasp of the common sense-objects.And he calls the common sense-objects ‘attendant’ [b5] not meaningthat they are of marginal importance, but because they follow uponthe proper objects of each sense as more perfect and more intelligiblefellow-travellers. He does not himself say what we said, that thecommon objects are the subjects of great sciences. For change [inrespect of place] and staying still are the subjects of astronomy. Evenif the stars are always in motion, still, it seeks to know their locationrelatively to one another; for in imagination it makes them intoconstellations and they are in places. And shape and magnitude aresubjects of geometry, while number when taken as non-material isthe subject of arithmetic, and taken in matter and in sounds is thesubject of music.

425b6 Such as change and magnitude and number

He says this including the others also through these. He includesstaying unchanged through change and shape through magnitude.For shape is in magnitude.

425b6-8 For if there were sight alone, and that was of white,they would escape notice more and all would seem to be the same

The philosopher Plutarch expounds the difficulty we stated in thethird section of the continuous exposition as follows. Why has naturenot marked off the common sense-objects for one sense, seeing thateven in the five senses themselves we see many sensible opposites?34

And it is rather Aristotle who says this, for the solution fits it. Heresolves the difficulty in the present passage by saying that if thecommon sense-objects fell under one sense only, say, for example,sight, and there also fell under this same sight the proper sense-objects, such as white or colour, the common sense-objects would

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escape notice, and number, shape, change and the rest would bethought the same as colour. But as it is, we contemplate number notonly in colour but in sounds and odours, and in that way they aredifferentiated from one another. If one of the five senses discernedthese they would much more elude us, since they are hard to huntdown even now when we get to know them through the five senses,and if one of the five were missing they would be even harder toknow.35 But why do I say that? If [only] one sense discerned them weshould not get to know them at all. But as it is, he says, since thecommon sense-objects belong to differing senses and are contem-plated in several, on this account it is clear how they differ both fromone another and from the proper sense-objects.

That completes the lecture.

[LECTURE 3]

425b12-13 Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must beeither by sight that a person perceives he sees, or by another[sense], etc.

Having shown in the foregoing that there is not a sixth sense whichhas the common sense-objects as its proper sense-objects, he nowwants through what follows to put forward another enquiry. Heenquires whether perhaps there are not just five senses, but ten.Since, he says, we see and perceive that we see, and hear and perceivethat we hear, do we, he enquires, see and perceive that we see by thesame sense, or is there one sense that sees the colours that aresubjects of sight, and another that perceives the activity of sight, thatis, another that perceives that we see? There are two things, then, tobe enquired into. One is whether it is with the same sense, that ofsight, that we both see colours and perceive the activity which seescolours; and the other is whether one sense sees colours and anotherperceives that we see, in other words, perceives the activity of sight.

Having gone through these problems he resolves them. He says itis not possible that one sense should see [colours] and anotherperceive the activity of sight, since [then] there would be no propersense-objects, but all sense-objects would be common. For if you takecolours, they will be common to the power to see and the power whichsees that we see, and if you take sounds, they will be common to thesense of hearing and to that sense which lays hold of the activity ofhearing, that is, which perceives that we hear. And the same with theother senses.

But that no sense-object should be proper, that all should becommon, does not yet appear absurd. But he attaches another absurd-ity to the statement [sc. that there are two senses]. If, he says, it is

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by one sense that we see, for example, and by another that we knowthat we see, does that sense by which we perceive the activity of seeingalso itself perceive its own activity? Or is there yet another sensewhich lays hold of its activity? If you should say that it lays hold ofits own activity itself why does not the first sense too, which lays holdof colours, lay hold of its own activity? Since, then, the statement isarbitrary, it is not the case that one sense lays hold of colours andanother perceives the activity. But it is not possible that there shouldbe a sense other than this which perceives that we see and hear, whichlays hold of its activity. For there will be another sense for that, andso to infinity. If it is false that there is this series to infinity, then itis a false statement also that says that the senses which lay hold ofthe sense-objects are other than those which lay hold of their activi-ties.

Then he attacks the other statement, the one which says that thesame senses lay hold of their subjects and of their own activities. Hebrings forward a difficulty and he resolves it; from which we cansurmise that Aristotle is of this opinion, that he thinks that the samesenses lay hold of the sense-objects that are their subjects and of theactivities. The difficulty which says it is not the same sense that layshold of its subjects and that perceives its own activity goes like this.He tries out his argument for sight, and says that seeing is nothingelse but laying hold of colours, and the activities of the senses are notcolours; for the activities are incorporeal; therefore sight does not layhold of activities. In resolution of this difficulty he says that seeing isnot always a laying hold of colours, since we also lay hold of darkness.But darkness is not a colour. So the statement is false. And besides,even when I concede that seeing is laying hold of colours, even so thereis no absurdity. For the activities are coloured in a way. That theyare coloured in a way, even if not properly – for how could somethingincorporeal be said properly to be coloured? – but anyhow it is clearthat they would be said to be coloured from the ‘sparks’36 that alsoappear even after the disappearance of the object of sight. Things likelights remain about the sense of sight even after the departure of thebright sense-object, from which it is clear that the activity is coloured.This happens with animate beings that, even in the absence of thesense-object, are able to keep hold of the imprints. It does not happenwith inanimate things like mirrors: when the sense-object departsnothing remains, for there is nothing that holds it.

But we say to this: ‘You argue badly, Aristotle. The activities ofsight are not coloured, but the transparent is the cause of [seeing]“sparks”. The transparent itself, after the disappearance of the visibleobject, outlines sparks and flashes in sight.’

These are the things that are declared in the text and, to put itbriefly, the Aristotelian mind is patent. He wants the particular

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senses to lay hold both of the things subject to them and of their ownactivities too. But Alexander in his Commentary37 wants the fivesenses to lay hold of the sense-objects that are their subjects, and thecommon sense to lay hold both of the subjects and of their activities.Plutarch said it was the function of the rational soul to know theactivities of the senses. For he says that this happens by virtue of theinferior part of the rational soul, which is opinion. For opinion, themost common part of the soul and the inferior, joins the rational tothe non-rational. For, as we have often come to know, it is always bythe inferior parts of themselves that the first are joined to the second.So that is how it is now. He says, then, that it belongs to opinion todo these things and lay hold of the activities of the senses.

But more recent interpreters neither tremble at Alexander’s frownnor pay heed to Plutarch, but pushing Aristotle himself to one sidethey have devised a newer interpretation. They say that it belongs tothe attentive part of the rational soul to lay hold of the activities ofthe senses. For the rational soul, according to them, does not haveonly five powers, intellect, thought, opinion, rational wish and choice;they add another sixth power to the rational soul, which they call‘attentive’. This attentive part, they say, stands over what happensin a human being and says ‘I exercised intellect’, ‘I thought’, ‘I opined’,‘I became spirited’,38 ‘I experienced desire’; and in general this atten-tive power of the rational soul ranges over all the powers, the rational,the non-rational and the vegetable. If, they say, the attentive poweris to range over all, let it go over the senses too and say ‘I saw’, ‘Iheard’. For it is proper to what lays hold of the activities to say this.If it is the attentive part, then, that says this, it follows that this iswhat lays hold of the activities of the senses. For there ought to beone thing laying hold of all, since the human being is one. If one laidhold of these and another of those, it would be, as he himself sayselsewhere [426b19], as if you perceived this and I that. It must, thenbe one thing, and that is the attentive part. This attentive part rovesover all powers, cognitive and vital. But if it is roving over thecognitive it is called ‘attentive’, which is why, when we want to rebukesomeone who is wool-gathering in his cognitive activities we say ‘Payattention to yourself!’ Whereas if it is going through the vital powersit is called ‘conscious’, which is why the tragedy says ‘Conscience,since I am conscious to myself of having done terrible things’.39 Theattentive part, then, is what lays hold of the activities of the senses.

And Plutarch, they say, did ill to hold opinion responsible. Forthere ought to be one thing that lays hold of the activities of all thepowers, and opinion does not lay hold of the activities of intellect. Itdoes not say ‘I exercised intellect’ or ‘I thought’. Even if it says ‘Iopined’ or ‘I became spirited’, still, it cannot contemplate the activitiesof the better powers. But saying this they are not accusing Plutarch.

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For I nowhere found him saying that the power which perceives theactivities of the senses belongs to opinion, but in this he agrees withAlexander, and he too holds the common sense responsible.40 Bothare convicted of speaking wrongly, since they say that the commonsense lays hold of the activities of each sense. For the common senselays hold of nothing that is not a sense-object. Every sense-object isin a body, but the activity is not in a body. Hence it is not asense-object. And if it is not a sense-object it does not fall under thecommon sense.

We agree with these that there is not a sixth sense which gets toknow that [we see and hear]. Not, however, because the same sensesees and knows that it sees, but because this belongs to the rationalpart of the soul, and of this, to the attentive. That there is not a sixthsense that knows that [we see and hear] we accept from what Aristotlesays. But that it is the same sense that perceives and gets to know itperceives, we do not accept from his saying ‘I do not find it followsthat the activity is coloured, if the same sense does know that [it isacting], since sight does not know colour only, but also light and dark.’We shall say to him: sight of itself knows only colour, and it knowsthe others by denial, by their not being colour, and is not affected bythem. But no one knows his own activity in the same way as thingsknown by denial. So even when it lays hold of colour, it does not know[this] because the activity is coloured. And that it is absurd to saythat the activity is coloured in a way, is clear. For it is incorporeal,and how can what is incorporeal be coloured? It will also share in bothwhite and black at the same time, since it sees them at the same time,which is absurd. It is better, then, to say that the sense-organ iscoloured, not the activity. And if assurance of this is derived from [our‘seeing’] lights, we say that this is not a colouring of the activity buta powerful impulse from the sense-object causing an affection in thesense-organ, and imagination, taking the imprint of this affection,keeps it, and that is why lights are seen by it. That it is not a colouringis clear, since it is seen even when we shut our eyes. For it should beknown that imagination is nothing other than faint sense, just assense is lively imagination.41

Besides, it is absurd that the same sense should know that it sees.For it must be by reflecting back on itself42 after having seen thecolour that it gets to know it sees. But if it reflects on itself it also hasan activity which is separate [sc. from matter], and what has aseparate activity has a separate substance, and on that account iseternal and incorporeal. So someone who says in an ambiguous waythat the rational soul is immortal will be shouting out plainly thatthe non-rational soul is immortal; which is absurd. The senses arenot eternal, and for that reason do not reflect on themselves. And ifthey do not reflect on themselves they do not lay hold of their own

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activities. For a thing’s reflecting on itself is nothing other than itslaying hold of its own activities.

So Aristotle does not speak rightly but, as we said, it belongs to theattentive part of the soul to get to know the activities of the senses.And that this is so can be seen from the things themselves. For whenreason is engrossed with something, even if sight sees, we do not knowthat it has seen because reason is engrossed. And later, when reasoncomes to itself and, though not seeing the friend, even now says thatit has seen him, it is as if it were taking up43 a small imprint of thething seen and, though it was engrossed, now44 having come to itssenses it said that it saw. So it belongs to reason to say ‘I saw’.

If anyone raises the difficulty: how can it be said that reason isengrossed with universals, but now we say that it acts along withparticular senses, say this in reply: when it uses the body as aninstrument it acts in connection with particulars, whereas when itdoes not use it as an instrument it is engaged with universals; andnow it uses the body.

So much on that. But we are not paying our nursling’s dues toAristotle but making out that his account is false. Let us say, then,that he agrees with us. When he says that the sense knows it is actinghe says it knows this, not as a sense, but as a tool of reason. He saidabove [425a22-4] that sight knows the sweet not as sight but ascommon sense, and he says this now in the same way. Not only doeshe do this, but common usage has this custom, [as] when it says thatthe adze made the chair. See! The tool is credited with the work, notthat it made it, but that the craftsman used it in making it. That, withGod’s help, completes the continuous exposition.

425b12 Since we perceive that we see and hear45

He did well to say: ‘we perceive that we see’ and not: ‘since we see’.For he is not trying out the argument only for sight but for everysense. That is why, using ‘perceive’, he states the argument in acommon way.

425b13-14 But it will be the same [sense] for sight and for thecolour subject to it

Having made a division and said that either we know the subject andthe activity by the same sense, or we know the subject by one and theactivity by another, in what follows he refutes one limb of the division,the one which says that what lays hold of sight, the activity, is one[sense] and what lays hold of the subject is another. He himself,however, does not say ‘and that of the subject is another’, and

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therefore makes his argument unclear. Then, wishing to clarify whatthe subject is, he brings in colour. For colour is the subject for sight.

425b14-15 So either there will be two for the same thing, or itwill be of itself

Here he brings on the absurdity. He says that if this is how thingsare and one sense perceives the subject and another the activity, itwill follow that there will be two senses for the same thing, forexample for colour there will be sight and the other sense thatperceives the activity of sight, and two things will be found perceivingthe same thing of themselves and not incidentally, which is absurd.If, on the other hand, it is the same sense that perceives the colourand its own activity, another absurdity follows: there is a sense ofitself.

425b15 Again, if it [the sense by which we perceive sight] wereother [either it will go on to infinity, or it will be the sense foritself]

Next he attaches another absurdity to the same hypothesis, the onethat says that the power perceiving the activity is other [than the oneperceiving the subject].

425b17 So we should do this with the first

It is as if he had said that we should stop with the first and say thatit lays hold of itself, and sight gets to know that it perceives the colour,and hearing likewise that [it perceives] the thing heard, and the samewith the others. For if saying that another sense knows that [weperceive] leads the account into difficulty we must, he says, go to thefirst and say that it knows its own activity. He ought rather to havesaid ‘immediately’, so as to say ‘so we should do this immediately withthe first’.

There are some, also, who interpret the present passage as follows.If the sense which lays hold of the activity of the other sense [theoriginal one] lays hold of its own activity, why does not the first too,which is the one laying hold of the subject, lay hold of its own activity?This sort of thing is arbitrary.

425b17-18 But there is a difficulty. If to perceive by sight is tosee, [and what is seen is colour or what has it]

Here he states the difficulty for the other hypothesis, the difficultythat if the same sense lays hold of the subjects and the activities, that

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first thing which sees will have colour too. He does well to add ‘first’,46

since sight receives the forms of sense-objects in acting towardsthings that are external, and he says that even before this it will havecolour of itself, if it is to be an object of sight to someone else.

425b20 It is plain, then, that perceiving by sight is not just onething

Here is the solution of the stated difficulty. And note that he did solvethis difficulty, or if you like he gave reassurances as one who is morepersuaded of this opinion, but left unsolved the remaining difficultybrought [467,31-2] against this opinion, the difficulty that if it is onepower that sees and that gets to know the activity, the same thingwill be perceived and perceiver. But he thinks that because he hasrefuted the opposing opinion he has also resolved this difficulty.These are his reassurances over the difficulties.

425b22-3 Further, that which sees too is coloured in a way.

‘In a way’ is added in place of ‘in some way or other’. For the activity,he says, is coloured.47

That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

[LECTURE 4]

425b26-7 The activity of the sense-object and the activity of thesense are one and the same, but their being is not the same

He has said above that the activity is in some way or other coloured(he showed this from the ‘lights’ that appear before our eyes after thesensible object has ceased to be present), and that the actual senseacts by receiving the forms of the sense-objects; and having got as faras this in the preceding [lecture], he now wants to develop this. It isas if he said: ‘What do I mean, the forms of the sense-objects go to theactual sense from the actual sense-object?’ The sense-object is two-fold, potential and actual and the sense is twofold, potential andactual. The actual sense, then, is the same as the actual sense-object.For if the activity is coloured, and the sense-object is colour, the actualsense is the same as the actual sense-object. He is speaking, of course,of the sense-object that is proportional [to the sense], for the dispro-portionate destroys sight. If it were the same as the disproportionatesense-object it would be destructive of itself, which is absurd.

But do not think, because he says that the actual sense is the sameas the actual sense-object, that he means the accounts also of thesense-objects are in the sense,48 since he does not say even that the

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rational soul has accounts of things,49 but that it is like a tablet onwhich nothing is written. That they [the senses] have accounts isEmpedocles’ view. He says ‘By earth we have sight of earth’.50 Aris-totle does not say this, but that it is because of what is easilyimprinted. The actual sense is easily imprinted and easily shaped forreceiving the forms of the things that are actual sense-objects. Thatis why he says that the actual sense is the same as the actualsense-object.

He establishes this as follows. First, if actual sense, he says, isnothing but having actual sense-objects, and actual sense-objects arethe things that are had by sense, and the thing had and what has itare the same, it follows that actual sense too is the same as the actualsense-object.

He also demonstrates the statement more acutely and physically51

in another way. He says this. In the third book of the Physics52 it isshown that every agent and patient are the same in subject, but differin how they are related. We remember him saying,53 at least, thatlearning and teaching are the same in subject,54 but differ in how theyare related. For the same speculative thought in relation to the pupilis learning and in relation to the teacher teaching. So every agent andpatient are the same in subject but different in how they are related.If, then, actual sense is a kind of patient, and the actual sense-objecta kind of agent, it is then clear that we may conclude that they arethe same in subject but different in how they are related.

That is how he proves the statement physically. But it should berecognised that though there are two ways of being related, onetowards the actual sense, which is having, and one towards the actualsense-object, which is being had, it is in the one case of hearing thathe takes the two ways of being related, because in some cases one ofthe ways of being related has no name. There are five senses, but inthe case of only one, I mean hearing, are there names for both theways of being related, that of the actual sense-object and that of theactual sense. In the case of the actual sense, the way of being relatedis called ‘hearing’, and the way of being related of the actual sense-object is called ‘sounding’. In the cases of the other senses, it is notpossible to find a name. The way of being related of actual sight wecall ‘seeing’, that of the55 actual thing seen we ought to call ‘colouring’,but we do not, and we shall learn the reason for that in the detailedcommentary [474,32-475,5]. Since, then, the two ways of being re-lated do not have names in the cases of all the senses, for this reasonit often escapes notice, and we do not notice the two ways of beingrelated.

Aristotle says this, and Alexander56 thinks fit to derive from it anargument supplementary to those Aristotle has himself provided inthe preceding to show that the five senses lay hold of their own

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activities. If, says Alexander, actual sense is the same as the actualsense-object, and actual sense lays hold of the actual sense-object, itclearly follows that actual sense lays hold of itself. For this is nothingelse but the activity of sense. For it is when it acts that it is said tobe actual. So since actual sense lays hold of itself it clearly followsthat sense lays hold of its own activity, which is what Aristotle thinks.

That is what Alexander says; but we say that he does not speaktruly. This supplementary argument here does not follow. The firstpoint is true, that actual sense is the same in subject as the actualsense-object, and actual sense lays hold of the actual sense-object. Butthe second point is not also true, the point that if sense perceives theactual sense-object it therein also lays hold of itself.57 Besides, actualsense gets to know not by virtue of what is common [to it and theactual sense-object], but by virtue of what differentiates it. It gets toknow in virtue of being affected, and that differentiates it, for senseis affected, while the sense-object affects. So I shall not concede this,O Alexander, that when actual sense gets to know, it is by virtue ofbeing the same as the actual sense-object. And if I should concedeeven this to you, for actual sense perceives not the way of beingrelated, but that thing in respect of which it is the same as the actualsense-object, what is this? Clearly the subject. For it is the same insubject, but different in the way in which it is related. And what isthe subject? Clearly the forms. These, then, are all it perceives. Whatfollows, then, is that actual sense lays hold of its own subject, not itsown activity, and its subjects are the forms of colours.

So much on that. But Aristotle infers from what has been said, firstthat if the actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object, clearlyif there is the actual sense there is also the actual sense-object, andif the actual sense passes away there passes away also the actualsense-object – as a thing seen but not as a subsistent thing. This isnot the case, however, with potential sense and the potential sense-object. Not that they do not exist together; for they obey the law ofrelatives and if there is potential sense there is also the potentialsense-object, while if there is not the former, neither is there thelatter. So in respect of being, the potential sense-object chimes in withthe actual and potential sense with actual. But they are discrepantin that actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object, whereaspotential sense is not the same as the potential sense-object. And thatis reasonable. For there is nothing here to make them grow togetherand unite them. In the case of the actuals the forms of the sense-objects come to be in the activity of the sense, and thereby make acertain relationship and natural junction. The activity itself joinstogether and makes sense object and sense the same. In the case ofthe potentials the forms of the sense-objects have not yet come to theactivity of the sense, and therefore there has not yet arisen commu-

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nity and unity. On this account, then, actual sense is the same as theactual sense-object, but potential sense is not the same as the poten-tial sense-object.

But the Protagoreans did not draw this distinction. They said thatsense and sense-object are the same without distinguishing andsaying that the actual are the same but the potential not. And thatis not surprising. For the Protagoreans did not admit that there wasthe potential at all, or provide any subsistence for sense-objects. Theysaid that sense-objects only are so long as they fall under sense, sincethey did not speak of the potential sense-object but only of the actual,and called it the ‘offspring’ of the senses.58 If we see, they say, thereis colour, and if not, there is not. For sweet and white are byconvention. So they spoke well, even if without drawing distinctions,for this reason, that sense and sense-object are the same. So if theyhad ever said ‘actual’ the conclusion would have followed.59

That is the first corollary. In the second he enquires why theextremes of sense-objects destroy the actual sense. He shows this asfollows. Actual sense is a consonance, a consonance is a proportion,and a proportion is destroyed by too little and by excess. For example,6 has to 3 a ratio of double, as does 1 to 2. If you add 1 to 2, the doubleis not preserved, and if you take 1 from 6 the double is not preserved.The ratio will not tolerate addition to or reduction from one term. ‘Oneterm’ is well said, for if you add to both, for example if you add 1 to 3and 2 to 6, the ratio of double is preserved in 8 to 4; that is why ‘one’is said. If a ratio, then, will not tolerate addition to one term orreduction, but is destroyed, neither, it follows, will the sense accepta reduction or increment of the sense-object, but is destroyed. Butexcess destroys all at once – for if it lays hold of it, at that moment itis affected and either forced apart or compacted, and destroyed.Whereas defect causes harm over time. For not acting is harmful.People in caves, if for a long time they do not see, become blind, justas people who do not hear suffer the same thing simply through notacting, in accordance with the Hippocratic saying ‘Movementstrengthens, inactivity wastes’.

We have set out the argument generally for sense and sense-object,but he sets it out for hearing, and rightly, because in the case ofhearing there is a word both for the subject, ‘sounding’ and for thesense, ‘hearing’. In the case of sight and taste it has been said thatthere is not a word for the subject. And he has another reason forsetting it out for hearing: he mentions consonance, and ‘consonance’is properly applied to sound, as we shall show. Sound is the subjectof hearing. That is why he sets out the argument for hearing.

He carries the argument on as follows. If actual hearing is the sameas sound, and sound is a consonance, not of itself to itself but tohearing (for that is what the argument wants, but he calls the

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community ‘consonance’)60 – if sound, then, is a consonance, andconsonance a proportionality – that is, a proportionality of the soundto the sense of hearing (and by ‘proportionality’ he does not meanmixture; for that is not what he thinks, but just as we say that theburden has a proportionality to the shoulder for being carried, but notthat there is also a mixture, so also sound has proportionality tohearing through being the same in subject, but there is no mixture)– if, then, the consonance is a proportion, and a proportion does nottolerate addition to one term – and so on as was said above.

But Syrianus61 thinks fit to say that even if he had not mentionedsound in the construction, the argument would not be defective. Forif he says ‘Actual hearing is a consonance’ it is clear that hearing is aconsonance with that of which it is the hearing; and what is that, ifnot sound? So it is included. And if he had said only ‘sound’,62 hearingwould have been included. For with what is sound a consonance if notwith that to which it is sound? And it is sound to hearing. Why, then,does he mention sound? On account of consonance, in order to showthat ‘consonance’ is said properly of sound. Or perhaps he wanted alsoto say both in order to say what the things are that have somethingin common.

The philosopher Ammonius63 raises the problem: why does heconclude that actual sense is a consonance through the actual sense-object as middle term? Why does he not say straight off that actualsense is a consonance? For it is consonance as the actual sense-objectis. If, then, each is a consonance through an attunement to the other,why on earth does he allot the consonance [initially] not to the sensebut to the actual sense-object? That is Ammonius’ difficulty, and heresolves it by saying that ‘consonance’ is taken from ‘sound’, as theword itself shows, and sound is a sense-object. For this reason, then,he allots consonance to the actual sense-object and not to the actualsense.

That, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition.

425b28-9 For it is possible for that which has hearing not tohear

First he says that the actual sense and the actual sense-object are thesame in subject, since it is ‘in being’, that is, in account, that theydiffer, just as ascent and descent are the same in subject (both are onthe ladder) but differ in account (for going up is one thing and goingdown another). Then he says that this fits only the actuals; it doesnot fit the potentials. For there are also potential sense andpotential sense-object. It is possible for someone who has <hear-ing>64 not to hear; for if the hearing belongs potentially he does not

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hear; and again if the object is [only] potentially a thing heard he doesnot hear it.

426a2-3 If change and acting and the affection are in the thingacted on65

Here he sets out the speculation from the Physics66 that actual senseis the same in subject as the actual sense-object but different in theway it is related. Change differs from acting in that where there ischange there is acting, but it is not the case that wherever there isacting there is change. The Creator67 acts, but acts without himselfbeing changed. Affection and action are changes, but this change, ifit is related to the agent, is called ‘action’, and if to the thing affected,‘affection’. He says ‘in the thing acted on’ in place of ‘in the thingaffected’. He wants to reach the conclusion that, if affection and actionare the same in subject (for both are changes), and change is in thething acted on, that is, the thing affected, then necessarily, as he says,the actual sense and the actual sense-object are the same. For thesense is a kind of patient and the sense-object a kind of agent. Thatchange is in the patient is clear. For if it were in the agent, everythingwhich changes [something else] will itself be changed, even the FirstCause, which is absurd.

426a3-4 [Necessarily also] actual [sound and] hearing are in thepotential68

The text lacks the word ‘hearing’ so as to give ‘in the potential hearing’[i.e. the organ of hearing].

426a5-6 That is why it is not necessary that what changesshould itself be changed

Then, having taken the assumption, he digresses and says thatchange is not in the changer but in the thing changed. For if it werein the changer, it too would be changed.

426a7 The [activity] of that which hears is hearing or audition69

Hearing is one thing, audition another. Hearing is the activity itself,audition is the laying hold, just as the clap itself is called ‘sound’ andthe affection arising in me from the clap is called ‘sounding’.70 Know-ing, then, that they differ, he differentiates them by saying [a7-8]‘Hearing is twofold and sound is twofold’. There are the potential andthe actual.

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426a10-11 [For just as the action and the affection are in thething affected,] so also the activity of the sense-object and theactivity of that which perceives are in that which perceives71

To make clear what is said, let us set out the argument with a model.When a carpenter makes a door his activity is in the wood and theaffection of the wood is in the wood itself; and in the same way, whenwe see, the activity of the sense-object, of colour, say, is in sight, andthe change of that which perceives (by ‘that which perceives’ he meansthe sense, [calling it] from the subject) is also in sight itself and notin the sense-object, that is, the colour, any more than [the changecaused by the carpenter is] in the carpenter.

426a11-12 But in some cases there are names for them, forinstance ‘sounding’ and ‘audition’72

Why, if in the case of hearing, we have both ‘audition’ from the senseand ‘sounding’ from the sense-object that is its subject, do we not alsospeak thus in the case of seeing? Why do we have ‘seeing’ [taking theword] from the sense but not ‘colouring’ from the subject? We reply,because ‘colouring’ indicates nothing else but the coloured body [theword being taken] from its having colour, something other than it, soit does not come from the subject itself, whereas ‘sounding’ comes fromthe subject itself. We also enquire: why do we not say ‘flavouring’ fromthe subject of taste, as we say ‘taste’ from the sense. To this reply: thename ‘flavouring’ is a cookery-term, so it is not used in connectionwith natural things.

426a15-16 And since the activity of that which perceives andthe activity of the sense-object are one, though they differ inbeing, they [the hearing and the sound, spoken of in this way73]must pass away together and be preserved together

Here he derives the first corollary of the fact that the actual sense isthe same as the actual sense-object – the same in subject, that is, butdifferent in how it is related. But we ought not to call this a ‘corollary’.For it is not because they are different [only] in account that it followsthey pass away and are preserved together, as he says, but because theyare relatives. So we ought to call this another thesis, and not a corollary.

426a19 But with those that are potential, it is not necessary

But with potentials, he says, it is not necessary. What is not neces-sary? Not that they should be together. It is necessary that they

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should be together by the law of relatives. That which is potentialsense-object exists together with potential sense, as the actual sense-object does with the actual sense. What, then does he say is ‘notnecessary’? Clearly the first, that it is not necessary that potentialsense should be the same as the potential sense-object, as we said inthe continuous exposition.

426a22 [But the physicists of the past] in part spoke correctly,in part incorrectly [thinking there is nothing white or blackwithout sight]

He is hinting at the Protagoreans. He says that they spoke correctlyin saying that actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object. Butthey did not speak correctly in that they said the potential also werethe same, and said without qualification that all were the same whenthey should not have said without qualification that they were thesame. Plato too refutes this doctrine in his dialogue the Protagoras.74

426a27 Since some sound is a consonance75

The ê in the second syllable of eidê is not the definite article but partof a connective. It is as if he had said ‘Since some sound is aconsonance’. What is the ‘some sound’? Clearly actual sound. It is thatwhich is proportionally related to actual hearing. It [ê] cannot be adefinite article since it is attached to the predicate. For definitearticles are equivalent to further differentiations76 and further differ-entiations are always attached to the subject. But here he takes‘consonance’ as the predicate of hearing and sound. Therefore weought not to take the ê as a definite article, since otherwise it willbe found to be construed with the predicate. So say that ei dê is onepart of speech. Here is the second corollary mentioned in the con-tinuous exposition. In it he wants to say why the extremes ofsense-objects destroy the senses. He does this through consonanceand proportion, as was said.

426a27-8 Sound and hearing are in a way one and in a way notone.77

This is well said. Sound and hearing are one in subject but in accountand in how they are related not one but different. So they are one andnot one.

426a28-9 and consonance is a proportion

He says this to show that the consonance of hearing with sound is not

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a mixture but they are consonant by virtue of a proportion. In thecontinuous exposition it is said how.

426a30 [Hearing too must be a kind of proportion.] And on thisaccount each [object] that is excessive destroys [hearing]

That the excessive destroys should be taken as common, as applyingto hearing, taste, sight and smell. For excesses destroy the senses.Each sense has things that destroy it, sight the overbright, such asthe light of the sun, hearing the sound of thunder, smell mephiticvapours, taste poisons, and touch fire and snow. That is why arts havebeen conceived that please the senses, painting for sight, music forhearing, scent-making for smell, cookery for taste, and for touch,baths and weaving.

426b2-3 and sweet and bitter things, because the sense is a kindof proportion

Wishing to give examples of sense-objects that destroy the sense, healso adduces sweet. Perhaps this destroys the sense by breaking itup, as too does the fatty. He says ‘because the sense is a kind ofproportion’ because sense, he says, is a proportion, and a proportiondoes not tolerate excess. Therefore neither does sense, being a pro-portion and a kind of commensurability.

426b3-4 Which is why they are also pleasant, when they arebrought pure and unmixed to the proportion, for instance thesharp, the sweet, the salty

Here he wants to say what sort of sense-object is pleasant, and hesays that that sense-object is pleasant which is first pure and un-mixed, but does not remain pure,78 but is brought to proportion, thatis, to mixture. Things that are mixed are pleasant through purifyingthe extreme, for instance the low and the high are not pleasant if youdo not mix them; for consonance and pleasure follow the mixture asa mean.

426b6 And to touch, the warm and the cool79

To touch, he says, the warm and the cool are pleasant. And notice howhe says ‘the warm’, that is, that which can warm, and ‘the cool’, thatwhich can cool. For they are pleasant when they can receive temper-ing. Disproportionate cold and hot are painful. He does well, then tosay that what is pleasant to touch is warm and cool, not hot and cold.

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If he had said the latter he would have meant the extremely hot andcold, which do not please touch but actually destroy it.

That is the lecture.

[LECTURE 5]

426b8-9 Each sense, then, has its subject sense-object, andbelongs in the sense-organ as such.

He has discussed the five senses and taught that there is not anothersixth sense contradistinguished from the five; and lest anyone shouldthink, because of this argument, that there is not the common senseeither, he wants through what follows to show that there is thecommon sense; not only that, but that this common sense is alsoincorporeal; and in addition, thirdly, that it acts atemporally. For itis not the case that it knows sweet at one time and white at another,but at the same now80 it knows that this is sweet and that that iswhite. Fourthly, he puts forward a problem about the common senseand gives a false solution; then he refutes the false solution; and then,after this, gives the true solution. That is the plan of the continuousexposition; come, let us spread each of these things out.

First, then, that there is the common sense is to be shown asfollows. Since we know not only that things of the same kind differ,things like white, black, grey, yellow and so on, but also that hetero-geneous things do like white and sweet, we must enquire what partof the soul it is that gets to know this difference. For even if intellectgets to know this sort of difference and says that white is differentfrom sweet, still, it is not of itself that intellect states this sort ofdifference, but it brings in sense to use as a tool. Without sense itwould not be possible to know sense-objects. So if white and sweet aresense-objects, how can intellect know them without bringing in senseto use as a tool? Neither immediately nor of itself would intellect beable to say they are different. And [there is the further argument]that things which do not have intellect know that these things differ.At least a dog, simply looking and not tasting, knows things that canbe tasted. At least, it knows that meat is tastable, even if it does nottaste it but only looks, and that a stone is not tastable even beforetasting. So it is not intellect that says sweet is different from white,but sense.

What sense? Is it one of the five, or two of them, for instance sightand taste? We say it does not belong to one sense to know this sort ofdifference. If it were one sense that knows this difference, then itwould know not only its own sense-object but one belonging toanother. For what gets to know a difference first knows what thediffering things are, if it is to know also in what respect they differ.

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The sense, then, which gets to know that white differs from sweet willknow not only white but also sweet. But this is absurd, to fuse thesenses and say that sight knows gustatory qualities. So it is absurdto say that one of the five senses knows how heterogeneous objectsdiffer.

And let no one say that it is not necessary to know sense-objectsbelonging to another [sense]: once it knows its own objects, thatsomething is white, it then knows by denial that something is notwhite; and it knows the difference in this way, by knowing that it isnot white. Let no one say this; for we are asking not ‘What is it thatgets to know that white differs from not white?’ but ‘from sweet?’ Thenot-white could also be odour or hot; but we said in a determinate way‘sweet’. We must definitely, then, know the sweet positively, if we areto learn its difference from white. So it is not one sense that knowsthis sort of difference.

Nor two senses, for instance sight and taste. For it should be onething that states their difference. For if it is not one thing that receivesthe forms of both, how will it be able to know how they differ, withone sense receiving the white form and the other the sweet? Forjudges too want to hear both sides to get to know how they differ. If,then, what states the difference of white from sweet is one thing, whatdiscerns it will be one thing too. So it is a property neither of the twosenses to know that these things differ, nor of one particular sense.So it belongs to another sense besides the five to know that whitediffers from sweet. Is this divided off from the five senses or not? Wereply that it is not. For it has been shown that there is not anothersixth sense divided off from these five. So it is common. It has beenshown, then, that there is the common sense. That completes the firstsection.

In the second section he shows that the common sense is not a body.If it was a body it would function part by part, for every body functionspart by part. So if it were a body it would never receive both sweetand white in the same part, but in one of its parts it would receivesweet, in another white, and there would not be a thing that discernsat all. Such a state of affairs, he says, would be as if you perceivedthis and I that. So the whole common sense as a whole perceives sweetand white. If the whole did not lay hold of them as a whole, how couldit discern them, not getting to know both? And even if I concede thatwhite and sweet can be received in the same part, contrary qualitiescannot, qualities like white and black or hot and cold.

And besides, if it were a body it would have to act by touching thesense-objects. For every body acts by touching. But the common sensedoes not act by touching the sense-objects. So it is not a body. That isthe second section.

In the third section he shows that it functions atemporally. He

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shows this as follows. As the common sense speaks, so also it gets toknow. So if it states at a single now that sweet is different from white,and it is not the case that at one now it states white to be differentand at another sweet, it clearly follows that it is also at a single nowthat it knows that sweet is different from white. For when thecommon sense states at one now it states [at one now] not incidentallybut of itself, just as, to take an example, think of this statement ofmine: ‘I now hear that Plato when he came to Sicily fell in withSocrates.’ Look! Here ‘now’ relates of itself to my hearing, for it is now,in reality, that I hear. Whereas in relation to Plato’s arrival ‘now’ isincidental.81 For even if I now hear, there is nothing absurd in hishaving got there long ago. But if it should happen that a seafight nowtakes place, and in the now in which it took place I said ‘I now heara seafight is taking place’, then ‘now’ applies <of itself> in relation tome (for I now hear) and also of itself in relation to the seafight; forthat too takes place now. The common sense, then, in that same nowin which it states that white is different from sweet also perceives thedifference. The ‘now’ belongs of itself both to the saying and to theknowing. So the common sense acts atemporally. That is the thirdsection.

In the fourth section he puts forward the problem. How, he asks,does the common sense discern contraries, for instance white andblack or hot and cold? For it discerns not only heterogeneous objectsbut objects of the same kind. So it is worthwhile to raise the difficultyhow contrary forms come to the common sense. If it were a body therewould be no difficulty. We could say that one contrary comes to onepart and another to another. But since it is incorporeal and withoutparts we raise the difficulty: how do contrary forms come to be in thesame thing? And again, if, though it were incorporeal, it actedtemporally, we could say that one contrary comes at one time andanother at another – for instance at this time hot and at that timecold. But since it acts atemporally and at the same now, for this reasonit is worthwhile to raise the difficulty. So the difficulty acquiresformidability from the two preceding sections. If it were a body therewould be no problem (for it could receive the contraries in differentparts), and if, though incorporeal, it acted temporally, again it couldreceive the contraries at different times. But since it both is incorpo-real and acts atemporally, because of this we raise the problem howit receives contrary forms at the same time.

That is the problem. He sets it out in relation to the common sense.But it fits the particular senses more. For they lay hold of contrariesmore than does the common sense. But the common sense lays holdof the things of which the particular senses lay hold, whereas theparticular senses do not in all cases lay hold of the things of which

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the common sense lays hold. So for this reason he sets out thedifficulty in relation to the common sense.

Such is the difficulty. Then he resolves it as follows. He says thatthe common sense is both one and many, one in subject but many inhow it is related, which is to say, in account. The other senses issuefrom the common sense as from a common spring, so the latter is onein subject but many in account. Insofar as it is one, it discerns thedifference, and insofar as it is many in account it receives thecontraries.

That is the false solution. Aristotle refutes it by saying that thingswhich are the same in subject and different in account, while they arein potentiality can receive opposites, but cannot receive oppositeswhen they come to be actual. For example, the hot and the cold arethe same in subject, for they come to be in one subject, and differ inaccount; but still they cannot be actual at the same time. Neither,then, can the common sense, because it is one in subject and many inaccount, go further and receive contrary forms of sense-objects at thesame time.

Having thus refuted the false solution, he gives another solutionthat is true. He says that the common sense is one in subject and alsomany in subject. This is how this solution differs from the former: theformer said that the common sense is one in subject and many inaccount, whereas this says it is both one and many in subject. To tryout the account with a model, think, please, of a centre and fivestraight lines running out from it and then diverging from oneanother. This centre is both one in relation to its own nature and alsomany. For that one is the end-point of each line even after they havediverged from one another. And do not say: ‘How, being without parts,can it be distributed to each of them?’ Such is the nature of incorporealthings, just as animal at least, is both one in nature and many, forthe whole of it is present as a whole in each individual’s nature. If,then, the common sense is both one and many in subject, as one itthereby discriminates, but as many it gets to know many things, evenif they should be contraries.

That is what the text says. But since this exposition is a bit logical,let us conceive a more physical solution.82 Here it is. The commonsense itself is incorporeal. But it is in the body as subject, for thepneumatic body83 is its subject. The forms of sense-objects, even ifthey are contrary, come to be in the pneumatic body one in one partand another in another. Then this power discerns the affections inthe pneuma. That is how we resolve the argument, and we say thatthe contrary forms come to be not in something without parts but insomething that has parts, namely the pneumatic [body], one in onepart and another in another. Say also that in a material way it doesnot lay hold of the contraries together, but in discerning it does lay

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hold of them together, since it discerns the contraries at the sametime. But if you attend, not even in discerning. For it is said in the deInterpretatione84 that contrary opinions are not those that say con-trary things about contraries, for instance that white forces apart andblack compacts, but those that say contrary things about the samething, for instance that white both forces apart and compacts. Theseare contrary opinions. So if the common sense says that white forcesapart and black compacts, it will not in any way be affected, sincedoes not make contrary discernments, but both are true, and it hasnot declared contrary things of the same thing. So even in discerningit does not lay hold of opposites.

So the foregoing solution is fine. And note that though he blamesPlato for mathematicising nature, he himself resolved physical mat-ters through mathematical. For look! He gives a solution through amathematical point. But to this we reply that Plato is not blamed forresolving physical matters through mathematical, but because heconstructs physical magnitudes out of mathematical.

After saying this, because he says that imagination and commonsense are the same he sets out the discussion of imagination and turnsto the teaching on the rational soul so as to show that this and notthe non-rational is what first sets in motion.

That is the continuous exposition.

426b8-9 Each sense, then, has its subject sense-object, andbelongs in the sense-organ as such

Each sense, he says, lays hold of its own sense-objects and is in itsown sense-organ, when the organ is in its natural state. By ‘sense-organ’ he means either the pneuma or the shell-like.85 The sense,then, which is in the sense-organ itself knows the objects of the samekind, and from here naturally sends them on to the common sense.For if each sense knows the objects of the same kind which arecontrary, and the common sense knows the heterogeneous objects,it follows that there is a common sense. Plato too before Aristotleinvokes a common sense when he says ‘if not, we are like people inthe wooden horse’:86 there is no sense in the wooden horse commonto those men.

426b12-15 But since we discern87 white and sweet and each ofthe sense-objects in relation to each, by what do we have thefurther perception that they differ? By sense, necessarily, sincethey are sense-objects

It is necessary, he says, that we get to know heterogeneous objects bysome sense, because we are laying hold of sense-objects, and sense-

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objects are so called with reference to senses, [arguing] as though onthe ground that reason does not lay hold of sense-objects; so he hasnot shown anything from this.88 We, however, gave a fine proof[478,11-15] from non-rational [animals] of this, that it does not belongto the rational [soul]. For indeed a dog discerns that sweet is differentfrom white, since it does not go for everything white – it does not gofor a stone – but only for what is succulent.

426b15-16 Hence also it is clear that flesh is not the lastsense-organ

Here is the second section. And note that he calls the body ‘flesh’ andthe sense ‘sense-organ’. He ought to have referred to that and saidthat the last sense is not the body. But he himself says that the lastsense-organ is not flesh. By ‘the last sense’ the common sense shouldbe understood. He calls it ‘last’ because the senses are brought to theirtermination there and the imprints in them, having gone through all,come to it. If, he says, the common sense were a body then it wouldhave to be by touching the sense-objects that it discerns them. And[another reason why the common sense is not corporeal is] because itdoes not perceive in a separated way, by different parts of the bodyin which it is, since that would be as if I perceived this and you that.For if there is not one power that discerns the white and the sweet,that is as if there were two people who perceived different objects andsaid they were different, though each did not know what the otherperceived.

426b20-1 But the one must say that they are other

One sense, he says, must say that sweet and white are other and thatwhite and sweet are. The same thing says it, and what says it shouldnot be a separated body.

426b22 So as it is with saying, so it is with thinking andperceiving89

He says ‘think’ in place of ‘imagine’.

426b23-4 And that it is not possible [to discern separate things]in a separate time either [is clear from this]

Here he gives the third section of the continuous exposition, that thecommon sense acts atemporally. Just, he says, as it is one incorporealsense that says that good is different from bad, so it follows that whenit says that bad is different from good it says it at the same primary

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time. For it says both now, now in the genuine [use of] ‘now’; not inthe incidental, as when what happened long ago I now say hashappened – as though because I now hear of it, the Trojan War werenow happening. ‘Now’ is said in the genuine way when I now knowwhat is now happening; and he says that in the same way the commonsense too pronounces its differentiation according to the genuine useof ‘now’. When it perceives it differentiates – for to act in connectionwith what is absent belongs to imagination.

426b28-9 So it is inseparable and [differentiates] at an insepa-rable time

This is the common conclusion of the two sections. He says that if atthe same time, at the same now, it differentiates the sweet from thewhite and the other, that is, the white from the sweet, clearly it bothis inseparable, that is, incorporeal,90 and acts at an inseparable time,that is, atemporally.

426b29-30 But the same thing cannot be affected by contrarychanges at the same time.

Here is the fourth section of the continuous exposition. He opens upthe problem and asks: if the common sense is incorporeal and actsatemporally, how can it lay hold of contraries at the same time? Forif it were a body, one part could lay hold of white and another of blackat the same time.

427a1 [If it is sweet, it changes sense or] thought [in one way]91

He means [by ‘thought’] either imagination or the activity of intellect.

427a2-3 Is what discerns, then, at once undivided in numberand inseparable in time,92 [but separated in being?]

Here is the false solution of the problem. He calls it ‘one in numberand inseparable in time’ that is, one in subject, but many in account.But instead of saying ‘in account’ he says many ‘in being’ [a3]. Insofaras it is many, then, it receives contraries, and insofar as it is one itdiscerns them. In account it is divisible, that is many – for what is dividedbecomes many – but in subject it is undivided and one. Wanting toindicate the subject, he says ‘undivided in number and place’ [a5].

427a5-6 Or is that impossible?

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potentiality, he says, the same thing can receive contraries and beundivided. ‘But not in being’ [a7], this in place of saying ‘in actualityit cannot receive contraries’, For in acting it is divided. For when thewhite, say, and the black are acting the subject is divided and tornapart, and does not remain undivided.

427a9-11 But it is like what some call a ‘point’: as it is one andtwo, so it is also divided93

Here is the second solution. Just as a point is both one as a point andtwo or many insofar as it terminates straight lines together, and, asmany, is separated: so too is the sense. Insofar as it is like a point,the perceiving thing is one and together, but insofar as it is thecommon exit for the sense-objects, as the point is for the lines, it isalso two and discerns many. But insofar as it is one, it lays holdtogether and atemporally.

427a14-16 Concerning the source, then, by which we say thatan animal is a thing that perceives, let our determination bemade like this.

He says ‘by which’ in place of ‘by virtue of which’. Not that an animalhas several sources: it is not for that reason that Aristotle says ‘I amspeaking of that source by which we say an animal perceives’, butbecause it is one and many, as Plutarch says.

That, with God’s help, completes the lecture and the first Division.

[SECOND DIVISION]

[LECTURE 1]

427a17-19 But since people define the soul chiefly by twodifferentiating features, change in respect of place and thinking,discerning94 and perceiving, etc.

Because changing all at once is bad, both in speech and in action, forthis reason he does not go straight from the non-rational [soul] to therational, but first states a certain differentiation of the cognitivepowers of the non-rational and the rational; he then also differenti-ates imagination from the cognition of reason; and in the middle hedifferentiates imagination from the particular senses, differentiatingthe non-rational [soul] in relation to itself, which was not his aim.And he says that imagination is not sense or opinion, neither does itconsist of both.

But before differentiating these things, wishing to make the differ-

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entiation all the greater he says what they have in common. Thecognitions of the non-rational and the rational have this in common,he says, that they are both discernments. And they have somethingelse in common, inasmuch as people in the past confused the cognitivepowers of the rational and the non-rational. For they called theactivities of the senses ‘intelligence’; they called non-rational activityby the name of rational, calling sense and imagination ‘intelligence’.Empedocles did this when he said: ‘Shrewdness for human beingsgrows in relation to what is present.’95 For from this usage we inferthat he said shrewdness and intelligence deal with sense-objects. Thesyllogism goes like this. Sense lays hold of sense-objects. What layshold of sense-objects lays hold of things present. So sense lays holdof things present. It is thus concluded in the first figure that sense iswhat lays hold of things that are present, and he calls this ‘shrewd-ness’. So he confused the names and called sense ‘intellect’.

Some, however, say that it is not intellect he called ‘shrewdness’but thought: for he says that thought is active in relation to what ispresent. And he uses ‘grows’ instead of ‘is active’, and does well to say‘increases’. For activity increases a power just as, on the contrary,inactivity harms it. For ‘movement strengthens’.96 If he says, then,that thought is active about things that are present, and what ispresent is known by sense, it follows that <he says> that sense andthought are the same.

But this is ill taken. For sense is not the only thing that is activeabout what is present: thought is too. Indeed, it is more so, becausesense has its sense-object external to it, whereas thought has its ownproper thing within, and brings it out when it wishes. So even if hesays that thought is active about what is present, he does not makeit sense. And we can say the same if by ‘shrewdness’97 he meansintellect. That is the first usage of words; we have now shown it getshim nowhere.

But he brings forward another usage by Empedocles, which reallyis to the point. Saying what differentiates dreams, Empedocles saysthat it is from activities by day that nocturnal imaginings arise. Andhe calls this imagination ‘thinking’98 where he says ‘Whence it befallsthem always to judge things that are other’.99 Look! You can see fromfar off that he calls cognition by the non-rational [soul], imagination,I mean, ‘thinking’. And Empedocles is not alone. Homer himself says:‘Such is the mind of earth-dwelling men as the father of gods and mendirects each succeeding day.’100 By ‘mind’ he here means sense, andby ‘day’ the sense-object. See then, he says, Homer too calls perception‘mind’ and there has arisen here a disturbance of names.

We, however, say on Homer’s behalf: ‘O Aristotle, you have under-stood the distich ill. By “mind” he means “mind”, and by “day” hemeans not the sense-object but fortune or fate. The idea behind the

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lines is this, that the mind of human beings is as their fortunedetermines.’ The distich is like what is said in the tragedy, ‘We haveminds according to our fortunes.’101 For when someone is poor he ismodest in character but when he has becomes rich he becomesboorish. But this does not fit everyone, that their minds are as theirfortunes, but only those who are careless, debauched and matter-bound in their life. Hence the poet did not say simply ‘men’ and leaveit at that, but added ‘earth-dwelling’, thereby making clear to us thematter-bound character of their life. Those whose life is not matter-bound do not change with fortune in the same way. So Homer’s usagedid not confound names either.

And some plead in defence of Empedocles too that dreams do notarise only from traces left behind by the senses, but from other thingsalso. They have three causes. One is the one mentioned, whenimagination makes the dreams out of the senses. But the rational soultoo is responsible for dreams, when it finds the solution to an enquiry;and so is divine illumination when we foretell the future. So if he says‘Whence it befalls them always to judge things that are other’, he hashis gaze on dreams from the rational soul. Thinking becomes otherin dreams because during the night the physical powers are moreevident and the rational soul is blunted; the latter acts more duringthe day.

Aristotle has a further complaint against Empedocles: not onlydoes he confuse names, but also when he said that like is known bylike he spoke about cognition, but not about error; though he oughtto have spoken about error more than about knowledge because ourerror is more extensive. The cause of this is coming to be102 and thesoul’s dimness of vision in matter. Just as in a pestilential districtthere are more sick people than healthy, so when souls are in a stateof coming to be, ignorance prevails over knowledge. Since, then, weare more in error he ought to have spoken more about error. ForEmpedocles is not of the opinion that error does not exist. The opinionitself that there is no such thing as error was refuted by Plato. If,then, he is of the opinion that there is no such thing as error, let himbe refuted by the Protagorean arguments.103 If he is of the opinionthat there is such a thing, why does he not give its cause? Perhaps,then, we should infer that if cognition is cognition of what is like, itfollows that error is contact with what is unlike, and through oneopposite he wants us to understand the other opposite as well. Thisdoes follow for him. But we do not agree that knowledge is cognitionof what is like. We refute this by a syllogism. If the knowledge ofcontraries is one and the same, and contraries are unlike, it followsthat like does not come to be known by like. For see! The knowledgeis one, and it knows two contraries. If the knowledge, then, is like oneof the contraries, it follows that it is not like the other; yet it gets to

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know it. So like does not come to be known by like, O Empedocles. Ifcognition, then, is not contact with what is like, neither is errorcontact with what is unlike. So much in opposition to Empedocles.

Then he says how the cognitive powers of the non-rational [soul],which are sense and imagination, differ from those of the rational.And first he says what differentiates sense from intellect becausethese also have a great deal in common. For they alone of the powersboth of the non-rational soul and of the rational intuit things in anindivisible way. For sense lays hold of its own sense-objects atempo-rally, as was shown a little way above,104 and intellect similarly actsatemporally. Since, then, they have much in common, for that reasonhe starts by saying how they differ. Intellect differs from sense, then,in that sense is in all animals whereas intellect is not: it is in manalone. That is how intellect and sense differ.

Next he says how sense differs from thought. He says that sensedoes not readily err, whereas thought errs readily. Thought errsreadily for two reasons: either because sense is occupied with thingsthat are plain and clear, and thought with things that are hidden; orbecause sense intuits things atemporally and, to put it simply, at thefirst attempt, whereas thought proceeds through intermediate pre-misses and conclusions, from which error tends to arise. For it is onlythought that syllogises, whence also it errs. These are the two reasonson account of which thought errs. Sense differs from thought, then,either in this or because sense belongs to all animals and thought tothose that have reason.

Then, after that, he says how imagination differs from sense andthought. He says imagination differs from them in that it is interme-diate between sense and thought. It starts from sense; sense givesimagination starting points. The latter then gives starting points tothought, for without imagination, thought cannot act. That is howimagination differs from sense and thought.

Then, in addition, he says how opinion and imagination differ. Wecan imagine what we want (for we can imagine both a three-cubitman and a twenty-cubit man, and we can form an image of a goat-stagand a centaur).105 But we cannot be of whatever opinion we want. Wecan say that twice two are ten, but not be of that opinion, and say thatfire does not heat, but not be of that opinion. So imagination is in ourpower, whereas opinion is not in our power.

But if truth is to be told, not all imagination is in our power either.For that which occurs in sleep is not: we do not imagine in sleep thethings we want. And why do I say ‘in sleep’? Not all imagining thatoccurs when we are awake [is in our power]. For when I imaginethings that are as they are, I cannot imagine them except as they are.For instance if I want to imagine Socrates, I cannot imagine himelegant and fair-skinned and long-haired. I have to imagine him bald

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and dark-skinned and pot-bellied. So the precise difference is this,that opinion is never in our power, whereas imagination is sometimesin our power. That is the first difference.

And I state a second difference too, like this. When we haveimagined war we are never frightened, but we are as if we were seeingit in a picture; but being of the opinion that there is a war we areimmediately frightened. That is the second difference. Against it thefollowing difficulty may be raised. ‘What do you mean, when weimagine fearsome things we are not agitated? A horse does not haveopinion. But if it sees a whip raised it backs away as though fright-ened by the imagination of fearsome things.’ That is the difficulty. Toit we reply that this is assent,106 which of itself belongs to opinion andis the substance of opinion, but which is incidental to imagination. Sowhen, opining fearsome things, I assent, I am agitated, and againwhen, imagining fearsome things, I assent, I am agitated. The horsetoo, then, is agitated by the imagination because of assent; since ifassent does not occur it is not agitated.

That being said, that, with God’s help, completes the continuousexposition.

427a17-18 But since people define the soul chiefly by twodifferentiating features, change in respect of place and thinkingand discerning

Alexander thinks the ‘since’ is to no purpose, because there is no mainclause. Plutarch, however, says that the main clause comes furtherdown, where he says ‘that perceiving and exercising judgement arenot the same [is plain]’ [427b6-7]. The meaning of the whole passageis this. Since people in the past defined the soul by two differentiatingfeatures, by change in respect of place and by thinking and discerningand perceiving, and understood thought and perceiving to be one andthe same thing, that exercising judgement and perceiving are not thesame is plain from this. Aristotle does this in order to convict Homerand Empedocles of going astray about names. It should be noted thathe takes ‘discerning’ in rather a wide sense to apply both to therational and to the non-rational [soul], whereas he applies ‘thinking’only to the rational and ‘perceiving’ only to the non-rational.

427a19-20 And thinking and exercising judgement seem to belike perceiving something, for in both of them the soul discerns

In the present passage Aristotle goes through the reason for people’sgoing astray in the past and the point from which they went astray.He says that since discernment is common both to sense and to all

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other cognition, for that reason they understood them all to be thesame, and that became the cause of their going astray.

427a28-9 As we made distinct also in our opening remarks107

For it was said above that cognition comes about by what is like; wequoted ‘By earth we have a sight of earth and by water of water’, andthe other sayings of Empedocles. Here he takes up another Empedo-clean point: he says he makes thought the same as touch. For he saysthat intelligence comes from contact with the like. Only touch layshold by contact. So he calls intelligence touch. But it is possible to sayto Aristotle that ‘contact’ is equivocal even in relation to the senses.The contact of touch is one thing and that of sight another. Grant,then, that there is another contact in the case of intelligence, and theconclusion does not follow that intelligence is the same as touch.

427b4 [Therefore of necessity either, as some say, all thatappears is true,] or error must be contact with the unlike

Just, he says, as contact with the like is cognition, so contact with theunlike is error, so you must not take ‘contact’ to be in all casestouching; it is equivocal, as we said. But if that is so, he says, and youknow what cognition is, you are also in possession of what error is.For cognition of opposites is one. But no chance difficulty now followsfor us. If cognition is by contact with the like, and cognition ofopposites is one, it follows that sense will become like opposites at thesame time, which is absurd; it acts by becoming like, and it lays holdof opposites at the same time. But there is nothing absurd in becominglike opposites in discernment. If air, though inanimate, discernscontraries at the same time, would it not be absurd if sense, which isanimate, did not discern opposites at the same time?

427b6-7 That perceiving and exercising judgement are not thesame, then, is plain

See the main clause for what was above.108 Since the soul is definedby two differentiating features, change and thinking, that the soul’scognition is not the same as sense is clear from this. The ‘then’ is putin because of what has been said in between. In the past it was thecustom, when the main clause in a long sentence arrived, to add ‘then’.And see that here he says loosely that the contemplative intellect‘exercises judgement’. This belongs to potential intellect. Since, then,he uses certain words sometimes speaking accurately and sometimesloosely, let us level up the roughness of his speech by a division.

Cognition [gnôsis] either comes about in connection with external

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things and makes sense [aisthêsis], or it comes about in connectionwith internal things and makes intelligence [noêsis] in the broadersense. It is rightly called ‘broader’ because imagination too acts inconnection with things that are internal, and this is called ‘passiveintellect’ [nous pathêtikos]. But activity in connection with internalobjects is occupied either with something universal or with somethingparticular. If with what is particular, it makes imagination [phanta-sia]; if with what is universal, it makes what is genuinely intellect[nous]. But cognition about universals itself is either better than[knowledge] by inference [sullogismos], in which case it makes con-templative intellect [theôrêtikos nous] dispositional [kath’ hexin] andactual [kat’ energeian] or it acts by inference, and makes what isgenuinely thought [dianoia] and in the broader sense supposal [hu-polêpsis]. For ‘supposal’ is applied both to thought and to opinion[doxa]. But if it acts worse than by inference it makes what isgenuinely opinion and supposal. Thought occurs either in connectionwith things we contemplate, in which case it makes systematicknowledge [epistêmê], or in connection with things to be done. And ifthe things to be done require deliberation [boulê] it makes practicaljudgement [phronêsis] – for practical judgement requires delibera-tion. But if the things to be done do not require deliberation,109 itmakes skills [tekhnai]. For the man of skill, insofar as he is a man ofskill, does not deliberate, though insofar as he is a human being, hedoes.

From the division, then, it has appeared that he spoke loosely insaying here that the contemplative intellect exercises judgement. Inthe passage before us he differentiates actual intellect from sense, inthat sense belongs to every animal (for every animal is an animate,perceiving substance), whereas intellect does not belong to everyanimal, and even in those to which it does belong it is not alwayspresent in actuality, even if it is present dispositionally. And it ismatter for rejoicing if even in old age one receives the addition ofwisdom [sophia].

427b8-9 But neither is thinking, which comprises rightly andnot rightly [ neither is this the same as perceiving]

Neither is potential intellect, he says, the same as sense. Wishing tosay what potential intellect is, he says ‘which comprises rightly andnot rightly’. Here he states the difference between thought and sense.For he calls thought ‘potential intellect’. It is in it that can be seenwhat is right and what is not right. For actual intellect always thinksrightly. Either it makes contact or it does not, so it is inerrant. Butpotential intellect, that is, thought, sometimes thinks rightly andsometimes not rightly; for it sometimes attains truth and sometimes

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runs into falsehood. And that is how it differs from actual intellect,since the latter is inerrant. And he differentiates potential intellector thought from sense by this: sense on the whole attains truth aboutits own objects, when the further conditions are preserved, for in-stance that the distance is commensurate and the sense is unaffected,whereas thought on the whole runs into falsehood, since it is in theregion of error.

And do not think, because sense attains truth more than doesthought, that therefore it is also superior. For it is because of thesenses that thought runs into falsehood, because it is interwoven withthem. And indeed, when it is separated from its ragged garments itmakes demonstrative syllogisms and becomes very shrewd, as thepoet says ‘Then the very shrewd Odysseus stripped off his rags’.110

And do not think this puzzling, if in itself sense attains truth, butwhen interwoven with thought it becomes a contributory cause to itof error. That happens because when it acts by itself it is occupiedwith particular things, and it attains truth, whereas when it isinterwoven with thought, which acts in connection with universals,it makes it individualise the universals, from which error arises.Always the better is debased by the presence of the worse, while theworse is not debased by the better.

427b9-11 Rightly, in practical judgement, systematic know-ledge and true opinion, not rightly in the contraries of these111

Having said that potential intellect judges rightly and not rightly hestates those things that are proper to right [thinking], practicaljudgement, systematic knowledge and true opinion, and to [thinking]that is not right, practical folly, systematic error and false opinion.His illustrating rightness of intellect through practical judgement isloose, as has been said, but he illustrates rightness of thought throughsystematic knowledge. The other112 clearly is said with reference toopinion.

427b11 Neither is this the same as perceiving113

Having divided thought into thinking rightly and thinking notrightly, he then says how both are different from sense.

427b14-15 For imagination is different from both sense andthought

What does he mean? The connective [‘for’] is as if in relation to aproblem; it is as if someone were raising the difficulty: if sense isdifferent from intellect then it will be the same as imagination. So he

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solves it by saying that imagination is something else besides senseand opinion. And he here says how imagination differs from thoughtand sense.

427b15-16 This114 does not occur without sense, and withoutthis there is no understanding115

This thought, he says, I mean imagination,116 does not occur withoutsense, and without this thought, he says, there is no supposal. For ithas been said that ‘supposal’ is applied to systematic knowledge andpractical judgement and opinion.

Some interpreters say that neither of these things is true. For thereis imagination even apart from sense, that of the goat-stag. But theysaid that imagination about sense-objects does not exist withoutsense. And there is opinion, which he calls ‘supposal’, without imagi-nation, opinion about things divine. So add that opinion about sense-objects or particular things needs imagination. And see: here youhave it that imagination is not the same as opinion or sense, butsomething intermediate receiving from sense and giving to opinion.So it is intermediate, and that which is intermediate is different fromthe extremes. It is not the case that imagination, opinion and senseare the same.

427b16-18 And that thinking117 is not the same as supposal, isplain. For the former affection is under our control

He uses ‘supposal’ for opinion and ‘thinking’ for imagination. He says,then, that this is the difference between imagination and opinion,that imagining is in our power but being of an opinion is not in ourpower. Hence we can imagine what is false, but we cannot make whatis false our opinion. For we can imagine that twice two is five, but wecannot make that our opinion, except by way of acting, where it maybe said that ‘The tongue has sworn, the mind remains unsworn’.118

For an opinion a person holds not by way of acting he holds as true,and he is not turned aside from it, unless somehow by speech, as isaptly expressed in the line ‘You have persuaded me by a speech thatis a most clever drug’.119 Some people raise the difficulty: ‘What? Dowe not often fall into imaginings that we do not want?’ But he did notsay that we are masters of our imaginings, but of imagining when wewish. And besides, it is in our power to imagine when we wish, but itis not in our power also [not to imagine] when we do not wish. If, then,it is not in our power when we do not wish, it follows that we alsoimagine against our will.120

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427b19-20 [For it is possible to put something before one’s eyes,]as people do when using mnemonic systems or image-making

‘Mnemonic’ refers to people taking imprints121 from sense-objects,who also attain truth; he calls ‘image-makers’ those who construct arepresentation, who also run into falsehood. So imagination is analo-gous to an image-maker, and opinion to someone using a mnemonicsystem. He says ‘before one’s eyes’ [427b18] instead of ‘ready to hand’.

427b20-1 But being of an opinion is not under our control. Wemust necessarily run into falsehood or attain truth

In opinion, he says, either what is false is shown or what is true,whereas imagination can also have what is false as true.

427b21-2 Further, when we opine something fearsome or fright-ening [straightaway we are affected accordingly]

This is how opinion and imagination differ. In opinion straightawaywe are afraid, if we form an opinion of something frightening, whereasin imagining, as he says [427b23] ‘we are as if [we were looking at apicture]’, that is, we neither fear nor are disturbed; we are as we werebefore, without being in any way changed.

427b24-5 And supposal itself comprises different things, sys-tematic knowledge and opinion and practical judgement

He now uses ‘supposal’ in a broad sense for the rational soul. It com-prises, he says, different things, which we will state below; not that hemeans to state these things in another treatise, but that he means tosay how they differ further down. But now, he says, imagination is to bedifferentiated from opinion and sense. It has already been differentiatedfrom opinion, but he has to differentiate it from sense too. Of that, withGod’s help, the next continuous exposition treats.

That is the lecture.

[LECTURE 2]

427b27-9 But concerning thinking, since it is other than per-ceiving, and seems to comprise on the one hand imagination andon the other supposal, let us first draw distinctions aboutimagination and after that speak of the other

Having differentiated imagination from opinion in what went before,

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Aristotle now wants to differentiate imagination itself from sense too.This makes it worthwhile to raise a problem. If the aim in the thirdbook is to discuss the rational soul, and if he mentions the powers ofthe non-rational soul at all only to differentiate them from therational, then why is it that now he does not differentiate them fromthe rational [soul] but from one another? For now he differentiatesimagination from sense, though they are both powers of the non-rational [soul].

That is the problem. We say that he does this in order that hisaccount may be complete and nothing may be left hanging as a looseend; or because he is next going to differentiate imagination fromopinion and sense together. The differentiation which is coming, then,of imagination from opinion and sense together will not be clear if hehas not first differentiated each on its own; so for that reason, havingin the former passage differentiated imagination from opinion alone,he now wants to differentiate it from the senses too: it is in order thatthe next differentiation may be clear, in which he differentiates itfrom opinion and sense in conjunction.

He differentiates imagination from sense by six arguments, ofwhich the first is this. If imagination is the same as sense, then sincewe imagine when we dream, we ought then to perceive also. But wedo not perceive. So imagination is not the same as sense. What? Yousay that dreams belong to potential sense? But dreams are a kind ofactivity, and when sense is in potentiality it is at rest and does notact. But neither do they belong to actual sense. For in dreams everysense is at rest. That is the first differentiation.

The second differentiation is taken from new-born children. Wesee, he says, that new-born babies act with sense, for sense belongsto us,122 but not with imagination. If new-born babies act with sensebut not with imagination, it follows that sense is different fromimagination. And whence is it clear that new-born babies do not actwith imagination? From the fact that they suck at every breast tobegin with, even if it is a breast of stone or a cow’s udder or what youwill,123 but later only at its mother’s. That would not happen if it werenot the case that to start with the imprints of the mother’s breast arenot put away, but later they are. And the point at issue is shown notonly by that. Though they have formerly come close to fire and beenburnt, they approach fire again. That happens because imaginationis not acting. If it were acting, the child would have received animpression from the former burn and would not approach a secondtime. From their approaching fire, then, and sucking at every breast,it is clear that they do not act with imagination.

The third differentiation comes from grubs, winged insects andants. For look! These have sense, but they do not have imagination,as is shown by their wandering manner of movement. They wander

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because their imagination has not received the imprints of the formerroute.

That is the third proof. Both it and the second seem to be logicaland contrary to what was said in the second book. It was said therethat where there is sense there is also appetition, and where there isappetition there is also imagination,124 so that, with appetition as amiddle term, imagination definitely follows sense. Why, then, doeshe say that grubs have sense but do not have imagination? Perhapseven grubs have imagination, but it is confused and dim, and becauseof the dimness it does not act. Then both what is said here and whatis said there will be true, there, that where there is sense there mustbe imagination too, and here, that it is not the case that where thereis sense, straight off there is also imagination. For it is dim andconfused.

Here is another difficulty it is worthwhile to raise. Granted thatgrubs do not have imagination, why does he say that ants and wingedinsects do not have imagination? He speaks falsely in that. Ants dohave imagination, as is shown by their knowing their undergroundhabitation. And bees too have imagination. They know their hives,and there they bring to birth the honey. If evident facts declare thatthey have imagination, why does he say that they do not haveimagination? That is the difficulty.

To it we reply that imagination is twofold. There is reminiscentimagination and there is teachable, by virtue of which we are taught,which the parrot too has; it is by virtue of it that it is taught humanspeech. Of which sort of imagination, then, does Aristotle deprivethese animals? We say, not of the reminiscent but of the teachable.That is the third differentiation.

The fourth differentiation issues from the manner of cognition.Sense acts concerning things that are, whereas imagination acts alsoconcerning things that are not. For this reason it happens that sense,when it is in its natural state, always attains truth, whereas imagi-nation sometimes runs into falsehood. For it forms representationsalso of things that are not as things that are. That is the fourthdifferentiation.

The fifth differentiation has the guise of an answer to a difficulty.Someone might raise the following difficulty. Sense and imaginationare the same to this extent, that when we have sense that is faint andthat does not fall under the observation of others we call it ‘imagina-tion’. At least, if one sees things from a distance one says ‘I eitherimagine or see this in the distance’. Hence if the bystanders do notsee it they say ‘You are imagining, my friend’ instead of ‘You seedimly’. You see, then, how dim sense is called ‘imagination’. It is asif Aristotle were meeting this difficulty in the fifth differentiation. Hesays that we should not immediately think, because dim sense is

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called ‘imagination’ in common usage, that imagination and sense arethe same. For if they were the same, not only ought dim sense to becalled ‘imagination’ but accurate sense too. But in fact nobody callsaccurate sense ‘imagination’. So sense and imagination are not thesame.

Then the sixth and last differentiation. If we take someone withhis eyes shut, then he will not see colours (how could he see, with hiseyes shut?) but still he imagines colours. If they do not act together,then, sense and imagination are not the same. Aristotle does well totake someone with his eyes shut, not someone blind. If he hadproposed someone blind, perhaps you would think of people blindfrom birth, who do not imagine concerning colours at all because theyhave no imprints of them.

There are six differentiations, then: from dreams, from new-bornchildren, from grubs, winged insects and ants, from the manner ofcognition, from the difficulty and from people with their eyes shut.That completes the first section.

In the second section he differentiates imagination from all thepowers of the rational soul. Of these, some are always true, such asintellect and systematic knowledge, and some are sometimes true andsometimes false, like thought and opinion. Imagination differs fromthose that always attain truth, in that it sometimes runs into false-hood while they are always true. It differs from those that sometimesattain truth and sometimes run into falsehood, in that they are inrational animals only, while this is not only in rational animals butalso in non-rational.

Whence is it clear, someone might ask, that neither thought noropinion is in non-rational animals? He goes on to construct syllogisms[to the conclusion] that opinion is not in non-rational animals. Thefirst syllogism is constructed in the second figure, as follows. What-ever has opinion also has rational conviction. Non-rational animalsdo not have rational conviction. Therefore non-rational animals donot have opinion. Whence is it clear that non-rational animals are notrationally convinced? He goes on to construct another syllogism, likethis. Non-rational animals are not persuaded. But the things that arepersuaded are the things that are rationally convinced, for persuasionis the efficient cause of rational conviction, and rational conviction isthe end of persuasion. There is a syllogism, then, to restate it, in thefirst figure, as follows. Non-rational animals are not persuaded.Things that are not persuaded do not have rational conviction. There-fore non-rational animals do not have rational conviction.

But we raise a difficulty about this too. Whence is it clear thatnon-rational animals are not persuaded? We see that snakes, per-suaded by conjurations, throw themselves in the fire. Again, the lionis tamed by being persuaded by the hunter, and the horse by the

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horse-breaker. We reply to this that the snake is not persuaded, butis driven by necessity by the conjurations and against its will. Neitheris the lion or the horse or any other animal that is domesticatedpersuaded, but it becomes habituated. Persuasion and habituationare not the same. Assent is the common genus of persuasion andhabituation, but habituation comes about through a kind of vitalbending,125 whereas persuasion comes about by cognition. Animalsthat are domesticated, then, are not persuaded but habituated, be-cause they assent. For persuasion, as was said, occurs throughreason126 and belongs to the rational soul, whereas habituation be-longs not only to the rational soul but to the non-rational as well.

That is the continuous exposition.

427b27 But concerning thinking, since it is different from per-ceiving127

It was said also above that he used the word ‘thinking’ indiscrimi-nately. By ‘thinking’ now he means imagination and supposal. Thenhe also divides it into these two, and says: let us speak aboutimagination in the primary sense, what is so called when the word isused properly and not applied metaphorically to the senses,128 andabout supposal.

428a1-2 If indeed imagination is that by virtue of which we saya phantasm129 comes to us, and not what we mean when speak-ing metaphorically

He said above that it is within our power to imagine what we wish,and this fits voluntary imagination; but there is also imaginationagainst our will, which is taken from phantasms, that is, fromsense-objects; there is not only voluntary imagination, which he rightlycalls ‘metaphorical’,130 since it carries off from things that are andconstructs a representation of that which is not, for instance a centaur131

from a horse and a bull. If there is imagination against our will, then, Ido not imagine what I wish, but by some one discerning power I imaginewhat is false as false and the truth as truth. For by this we alsodifferentiate false from true. And opinion too and perception differenti-ate false from true in this way, by getting to know things as they are.132

428a4-5 [Is it some one of those powers or dispositions by virtueof which we discern or133 attain truth or run into falsehood?]Such are sense, opinion, intellect, systematic knowledge

But someone will say ‘How is it that above he said that intellectalways attains truth, but now he says it also sometimes runs into

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falsehood? For he says “by virtue of which we discern or attain truthor run into falsehood”, such as “systematic knowledge” and “intellect”,and counts intellect and systematic knowledge along with things thatsometimes run into falsehood.’ We reply that truth and falsity do notfit all the things he mentions, but truth fits some, such as intellectand systematic knowledge (for these discern the true), and both truthand falsity fit others, such as opinion and sense.

It is possible to supply a further additional differentiation ofintellect and sense. First this. If sense acts concerning something, sodoes intellect, and it acts better than sense (for do not think it absurdthat intellect should sometimes occupy itself with particulars), butthere are things concerning which intellect acts and sense does not.For intellect knows substance, whereas sense fails to reach substance.Secondly, sense does not know its own activity, but intellect knowsboth its own activity and that of the other [powers]. That intellect actsin connection with universals, and has the sense-object134 internal toit, while sense acts in connection with what is particular and external,goes without saying.

428a5-6 That it is not sense, is clear from the following

Here is the first differentiation of sense and imagination. He dividessense into potential and actual, and says that imagination is not thesame either as potential sense or as actual. Not as potential, becausewe act clearly in dreams, and at that time sense is potential and doesnot act. Nor is it the same as actual either; since we should neverimagine in our sleep (but in fact we do imagine), because in sleep[sense] is potential and not actual. So imagination is not the same asactual sense. If it has been shown, then, that it is the same neitheras potential sense nor as actual, it follows that sense differs fromimagination.

428a8 Then sense is always present

Here is the second differentiation of sense and imagination.

428a9 And if it were the same in actuality, to all [wild beastsimagination might belong].

Here is the third differentiation. Some people have thought that,since he divided sense into potential and actual, he is here differen-tiating imagination from actual sense.135 Their differentiation is likethis. If imagination were the same as sense, everything that hasactual sense ought to have imagination too. But that seems not to bethe case. We say that those things have imagination which have it

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fully articulated and complete, so that they are also capable oflearning. But grubs and ants, even if they have imagination, have itdim and inarticulate. If, therefore, these do not have imagination,clearly sense and imagination are not the same. And some say thathe does well to say we must enquire ‘if they are the same in actuality’,for imagination and sense can be the same potentially: imaginationsometimes receives from sense.

428a11-12 Then they [sc. perceptions] are always true, but mostimaginings that occur are false

Here he gives the fourth differentiation of sense and imagination.

428a12-13 Then we do not even say, when we act accurately[with regard to the sense-object, that this appears to us a man]

Here is the fifth differentiation.

428a15-16 And what we said, indeed, earlier, sights appear topeople even when they have their eyes shut

Here is the sixth differentiation. Some people say that he wants todifferentiate imagination from potential sense. The differentiation is:how is it that someone with his eyes shut sees colours? If when hiseyes are shut sight is present potentially, but he imagines, and againafter opening his eyes he imagines,136 clearly imagination is not thesame as potential sense. He says ‘we said earlier’ for this reason, thathe also mentioned earlier the lights137 that stay on before sight. Theyare both sense-objects in that they are seen, and not sense-objects,since the sense-object is absent; and they are imagination, becausewe see them with our eyes shut, and not imagination, because thelights are massed blows of the sense-object,138 and when the blow ispresent, imagination does not act. If, therefore, when this light doesnot belong to sense, it belongs to imagination, and when it belongs tosense it does not belong to imagination, imagination and sense arenot the same.

428a16-17 But neither is it any of those [powers] that alwaysattain truth

Here is the second section, in which he differentiates imaginationfrom intellect and systematic knowledge. By ‘intellect’ here we shouldunderstand thought. And see how he puts forward the exposition ofit as a proof. He differentiates them by the fact that intellect and

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systematic knowledge always attain truth, whereas imaginationsometimes also runs into falsehood.

428a18-19 It remains, then, to see if it is opinion. For opinioncomes both true and false.

Here he wants to show that imagination is not the same as opinion.It is worthwhile to raise the problem why, after having shown thisabove, he shows it again. And perhaps it may be said that since theyhave much in common, for that reason he differentiates them severaltimes. They have things in common because always the last parts ofthings that are primary are the same as the first parts of things thatare posterior, so that there is no gap. Opinion is the last part of reason,and imagination the first part of the non-rational [soul], so they arepractically the same. And say also another thing, that opinion andimagination are occupied with true and false, so they have something incommon in this too, and for this reason he differentiates them.

He differentiates them syllogistically as follows. Imagination be-longs either to all non-rational animals, according to the formerAristotle who put dim imagination into all non-rational animals, orto some, according to the present Aristotle who does not put accurateimagination into every non-rational animal. If imagination, then,belongs either to some non-rational animals or to all, and opinionbelongs to no non-rational animal, it follows that imagination andopinion are not the same. The construction is in the third figure.

428a19-20 But rational conviction follows opinion139

This provides the differentiation from imagination, and the demonstra-tion of one premiss of the syllogism, the one which says that opinionbelongs to no non-rational animal. Where there is opinion there are alsopersuasion, rational conviction and being persuaded. For it is notpossible for someone who is of an opinion not to be rationally convincedof his opinion. And where there are persuasion and rational convictionthere is reason. But reason does not belong in non-rational animals. Soit follows that there is no opinion in non-rational animals either. Per-suasion is the activity of the persuader in relation to the persuaded,rational conviction is the finished state and cognition of the personpersuaded, being persuaded is dim cognition and the route to opinion,and opinion is the idea that prevails after these things.

428a21 And rational conviction belongs to no wild beast140

People have raised a difficulty about horses. How is it that they fearthe whip and are subject to the horse-breaker if not by some kind of

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persuasion? We say it is not through persuasion but through somekind of habituation. For they have the habit of being constantlybeaten by it and assent. For we say that assent is the common genusof persuasion and habituation. The problem was also raised howsnakes are persuaded by conjuration if non-rational animals do nothave persuasion. We said that this is not persuasion either. The snakedoes not hear the thing said but the voice. It retreats to the fire whenconjured because it is forced by demons of some kind that fear theconjuration. And to put it simply, that which is persuaded can bepersuaded to change its mind, and being persuaded to change one’smind belongs to cognition. For cognition about the same thing is notalways the same. But what is habituated is always disposed in thesame way about the same thing; the horse always fears the whip. Itfollows that habituation does not belong to cognition and is not thesame as persuasion. That cognition is not always the same about thesame thing is clear, since that is why we say that the spider does notmake its web by prior deliberation and cognition, because it alwaysmakes it in the same way, and similarly the bee with the comb. If itwas from prior deliberation, it would do the same thing now in oneway and now in another.

428a22 Again if141 rational conviction follows on every opinion

The ‘again’ looks as if it is introducing another proof that imaginationdiffers from opinion, but it is not; it is an establishment of the firstproof.142

That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

[LECTURE 3]

428a24-6 It is plain, then, that imagination cannot be eitheropinion with sense, or opinion through sense, or an interweavingof opinion and sense, etc.

Having differentiated imagination in the foregoing from opinion andsense, addressing each on its own, now he wants to show thatimagination is not a plaiting together of sense and opinion, or opiniontogether with sense, or opinion through sense. Aristotle wants toshow that imagination is none of these three things, and he shows itis none of them through a single argument.

And let no one think that these three are the same as one another.They are different from one another. For if I say that imagination isnot opinion together with sense,143 I take both as bringing aboutimagination in the way two doctors might bring about health. So hesays this first, that opinion and sense do not bring about imagination

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together. If I say that imagination is not opinion through sense, Imean that opinion is not an efficient cause of imagination, whichefficient cause brings about imagination through sense as an instru-mental cause, so that opinion would be the efficient cause of imagi-nation and sense the instrumental – as the doctor is said to bringabout health through blood-letting. If I say, then, that imagination isnot opinion through sense I mean that opinion is not the efficientcause of imagination through sense as instrumental cause. Butneither is imagination an interweaving of opinion and sense, that isto say, they are not material causes of imagination, opinion and sense.For as the interweaving of wine and honey is the matter of honeyedwine, so the interweaving of sense and opinion will be the matter ofimagination. But it is not [strictly speaking] an interweaving becausesense and opinion no longer stay intact when they make imagination,but are mingled. In the first two limbs [of the division] both opinionand sense stay intact, both when both are efficient and when one isefficient and the other instrumental.

Imagination, then, is neither opinion and sense together, with bothbeing efficient [causes], nor opinion through sense, with the oneefficient and the other instrumental, and neither is it an interweavingof opinion and sense with both being material. That imagination isnone of these, Aristotle shows through a single argument like this.Opinion, he says, fights with sense, and nothing consists of two thingsthat fight together and are acting in the conflict. So imagination doesnot consist of opinion and sense.

That opinion and sense fight is clear from this. Sense sees the oarin water broken, but opinion at the same now is rationally convincedit is intact. So opinion fights with sense. Again, sight sees the Sun afoot across and at the same now opinion shows it is many times asbig as the whole Earth. Nothing consists of things that are fightingwith one another at the same now. Neither, it follows, does imagina-tion consist of opinion and sense. For if opinion achieves truth andsense runs into falsehood about the same thing, and imaginationconsists of these, it follows that it will be both attaining truth andrunning into falsehood about the same thing, which is absurd.

But someone will say that perhaps, even if opinion thinks thisabout the Sun when acting by itself, still, when it is interwoven withsense, it is changed to become like it and runs into falsehood. Forsense always has the supreme power, since oaths too are alwayssworn with regard to sense-objects.144 So when opinion is foundchiming in with sense and no longer fighting against it, clearly one ofthe combatants has been destroyed, and it is not absurd if somethingconsists of them.145

To this we reply that opinion is destroyed in four ways. The personwho is of the opinion is destroyed, for example the man dies. Or the

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thing that is the subject of the opinion changes. For instance if I amnow of the opinion that Socrates is seated, and he has stood up, clearlythe opinion that he is seated has, as true, been destroyed. Trueopinion, then, is destroyed either if the person who is of it is destroyedor if the thing it is about changes. And opinion is destroyed also ifforgetfulness takes over, or if the contrary opinion overcomes the first.But now none of these things has ensued. The man who was of theopinion has not perished; the thing it was about has not changed (theSun has remained many times as big as the Earth); forgetfulness hasnot come along (for when you wish [to think about the matter],astronomy forces you to say that the Sun is larger than the Earth);and neither has a contrary opinion overcome the soul, but the sameopinion remains in force. If, therefore, the four rules which keepopinion from destruction are preserved, it follows that the opinionremains, and neither of the combatants has been destroyed.

That is Aristotle’s argument; it is the one that shows that imagi-nation does not consist of opinion and sense because nothing consistsof things that are fighting with one another; but opinion and sensefight; therefore imagination does not consist of opinion and sense.That is Aristotle’s argument. And it is also possible to supply fromoutside [his works] three further arguments that plead for Aristotle.

The first of them is this. If imagination consists of opinion andsense, non-rational animals should not have imagination, since theydo not have opinion, a component of imagination for us. That non-rational animals do not have opinion has already become clear in theforegoing, since we said that opinion is part of the rational soul, andthe non-rational animals do not have a rational soul; so they do nothave opinion either. That is the first argument.

Second argument. As things are, so does opinion opine, and sensetoo for the most part attains truth. But imagination much more oftenruns into falsehood. It follows that imagination does not consist ofopinion and sense. But this argument is false, in my view, since it ispossible for there to be something in the composite which there wasnot in the simple [components]. For instance in the bodies of animalsthere are colours, say red, that there are not in the elements. It wouldnot be absurd, then, if imagination too were composed of opinion andsense, though they do not run into falsehood and it does, because thereis something in the composite that is not in the simples. So thisargument does not altogether carry necessity.

But the third argument does carry necessity. It goes like this.Nothing that consists of things that are not in our power is in ourpower. If opinion, then, is not in our power, and neither is sense inour power (for it is impossible, when colours are present and the airis lit up and the eyelids are not closed, not to see; and again, when wedo see, it is impossible to see white colour as black or grey or the like)

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– if the simples, then, opinion and sense, are not in our power, itfollows that neither will imagination, if it is composed of them, be inour power. But imagination is in our power. I form a representationof a man as tall as the sky and of a goat-stag. If imagination, then, isin our power, it follows that it is not composed of opinion and sense.For nothing that is in our power consists of things that are not in ourpower. That is the third argument.

And we shall show that imagination is not a mixture of opinion andsense either.146 If it were a mixture of these, imagination ought toknow what is intermediate between the two, and since opinion saysthat the Sun is 170 times as big as the Earth, and sense thinks theSun is a foot across, imagination, being intermediate between these,ought to shun the cognition of either extreme and say that the Sun is100 times as big as the Earth. But it does not say this. It follows thatit is not a mixture of opinion and sense.

So much on that. But it is plain that Aristotle is saying these thingsagainst Plato, when he says that imagination does not arise out of amixture of opinion and sense. For in the Sophist Plato plainly saysthat imagination is from opinion and sense.147 Perhaps, then, Platodoes not mean this, but because imagination is intermediate betweenopinion and sense, and it is customary to say that intermediates areproduced by the extremes, for this reason he said this. For indeed, hesays in the Timaeus148 that the soul arises out of being that is withoutparts and being with parts. What is without parts is not mixed; butbecause the soul is intermediate between them, on that account hesays it is out of them. Or say that he is not even referring to what isgenuinely the power of imagination, but he here calls ‘imagination’the false phantasms that seem to be true. For the denoument of theargument in the Sophist is as follows. Socrates149 says to the sophist:‘You are a mountebank: you occupy yourself with what is not.’ Thesophist replies: ‘So what is not, according to you, is, if I busy myselfwith it. Everything with which someone is occupied must also be. Soif I occupy myself with what is not, it follows that what is not, is.’When the sophist says this, Socrates replies that [the phrase] ‘whatis not’ is [used] in many ways. It is used of the unutterable, that whichnowhere and in no way is; or of what is other; or of what is better thanbeing, which is called ‘the super-real’, or of what is worse than being,which is called ‘the sub-real’; and falsehood too is called ‘what is not’.And there are many different varieties, he says here, of falsehood; buthe says that one species of falsehood comprises things that seem tobe true, as with the broken oar. He speaks of this falsehood asimagination arising from opinion and sense because it is intermediatebetween them, since both opinion and sense attain truth, but sense[only] for the most part. So much on behalf of Plato. And one mightsay to Aristotle: ‘You chide Plato for saying this, though you yourself

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have said that dim sense is imagination150 and that opinion is fromsense and imagination because these precede opinion. If you saythings like that, how can you censure others?’

That, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition.

428a26-7 Both on account of these things 151

What is the force for him of the present passage, that he says ‘bothon account of these things’? Either on account of what is going to besaid, or on account of what was said earlier. For if it has been shownthat opinion and sense are not in our power it follows that imagina-tion does not arise out of them, since [if it does] it too will not be inour power.

428a27-8 And it is clear that the opinion will not be other thanthat which is the thing of which there is also at the same timesense.152

What is he saying? That if imagination were in any way a product ofopinion and sense, these – I mean opinion and sense – ought to beoccupied with the same thing. For the opinion that Socrates is justand the sense that he is white will not produce imagination, but bothopinion and sense should think that Socrates is just. And when theyare both occupied with the same thing it should not be the case thatone of them is [occupied with the thing] of itself, for instance opinionthinks Socrates rational, while sense [is occupied with somethingrational] incidentally, so that [of itself] it thinks him white, but sothat it too thinks him rational, and [does so] of itself. So opinionand sense, being occupied with the same thing and both of them ofthemselves, if indeed that were possible, would produce imagina-tion.

428b1-2 Having something appear, then, will be opining whatis perceived not incidentally

He uses ‘having something appear’ instead of ‘imagining’. It is as ifhe said that imagining, therefore, according to those who say it is aninterweaving, will come from opinion and sense. He does well to add‘not incidentally’ so that sense may perceive it of itself, as was saidjust above.

428b2-3 But things appear falsely about which at the same timewe have a true supposal

Here he refutes those who say that imagination consists of an inter-

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weaving of opinion and sense. He says that if that were so, becausesense sees the Sun as a foot across, but opinion thinks it is manytimes as large as the Earth, it will turn out that imagination saysboth what is true and what is false, which is absurd. He callsopinion ‘supposal’.

428b4-5 So it turns out, either that it has discarded its ownopinion.153

Here he starts to enumerate the ways in which it is possible for anopinion to perish. They are four; we stated them in the continuousexposition. He says ‘though the thing is preserved’ [428b6] to showthat opinion and sense in acting are not damaged. He should havesaid ‘though he and they are preserved’ – ‘he’ referring to the opiner,and ‘they’ to the thing opined and the activity. For if these are[preserved] the opinion is not damaged.

428b7-8 Or if anything has it,154 the same [opinion] must be trueand false

Here he states the absurdity. He says that if anything has the sameopinion and has not lost it by one of the stated rules for how an opinioncan be lost, clearly according to you who say these things, imaginationconsists of true and false things at the same time, which is absurd,the false sense that sees the Sun [a foot across] and the true opinionthat knows it is many times larger than the Earth.

428b8-9 But it would become false when the thing changedwithout one’s knowing155

Here he says that it is possible for opinion and sense both to run intofalsehood, if forgetting occurs or there comes a change and the thingthe opinion is about becomes changed.

428b9 So imagination is not any one of these, nor does it consistof them

It follows, he says, that imagination is neither sense by itself noropinion; neither does it consist of them, that is, of an interweaving ofopinion and sense.

That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

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[LECTURE 4]

428b10-13 But since it is possible, when one thing is changed,for another to be changed by it, and imagination seems to be akind of change, and not to occur without sense, but in thingsthat perceive and of things of which there is sense, etc.

The present continuous exposition teaches four things. First, whatimagination is – and that is reasonable. Having said above what it isnot, he now says what it is. And he has another reason for doing this,since he proposed to teach about those parts of the non-rational [soul]which are rational in form. Since he did not teach about imaginationabove, therefore, he does so now. That imagination is rational in formis clear from its being called ‘passive intellect’. That, then, is why heteaches what imagination is.

Then, after that, he says what imagination and sense have incommon. Someone might reasonably raise the difficulty that he oughtrather to say what is common to things that are altogether remote,opinion and imagination. For it is a dialectical principle that oneought to say what is common to things that are altogether remote,and opinion is remote from imagination because one belongs to thenon-rational and the other to the rational [soul]; whereas sense is notvery remote from imagination, for they belong to one soul, I mean thenon-rational. Why, then, does he say what they have in common?

In reply to this, say it is reasonable for him to do this. For thedifficulty was raised above why, having proposed to differentiate thenon-rational [powers] from the rational, he now differentiates thenon-rational in relation to itself. So it is to show that the abovedifferentiation was sound that he now says what they have in com-mon. That is the second section.

In the third section he enquires why imagination is so called. Andin the fourth section he enquires why it is given us by the Creator.

Let us start with the first and say what imagination is. But beforewe do that, let us take in advance an assumption that will help us tothe definition. It should be known, then, that just as [in general] ofthings there are, some only change [something else], some only arechanged, and some both change and are changed, so it is in us. Thesense-object only changes; the sense both changes and is changed (forit is changed by the sense-object and changes imagination); andamong non-rational animals, imagination only is changed – for in ourcase, being changed by sense it changes opinion.

These points being taken in advance, it should be known thatimagination is a power that through sense as an intermediary re-ceives the forms of sense-objects. That is the definition of imagination.

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But right at the entrance people may raise the difficulty against itthat this account does not at all differentiate imagination from thecommon sense. For the common sense too is a power that receives theforms of sense-objects through sense as an intermediary. And ifanyone were to say that this definition does not fit the common sensebecause that knows immediately that white and sweet differ, actingalong with the senses, and not through sense as intermediary, we sayto him that even if it acts along with the senses, still, it does not layhold of these things immediately, but it receives from sight theimprint of white and from taste the imprint of sweet, and discernsand pronounces that they are different. So the present definition doesfit it too.

But we say that imagination receives the forms through the me-diation of all sense, both common and particular, whereas the com-mon sense receives the forms through the mediation only of particularsenses. So that is the difference between imagination and commonsense, and that is the solution. And that this definition attains truth,and imagination does act through sense as an intermediary, is clearfrom the blind. Those who are blind from birth have no imaginingabout colour at all. Similarly with the deaf from birth: what imagina-tion have they about sounds? This makes it clear that imaginationacts always through the mediation of the senses.

But this gives rise to a difficulty worthy of being raised. What?Does not imagination form representations of certain things sensehas not seen? Sense has not seen a goat-stag, at least, or a man astall as the sky, but still imagination forms representations of thesethings. So imagination forms representations of things sense has notseen, and acts without sense. That is the difficulty. In reply to it weshall say that even when it forms representations, it again takes itsstarting points from sense. For it has seen a goat on its own and astag on its own, and taking these simple starting points from senseit has formed the composite representation too. And if it also forms arepresentation of a man as tall as the sky, still, it has previously seenan individual man. This, then, is how this difficulty too should beresolved.

And he does well on account of something else also to say ‘throughsense as an intermediary’, on account of the medium. For that tooreceives the forms of sense-objects, but not through sense as anintermediary. And do not think that sense is better than imaginationfor this reason, because imagination acts through it. For it is not assomething which brings about imagination that sense contributes toit, but as something which serves it, like the medium. Hence it is notbetter. For by this argument you could say that imagination is betterthan opinion, since it serves opinion. But in fact it is agreed that

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opinion is better because it belongs to the rational soul, while imagi-nation belongs to the non-rational.

And when I say that imagination receives the forms of sense-objects, do not think it is imprinted according to the sense-objects,since the first imprints would be obliterated by those that come later;it receives only the accounts.

From its being said that imagination acts through sense as anintermediary, Themistius draws the conclusion that imagination isshown to act not only after the senses but together with them.156 Forif when the senses are acting it receives the imprints from them, anddoes so not like an inanimate container, but receives them and knowsthem at the same time, clearly imagination acts at the same time assense, and we shall show that Aristotle says this in the text. But hespeaks ill. It is not when imagination receives the forms from thesenses that it also acts; after the senses have finished, that is whenimagination acts. For if it acted at the same time as the senses, howwould it differ from the common sense? The common sense is whatacts at the same time as the particular senses. So imagination actsafter the senses. For it must receive the forms into itself from senseand only then act. So if the senses do not send on [the forms]imagination does not act. It must, therefore, act after the senses havefinished.

It is worthwhile to raise the difficulty: ‘Look! I direct my gaze atthe Sun, and I send the imprint to imagination, and I remain contem-plating the Sun for another hour, and imagination acts while I amstill directing my gaze and seeing the Sun.’ But then the first look byvirtue of which I sent the form to the imagination has ceased. Soimagination acts after sense, and Aristotle’s account stands firm.That completes the first section.

In the second section he says what imagination and sense have incommon. It should be known, then, that imagination and sense havethe same sense-objects. That is why they have something in commonand are both in the same way occupied with them. Just as sense hasboth common and special sense-objects, and both things that aresense-objects of themselves and things that are sense-objects inciden-tally, as has already been said, so imagination too occupies itself withthese things. That is the first thing in common.

Second thing in common. Just as sense always attains truth aboutthe proper sense-objects, attains it less about the incidental objects,and still less about the common objects, so too imagination. Those arethe two things common to sense and imagination.

That is what Aristotle says. But it is worthwhile to raise twodifficulties. The first of them is this. Why does Aristotle now [428b27-8] say that imagination always attains truth about the proper sense-objects, when above [428a12] he said that imagination does not

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always attain truth, but sometimes also runs into falsehood? That isthe difficulty. In reply to it we may say that imagination is twofold.There is the imagination which only receives forms and is, as it were,a repository, and the imagination which depicts whatever it wants.The one that receives the forms always attains truth, and for it, thisstatement that says that imagination always attains truth about theproper sense-objects is true. But the one that depicts whatever itwants, that is the one that runs into falsehood. When it depicts thingsthat are not, it runs into falsehood, and of it the things said above aretrue, that imagination runs into falsehood. That is the first difficultyand its solution.

Second difficulty. How is it that above157 he said that sense attainstruth about the common sense-objects more than about the inciden-tal, and now he says the contrary, that it attains truth about theincidental objects more than about the common? That is the difficulty.In order that we may make Aristotle consistent both with himself andwith the facts, we shall resolve it as follows. As was said also above,there are two kinds of incidental object: individual substances, whichdo not at all fall under any sense but are thought of from the thingsincidental to them; and a sense-object is incidental which falls underanother sense, as sweet is an incidental object for sight – for of itselfit is a sense-object of taste. Since there are these two kinds ofincidental sense-object, this statement and the one made above canboth be true. If by ‘incidental sense-object’ you take individual sub-stances, the statement above is true: for sense attains truth moreabout the common sense-objects than about individual substances.That sense attains truth more about the common sense-objects thanabout individual substances is clear from the fact that sense is moreaffected by the common sense-objects. By individual substances it isnot affected at all, for sense is not affected in any way by substanceas substance. But it is affected by the common objects, as has alreadybeen shown [455,2-8]. For it is forced apart by large size and com-pacted by small [cf. 455,6-8], and is similarly affected by the other[common objects]. And a sense gets to know more that by which it isaffected, and attains truth about that about which it gets to knowmore. It follows that sense achieves truth more about the commonobjects than about individual substances, and in this way the state-ment above is true.

But if you take the incidental sense-objects to be the other thingsignified by ‘that which is incidental’, then the statement is truewhich says that sense attains truth more about that which is sense-object to another sense than about the common sense-objects. This isshown as follows. That which is close to what always attains truth,attains truth more than that which is not. The proper sense-objectsalways attain truth, and the sense-object of another sense is closer,

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as I shall show, to the proper sense-objects than are the commonsense-objects. It follows that that which is a sense-object of anothersense attains truth more than the common sense-objects. That thisis closer, is not hard to see. For it should be known that neither theproper sense-objects nor the sense-objects of another sense are sepa-rable from matter; so they are close to each other because they cannotbe separated from matter. Neither whiteness, which is a propersense-object of sight, nor sweetness, which is a proper sense-object oftaste, can be thought of apart from matter. But the common sense-objects can be thought of apart from matter; for it is by separatingthem from matter that philosophers have set up mathematics. It isfrom the common sense-objects that arise the objects of mathematics.If the sense-objects of another sense, then, are closer to the propersense-objects than are the common sense-objects, and those that arecloser to the proper sense-objects attain truth more, it follows thatthe sense-objects of another sense, which are one thing signified by‘the incidental’, attain truth more than do the common sense-objects.So both this statement is true which says that sense attains truthmore in connection with the incidental than in connection with thecommon sense-objects, and also the statement above is true whichsays that sense attains truth more in connection with the commonobjects than in connection with the incidental.

But it should be known that the common sense-objects are bothcoarse-grained and accurate. Insofar as they are grasped by one sensethey are coarse-grained, but insofar as they are grasped by all, theyare accurate. That the common sense-objects do not become accu-rately known by a single sense is shown by the fact that people sailingpast think the land is moving and the ship is stationary. See! Theyare mistaken about what stays still, the land, and what is in motion,the ship, because they are accustomed to knowing things by sightalone. And there is another way in which we can be seen to bemistaken about staying still. We think stars, which are always inmotion, are stationary. And sight makes mistakes about numbers,thinking that things in different spheres are in one. For look! We saythat the Moon is in Aries or Taurus. But Aries is in one sphere, thenon-planetary, and the Moon in another. We also make mistakesabout shape and size. Distant things which are square and large wethink small and round because their angles do not appear.

But someone will say that insofar as we have this case, it is notpossible to know even the incidental objects. If you say that distancemakes it impossible to know the common objects, the incidental toowill not be seen because of distance. That the person approachingfrom afar is white, we know; that it is Theaetetus or Socrates we donot know. In reply to this it may be said that it is only on account ofdistance that the incidental objects are not seen, but the common

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objects are not seen as they are even from nearby. For see, when welook from directly underneath at a tight-rope, though in fact it iscurved,158 we think it is stretched out straight. And in a picture wesee the white159 patches standing out and the black as it were cut intoit – which is why they make breasts white. Shape is responsible forthis. So this difficulty too is resolved. That completes the secondsection.

In the third section we enquire why imagination is so called.Because in imagination sense-objects have come to rest. So becauseit is a state of rest for the things that have come to light, on thataccount it is called ‘imagination’. By ‘things that have come to light’160

he means all sense-objects that have been made manifest.161 For itreceives the imprints of all the senses, but since sight is the best ofall, for that reason it is called after its subject, light. For imaginationis named from light. That completes the third section.

In the fourth and last section of the continuous exposition weenquire why imagination is bestowed on us and what its end is. Weshould know, then, that it is bestowed on non-rational animals eitherfor them to have something analogous to reason or because throughit they provide themselves with food. For ants act in accordance withimagination when they store up for themselves in advance a treasuryof corn for nourishment. But on rational animals imagination isbestowed either that the body may be more serviceable and suitablefor the reception of what is better – for if it did not become suitableto receive imagination, how could it receive the rational soul? And wehave imagination for another reason, in order that when reason isderanged in judgement, being overlaid with certain affections, wemay have this administering our affairs, for instance when we aresick or drunk, when we can hardly act according to the rational soulbecause of the unsuitability of the instrument.

That, with God’s help, completes the fourth section and the con-tinuous exposition and the second Division, in which he differentiatesthe rational soul from the non-rational. For in the first Division hedifferentiated the non-rational soul in relation to itself, in the presentsecond Division, as we have said, he differentiates the rational soulrelatively to the non-rational, and in the Division that comes next hecompares the rational soul with itself.

428b10-11 But since it is possible, when one thing is changed,for another to be changed by it162

He starts with the assumption163 and says that [in general], amongthings that are, there is that which is changed by something else andby which a further thing is changed, and that this happens in the caseof the soul too. Just as, in the world of things, we see that the hand

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changes [sc. moves] the crowbar and the crowbar the stone, so senseis changed by the sense-object and this changes imagination. Forafter sense has intuited the sense-object and received the sense-object’s form, it keeps it, and imagination intuits this form, and thatis how imagination arises, as Plutarch says, which is why he definesit as a change of the soul which is stirred up proximately by actualsense. And do not raise a difficulty about how it may be that at nightwe imagine this particular man though sense is not then acting. Forimagination remains and has the imprints from the seeing thatoccurred before; that is why, even though sense does not act in thenight, I imagine. The ‘but since’ refers to what was said above. Forsince he said above that it [imagination] is not opinion or sense, nowhe says ‘but since’ it is changed by sense, imagination is a powerreceptive of forms of sense-objects through sense as an intermediary.

428b12-13 But in things that perceive and of things of whichthere is sense

We must perceive, he says, and only then imagine. For those de-formed from the start do not imagine. That is why he says ‘in thingsthat perceive’. But why does he say ‘and of things of which there issense’? Because of those who are not blind from birth but who losesight around about the second year, before imagining. These toocannot imagine about colours. Even those who have sense, if they loseit at the beginning, do not imagine. So therefore it is not possible toimagine about things that do not fall under our attention through thesenses.

428b14 And this must be like the sense, [it would not be possiblefor this change to belong without sense]

Here begins the second section, in which he tells us what imaginationand sense have in common without having yet defined imagination.Then he back-tracks and defines it, and then, having done so, givesa fuller account of what they have in common. So now he says thatimagination must be like sense because imagination concerningsense-objects cannot occur without sense. He does well to add ‘possi-ble’ [428b15] lest anyone should think it is possible to imagineseparately from sense. For this follows of necessity.

428b16-17 And what has it must do and undergo many thingsin accordance with it164

He does well to say ‘many’. It does not do everything in accordancewith imagination, but things that have it without reason do [all]

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things in accordance with it, for instance ants go out in accordancewith it to collect together food. Nor do we always undergo things inaccordance with imagination. For when lying with someone we emitsemen without any prior imagining, as sometimes happens to us insleep, it is not by imagination that we are affected. He does well, then,to say that we neither do nor undergo all things in accordance withimagination. And see how, before completing what they have incommon, he explains what the end of imagination is.165

428b17 And it must be both true and false166

He returns to what is common. He says that sense and imaginationhave something in common in attaining truth and running intofalsehood. They come to have this in common because they have thesame sense-objects and lay hold of them in a similar way.

428b18-19 Sense of the proper objects is true or has the leastpossible falsehood

Now he says something safer than what was said above. Above[428a11; 418a11-12] he said that sense does not run into falsehood atall about the proper objects, but here he says that at times it does alsorun into falsehood. Why does he say that sense has some littlefalsehood about the proper objects? Because of their smallness. Whena drop of black is mixed with a lot of white, it cannot differentiate it.

428b19 Secondly there is sense of the incidence of thesethings,167 and here it is already possible for falsehood to come in

The second [class of] sense-objects, he says, are the incidentals. Weraise the difficulty: if we say that substances are incidental sense-objects, how can we say that they are incidental, when they aresubstances? We say that there is no absurdity. In the way in whichwe say it is incidental to a master to be a human being, in this wayalso we say now that substance is incidental to colours. For see! Inthe former case, predicating in an unnatural way, we say that humanbeing, which is a substance, is incidental to master, which is some-thing incidental. He says ‘and here’ [428b20-20a] instead of ‘and inimagination’. For incidental sense objects are in that also.

428b21-2 For it does not run into error about its being white,but it does about whether it is this or something else that iswhite

Here again he is speaking of sense. That it is white, sight knows; for

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white is a proper sense-object of sight, and about the proper sense-objects truth is attained on the whole. But it runs into error aboutthat to which this white belongs, for instance the individual sub-stance, whether it is Cleon or Alcibiades. For it does not know alsothat this white belongs to Cleon, even if it knows that it is simplywhite.

428b22-3 Thirdly, [sc. there is sense] of the common objectswhich follow upon the incidental objects to which the properobjects belong

A third sort of sense-object, he says are the common sense-objects.Then, wanting to clarify what he means by ‘common sense-objects’,he says ‘the things that follow upon the incidental sense-objects inwhich also the proper objects belong’. By ‘incidental sense-objects’ wemean individual substances. In the individual substance there arechange, size and the other common sense-objects, and also the properobjects. For colour is in an individual substance.

428b25 And the change which comes about through the agencyof the activity will differ from the sense.168

Here he states the second thing common to sense and imagination.The statement must be read as having its words out of order.169 Thechange, he says, which comes about through the agency of actualsense, that is, imagination, which is stirred up by these three statedkinds of sense, that of the proper objects, that of the incidental andthat of the common, this imagination, he says, will differ from all thekinds of sense from which it arises, since it is evident that what occurswhen the sense object has to be present is different from that whichalso occurs sometimes when it is not. But, he says, it has truth andfalsity proportional to the kinds of sense. Just as among them thefirst mentioned, that of the proper sense-objects, is true, so alsoimagination when this sort of sense is most present will be true. Andas the remaining two kinds of sense, that of the incidental objects andthat of the common, were sometimes true and sometimes false, so alsowould be the imaginings that come from them, whether they arepresent or not.

428b27-8 And the first when the sense is present is true

Drawing conclusions from this passage Themistius170 says that imagi-nation acts at the same time as sense, because it says that imagina-tion attains truth ‘when sense is present’.

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428b30 If, then, nothing else has the things that have beensaid171

[Nothing else,] that is, except imagination, and if imagination has thethings that have been said, which also complete its substance, I meanthe definition, then clearly imagination is ‘a change coming aboutthrough the agency of actual sense’ [429a1-2]. And note where hedefines imagination, saying this in the middle.

429a2-3 But since sight is sense most of all

Here he wants to state the etymology of imagination.

429a5-6 Animals do many things in accordance with them [sc.appearances]

Having said why imagination is so called and given the etymology ofthe name, he now wants to say why it is given us.

429a6 Some because they do not have intellect, such as wildbeasts

It should be known that what in us is intellect, in non-rationalanimals is imagination. For we, when removed from sense-objects,act in accordance with intellect, but non-rational animals act inaccordance with imagination. For sense-objects are readily takenaway, but intellect and imagination, in what has them, are alwaysthere.

But Plutarch thinks imagination is twofold. And its end in theupward direction, or at least its beginning, is the end of that whichthinks, while its other end is the summit of the senses. Imaginationcontributes nothing to intellect or thought, but on the contrary iscleaned up by intellect and thought, and they perfect what is imper-fect in it, and even lead it to truth, to the extent to which it is capableof truth. Hence imagination wants to follow everywhere and bechanged at the same time [as they], wishing to obtain a share ofreason and truth. And that marvellous man Plutarch gives a finemodel for it, so it is worthwhile also to state it. He says that just astwo lines touch each other at a single point, so the upper part ofimagination touches that which thinks. For just as that point is boththe same and other, the same in that it is one, but other because wecan take it both with the upper line and with the lower, so tooimagination can be taken both as one and as two, since it bringstogether into one what is divided in the sense-objects, and what is

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simple and, so to speak, unitive in divine things it pounds up intocertain imprints and differing forms.

429a7 Some because intellect is covered over

He does well to say ‘covered over’. For intellect is always there in usand acting, but it is sometimes hidden through disease or anger ordrunkenness. These screen it off so that sometimes its activity is notknown.

But if that is so, clearly he is of the opinion that the rational soulis immortal. For he does not say that it is affected in derangement,but that it is covered over.

That, with God’s help, completes the second Division and thelecture.

[THIRD DIVISION]

[LECTURE 1]

429a10-13 Concerning that part of the soul with which the soulgets to know and exercises judgement, whether it is separable,or not separable in magnitude but in account, we must see whatdifferentiates it and how thinking ever comes about

After differentiating the non-rational soul from the rational he nowgoes on also to differentiate the rational soul in relation to itself. Inconnection with the rational soul he has three enquiries. First,whether it is destructible or indestructible. Secondly, he differenti-ates the rational soul from sense. And do not be puzzled why, afterdifferentiating sense from rational soul above, he does the sameagain. Since the differentiation will help him to show that the rationalsoul is eternal, for that reason he states it. Then, a third section, heenquires how thinking comes about. The present continuous exposi-tion carries out the enquiries of the first two sections.

He starts with the second section, that is, the difference of reasonfrom sense, because this helps, and occupies the relationship of aproof, to show that the rational soul is eternal. And wishing to makethe differentiation urgent, he first says what reason and sense havein common. And do not find it a problem why, having stated whatthey have in common above, he also states this now. For know thatwhat they have in common also helps to show that the soul isimmortal. So he starts from what reason and sense have in common.

The first thing he says they have in common is that they are bothpotential, both reason and sense, and neither does the soul haveaccounts of the objects of intellect (for it is like a writing tablet on

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which nothing is written, according to Aristotle), nor does sense haveaccounts of the sense-objects, but they only receive imprints andforms. For sense does not lay hold of the sense-object but of a kind ofimprint of the sense-object. For sense fails to reach the substance.The rational soul, even if it does think substance, still does not, iteither, have imprints of objects of intellect. That is the first point incommon.

Second point in common. Both the rational soul and sense arepotential, though the rational soul is so by virtue of suitability andsense by virtue of having the disposition; but still, both are potential,and if they are, it must be that they go to actuality through beingaffected. Being affected, then, is common to them.

But because being affected pointed to the rational soul’s beingdestructible, for this reason he says that they undergo an affectionwhich is perfective, not destructive. It is not affected with regard toits substance, but with regard to the activity. For cognition is theactivity of intellect, and changes from being potential to being actual.And that is the third point in common, that both undergo perfectiveaffections.

But so that from what they have in common you may learn thatthe soul is immortal, you should know that what is genuinely the soul[i.e. the rational soul] undergoes perfective affection more than sense.For sense is destroyed by excesses, whereas the soul is made morelimber as a result of excesses. From that it is clear that it is eternal:it is never destroyed.

Those are the points in common. Sense differs from the rationalsoul in that when sense acts in connection with what is more of asense-object it is blunted for dealing with things that are less,whereas the rational soul when it acts in connection with what is more[intelligible] acts more in dealing with what is less. For instance ifsight sees disproportionate white or a labyrinthine shape it is affectedby these things and does not lay hold of what is less white. Butintellect, even if it acts concerning great things, is limbered up bythat, and acts all the more concerning lesser. And what is the causeof this? Because sense needs the body and does not act without it, andbecause the body is compacted or forced apart by excesses and isaffected, that is why it cannot act concerning the lesser things. Butthe intellect does not need the body so as to be affected when the latteris, but is limbered up in connection with the greater things and findsis easy to grasp the lesser. And this shouts aloud the eternity of thesoul. So its eternity is shown from the difference between sense andintellect too.

And we shall show by a proof of our own that the soul is eternal,which was the first section. If the soul thinks all things,172 it is eternal.For it could not think all things if it were a body or a form in matter.

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If it were a body it would have to be a mixture that was either hot orcold, and a mixture does not think similar mixtures. It follows that itwill not think similar mixtures, and it will not longer think all things.For it has been said [424a2-3] that touch does not lay hold of what issimilarly cold or hot. But why <not> say that it is a form in matterand uses the body as an instrument? But if it uses it as an instrumentit will not think the instrument, and again it will not think all things.If it thinks it too, it will need another instrument, and so ad infinitum.Besides, an instrument helps that of which it is an instrument. Butthe body impedes the soul’s acting. Therefore it is not its instrument.

Since this too, then, has been said, that, with God’s help, completesthe continuous exposition.

429a10 Concerning that part of the soul with which the soulgets to know173

It is not possible to draw from this Plutarch’s conclusion that all soulsare one many-powered substance, and that this is true is shown byhis saying that one part of the soul is the rational part. For he nowcalls this a ‘part’ in the following way. Since many things contributeto holding the body together he says that this part of the soul too, thatis, the rational soul, is one of the things that help the body. For howcould he say it is one many-powered substance when he has supposedthat there is indestructible soul and destructible?174 It is not possiblethat of the same substance one part should be destructible andanother indestructible. That is how we reply to him.

And to Alexander [we say]: ‘See how he calls intellect “part of thesoul”. When he says intellect is eternal, do not say he means theintellect from outside:175 he means that which is in us.’

For it should be known that ‘intellect’ signifies three things inAristotle. Alexander of Aphrodisias states these three in one way andPlutarch in another. Alexander says that the first thing signified by‘intellect’ is potential intellect, such as is present in the case ofchildren. In children there is potential intellect. Second after poten-tial intellect is signified dispositional intellect, as is present in thecase of complete human beings. Complete human beings, who havethen acquired knowledge of things, are said to have dispositionalintellect. The third thing signified by ‘intellect’ is actual intellect, thatwhich is from outside, the completely perfect, which is not disposi-tional or potential, so that it is simple and always actual, that whichgoverns the universe. These are the three things signified by ‘intellect’according to Alexander.

But Plutarch does not accept this; he states the things signified by‘intellect’ differently. He says that the first thing signified by ‘intel-lect’ is dispositional intellect, and this sort of intellect is present in

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the case of children. For Plutarch wants babies, according to Aristotle,to have accounts176 of things, and the rational soul to know all things,and learning not to be genuinely learning but recollection. For thisreason he gives children dispositional intellect that has accounts ofthings; but they do not know things, he says, because they need tolearn, which learning is recollection. The second thing signified by‘intellect’ is what is dispositional and actual at the same time, asintellect is in the case of complete human beings. In these there isboth dispositional and actual [intellect], for they have already learntand come to know things and, as it were, recollected them throughlearning. The third thing signified is intellect that is actual only; suchis intellect from outside, perfect intellect. These are the three thingssignified by ‘intellect’ according to Plutarch.

Ammonius censures both of them, both Alexander and Plutarch,saying that both are wrong and that they err both severally andtogether.177 Their common error is that both say that the third thingsignified by ‘intellect’ is actual intellect from outside, which is, in aword, God. Aristotle is not now discussing the intellect from outsidebecause he has not entered upon a theological treatise, and besides,the discussion now is about that intellect which is part of the soul. Hebegins, at least, by saying ‘About the part of the soul by which it thinksand gets to know’. If, therefore, he is now speaking of intellect that ispart of the soul, how can this signify intellect from outside? Thatintellect which is from outside is not part of the soul. And because,further down, he says that this actual intellect arises from potentialintellect in us; intellect from outside does not come from potentialintellect in us. And if they should also say that, when he says intellectthinks all things, he is speaking of intellect from outside, they speakfalsely there too. The potential intellect that is in us has thinking ofall things just as the sketch for a likeness has the imprints, even ifthey are not plain, of all the things that will be shown. Intellect too,then, has thinkings of all things, even if they are not plain; and whenit thinks they become plain. And that it is what he called ‘part of thesoul’ that he says is eternal further down, is shown by his saying ‘Thispart of the soul only is eternal’ [cf. 430a23], [the part] only thatconsists in the rational soul, not the others. That is the commonmistake they both make.

And again, each goes wrong on his own, as follows. Alexander, inthat he is not willing to say anything against the text, but alwaystries to follow it and now too falls into contradictions. Taking his startfrom the text, he thinks that intellect itself and its substance arepotential, and does not say that it is potential in respect of itsactivities, for instance the intellect of children is with regard to uspotential, because it does not yet know the forms of things, but issuitably disposed for getting to know them, and to that extent is

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potential because its activity does not yet know the things that are.But Alexander says that the very substance of intellect is presentpotentially in the case of children, and establishes this saying thatintellect is potential, and if it is potential by virtue of suitability,clearly it does not yet have the form, but is only matter. For every-thing that is potential in the first way178 is in matter. Intellect, then,is matter and does not have form, lest being muddied by form it shouldincline to the cognition of its own form and should not know formscontrary to it.179 For as the transparent is colourless so that it mayserve to carry colours impartially, in the same way intellect, he says,is formless that it may know all forms.

So says Alexander, altogether erroneously. For if it is formless forthis reason, that it may know all things that are, he should extendthe argument: it ought not to be anywhere in any way whatever. Forit also knows what in no way is. And we refute Alexander not only inthis way but from Aristotle himself. Aristotle himself says thatintellect is the form of forms [432a2]. That is the error peculiar toAlexander, that he says intellect is formless. For he says that itssubstance is potential in children, and what is potential is formless.

Plutarch too has a mistake peculiar to himself. He applies toAristotle what belongs to Plato. Plato is the person who thinks thatthe intellect of children is dispositional and has accounts of things,not Aristotle. But Plutarch thinks that Aristotle too says this. Howcan he not be speaking falsely when Aristotle refutes him? He saysthat the intellect of children is like a writing tablet on which nothingis written, because it is suitable for receiving the accounts of thingsbut has not already actually received them.

Alexander and Plutarch, then, err both severally and together. Sonow let us say what is true. It should be known that we are of theopinion that intellect is always form. For the intellect of children isform, potentially receptive of forms, and insofar as it is form it is notpotential, as Alexander thinks, but insosofar as it is potentiallyreceptive of forms it does not have the accounts of things, as Plutarchthinks. Next let us say what things are signified by ‘intellect’. Thefirst thing signified is intellect that potentially knows things, as ispresent in the case of children. The second thing signified is intellectthat knows things dispositionally, as is present in people that arecomplete and know things, but stay still and are not acting withrespect to them. The third thing signified is not intellect coming infrom outside, as they think, but intellect that is dispositional and atthe same time actual, as is the intellect of people who are complete,who know things, and who are bringing out their knowledge andacting in accordance with it. That is how we state the things signifiedby ‘intellect’.

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429a10-11 Concerning that part of the soul with which the soulgets to know and exercises judgement180

He calls intellect ‘a part’ of the soul, not as though it were the leastthing in the soul, but as if someone were reckoning up the entirecosmos, placed the Sun in order after all the rest, and then finallycalled the Sun ‘part of the universe’. He does well to say ‘with whichthe soul gets to know and exercises judgement’. For the soul has acontemplative part and a practical. By saying ‘with which it exercisesjudgement’ he indicates the practical part, and ‘with which it gets toknow’, the contemplative.

But what does he mean when he says that, concerning this part ofthe soul in which it gets to know and exercises judgement, we oughtto enquire whether it is eternal or not, ‘whether it is separable or notseparable in magnitude but in account’? Some people interpreted thepresent passage in this way, that it is ‘whether the intellect isseparable from body or not separable from body, but separable onlyin concept and not also in actuality’. That is the first proposition,181

whether the intellect is separable and eternal. But this presentinterpretation in no way pleases Plutarch: he altogether condemns it.His interpretation is that Aristotle says this, meaning to say:‘whether the intellect is separable from imagination and sense be-cause it has another substance independent of them, or there is asingle substance, which throws out before the intellect both imagina-tion and sense, and which is many only in account.’ For that he islooking at these is clear from his just having finished discussing them.He does not enquire whether or not it is separable from body. For howcan someone who has conceded that imagination is separated frombody be in two minds about intellect, which transcends all the [other]powers, as to whether or not it is separate from body? And by‘magnitude’ understand ‘substance’. So the first proposition is this,whether intellect is separated in substance from imagination andsense, or there is one substance for all, and they differ only in account.

So much on that. But since Aristotle mentions the unmixed andunaffected and separable in order to show that the soul is eternal,Alexander undermines these three. First, the unmixed. He says thatAristotle calls the soul ‘unmixed’ because it is customary that whenthings are mixed they are first by themselves and only then mixedtogether. For see! In honeyed wine there is first honey by itself andwine, and only later are they interwoven. It is because the soul, then,is not first on its own before being mixed with the body, but is mixedwith the body simultaneously with coming to be, it is for this reasonthat he calls the soul ‘unmixed’. He calls in ‘unaffected’, since it is notthe suitability of the soul itself that is affected but the body by virtue

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of its suitability. Since, then, it is the being affected of the suitabilitythat we call ‘affection’, and in fact it is not affected, for this reason hecalls it ‘unaffected’. And he calls it ‘separable’, he [sc. Alexander] says,by virtue of its otherness, calling it ‘separable’ inasmuch as it is whollydifferent from the body. But he speaks ill. For by the argument bywhich he shows that rational soul is unmixed, unaffected and sepa-rable, it would be possible to show the same of sense. But in fact it isin differentiating reason from sense that he says these things belongto the rational soul. It follows that they do not belong to sense as well.Do you, then, take these things as shouting aloud the eternity of thesoul and not as Alexander takes them. For if it is eternal it is definitelyunmixed with matter, separable from it and unaffected. So much bythe way.

But the present text, as we say, states the first point in theenumeration down to ‘whether the soul is indestructible or not’.182

429a12-13 We must see what differentiates it, and how thinkingever comes about183

By his saying ‘we must see what differentiates it’ the second sectionis enumerated, in which he means to say how reason differs fromsense; and by ‘how thinking comes about’ he states the third section.

429a13-14 If thinking is indeed like perceiving [it would beeither being affected in some way by the object of thought, orsomething else like that]

Here he starts from the things reason and sense have in common, andseems to start from the second thing in common, that both areaffected, though that is out of order. The point that they are potentialshould have preceded it. For the second point in common arises fromthis. For if they are both potential, and that which is in potentialityneeds affection in order that it may come to be in actuality, for thisreason they also have in common being affected. But it could be saidthat he does start from the first thing in common. For he says thatthinking is like perceiving and perceiving is in potentiality; from thisit follows that thinking also is in potentiality. And lower down hestates this thing they have in common clearly.

It is also possible to explain in outline this gobbet. ‘If intellect islike sense’184 (instead of ‘if you suppose that intellect is like sense’),intellect too must be a thing affected in some way by the object ofintellect, as sense also is by the sense-object. If it is not affected bythe object of intellect there is ‘something else similar’ [a15] instead of‘it is unaffected’. For because it seemed awkward to say that therational soul is affected, for that reason he said ‘or something else

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similar’ – that is, [it undergoes] a perfective affection, not a destruc-tive one. Then, as though adjudicating, he adds to the account ‘it must,therefore be unaffected’. Why does he put in the ‘therefore’? Notbecause he says ‘the rational soul is receptive of forms’; it is not forthis reason that he concludes that it is unaffected (for this does notfollow),185 but because he said ‘or’ it undergoes ‘some similar’ perfec-tive affection; it is because of this that he concludes that therefore atany rate to this extent it is unaffected.

429a15-16 [It must be unaffected, therefore,] but receptive ofthe form and potentially such but not that

Alexander here fell into error and thought that it is receptive of theforms (intellect, I mean) and is in potentiality; ‘but not that’ [he readsas being] in place of ‘but not a form’. He takes the words ‘but not that’ill. By ‘but not that’ we ought to think ‘but it is not actually that ofwhich it thinks’, as we said above. For intellect does have a form, orrather is a form, but the form it gets to know it does not have actually,but potentially. For intellect is potentially the objects of intellect andsense is potentially the sense-objects, not actually.

429a18-20 It must, then, since it thinks all things, be unmixed,as Anaxagoras says, in order that it may control, that is, in orderthat it may get to know

If you want intellect to think all things, he says, you must suppose itunmixed with matter. For if you say it consists of matter, it will notknow it. And indeed for this reason touch does not lay hold of what isof similar heat to itself. And for this reason also Anaxagoras, whenhe said that all things are of similar parts, did not suppose thatintellect is of similar parts, in order that it may control all things,that is, get to know all things. What in Anaxagoras is ‘to control’ inAristotle is ‘to get to know’. And it is quite right that a thing shouldnot know the things it is of: for that which knows and that which isknown want to be different.

But Alexander again thinks otherwise. He says that if it thinks allthings it is unmixed with forms and does not have a form. But wedraw a further distinction and say that it is unmixed with the formsit knows, since it itself is straight off a form. Alexander may say tothis: ‘According to you, the intellect is unmixed with the forms it getsto know, but it gets to know itself too, and you say that it is a form:so it is unmixed with itself, which is absurd.’ But we reply to him thatit is as something thinking that it is unmixed with what is thoughtand other than it.

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429a20-1 For what is alien, appearing alongside, impedes andwill get in the way186

What is he saying? That if the intellect was of matter, the matteritself would appear alongside, get in the way and impede its thinkingnot only of itself but of alien objects of intellect, that is, the others. Itfollows that it is not of matter. You can also interpret it in anotherway and say: if intellect actually had any forms of the things it getsto know, and was not all things potentially, it would be muddied andwould not know accurately, just as neither will sight, if the transpar-ent is coloured, know all colours accurately. That is what we say; butAlexander says that both here he wants intellect not to have form,and in what he infers [sc. in the next sentence]. For he says that ithas no nature except only that it is potential. But we say that it is inthis respect that Aristotle says it does not have a nature: its natureis not such as to have the forms of objects of intellect in actuality, asPlato thinks, but only in potentiality; since it is itself a form and itssubstance is actual.

429a23 By ‘intellect’ I mean that with which the soul thinks andsupposes

Since imagination too is called ‘passive intellect’ he says that ourpresent discussion is not about that, but about that intellect in virtueof which we exercise thought and suppose. Here he uses ‘intellect’ ina rather wide sense. By ‘exercise thought’ he indicates thought andby ‘suppose’, opinion. He says, then, that the intellect is nothing inactuality before it thinks, but in potentiality, and what is in potenti-ality is not its substance but its activity. And for that reason theintellect is not a body. For it would be of some quality, hot or cold.Nor does it use the body as an instrument. It is able to think greatthings and small alike, which sense, which does use the body as aninstrument, cannot do.

429a27-8 And they say well who say that the soul is the placeof forms

He praises Plato. For he said above that the soul receives the formsof objects of intellect and only then acts, and for this reason he praisesPlato who says that the soul is the place of forms. But he finds faultwith him on two counts. First, that he says that all soul, and not justthe rational soul, is the place of forms – though one might say onPlato’s behalf that he calls only the rational soul ‘soul’ and the others‘animations’,187 which is why he says ‘All soul is immortal’.188 Even,

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then, if he says the the soul is the place of forms, still, he means onlythe rational [soul]. And he also finds fault with him on another point,that he says the forms are in the soul actually and not potentially.For Aristotle likens it to a writing tablet on which nothing is writtenand calls ‘learning’ what is genuinely learning, whereas Plato likensit to a writing tablet which is already inscribed, and calls learning‘recollection’.

429b7 [And when it comes to be each thing in the way theknower in actuality is said to –] this comes about when it is ableto act through itself

What is he saying? That intellect which is in potentiality comes to bein actuality at that time when it is able to act with systematicknowledge and contemplatively. It comes about that intellect actswith systematic knowledge when the soul can act on its own. That isnot always. It is with difficulty in old age.

429b8-9 even then it is in potentiality in a way, not, however asit was before it learnt and found out. And then it is able to thinkitself189

Even after learning things, he says, and becoming still, intellect is inpotentiality. But it is not in potentiality as it was before learningsomething or finding it out. For before learning and finding outintellect is in potentiality in the former sense of ‘in potentiality’ thatis, by virtue of suitability, but after learning it is in potentiality byvirtue of having the disposition, which is the second thing signifiedby ‘in potentiality’. He calls this ‘in potentiality in a way’. He doeswell to mention learning and discovery, since all systematic knowl-edge is obtained either by learning or by discovery.190

That completes the lecture.

[LECTURE 2]

429b10-12 But since magnitude is one thing and being a mag-nitude another, and water and being water, and the same withmany other things, but not with all [for with some it is the same,it discerns being flesh and flesh either each with something else,or with the same thing otherwise disposed191]

He proposed to make three enquiries concerning the intellect, onewhether it is eternal or destructible, a second, what it has in commonwith, and how it differs from, sense – which is also the starting pointfrom which he stalks its eternity – and thirdly how thinking comes

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about. The first two he has adequately demonstrated in what hasgone before. Now he has what is left before him for demonstration,and here he is investigating how thinking comes about.

Aristotle starts by raising a problem. There are two kinds ofcognition in us, that of the non-rational part, like the senses, and thatof the rational, like intellect. And there are two sorts of thing we getto know, things that are in matter and sense-objects, and things thatare non-material. Aristotle enquires in what follows whether eachcognition is of its own thing – for instance the non-rational gets toknow the things that are in matter and the rational only the thingsthat are non-material. Or does the non-rational know only the thingsin matter, while the rational, being better, knows not only the thingsthat are non-material but those in matter as well?

That is the problem, and Aristotle adjudicates saying that therational soul knows not only the things that are non-material but thethings in matter as well. For if something knows what is better, allthe more it knows also what is worse. So if it knows things that arenon-material it must also survey the things that are worse than whatis non-material, that is, the things in matter. For if intellect, whichis rational cognition, knew only the things that are non-material, anddid not know the things that are in matter, intellect will be in a certainrespect non-intellect.192 Not thinking things that are in matter it willbe non-intellect in respect of them. But it is absurd that intellectshould be in some respect non-intellect. It follows that it does notknow only things that are non-material but things that are in matteras well.

That is what Aristotle says. And we are able to show from outside[his works] that intellect knows things in matter too. If it did not knowthings in matter, how could it set sense right? Sense sees the oar inwater broken and the Sun a foot across, and intellect sets it right,showing that the oar is not broken and the Sun is larger than theEarth. How, then, could intellect set sense right if it did not thinkthings in matter, that is, sense-objects? Besides we have a rule abovethat what knows the difference of one thing from another, all the moreknows the differing things. If intellect, then, knows how non-materialthings differ from things in matter, it follows that it knows the thingsin matter.

But perhaps you will say it is absurd for intellect to know thingsthat are external. That belongs to sense because it knows things thatare in matter and particular. For intellect knows only what is univer-sal and it is for sense to know particulars, which are things in matter.I shall reply to you that intellect is one in subject but differs inaccount. For intellect either acts by itself only, and then it knows onlyuniversals; or it acts with sense, using it as an instrument, and thenit knows things that are in matter and particular. For just as the same

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straight line is the same in subject but differs in account (for what isnow straight may be bent and become curved), so too intellect, whilebeing the same in subject, is analogous sometimes to a straight line,when it acts by itself and knows things that are non-material, andsometimes to a straight line that has been bent, when it is curvedround towards sense and uses it as an instrument, and then it knowsthings in matter too. That is the first problem and its solution.

There is a second problem before which we must first take thispreliminary assumption, that what is brought from potential toactual must be altered, and the alteration is an affection. This beingassumed in advance, the problem then proceeds. If intellect knowsthings in matter, clearly it is affected by them. It is brought by themfrom potential cognition to actual cognition, and what is brought frompotential to actual is altered, and what is altered is affected. It followsthat intellect is affected by things in matter. And since nothing isaffected by what is not of the same matter, it clearly follows thatintellect is of the same matter as things in matter, and is itself inmatter and destructible. For things in matter are destructible. Andhow can it be destructible according either to Aristotle or toAnaxagoras who say it is unmixed with matter? That is the problem.

Resolving it we say that you do ill to take it that everything whichacts is also affected. That statement is false. That which acts isaffected in turn only when it is of the same matter as the thingaffected. Since, then, intellect is not of the same matter as things inmatter there is no necessity for it to be affected by the things in matterwhen it knows them. For the Creator acts when he benefits us, yethe is not affected in turn by us. So those agents only are affected inturn which are of the same matter as the things affected.

That solution is provided from outside [Aristotle’s works]. ButAristotle states another solution, which he also gives elsewhere.193

There are two kinds of affection, one perfective and the other destruc-tive. In the case of the one that is destructive, the statement standsfirm that what is affected comes to be like the agent. But whenintellect knows sense-objects it undergoes a perfective affection whichis rather to be called ‘being unaffected’ than ‘affection’. So againintellect is not affected. For things that are perfected by somethingdo not have to be also of the same matter as it. For see! The cosmosis perfected by the Creator, and does not come to be of the same matteras he. Again, things here are arranged and made perfect by theheavenly bodies, and are not of the same matter as they. Again, airis made perfect by light and is not of the same matter as light. Sointellect too undergoes from sense-objects that affection which isperfective, and being made perfect by them is not of the same matteras they. It should be noted that even if we say it undergoes an affectionwhich is perfective, it is not the substance of intellect that the

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affection touches, but its activity. That is the second problem and itssolution.

Since these two problems took their point of departure from thingsin matter, it is right to raise a problem also about non-material things.Since intellect knows itself and reflects on itself, how does it know<itself?> Is it by virtue of being intellect, or is it intellect by virtue ofone thing and object of intellect by virtue of another? If it is intellectby virtue of one thing and thing thought by virtue of another, clearlyit follows that intellect is not simple but composite. It has componentsinsofar as it is intellect and insofar as it is thought. But if, avoidingthis absurdity, you say it is thought by virtue of being intellect, youfall into another absurdity. For it is shown in the treatise on Proof194

that ‘that by virtue of which’ converts. So if by virtue of being intellectit is thought, then it is also the case that by virtue of being thoughtit is intellect, if they are to convert. But if it is by virtue of beingthought that it is intellect, we obtain the conclusion that everythingthat is thought is intellect, and since objects of mathematics areobjects of intellect, these too are intellects, which is absurd. But if yousay that it does not think itself, you speak falsely. For if it does notthink itself, how does it know that it is separated from the body? Suchis the whole problem, but because of the lack of clarity, let us go overit again briefly. Since intellect thinks itself, either it is by virtue ofbeing intellect that it thinks itself, and since ‘that by virtue of which’converts, it will also be intellect by virtue of being thought, so thatwe conclude that all objects of thought and objects of mathematicsare intellects; or else it is intellect by virtue of one thing and thoughtby virtue of another, and intellect will be composite, which is absurd.

He resolves the difficulty by assenting to one of the limbs andsaying that everything which is genuinely an object of intellect isintellect. For objects of mathematics are not genuinely objects ofintellect, and on that account are not intellects. They are our concep-tion, and we separated them from matter, since they are things inmatter. But such things as derive, being objects of intellect, not fromus but from within,195 those are intellects. For indeed if you mentionangels, these too according to Aristotle are intellects, and if youmention him who patrols the non-planetary sphere, whom he calls‘the Creator’,196 he too, according to Aristotle, is intellect. But sincethat God is intellect is the view neither of Plato nor of pious doctrine– for God is in fact superior to intellect, for which reason he is alsocalled ‘Providence’,197 as coming before intellect – come, let us resolvethe problem in another way.

We say that the conclusion does not follow, that every object ofthought is intellect. For first, objects of intellect are either genuinelyobjects of intellect, such as those things which are altogether non-material, or not genuinely, but in the way in which sense-objects are

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said to be objects of intellect, such as a stone. The present discussionis about things that are genuinely objects of intellect. If that is so,things which are genuinely objects of intellect will be intellect, andnothing absurd will follow. Secondly, what really follows is not thatevery object of intellect is intellect, but that everything that thinksitself is intellect. For what does the problem say? ‘By virtue of beingintellect it is thought.’ [Thought] by what? Clearly by itself. So, please,convert the whole proposition through ‘that by virtue of which’ andsay: ‘by virtue of being thought by itself it is intellect.’198 That is thehealthy conversion. So if what is concluded from the conversion is notthat that which is an object of intellect is intellect but that everythingwhich is an object of intellect to itself is intellect, it is no longer thecase that every object of thought is intellect.

And Aristotle’s solution does not please us, not only because of[what it implies about] the divine, but because universals are objectsof intellect but not intellects. And to say that it is not as intellect thatintellect knows itself is absurd. For in the first place, as we said, whatis one in form and the same will be twofold, thinker and thing thought;and it will not know all of itself, for it thinks itself inasmuch as it isthought, not inasmuch as it thinks. So it is as intellect that intellectknows itself. That is the third object of enquiry.

Fourth object of enquiry. If intellect knows itself, and intellect isalways present to itself, why does it not always think itself? For wecan see that we human beings rarely reflect on ourselves, but we thinkeither about God or about the cosmos, and rarely about ourselves. Butwe ought always to think ourselves, since intellect is always presentfor itself. That is the problem. We say that it is because of mixing withthings that are and attending to them that this happens. It is as iftwo people came along, and one is a friend and the other some famousperson; we do not even say ‘hello’ to the friend because we are usedto him, but we give our hand to the other. In this way too intellect,knowing that it is always present for itself, rarely thinks itself butoften thinks things in the cosmos or above it. It is not by virtue ofbeing intellect, then, that intellect does not always know itself, butthis happens because of its activity. For just as in depressions theintellect does not at all know [itself] because of being turned awayfrom itself, so when it is engaged on the business of another, devotingitself to the affairs of the body, it does not know itself; being at thattime intellect not in actuality but in potentiality.

Plotinus says that there is intellect that always knows itself andintellect that does not always know itself;199 here you can again takethat which is actual as always knowing itself and that which ispotential as not always. He speaks of it as always knowing becausePlato200 speaks of the soul as always in motion. He takes ‘always inmotion’ to refer to its making the body always living, but also to its

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making it always cognitive. And intellect, he says, is always cognis-ing, and if we do not also perceive that it is always cognising, thatcomes about because of the disturbance made by the body.

That, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition.

429b10-11 But since magnitude is one thing and being a mag-nitude another, and water and being water201

It is said also in the Categories and the Physics that this thing is onething and [being] this thing another.202 ‘This’ signifies the two to-gether, that which is form with matter, such as water or a magnitude,whereas ‘being this’ signifies the form alone without the matter, suchas being water, being a magnitude.203 In the case of things that arein matter there is this [double] way of signifying, but in the case ofthings that are non-material, this and [being] this are the same, forin the case of God or a mathematical point or the like the same thingis signified by the two case-inflections. Aristotle’s entire meaning,then, is this. Does intellect know those things for which there is adifference between ‘this’ and ‘[being] this’, that is, things in matter?Or does it know only those things for which ‘this’ and ‘[being] this’ arethe same, that is, things that are non-material? So ‘magnitude’ meansthe two together, ‘being a magnitude’ the form alone, and ‘water’means the two together, ‘being water’ the form alone.

429b12-13 For in some cases they are the same being flesh andflesh204

He uses an inappropriate example. For in the case of flesh, ‘this’ and‘[being] this’ do not mean the same: this is the case only with objectsof intellect. But in the case of things in matter, as we said, theaccusative205 signifies one thing and the dative another. If flesh, then,is one of the things that are in matter, there is a divergence in thethings signified by the accusative and the dative. He does this being,from the loftiness of his genius, contemptuous of examples, as is oftenhis custom.

429b13 It discerns either with something else or with the samething otherwise disposed

He is still raising the problem, and this should be joined on to whatis above. Above he raised the problem whether intellect knows thingsin matter at all. Now, as though agreeing by his silence that it knowsthings in matter, he raises the problem whether perhaps it thinksthings in matter with one part of itself and things that are non-material with another. This thing he says, then, ‘it discerns now with

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one thing and now with another’,206 is in place of ‘objects of intellectwith one part of itself and things in matter with another’. Plutarchand Alexander want what is non-material to be known by what isnon-material and what is in matter by what is in matter. But Aristotlesays that both of them, both things in matter and non-material things,are known by the same intellect, but now disposed one way and nowanother, now using the body as an instrument, in the case of thingsin matter, and now not, in the case of things that are non-materialand objects of intellect.

429b13-14 For flesh is not without matter, but like snubnosedis this in this

This passage is a plea for the opposite doctrine or the problem justraised. For having raised a problem in saying that perhaps theintellect thinks things in matter with one part of itself and non-material things with another, he pleads in these words for theproblem and says it is right that it should think things in matter withone part and non-material things with another. For flesh is notwithout matter; it is a thing in matter. For just as snubnosedness is‘this in this’207 – in place of ‘form in matter’ – so too flesh is form inmatter. So it is reasonable that the intellect should not think thingsin matter and non-material things with the same part.

429b14-16 With that which perceives, then, it discerns hot andcold and the things of which flesh is a certain ratio

Here Plutarch and Alexander obtain the assurance: ‘Look! He himselfsays that things in matter are known by that which is in matter. Hesays it is by that which perceives that hot is known.’ So what do wesay? That he is not saying this [as his real view] but pleading for theproblem, and then here he introduces the true solution. He says thatintellect uses the instrumentality of sense in discerning things inmatter, that is, hot and cold. Then, since he has mentioned hot andcold, but flesh does not discern only these but also as many otherthings as enter into its commensurability, such as dry, wet, soft andas many others as are similar, but he could not mention them all inthe text or it would make it too long, because of this he briefly signifiesthe rest by putting in ‘and the things of which flesh is a certain ratio’that is, of which the account of flesh or its definition consists. Intellect,then, using the instrumentality of sense discerns cold and hot and theother things of which the definition of flesh consists.

And Aristotle is of this opinion [as is clear] first from his resolvingthe third problem which says that if that which is an object of intellectis intellect then a stone too, being an object of intellect, is intellect.

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For he says there that objects of intellect are either genuinely objectsof intellect or non genuinely, like sense-objects. So he says thatsense-objects are objects of intellect, even <if> not genuinely. If thatis so, clearly he is of the opinion that they are thought by intellect.And we can obtain assurance from something else. It is he who says208

that just as objects of mathematics are separated in account, so alsointellect differs from itself in account. If it differs from itself inaccount, it is clear that this is why it differs, that it may know thingsin matter and non-material things. For if it knew only non-materialthings, what need of difference?

429b16-18 But with something else, either something separableor [something related to it] as a crooked line to itself whenstraightened out, it discerns being flesh

This gobbet again proceeds interrogatively and takes its questionfrom a division. The meaning is this. Since the intellect discernsthings in matter with one thing and non-material things with an-other, are these parts of the intellect by which it discerns things inmatter and non-material things separate from one another? Or arethey like a line that is the same in subject but different in account?For it is one thing to be a straight line and another to be crooked. Thatis the aim. But we must take it interrogatively and paraphrase thetext as being phrased with the words out of order.209 ‘With somethingelse it discerns being flesh’ – in place of ‘with another part it discernsnon-material things’. Then, with the words coming out of order, ‘withsomething else that either is separate from the other part thatdiscerns things in matter, or, like the crooked line, is one intellect insubject but different in account’.

429b18-19 And again in the case of abstract things, straight islike snubnosed, for it is with continuum

He comes to his other example, objects of mathematics. What does hesay? That like snubnosed, straight too must be in continuity assubject (for it is in some continuous body) but still we separate thesethings in account from continuity and say that in their case theessence is one thing, that is, the abstract form, and the matteranother, the continuity. He shows <this> by saying ‘being straight<and straight>’.210 So just as in these cases we separate the form andmatter in account, so too intellect differs from itself in account. Andhe pleads now that objects of mathematics are things in matter. Forthe continuous, as he says, is the matter of shape, and shapesthemselves are form. So objects of mathematics are things in matter.

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429b19-20 But [sc. it discerns] the essence, if being straight issomething other than straight, with something else.211

If, he says the essence, that is, the form, of objects of mathematics(for ‘essence’ signifies form) makes straight other <than beingstraight>,212 that is, [if] ‘this’ is other than ‘[being] this’, then that<which discerns> [it] is something else. ‘With something else’ is inplace of ‘then intellect discerns objects of mathematics with anotherpart of itself, and not with the part which which it discerns non-material things’. For if ‘this’ and ‘[being] this’ are different, clearlythey are things in matter. And we should note what Plutarch notesin his commentary, that Aristotle says that objects of mathematicshave a subject. The gobbet, then, is: if the essence, that is, the form,keeps being straight, the ‘[being] this’, other than the straight, thatis, the ‘this’, clearly they are in matter. And if they are in matter, theintellect discerns them with another part of itself, not that with whichit discerns non-material things.

429b20 Let it be duality

To what does this relate? To the forms in continuity. For abstractthings reveal only one thing, the form, but things that are not abstractreveal two, the form together with the matter. And he rightly callsthese things ‘two’ since they are in matter and admit of division liketwo. For abstract things are indivisible and like a unit. And indeedthe bent line in being two reveals something of being in matter. Soobjects of mathematics also are of two sorts, in respect of their form,which we indicate when we say ‘being straight’ and in respect of formand matter, which we signify when we say ‘straight’.

429b20-1 So it discerns them either with something different orwith something differently disposed213

The conclusion, that necessarily it discerns things in matter andnon-material things either with something different or with the samething differently disposed. Then, giving the solution to the wholeproblem, he says: ‘So in general, in the way in which things areseparable from matter, so it is also concerning the intellect’ [429b21-2]. That is, putting it as briefly as possible, just as forms are separatedfrom matter only in conception and account, not in their actualsubsistence, so also intellect is always inseparable from itself, beingalways the same in subject, but in conception and account is sepa-rated correspondingly to the things known.

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429b22-3 But someone might raise the problem, if the intellectis simple and unaffected [and has nothing in common withanything, as Anaxagoras says, how it will think, if to think is tobe affected in some way]

Here is the second problem, which says that if intellect knowssense-objects it will be affected by them. But nothing is affected bythem if it is not of the same matter as they. This is signified when heputs into the text ‘for it is insofar as something is common to boththat one acts and the other is affected’ [429b25-6] – in place of ‘[and]by virtue of what is common, that is, by virtue of the matter, [theother] is affected’. So if the intellect knows them, it is also affected bythem. And if it is affected by them, it is of the same matter as they.But if it is of the same matter as sense-objects, intellect is no longersimple, but composite. So the argument is formulated analytically.

429b26 And further, is it itself too an object of intellect?

Before giving the solution of the second problem he here puts forwardthe third problem, and says that <if> the intellect itself too is ([‘is’] inplace of ‘is present as’) an object of intellect, how does it think itself?And as to the first he says that if it is in virtue of being intellect thatit knows itself, there will be intellect in all objects of intellect, evenin a stone, therefore, and a stone will be intellect. For it converts. Hehints at this in the text where he says ‘either intellect will be presentin the other things’ [429b27] (in place of ‘intellect will be present inthe other objects of intellect’), so that all objects of intellect will beintellect. Then, before stating the other absurdity – that if it is not invirtue of being intellect that it knows [itself], it will be twofold,thinker and thing thought, and it will not know itself entirely, for itwill not know itself as thinker – before this he introduces the solutionof the second problem, saying that the object of intellect is one not innumber but in form.214 There is what is genuinely and what is notgenuinely an object of intellect, and what is genuinely an object ofintellect is intellect. Then he introduces the other absurdity in thesecond215 problem, that if it does not know [itself] in virtue of beingintellect, it will be twofold, so as to be both object of intellect andthinker. He brings that out, saying ‘it will have something mixed in,which makes it an object of intellect like the others’, in place of ‘it willhave some sort of composition, which composition makes it intellectby virtue of one thing and object of intellect by virtue of another, likethe other objects of intellect’. He does not say this because the otherobjects of intellect are composite (for all objects of intellect aresimple), but intellect, he says, will have something that makes it an

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object of intellect as it makes the other non-material things objects ofintellect.

429b29-30 A distinction has been drawn earlier about beingaffected in virtue of something common

Here he resolves the two problems, and first the second whichconcludes that intellect is of the same matter as sense-objects, sayingthat the name ‘affection’ is common [to more things than one]. Thereis perfective [affection] and there is destructive. So the affection thatintellect undergoes is perfective, and the perfective is not properlycalled ‘affection’.

429b30-1 That intellect is in potentiality the objects of intellect

Having said that intellect will be the objects of intellect, even a stone,and having said above that there are two kinds of object of intellect,that which is genuinely so and that which is not, now he says thatintellect is in potentiality the objects of intellect that are genuinelyso, and when it thinks them it is actually they. For intellect, he says,does not have the objects of intellect if it does not think them; it islike a writing tablet on which nothing is written.

Iamblichus says: ‘And see that he says “writing tablet” and not“sheet of papyrus”. For it is not called a “writing tablet” if it does nothave written letters on it. He says this meaning that the souls ofchildren, which are potential intellect, have the accounts of things.So if he likens it to a writing tablet clearly it has accounts of things,just as the writing tablet has written letters. If he calls it “on whichnothing is written”, it is in place of “ill written” because it has faint,non-evident written letters, as also we say of a tragic actor with a badvoice “He has no voice”. So Aristotle too (says he), like Plato, is of theopinion that objects of intellect are in the soul, and accounts of allthings, and that there is recollection, not learning.’ He says this toshow that Aristotle too is of the same opinion as he.216

430a2-3 And it is itself an object of intellect as are the objectsof intellect217

Here is the solution of the third problem, that everything that isgenuinely an object of intellect is intellect.

430a4-5 For contemplative knowledge and what is known inthis way are the same218

What is he saying? That it is not at all absurd that the same thing

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should be thinker and thing thought. For that which is genuinely anobject of intellect, which he calls ‘what is known’, and what isgenuinely intellect, which he calls ‘knowledge’, are the same. ‘Genu-inely’ is added, because objects of mathematics are not genuinelyobjects of intellect. They are called ‘objects of intellect’ at all [only]because representations of them are formed by us and they dependon our conception.

430a5 But the cause of its not thinking always should beinvestigated

Here is the fourth point of difficulty, why intellect does not thinkalways. He raises the difficulty but he does not solve it (but we havesolved it already [528,11-24]), but goes back again after this to thesolution of the problem which said that the objects of intellect will beintellect. Having said that in the case of things that are genuinelyobjects of intellect, that is true, he now says that in the case of thosethings that are in matter, which are potentially and not genuinelyobjects of intellect, object of intellect and intellect are not the same.For intellect is a non-material thing.

That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

[LECTURE 3]

430a10-12 Since just as219 in all nature there is something whichis matter for each kind (and this is what is all those thingspotentially), and something else that is cause and maker bymaking all things [as happens with skill in relation to material,it is necessary that these differences should be present in thesoul too]

After enquiring after four things in the case of potential intellect hethen comes to actual intellect as well, and enquires into ten thingsconcerning it. First, that intellect makes all things. Second, that itacts by its substance; for it is not in the way other substances putforth activities, it is not so with actual intellect. For the substance ofactual intellect does not put forth its activity, but straight off its verysubstance is activity, and the substance of actual intellect is nothingelse apart from its activity. Thirdly, he says, it belongs to actualintellect to think always and act and never leave off from acting.Fourth, that it is psychical.220 Fifth, that it is immortal. Sixth, that itis separable. Seventh, that it is like a disposition and light; for justas light does not itself make colours, but it makes evident colours thatare already there, so also actual intellect does not make things, butimprints things that already are and engraves them on potential

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intellect. Eighth, that potential intellect differs from actual in timeand not in subject. Ninth, that intellect forgets. Tenth, that it alwaysacts with imagination. The text says that these ten points belong toactual intellect, and it says nothing else; but the interpreters havetaken many different lines, some understanding actual intellect oneway and some another.221

Alexander calls ‘actual intellect’ the one source of all things, theIntellect from outside. Marinus says that actual intellect is not theone source of all things but some supernatural222 or angelic being. Butin a word, at least, he says that actual intellect is neither ours northat of the one source of all things. Plotinus thinks that actualintellect is human intellect, which comprises what is always actingand what sometimes acts.223 For Plotinus goes astray from Plato;hearing from him that soul is always in motion, he thinks he calls itthis because it always thinks, and on this account he believes thatthere is an intellect that is always thinking. So Plotinus says thatwhat he calls ‘actual intellect’ is human intellect that thinks always.Plutarch, however, and this is our position too, does not think thatintellect in us is twofold but simple, and this simple intellect, he says,is not always thinking but thinks sometimes. Plutarch, then, believesthat by ‘actual intellect’ he means human intellect, which he alsobelieves to think sometimes. That is how many opinions have arisenabout actual intellect. They are four in number, those of Alexander,Marinus, Plotinus and Plutarch, and each of them has something toplead in its favour. So it is right to set out the pleas for each opinion.

Alexander says that actual intellect is the First Cause.224 He goesastray from hearing him [Aristotle] say that it makes all things. Whois it that makes all things, if not the First Cause? So if Aristotle saysthat actual intellect makes all things, clearly by ‘actual intellect’ hemeans the First Cause. And again, because he says that actualintellect has its activity concurrent with its substance, which ispeculiar only to God – for our intellect plainly brings about its activitythrough a power. And again because it always acts. Alexander’s errorstarts here and he says that these things fit no one but God alone. Itis a peculiarity of God alone to have activity concurrent with sub-stance and to act always.

Plotinus was misled by its always acting and supposed an intellectin us that is always acting and calls this ‘actual intellect’.

Marinus used the arguments of both and said that it is a super-natural intellect that Aristotle calls ‘actual intellect’. It is not humanbecause he says it thinks all things and acts by its substance andthinks always. But neither is it the Intellect from outside. For if hesays that it is analogous to light and a disposition and that it actswith imagination and forgets, these things do not belong to theIntellect from outside. His saying it is analogous to light and a

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disposition shows that these things are proper to an intellect that isbetween Intellect from outside and human intellect, a sort of angelicintellect. For light is intermediate betweeen that which illuminatesand that which is illuminated, and a disposition is intermediatebetween suitability and having to hand. He likens the intellect tothese, so clearly he is speaking of a kind of intellect intermediatebetweeen the human and that which is from outside.

But Plutarch pleads that the treatise is about the soul and Aristotlehas no business now to discuss the Intellect which is from outside. Itis human intellect that he calls ‘actual intellect’, because that is whatthe treatise he has undertaken is about.

An attack, then, common to three of them, I mean Alexander,Marinus and Plotinus, arises from the text. For we find Aristotlesaying that actual intellect is the same in subject but different in timein being potential and actual. For having formerly been in potentialityit comes later to be in actuality. If Aristotle, then, says this in thetext, clearly by ‘actual intellect’ he does not mean God, as Alexanderthinks. For God is not formerly in potentiality but always in actuality,being the spring of goodness. And neither is a supernatural or angelicintellect formerly in potentiality – for Aristotle wants these intellectsto be actual. So Marinus too speaks ill. But there is somethingcontrary to Plotinus as well. For according to him it acts always, andif so, it was not formerly in potentiality. But Aristotle says it wasformerly in potentiality. It has clearly emerged, then, through thisthat he is not referring either to God or to an intellect that issupernatural or angelic, or to any intellect that acts always, but thediscussion is about the intellect that is in us. That is the first attack.

The second is this. Why does Aristotle say that intellect alone isimmortal and eternal? For he says this too: ‘It alone is immortal andeternal’ [430a23]. For if we are thinking of the First Cause, it is notthe case that it alone is immortal (for there are other things that areimmortal), and again if we are thinking of that which is angelic orsupernatural it is not the case that it alone is immortal (for the FirstCause is immortal too); and again if we are thinking of the intellectwhich according to Plotinus is always thinking, neither is that aloneimmortal. For there are also other things that are immortal, such asintellects that think sometimes. For it is not only intellects whichthink always that are immortal; so, according to Plotinus, are intel-lects which think sometimes. So this too is a common attack on them,that they cannot find what intellect it is of which he says that it aloneis immortal.

But those who say that the human intellect thinks sometimes, andthis is the only intellect there is, and we do not have another, are ableto make a defence and say this: that there are many things that go tomake up a human being, and of these intellect alone is immortal and

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eternal. We must reason that ‘alone’ is said relatively to the thingsthat go to make up the human being. But Plotinus cannot give thisdefence. He supposes two intellects, that which thinks always andthat which thinks sometimes. Which, then, can he call ‘alone immor-tal’? If that which thinks always, he speaks falsely. For that whichthink sometimes is immortal too. And if he says that that whichthinks sometimes is immortal, so, according to him, is that whichthinks always. So Plotinus is not able to say how we can call intellect‘alone immortal’.

He does well to add that intellect is ‘immortal and eternal’. For thenon-rational soul also and the vegetative soul are immortal, but theyare not eternal. For they bring along life, and nothing receives thecontrary of what it brings along, so it follows that if they have lifethey are also immortal.225 They are not, however, eternal. A thing iscalled ‘eternal’ for being always in existence, but ‘immortal’ for beingalways living. So intellect alone of the things in us is both always inexistence and always living; the non-rational soul and the vegetativeare always alive but not always in existence. So this too belongs tothe human intellect.

These attacks apply commonly to all three. Against Alexander andMarinus we have this to say, that in the text he calls intellect‘separable’, not ‘separated’. The First Cause, which Alexander says,and the supernatural, which Marinus says, is actual intellect, areseparated, not separable. ‘Separable’ signifies ‘not yet separated, butcapable of being separated’. They are already separated, both theFirst Cause and the supernatural or angelic intellect, not only inaccount but also in substance, that is, in subject. So we have an attackfrom the text that it says that actual intellect is separable and notseparated.

And there is another attack from his calling the actual intellect‘psychical’.226 For neither is the First Cause psychical, O Alexander,neither is a supernatural being, O Marinus. So we cannot think thatactual intellect is either a supernatural being or the First Cause, butonly that intellect in us which sometimes acts, the human one. Andalso because he says in the text that it acts with imagination. Neitherthe First Cause nor any supernatural being acts with imagination,but only the intellect that is in us.

That is a common attack on Alexander and Marinus. AgainstAlexander on his own we may say this. How can we think that by‘actual intellect’ he means the First Cause, if he likens it to light andto a disposition? The First Cause is a substance, not a disposition,and brings forth227 substances, and is analogous not at all to light butto the Sun itself. So this too fits that intellect which is present in us.And again Aristotle says that just as light does not make colours, butmakes plain colours that are already there, so too intellect seems to

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make all things by making them plain. But it is absurd to say this ofthe First Cause. The First Cause produces the very substance ofthings that are, and there is nothing that it has not made. And again,O Alexander, he calls it a ‘disposition’, and a disposition is that whichis in potentiality in the second way.228 The First Cause is not inpotentiality in any way. Again, Aristotle says of it that it is the samein subject but different in time in being potential and actual. The FirstCause in no way has anything prior to itself either in potentiality orin actuality. Besides, he says that intellect forgets. How can thatbelong to Intellect from outside? It is the intellect in us that forgetsthrough being impeded by its relation to the body.

All the things, then, which Aristotle says fit actual intellect [showthat229] his discussion is about the human intellect that is broughtfrom potentiality to actuality. This will be demonstrated if we showthat the things which seem not to belong to it, I mean making allthings, acting by its substance and thinking always, do belong to it.

It should be known, then, that actual intellect is said to make allthings because it inscribes the imprints of all things in potentialintellect. That is why Plato too likens it to a painter230 and Aristotlestraight off proposes that it is a painter. For if potential intellectbecomes all things, actual intellect makes all things. So this canbelong to the human intellect. For it is not Intellect from outside thatinscribes all things in potential intellect, but actual intellect in us.

And the other gobbet fits it too, the one saying it acts by itssubstance. To understand this we must first go back a little. Theknower is neither the soul alone nor knowledge alone but a mixtureof both. The knower consists of soul and knowledge. And soul isanalogous to matter, knowledge to form. And since, as we have cometo know in the Physics,231 the form of everything is substance morethan the matter, knowledge is the substance of the knower, and theknower acts by virtue of knowledge, which has been shown to be theknower’s substance. It follows, then, that it is by virtue of this that itis said to act by its substance, because knowledge is the substance ofthe knower. It is not by virtue of that lofty and exalted speculationthat, as with God, its substance is the same as its activity – for withsouls and other substances apart from the First Cause there issubstance and power and activity. It is said to act by its substancebecause knowledge is said to be, as it were, the substance of soul. Hegives intellect its name, then, from what is better. For since intellectacts by its activity, and it acts when it is in actuality, and in all thingswhat is actuality and substance is better, for this reason, meaning tosay that it acts by its activity he says it does so by its substance, thatbeing what is better.232 In the same way we often indicate the wholeby one [part] which is superior, as in ‘O Teucer, dear head’.233 Thistoo, then, fits the actual intellect of the human being. For it thinks

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when it is in actuality. But intellect from outside is activity straightoff. That he is using ‘substance’ because of its superiority is clear fromhis saying: ‘That this is so is clear. For the agent is superior to thepatient and the source to the matter.’234 So he uses ‘substance’ becauseit is superior.

And the third thing fits it, that intellect always thinks. Not, asPlotinus believes, because the same intellect thinks always through-out everything, for we are not saying that the intellect which is onein number always thinks; but because in the whole cosmos there isalways a human intellect thinking. Even if I am not thinking, still,someone else is, and ‘always’ applies by succession, so that God’sirradiation may never cease to shine on us. For if we did not thinkalways, but at times we did not think, it would cease. If this is howwe say it always thinks, this belongs to human intellect. That itthinks always we apply not to one intellect in number but to all, justas we say that man lives always, not because of Socrates but becausethere is some man always living. Or else [we may say] that it is saidalways to think because it is always capable of thinking. The personwho has intellect thinks at whatever hour he wishes. So this belongsto human intellect. For Intellect from outside is the one intellect innumber that thinks all things.

So much is said to outline the continuous exposition. But it is ourtask to indicate the ten points in the detailed commentary and fillthem out. That is the continuous exposition.

430a10-11 Since just as in all nature there is something whichis matter for each kind, and this is what is all those thingspotentially235

What does he mean to show by this? That intellect makes all thingsand is psychical. He thus brings out the statement that just as inthe fields of nature and skill there is the potential, which he calls‘matter’, and the actual, which he calls ‘efficient cause’, so too inthe soul, he says, there is potential intellect and actual intellect.And in saying ‘in the soul’ [a13] he shows that it is psychical. Inactuality, then, it ‘makes all things’, from which you have it thatit makes all things. See, then: two points.236 But why, having said‘in each nature’,237 does he also say ‘in each kind’? Say that ‘in eachnature’ is used in a more universal sense, and ‘in each kind’ in amore particular; so it is like this: just as in each animal (which hecalls ‘nature) there is the potential and the actual, so there arethese things in each kind, for instance the human kind or theequine, or in this or that.

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430a15-16 [There is intellect that is such by becoming all things,and intellect that is such by making all] like a sort of disposition,such as light. For in a way light too makes potential coloursactual colours238

See! Another thing proper to intellect: he makes it analogous to adisposition and to light.239 And rightly, for as light makes coloursvisible – it does not make them colours, but it puts forth their activity– and as a disposition puts forth activity and not substance, so too theintellect that is in us puts forth activity and not substance. That iswhy it is analogous to them. And if that is so he is not talking of thedivine intellect, for that puts forth substances as well. He makes ourintellect analogous to a disposition in another respect too: not becauseit is a quality, but as a disposition stands to what is in potentiality inthe first way240 (for it perfects it), so actual intellect perfects what ispotential in intellect. But because he likens it to light Alexander fallsinto error, because Aristotle says it makes all things as does light.But he ought not to have fallen into error. For Aristotle adds ‘in away’; God does not make all things in a way; he makes all things inevery way.

430a17-18 And this intellect is separable and unmixed andunaffected, being by its substance actual241

See! He states another property242 [of intellect]: it is separable. Whydid we not say ‘and unmixed and unaffected’ in the continuousexposition as he says now? Because these things are included in‘separable’. The separable is also unmixed and unaffected. And in‘being by its substance actual’ he states another property, that it actsby its substance.243 And that he here speaks according to what issuperior is shown by his saying ‘for always the agent is better thanthe patient’, that is, the actual than the potential. For the agent isthe actual, the patient the potential. ‘And the source’ is superior ‘tothe matter’ [430a19], by ‘source’ meaning the form. So ‘substance’ isnow said because it is superior, not because intellect has substancewithout power,244 for that applies to the Intellect from outside, not toours, for that [i.e. ours] has powers.

430a19-20 Knowledge in actuality is the same as the thing[known]

He throws in this in the middle: actual intellect is things, as potentialintellect is potentially things.

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430a20-1 That which is in potentiality is prior in time in the one[but in all, not even in time]

He states the further property of intellect245 that potential intellect isprior to actual intellect in time. And lest anyone should say that thisis false as regards the whole cosmos (for the actual intellect of oneperson is prior to the potential of another; for it is not the case thatin the whole cosmos sometimes intellect acts and sometimes it doesdoes not, but always the actual intellect of one is before the potentialof another, and that gives you this other property,246 that it thinksalways) – for this reason, then, he says that the potential is prior tothe actual in the one human being, not in the whole cosmos. For inthe whole cosmos, people say, neither is prior to the other, neither thepotential to the actual nor the actual to the potential. For if, accordingto Aristotle, the universe is eternal, neither is prior to the other, butthey are contemporary. And this is like the enquiry raised by thesimple, ‘which is first, the egg or the bird?’ He hints at this in saying‘but in all, not even in time’ [a21], instead of ‘in the whole cosmos’ –and ‘in all’ in place of ‘on a holistic and cosmic view’ – ‘the potentialdoes not precede the actual in time’.

430a22-3 And when separated, only this is what it is

He throws in this in the middle too, that when intellect is separatedand comes to be actual, then it comes to be what it is, that is, genuinelyintellect. For the potential is not genuinely intellect.

430a23 And this alone is immortal and eternal

Look! Again he states another property:247 intellect is immortal andeternal. By ‘this alone’ he means [alone] of the constituents of thehuman being. For only this is eternal and immortal. For the non-rational and the vegetative soul, as has been said, is immortal butnot eternal. It is called ‘immortal’ even if he is of the opinion that itis destructible, since it is not by virtue of being soul that it is destroyedbut by virtue of being in a body. For that reason Plato too says thatall soul is immortal, saying this of the vegetative soul and non-rational soul too. Matter, in contrast, is eternal but not immortal.That is why intellect is said to be imperishable248 as it is also said tobe eternal and immortal. And observe that he is not saying this aboutthe Intellect from outside. For ‘this alone’, being neuter, is construedwith the earlier words that intellect is a ‘part of soul’;249 this part ofthe soul is immortal and eternal, whereas the Intellect from outsideis not a part.

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430a23-5 But we do not remember, because this is unaffected,and the passive intellect is destructible

See! He states this other property,250 that intellect forgets. Plutarchsays that this is said in answer to the problem which asks ‘Why doesintellect not always think, if it has within it that which is cognitive?251

Solving this, he says that the cause of this is its acting with imagina-tion, and when that is destroyed it can no longer act through it orthrough itself. And people raise the difficulty: ‘Yes! Intellect forgetsthose things it has enquired after in the other [ante mortem] life, theparticular things concerning which imagination has acted with it,because that is destroyed. But why does intellect not remember thosethings of which it itself retains the imprint from imagination andabout which it has acted on its own? For we know that Aristotlehimself believes that there are activities intellect has without imagi-nation, for example reflection upon itself, consideration of incorporealthings, reflection upon the divine, cognition of universals – and ingeneral all that it thinks apart from sense it thinks also apart fromimagination.’ To this it may be replied that if in a disease affectingpart of them people are distraught and forget the recent past asThucydides says in his History, ‘they did not know themselves’,252 howmuch the more in a change affecting the whole of their life will theynot forget what went before? From here you may take three253 doc-trines. He is of the opinion that imagination is destructible, for see,he says that passive intellect is destructible. Another doctrine is thathe calls that intellect which he says does not remember ‘unaffected’;so he says that the intellect which is in us is unaffected – for Intellectfrom outside is not said to forget.

430a25 And without this, it thinks nothing

He states the further property254 that without imagination intellectdoes not act. Observe that the statement is in need of explanation.For it does not always act with imagination, unless you should saythat it is [always] when it is occupied with particulars. Or say alsothis other thing, that non-imaginative activities are few. For evenwhen it acts concerning divine things, imagination runs out beside it,making an imprint of things for which there can be no imprints, andon that account Plato says it is the final evil.255 So if on the whole itacts with imagination, say that now he uses ‘always’ in place of ‘onthe whole’. Or say this other thing too. Intellect does always act withimagination. For if sense is the start of all knowledge, and wheresense is missing imagination is missing too, and if imagination, thenthinking (which is why people blind from birth neither imagine nor

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think concerning colours), it clearly follows that separately fromimagination intellect does not act.

That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

[LECTURE 4]

430a26-7 Thinking indivisible256 things is where there is nofalsehood

After potential intellect containing four points and actual intellectcontaining the ten points we have stated, he comes next to objects ofintellect. And it should be known that in the case of the rational soulone should start from the intellect because that is clearer than theobjects of intellect, whereas in the case of the non-rational soul oneshould start from sense-objects because they are clearer. For every-where in teaching it is good to make one’s start from what is clearer.So having taught about intellect, he comes to the objects of intellect.

He says that the object of intellect is indivisible. But do not thinkfrom this that he means intellect knows only indivisible things. Itknows both indivisible and divided things, but it knows the dividedin an indivisible and pointlike way. For the central point also containsthe circle seminally. Intellect, then, knows all things in an indivisibleway. For this is proper to intellect, to collect together and unitedivided things and think them indivisibly. And that it knows evendivided things indivisibly is shown by his saying in the treatise onProof257 that that by which terms are known is not merely knowledgebut the source of knowledge, using ‘source of knowledge’ for intellectand ‘knowledge’ for thought. And see! He says that intellect knowsthings termwise and indivisibly.258

But since the discussion is of that which is indivisible, it should beknown that ‘indivisible’ is used in five ways.259 A term is called‘indivisible’. For we know that a proposition has two terms, thesubject and the predicate, for instance ‘Plato walks’ is a proposition,‘Plato’ is a term and ‘walks’ is a term and, to put it simply, a term is,as we learn in the de Interpretatione,260 a simple spoken sound. Thatis the first thing signified by ‘indivisible’, a term. A second thingsignified is a continuous magnitude. This is divided potentially butactually undivided. A third thing signified is that in quantity whichis without parts, such as a point, a unit, a now. These are theindivisibles in quantity. A fourth thing signified by ‘indivisible’ is aform in matter. It is not this that is divided but its subject. The fifththing signified is a non-material form. These are the five thingssignified by ‘indivisible’.

There are two difficulties we can raise from this. One is how he cancontradistinguish the other four indivisibles from a term, seeing that

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the other four are terms too. For each of them is a simple word, andtherefore a term. It is not a proposition to say ‘continuous magnitude’,neither, again, is it a proposition to say ‘non-material form’.261 Foreach of these is one term only, and a proposition does not arise fromone term only. If that is so, how can he contradistinguish them froma term, seeing that they are terms too? That is the first problem. Toit we reply that it is one thing to say simply ‘term’ and another to say‘term of a certain sort’. The first thing signified by ‘indivisible’intimates simply a term, and the other four, terms of particular sorts.So it is not unreasonable but with good reason that he contradistin-guishes what is simply a term from what is a term of a certain sort.That is the solution.

The second problem people raise goes like this. Why does hecontradistinguish a form in matter from a magnitude? For a magni-tude is itself a form in matter. For this thing, magnitude, is the firstform that comes along before all other forms to formless matter: firstit is made quantitative and then after that it is made qualitative. If,therefore, magnitude is a form in matter, why does he contradistin-guish it from form in matter, seeing that magnitude is subsumedunder form in matter? That is the problem. To it we reply that he doesnot contradistinguish every form in matter from magnitude, but that[only] which comes upon matter after it has been given magnitude.For matter when it has received the form of magnitude remains [anobject only] for conception, but when it has received the other formsit becomes a sense-object. So he contradistinguishes actual form fromform in conception, that is, from the form of magnitude. For this, whenit has come to matter, delivers it to conception; for it is not possibleto see matter that has been given magnitude all by itself without anyother form, except by conception alone. So magnitude may be a formin matter; but then he contradistinguishes it not from every form inmatter, as I have just said, but from that which is actual and revealsmatter as a sense-object.

So these five things signified by ‘indivisible’ can be brought undera kind of division. The division is this. A term is either simply a termor a term of a certain sort. If it is simply a term it makes one thingsignified by ‘indivisible’: a term. If it is a term of a certain sort, it iseither potentially divided into parts but actually without parts or<both potentially and actually without parts>.262 If it is potentially inparts but actually without parts, either it is of itself in parts orincidentally. If it is of itself in parts, it makes continuous magnitude.If it is incidentally in parts it makes form in matter. That, then, ishow it is if it is potentially in parts but actually without parts. If,however, it is both potentially and actually without parts, either it iswith matter, and makes the indivisible in quantity, such as a unit, apoint, a now; or it is non-material and makes a non-material form.

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Since, then, we have learnt from the division that there are five thingssignified by ‘indivisible’, let us next see how intellect thinks each ofthem.

It should be known that it, a thing without parts, thinks a termwhich is without parts as a simple spoken sound, and so neither asfalse nor as true. For truth and falsity are not to be seen in connectionwith simple spoken sounds, but in connection with composites. Andwhy, I ask, in the text does he mention only falsehood and not alsotruth? For he says that thinking in the case of indivisibles is aboutthings where there is no falsehood, and does not add ‘and where thereis no truth’. We have come to know in the de Interpretatione263 thatnot only falsehood but also truth is absent from simple spoken sounds.So why in the text does he mention only falsehood? We reply that hisopinion in the Metaphysics is contrary to his opinion in the deInterpretatione. In the de Interpretatione he says that neither truthnor falsehood is to be seen in connection with simple spoken sounds,that is, in terms; it is in propositions that he says the true andfalsehood appear. But in the Metaphysics264 he says that in simplewords, that is, in terms, falsehood is not to be seen, but truth is to beseen. For when intellect with a simple intuition intuits each simplespoken sound, that is to say, each term, and thinks it on its own andof itself, adding nothing else, it thinks truly. For instance in saying‘walks’ forthwith intellect thinks walking, itself alone, not addinganything else. Again, in ‘to eat’ it immediately thinks chewing, thatis, the teeth moving up and down, without any addition. That is whathe says in the Metaphysics. And now he follows that treatise and forthat reason does not deny truth to simple words, but only falsehood;because intellect never runs into falsehood but always attains truth,according to the saying of Plotinus, ‘either intellect makes contact orit does not, so it is inerrant’.265

But it should be known that there are two kinds of truth, substan-tive and that which is contradistinguished from falsehood. An exam-ple of substantive is when I say ‘This is genuinely a man’: I say thisin contrast to a man in a painting, for the latter is not genuinely aman. So simply because he really exists he is said to be truly a man.In a term too, therefore, we say that there is substantive truthbecause inasmuch as it is a term, it is true that it is, and we do notsay this by way of contradistinction from the false.

Having said this about intellect, that it knows terms truly, he turnsto thought, and says that it not only attains truth but also runs intofalsehood. And another thing: the form in which intellect knows allthings is as being each one, whereas thought knows things as beingcomposite, which is not the same. For intellect knows a thing ascontinuous and one, whereas thought knows a thing as composed ofmany things, like a door, for that is composed of many pieces of wood.

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Thought is like Empedoclean Friendship, which brings togetherthings divided by Strife. And indeed it is said in Empedocles that ifthere were not Friendship, ‘many neckless heads would havegrown’266 – that is, there would have arisen heads without necks ifthere were not Friendship to join them together.

A third property of thought which he states in addition to these isthat it runs into falsehood either through the predicate or throughthe tense.267 For if I say that man is winged, or will be or was, theproposition is false because of the predicate term, I mean ‘winged’.But if I say that the Trojan War was yesterday, then the propositionis false because of the tense.268 In the case of eternal things, falsehoodcomes only from the predicate, not from the tense as well. For if I saythat God was or is or will be I always speak truly, for I speak of whatalways is. But in the case of things that are not eternal, propositionscome to be false both from the tense and from the predicate. From thepredicate, as when I say a goat-stag now exists. The falsehood arisesnot from ‘now’, the tense, but from ‘exists’, the predicate. And again,if I say ‘A shadow is now a body’ the falsehood comes not from ‘now’(for not only is it not now a body but it was not and will not be either),but from saying it is a body. So in the case of things that come to be,falsehood arises in thought in two ways, either from the predicate orfrom the tense, whereas in the case of eternal things it comes onlyfrom the predicate. But none of these things belongs to intellect. Forit thinks all things always and has no falsehood either from thepredicate or from the tense.

He states a fourth property of thought in addition to these, that itis occupied with propositions, whereas intellect is occupied withterms. And when I say ‘propositions’, do not think I say this in theway stated in the Logic,269 that it is occupied with assertion ascomposition, since assertion puts together the subject with the predi-cate, and with denial as division, since denial denies the predicate ofthe subject and divides it from it. Man, it says, is not white. For nowwe say that thought is occupied both with assertion as division andcomposition and with denial as division and composition. For asser-tion, insofar as it joins together, is called ‘composition’, but insofar asit consists in two things that can be taken apart, it is division. Anddenial, even if it says ‘Socrates is not pale’, joins dark to him and isagain composition, but it is also division inasmuch as it separatespale from him. That is how thought is now said to be concerned withpropositions.

Having said these things by way of an excursus, since he has saidhow intellect thinks terms, he next enquires how it thinks undividedmagnitudes, which were the second thing signified by ‘indivisible’.These are threefold, for magnitude is threefold. It is a whole, and hasparts, and is composite. Intellect thinks it as a whole atemporally and

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at a now. For it is not possible for intellect to think it in a time. Forevery time is divisible. If it thinks it, then, in something divisible, thething thought too, the magnitude, will be divisible; for as it is withthe time, so it is with the magnitude. But it is actually undivided. Forit thinks it as a whole, and a whole is undivided. It thinks it, then,not in a time but at a now. And also because if it did not know them270

atemporally and at a now, it would no longer think the whole in thesame time, and it would be found that at some time it does not knowit.271 But thought gets to know it in a time. But intellect also thinksthe magnitude as a thing which has parts, thinking the different partsat different nows, and thinking each part actually at a now. But as acomposite thing it is no longer thought by intellect but by thought. Soa magnitude is thought in these three ways, as a whole, as somethingthat has parts, and as a composite; and in two of them intellect thinksit, as a whole and as something that has parts, but as a composite isit thought by thought.

But intellect knows the form in matter no longer of itself butthrough imagination as an intermediary. For intellect cannot thinksense-objects of itself; it has need of imagination. So it thinks themthrough imagination as an intermediary. But it is not the case that,because intellect thinks through imagination as an intermediary, ittherefore also thinks in parts. For even in imagination there issomething indivisible. That this is true is clear from the fact that thefirst imprints are not made to disappear by the later: it is clear fromthis that there is something without parts in it. And it is in virtue ofthis thing without parts that intellect thinks. So again it thinks in apartless way.

Again, intellect thinks that which is partless in quantity by denial.For just as we think darkness by denial of light, so also by denial ofnumber we think the unit, by denial of time the now, and by denialof magnitude the point. So it is by denial that we think that which ispartless in quantity. But if anyone says that black also is known bydenial of white he speaks falsely. For both are made to have form andboth act, the one compacting, the other forcing apart, and of them-selves both are known positively. Unless you use ‘black’ in place of‘dark’, as in ‘black death’.272

These things are known by our intellect negatively; but the DivineIntellect knows all things positively and intuitively, apart from evil.That, it does not know. Otherwise it would make it. For whatever itknows, it also makes. Its cognition is subsistence-giving. That is whyit is said ‘He said, and it came to be’.273 But this saying may beinterpreted in two ways: what he knows and says, this also comesabout;274 or because his activity is all at once, and that is why it issaid, ‘He said, and it came to be’. And there is a corollary you can

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derive from this. If he [Aristotle] says that intellect acts negatively,he cannot be speaking about the Divine Intellect.

That is how intellect in us knows what is partless in quantity.Non-material forms it knows in the following five respects. Either ascause, and that either as efficient or as perfective275 – for it does notknow it only as final cause, as some people think. And it knows it ashaving nothing contrary to it (for it may be contrary in some way toour good and to the light in us, but in itself it is not).276 And it knowsit as thinker and thing thought. For having that which is divinewithin, that which is cognitive also thinks itself.

That having been said, that, with God’s help, completes the con-tinuous exposition.

430a28 [But in things in which there is false and true, there issome composition of thoughts] as though being one [– just asEmpedocles said ‘whence in many cases sprouted necklessheads’ that were then put together by Friendship]

See what he is saying: that intellect knows truth only, and wherethere is falsity and truth, that belongs to thought. And where thereis composition, again that belongs to thought. And see: he has alreadystated the [first] two properties of thought. And thought thinks thiscomposition, he says, as one thing. He does well to say ‘as though’.For it does not know the composition as something genuinely one, forto know what is genuinely one belongs to intellect, but thought knowsit as one by juxtaposition. That is why it has something in commonwith Empedocles’ Friendship, in that it unites by juxtaposition andnot genuinely.

430a31 [So these separated things too are put together] forinstance incommensurable and diagonal

What does he want to say? That it is also from the predicate thatthought attains truth and runs into falsehood. If it says that thediagonal is commensurable it speaks falsely on account of the predi-cate, for it is always incommensurable with the side. <And if it saysit is incommensurable with the side>277 it speaks truly because of thepredicate.

430a31-b1 And if they are things that have been or will be, itthinks the tense in addition and adds it

What does he intend to say by this? That it is also through tense beingwell or ill added that truth and falsity arise in things. If you say ‘TheTrojan War will take place’ you speak falsely because of the future

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tense; but if you say ‘it took place’ you speak truly because of the pasttense. Truth and falsity, he says, are ‘always in a composition’[430b2], not in simple things. For if you say that the pale thingSocrates278 is not pale, you speak falsely, and if you say that what isnot pale is pale you speak falsely because the composition does notfit.279 And see that he calls both the assertion and the denial ‘compo-sition’. It is also possible, he says [430b3], to call both ‘division’,because they consist of things that are different, and it is possible todivide them into the terms out of which they were put together. He doeswell to say ‘it is possible’ [b3]. For, if you care about the logical sequence,it is possible to call assertion ‘division’ because it is divided clearly intosubject and predicate, and to call denial ‘composition’ because it iscomposed of subject and predicate.280 And that is how he speaks here,but in his Logic he calls only assertion ‘composition’ and denial ‘division’.

430b5 [But in any case what is false or true is not only thatCleon is white,] but also that he was or will be281

What is he saying? That if the predicate is false, it is falsely said inevery tense, for instance if you call Cleon white and he is not white,whether you say that he is white or was or will be, you speak falselybecause of the predicate. The tense does not introduce a differencehere. And see the two further properties of thought, that it is occupiedwith denial and assertion, which he calls ‘composition’, and he saysit runs into falsehood either through the predicate or through thetense.

430b5-6 That which makes one is intellect in each case

This is what was said also above. Read the sentence as having itswords out of order:282 ‘That which makes each of these one is intellect’.For we said that intellect thinks even divided things in an indivisibleway. And see that instead of ‘thinks’ he says ‘makes’. That is alto-gether remarkable. Just as that which is, gives to all things a shareof being, and that which is beautiful, a share of beauty, so alsointellect, in virtue of its own simplicity and unitivity, makes compos-ite things simple. For intellect thinks them as simple and not ascomposite.

430b6-7 But since the undivided is twofold, the potentially andthe actually, [nothing prevents it from thinking the undividedwhen it thinks length (for it is undivided in actuality) and in anindivisible time]

He comes to the second thing signified by ‘indivisible’, which is

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magnitude or the continuous. Either this is potentially divided butactually undivided, like a magnitude, or actually divided but poten-tially undivided, like water. Intellect, then, he says, knows what ispotentially divided as actually undivided, and what is actually di-vided as potentially undivided. And it knows these things, he says,‘in an indivisible time’ also; otherwise in half it would know half. Byan ‘indivisible time’ [b8-9] he means a now, speaking ill. For a now isnot a time but a beginning of time.283 By a ‘now’ I mean an instant.But if you take the now that has duration,284 that has a beginning anda limit and is a time. But now we are speaking of the instantaneousnow. It is not only because the undivided is twofold that he says theundivided is twofold, but because it is only when there is an actualcutting of a magnitude into two parts that it is divided.285 For amagnitude is either potentially or actually undivided. A length isactually continuous but potentially divided. Understand ‘length’ here[b8, b10] as being in place of ‘continuous’. He says, then, that nothinghinders intellect from thinking a length not insofar as it is dividedbut insofar as it is continuous. For it is continuous in actuality. Thisis to be taken as establishing what was said above, that intellect layshold of composites as simples.

430b9 For the time is divided and undivided in the same way[as the length]

He says that it thinks in an indivisible time; and lest anyone shouldsay that time is not indivisible, he says that time is divided andundivided, speaking ill. For he used ‘now’ in place of ‘undivided time’ignoring the fact that the beginnings of quantities are not quanti-ties.286 So the beginning of a time is not a time.

430b10 So it is impossible to say what it thinks in each half

This again is establishing what was said above, that if it is insofar asthe time is divisible, and not insofar as it is undivided, that we thinka ten foot plank, then in half the time, say, we should think half theplank, that is, five feet, and in the other half of the time the other fivefeet. But plainly that is not how it is. For the magnitude, he says, isnot actually divided [sc. in thought] so that you can say that it thinkshalf in half the time, but is divided only in potentiality. Intellectthinks it as actually undivided.

430b11-12 But if it thinks each of the halves separately [itdivides the time also at the same time]

He uses ‘thinking’ [noein] loosely in place of ‘exercising thought’

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[dianoeisthai]. For he is talking now about thought. Having said thatintellect thinks undividedly he says that thought knows each [part]separately in a divided way. And even when it knows them unitedand together it knows them as lengths composed of two components,‘out of both’ as he puts it [b13], and it knows them ‘in the time that isfor both’ [b13-14], that is, dividedly, and no longer as a length but asdifferent lengths. For that is the meaning of ‘as if lengths’ [b13]. Hedoes well to add ‘as if lengths’. For only one length is the subject, andif intellect thinks it at different times, what is one length in actualitywill be [a plurality of] lengths, which is absurd.

430b14-15 But that which is indivisible not in respect of quan-tity but in form [it thinks in an indivisible time and with anindivisible part of the soul]287

The third thing signified by ‘indivisible’. It is as if he said that thereis nothing to hinder thinking even the continuous as undivided,because there is something undivided in it, and if something is onein form and indivisible it is agreed that it is known in an indivisibletime and with an indivisible power of the soul. What is the indivisiblepower of the soul? Clearly intellect.

430b16 But it is incidentally, and not insofar as those thingsare divisible, [but insofar as they are undivided,] that by whichit thinks288 and the time in which [sc. it thinks] [are indivisible]

Forms in matter, he says, that intellect thinks are indivisible inciden-tally. In itself a form in matter is divisible, which is why even with acertain [finite] extension we can see the division of the continuumgoing on to infinity. But they are said to be indivisible incidentallybecause their unification comes to them from without. This, then, iswhat he is saying. It is not insofar as these forms in matter aredivisible (‘insofar as’ in place of ‘by virtue of being’), it is not in thatway that intellect thinks them; but even if they are divisible, intellectthinks them in an undivided way, because the soul thinks them withan undivisible part of itself (the indivisible part of the soul is intellect)and at an indivisible time.

Interpret also as follows. Intellect knows lengths and shapes at anindivisible time and in an indivisible power of the soul incidentally,since those things are not indivisible of themselves but have theirunification incidentally. What? Is anything that intellect thinks indi-visible incidentally? We say that it is its nature to think in anindivisible way, but it thinks what is undivided incidentally becausebeing undivided supervenes incidentally on these objects of intellect.

Some people289 say that by ‘soul’ [at b15] he means imagination.

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Meaning to say what? That it is by using imagination that intellectgets to know forms in matter. It uses, he says, the indivisible part ofimagination. For it has an indivisible part, as is shown by the factthat later imprints do not make the first ones disappear. But imagi-nation too, he says, is divided incidentally because it is in a divisiblesubject. For form too is divided in this way. So the tool by using whichintellect thinks, namely imagination, is divisible incidentally and notas imagination.

And the ‘time at which’ intellect thinks is indivisible. Again, hecalls a now a ‘time’. And the now, it too is divisible incidentallybecause it is in a time that is divisible. So we may conclude that hemeans here that even if imagination and the now in time are divisibleincidentally, still, it is taking these things as indivisible and as onethat intellect thinks forms in matter. And perhaps it is possible to saythat he wanted to bring out something imagination and forms inmatter have in common, that both are divisible incidentally.

430b17-18 For there is something indivisible in them too, butperhaps not separable [which makes one the time and thelength]290

There is, he says, both something indivisible in time, the now (againhe uses words loosely) and also something indivisible in imaginationwhich intellect uses. Why does he say ‘perhaps’ and make it question-able? Is it not agreed that imagination is not separable but destruc-tible? Perhaps, then, we may say: since he calls it ‘passive intellect’and says it acts with intellect, for this reason he could not say that it,as intellect, is inseparable. That is why he makes it questionable. [Butwhether it is separable or not separable, by this291] all things, bothlength and time, are thought as one. For this separable thing is inevery length or time or continuum as in one. That is why intellect too,being separable, knows all things as one.

430b19 And this is likewise in every continuum [both time andlength]

This what? It is in place of: ‘The form that is without parts andinseparable is in every time and length.’292

430b20 A point and every division

Here is another thing signified by ‘indivisible’, that which is indivis-ible in quantity; that is to say, things in every way indivisible. Butsince of things in every way indivisible some are known by privation293

and some of themselves, he speaks first of those [known by] privation,

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because they are more easily known by us, like, he says, a point. This,as was said in the continuous exposition, is known by denial of thecontinuum. And after the point he brings in ‘things indivisible in thatway’ so as to say line and surface. For these are the limits of otherthings. And perhaps it may be said: ‘What? Are lines and planesindivisible?’ We say: insofar as they are limits of other things theyare indivisible. He mentions these things at all because not only is apoint a division of a line, but also a line is a division of a surface anda surface of a solid.

430b20-1 and what is indivisible in this way is shown as isprivation

‘And what is indivisible’, he says, ‘in this way’, that is, like a point, isshown, it too, by ‘privation’. He says this because of incorporeal thingsand the divine, which are not known by privation. Surface is knownby privation of depth, line by privation of depth and width, and pointby privation of depth, width and length. He calls these ‘divisions’[b20], and plausibly. For a point divides a line, a line a surface and asurface a body. In themselves they are indivisible.

430b22-3 [And a similar account holds for other things, such as]how it comes to know evil or black

That evil is privation of fair294 is agreed. But that black is privationof white is false. Black is made to have form, as we said [547,5-6].Perhaps, then, he says ‘black’ in place of ‘dark’, so that dark isprivation of white, and by ‘white’ you understand light. Dark is aprivation of that.

430b23 But that which comes to know must be potentially, andit must be in it.295 [But if to some one of the causes296 nothing iscontrary, it gets to know itself and is in actuality297 and isseparable]

He says ‘be in’ in place of ‘be present in’. He is now enquiring how wemust think what is divine, and he makes two preliminary assump-tions. First, that the thinker must be potentially as is the thingthought. By ‘potentially’ he means by suitability. For Aristotle doesnot want there to be accounts of things in the soul. As the thingthought, then, is potentially, so must the thinker be too.298 For thatwhich comes to know must in this way become completely like thething to be known and be like it and be potentially it. And the thingknown, in turn, must be present in the knower itself when it gets toknow it – that is the second [preliminary assumption]. When the

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thinker is so disposed it knows the divine in the five respects stated[547,17-22]. He states all of them except [that it knows it] as cause.He says it has no contrary, for it has no linkage with anything oropposition at all because of its transcendence. That it is also ‘inactuality’ is clear, because it also knows itself. And please, as Plutarchsays, do not think that ‘separable’ [b26] means [separable] only fromthe matter of bodies; it means also from psychical powers. He says‘separable’ from them but he should have said ‘separated’; for thedivine has been separated. So according to Aristotle’s statement[430b24-6], if a thing which is a cause299 has no contrary, that thing‘knows itself and is in actuality and is separable’, and [this is true]not only [of] intellect but [of] anything else there may be of this kind.

That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

[LECTURE 5]

430b26-7 Saying is [sc. saying] one thing of another, as isassertion300 [and is always true or false. But not all intellect is;but that which is of what a thing is in respect of essence is true,and is not [sc. thinking] one thing of another]

Having shown that intellect is eternal and that it differs from sense,and shown how thinking comes about and how objects of intellectdiffer, he does not pass on from the intellect before stating thedifferentiation concerning it in a wholly complete way. His differen-tiation concerning intellect is threefold. He differentiates intellectoccupied with simples from that which is occupied with composites,that is, from thought; potential intellect from actual; and practicalintellect from contemplative. He does the first with one differentia-tion, the second with two and the third with three.

Intellect, he says, which is occupied with simples differs fromintellect which is occupied with composites, that is, from thought (forit is that which is occupied with composites) in that intellect alwaysattains truth while thought both attains truth and runs into false-hood, and the true for intellect is not even like the true for thought.For the true for intellect is substantive truth, whereas that forthought is in a composition of one thing [thought] of another. Intellectis like sense occupied with its own sense-objects, which always attainstruth. Thought is like sense occupied with incidental sense-objects;for that sometimes runs into falsehood and sometimes attains truthand involves composition. It knows one thing by another, for instanceman by pale. So simple thoughts, analogous to sense attending to itsown business and always attaining truth, always attain truth,whereas composite thoughts, analogous to sense attending to thebusiness of another and sometimes attaining truth but sometimes

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running into falsehood because of this – they too sometimes attaintruth and sometimes run into falsehood. That is how he differentiatesintellect occupied with simples from intellect occupied with compos-ites.

Then next he differentiates potential intellect from actual, firstbecause actual intellect is the things themselves, whereas potentialintellect is not things unless it thinks them. Secondly, because poten-tial intellect comes before actual in time in the one person, though inthe whole [cosmos] it does not come before; for there are always boththe potential and the actual. For there must always be the actual tolead the potential to being actual.

And having made this differentiation in this way he also differen-tiates contemplative intellect from practical. The first differentiationhe gives is this, that practical intellect is occupied always withparticulars whereas contemplative is occupied also with universals.He gives a second differentiation: practical intellect always usesimagination, and contemplative does not. Third differentiation: incontemplative intellect there are true and false, whereas in practicalthere are good and bad. And this differentiation is rather to bepreferred. For the second does not altogether carry necessity. Forcontemplative intellect too always uses imagination.

And it should be known that contemplative intellect is not otherthan practical [intellect] in subject. For just as potential intellect isnot other than actual [intellect] in subject (for it is the same), butdiffers only in time, so too practical intellect stands to contemplative:in subject it is the same, but different in how it is related. Contem-plative intellect is analogous to sight discerning only the forms ofcolours and coming to know that this is white and that black. Practicalintellect is analogous to sight not only knowing the forms of coloursbut also making the pleasant its own and turning away from thedistressing. For like sight when besides the white and black it gets toknow also the pleasant and the unpleasant, so too practical intellectknows not only the true and the false but also the good and bad; andthe pleasant to sight is analogous to the good, and the unpleasant tosight is analogous to the bad. But intellect often chooses the unpleas-ant in place of the pleasant, because the unpleasant is good and thepleasant, sometimes, also bad. So this is the difference, that contem-plative intellect acts without appetition, knowing only truth andfalsity, whereas practical intellect acts with appetition, by knowingwhat is good and what bad.

After taking the differentiation of the contemplative from thepractical intellect this far, he provides us with yet another differen-tiation of intellect from sense. For since both in differentiating intel-lect from thought and again in differentiating contemplative intellectfrom practical he has likened intellect to sense, lest anyone should

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think that intellect is like sense in every way, for that reason he nowprovides a differentiation of intellect from sense and says that aparticular sense, like sight, knows white and black, and sight is thecommon lodging for white and black, while for white and sweet thecommon sense is the common lodging. <For> it is not sight but thecommon sense that knows the difference there is between white andsweet. As the common sense, then, is the termination of the particularsenses, so also intellectual cognition is the common lodging of objectsof contemplative intellect and intellectual action is [the commonlodging] of objects of practical intellect such as good and bad. But ofboth, of objects both of contemplative and of practical intellect, thelodging is intellect.

Plato used to call intellectual cognition ‘attentive’301 and intellec-tual action ‘conscious’. He said that they are the same in subject. Forit is the one who knows that acts: life is linked to cognition, and it isone thing that says ‘I thought’ and ‘I fed’.302 If that were not so, it mayreasonably be said it would be as if I perceived this and you that. Butthey differ in account in that one acts and the other knows. Aristotletoo is of this opinion. And they have something in common in respectof their very subjects.303 What is good is also true, and what is bad isfalse. But they differ in that ‘good’ is said relatively to something (forwhat is good in virtues relatively to the soul is bad for the body);whereas ‘true’ is not said relatively to anything, but true is alwaysthe same and fair. For Plato’s statement is not to be accepted, that toconcede to the maniac the pledge of the sword is true but bad.304

According to Aristotle, the true as such is always fair.It should be known that even if we say that the common sense is

like intellect because as the common sense is the termination of allthe particular senses, so also intellect is the termination of all objectsof intellect, objects of thought and objects of opinion, still, there is adifference. In the case of the senses, the common sense is another oneadditional to the five, whereas in the case of objects of intellect, thatwhich knows the difference is not something over and above the three,but one of the three. For intellect, which is part of the three – I meanopinion, thought and intellect – itself knows how objects of intellectdiffer from objects of thought and objects of thought from objects ofopinion. That is how intellect is different from the common sense.

And it should be known that just as common sense knows not onlythe things that the particular senses know, but other things inaddition (for the common sense knows how the sense-objects that fallunder sense differ, whereas the senses, as we have already said, donot know this: the particular senses know only sweet and white, butthe common sense knows not only these things but that they aredifferent), so too, then, intellect knows not only the objects of intellect,thought and opinion, but also how they differ. For what is known by

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the worse is known by the better too, but what is known by the betteris not known by the worse. The difference, at least, between objectsof thought, intellect and opinion is not known to either thought oropinion, but intellect knows it, being better than both, both thoughtand opinion. So there is an analogy like this. As black is to its properthought, so is white to its proper thought, and alternando as black isto white, so is thought [of] white to thought [of] black.

That, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition.

430b26-7 Saying is [saying] one thing of another, as is asser-tion.305

What does he want to say? That intellect occupied with simples isdifferent from intellect occupied with composites; for it is occupied,he says, with assertion in the mind. This is as it were simple in themental state and always true; whereas intellect occupied with com-posites is occupied with expressed assertion, which admits of true andfalse and involves composition because of the expression. His saying,then, that in all cases it is true or false [b27] must be taken asreferring to expressed assertion, not to assertion in the mind. For ‘notall intellect runs into falsehood’306 in place of ‘attains truth or runsinto falsehood’. [For intellect of simple thoughts attains truth only, itdoes not also run into falsehood; so not all intellect attains truth orruns into falsehood.] [Falsehood]307 is mentioned, he says, becauseof practical intellect. For contemplative intellect, in that it lays holdof simple and pure thoughts, does not run into falsehood, but practicalintellect, because it combines forms in matter with itself and with oneanother, exercises thought, he says, in this and runs into falsehoodon this account. So again, falsehood follows upon thought.

430b28-9 But that which is of what a thing is in respect ofessence is true, and is not [sc. thinking] one thing of another

It is as if he said that that kind of intellect alone [always] thinks trulywhich is in respect of what a thing is and of essence. ‘What a thing is’indicates substance, and ‘essence’ indicates form. So what is said issomething like this, that that intellect attains truth which lays holdof substance with respect to form, that is, which lays hold of form byitself. This is contemplative intellect, which always attains truth andis not [thinking] ‘one thing of another’ [b28-9], that is, which is notoccupied with composites. Being occupied with composites belongsnot to what is genuinely intellect but to thought. And do not thinkthat intellect is the same in subject as thought but different inaccount, as was said in the continuous exposition;308 for intellect isdifferent from thought in subject too.

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430b29-30 But just as the seeing of what is proper309 is true, butwhether what is white is or is not a man, that is not always seentruly

What is ‘the seeing what is proper’? [This is] in place of: ‘seeing whatis proper and attending to its own business, for example seeing whiteand no more, not also seeing the substance to which this whitebelongs’, for that is not always true. For there are times when senseruns into falsehood about things that are sense-objects incidentally,as was said above.

430b30 so it is with such things as are without matter

What is he saying? That as sense stands to objects that are its ownor not its own, so things without matter stand to objects of intellect.By ‘things without matter’ he means thought and intellect. For theseare non-material powers. And object of thought and of intellect, ontheir side, are things without matter. Objects of intellect, which healso calls ‘simples’, are analogous, he says, to sight seeing what isproper to it; but objects of thought, which he also calls ‘composites’,he says are analogous to sight attending to the business of another,and wanting to know not only that the thing is white, but that it is awhite man or a white horse.

431a1-2 Actual knowledge is the same as the thing, [but poten-tial is prior in time in the one]

By ‘thing’ he means the object of knowledge. He says that actualknowledge is the same as its object. For knowledge does not come toknow its object unless it has been made completely like it and becomeas it is. This [remark] is not put in to no purpose, but since thediscussion is about objects of intellect, and objects of intellect becomeactual objects of intellect and are known by intellect through system-atic knowledge as an intermediary, for that reason he makes mentionof systematic knowledge and says that when it is actual it is like theobject of knowledge. ‘But potential knowledge is prior to actual in theone’ individual [a2].

431a2-3 but with regard to the whole, not even in time, [for allthings that come into being are from what is in actuality]

Some books have ‘with regard to the whole’ and some ‘simply’.310 Whathe means is that to speak simply, and with a view to the whole, inthe whole cosmos the potential is not prior to the actual because all

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things are advanced to actuality by311 what is in actuality throughwhat is able to advance [them]. Some people say that ‘what is inactuality’ need not be taken to refer to the Creator; the point is thatwhat is potentially one thing is always something that is actuallysomething else, for instance the semen that is potentially an embryois actually semen, and the bread which is potentially blood is actuallybread. But I think that they do not say well. For there is nothing whichis always actuality alone and by which all things are advanced, exceptonly the Creator.

When he gets here Alexander says that the argument is disordered,since he [Aristotle] discriminated potential from actual intellectabove, and he now does the same thing. To this we reply that theargument is repetitive, not disordered. For he does this now in orderto give the whole differentiation at once.

431a4-5 The sense-object plainly makes that which perceives,from being potential, to be actual; for it is not affected or altered.[Hence this is another species of change. For change is theactuality of what is incomplete, and what is actuality withoutqualification is something else, [sc. the actuality] of what hasbeen completed]

What is the meaning of this text? He wants to differentiate practicalintellect from contemplative. But before coming to the differentiationhe wants to speak about sense for [one of] two reasons: either becauseintellect has something in common with sense inasmuch as it actswithout an intermediary, or because he has a passion for using senseas a model in this differentiation, and that is why he says somethingabout sense that he has said already, that sense is in potentialitywhen it is not acting by virtue of having the disposition and not, likethought, by virtue of suitability. And whenever the sense-object ispresent and the sense acts, the sense is brought to actuality by thepresence of the sense-object. It is not through change that it comes tobe actual. Sense is not affected or altered when it is brought frompotentiality of the second kind to being actual. For Aristotle does notwant what is brought from the second sort of potentiality to the secondsort of actuality to be altered nor to be affected, so it is either notchange or another species of change. For if anyone wants to call this‘change’ let him call it another species of change over and above thosementioned in the Physics,312 and introduce a new classification ofnature. Then he [Aristotle] also establishes that the advance from thesecond kind of potentiality to the second kind of actuality is notchange. For he says that ‘change is the actuality of what is incom-plete’313 (for change moves from incomplete to complete, and it [theincomplete thing] is affected and altered), but what is potential in the

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second way is complete. The activity of things that are complete isnot change but something else besides change. So the passage fromthe second sort of potentiality to the second sort of actuality is not achange but a switch.314

431a8 Perceiving is like mere saying and thinking [but when[sc. the soul perceives something to be] pleasant or distressing,as through asserting or denying it pursues or avoids]

He is still differentiating contemplative intellect from practical. Whatdoes he say? That if, like sense, it has mere saying, that is, merecognising and thinking, it is called ‘contemplative’. But if it includesexperiencing pain and pleasure he says it asserts and pursues sincewe welcome it [sc. what gives us pleasure] and go for it. He callswelcoming it ‘asserting’, and what is painful we deny: we do notwelcome it but actually avoid it. As though, he says, with the discern-ing power of practical intellect we discern good and evil. Do not, then,take everything to refer to the same thing.315 Then, since it has beenshown above that sense and appetition are the same in subject, andhe has to say that practical intellect acts with appetition, he says itacts with sense, sense and appetition being the same in subject.

431a11 [And to experience pleasure and distress is to be activewith the perceiving mean] in relation to the good or bad assuch316

He does well to add ‘as such’. For things are not good or bad inthemselves, but in relation to the animal, what conserves being called‘good’ and what destroys ‘bad’.

431a12-13 And avoidance and appetition are this317 when inactuality, and that which is appetitive and that which avoidsare not other [either than one another or than that whichperceives; but their being is other]

What is he saying? Comparing the actually distressing and actualpleasure he says they differ in account. He calls the distressing ‘thatwhich is avoided’ and the pleasant ‘appetition’. Then, lest someoneshould think that we reach for something pleasant with one powerand avoid what is distressing with another, he now says that pleasureand distress318 do not differ except in account. They do not differ insubject. For the subject of both is the non-rational part of the soul.But why do I say this, when there is no difference in subject evenbetween perceiving and experiencing pleasure? The subject of thesealso is the non-rational. But they differ ‘in being’ [a14], that is, in

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account. He says this to show that contemplative intellect too differsfrom practical only in account.

431a14-15 But to the thinking soul, phantasms stand in thesame way as perceptions

He uses ‘thinking soul’ loosely for contemplative intellect. What is hesaying? That it too sometimes uses imagination as also does practicalintellect. But even if it uses imagination, he says, to it phantasms arelike perceptions, that is, like sense alone without pain or pleasure.But to practical intellect, which has good and bad as its subjects, theyare, he says, as it were assertions and denials, and it then usespleasure and distress, and pursues the pleasant and avoids thedistressing. And this intellect always uses imagination because italways experiences pleasure and distress, which is not possibleseparately from imagination, but the first intellect [i.e. contempla-tive intellect] sometimes does not. It does not think any particularswithout imagination, but it thinks universals even separately fromimagination. But do not think that the good is the same as thepleasant or the bad as the painful. Sexual indulgence is a pleasantevil, and to control oneself about all things is a painful good. So donot think that the pleasant for practical intellect is the same as thegood for it.

431a17-18 Just as the air makes the pupil to be of a certainquality, [and this something else, and hearing similarly, but thelast thing is one, and one mean, though it is many in being .But what it is by which it discerns how sweet and hot differ hasbeen said, indeed, before, but may also be said thus. There isone thing, but [sc. one] as a boundary mark]

He is speaking of the common lodging. And what does he say? Thatas the air alters the pupil, and the pupil the pneuma, and that thepower of crystalline form,319 and this [power] is roused and sees, andit is one and insofar as it discerns it is a mean, but in another respectit is different – that is, in account – from the other things that discern(for hearing too in the same way has some one thing that discerns),– as it is, then, in those cases, so also in intellect there is a commonlodging which is a last thing and a discerning middle. The text saysthe first part of this, the part about sight and hearing, but it does notsay ‘so also intellect has a lodging’. But having said the first, thePhilosopher leaves us to understand the rest along with it, the partabout intellect, and turns to other things.

A particular sense, he says, discerns in this way,320 but it does notdiscern white and sweet, but there is something else which we

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mentioned above, he says [a21], and will mention also now, thecommon sense. This is the common lodging for these and is one likea boundary mark. By ‘a boundary mark’ he here means the centre ofa circle, from which many straight lines issue forth.

431a22-3 And these, being one by analogy and in number, standto each321 as those things to one another

What is he saying? That as the ‘boundary mark’, that is, the centre,[stands to the radii] so the common sense stands [to the other senses]both by analogy and in number. In analogy, because just as the centrestands to each of the lines from it, so the common sense stands to eachof its senses; and as the lines have a certain analogy to each other,so, he says, have the particular senses a certain analogy to oneanother. That is how it is one by analogy. How is it one in number?Because just as there is one centre which has a relationship tomany lines, so the common sense, itself one, has a relation to manysenses.

431a24 For how is wondering how it discerns heterogeneousobjects different from wondering how it discerns contraries, likewhite and black?

Having said that as the common sense stands to the properobjects 322 do not, he says, wonder how a particular senseknows objects of the same kind, if you do not wonder how thecommon sense knows heterogeneous objects; for it is the same.323

By ‘objects of the same kind’ he means black and white, for bothfall under colour. By ‘heterogeneous’ he means white and sweet,for these, in that they fall under different senses, are in factheterogeneous.

431a25-7 As the first [A324], white, is to the second [B], black, asthey are to each other325 so let the third [C] be to the fourth [D];[so that also alternando]326

He uses the letters here to indicate, A, white, B, black or sometimessweet, and C and D for objects of intellect, so that C would be theaccount of white and D the account of black. And what does he say?That as the common sense knows the first and second (you may takethe first still to signify white, the second sweet) so also intellect knowsthe third and fourth, that is, the accounts of these things. Andintellect, he says, also knows ‘alternando’327 AC and BD, that is, boththe sense-objects and the objects of intellect.

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431a28-9 [If, then, C and D should belong to one thing, it willbe thus, as also A and B:] one and the same, but the being notthe same, and that one likewise;328 [and the same account evenif A should be sweet and B white]329

In subject, he says, they are the same – I mean the form of white orblack, or white or black – but they are different in account. For wesee white and black differently and we think them differently.

431b2 That which thinks, then, thinks the forms in phantasms

What is he saying? That practical intellect thinks the forms of thingsusing imagination; and as in that, he says, there are pursuit andavoidance, since it is appetition, so also there are these things inintellect when it experiences pleasure and distress. Either say thator this other thing, that above he calls sense-objects ‘phantasms’ andbelow he calls them ‘imagination’. And what is he saying? Thatintellect sometimes acts along with sense-objects and experiencespleasure and pain, and sometimes acts without sense, making use ofimagination. When it sees torchlight and thinks it is an enemy’s, itacts with perception. But when deliberating where it should makewar, then it uses imagination.

431b5-6 For instance, perceiving torchlight, that it is fire it getsto know by that which is common330

What is [the meaning of] ‘it gets to know by that which is common’?Some say [that it gets to know] by the change [sc. in respect of place]of the fire. For change is a common sense-object. But it is absurd tosay of what gets to know 331 for he spoke of that which gets to know.Say, then, that he says this because we get to know the fire by thecommon sense. He says this because he knows that whatever is asubject of a particular sense is also a subject of the common sense.

431b6-7 But sometimes by the phantasms in the soul [it reasonsand deliberates what is future in relation to what is present]

What is he saying? That when someone has imagined and deliberateson where to make war, and deliberates about what is present on thebasis of what is past, and chooses the place that is pleasant and avoidsthat which is painful, then he uses imagination. It should be known,he says, that pleasant and distressing are always in [the sphere of]practical intellect, whereas the true or the false that is without actionis in contemplative intellect. And this, he says, is in the same intellect

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as good and bad. They differ as absolute and relative, since the trueis so called absolutely and is always the same, whereas the good isworthless and charming in relation to something. For what is good inrelation to one thing, say the soul, is not good in relation to the body.

That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

[LECTURE 6]

431b12-14 But abstract things, as they are called, it thinks,–just as, if [someone thought] snubnosed not as snubnosed butseparately, as curved, [he would think it without the flesh inwhich the curved is, so it thinks objects of mathematics, whichare not separated, as separated when it thinks them]332

Having differentiated simple intellect from composite, practical fromcontemplative and potential from actual, he returns to the object ofintellect and now teaches about that. The object of intellect is form,and form is threefold: what is altogether in matter, like physicalforms, what is entirely non-material, and what is in one way in matterand in another non-material, like objects of mathematics. Above333 hehas examined form in matter, when he spoke of what is this particularthing, and also non-material form, when he enquired into being this.So now he comes to objects of mathematics and enquires how intellectthinks them. And he says that it thinks them not as forms in matterbut as non-material. It does not know them in the same way assnubnosed, which it has to think in matter, in the nose, but it knowsthem like curved. For that is thought without matter.

And intellect thinks objects of mathematics using imaginationwithout parts as an instrument. For imagination is without parts: forwhen it conceives Socrates running, it conceives him as one thing,and not as something different from, and over and above, the running.For if imagination comes from sense, since that is not transition-mak-ing, it is clear that it too is without parts, and does not maketransitions from one thing to another, but imagines all at once. Fromthis what does he infer? That imagination, like intellect and sense,only attains truth and does not also run into falsehood, becauseimagining does not involve composition. And from this the soul isshown to be separable, since things that cannot be separated, I meanobjects of mathematics, are separated by it in conception because ithas separability in its substance.

Having said this he enquires whether or not, if actual intellect is[identical with] things, and if it is in coming to be, it is able to knownon-material things. He raises the problem, but for the moment hedoes not solve it. In regard to this Plato says that intellect, when it isin coming to be, can be a citizen of Heaven, and act in connection with

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non-material things and be contemptuous of the body. For if soulsoutside [the body] that are body-loving are always with body, even intombs,334 what wonder if also souls in coming to be should act inconnection with non-material things? So Plato; but Aristotle, furtherdown,335 says that objects of intellect are of three sorts. First, thereare non-material objects of intellect; secondly, there are intermediateobjects of intellect; and thirdly, there are those in matter. And in thecase of the non-material he says there is no need of imagination: thethinkings are non-imaginative. But when, he says, it thinks objectsof mathematics, it uses imagination as subject. But even if it does useit as subject in knowing objects of mathematics, it does not follow fromthis that phantasms and objects of mathematics are the same. Forphantasms are subjects only of imagination, whereas objects ofmathematics are subjects also of the soul that uses imagination assubject. But forms in matter the soul gets to know by using sense andimagination as an instrument. If, then, there is non-imaginativeactivity, it follows that intellect in coming to be is capable of knowingthat activity; it has no need of anything in order to know it.

But he pleads as advocate for the opinion which says that intellectdoes not know forms that are in every way non-material. They areseparate from matter. So it too should be separate from matter if itis to think them, since what gets to know ought to be made completelylike what is known in every way. But in the animal it is not separated.So it does not know them. That is the first plea. But that is false, OAristotle. For if intellect does not while it is in the animal know thingsthat are in every way non-material, how is it that in your treatise theMetaphysics you both enquired after forms that are in every waynon-material, and found them, and reported them to us? That makesit clear that even while it is in the animal, intellect knows forms thatare in every way non-material. That is the first plea and the counterto it.

Second plea.336 Intellect does not think non-material forms, be-cause non-material forms do not exist at all; and since they do notexist, for that reason they are not thought by intellect either. That isthe second plea. To it we reply: ‘How can you say this, Aristotle, whenin other works you shout aloud in so many words that there are divineforms, which are what non-material things are? So there are non-material forms.’

Third plea. Intellect always acts with imagination. It never acts onits own, but always with imagination, even when it acts in connectionwith divine things. For indeed there too it acts with imagination, andimagination always gets to know forms in matter; for it is fromknowing the good order of the cosmos and the excellence of thingsthat intellect is led to know the Providence that arranged them inorder: so even when it thinks divine things it does not act without

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imagination. And imagination, as has been said, always knows thingsin matter, for imagination knows only those things which senseknows. If intellect, then, knows only those things that imaginationknows, because it does not act without it, and imagination knowsthose things which sense knows, and sense knows only things inmatter, it follows that intellect knows only things in matter, and doesnot in any way know non-material things as well. That is the thirdplea. To this we say in opposition that when intellect acts in connec-tion with particular sense-objects, then it acts with imagination anddoes not depart from it from beginning to end, but is with it when[immersed] in sense-objects. But when it thinks divine things then itdoes act through imagination. For we said that it is from the goodorder and good arrangement we can see, that we are led across to thedivine. So it does act through imagination. But it no longer acts withit; for it no longer needs it. Incorporeal things are thought evenseparately from imagination. That is the solution to the plea.

Fourth plea. Intellect cannot think non-material things becauseintellect is the same as imagination. For like imagination it neitherattains truth nor runs into falsehood. If intellect, then, is the sameas imagination, and imagination does not think non-material forms,neither will intellect think non-material forms. That is the fourthplea. To it we reply that intellect is not the same as imagination, sinceimagination gets to know only qualities which the senses also get toknow – for imagination knows nothing that sense does not know too.Whereas intellect knows substances. If imagination, then, does notknow substances, and intellect does know substances, it follows thatintellect is not imagination. That is why Plato too in the Theaetetussays ‘imagination does not attain to substance’337 – in place of ‘cogni-tion of substance does not come its way’. So intellect is not the sameas imagination.

Having said this and taken the discussion of cognitive activitiesthus far, Aristotle wants to draw a common conclusion for his accountthat will apply to the activities in common. He says that through itscognitive powers and activities the soul is all things that are. For thethings that are, all are either sense-objects or objects of intellect,which he calls ‘objects of knowledge’, and each of these is of two kinds.Everything is either potential or actual. <For>338 everything that ispotential comes to be actual. All things, then, fall into four groups:potential sense-objects, actual sense-objects, potential objects ofknowledge and actual objects of knowledge; and there is nothingamong things that are, that is outside these four. But now, there arealso these four in the soul. The soul has potential senses and potentialknowledge, and actual senses and actual knowledge. But it is not thecase, when we say that the soul is all things, that by this we meanthat there are stones or wood in the soul; but [we say this] because

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the soul becomes like things and is an image of them, since like isknown by like. And again, let no one accept the Platonic hypothesesand think that accounts are in the soul. Aristotle is not saying thateither. But when there are potential sense and potential knowledgeof things the suitability only for the things is present, and when thereare actual sense and knowledge, then we get to know the accounts ofsense-objects and objects of knowledge, and, in a word, then actualcognition comes about.

Having said this by way of summary of the whole discussion, heturns from intellect to what changes [the animal] in respect of place.He ought to have gone on to that after sense. For he thought it bestto turn from things that belong to more [animals] to things that belongto few. But he placed his discussion of this after discussing all therational and non-rational soul because these things [sc. which he saysabout the rational and the non-rational soul] are also needed forteaching what that which <changes> in place is and what it is not.We say that it is not imagination or sense or intellect or that whichnourishes or anything else like that. So if we did not have priorknowledge of these things, how should we know that it is not thesethings? That which changes in respect of place is mixed appetitionfrom the non-rational and the rational. The appetition of the non-rational moves us when we follow our emotions, while appetition ofthe rational soul moves us when we follow reason. If we do not know,then, what the non-rational and the rational are, how should we knowwhat is a mixture of them? That is why he comes later to that whichchanges in respect of place.

And what does he teach about it? He takes Plato up on three points.First, why does he divide the soul as a whole into parts, when he oughtto have divided it as a substance into powers? We plead in Plato’sdefence that he divides soul universally as a whole into parts, intothe physical, the non-rational, the logical; and he divides the particu-lar souls as substances into powers.339 He does, then, know the latterdivision too. And if you raise the problem why he calls the spiritedand the desiring ‘parts’, though they fall under one soul, the non-rational, then ask also why Aristotle says that intellect is a ‘part’ ofthe soul.

Secondly, he takes Plato up for leaving a number of things out. Hedivides the soul into three, spirit, reason and desire, and housesreason in the brain, spirit in the heart and desire in the liver. But heleaves out that which imagines and that which perceives, that whichchanges in respect of place, that which is appetitive. But we say thathe knows these things too and mentions them when he is doingnatural science in the Timaeus. In the Republic he mentions [only]these three because they are needed for all the constitutions. Whenreason is master it produces aristocracy and monarchy, where spirit

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is master it produces democracy, and desire, the multiform beast,340

when combined with love of wealth produces oligarchy and whencombined with love of pleasure produces, if it is law-abiding, aristo-democracy,341 if lawless, tyranny.342 So he mentions only the thingsthat are useful to him, but he knows the lot.

He takes Plato up, thirdly, on the ground that, in saying thatreason is in the brain, spirit in the heart and desire in the liver, hetears appetition apart from itself. For appetition is a mixture of therational with the non-rational, and these are in different places. Soappetition too is torn apart. In reply to this, say that the whole soulis present in each part, but according as a part has greater suitability,reason or spirit appears; and appetition is not torn apart.

That is the continuous exposition.

431b12 But what are called ‘abstract things’ it thinks as if[someone thought] snubnosed

‘But abstract things’ is like a heading for the discussion, such as wefind also in the Hippocratic writings, for instance in those on womenthere is the heading ‘But concerning the diseases of women’. That ishow here too ‘abstract things’ is said.343 Wishing to show how abstractthings are thought, he proceeds: ‘it thinks’ he says, ‘as snubnosed’.For snubnosed is thought with matter, and curved without. So hemakes objects of mathematics, which he calls ‘abstract’, analogous tocurved. For curved comes to be like something non-material, beingabstract.

431b15-16 So it thinks objects of mathematics, which are notseparated, as separated344

In this he means to tell us the nature of objects of mathematics. Theseare thought separated, but not as things separated in actuality; onlyin conception. And from here we obtain a corollary: the soul isseparable, since it separates things that are inseparable; if it werenot separable it would never separate these.

431b16 In general, actual intellect is things

Since he has said that intellect separates mathematical forms andthat is how it thinks of them, for that reason he adds this, thatintellect is the same as things, so that its substance also is separatedwhen it knows separable things, and it is itself separable and we knowlike by like.

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431b17-19 But whether or not it is possible for it to thinkanything separated without itself being separated from magni-tude, we must consider later

Here he puts forward the problem which we mentioned in the con-tinuous exposition, that if actual intellect is [the same as] things, andthings, insofar as they are objects of intellect, are non-material, itfollows that intellect is non-material; and how can it be non-materialif it is held in coming to be? How will it get to know non-materialthings if it is held in coming to be? He promises to give the solutionin what follows. And it has also been shown above that it can thinkthings in every way non-material provided that it does not use thebody as an instrument but is unmixed with any body.

431b20-1 Now, summarising what has been said about soul, letus say again [that the soul is in a way all things that are. Forthings that are, are either sense-objects or objects of intellect,and knowledge is the objects of knowledge in a way, and sensethe sense-objects]

He brings forward the conclusion applying to all cognitive activitiesin common. The conclusion is that things that are, are all eithersense-objects or objects of intellect. But as we said, he calls objects ofintellect ‘objects of knowledge’. And he divides these into the potentialand the actual, and shows that all these are in the soul, and thatwhich is potential knows the potential, and that which is actual, theactual.

Some people raise the problem, if all things that are, are eithersense-objects or objects of intellect, and a thing is a sense-object or anobject of intellect relatively to something, it will follow that all thingsthat are, are relative, even the divine, which is absurd. We reply thatall things that are, insofar as they are sense-objects and objects ofintellect, are relative; but insofar as they have subsistence, they areof themselves. For even the black itself, insofar as it has subsistenceof itself, is not something relative, though insofar as it is a sense-object, it belongs among relatives.

431b21 That the soul is in a way all things345

He does well to add ‘in a way’, since forms are in matter, and the soulknows them in a non-material way, not as being in matter. For it isnot the stone that is in the soul, but its form without the matter.Similarly with the others. That is why he says ‘in a way’.

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431b23-4 But how this is, we should enquire346

[The answer is] that it is according as they are potential and actual,that sense is the sense-objects and knowledge the objects of knowl-edge.

431b28-9 [That in the soul which perceives and that whichknows are potentially these things, the one the object of knowl-edge, the other the sense-object.] They must be either the thingsthemselves, or the forms. Not themselves347

Having said above that we should enquire how sense lays hold of itsobjects, now he says that necessarily either the composite formsthemselves are in the soul, that is, the form also with the matter, orthe form itself by itself. But, he says, the composite forms are not inthe soul. There is certainly no stone in it. Therefore necessarily theforms alone are present in the soul.

432a1-2 So the soul is like the hand. For the hand is aninstrument of instruments, and intellect is a form of forms, andsense a form of sense-objects

What he is saying is something like this. Just as the hand, while beingan instrument of the body, uses instruments, as a carpenter mightuse an adze, perhaps, or a measuring rod, so also the soul, while itselfa form, is receptive of other forms, because it has accounts of formswithin itself.348 Both intellect and sense are forms and receptive offorms in the same way because they have accounts of forms. Butintellect is the form of all forms – for all forms are present in it whenit is actual – whereas sense is the form only of sense-object forms,because it is sense-objects that are in actual sense.

432a3-6 But since there is no thing, it is thought, separatedand over and above magnitudes that are sense-objects, objectsof intellect are in perceived forms, both the so called abstractobjects and such as are dispositions and affections of sense-objects

Here are the pleas, the first of which, he says, states that forms whichare non-material in every way do not exist at all. This statement hasits words out of order349 and is read as follows. There is nothing overand above perceived magnitudes, as everyone thinks, but the thingsthat are, all are perceived magnitudes. He means to say that thoughtsare of either the first sort or the second or the third,350 and that it

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knows the first non-imaginatively but the second and third withimagination, even if it uses it in one way as an instrument, in anotheras a subject.351 What, then, is he saying? Since there is no thing overand above magnitudes, that is, without matter, as some sense-objectsare thought to be, such as objects of mathematics (for these appear tobe separable, but they are not), because of this, he says, objects ofintellect are in the forms of sense-objects; objects of mathematics, forinstance, even if they seem separable, which are the second group.And the third are inseparable, the sense-objects. He refers to thesecond in saying ‘the so-called abstract objects’ and the third in saying‘and such as are dispositions or affections of sense-objects’. For theseare forms in matter and affections, being qualities in matter <or>lives,352 and only their magnitude is separable in account.

432a7-8 And for this reason, therefore, a person who does notperceive would not learn or understand anything353

Because these third354 are sense-objects. And he says here unclearlywhat is said clearly in the treatise on Proof. He says there that senseis the starting point of all knowledge355 because, as he says now,objects of intellect have to be in perceived forms. ‘In cases, then, wherea sense is missing, that sort of knowledge is missing too.’356 Then,having said ‘would not learn anything’ he adds ‘or understand’, thatis, or discover. For there are two routes to cognition, learning anddiscovery.

432a8-9 And when a person contemplates, he must at the sametime contemplate a phantasm. [For phantasms are like percep-tions]

Having said that the forms of objects of intellect are in sense-objects,for this reason, he says, it is necessary that intellect should at thesame time contemplate a phantasm, that is, [use357] imaginationas an instrument, since indeed sense is what makes it.358 So thatwhether we say that it uses imagination or that it uses sense, it is thesame. In these words he states the second plea, that intellect actsalong with imagination, and imagination does not know forms with-out matter. Neither, therefore, does intellect.

432a10 Except for being without matter

Having said that phantasms are like perceptions, he says they arewithout matter. For the senses act in connection only with things inmatter, and imagination only in connection with forms. But somepeople359 think he is joining ‘except for being without matter’ to

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intellect. Having said that it is the same whether you say intellectuses sense or imagination, he says ‘except that intellect knows whatis without matter’.

432a10-11 Imagination is other than saying and denial, [for it isan interweaving of thought that is what is true or false. But thefirst thoughts, what will distinguish them from being phantasms?]

For it [imagination] is occupied with simples, which is why also it iswithout parts, being occupied with terms. Hence truth in it is sub-stantive; it does not lie in composition. If, therefore, it neither attains[non-substantive] truth nor runs into falsehood, since it neitherasserts nor denies, and if intellect similarly (according to the plea)neither attains truth nor runs into falsehood, ‘what will distinguishthe first thoughts’, which are simple, from phantasms [431b12-13]?So intellect too will be imagination. It should be known that intellectand imagination and perception have substantive truth and know ina termwise manner.

432a13-14 Or are not even the others360 phantasms, though theyare not without phantasms?

These words are a refutation of the third plea. Having stated threepleas, he refutes only the third, saying ‘perhaps not even the otherphantasms are thoughts’. But what sort of thoughts does he mean?Those which we have said are simple and on that account similar toimagination. ‘Though not’, he says, ‘without phantasms’, that is, theyare not separate from imagination. So the thoughts arise throughimagination, but imagination is not the same as intellect. Except,however, he says, when it thinks thoughts of the first kind it does notuse imagination as an instrument, though it uses it with thoughts ofthe second and third kinds. But anyhow a phantasm and a thoughtare not the same. For a phantasm is in matter in a way, while athought is non-material.

It should be known that we raised certain other matters in thecontinuous exposition,361 but since we looked at them superficially itseems best to take up the discussion again from above. It is better tocover the same ground twice than to miss anything out. That, withGod’s help, completes the lecture.

It is possible that the Commentary originally stopped with this lecture,and that the lectures on DA 3.9-13 were added later with thesebridging sentences. In that case the original Commentary may havebeen only on DA 3.1-8, and we need not wonder what became of thecomments on the first two books.

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Notes

1. OCT has ‘no other sense’.2. krustalloeides. The word is not in Aristotle, but later writers refer to an inner

part of the eye as to hugron krustalloeides, literally, ‘the liquid of crystalline form’;see Philoponus in DA 2 especially 350,24-33, 364,34; 418,20. Aristotle says thatthe eye is of the same watery material as the brain, which is cold and wet: Sens.438a12-14, b28-30.

3. Because it contains an enumeration of all the materials.4. i.e. we might have something in us (sc. air or water) which is ‘such as to carry’

and sensitive to a sixth kind of sensible property, but we might lack a sixth senseand so not know this, just as an animal that has smell but not sight would not knowthat there are colours.

5. sunêmmenon; this looks like a slip for proslêpsis, ‘minor premiss’.6. i.e. if a sense-organ is missing, a sense-object is; but a sense-object is not; so

neither is a sense-organ. Contrast the invalid 447,36-9.7. 81,15-17.8. Reading sumbebaiousthai for sumbolaiôsasthai, ‘interpret symbolically’ ac-

cording to Liddell and Scott.9. Hayduck’s text has lemmata printed by themselves with references to

Aristotle by page and line, and quotations printed in the commentary and distin-guished by wider spaces between the letters. This passage is printed as a quota-tion, not as a lemma. The MS P 1914 makes no differentiation between lemmata,quotations and commentary.

10. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.11. i.e. as a reply to the difficulty that there are more sense-objects than

sense-organs.12. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.13. On the second interpretation Aristotle does not commit himself to saying

that air and water both figure as materials of olefactory sense-organs.14. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.15. What is the categorical syllogism? Perhaps that everything perceived

incidentally falls into one of the two classes he distinguishes; nothing falling intoeither class produces an affection; therefore nothing perceived incidentally pro-duces an affection.

16. The Commentator is referring to 425a27-8. Aristotle’s words here should, Ithink, be translated: ‘But we already have perception of the common objects whichis non-incidental common to the special senses’, i.e. they are already perceived ofthemselves, not incidentally, by sight and touch (cf. 418a8-11). Understood in thisway, however, they remove the need for the sort of ‘common sense’ commentatorsusually attribute to him. Our Commentator, therefore, suggests that he is raisinga difficulty, though it is hard to see what the difficulty consists in.

17. What follows has little relation to 426b6-11. The Commentator quotes fromthese lines at 462,5, but I could believe that he knows of them only from acommentary by Plutarch, and that they are missing from his text.

18. Works and Days 361-2.19. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.20. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.21. Probably a reference to Metaph. 14.1, 1088a6, not to some treatise by the

Commentator.22. sc. in the perceiver. Taking Aristotle’s statement in this way makes it very

difficult to understand – the Commentator shows signs of desperation at 458,1-3– and we might do better to suppose Aristotle is thinking of changes and stayingsunchanged in the object perceived: we differentiate colour, shape and size becausethey change independently.

23. Plutarch of Athens (died 432); his commentary is lost.24. 453,29-31. Note the slightly different treatment of this point at 311-12, 315.25. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.26. Cat. 10a11. Deleting interrogation mark in Hayduck at 458,25 (which is not

in t).27. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.28. OCT brackets the words ‘we see the son of Cleon’.29. The quotation marks here, omitted by Hayduck, are present in t.30. This part of the sentence is not printed as part of the lemma by Hayduck.31. Altering Hayduck’s textual layout. 32. This sentence is printed in parentheses in OCT.33. OCT: ‘several senses and not just one’. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.34. cf. DA 2.11, 422b23-3235. Reading dusgnôstotera, ‘harder to know’ for dusgnôsta, ‘hard to know’, as

Hayduck suggests.36. i.e. after-images.37. Alexander’s commentary on the de Anima is lost, but this theory of con-

sciousness appears in his own de Anima, 65,2-10.38. i.e. I experienced the motivations of the ‘Spirited Part’ of the psyche, the

thumoeidês.39. Euripides, Orestes 396.40. This seems inconsistent with 464,28-30. Perhaps the point is not that

Plutarch explicitly says opinion is responsible, but that he implies this in sayingthat the ‘inferior part’ is responsible.

41. A striking anticipation of Hume.42. epistrephousa, a Plotinian term: see, for instance, Enneads 4.8.4; 5.2.1.43. Reading epanalabôn for enapolabôn, ‘intercepting’.44. Punctuating before nun as Wolfgang Bernard suggests: ‘Philoponus on

Self-Awareness’ in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristote-lian Science, London 1987, p. 159n22.

45. Neither this nor the next passage, 425b13-14, nor 425b17 at 468,1-2 isprinted as a lemma by Hayduck.

46. Probably a play on words: Aristotle uses ‘first’ (prôton) to indicate theprimary subject of seeing, but the Commentator finds it specially apt because thiswill be coloured prior to seeing.

47. Perhaps we should add, as Hayduck suggests, ‘in some way or other’.48. i.e. that there is present in the sense knowledge of the universal forms the

objects exemplify.49. pragmatôn, a word used for things as constrasted with thoughts and words.50. DK 31B109.151. A ‘physical’ demonstration, for Aristotle and his followers, is one that starts

from premisses belonging to the same discipline as the conclusion, whereas a

154 Notes to pages 32-45

‘logical’ one depends on general or non-technical considerations: GA 2, 747b28-30,cf. GC 1.2, 316a11, Metaph. 7.4, 1029b13, EN 7.3, 1147a24.

52. 202a31-b22.53. Reading legontos for legontes, ‘we remember saying’, at 469,32.54. e.g. my learning Pythagoras’ thereom from you and your teaching it to me

are one and the same process.55. Correcting tês to tou at 470,14. 56. In the lost commentary, presumably. 57. The context being opaque?58. See Plato, Theaetetus 156A-E, apparently the Commentator’s source for the

Protagoreans, though Plato does not use the same word, gennêma, as he, butekgona.

59. Reading sunêgageto for eisêgageto, ‘he had introduced’, at 472,4.60. The Commentator thinks that sound (phônê; strictly speaking sound with

pitch, as distinct from noise) is called a ‘consonance’ insofar as it is ‘proportional’to the sense of hearing, and insofar as it is proportional, the sense (or the air in thesense-organ) receives its form, and has this in common with it.

61. The commentary on the de Anima of Syrianus, disciple and successor ofPlutarch at Athens, is lost.

62. i.e. if he had argued: ‘If sound is a consonance, and a consonance is aproportion, and a proportion is destroyed by addition, so is hearing.’

63. The reference is probably (see my Introduction, p. 2) to the lost chapters ofPhiloponus’ in de Anima 3.

64. This word, as Hayduck says, has dropped out at 473,27.65. OCT has: If change and acting [and the affection] are in the thing changed.66. Physics 3.3, 202a13-b22.67. The Commentator uses the word dêmiourgos, literally ‘craftsman’, which

Plato uses in the Timaeus to refer to the divine maker of the world; like many earlyreaders, he equates this figure in Plato with the Judaeo-Christian God.

68. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.69. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.70. We need not suppose that ‘sounding’ (psophêsis) is here being used to

express the idea of a kind of sense-datum like ‘ringing in the ears’. Aristotle defines‘that which sounds’ (psophêtikon) as ‘that which changes a single quantity of aircontinuously up to hearing’ (DA 2.8, 420a3-4). A string’s doing this, as distinct frommerely vibrating, is ‘sounding’.

71. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.72. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.73. sc. as actual.74. A slip: the Commentator means the Theaetetus.75. The Commentator reads ei dê sumphônia phônê tis estin. OCT reads ei d’ hê

phônê sumphônia tis estin, ‘if sound is a kind of consonance’. The original manu-script will have had, without spaces or breathings, eidê. The Commentator defendsreading this as he does – though he takes eidê as one word, ‘if indeed’, and not asOCT does, ‘if ’ followed by the definite article.

76. prosdiorismoi, the technical term for quantifiers like ‘all’, ‘some’: for theequivalence of the definite article to the universal quantifier, see Stephanus in deInterpretatione 67,3-27; for the impropriety of attaching a quantifier to a predicate,29,17-22.

77. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. OCT brackets ‘and in a way not one’.78. The text here, as Hayduck says, is dubious, though the meaning seems clear

enough.

Notes to pages 45-52 155

79. Bracketed in OCT.80. Aristotle introduced the use of nun, the Greek word for ‘now’, to signify a

durationless instant (Physics 4.10, 218a6, a24 etc.)81. It does not modify ‘arrived’.82. See note on ‘physical’, 469,29. The preceding account is ‘logical’, because

Aristotle uses objects of mathematics as a model for psychological processes.83. See Introduction, pp. 5, 11. The pneumatic body of the Neoplatonists, being

separable, is not composed of Aristotle’s pneuma (see MA 10) which seems to be akind of physical gas; though a couple of lines below the Commentator refers to itsimply as ‘the pneuma’.

84. 23b3-7. But the example about black and white is not in this passage, butcan be found in Plato, Timaeus 67E.

85. ostreinon. This is presumably a reference to the ordinary, earthen, asdistinct from the pneumatic or the heavenly body: for the word, compare Proclus,in Timaeum 237,26 and 29.

86. Theaetetus 184D.87. OCT reads ‘we also discern’.88. Because reason does apprehend sense-objects, using sense as an instrument.89. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.90. Reading toutesti sômatos for esti sômati, ‘inseparable in body’ at 483,30.91. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.92. OCT omits ‘in time’.93. OCT has ‘so it is <both undivided and> also divided’.94. In place of ‘discerning’, krinein, OCT has phronein, ‘exercising judgement’.95. DK 31B106.96. The tag from Hippocrates used at 472,20.97. Reading mêtin for aisthêsin, ‘sense’, at 486,6, as Hayduck suggests.98. phronêsis, here, however, meaning thought generally.99. i.e. differences in waking experiences result in differences in dreams. cf. DK

31B108.100. Odyssey 18.136-7. The Commentator completes the quotation; Aristotle

quotes only the first phrase.101. Euripides Hippolytus 701.102. i.e. the world of coming to be in which we live, as contrasted with the

Platonic world of being.103. Theaetetus 152-83.104. 479,22-480,3; 483,18-31.105. The Commentator seems to mean by this (as the word he uses, hippoken-

tauros, suggests) a mixture of a horse and a bull.106. sunkatathesis, a Stoic term.107. Hayduck prints these words as part of the commentary, but they are

certainly a quotation, and probably a lemma. Aristotle’s reference is probably to404b7ff.; the Empedoclean fragment quoted here is quoted at 404b13-15.

108. i.e. for ‘Since people define the soul’ etc., 429a17-18; see 489,9-11.109. i.e. deliberation about whether or not to do them at all, not about how to

achieve an objective already decided upon.110. Homer, Odyssey 22.1.111. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.112. i.e. his illustration of thinking not rightly.113. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.114. Reading hautê for autê with the OCT.115. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.

156 Notes to pages 52-68

116. Reading hautê for autê and phantasian before legô at 492,10. Hayduckthinks that dianoia has replaced phantasia at this line and 492,11, but it is hardto think how such a corruption could have occurred.

117. OCT brackets ‘thinking’, noêsis, expecting us to understand ‘imagination’.118. Euripides, Hippolytus 612.119. A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, Adespota 317, Hildesheim

1964, p. 899.120. Reading akontes, ‘against our will’, for hekontes, ‘of our own free will’ at 493,4.121. See R. Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, London 1972, pp. 22-34. It is tempting

to read topous, ‘places’, for tupous, ‘imprints’, at 493,7.122. sc. from birth: cf. 417b16-18.123. Reading hoiosoun with the MSS; but perhaps we should read oios ê, ‘or a

sheep’s’.124. See 413b21-4, 414b1-16. Aristotle is not as straightforward as the Com-

mentator here suggests. There is some discrepancy between his treatment of thematter here and the treatment in Philoponus’ commentary on Book 2, 240,7-15and 254,23-31.

125. Reading prosklisei instead of prosklêsei, ‘invocation’, at 497,9, as Hayducksuggests. Habituation is like a plant’s being trained into a shape by having itsbranches bent.

126. Or perhaps ‘through argument’.127. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.128. As at 428a12-15, discussed above 496,2-4.129. phantasma, an Aristotelian term for a mental image. 130. ek metaphoras. metaphora literally means a carrying across from one thing

to another.131. See on 488,18.132. The Commentator is probably led to offer this tortuous interpretation

because his text asserts at 428a3 that imagination is one of the powers by whichwe discern and think truly or falsely. In the OCT Ross inserts an interrogativeparticle, making Aristotle ask if it is one of these powers. This gives a better sense.

133. So quoted at line 33 below; the OCT has ‘and’. 428a4-5 is not printed as alemma by Hayduck.

134. aisthêton; perhaps a slip for noêton, ‘object of intellect’.135. Instead of taking tês energeiai as an adverbial phrase, ‘the same in

actuality’, as I have translated it, they supply aisthêsei, ‘the same as actual sense’.136. Perhaps in view of lines 20-2 below we should insert ou, ‘he does not

imagine’.137. See 464,8 above.138. See above, 466,12-15.139. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.140. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.141. OCT omits ‘if ’.142. OCT brackets these lines 428a22-4, which are, in fact, rather a repetition

than an establishment of 428a19-22.143. The MSS have here ‘If I say that imagination is opinion with sense’, which

Hayduck rightly brackets.144. e.g. ‘I swear by my head ’145. That is, if the original opinion has been destroyed, opinion and sense are

no longer combatants, and it is not absurd if imagination consists of them.146. i.e. a compound in which opinion and sense do not stay intact, cf. 502,3-4.147. Sophist 264B.

Notes to pages 68-80 157

148. 35A.149. The Commentator confuses the Eleatic Stranger with Socrates, and in-

cludes among the varieties of ‘that which is not’ some that do not appear in theSophist. The words ‘super-real’ (huperousios) and ‘sub-real’ (metousios) are notPlatonic, but the Republic (6.509B) speaks of what is superior to being, epekeinatês ousias, and space in the Timaeus (49-51) is perhaps inferior.

150. See 428a12-14, but cf. 466,17 above.151. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.152. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. OCT reads: And because the opinion

will not be about anything other than that, if it is, of which there is also sense.153. OCT: true opinion.154. OCT: if it still has it.155. A difficult text. See Ross 1961, p. 288.156. Themistius does at 92,4-7 say that imagination sometimes acts simultane-

ously with sense, though he does not deduce this from the statement that imagi-nation acts through sense as an intermediary.

157. The Commentator may be thinking of 425b5-11.158. i.e. it sags in the middle. I am assuming that êrtêmenon (from a verb

meaning ‘attach to’, ‘suspend from’) kalôn (from kalôs, ‘rope’) means a tight-rope,though I have not found this example elsewhere in the literature of the Argumentfrom Illusion.

159. That is, presumably, shape is what we are mistaken about; colour isresponsible for the mistake.

160. phanthenta; Aristotle does not use this word in our text, but derivesphantasia, ‘imagination’, from phôs, ‘light’.

161. phanerôthenta, another cognate word.162. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.163. See above, 507,10.164. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.165. sc. that we may act and be affected in accordance with it.166. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.167. OCT supplies <which are incidental on the sense-objects> from 428b24.168. OCT: ‘And the change which comes about through the agency of the

activity of the sense will differ.’169. i.e. the words should be reordered as in the OCT. As the Commentator’s

text stands, it is most naturally taken to mean: ‘The change which comes aboutthrough the agency of the activity of sense will differ from sense’; the OCT seemsrather to mean: ‘The changes which come about from through the agency of theactivity of sense will differ from one another (sc. as do the three kinds of sense).’The commentary seems to want to find both meanings.

170. cf. Themistius 93,16-18.171. Neither this nor 429a6 below is printed as a lemma by Hayduck.172. i.e. if there is nothing it cannot have as an object of thought.173. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.174. i.e. separable and inseparable (429a11-12).175. Aristotle’s GA 2.2, 736b15-29 was understood by ancient commentators to

imply that the intellect, or some part of it, enters the human body thurathen, ‘fromoutside’. I discuss this passage in Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (eds),‘Aristotle on the place of mind in nature’ in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’sBiology, Cambridge 1987, 412-14. In my opinion the only parts or capacities of thesoul that Aristotle wants to have enter ‘from outside’ are those that enter thefemale with the semen at conception, and no sort of intellect does this.

158 Notes to pages 80-95

176. i.e. knowledge of the forms of things.177. This account agrees partly but not wholly with what Philoponus says in

the de Intellectu. The points about theology (518,36-519,1) and the intellect’s beinga part of the soul (519,1-5) appear at 46,80-3 and 66,82-4, but as points againstAlexander only, not against him and Plutarch together, and the objections toAlexander and Plutarch severally (519,15-520,6) do not appear (though Philo-ponus does note (37,81-38,84) that Plato held the view our Commentator attrib-utes to Plutarch). If our Commentator did not have access to Ammoniusindependently of Philoponus, we must suppose that in most of what he says aboutAlexander and Plutarch here he is no longer reproducing Ammonius but speakingin propria persona. The opinion he attributes to Plutarch as a mistake ‘peculiar tohimself ’ (519,38) is declared by Philoponus to be true (38,99-39,15, cf. 45,53;48,28).

178. The first way of being potentially f is by being suitably constructed forreceiving f; the second is having the relevant disposition.

179. This is, of course, the opposite of the reason given at 517,21-5 and below,522,31-2.

180. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.181. problêma, a word that also appears in the parallel passage in Philoponus,

de Intellectu, 7,41.182. Paraphrasing ‘whether it is separable, or not separable in magnitude but

in account’.183. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.184. The gobbet is actually ‘if thinking is like perceiving’ (429a13-14).185. Sense is receptive of forms but is not unaffected.186. The Commentator takes ‘what is alien’, to allotrion, not as subject but as

object, and understands: ‘[its own form] appearing alongside, impedes [the cogni-tion of] what is alien’; similarly Alexander, de Anima 84,15-16.

187. empsukhiai; the word, however, is not in fact Platonic.188. Phaedrus 245C.189. OCT: think through itself.190. Learning is a matter of mastering proofs, e.g. in mathematics, whereas

discovery is conducting empirical research.191. So the OCT continues; the Commentator’s text seems to have had a

different punctuation: see 529,9 and note below.192. anous, an echo, perhaps, of Plotinus, Enneads 5.9.2.193. Perhaps a reference to 417b2-16, though there Aristotle speaks of the two

kinds of affection as destructive and preservative, not destructive and perfective.194. This looks like a reference to the Analytics but it is not clear what

particular text the Commentator has in mind. In Posterior Analytics 1.4 Aristotlediscusses grounds on which a thing may be said to be ‘in virtue of itself ’ somethingand seems to imply that if what is odd is in virtue of itself a number, then numbersare in virtue of themselves odd or even.

195. Literally ‘from indoors’, oikothen, a word expressing the opposite ofthurathen, ‘from outside’.

196. ‘The Demiurge’; but the name and doctrine are rather Platonic thanAristotelian.

197. ‘Providence’ ought to mean ‘seeing in advance’, but the Greek word ittranslates, pronoia, means ‘thinking in advance’. The Commentator’s suggestionthat it means ‘in advance of thinking’ is a characteristic play on words; cf.469,18-20; 497,25; 513,18-19.

198. That is, if it is by virtue of being intellect that intellect is an object of

Notes to pages 96-106 159

thought to itself, then anything that is an object of thought to itself will, by virtueof that, be intellect.

199. I have not found a place where Plotinus says quite this, though Hayducksuggests that here and below at 535,8-9 the reference is to Enneads 5.9.5. There isa helpful discussion of the Commentator’s (not wholly consistent) reports ofPlotinus by H. Blumenthal in Aristotle Transformed pp. 312-15.

200. Phaedrus 245C.201. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.202. This distinction does not appear in the Categories, where there is no

mention of matter or matter and form together, though Aristotle does use ‘beingthis’ locutions, e.g. 1a5; in Physics 2.2, 194a1-7 Aristotle distinguishes things ‘saidlike snubnosed’ and things ‘said like curved’, but the most relevant discussions arein Metaphysics 7.

203. The Commentator probably has in mind the difference between, say, a footof rope (a magnitude) and being a foot long. What I express by ‘this’ and ‘[being]this’ the Commentator expresses by the accusative and dative case inflections (seebelow 529,4, 529,12).

204. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. OCT closes parentheses after ‘thesame’, and makes ‘being flesh and flesh’ part of the next sentence. This punctua-tion would have saved the Commentator the need to attribute contempt forexamples at 529,14-15.

205. airiakê, here and below at 529,14. We might expect ‘nominative’ (eutheia),but Aristotle used the accusative at 429b13.

206. The Commentator here alters Aristotle’s words.207. Concavity in a nose: see Metaph. 7, 1030b16-20.208. The Commentator is probably thinking of 429b21-2.209. Because ‘with something else’, allôi, is separated from ‘it discerns’, krinei.210. Following Hayduck’s suggestion and reading to euthei einai kai to euthu

from Aristotle’s text instead of the dubiously grammatical to euthu einai at 531,13.211. OCT: ‘But the essence, if being straight is something other than straight,

is something else.’212. Following Hayduck’s suggestion and reading to euthu tou euthei einai for

to euthu einai at 531,21.213. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.214. The Commentator is referring to 429b28, ‘and [if] what is an object of

intellect is one in form’, though in fact this seems to relate more to the thirdproblem that the second. He seems to be using ‘one in number’ not in the usualsense of ‘one individual and not two’ but to express total and not merely genericsameness in form; cf. Aristotle Topics 1.9, 103a9-10.

215. Perhaps a slip for ‘third’.216. i.e. as Plato.217. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.218. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.219. OCT brackets ‘just as’.220. i.e. it is part of the soul.221. The account of the four lines of interpretation which follows resembles that

of Philoponus in the de Intellectu 43,18-45,59, and may derive partly from it. Avaluable discussion of the account here is provided by H.J. Blumenthal: ‘Neopla-tonic elements in the de Anima commentaries’, in Richard Sorabji (ed.), AristotleTransformed, London 1990, pp. 311-20.

222. Literally ‘demonic’, but ‘demon’ (daimôn) in this context has no pejorativesignificance. Socrates had a daimôn that was entirely benign. A daimôn is a

160 Notes to pages 106-114

supernatural being, inferior to a god and not, like a angel, tied to Judaeo-Christiantheology.

223. See above on 528,26.224. de Anima 89,18.225. The argument is taken from Plato, Phaedo 105.226. Aristotle does not explicitly call it ‘psychical’, the Commentator relies on

his saying that there is a matter-cause distinction ‘in the soul’ (430a13).227. proagei, a neutral word; Peter Lautner suggests emending to paragei

which in Neoplatonic writing is used for the action specifically of an efficient cause.228. The first way is by ‘suitability’. I am potentially a reader in the first way

if my bodily structure is such that I can learn to read; I am potentially a reader inthe second if I have learnt to read but am not now exercising the ability; v. DA 2.5,417a22-8.

229. As it stands the sentence is ungrammatical; some words have probablydropped out.

230. Reading graphei at 538,6 with D instead of grapheiôi, ‘paintbrush’. Thereference is to Philebus 39B.

231. Phys. 2.1, 193b6.232. In this sentence the same Greek word, energeiâi, is translated ‘by activity’

and ‘in actuality’. The Commentator seems to be influenced by this, but the wholepassage is best understood if we suppose he does not confuse the two notions. Hetakes Aristotle’s words to mean literally that actual intellect is ‘by [virtue of] itssubstance activity’; he thinks these are equivalent to ‘it acts by [virtue of] itssubstance’; he believes Aristotle really means ‘it acts by virtue of knowledge’ andhe suggests Aristotle uses ‘substance’ instead of ‘knowledge’ because knowledgestands to intellect as its form or (in one sense of that word, see DA 2.1, 412a10) itsactuality. Compare Philoponus, de Intellectu 57,75-58,96.

233. Homer, Iliad 8.281.234. The words ‘that this is so is clear’ have been inserted by the Commentator

(or are a doublet of the preceding words and should be bracketed) and the rest ofthe quotation is less than word-perfect.

235. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.236. Points 1 and 4 in the continuous exposition.237. He does not say this but ‘in all nature’, that is, throughout the natural

world.238. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.239. Point 7.240. See note on 537,34.241. OCT: actuality.242. Point 6.243. Point 2.244. i.e. not because it it does not act by virtue of a power. 245. Point 8.246. Point 3.247. Point 5.248. The term used by Plato at Phaedo 105-6.249. The Greek word ‘part’, morion, is neuter, whereas ‘intellect’, nous, is

masculine. The use of ‘part of soul’ to which the Commentator refers is not in thischapter but at the beginning of chapter 4, 429a10.

250. Point 9.251. Instead of gnôstikon, ‘that which is cognitive’, at 541,22 we should perhaps

read gnôston, ‘its object of cognition’, especially as even before being separated

Notes to pages 114-121 161

intellect can produce objects of thought from itself (429b7). Plutarch may bereferring to the problem raised at 430a5-6.

252. The Commentator is probably refering to the description of the Plague,2.49.8, though the quotation is not word for word.

253. Only two appear in what follows. Perhaps a sentence has dropped out orperhaps, as Hayduck suggests, we should amend ‘there’ to ‘two’.

254. Point 10.255. Probably, as Hayduck suggests, a reference to Phaedo 66D, though Plato

does not specifically mention imagination there. 256. The one Greek word adiairêtos has to be translated sometimes ‘indivisible’

and sometimes ‘undivided’. Similarly with diairêtos, ‘divisible’ or ‘divided’. It isusually clear which translation is more appropriate, but some of the heavy weathermade both by Aristotle and by his commentators is to be accounted for by theambiguity of the Greek terms.

257. The reference is to Post. An. 1.3,72b23-5. The word horos, however, whichthe Commentator uses in the sense of ‘term’ is probably used by Aristotle in thatpassage in the sense of ‘definition’.

258. Not in so many words.259. cf. Philoponus, de Intellectu 65,56-66,71, where there is a fivefold classifi-

cation that is very similar but not identical; again our Commentator could beborrowing.

260. See 16a19-21, b6-9, and the commentary of Stephanus 8,30ff.261. i.e. to say ‘a yard’ or ‘an angel’.262. Accepting Hayduck’s insertion.263. 16a9-16.264. 9.10, 1051b17ff, where Aristotle speaks of ‘touching’, thigein.265. I have not found these words in Plotinus, but Enneads 5.3.17 speaks of

intellect as ‘making contact’, ephapsasthai.266. DK 31B57. Empedocles actually said that many neckless heads did arise

– a line of which Aristotle seems to have been particularly fond.267. In postclassical Greek the same word is used for time and for the gram-

matical feature of words and sentences we call ‘tense’. Here as below the Commen-tator, who is interested in grammar, probably uses it in the grammatical sense;and he probably takes Aristotle to use it in that sense at 430a31 (548,3 below),though it is doubtful if the word had acquired this technical use when Aristotlewrote.

268. The token-reflexive expression ‘yesterday’ (khthes) is treated as a tense-indicator, as by D.H. Mellor in Real Time.

269. cf. de Interpretatione 16a12-13 and Stephanus’ commentary 6,22-5.270. sc. wholes, retaining auta at 546,23; but it might be better to read auto, ‘it’.271. There seems to be some confusion between saying that if the whole is not

present to thought at an instant, some part of it is not present at that instant, andsaying that if the whole is not present at an instant, it is not present throughoutthe time to which that instant belongs.

272. Homer, Odyssey 12.92.273. A reference to Genesis 1.274. The choice seems to be between supposing that there are two distinct

things, an act of divine thinking and saying, and a physical outcome, the latterbeing an effect of the former, and supposing that there is a single divine act whichmay appear to us either as a piece of thinking and saying or as a physical outcome.

275. That is, either as source of change or as final cause.276. An allusion, perhaps, to evil spirits.

162 Notes to pages 121-127

277. As Hayduck says, words to this effect have dropped out.278. Hayduck, I think unnecessarily, inserts hoion in 548,10 to give ‘If you say

that a pale thing such as Socrates ’.279. The meaning seems to be that the composition of subject and predicate in

the speech does not ‘fit’ the composition of things and property in reality.280. The Commentator does not note the difference between this suggestion,

that saying Socrates is not pale is a special way of predicating pallor of him, fromthe suggestion of 546,10, that it is predicating darkness of him.

281. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.282. i.e. take hekaston in to dê hen poioun touto ho nous hekaston as coming

immediately after poioun.283. So Physics 4.13, 222a10-12.284. i.e. we use ‘now’ for the present time-stretch, which might be quite

extended – today, modern times, the post-glacial epoch: see Physics 4.13, 222a21-3.285. This seems to be a play on words. The word I translate ‘twofold’ here,

dikhôs, expresses the idea of something cut asunder.286. The Commentator surely means that Aristotle uses ‘undivided time’ in

place of ‘now’; but it is doubtful if he does. He seems rather to be comparingthinking of an undivided length and thinking of the parts separately with travel-ling continuously for a time and travelling for two time-stretches interrupted by astop.

287. Editors of Aristotle transpose this sentence to 430b20. But Aristotle’sthought in these lines is difficult to follow on any reading. The Commentator seemsto be commenting on the following text: ‘But that which is indivisible not in respectof quantity but in form, it thinks in an indivisible time and with an indivisible partof the soul. But it is incidentally, and not insofar as those things [the forms inmatter] are divisible, but insofar as they are indivisible, that that with which [thesoul] thinks and the time in which it thinks are indivisible. For there is somethingindivisible in them also, though perhaps inseparable, which makes the time [inwhich they are thought] and the magnitude one. And this is present likewise inevery continuum, both time and length.

288. OCT: that which thinks.289. This interpretation is mentioned by Philoponus, de Intellectu 77,63-86.290. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.291. Line 551,28 is certainly corrupt, and the corruption either extends to or

renders unintelligible the next two lines. I supply some words to introduce whatfollows, but it is unclear how the indivisible element in imagination can be in everycontinuum.

292. Understanding en holôi esti at 551,33-4 as ‘is present in every’ on thestrength of Pr. An. 1.1, 24b26-7.

293. The same word is used to express privation, or a lack of something, andnegation or denial. An instant is conceived as not extended in time, a point as notextended in length, a line as not extended in width, a surface as not extended indepth; each is known by ‘denial’ of some mode of continuous extension.

294. kalou; one might have expected ‘good’, agathou.295. The OCT obelises the last clause; the Commentator takes the whole lemma

to mean ‘That which knows must be potentially [what the thing known is actually]and the object of intellect must be [potentially] in it’.

296. OCT obelises ‘of the causes’.297. The OCT here reads ‘and is actuality’ (or ‘activity’), energeia, following

Simplicius and Themistius. The Commentator seems to have read ‘and is inactuality’, energeiâi with our MSS of Aristotle.

Notes to pages 127-132 163

298. It looks as though ‘potentially’ in this sentence has become displaced, andwe should understand: ‘As the thing thought is, so should the thinker too bepotentially.’

299. The Commentator is going by the words tôn aitiôn at 430,25, which theOCT obelises.

300. OCT: as is denial.301. This word is not in Plato’s surviving works.302. Hayduck punctuates ‘I thought and I fed’ as a single utterance, making the

statement pointless.303. i.e. subject matters.304. At Republic 1, 331C Plato says that returning the pledged sword to the

maniac is bad, but not that it is true.305. OCT: as is denial. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.306. It looks as if the Commentator at 430b27 reads ho de nous ou pas pseudetai,

where our MSS have only ho de nous ou pas.307. Some words have dropped out, possibly including ‘falsehood’ and the name

of another commentator, e.g. ‘Falsehood is mentioned, Plutarch says, because ofpractical intellect’.

308. This is implied at 554,20-5, since practical intellect is a kind of dianoia,and elsewhere, e.g. in the division at 490,20-34. But there ‘subject’ means thatwhich thinks; here it means the subject-matter thought about.

309. OCT obelises ‘of what is proper’.310. The readings are holôs and haplôs. This passage is the only evidence for

the second.311. Literally, ‘out of ’ (ek). The Commentator is using Aristotle’s words at

431a3-4: ‘All things that come to be do so out of what is in actuality [as they are]’,but whereas the other interpreters to whom he refers apparently understand thepreposition as introducing the material cause, he seems to understand it asintroducing the efficient cause. He also seems to understand Aristotle as saying at431a3-4 ‘There is one actual thing such that all things come from it’ rather than‘For everything that arises there is something actual from which it comes.’

312. Alteration, change of size, change of place and coming into being: see, e.g.,Physics 3.1, 201a11-15.

313. a6-7; cf. Phys. 3.2, 201b31-3314. metabolê, a more general word than kinêsis, ‘change’, cf. Physics 5.1,

224a21-b10.315. An obscure warning. Perhaps the Commentator means that we should not

be misled by the analogy into identifying practical intellect and judgement withmere sentience.

316. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.317. OCT: ‘are the same’.318. i.e. what experiences pleasure and what experiences distress.319. Retaining the MSS krustalloeidê in place of Hayduck’s emendation en tôi

krustalloeidei, ‘power in that which is of crystalline form’. For that which is ofcrystalline form, see 448,19.

320. sc. as a mean relatively to objects proper to it, see lines 11-12 above.321. OCT: stand each to each.322. As the text stands, there is a lacuna here. We could eliminate it by reading

hopôs for hoti hôsper in 561,3; ‘Having said how the common sense stands to theproper objects ’

323. The Commentator reads Aristotle as asking why it is puzzling how weknow white is different from black if it is not puzzling how we know white is

164 Notes to pages 133-141

different from sweet. It is more natural to read him as asking the reverse, why itis puzzling how we know white is different from sweet if it is not puzzling how weknow white is different from black. On any reading, however, 431a20-431b1 areextremely difficult lines. It is hard to be confident about any reconstruction eitherof Aristotle’s thought or of his original text.

324. In Greek the letters A, B, C etc., serve as numberals in place of the arabic1, 2, 3 etc. In Aristotle’s text the letters are used; in our text they are replaced bythe words ‘first’, ‘second’ etc.

325. OCT brackets ‘as they are to each other’.326. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.327. 431a27: ‘so also alternando’. This should mean: if A is to B as C is to D,

then A is to C as B is to D; as white is to the account of white, so sweet is to theaccount of sweet.

328. OCT: and those ones likewise.329. A very difficult piece of text. The words I have supplied follow the

manuscripts of Aristotle; if that is the text the Commentator had, he perhapsunderstands Aristotle to be saying that as that to which white and black belongmay be the same and one in subject but not in being, so may be that to whichperception or knowledge of white and black belong. Ross thinks (Ross 1961 p. 305)that the Commentator read ‘If D and B should belong to one thing, the situationwill be as if C and A did’, and amends accordingly; his ‘those ones’ for ‘that one’ isalso an emendation. He takes C and D, however, to be further objects of sense,sweetness and bitterness, which is clearly not the Commentator’s understanding.Further on the text see Hamlyn, pp. 146-7. The passage is not printed as a lemmaby Hayduck.

330. Ross takes ‘by that which is common’ with the words that follow: ‘perceiv-ing a beacon to be fire, and seeing by the sensus communis that it is moving, oneknows that it belongs to the enemy’ (Ross 1961, p. 302). Hamlyn follows Bywaterin deleting ‘by that which is common’. This passage is not printed as a lemma byHayduck.

331. The text as we have it here makes no sense, but I am not sure thecorruption is very deep. The people the Commentator is criticising take Aristotleto be saying that we get to know that the light (whether torchlight or a beacon) isfire by its movement. The Commentator thinks this is confusing the object of thecommon sense with the common sense itself; that by which we get to know, is thecapacity which gets to know, not that from which something is inferred.

332. Taking the Commentator’s text to be: ta de en aphairesei legomena noeihôsper an ei to simon, hêi men simon ou, kekhôrismenôs de hêi kampulon ei tisenoei, aneu tês sarkos an enoei en hêi to kampulon – houtô ta mathêmatika oukekhôrismena hôs kekhôrismena noei hotan noêi ekeina. The OCT reads: ta de enaphairesei legomena hôsper, ei <tis> to simon hêi men simon ou, kekhôrismenôs dehôi koilon [ei tis] enoei energeiâi, aneu tês sarkos an enoei en hêi to koilon – houtôta mathêmatika ou kekhôrismena <onta>, hôs kekhôrismena noei, hotan noêi <hêi>ekeina. This might be translated: ‘But abstract things as they are called, just as ifsomeone were in actuality to think snubnosed not as snubnosed but as hollow, hewould think it without the flesh in which the hollow is – so it thinks objects ofmathematics, though they are not separated, as separated when it thinks them asthemselves. Further on Aristotle’s text see Hamlyn and Ross 1961 ad loc.

333. 429b10-18; see 528,34ff. and notes. 334. See Plato, Phaedo 81C-E.335. 432a3-14, according to the Commentator. It is difficult, however, to discern

this threefold classification in those lines, and still harder to find Aristotle saying

Notes to pages 141-144 165

what the Commentator would like him to say, that thought about completelynon-material things does not involve imagination.

336. The first plea is derived from 431b17-19; the three that follow are extractedfrom 432a3-13, and in the detailed commentary below they are numbered first tothird, not second to fourth.

337. At Theaetetus 186B-C Plato says that sense does not attain to ousia; ousiahere does not mean quite what is means in Aristotle’s doctrine of categories, butPlato would certainly deny that it is by sense that we grasp the nature of a naturalkind.

338. ‘For’ (gar) at 564,31 is inserted by Hayduck. But it might be better to omitthis sentence altogether, since it seems pointless. D omits the preceding sentence,suggesting that there has been dittography.

339. The defence is that the division into parts is of the genus, soul, into species,and that a species of soul, e.g. vegetable (‘physical’) or animal (‘non-rational’), isdivided into powers.

340. Republic 9, 588-9.341. A useful word, not in Liddell and Scott, the meaning of which is clear. A

system like ours in which election by ballot is used to secure ‘the best’ rulers wouldcount as aristodemocratic.

342. By modern standards this account of what Plato says is far from accurate.343 The purpose of this suggestion is to avoid having to fit ‘abstract things’ into

the construction of the sentence that follows. Ross translated his similar text: ‘Asregards abstract things, it is as if one had thought of the snub ’ (1961, p. 302).

344. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.345. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.346. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.347. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.348. The Commentator is not usually willing to give such a handle to a

Plutarchian interpretation of Aristotle.349. The words the Commentator thinks are out of place are probably ‘it is

thought’.350. Either non-material objects of intellect or intermediate objects of intellect

or forms in matter: see 563,12-13.351. How is imagination the subject of mathematics? Perhaps because mathe-

maticians have to use mental images, according to the Berkeleyan account in deMemoria 450a1-7.

352. Inserting ê after enuloi at 568,24 as Hayduck suggests. ‘Lives’, zôai, hereprobably means vital powers or souls.

353. OCT: ‘neither would a person who perceives nothing learn or understandanything’.

354. Reading trita at 568,28 in place of tria ‘three’, since of the three kinds ofobject of intellect, the first are not sense-objects.

355. See Posterior Analytics 1.18 and 2.19.356. An inaccurate quotation of Post. An. 1.17, 81a38-9.357. There is a lacuna here; ‘use’ has almost certainly dropped out, and possibly

some further words.358. The ‘it’ (hautês) is presumably imagination.359. Referred to also by Philoponus, de Intellectu 117,1.360. There is a case for reading tauta, ‘these’, with Ross 1961, following

Themistius, in place of ta alla, ‘the others’, which, though the Commentator doesnot remark on it, is extremely hard to understand.

361. 565,7-566,7, concerning the next chapter of the de Anima.

166 Notes to pages 144-151

abstract: en aphaireseiabstraction: aphairesisabsurd, absurdity: atoponabundance: pleonazeinaccount: logosaccurately: akribôs

speak accurately: kuriolekteinaccusative (case): aitiakêacross, lead across: metageinact: energeinact on: dranact together: sunergeinacting: hupokrisis

not by way of acting: anupokritôsaction: pragma

right action: katorthômaactuality: energeia; entelekheia

in actuality: kat’ energeian;energeiâi; entelekheiâi

acute: drimusaddition: prosthêkêadduce: enistasthaiadjudicate: epikrineinadvocate, plead as an advocate:

sunêgoreinafar, from afar: telaugôsaffect, be affected: paskhein

be affected in turn: antipaskheinaffection: pathosage, old age: gêrasagent: poiounagitate: tarattein

be agitated: ptoeisthaiagree with: suntithesthaiaim: skoposair: aêralien: allotriosalive, be alive: zênall cases, not in all cases: ou pantôsalongside, appear alongside:

paremphainesthaialways in motion: aeikinêtosalways living: aeizôos

alter: alloiounalteration: alloiôsisalternando: enallaxambiguous, in an ambigous way:

amphibolôsanalogous to: analogos

be analogous to: analogeinanalogy: analogiaanalytically: kat’ analusinangel: angelosangelic: angelikosanger: thumosangle: gôniaanimal: zôonanimate: empsukhosanimation: empsukhiaant: murmêxappear alongside: paremphainesthaiappetition: orexis

have appetition for: oregesthaiobject of appetition: orekton

appetitive: orektikosapproach: epiballein; prosballeinaquatic: enudrosarbitrary: apoklêrôtikosargument: epikheirêsis; logosaristocracy: aristokratiaaristodemocracy: aristodêmokratiaarithmetical discourses: arithmêtikoi

logoiarrange in order: diakosmeinarrangement, good arrangement:

eukosmiaarticle (gr.): arthronarticulate fully: diarthrounarticulation: diarthrôsisascent: anabasisassent (v.): sunkatatithesthaiassent (n.): sunkatathesisassertion: kataphasisassumption (preliminary): lêmmaassumptions: keimenon

English-Greek Glossary

assurance, derive assurance, obtainassurance: pistousthai

astronomy: astronomiathink about astronomy: astronomein

atemporally: akhronôsattach: sunageinattack (v.): apoteinesthaiattack (n.): epiboulê; katadromêattempt: prosbolêattending to : katanoêsisattentive: prosektikonattunement: harmoniaaudition: akousisawkward: phortikos

baby: paidionback away: anapodizeinbad: kakosbalance, that hangs in the:

ampheristosbath: loutronbe: einai; huparkhein

in being: tôi einaithing that is: oncoming to be: genesis

beard: geneionbee: melissa; melittabelong: huparkheinbelonging to another: allotriosbelonging properly to: oikeiosbending: prosklisisbetween, what has been said in

between: metaxulogiabewitch: goêteueinbid: epitrepeinblack: melasblind: ektuphlounblind rat: aspalaxblow: plêgêblunt: ambluôttein

be blunted: amblunesthaibodily: sômatikosbody: sôma

of body: sômatikosbody-loving: philosômatosbook: logosboundary: horosbrain: enkephalosbread: artosbreak: klanbreak off: apokoptein; diakopteinbreak up: diakoptein; ekluein

breast: mastos; mazosbreathing: anapnoêbreathing (gr.), with a rough

breathing: daseôsbrief, in brief: suntomôsbring about, that brings about:

poiêtikosbright: lamprosbring along: khorêgeinbring forth: proageinbring forward: epageinbring into use: proskhrêsthaibring out: prokheirizesthaibring together: sunathroizeinbring under: anageinbuild into: enkatoikodomeinburden: phortionburrowing: katadusisbusiness, attend to the business of

another: allotrioprageinattend to one’s own business:

idiopragein

camel: kamêloscapture, try to capture: thêreueincareless: rhaithumoscarpenter: tektoncarry: bastazein; diakonein

serve to carry: diakoneinsuch as to carry: diakonêtês

case (gr.): ptôsiscategorical: katêgorikoscause: aitia; aition; see efficient, final,

instrumental, material, primarycave: spêlaioncensure: kakizeincentre: kentroncertainly: pantôschampion: aristeuschange (v. tr.): kinein; metaballein;

ameibein(n.): kinêsis; metabolêthat changes: kinêtikosbe without changing: akinêteinwithout change: akinêtos

change along with: sunkineincharacter: êthoscharacterise: kharaktêrizeinchewing: masêsischill: psuxischime in with: sumphôneinchoice: proairesis

168 Indexes

choose: proaireisthaicircle: kuklos

in a circle: kuklikoscitizen of heaven: ouranopolitêsclarify: saphênizeinclarity, lack of clarity: asapheiaclause, main clause: apodosisclean up: anakathaireinclose, come close to: prosomileinclose up: sustellesthaiclutch: drassasthaicoarse-grained: pakhumerêscohere: sumphuesthaicold: psukhroscollect together: sunageincolour (n.): khroa; khroia; khrôma

(v. tr.): khrômatizeincolouring: khrômatismos; khrôsiscomb: smênêcome before: protereueincome close to: prosomileincome in: epiphoitancommensurability: summetriacommensurable: summetroscomment: hupomnêmatizeincommentary, detailed commentary:

lexiscommentators: hupomnêsantescommon: koinos

thing in common: koinôniahave something in common:

koinôneincommunity: koinôniacompact: sunkrineincompare: sunkrineincomplete (a differentiation, v.):

holotelôs eipeincomplete (adj.): teleioscompletely perfect: panteleioscomposite: sunthetoscomposition: sunthesisconcave: koilosconceive: epinoeinconception: epinoiaconclude, draw conclusion: sunageinconclusion: sumperasmaconcurrent: sundromoscondition, further condition:

prosdiorismosconditional premiss: sunêmmenonconfirm: sumbebaiousthaiconfuse: sunkhein

confused: sunkekhumenosconfusion: sunkhusisconjure: horkounconjuration: horkosconnective: prosthesis; sundesmosconscience: sunesisconscious, be conscious:

sunaisthanesthai; suneidenaiheautôi

consciousness: sunaisthêsisconsistent: amakhosconsonance: sumphôniaconstellations, make into

constellations: katasterizeinconstitution: politeiaconstruct: plekeinconstruction: plokêcontact: thixiscontainer: angeioncontemplate: theôrein

thing we contemplate: theôrêtoncontemplative: theôrêtikoscontemplatively: theôrêtikôscontemporary: homokhronoscontemptuous, be contemptuous of:

kataphroneincontinuity: sunekheiacontinuous: sunekhêscontradict: enantiousthaicontradiction: enantiotêscontradistinction: antidiastolêcontradistinguish: antidiairein;

antiastelleincontrary: enantios

be contrary to: enantiousthaicontribute: sunteleincontributory cause: paraitioncontrol: kuria

control oneself: enkrateuesthaibeing out of control: akrateia

convention, by convention: nomôiconversion: antistrophê

undergo a conversion: tropeisthaiconvert: antistrepheinconvex: kurtosconvict: dialenkhein; exelenkheinconviction, rational conviction: pistisconvince, be rationally convinced:

pisteueincooking: mageirikêcooking term: mageirikon onomacool: psuktos

English-Greek Glossary 169

corollary: porismacorrect: diorthouncosmos: kosmos

above the cosmos: huperkosmiosin the cosmos: enkosmios

counter, run counter to: enantiousthaicounteract: antipratteincover, be covered over: epikaluptesthaicovering: khitôn; skepêcrane: geranoscreator: dêmiourgoscredited, be credited: philotimeisthaicrowbar: mokhloscrown: stephanouncrystalline, of crystalline form:

krustalloeidêscube: kuboscurve round: epikampeincurved: epikampês; kampulos; kukloterêscustomary, what is customary: nomoscut into: enkolapteincutting: tomê

dark, darkness: skotosdative (case): dotikêdeaf: kôphosdebase: notheueindebauched: akolastosdeclare: apophainesthaidecline: parakmêdefect: endeiadefence: apologia

make a defence, plead in defence:apologeisthai

deficiency in self-control: akrasiadefinitely: pantôsdefinition: horosdeformed: pêrôma, pêrosdeliberate: bouleuesthai

that which deliberates: bouleutikondeliberation: boulêdemocracy: dêmokratiademon: daimôndemonstrate: apodeiknunaidemonstration: apodeixisdenial: apophasisdenoument: peripeteiadepict: anazôgrapheindepression: melankholiadepth: bathosderange, be deranged in judgement:

paraphronein

derangement: paraphrosunêderive: sunageindescent: katabasisdesire: epithumiadesiring: epithumêtikosdestroy: phtheireindestructible: phthartosdestructive: phthartikosdetailed commentary: lexisdeviant: diestrammenosdevise: mêkhanasthaidialogue: dialogosdiameter: diametrosdifference: diaphoradifferentiate: diakrineindifferentiating feature: diaphoradifferentiation: diakrisis

further differentiation: prosdiorismosdifficulty: aporia

raise a difficulty: aporeindig: orutteindigest: petteindigestion: pepsisdigression: metaxulogiadim: amudrosdiminish: meioundimly: amudrôsdimness of vision: ambluôpiadisagree: diaphôneindisagreement: diaphôniadisappear, make to disappear:

aphanizeindiscern: krinein

in a discerning way: kritikôsdiscernment: krisisdiscovery: heuresisdiscrepant, be discrepant: diaphoneindiscrete: diorismenosdisease: nososdisposed, in how disposed: skheseidisposition: hexisdispositional: kath’ hexindisproportionate: ametrosdisputable, be disputable:

amphiballesthaidistance: diastasis; diastêmadistich: distikhiondistinction, draw a distinction:

diastelleinwithout drawing distinctions:

adioristôsfurther distinction: prosdiorismos

170 Indexes

distract: ekkroueindistress: lupêdistressing: lupêrosdistribute: aponemeindivide: diaireindivide in parts: merizeindivide off: diakrineindivided, divisible: diairetosdivine (v.): manteuesthaidivine (adj.): theiosdivisible in parts: meristosdivision: diairesis; tmêmadoctor: iatrosdoctrine: dogmadodekahedron: dôdekaedrondog: kuôndomesticate: tithaseueindoor: thuradouble: diplasiosdownward, on the downward path:

katagôgosdrag: sureindream (v.): oneirotteindream (n.): enupnion; onar; oneirosdrop: rhanisdrug: pharmakondrunkenness: methêdry: xêros

earth: gêearth-dwelling: epikhthoniosearthen: geôdêsearthy: gêinoseffect, side effect: sumptômaefficient cause: poiêtikon aitionegg: ôioneikosahedron: eikosaedronelbow: ankônelegant: asteioselement: stoikheionembryo: embruonemission: ekpompêemit: ekkrineinend: telos

loose end hanging: ekkremêsend point: apoteleutêsis; perasend together: sumperatounendow with life: zôounengage, be engaged with: endiatribeinengrave on: enkharatteinengross, be engrossed:

apaskholeisthai; askholeisthai

enjoyment: apolausisenquire: zêteinenquiry: zêtêsis

object of enquiry: zêtêmaenslave: andrapodizeinenumerate: aparithmeinequine: hippeiosequivocal: homônumos

thing said equivocally: homônumiaerror: apatê

be in error: apatasthaisystematic error: anepistêmosunê

essence: to ti ên einaiestablish: kataskeuazeinestablishing argument,

establishment: kataskeuêeternal: aïdioseternity: aïdiotêsether: to aitherionetymology: etumologia

give the etymology of: etumologeineunuch: eunoukhosevident facts: enargeiaexample: paradeigmaexcellence: aretêexcess: huperbolêexcursus: parekbasisexist, really exist: huparkheinexperience pain: aniasthaiexperience pleasure: hêdesthaiexplanation: paramuthiaexposition: diexodos; ekthesisexpressed: kata prophoranexpression: prophoraextending: ekstasisextension: ektasisextraordinary: exaisiosextreme: akros; akrotêsextremely: akrôseye: opthalmoseyelash: blepharis

in the eyelashes: blepharitiseyelid: blepharon

fact: pragmafails to reach: atukhêsfall under: hupopipteinfalse: pseudêsfalse opinion: pseudodoxiafalsehood: pseudos

run into falsehood: pseudesthaifate: heimarmenê

English-Greek Glossary 171

faults, one who loves to find faults:philenklêmôn

fear: tremeinfewness: oligotêsfifth substance: pemptê ousiafight: makhesthaifight back against: anakrouesthaifigure: skhêmafill out: platuneinfinal cause: telikon aitionfinished state: apotelesmafirst cause: prôtê aitia; prôton aitionfish: ikhthusfit, thing that does not fit:

anharmodiosflash: proaugasmaflavour: khumosflavouring: khumôsisflesh: sarxfollow: parepesthai; sunageisthai

in the following way: toioutotropôsfollow upon: parakoloutheinfolly, practical folly: aphrosunêfood: khortosfoot: pous

a foot across: podiaiosfooted: pezosforce: epagôgêforegoing: ta prolabontaforce apart: diakrineinforget: epilanthanesthaiforgetfulness, forgetting: lêthêform: eidos

make to have form: eidopoieinformidability, acquire formidability:

deinousthaiformless: aneideosforthwith: exapinêsforward, that goes forward: badistikosfoundations: themeliafragrance: euôdiafriendship: philiafrown: ophrusfruit: mêlonfunction: ergonfurther condition, differentiation,

distinction: prosdiorismosfuse: sunkhein

gap: kenongaze, direct gaze at: atenizeingenerated: genêtos

not generated: agenêtosgenus: genosgeometry: geômetriago astray: planasthai

going astray: planêgoing up: anabasis

go back to: anatrekheingo to make up: sumplêroungo over again: epanalambaneingoat: tragosgoatstag: tragelaphosgobbet: rhêseidion; rhêsidionGod: theosgood: agathosgoodness: agathotêsgovern: gubernangrasp: katalambaneingrow, growing up: anabasisgrow together, make to grow together:

sumphueingrub: skôlêx

habitation, underground habitation:katadusis

habituate, be habituated, becomehabituated: ethizein

habituation: ethismoshair: thrix; trikhês

be long haired: komanhand: kheir

give one’s hand to: dexiousthaihaving to hand: prokheirisis

hazardous: paraboloshead: korsêheading: programmahealth: hugieiahealthy, be healthy: hugiaineinhearing: akousis

of hearing: akoustikoscan be heard through: diêkhês

heart: kardiaheat: to thermon; thermotêsheaven, citizen of heaven:

ouranopolitêsheavenly body: ouranionheed, give heed to: enakoueinhello, say ‘hello’ to: proskuneinheterogeneous: heterogenêshint at: ainittesthai; hupainittesthaihive: smênoshold: katekhein

keep hold of: katekhein

172 Indexes

homeomerous: homoiomerêshoney: melihoneyed wine: oinomelihorse: hipposhorse-breaker: pôlodamnêshostage: homêroshot: thermoshour: hôrahouse: katoikizeinhuman, anthrôpeios; anthrôpinoshuman being: anthrôposhunt, hard to hunt down: dusthêratoshypothesis: hupothesishypothetical: hupothetikos

by hypothetical reasoning:hupothetikôs

idea: ennoiaidle: argosill-written: kakographosilluminate: phôtizeinillumination: eklampsisimage, become an image of:

exeikonizeinimage-maker: eidôlopoiosimagination: phantasiaimaginative, non-imaginative:

aphantastosnon-imaginatively: aphantastôs

imagine: phantasiousthai;phantazesthai

that which imagines: to phantastikonimitating: mimêsisimmediately: amesôsimmobile: monimosimmortal: athanatosimpartially: adekastôsimpede: empodizeinimprint (v.): entupoun; tupoun

easily imprinted: eutupôtosimprint (n.): tupos

receive imprints: tupousthairesisting imprints: dustupôtosby way of imprint: tupôtikôsthing for which there can be no

imprints: atupôtosimpulse, purposive impulse: hormêinactivity: hêsukhiainanimate: apsukhosinarticulate: adiarthrôtosincidental, incidentally: kata

sumbebêkos

incline: rhepeininclude: sumperilambaneinincommensurable: asummetrosincomplete: atelêsincorporeal: asômatosincrease: auxaneinindefinite: aoristos

in an indefinite way: aoristôsindestructible: aphthartosindicate: eisageinindividual: atomosindividualise: atomounindivisible: adiairetos

in an indivisible way: adiairetôsindivisibly: adiairetôsinduction: epagôgêinductive: epagôgikosinerrant: anamartêtosinfection: sêpsisinfer: sullogizesthaiinference: sullogismosinfinity, to infinity: ep’ apeironinnate: emphutosinscribe: katagraphein

already inscribed: engraphosinsect, winged insect: muiainseparable: akhôristosinstant: to akharesinstrument: organoninstrumental: organikosinstrumentality of sense: aisthêtikon

organonintellect: nous

object of intellect: noêtosintellectual: noerosintellectually: noerôsintelligence: noêsisintelligible: noerosintermediary, without an

intermediary: amesosinterpretation: exêgêsisinterpreter: exêgêtêsinterrogatively: erôtêmatikôsinterweave: sumplekeininterweaving: sumplokêintimate: ainittesthaiintuit: epiballein; prosballeinintuition: prosbolêintuitively: epiblêtikôsirradiation: ellampsis

join on: sunaptein

English-Greek Glossary 173

joint: ginglumosjudge (v.), exercise judgement:

phroneinjudge (n.): dikastêsjudgement, practical; judgement:

phronêsisjump ahead: propêdanjunction, natural junction: sumphuiajuxtaposition: parathesis

kind, of the same kind: homogenêsknow, get to know: gignôskein

hard to know: dusgnôstosthat is known: epistêtos

knower: epistêmônknowledge: eidêsis; epistêmê

object of knowledge: epistêtonhave prior knowledge of:

progignôskeinsystematic knowledge: epistêmê

labour, direct labour: kamatonpoieisthai

labyrinthine: laburinthôdêsladder: klimaxlast part: eskhatialaw: nomoslaw abiding: ennomoslay hold of: antilambanesthai

that lays hold of: antilêptikoslaying hold of: antilêpsislead, take the lead of: protereueinlead across: metageinlearning: mathêsisleave open: amphiballeinlength: mêkosletter: stoikheion

written letter: grammalevel up: exomalizeinlicentious: aselgêslie ready for: prokeisthailie with: sunousiazeinlife: zôê

endow with life: zôounlife-giving: zôogonoslight: lampas; phaos; phôslike: homoios

become like: homoiousthaimake completely like: exomoiounvery like: paromoios

liken: apeikazein; eikazein; exeikazein;pareikazein

likeness: eikônlimb: skeloslimber, make limber: gumnazeinline: grammê; stikhos

straight line: eutheialinkage: suzeuxislion: leônlittle, too little: meiôsislive: zênliver: hêparliving in water: enudroslogical sequence: akolouthialocation relativly to one another:

katasterismoslodging: katagôgionloftiness of genius: megalophuialofty speculation: hupsêlon theôrêmalogical: logikosloins: aidoionlong, make too long: mêkuneinlook (n.): thealook at: theôreinloose (speaking), loosely:

katakhrêstikôsspeak loosely, use words loosely:

katakhrêsthailove of pleasure: to philêdononlove of wealth: to philokhrêmatonluminous, of luminous form: augoeidês

main clause: apodosistaking a long time to reach the main

clause: makroapodotosmake up, go to make up: sumplêrounmaniac: mainomenosmanifest, make manifest: phanerounmany-powered: poludunamosmarching with: prosekhêsmarginal, of marginal importance:

parergosmarvellous: thaumasiosmaster (v.): krateinmaster (n.): despotêsmastery, gain the mastery: epikrateinmaterial, material cause: hulikon

aitionin a material way: hulikôs

mathematics: mathêmataobjects of mathematic: mathêmata

mathematicise: katamathêmatikeueinmature, be mature: akmazeinmaturity: akmê

174 Indexes

have maturity: akmazeinmean: legeinmeaning: sêmasiameasuring rod: kalamosmid-sky, be in mid-sky: mesouraneinmind: phrên

in the mind: endiathetospersuade to change one’s mind:

metapeitheinbe in two minds: distazein

minor premiss: elatton; proslêpsismirror: esoptron, katoptronmistake: hamartiamixed: miktosmixing with: epimixiamixture: krama; krasismnemonic, using a mnemonic system:

mnêmonikosmodel: paradeigmamoisture: hugrotêsmoment, for the moment: teôsmonarchy: basileiamortal: thnêtosmotion, always in motion: aeikinêtosmountebank: goêsmouth: stomamove, that moves: poreutikosmove up and down: doneinmovement: poreia

change in movement: poreutikêkinêsis

organ for movement: organonporeutikon

mud: ilusmuddy: epitholounmultiform: polumorphosmultipartite: polumerêsmultitude: plêthosmusic: mousikêmussel: pelôris

nail: onuxname: onoma

have a name: katonomazesthainatural: phusikosnatural junction: sumphuianatural science, do natural science:

phusiologeinnature: phusisnear at hand: prosekhêsnecessarily: anankaiôsnecessary: anankaios

necessity: anankêneckless: anaukhênnegation, conversion with negation:

antistrophê sun antitheseinegative (n.): arnêsisnegative, establish negative point:

anatrepeinnegatively: apophatikôsneighbour: geitônneuter, in the neuter: oudeterosnew, introduce a new classification:

kainotomeinnew-born: neogenêsnight: nuxnoble: gennaiosnocturnal: nukterinosnon-imaginative: aphantastosnon-imaginatively: aphantastôsnon-material: aülosnon-planetary: aplanêsnon-rational: alogosnose: rhisnostril: muktêrnote: sêmeiousthainourish: trepheinnourishment: trophênow: nunnowhere, getting nowhere:

aprosphorosnumber: arithmos

have the same number: isostheneinnursling’s dues: tropheia

oar: kopêoath: horkosoccupy, be occupied with:

katagignesthaioctahedron: octaedronodour: osmêoffspring: gennêmaold age: gêrasoligarchy: oligarkhiaone, as being each one: henoeidêsone or the other: thaterosopen, leave open: amphiballeinopen out: diastellesthaiopinion: doxa

be of the opinion: doxazeinsubject of opinion, object of opinion,

thing opinion is about: doxastosof the same opinion as: homodoxos

optic: optikos

English-Greek Glossary 175

order, arrange in order: diakosmeingood order: eutaxiaout of order: skolioswords out of order: huperbaton

ordering: diataxisotherness: heterotêsoutline: prokharatteinoutside, from outside: thurathenoverbright: huperlamprosovercome: kataballeinoverlay: katakrupteinoverlook: paroranown, its own, belong as its own: oikeios

make its own: spheterizesthai

pain: aniaexperience pain: aniasthai

painful: aniarospaintbrush: grapheionpainter: grapheuspainting: zôgraphiapalsy, someone with palsy: parêtospapyrus, sheet of: khartionparaphrase: paraphrazeinparrot: psittakospart: meros

thing of similar parts: homomereiawithout parts: amerêsin parts (adj.), divisible into parts:

meristosin parts (adv.), part by part: meristôsdivide in parts: diamerizein

particular: merikospartition (v.): diamerizeinpartless: ameristos

in a partless way: amerôspass away: phtheiristhaipass through: parodeueinpassage: agôgê

(in text): rhêtonpassing away: phthorapassion, have a passion for: truphanpassive intellect: nous pathêtikospatient: paskhônpatrol: peripoleinpeculiar, peculiarity, way peculiar to:

idiômaperceive: aisthanesthai

perceiving, that perceives: aisthêtikosperceivingly: aisthêtôsperfect (v.): teleiounperfect (adj.): teleios

perfective: teleiôtikosperiphery: periphereiaperish: apollusthaiperson, famous person: lamprospersuade: peithein persuade to change one’s mind:

metapeitheinpersuasion: peithôpervade: phoitanpestilential: loimôdêsphilosopher: philosophosphlegm: phlegmaphysical: phusikosphysicist: phusiologospicture: graphêpious: eusebêspit: bothrosplace: toposplain, make plain: phanerounplaiting together: epiplokêplane: epipedonplanetary, non-planetary: aplanêsplant: phutonplea: sunêgoriaplead: dikaiologeisthai

something to plead: dikaiologiaplead for, plead as advocate:

sunêgoreinplease: hêdein; hêduneinpleasant: hêduspleasantness: hêdutêspleasure: hêdonê

experience pleasure: hêdesthaipledge: parakatathêkêplotting against: epiboulêpneuma: pneumapneumatic body: pneumatikon sômapoint: kephalaion; sêmeion; stigmê

to the point: prosphorospoint at issue: prokeimenonpointlike, in a pointlike way: kentrikôspoison: dêlêtêrionpolemic, be in the heat of:

apomakhesthaipolyps: polupouspoor: penêspositively: kataphatikôs; ek

kataphaseôspotential, in potentiality: dunameipotbellied: progastôrpound up: anamattesthaipower: dunamis

176 Indexes

supreme power: kurospractical: praktikos

practical folly: aphrosunêpractical judgement: phronêsis

prayer: eukhêpreceding: proteraiosprecipice: krêmnospredicate (v.): katêgoreinpredicate (n.): katêgoroumenonpremiss: protasis

conditional premiss: sunêmmenonmajor premiss: meizonminor premiss: elatton; proslêpsis

prepare: eutrepizeinprevail: authenteinprinciple: arkhê; logosprior deliberation: probouleusisprior imagining: prophantazesthaiprior knowledge: progignôskeinprivation: sterêsisproblem: aporia

raise problem: aporeinproduce: parageinproof: epikheirêmaproper: idikos

belonging properly to: oikeiosproportion: logosproportional: summetrosproportionality: logosproportionally: summetrôsproportional to: analogosproposition: problêma; protasis

supplementary proposition: porisma prostitute: porneia

go to a prostitute: porneueinprotect: skepazeinProvidence: pronoiaproximate: prosekhêsproximately: prosekhôspsychical: psukhikôspull: helkeinpulling: helxispupil (of eye): korêpupil (learner): mathêtêspure: eilikrinêspurpose, to no purpose: matênpurposive impulse: hormêpush (v.): ôtheinpush (n.), pushing: ôsisput forth, put forward: proballeinput together: suntithenaipyramid: puramis

qualitative, make qualitative: poiounquality: poiotêsquantitative, make quantitative:

posounquestion, as a question: erôtêmatikôs

rag: rhakosranged along with: sustoikhosrational: logikos

rational in form: logoeidêsnon-rational: alogos

reach, reach out: oregesthaifails to reach: atukhês

react: antidranread: anaginôskeinreading: anagnôsis

(textual) reading: graphêreason: aitia; logos

that reasons: logistikosreasoning: logismosreassurance: paramuthiareassure: paramutheinreception: diadokhêreceptive: dektikosréchauffé, be réchauffé:

anakhlazesthaireckon, reckon off: arithmeinrecollection: anamnêsisrecognise: epigignôskein; gignôskeinreduction: elleipsisreference: anaphorareflect: epistrepheinreflection: epistrophêreflection: anaklasisrefute: anatrepein; elenkheinrefutation: anatropê; elenkhosreject: atheteinrelated, way of being related: skhesis

in how related: skheseirelation: emphereia; skhesisrelationship: logos; skhesisremain still: meneinreminiscent: anamnêstikosrepetitive, be repetitive: dittologeinrepository: dokheionrepresentation: anaplasma

from a representation of: anaplatteinreproach: elenkheinreptile: herpetonresist: antibainein

resisting imprints: dustupôtosresolve: epiluesthai

English-Greek Glossary 177

responsible: aitioshold responsible for: aitian

restrain: anakhaitizeinright, set right: epidiorthoun

right action: katorthômarod: rhabdos

measuring rod: kalamosrooted, be rooted: rizousthairope: kalôsrotation: dinêsisrough, with a rough breathing: daseôsroughness: trakhutêsround: strongulosrout: phobeinrove: phoitanrule: kanônruling part: hêgemonikonrun out beside: pareistrekhein

safe, what is safe: asphaleiasafer: asphalesterossavoury sauce: karukeumasay: legein

thing said: dialektonsay against: epilegeinsay ‘hello’ to: proskuneinsaying: logionscent-making: murepsikêscience: epistêmê

do natural science: phusiologeinscreen off: antiphratteinseafight: naumakhiasecondary: deuterossection: kephalaionsee, can see: theôrein

can be seen through: diaphanêsthing seen: oraton

see directly: autopteinseeing: orasisseeing sparks: marmarugaiself-controlled, person with

self-control: enkratêssemen: spermasemicircle: hêmikuklionseminally: spermatikôssend on: eisballeinsense: aisthêsis

sense-object: aisthêtonsense-organ: aisthêtêrioncommon sense: aisthêsis koinêspecial sense: aisthêsis idikê

incidental sense-object: aisthêtonkata sumbebêkos

instrumentality of sense: aisthêtikonorganon

way distinctive of sense: aisthêtikonidiôma

senses, come to one’s senses:ananêphein

sentence: logosseparable, separate (adj.): khôristosseparate (v.): khôrizeinserve to carry, serve: diakoneinserviceable: euergêsset out: gumnazeinset right: epidiorthounsetback to arise: antipipteinsever: diaskhizeinsexual gratification: aphrodisiasexual indulgence: aphrodisiazesthaisink deeper into: embathuneinshade, shadow: skiashape: morphê; skhêma

have shape: skhêmatizesthaiby way of shape: morphôtikôs

shaped, easily shaped: euplastosshare, lack a share: amoireinshell, animal with a shell:

ostrakodermonshell-like: ostreinosshoulder: ômosshout aloud: boanshrewd, very shrewd: polumêtisshrewdness: mêtisshut eyes: kleiein ophthalmous

have eyes shut: muein ophthalmoussick, be sick: noseinside: pleuraside effect: sumptômasight: opsis

of sight: oratikossign: sêmeionsignify: sêmainein

way of signifying: sêmasiasilent, be silent: sigansimilar, thing of similar parts:

homoiomereiasimple: haploussinew: neuronsize: megethossketch: skiagraphiaskill: tekhnê

man of skill: tekhnitês

178 Indexes

thing in the field of skill: tekhnêtonsky, as tall as the sky: ouranomêkês

be in mid-sky: mesouraneinsleep (v.): katheudeinsleep (n.): hupnossmell: osphrêsis

object of smell: osphrantoncan be smelt through: diosmos

snake: ophissnow: khiônsnubnosed: simossnubnosedness: simotêsso-and-so: deinasoft-fleshed: hapalosarkossoftness: malakotêssolid: stereossolution: lusissophist: sophistêssource: arkhêsoul: psukhêsound (adj.): spoudaiossound (n.): phônê; psophossounding: psophêsissparks, seeing sparks: marmarugaispeak, speak of: legein

speak accurately: kuriolekteinspeak truly: alêtheuein

special (sense, sense-object): idikosspecies: eidosspeculation, speculative thought:

theôremaspeech: logossphere: sphairaspider: arakhnêsspider’s web: arakhnionspirit: thumosspirited: thumikos; thumoeidês

become spirited: thumousthaispoken sound: phônêsponge: spongosspring: pêgêstag: elaphosstand firm: rhônnusthaistarting point: arkhêstate: diathesisstatement: logosstay still: êremeinstaying still: êremiastaying unchanged: stasisstill, remain still: meneinstir up: diegeireinstomach: gastêr

straight line: eutheiastraight off: autothenstrand: plegmastrife: neikosstronger: kreittonstrongest: kratistosstructure of argument: diaskeuê logousubject: hupokeimenon

be subject: hupokeisthaisublunary: huposelênossubreal: metousiossubsistence: huparxis; hupostasissubsistence-giving: hupostatikossubsistent: huphistamenonsubstantive: huparktikossubsume: anageinsuccession: diadokhêsuck at: bdalleinsuitability: epitêdeiotêssuitable: epitêdeiossummer: therossun: hêliossuperficially: epipolaiôssuperfluity: perittonsuperior: entimoteros; timiossuperlunary: huperselênossupernatural: daimoniossuper-real: huperousiossupplementary proposition: porismasupply further, supply additional:

proseuporeinsupposal: hupolêpsissuppose: hupolambanein; hupotithenaisupreme power: kurossurface: epiphaneiasurmise: stokhazesthaisweet: glukusswitch: metabolêsword: xiphossyllable: sullabêsyllogise: sullogizesthaisyllogism: sullogismossyllogistically: sullogistikôssystematic knowledge: epistêmê

with systematic knowledge:epistêmonikôs

talking about: logostall, as tall as the sky: ouranomekêstame: hêmerountask: agôntaste: geusis

English-Greek Glossary 179

object of taste: geustonTaurus: taurosteachable: didaktosteaching: didaxistemerarious: tolmêtiastempering: epitasistense: khronosterm: horosterminate together: sumperatountermination: apoperatôsis

bring a termination: apoperatountermwise, in a termwise manner:

horikôsterror: deiliatext: lexistheological: theologikosthesis: problêmathing: pragmathink: dianoeisthai; noein

that which thinks: dianoêtikonthink out: ennoeinthinking: noêsis; pronoêsisthought: dianoia; noêsis

exercise thought: noeintake thought in advance:

pronoeisthaitaking thought in advance: pronoia

tight rope: artêmenos kalôsthink (discursively) dianoeisthai

that thinks: dianoêtikonthought: dianoia

object of thought: dianoêtonthunder: brontêtogether, act together: sunergein

put together: suntithenaitwo together: sunamphoteron

tomb: taphostooth: odoustorch light: phruktostouch (v.), perceive by touching:

haptesthaiobject of touch: hapton

touch (n.): haphêtrace left behind: leipsanontragedy, said in a tragedy: tragikostragic actor: tragoidostranscend: epanabaineintransition, not transition-making:

ametabatostransparent: diaphanêstraveller, fellow traveller:

sumparatheon

treasury, store up a treasury inadvance: prothêsaurizein

true: alêthês; alêthinosbe true: alêtheuein

truly, what is truly: alêthinosspeak truly: alêtheuein

truth: alêtheiaattain truth, achieve truth:

alêtheueintry out: gumnazeinturn aside from: ekklinein;

metatrepesthaiturn away from: apostrephesthaitwo together: sunamphoteron

unaffected: apathêsbeing unaffected: apatheia

unchanging: akinêtosunchangingly: akinêtôsunclear: asaphêsunconfused: asunkhutosunderground habitation: katadusisundermine: paratheireinunderstand: hupakoueinunderstand along with: sunupakoueinundifferentiated: adiaphorosundivided: adiairetosundividedly: adiaretôsunfold: anaptusseinunification: henôsisunit: monasunite: henopoiein; henoununitive: heniaiosunity: henôsisuniversal (n.): katholouuniversal (adj.): katholikosuniverse: to panunmixed: amigêsunperceiving: anaisthêtosunpleasant: lupêrosunspoken difficulty: sigêtheisa aporiaunsuitability: anepitêdeiotêsunteachable: adidaktosunutterable: arrêtosupward, on the upward path: anagôgosurgent, be urgent: katepeigeinusage: khrêsis

common usage: sunêtheia koinê

vegetative: phutikos vehicle: to okhoun

movement in a vehicle: okhêsis

180 Indexes

vice: kakia virtue: aretêvision, dimness of vision: ambluôpiavital: zôtikosvoice: phônê

having no voice: aphônoswith a bad voice: kakophônos

waking: egrêgorsiswalk, power to walk: badistikê

dunamiswalking: badisis

in walking: badistikoswall: toikhoswander: planasthaiwander astray: paraplanasthaiwarm: thermantoswaste: têkeinwater: hudôr

living in water: enüdroswax: kêrosway, by the way: parergos

in some way or other: hamôsgepôswealth, love of wealth: to

philokhrêmatonweaving: huphantikêweb, spider’s web: arakhnionwelcome: dekhesthai

well: phrearwhip: mastixwidth: platoswill, against one’s will: akousioswinged: ptênoswinged insect: muiawinter: kheimônwish, rational wish: boulêsiswithin, from within: oikothenwrite

writing tablet in which nothing iswritten: grammateion agraphon

written letter: grammaill written: kakographos

wooden horse: dourios hipposwool-gathering, be wool-gathering:

rhemnesthaiword: lexis

in a word: logôi eipeinin so many words: diarrêdênwords out of order: huperbaton

work: ergon

yellow: xanthosyield: eikeinyoke together with: suzeugnunai

zoophyte: zôophuton

English-Greek Glossary 181

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adekastôs, impartially, 519,29adiairetos, indivisible, 459,5; 484,15

542,27.28; 543,5.6.10.13.14.16.18;(division of) 544,5-16;549,4.9.10.23-5; 550,24;551,1.9.22; 552,2-4.10

undivided, 543,12;549,5-6.8.13-16.30; 550,3

adiairetôs, indivisibly, in anindivisible way, 542,29-543,4;551,5

undividedly, in an undivided way,550,7.30

adiarthrotos, inarticulate, 499,1adiaphoros, undifferentiated, 599,21adidaktos, unteachable, 590,1.3.5adioristôs, without drawing

distinctions, 472,2aeikinêtos, always in motion, 461,28;

511,1; 528,28; 535,10.11; 600,1aeizôos, always living, 528,28-9aêr, air, 448,18.20.21.40; 449,1.2.4;

452,18.28agathos, good, 554,18.31-7; 559,5;

560,6; 580,11.12 etc.prôton agathon, the First Good,

586,5agathotês, goodness, 536,12-13agenêtos, not generated, 599,32; 600,2agraphos, on which nothing is

written, 469,18; 516,24; 524,14;533,25.30

agreuein, stalk, 525,8agôgê, passage, 558,30agôn, task, 539,11aïdios, eternal, 466,24; 516,14.18;

517,6.20; 518,7; 519,13.14; 520,34;521,12; 537,4.5; 541,5-16;545,25.28.36

aïdiotês, eternity, 517,18-19; 521,27aidoion, loins, 578,18ainittesthai, hint at, 475,23; 540,30;

582,2; 584,9.16

intimate, 543,25aisthanesthai, to perceive, 447,28;

462,29-32; 463,1.3; 467,16;489,13-15; 522,6; 596,19-21

aisthêsis, sense, (as contrasted withintellect and imagination) 446,21;485,30; 487,29,30; 488,1;490,6.10.15; 491,7.9.15.16;492,6.15; 494,5; 498,13.15; 501,13;506,26; 509,4-5; 512,31; 513,33;514,15.17.18; 516,19; 521,37;522,9.10; 554,39;568,1; see alsokata dunamin, kat’energeian

(a particular sense-faculty), 446,22;447,3.17-19.27.31.35; 449,8-11;450,14; 451,3.4; 453,26; 455,13;456,15; 459,15; 462,31.32;463,2.11; 469,9-10

aisthêsis idikê, special sense,454,1-2; 573,24

aisthêsis koinê, common sense,446,11; 447,1; 455,21-2.26.34;456,1.3; 460,16-20; 465,25.26.28;477,23-5.28; 479,8-9; 480,5.7;481,3.6.15; 483,3-4; 555,5.7;560,20.26.28; 561,5

aisthêtêrion, sense organ, 447,18;448,3.4.25; 449,8-10.29; 452,1.8.9;453,20-2; 457,13; 466,11.14;482,11-13; 601,25; 602,10;606,6.20.21

aisthêtikos, (that) which perceives,perceiving, 474,29; 574,13; 587,3

aisthêtikê psukhê, perceiving soul,594,29.31; 595,36; 598,10

aisthêtikon idiôma, waydistinctive of sense, 458,13.16

aisthêtikon organon, theinstrumentality of sense, 530,9

aisthêton, sense-object, 447,5,449,30; 452,2; 469,9.11; 561,26;567,8; 568,19

Greek-English Index

aisthêton idikon, specialsense-object, 509,7

aisthêton idion, propersense-object, 456,30.33; 457,3-6;458,4; 459,10-12; 462,13.27;509,10; 513,17,19; 514,9

aisthêton kata sumbebêkos,incidental sense-object,sense-object incidentally,454,2.18; 455,3; 457,28; 458,5-6;460,29-30; 509,10-11.24-5;513,23.24; 514,8-9; 553,32-3

koinon aisthêton, commonsense-object, 453,28.32.34;454,1.5; 455,6; 456,17.19.23;457,3-5.27.29; 458,10.17.19;459,22; 462,8.12.14; 509,11.24.26;510,2.4; 514,7

aisthêtôs, perceivingly, 576,15aitherion, to, the ether, 450,29aitia, reason, 488,2; 489,22; 558,13;

588,1; 593,4cause 486,36

aitiatikê, accusative, 529,12.14aitian, hold responsible, 448,38aitios, responsible for, 578,36.39aition, cause, see hulikon,

organikon, poiêtikon, prôton,telikon

akares, to, an instant, 549,11.13akhôristos, inseparable, 483,30.31;

532,15; 566,21akhrômatistos, colourless, 519,29akhronôs, atemporally, 477,25;

479,22; 480,13.18; 484,30;487,33.35; 488,4

akinêtein, be without changing,595,8; 604,33-605,1

akinêtos, unchanging, withoutchange, 594,19.24; 598,32

akinêtôs, unchangingly, 458,35akmazein, be mature, have maturity

577,20.27.29akmê, maturity, 577,13; 583,3;

598,12; 599,15akoê, hearing, 472,22-473,7; 474,18.19akolastos, debauched, 486,30akolouthia, logical sequence, 548,15akousios, against one’s will, 497,22-6akousis, hearing, 470,11; 472,24

audition, 474,18.32akoustikos, of hearing, 463,11

akrasia, deficiency in self-control,593,13

akrateia, being out of control, 593,13akratês, deficient in self-control,

578,16.19; 579,11akribês, accurate, 456,29.36akribôs, accurately, 456,24akros, extreme, 492,20; 504,1.9akrotês, extreme, 472,5; 476,8-9akrôs, extremely, 477,17alêtheia, truth, 544,20-31; 545,3.6.10alêtheuein, attain truth, achieve

truth, 491,13.16.19.26; 495,32;496,24-6; 502,19-21; 513,12;514,1.31; 545,13; 553,28.32.33;554,3-5; 556,11.16.25.27;569,19.20

speak truly, 545,27to be true, 492,13

alêthês, true, 491,30-1; 504,23;505,20; 506,7; 555,18.20.24.25;

alêthinos, true, 506,6what is truly, 585,25.28

alloioun, alter, 526,13.17;558,20.22.28; 605,8

alloiôsis, alteration, 457,29; 526,14allotriopragein, attend to the

business of another, 528,23;554,4; 557,13

allotrios, belonging to another,478,19; 595,25

alien, 523,15-16alogos, non-rational; 496,27.29-33;

503,11.13.14; 507,15; 511,27;515,9.11

alogos gnôsis, non-rationalcognition, 525,12.15.18

alogos psukhê, non-rational soul,446,5; 450,11.13; 485,11.12.14;494,7.10-11; 507,1.2.5; 541,8.12;577,4-8; 597,19.26.31-2

amakhos, consistent, 509,27amblunesthai, be blunted, 487,4ambluôpia, dimness of vision, 487,10ambluôttein, blunt, 455,8; 517,9ameibein, change, 590,32amerês, without parts, 504,10;

543,12; 544,8.9.13; 551,33ameristos, partless, 546,37amerôs, in a partless way, 546,37amesôs, immediately, 447,35; 451,13

etc.

184 Indexes

without an intermediary, 451,16;558,14; 601,21; 603,27

ametabatos, transition-making,562,31

ametros, disproportionate, 469,14;517,10-11

amigês, unmixed, 521,11-18;523,5-11; 526,22

amoirein, lack a share of, 577,10;596,37

amphêristos, that hangs in thebalance, 593,15

amphiballein, leave open, 551,24.27amphiballesthai, be disputable;

447,20-2amphibolôs, in an ambiguous way,

466,22-3amudros, dim, 495,14.15.17; 496,5;

500,13amudrôs, dimly, 456,34.35; 592,29anabasis, ascent, 473,23

going up, 473,24growing up, 577,13

anakhaitizein, restrain, 581,15anakhlazesthai, be réchauffé, 455,29anagein, subsume, 543,33

to bring under, 589,8.9anaginôskein, read, 568,12; 596,32-3anagnôsis, reading, 582,6anagôgos, on the upward path,

596,30anaisthêtos, unperceiving, 594,35;

596,17.18anakathairein, clean up, 515,17anaklasis, reflection, 605,20.22.24anakrouesthai, fight back against,

581,6analambanein, restate, 496,36analogein, be analogous to, 511,27;

535,34.36; 537,28; 538,14;539,27-32; 557,12-13; 600,33

analogia, analogy, 556,5; 560,26.30analogos, analogous to, 493,9

proportional to, 514,22analusis

kat’ analusin, analytically, 532,27anamartêtos, inerrant, 491,12anamattesthai, pound up, 515,29anamnêsis, recollection, 518,23-4;

533,33-4; 596,6anamnêstikos, reminiscent,

495,25.28

ananêphein, come to senses, 466,34anankaios, necessary, carry

necessity, 449,19; 503,24anankê, necessity, 447,30 etc.anaphora, reference, 482,23anaplasma, representation, 497,25anaplattein, form representation of,

488,17; 495,33; 503,31-2; 508,1-6;534,7

anapnoê, breathing,575,15-16.18.19.26.28

anapodizein, back away, 488,35anaptussein, unfold, 477,31anarmodios, thing that does not fit,

548,11anatrekhein, go back to, 577,4-5anatrepein, establish the negative

point that, 457,14; refute 477,29;480,31; 481,2; 569,28; 599,12

anatropê, refutation, 484,18; 569,27anazôgraphein, depict, 509,17-21andrapodizein, enslave, 572,26-7aneideos, formless, 519,30.31.36.37;

543,29anepistêmosunê, systematic error,

491,33anepitêdeiotês, unsuitability, 448,35;

511,36; 576,33-4; 577,9angeion, container, 508,22angelikos, angelic, 535,6.38;

536,13.18.23; 537,15angelos, angel, 527,27ankôn, elbow, 588,23ania, pain, 559,29aniaros, painful, 559,3; 560,5; 562,8aniasthai, experience pain, 559,1;

561,28anoikeios, inappropriate, 529,10anôlethros, imperishable, 541,13anomogenês, heterogeneous, 478,25;

480,6; 482,15.22; 561,5.7.8anomoeidês, different in species,

586,3anomoieidês, heterogeneous, 478,3

dissimilar in species, 579,30.31.32anomos, lawless, 565,37anomoülos, not of the same matter,

526,18-19anous, non-intellect, 525,22.23.24anthrôpeios, human, 539,24anthrôpinos, human, 535,8.32.38;

536,2; 539,1.4-5.9

Greek-English Index 185

anthrôpos, man, 450,14.16; humanbeing, 490,34; 541,7

antibainein, resist, 588,36-7antidiairein, contradistinguish,

477,22antidiastellein, contradistiguish,

457,24; 543,17.22.26.28.32.36antidiastolê, contradistinction,

545,11antidran, react, 599,7antilambanesthai, lay hold of,

449,32 et passimantilêptikos, (thing) that lays hold

of, 464,22.23; 596,10antilêpsis, laying hold of, 597,24antipaskhein, be affected in turn,

526,24-8antiphrattein, screen off, 515,33antipiptein, setback to arise, 572,24antiprattein, counteract, 583,15antistasis, counter, 563,31antistrephein, convert,

527,12-14.20.39; 532,33; 602,3;606,14

antistrophê, conversion, 528,2sun antithesei, conversion with

negation, 450,2anupokritôs, not by way of acting,

492,29aoristos, indefinite, 580,28aoristôs, in an indefinite way,

592,26.29aparithmeisthai, enumerate, 505,23apaskholeisthai, be engrossed,

596,11apatasthai, be in error, 487,9.12-13

err, 488,1-8fall into error, 461,20; 522,22;

539,35.37apatê, error, 455,31; 487,8.13-18;

488,6; 490,1.3apatheia, being unaffected, 526,33apathês, unaffected, 453,21;

521,11-12.18.21; 542,4;596,3.4.19; 597,3

apeikazein, liken, 537,27; 555,1;589,19.20

apeironep’ apeiron, to infinity, 463,25

aphairesis, abstractionen aphairesei, abstract, 532,3.5;

566,8-16

aphanizein, obliterate, 508,18make to disappear, 546,35; 551,10

aphantastos, non-imaginative,542,10; 563,14.20; 584,9

aphantastôs, non-imaginatively,568,15

aphônos, having no voice, 533,31aphrodisia, sexual gratification,

576,12; 578,18; 579,6aphrodisiazesthai, sexual

indulgence, 560,5aphrosunê, practical folly, 491,33aphthartos, indestructible, 518,4.5aplanês, non-planetary (sphere),

511,4; 527,28 apodekhesthai, agree with, 570,14;

591,17 apodeiknunai, demonstrate,

447,24.25.26; 457,23.25; 469,29;525,9; 538,2; 587,1; 595,10; 596,36

apodeixis, demonstration, 447,19;500,18

apodosis, main clause, 489,9.10;490,13.16

apoklêrôtikos, arbitrary, 463,20-1;468,12

apokoptein, break off, 582,7apolausis, enjoyment, 589,33-4apologeisthai, plead in defence,

486,34; 565,22to make a defence, 536,31

apologia, defence, 536,34; 572,10.16apollusthai, perish, 603,13apomakhesthai, be in the heat of

polemic, 575,4aponemein, distribute, 481,12 apoperatoun, bring to termination,

455,21; 483,4apoperatôsis, termination,

555,7.25.27apophainesthai, declare, 455,24;

456,7; 464,17apophasis, denial, 459,3.7; 466,5.6;

478,26-7; 546,4-10; 547,1-5;548,12.17.19.24-5; 559,31

apophatikôs, negatively, 547,8-9.15aporein, raise problem, raise

difficulty, 448,24 etc.aporia, problem, difficulty, 448,25 etc.

lack, 576,37aporon, difficulty, problem, 495,18;

532,29

186 Indexes

apostrephesthai, turn away from,554,28; 599,16

apoteinesthai, attack, 463,28apotelesma, finished state, 500,23apoteleutêsis, end-point, 593,6apotiktein, bring to birth, 495,23aprosphoros, getting nowhere, 486,12apsukhos, inanimate, 490,9 etc.arakhnês, spider, 500,38; 590,4arakhnion, (spider’s) web, 501,1aretê, virtue, 555,20; 579,34.35

excellence, 563,40argos, idle, 584,29aristeus, champion, 593,27-30; 594,9aristodêmokratia, aristodemocracy,

565,37aristokratia, aristocracy, 565,34arithmein, reckon, reckon off, 580,26

arithmêtikoi logoi, arithmeticaldiscourses, 457,25

arithmos, number, 453,30; 457,24.25 arkhê, starting point, 488,12 etc.

principle, 570,22source, 587,3 etc.

arnêsis, negative, 596,13.15arrêtos, unutterable, 504,20arthron, (definite) article, 475,29;

476,3-6artos, bread, 558,2asapheia, lack of clarity, 451,8.20asaphês, unclear, 467,23aselgês, licentious, 579,2askholeisthai, be engrossed,

466,30-6; 573,1asômatos, incorporeal, 463,37; 464,5;

466,9.22; 477,24; 483,19; 571,29aspalax, blind rat, 450,21; 453,6;

595,30asphaleia, what is safe, 452,5asphalesteros, safer, 513,16asteios, elegant, 488,27

charming, 562,13astronomein, think about

astronomy, 571,6; 573,4astronomia, astronomy, 461,28asummetros, incommensurable, 548,1asunkhutos, unconfused, 589,39;

590,2atelês, incomplete, 558,27; 577,11-30atenizein, direct gaze at, 508,33.35athanatos, immortal, 466,23.24;

516,1.21; 536,21-537,5; 541,6-16;596,4.19

athetein, reject, 597,17atimos, inferior, 464,25-7atomos, individual, 481,14; 509,29.35;

510,8; 557,25atomoun, individualise, 491,28atopon, absurd, absurdity, 467,26 etc.atupôtos, thing for which there can

be no imprints, 542,11atukhês, fails to reach, 498,7; 516,27;

564,24augoeidês, of luminous form, 597,18aülos, non-material, 461,31;

525,13-24; 543,15; 547,17;563,23.29,31; 564,15-18

aülôs, in a non-material way, 567,19authentein, prevail, 487,12autothen, straight off, 473,12 etc.autoptein, see directly, 574,17auxanein, increase, 458,33.34 etc.

badisis, walking, 544,34badistikos, that goes forward, 591,32

in walking, 588,34 badistikê dunamis, power to walk,

577,20-1basileia, monarchy, 565,34-5bastazein, carry, 472,33-4bathos, depth, 552,16-18 bdallein, suck at, 494,31; 495,4bia, violence, 589,11blepharis, eyelash, 595,16blepharitis, in the eyelashes, 595,18blepharon, eyelid, 503,28; 575,29boan, shout aloud, 466,23; 517,19;

521,27; 563,35bothros, pit, 598,30; 603,13boulê, deliberation, 490,32.33boulêsis, rational wish, 464,35;

585,22-3bouleuesthai, deliberate, 490,34;

592,14bouleutikos, that which deliberates,

deliberative, 579,17; 589,37.38;593,3-11

brontê, thunder, 476,21

daimonios, supernatural, 535,6.31;536,13.18.23; 537,11.14

daimôn, demon, 500,33supernatural being, 537,19.20.23

Greek-English Index 187

daseôs, with a rough breathing 585,5deilia, terror, 602,19.20deina, so-and-so, 590,22.23deinousthai, acquire formidability,

480,15dekhesthai, welcome, 559,2.4dektikos, receptive, 507,17.20.27.29;

508,9.17dêlêtêrion, poison, 476,22dêmiourgos, creator, 474,2; 507,9;

526,26.35; 527,29; 557,31; 558,4dêmokratia, democracy, 565,35despotês, master, 513,26.28dexiousthai, give one’s hand to,

528,18diadokhê, succession, 539,2diairein, divide, 481,9diairesis, division, 467,17-18.20;

546,5of a concept, 490,19; 544,4; 589,36

diairetos, divisible, divided, 484,14;549,5

diakonein, serve to carry, 449,2;597,7

carry, 449,4; 519,29; 605,29serve, 508,12.14

diakonêtês, such as to carry, 449,25diakoptein, break off, 577,38

break up, 605,18.20.25diakosmein, arrange in order, 564,1diakrinein, differentiate, 483,26;

493,25.26; 494,4.5; 507,4.5force apart, 472,17; 481,28; 510,4;

517,15; 547,6divide off, 479,4.5

diakrisis, differentiation, 461,12.13;494,14.17.25.26; 495,5

dialegesthai, speak, 460,18dialektos, thing said, 500,32dialogos, (Platonic) dialogue, 578,31diamerizein, partition, 586,13; divide

in parts, 605,19diametros, diameter, 547,35dianoeisthai, think (sc. discursively),

465,1.21; 550,6dianoêtikon, that which thinks,

515,14.23dianoêton, object of thought,

555,27.32.40; 556,2.3; 557,10.12dianoia, thought, 446,9; 486,1.2.5;

487,39; 488,1-15; 489,29;490,28.29.31; 491,9.10.12.15;

492,8.10,11; 496,23.28; 515,15.16;545,13.14,17; 546,7.24.27.30;550,6.8; 553,23.27-30; 556,32.34;593,6

diaphanês, transparent, 464,15;519,29; 607,9-10

can be seen through, 601,28diaphora, difference, 478,1 etc.

differentiating feature, whatdifferentiates, 446,7.9 etc.

diaphônein, be discrepant, 471,21disagree, 581,30

diaphônia, diagreement, 596,35-6diaporein, go through a problem,

463,6diarthroun, articulate fully, 498,30 diarthrôsis, articulation, 588,23diarrêdên, in so many words, 563,35diaspan, tear apart, 484,22;

566,3.5.7; 572,15; 575,1diastasis, distance, 574,15diastellein, draw a distinction,

471,31.32diastellesthai, open out, 592,28diastêma, distance, 491,17diaskhizein, sever, 572,12diataxis, ordering, 573,5diathesis, state, 458,1

mental state, 556,11didaktos, teachable, 495,25.29didaxis, teaching, 469,32.34diêirêmenôs, dividedly, in a divided

way, 550,8.11diegeirein, stir up, 512,14diêkhês, can be heard through, 601,28dielenkhein, convict, 489,16diestrammenos, deviant, 579,20.21dikaiologeisthai, plead, 536,2diexodos, exposition, 570,29dikaiologia, something to plead,

535,19dikastês, judge, 478,36dinêsis, rotation, 589,12diôrismenos, discrete, 459,4diorthoun, correct, 591,16diosmos, can be smelt through, 601,28diplasios, double, 472,8-12distazein, be in two minds, 521,6distikhion, distich, 486,23.26dittologein, be repetitive, 558,7dôdekaedron, dodekahedron, 450,31

188 Indexes

dogma, doctrine, 529,29; 542,2.3;586,25

dokheion, repository, 509,17donein, move up and down, 545,1dotikê, dative, 529,12.14dourios hippos, wooden horse,

482,17.18doxa, opinion, 446,9, 465,18.19;

488,15.21; 490,29.30; 492,15-21;496,28-32; 500,3.8; 502,27.32;503,2.4; 593,5.6

doxastos, subject of opinion, thingopinion is about, 502,28.31.35;506,11

object of opinion, 555,27-556,3doxazein, be of the opinion,

487,14-16; 488,18-20; 492,26-9;502,28.29.31.34

dran, act on, 599,4drassasthai, clutch, 599,6drimus, acute, 455,33; 469,29dunamis, power, 446,7; 465,12;

597,29.31dunamei, kata dunamin, in

potentiality, potential, 469,9;519,19.20.22.24-6; 522,22.27;558,20.21.26.28.30;564,30-2.34.35; 567,9-11

aisthêsis, potential sense, 469,10;475,18; 498,14.15; 558,16

nous, potential intellect, 491,7;518,11; 534,31; 558,6

dusgnôstos, hard to know, 462,20dusthêratos, hard to hunt down,

462,18dustupôtos, resisting imprints, 448,10

egrêgorsis, waking, 575,27.29eidêsis, knowledge, 518,14; 520,19;

596,23eidopoiein, make to have form,

547,5-6; 552,24eidos, form, 529,34; 531,12; 543,14;

562,20.22species, 579,28.29.32

eidôlopoios, image-maker, 493,8.9eikazein, liken, 538,6; 539,35eikein, yield, 579,7eikosaedron, eikosahedron, 450,31eikôn, likeness, 519,10eilikrinês, pure, 477,6.7einai, to be, 537,7

on, thing that is, 567,8.12tôi einai, in being, 484,12to ti ên einai, essence, 531,11

eisagein, indicate, 523,32eisballein, send on 482,13eisdokhê, reception (in optics),

605,23-4ekklinein, turn aside from, 595,9;

601,1ekkremês, loose end hanging, 494,12ekkrinein, emit, 513,6ekkrouein, distract, 596,10.12.26eklampsis, illumination, 486,38-487,1ekluein, break up, 476,29ekpompê, emission (in optics), 605,27ekstasis, extending, 589,3ektasis, extension, 550,25ekthesis, exposition, 499,28ektuphloun, to blind, 453,9elatton, minor premiss, 590,17elaphos, stag, 508,5elenkhein, refute, 467,20

reproach 573,26; 574,5elenkhos, refutation, 596,38ellampsis, irradiation, 539,3; 588,3elleipsis, reduction, 472,11.14.15embathunein, sink deep into, 588,37embruon, embryo, 558,1empodizein, impede, 517,30; 596,23

be an impediment, 596,31emphereia, relation, 446,26emphutos, innate, 588,12empsukhia, animation, 524,11; 572,8empsukhos, animate (being), 464,10enakouein, heed, give heed to,

574,16; 579,7enallax, alternando, 561,17enantilogia, contradiction, 519,17enantios, contrary, 553,7.13 etc.enantiousthai, contradict, 456,26.29

be contrary to, 536,15run counter to, 579,37.39

enargeia, evident facts, 495,23endeia, defect, 472,17endiathetos, in the mind, 556,10.15endiatribein, be engaged with, 467,3energeia, activity, 463,1.3.11-12;

464,4.23; 465,7.24; 466,6.7;469,11; 528,21

actuality, 557,30; 558,19.27energeiâi, kat’ energeian, actual,

actually, in actuality, 469,8.9;

Greek-English Index 189

471,5; 475,10; 480,33; 533,24;549,5.6; 557,18; 558,1.2; 559,15;567,10.11

aisthêsis, actual sense, 469,10;470,1; 471,4; 472,5.6; 473,21;475,9.19; 498,14-15

nous, actual intellect, 490,27;491,11.14; 518,27.30; 520,18;524,19; 534,30; 558,6

energein, act, 467,6; 470,25; 535,9.30;540,7

energêma, activity, 486,14engraphos, already inscribed, 524,15enistasthai, address, 501,12enkatoikodomein, build into, 448,20;

449,3enkephalos, brain, 565,29; 566,2enkharattein, engrave on, 534,30-1enkhumos, succulent, 482,27enkolaptein, cut into, 511,14-15enkosmios, in the cosmos, 528,20enkratês, self-controlled, person with

self-control, 579,5.6.12enkrateuesthai, control oneself,

560,6; 578,17ennoein, think out, 573,2; 578,11ennoia, idea, 459,31; 486,25; 500,25;

570,18consideration 541,30

ennomos, law-abiding, 565,37entelekheia, actuality, 558,3

entelekheiâi, in actuality, 557,29entimoteros, superior, 446,8entupoun, imprint, 534,30enudros, living in water, 449,13

aquatic, 452,28enulos, in matter, 525,13 etc.

enulon eidos, form in matter,517,22 etc.

enulos zoê, matter-bound life,486,30

enulôs, as being in matter, 486,33;567,19

enupnion, dream, 486,35epagein, bring forward, 567,7epagôgê, induction, 449,31

force, 454,32epagôgikos, inductive, 448,2.23.27;

449,19.28.29epagôgikôteros, on the inductive

side, 450,8

epanabainein, transcend, 521,7;553,8-9

epanalambanein, go over again,527,18-19

epiballein, intuit, 487,32approach, 495,3

epiblêtikôs, intuitively, 547,9epiboulê, plotting against, 595,13;

attack, 607,5epigignôskein, recognise, 454,19epidiorthoun, set right, 525,26.28.30epikaluptesthai, be covered over,

515,31; 516,2epikampês, curved, 526,7epikamptein, curve round, 526,9epikheirêma, proof; 450,20.26;

516,17; 576,9.14.18; 578,35;596,37

argument, 584,19epikhthonios, earth-dwelling, 486,32epikratein, gain the mastery, 590,15epikrinein, adjudicate, 522,14; 525,17epilanthanesthai, forget, 534,32;

537,39.40; 541,20.25.32; 542,1.5epilegein, say against, 519,17epiluesthai, resolve, 451,31; 526,22;

533,15epilusis, solution, 462,10-11; 543,27epimixia, mixing with, 528,15-16epinoein, conceive, 458,29; 476,22-3;

562,29epinoia, conception, 520,33; 527,25;

532,14.16; 543,36-544,1; 563,4;566,19

epipedon, plane, 552,9epiphaneia, surface, 552,8.12.17.20epiphoitan, come in, 450,10epiplokê, plaiting together, 501,13epipolaiôs, superficially, 570,6epistêmê, knowledge, 487,20 etc.

systematic knowledge, 490,31 etc.science, 461,27; 607,1

epistêmonikôs, with systematicknowledge, 524,19-20

epistêmôn, knower, 538,12-19epistêtos, what is known, 534,4

object of knowledge, 557,18-24;564,29.32; 567,9

epistrephein, reflect, 466,19-27;527,7; 528,13

epistrophê, reflection, 541,30epitasis, tempering, 477,14

190 Indexes

epitêdeios, suitable, 511,31epitêdeiotês, suitability, 521,19 etc.

kat’ epitêdeiotêta, by virtue ofsuitability, 516,31; 519,25;524,29; 558,16-17

epitholoun, muddy, 523,18epithumetikos, desiring, 565,26;

574,28epithumia, desire, 565,29.30.35;

566,3; 571,20.24; 574,6 etc.epitrepein, bid, 578,17êremein, stay still, 494,24.25êremia staying still, 453,29.31;

457,32.34; 458,3; 461,28; 510,38ergatês, craftsman, 467,12ergon, function, 464,24

work, 467,11erôtêmatikôs, interrogatively,

530,29.34 as a question, 596,14

esoptron, mirror, 605,25eskhatia, last part, 500,6.8ethismos, habituation, 497,8.9;

500,28.30.37ethizein, become habituated, be

habituated, 497,7-12êthos, character, 486,28etumologein, give the etymology of,

515,7etumologia, etymology, 515,5euergês, serviceable, 511,30eukherôs, readily, 448,11; 517,18eukhê, prayer, 579,4eukosmia, good arrangement, 564,11eunoukhos, eunuch, 577,28euôdia, fragrance, 571,11.13euplastos, easily shaped, 469,22eusebês, pious, 527,30eutaxia, good order, 563,40; 564,11eutheia, straight line, 481,8;

526,5.6.8.9eutrepizein, prepare, 576,37eutupôtos, easily imprinted, 469,21;

605,16exaisios, extraordinary, 602,16exapinês, forthwith, 544,34exêgêsis, interpretation, 464,32exêgêtês, interpreter, 464,30exeikazein, liken, 587,29.31; 588,2exeikônizein, be an image of, 564,38exelenkhein, convict, 465,26exomalizein, level up, 490,20

exomoioun, make completely like,553,3; 557,20; 563,25

exôthen, from outside (his works),503,9; 525,25; 526,29

gastêr, stomach, 600,31gê, earth, 448,9.14; 452,8gêinos, earthy, 453,2; 594,34; 595,2geitôn, neighbour, 596,12.26geneion, beard, 595,16.18genesis, coming to be (the world of),

487,9-10; 563,6; 566,31; 567,1genêtos, generated, 599,27.28gennaios, noble, 578,35gennêma, offspring, 471,37; 602,28.29genos, genus, 579,27.28.32geôdes, earthen, 594,35.36; 598,15;

600,21geômetria, geometry, 461,31geranos, crane, 580,7gêras, old age, 491,4; 524,22geuesthai, taste, 455,15 etc.geusis, taste, 448,13 etc.geuston, object of taste, 602,11ginglumos, joint, 587,30; 588,17.28gignôskein, know, get to know,

454,21cognise, 528,30.31recognise, 454,22

glukus, sweet, 454,17 etc.gnôsis, cognition, 490,14 etc.gnôstikos, cognitive, 465,12 etc.gnôston, object of cognition, 541,22

(see note); 572,21 etc.goês, mountebank, 504,15goêteuein, bewitch, 581,29gônia, angle, 511,6gramma, written letter, 533,30

grammateion agraphon, writingtablet on which nothing iswritten, 469,19; 516,24-5; 520,4-5;524,14; 533,25-30

grammê, line, 552,8-20 etc.graphê, reading, 598,17.21

picture, 488,32; 511,14grapheion, paintbrush, 538,6 (see

note)grapheus, painter, 538,6 (see note);

538,7gumnazein, set out, try out (an

argument), 463,34; 467,15;472,21-7; 480,20.24; 481,8

Greek-English Index 191

make limber, 517,6.13.17

hamartia, mistake, 519,15.38hamôsgepôs, in some way or other,

468,30; 469,3hapalosarkos, soft-fleshed, 600,33-4haphê, touch, 448,13.32; 450,36;

451,16.17; 489,29-34; 595,2;597,10; 598,24.37; 600,18.19.22;601,5.7-10; 602,1-9;603,7-12.20.21.25.27.29-32;604,2.9.12

haplos, in general, 465,2haplous, simple, 450,32; 527,9; 532,26haptesthai, touch, perceive by

touching, 601,19; 603,8.11haptos, object of touch 449,33; 451,16harmonia, attunement, 473,14hêdein, please, 476,23hêdesthai, experience pleasure,

559,1.20; 560,1; 561,25.28hêdonê, pleasure, 559,15.18.30.32;

572,25hêdunein, please, 477,18hêdus, pleasant, 458,22; 554,28;

559,17.18; 560,4.5; 562,8; 607,14hêdutês, pleasantness, 477,9hêgemonikon, ruling part, 587,25heimarmenê, fate, 486,24-5hekatonebdomêkontaplasios, 170

times as big as, 503,37hêlios, the Sun, 537,28helkein, pull, 588,37.39; 589,1.12-19helxis, pulling 588,35, 589,2.4.8-13;

591,29hêmeroun, tame, 497,4; 602,30.31.32;

607,19hêmikuklion, semicircle, 589,13hêmisphairion, hemisphere,

590,11.12heniaios, unitive, 515,28; 549,1henoeidôs, as being each one, 545,14henopoiein, unite, 542,31-2henôsis, unity, 471,29

unification, 551,3henoun, unite, 471,24; 547,31hêpar, liver, 565,30; 566,3herpeton, reptile, 591,32hêsukhia, inactivity, 486,4heterogenês, heterogeneous, 452,3heterotês, otherness, 521,22heuresis, discovery, 525,1; 569,2

hexis, disposition, 534,28; 537,27.34;539,27.33; 558,16

nous kath’ hexin, dispositionalintellect, 490,27;518,13.16-17.27.28; 520,17

hippeios, equine, 539,24hippos, horse, 488,35; 489,4; 497,4.6;

500,26.36; 596,28dourios hippos, wooden horse,

482,17.18hippos tês kakias, horse of vice,

596,26.27holikôs, on a holistic view, 540,31holotelôs, in a wholly complete way,

553,21homêros, hostage, 570,23homodoxos, of the same opinion as,

533,34-5homogenês, of the same kind, 478,1;

480,6; 482,13; 561,4.6homoiomerês, homeomerous, 597,23homoiomereia, thing of similar

parts, 522,34homoiousthai, become like, 490,6-8

homoion homoiôi, like (known) bylike, 487,7.22

homokhronos, contemporary, 540,28homônumia, things said equivocally,

575,13homônumos, equivocal, 575,12homoulos, of the same matter,

526,19.24.34; 532,22.25.26hôra, hour, 580,26.34horasis, seeing, 470,14; 474,34.35horatikos, of sight, 463,1.2.5-6.8horaton, thing seen, 464,7 470,14;

602,18horikôs, termwise, in a termwise

manner, 543,4; 569,23horkos, conjuration, 497,6; 500,30.33

oath, 502,24horkoun, conjure, 500,32hormê, purposive impulse, 576,26-8;

578,5; 583,19horos, boundary, 560,21.25

definition, 507,10term, 472,11; 543,6-10; 544,5-7;

545,24 hudôr, water, 448,18.27; 601,27;

607,10.11hugiainein, be healthy, 487,11hugieia, health, 501,20.26

192 Indexes

hugrotês, moisture, 449,13-14hulê, matter, 502,1.2; 522,32;

523,14.16; 528,37; 529,33; 530,1;531,12; 539,17; 541,12; 598,27;599,1.4.5.9

hulikôs, in a material way, 481,25hulikon aition, material cause,

501,29; 502,9humên, membrane, 450,23; 453,8hupainittesthai, hint at, 593,26hupakouein, understand, 487,19huparktikos, substantive,

545,6.7.10; 569,18.23huparxis, subsistence, 567,15.16huparkhein, belong, 461,14; 500,12;

514,9to be, 449,6really to exist 545,9

huperbaton, words out of order,514,16; 531,1.3; 548,28; 568,11;606,1

huperbolê, excess, 472,7.16;517,5.6.15; 602,9; 606,18.21

huperkosmios, above the cosmos,528,20

huperlampros, overbright, 476,20huperousios, super-real, 504,21huperselênos, superlunary, 594,22huphantikê, weaving, 476,25huphistamenon, subsistent, 471,15hupnos, sleep, 498,18.19; 575,27.28hupokeimenon, subject

(grammatical) 476,4; 546,4.6;548,16.17

(logical), 590,32(i.e. subject matter), 456,21.23;

463,29; 511,23; 563,15tôi hupokeimenôi, in subject,

473,22.23; 474,6; 475,10; 480,26;530,32-3; 531,4; 571,22.26; 584,32

hupokeisthai, be subject, 472,27;500,27; 563,18

hupokrisis, acting, 492,28hupolambanein, suppose, 523,31.32;

570,20hupolêpsis, supposal, 490,28-30;

492,11.12.16.24; 493,22;497,16.18; 593,23

hupomnêma, commentary, 464,20-1;531,25

hupomnêmatizôn, in hiscommentary, 575,7

hupomnêsantes, commentators,453,15

hupopiptein, fall under, 454,16.20;555,36

huposelênos, sublunary, 594,22hupostasis, subsistence, 471,34;

532,14-15; 588,3hupostatikos, subsistence-giving,

547,11hupostrônnusthai, form a mattress,

601,8hupothesis, hypothesis, 467,34; 565,2

hupothetikos sullogismos,hypothetical syllogism, 447,17;455,10;

hupothetikôs, by hypotheticalreasoning, 454,11

hupotithenai, suppose, 518,4hupotupôsis, outline, 539,10

iatros, doctor, 501,20.25; 588,10idiazein, be peculiar, 449,3idios, proper, 454,3-6.8; 457,11;

459,8.24; 460,26; 462,13; 540,3.19;541,6

idikos, special, 454,1; 509,7; 573,24of our own, 517,20

idiopragein, attend to one’s ownbusiness, 455,13; 554,2; 557,3

idiôma, peculiarity, 572,30.37.38idiôma aisthêtikon, way peculiar

to sense, 458,13.14.16idiôtês, simple person, 540,29ikhthus, fish, 449,13 ilus, mud, 588,37isosthenein, be of the same number,

595,3-4

kainotomein, introduce newclassification, 558,25

kakia, vice, 596,26.27kakizein, censure, 518,32kakographos, ill written, 533,30-1kakophônos, with a bad voice, 533,32kakos, bad, 554,18.31-7; 560,4.5;

562,11 etc.evil, 547,10

kalamos, measuring rod, 567,34kalôs, rope, 511,12

artêmenos kalôs, tightrope, 511,12kamêlos, camel, 450,7kampulos, curved, 562,27; 566,14-16

Greek-English Index 193

kanôn, rule, 503,3; 506,4; 525,31kardia, heart, 565,30; 566,2;

587,24.25; 588,7.15.17karukeuma, savoury sauce, 601,16kataballein, overcome, 502,33; 503,2katabasis, descent, going down,

473,23.25katadromê, attack, 536,6.19.28;

537,8.16.17.24katadusis, underground habitation,

495,21burrowing, 595,31

katagignesthai, be occupied with,488,3; 498,6 etc.

katagôgion, lodging, 555,4-11;560,9.14.16.21

katagôgos, on the downward path,596,30

katagraphein, inscribe, 538,5.9katakhrêsthai, use (words) loosely,

speak loosely, 550,6; 551,23;573,17

katakhrêstikôs, loosely, loose(speaking), 490,17.19.35; 491,34-5

katakruptein, overlay, 511,34katalambanein, grasp, 603,11katamathêmatikeuein,

mathematicise, 481,34-5katanoêsis, attending to, 528,16kataphasis, assertion, 546,3.7.8;

548,12.16.19.25; 559,31ek kataphaseôs, positively, 478,31

kataphatikôs, positively, 547,7.9kataphronein, be contemptuous of,

529,14-15; 563,9kataskeuazein, establish,

451,7.9.11.18.21.24 etc.kataskeuê, establishment, 501,6

establishing argument, 598,23katasterizein, make into

constellations, 461,30katasterismos, location relatively to

one another, 461,29katêgorein, predicate, 513,29katêgoroumenon, predicate,

476,3.5.7; 543,7; 545,22; 546,4;548,16-26

katêgorikos, categorical, 455,11katekhein, hold (in sensory system),

464,13katepeigein, be urgent, 516,18-19;

600,14

katharos, pure, 556,19katheudein, sleep

en tôi katheudein, in sleep,488,22.24

katholikos, universal, 596,7katholikôteron, in a more universal

sense, 539,21katholou, universal, 596,23 etc.katoikizein, house, 565,29katonomazesthai, have a name,

470,8.9.17katoptron, mirror, 464,12katorthôma, right action, 584,28keimenon, assumption, 575,5kenon, gap, 500,7kentrikôs, in a pointlike way, 542,29kentron, centre, 481,8.10; 542,30;

560,22.25.27.31; 589,20; 591,30kephalaion, section, 455,11.12;

456,12; 479,8.20-3; 480,4point, 535,1; 542,21.22; 587,12

kêros, wax, 605,13.14kharaktêrizein, characterise,

598,15; 600,21khartion, sheet of papyrus, 533,26kheimôn, winter, 580,7.8.32kheir, hand, 512,8; 567,33; 604,25-7khiôn, snow, 476,22khitôn, covering, 595,31 khorêgein, bring along, 537,3.4khôristos, separable, 520,31-3;

521,1.22.23; 537,10.12.13; 540,3.5;551,25.28-31; 563,3;566,20.21.25.26; 573,16.19

separate, 466,21; 563,23.24khôrizein, separate, 537,10.12-14.17;

563,4.26; 566,21khortos, food, 587,9khrêsis, usage, 485,24-5; 486,11.12khroa, colour, 452,17khroia, colour, 454,17.19; 461,8 khrôma, colour, 455,32; 466,4.5.7;

469,12; 471,10; 474,28; 475,1;539,28

khrômatismos, colouring,466,13.15-16

khrômatizein, colour (v.), 464,4.9.14;466,2.7-9.11; 468,30; 469,11

khronos, time, 480,11.12.17;483,21.31; 540,20.31549,9.23-7.30-2; 550,2.32;

194 Indexes

551,14.22.34; 580,2.3.15.16.22.27;581,2.4

tense, 545,22.25.26.31.35.38;548,5.7.26

khrôsis, colouring, 470,15; 474,35.36khumos, flavour, 462,16; 601,16khumôsis, flavouring, 475,3.4kinein, change (transitive), 570,19-21

etc.kinêsis, change, 453,9 etc.kinêtikos, (that which changes),

570,14.27.29 etc.klan, break, 525,27.29

to bend, 526,7.9; 532,6klimax, ladder, 473,24koilos, concave, 588,20koinônein, have (something) in

common, 473,10; 485,17-19;558,13 etc.

koinônia, thing in common,446,10-11.26; 516,19-23.29.30;517,2; 521,37; 522,1-7;600,14.19.25 etc.

community, 471,28koinos, common

koinê aisthêsis, common sense,446,11; 455,21-2; 464,22; 465,25;477,23; 479,8-9; 480,5; 555,5.34-8;560,20 etc.

koinon aisthêton, commonsense-object, 453,28 etc.

koman, be long haired, 488,27kôpê, oar, 502,14; 525,27.28kôphos, deaf, 507,33; 601,35korê, pupil, 560,10korsê anaukhên, neckless head,

545,19kosmein, adorn, 450,11kosmikôs, on a cosmic view, 540,31kosmos, cosmos, 520,23; 526,35;

540,21krama, mixture, 503,35.36; 504,5;

538,13krasis, mixture, 472,32; 504,3;

517,23.24kratein, master, 523,1

keep hold of, 464,11kratiston, strongest, 572,18kreitton, stronger, 572,19.23krêmnos, precipice, 583,9; 595,12-13krinein, discern, 453,33 etc.krisis, discernment, 489,24; 490,8

kritikôs, in a discerning way,481,25.26.33

krustalloeidês, of crystalline form,448,19; 560,11

ktupos, clap, 474,21kubernan, govern, 518,17kubos, cube, 450,31kuklikos, in a circle, 591,33; 597,1kuklos, circle, 587,31; 589,20.23;

591,30kukloterês, curved, 511,12 (see note)kuôn, dog, 478,11; 482,26kuria, control, 590,9kuriolektein, speak accurately,

490,19kuriôs, properly, 464,5kuros, supreme power, 502,23;

572,23; 579,22kurtos, convex, 588,18.20

laburinthôdês, labyrinthine, 517,11lampas, light, 464,8; 466,12.15;

469,4; 499,18.21.22lampros, bright, 464,9

famous person, 528,17legein, argue, 464,13

say, 447,22speak of, 446,22mean, 450,17; 504,7

leipsanon, trace left behind, 486,35;581,14

lêmma, (preliminary) assumption,474,16; 507,10, 512,5; 526,12

leôn, lion, 497,4.6; 581,8.13.17lêthê, forgetfulness, 502,32; 503,1

forgetting, 506,10lexis, text, 450,21; 521,29; 530,13 etc.

word, 473,17detailed commentary, 470,16; 539,11

etc.logikos, rational, 525,12logikê psukhê, rational soul,

446,6.13; 447,15; 450,10.13.17;465,33; 466,23; 485,11; 494,6-7;496,22; 507,1; 508,15-16;511,35.38; 512,2; 516,8-14;517,8.9; 518,3; 521,24.26; 595,36;596,39; 597,17

logical, 495,9logikôteros, a bit logical, 481,17logion, saying, 547,12

Greek-English Index 195

logismos, reasoning, 585,23; 587,2;596,25

logistikon, that which reasons, 593,8logoeidês, rational in form 506,22logos, account, 469,17.18; 516,24.25;

520,2.5.11; 533,28; 565,5; 596,8etc.

logôi, kata logon, in account,473,22; 530,33; 531,5; 584,33 etc.

argument 447,26.31.34.35; 448,23;449,19.28.29; 450,8; 473,3; 477,23;494,19 etc.

diaskeuê logou, structure ofargument, 455,10

book, 446,12.14; 453,28; 455,7principle, 506,28proportion, proportionality,

472,31-34; 473,1reason (i.e. explanation), 488,8reason (the faculty), 466,30; 467,7;

485,13; 488,9; 500,21; 516,19.23;565,18.29.34; 566,2; 571,20;573,22.31; 574,6; 576,11.12;583,23; 586,22; 593,10.14.16 etc.

relationship, 516,17sentence, 599,36speech, 485,10; 492,30statement, 596,29; 597,18talking about, 539,32logôi eipein, in a word, 518,35

loimôdês, pestilential, 487,10loutron. bath, 476,25lupê, distress, 559,19.32lupêros, distressing, 554,30.32.33;

559,15.16 unpleasant, 607,14

lusis, solution, 449,6; 468,22;481,2.3.5; 484,10.25; 526,28

makhê, conflict, 502,12makhesthai, fight, 502,11.13; 503,6mageirikê, cooking, 476,24

mageirikon onoma, cooking-term,475,5

mainomenos, maniac, 555,22makroapodotos, taking a long time

to reaching its main clause, 582,32malakotês, softness, 595,33manteuesthai, divine, 451,32marmarugês, seeing sparks, 464,7.15maskhalê, armpit, 595,19.21masêsis, chewing, 544,35

mastix, whip, 488,35; 500,26.36mastos, breast, 494,31; 495,4matên, to no purpose, 447,32.33.34

etc.mathêmata, mathematics, 510,23

objects of mathematics, 510,24;527,15.21.24; 531,8.20.23; 532,7;562,22.24.27; 563,4

mathêmatikos, mathematical, 481,35mathêsis, learning, 469,32.34; 569,1mathêtês, pupil, 469,34mazos, breast, 511,15megalophuia, loftiness of genius,

529,14megethos, size, 453,29 etc.

magnitude, 546,15 etc.megethunai, give magnitude, 543,34meiôsis, too little, 472,7meioun, diminish, 458,33.34meizôn, major premiss, 590,16.17mekhanasthai, devise, 572,27mêkos, length, 550,9-13.32; 551,29 etc.mêkunein, make too long, 530,13 melankholia, depression, 528,22melas, black, 511,14; 547,5.7.8

dark, 567,16meli, honey, 455,15; 461,19.21; 495,23melissa, melitta, bee, 495,22; 501,2mêlon, fruit, 571,12.13menein, remain still, 589,5.10.18.21mêpote, perhaps, 462,28merikos, particular, 490,24; 526,1.5;

596,24.32aisthêsis merikê, particular sense,

459,23; 461,18.20meristos, in parts, 544,8.9

divisible into parts, 571,29.31meristôs, part by part, 479,9

in parts (adv.), 546,33merizein, to divide into parts, 571,30mesotês, mean, 477,10; 560,12mesouranein, be in mid-sky, 590,11metaballein, change, 517,1; 590,31;

604,30-2metabolê, change, 605,1 etc.

switch, 558,31metagein, lead across, 564,12metapeithein, persuade to change

one’s mind, 500,34metaphora

ek metaphoras, metaphorically,497,18.24 (see note)

196 Indexes

metatrepesthai, turn aside from,492,30

metaxu, to, the medium, 451,23,508,9

metaxulogia, digression, 474,16 what has been said in between,

490,15methê, drunkenness, 511,35; 515,32mêtis, shrewdness, 485,25.29; 486,1metousios, sub-real, 504,21miktos, mixed, 600,17-29; 601,5-12mimêsis, imitating, 597,35mnêmonikos, mnemonic, using a

mnemonic system, 493,7.10mokhlos, crowbar, 512,8monas, unit, 459,4; 543,13monimos, immobile, 583,1; 598,32;

599,18.27-9morphê, shape, 551,1morphôtikôs, by way of shape, 574,15mousikê, music, 461,32; 602,24

muein opthalmous, have eyesshut, 496,11-15; 499,14.15.20;577,34

muia, winged insect, 495,5.19; 496,19muktêr, nostril, 449,14murepsikê, scent-making, 476,24murmêx, ant, 495,5.19-21; 496,19;

498,31; 511,29; 513,4; 580,8; 590,3mus, muscle, 575,21

naumakhia, seafight, 479,33-5neikos, strife, 545,18neogenês, new-born, 494,26neuron, sinew, 587,24; 588,11; 591,27noein, think, 491,11; 497,15 516,15;

517,21.22.28; 522,5.6.25.31.32;525,10.23.30; 527,9-22; 528,1.7-9;545,37; 546,13-37; 547,1-4.21.22;564,10.14-17; 566,13.14.23

exercise intellect, 465,1.20noêma, thought, 554,2.3;

556,5.6.16.19; 568,14; 569,21.29noeros, intelligible, 461,26

intellectual, 555,9-12noerôs, intellectually, 596,9noêsis, intelligence, 485,21.23.25;

489,30.31.34; 490,21thinking, 492,22.24; 519,9.11;

542,16; 583,31; 592,9,11noêtos, object of intellect, 522,10,11;

527,8.15.20.24.26.33-7; 528,3.4;

530,19-21; 532,31.32; 533,1.5-13;542,22-7; 555,29.32.40; 556,3;557,9.11; 562,19.20

nomos, law, 471,17; 475,17; 588,9what is customary, 521,14nomôi, by convention, 472,1

nosein, be sick, 487,11nosos, disease, 515,32notheuein, debase, 491,29nous, intellect, 446,10; 465,20;

478,4-14; 487,31-8; 490,25.27;518,7.27; 522,9.10.23; 525,12.21;527,6,8; 528,6.9; 536,26.27; 578,7;see also kata dunamin, kat’energeian, kath’ hexin,pathêtikos, praktikos,theôrêtikos, thurathen

meaning, 489,11; 529,4; 530,30 mind (i.e. meaning), 464,18

nun, now, 479,24-36; 480,1; 483,21-6;543,13; 545,30-3

nukterinos, nocturnal, 486,14nux, night, 576,26.27

odous, tooth, 544,35; 577,12.19oikeios, its own, 478,19; 595,25

belong as its own, 572,31belonging properly to, 584,12.13.28

oikothen, from within, 527,26oinomeli, honeyed wine, 502,1; 521,15okhoun, to, the vehicle, 589,16okhêsis, movement in a vehicle,

589,15oktaedron, octahedron, 450,31oligarkhia, oligarchy, 565,36oligotês, fewness, 581,18ômos, shoulder, 472,33onar, dream, 486,13-14.37.38oneiros, dream, 494,23.25oneirôttein, dream (v.), 494,20onoma, name, 470,13

term, 475,4onux, nail, 595,1ôion, egg, 540,29 ophis, snake, 497,3.5; 500,30ophrus, frown, 464,31ophthalmos, eye, 453,7; and see

muein opsis, sight, 448,19; 451,25; 453,30;

455,14.16; 456,8; 460,3; 462,12;463,35.37; 464,8; 467,28; 468,3.18;470,14; 476,20; 478,23.33; 510,37;

Greek-English Index 197

511,2.22; 602,31; 605,26; 606,2.26;607,1

optikos, optic, 605,27oregesthai, reach out, 576,15; 582,12;

591,13.15; 592,2.3have appetition for, 589,32.34

orektikos, appetitive, 574,32to orektikon, that which is

appetitive, 571,8; 572,15.31;579,16.17.18.21-29; 587,8.9

the appetitive part, 572,33-6; 579,18orekton, object of appetition, 571,8;

581,21.33; 585,28; 587,9,10.23;590,7

orexis, appetition, 495,11.12;554,35.36; 559,7-9; 565,15-17;566,3-7; 573,6; 574,25.27; 575,2-9;576,15-17; 579,10.11.14.16.31-9;581,22; 585,19.22; 590,7-9;592,4-13

organikos, instrumental, 502,6.8;587,24.26.29; 588,6;

organikon aition, instrumentalcause, 501,24.25.28

organic, 583,1organon, instrument, 467,1; 511,36;

517,27-31; 524,1.3; 526,4; 529,25;551,13; 562,28; 563,19; 567,33.34;568,16; 570,2; 576,7; 578,8.9.26

organ, 576,22.23.30.33.37; 582,27aisthêtikon organon,

instrumentality of sense, 530,9oruttein, dig, 453,8ôsis, pushing, push, 588,35.37;

589,4.8.9.11.13; 591,29; 602,17 osmê, odour, 449,33; 452,3.5osphranton, object of smell, 601,17;

602,13osphrêsis, smell, 448,20-2;

449,1.12.24; 452,4; 476,21; 601,36ostrakodermon, animal with a shell,

600,32ostreinos, shell-like, 482,12ôthein, push, 588,35; 589,1.12.14.16;

604,28.29; 605,2ôthesis, pushing, 589,3oudeterôs, in the neuter, 541,14ouranion, heavenly body, 526,36;

595,34.36.37.39;596,3.16.27.33.36.39;597,6.8.10.13; 598,1-3; 600,22.24

ouranomêkês, as tall as the sky,503,32; 507,36; 508,6

ouranopolitês, citizen of heaven,563,8

ousia, substance, 460,11,13;519,23.37; 537,27.28.32; 571,15-18

atomon ousia, individualsubstance, 514,10-12

deutera ousia, secondarysubstance, 446,26

pemptê ousia, fifth substance,453,20; 597,13; 600,23

ousiôdês, in substance, 563,4

paidion, baby, 494,31; 577,11.13.15pais, child, 518,12.21.24; 519,20.24.37pakhumerês, coarse-grained, 510,32pan to, the universe, 520,24panteleios, completely perfect, 518,16pantôs, certainly, 453,21

definitely, 478,31 etc.ou pantôs, not in all cases, 480,23;

490,2parabolos, hazardous, 580,1.4paradeigma, example, 459,22;

460,11; 476,28; 529,10.15; 577,25;585,7-8; 590,22

model, 474,25; 481,7; 558,14; 589,22;604,23

paragein, produce, 537,33paraition, contributory cause, 491,25parakatathêkê, pledge, 555,22parakatiôn, further down, 493,24;

519,6.13; 522,7; 563,12parakeisthai, lie ready for, 595,26;

599,18parakmê, decline, 577,13parakolouthein, follow upon,

556,21-2paramuthein, reassure, 468,23paramuthia, reassurance, 468,28

explanation, 542,8paraplanasthai, wander astray,

583,8paraphrazein, paraphrase, 531,1paraphronein, be deranged in

judgement, 511,33paraphrosunê, derangement, 516,2paraphtheirein, undermine, 521,13parathesis, juxtaposition, 547,30.31pareikazein, liken, 588,32; 589,6-7

198 Indexes

pareistrekhein, run out beside,542,11

parekbasis, excursus, 546,13paremphainesthai, appear

alongside, 523,14parepesthai, follow, 515,19parergos, of marginal importance,

461,25parergôs, by the way, 601,13paretos, someone with palsy, 602,1parodeuein, pass through, 605,12.18

(see note)paromoios, very like, 594,11paroran, overlook, 582,34paskhein, be affected, 457,17;

526,15.18.19; 558,20.22.28 etc.pathos, affection, 453,18.20;

455,1.2.6; 458,32-4; 481,22;511,34; 516,34; 517,3.5; 522,14.18;526,30; 527,1.2; 533,17-19

emotion, 565,17; 576,11.12;578,16.17; 579,34; 581,27;583,15.17.25; 584,11; 590,15;593,14.15

pathêtikos nous, passive intellect,490,23; 506,24; 523,29; 542,3

pêgê, spring, 536,12peithein, to persuade, 496,34;

500,23.24.34peithô, persuasion, 496,35; 497,8.9;

500,21,22pelôris, mussel, 453,12penês, poor, 486,28pepsis, digestion, 452,33peras, end-point, 481,11

end, 450,36; 515,13peripeteia, denoument, 504,14periphereia, periphery, 598,3peripolein, patrol, 527,28peritton, superfluity, 577,1pêros, deformed, 512,22pêrôma, deformed, 453,6;

577,11.12.16.17.23.26-8; 583,2pettein, digest, 452,33pezos, footed, 449,12phaneroun, make manifest, plain,

511,21; 537,30.31phantazesthai, imagine,

488,15-16.17.23-7.31; 492,25-7;493,1-3; 496,2-4.13; 497,21.27.28;498,17-18; 507,33.34;512,15.17.22-8; 580,21

phantasia, imagination,446,9.11.15.20; 455,23; 466,17.18;486,15.17; 488,10-15; 490,25;492,6-8; 494,19.20.22.28-31;495,25; 498,13.14.26; 499,1-6;500,3.8; 501,11.13; 502,2.4;503,5-6.7; 504,3.5; (defined)507,16-35; 508,1.11; 509,4.5;(etymology) 511,18-24; 512,12;513,3.6; 514,15.17; 515,2.5.7;541,23.26; 542,2.7.8; 546,31-4;551,7-9; 562,28-30; 563,14-16;564,2-5; 582,9-16; (division of),589,35-590,5;

imagining, 499,5; 514,27; 584,10-11phantasiousthai, imagine, 582,12-13phantasma, phantasm, 504,13;

561,26; 563,17.18; 569,5.11.21.29;593,1.2.4

imagining, 492,32phantastikon, to, that which

imagines, 574,27.32phaos, light, 511,23pharmakon, drug, 492,31philêdonon, to, love of pleasure,

565,36philenklêmôn, one who likes to find

faults, 446,19philia, (Empedoclean) Friendship,

545,17.19.20philokhrêmaton, to, love of wealth,

565,36philosômatos, body-loving, 563,9-10philosophos, philosopher, 590,22-6.32

ho philosophos, the Philosopher,560,17; 576,28; 584,29; 594,23

philotimeisthai, be credited, 467,11phlebotomon, blood-letting, 501,25phlegma, phlegm, 595,22phluaros, garrulous, 596,11.26phobein, rout, 593,26.27; 594,6phoitan, rove, 465,12.13

to pervade, 571,11phônê, sound, 472,26.27.29.31;

473,3.6-8spoken sound, 543,9.19; 544,19.25voice, 500,32

phortikos, awkward, 522,12phortion, burden, 472,33phôs, light, 476,21; 511,23;

535,34.36.38; 537,26.28.30phôtizein, illuminate, 535,38.39

Greek-English Index 199

phrear, well, 571,6; 573,4; 583,9 phrên, mind, 486,27.30; 492,29phronein, judge, 486,16

to exercise judgement, 490,17.36phronêsis, thinking, 486,15.17; 487,3

practical judgement, 490,32.33;491,32.34; 492,12

phruktos, torchlight, 561,29phthartikos, destructive, 448,8;

476,20; 516,35phthartos, destructible, 448,7;

516,10.34; 518,4.5; 572,2.3phtheirein, destroy, 472,14.15;

602,8.11-20phtheiresthai, pass away, 471,14;

598,12be destroyed, 472,8; 502,27-32

phthora, passing away, 598,12phusikos, natural, in the field of

nature, 475,5; 539,16physical, 469,29; 481,18.35

phusikôs, physically, 470,3phusiologein, do natural science,

565,32phusiologos, physicist, 570,25phusis, nature, 447,34; 450,25; 462,8;

576,35.37; 587,30; 588,32.33;589,5.7-10; 598,31

phutikos, vegetative, 446,5; 537,2.7;541,8.11; 574,9.26; 575,4;576,20.29; 582,5.8.10.21; 595,35;597,19

phuton, plant, 575,6-8; 576,19.20;594,19.26.27; 595,5.6;598,14.15.24.26.28; 599,9-11

pisteuein, be rationally convinced,496,33,34; 500,21

pistis, rational conviction,496,31.32.35; 500,20.21.23

pistousthai, derive, obtainassurance, 466,12; 530,5.23;595,15

planasthai wander, 495,7; 590,2go astray, 489,23; 535,9.21

planê, going astray, 489,16.22.25platos, width, 552,18platunein, fill out, 539,12plêgê, blow, 499,21plegma, strand, 572,14plekein, construct (a syllogism),

496,29.33pleonazein, abundance, 595,21.22

plêthos, multitude, 581,18pleura, side, 548,1plokê, construction, 473,3; 500,17pneuma, pneuma, 481,22; 482,12;

560,10; 587,24.26.27;588,2.3.8.10.12.24.31.38;589,6.20.21;

Kharônia pneumata, mephiticvapours, 476,22; 602,14

pneumatikon sôma, pneumaticbody, 481,20.21.24

podiaios, a foot across, 502,16; 503,38poiêtikos (that) brings about, 501,19

poiêtikon aition, efficient cause,496,34; 501,23.24.27; 539,17;547,18; 571,3.4.7; 581,30.35;588,4-5;

poiotês, quality, 478,23poioun, make qualitative, 543,31

kamaton poiesthai, direct labours,446,5-6

poioun, paskhon, agent, patient,469,30-1

politeia, constitution, 565,34pôlodamnês, horse-breaker, 497,5;

500,27poludunamos, many powered,

517,35; 518,4; 571,37polumerês, multipartite, 571,23polumêtis, very shrewd, 491,22.23polumorphos, multiform, 565,35polupous, (nasal) polyps, 601,36poreia, movement, 495,7; 583,1poreutikon, that which moves,

575,17.23poreutikon zôon, animal that

moves, 594,21.24-9;595,9.11.27.29.34.35;600,13.15.19.34; 601,3

poreutikê kinêsis, change inmovement, 575,16.31

organon poreutikon, organ formovement, 576,22.23

porisma, corollary, 472,4;475,9.11.14; 476,8; 547,15; 566,20

supplementary argument 470,19.28pornê, prostitute, 583,26porneuein, go to a prostitute, 590,14posoun, make quantitative, 543,31pous, foot, 588,35-589,4pragma, thing, 466,30; 488,3.5;

512,7; 566,24.30; 568,12.17

200 Indexes

action, 485,10 fact, 509,28

pragmateia, treatise, 453,28; 455,7;602,34

praktikos, practical, 520,26.27 nous, practical intellect,

554,13-18.23.27.30.36.38; 555,1;558,11; 576,8; 578,8.12.15; 583,13;584,21-5; 586,8.9; 592,8.13.20.21

prakton, thing to be done, thing thatcan be done, 490,31-3; 578,10;583,14; 586,4.6; 591,4.9

proagein, bring forth, 537,28advance, 557,29.30; 558,4

proaireisthai, choose, 578,27.28;592,14

proairesis, choice, 578,12-13.26-7proaugasma, flash, 464,16proballein, put forward, 477,28;

480,4; 532,30 put forth, 534,22.23; 539,29.30.32

problêma, thesis, 475,13proposition, 520,34; 521,8

probouleusis, prior deliberation,501,1

proêgeisthai, precede, 504,29; 522,2;540,31

progastôr, potbellied, 454,24; 488,28progignôskein, have prior

knowledge of, 565,14programma, heading, 566,10prokeimenon, point at issue, 494,35prokharattein, to outline, 464,16-17prokheirizesthai, to bring out,

486,9; 520,19prokheirisis, having to hand, 535,39prolabon, foregoing, 446,5; 453,26-7pronoeisthai, take thought in

advance, 581,14give first thought to, 450,25

pronoia, (divine) Providence, 527,31;564,1

taking thought in advance, 581,7propêdan, jump ahead, 455,17prophantazesthai, prior imagining,

513,6-7prophora, expression, 556,14

kata prophoran, expressed,556,12,15

prosballein, intuit, 447,35; 488,5;512,10

approach, 495,1

prosbolê, attempt, 488,4 intuition, 544,31

prosdiorismos, furtherdifferentiation (i.e. quantifier),476,3.4

further distinction, 458,10; 523,6further condition, 491,16-17

prosektikos, attentive,464,32-3.36.37;465,4.6.11.13.16.34; 466,28;555,12

prosekhês, proximate, 581,36marching with, 588,6near at hand, 590,35; 600,7

prosekhôs, proximately, 512,14;590,36

proseuporein, supply further,additional, 498,3; 503,9; 576,24-5;583,7

proskhresthai, bring into use,478,6-7.9

prosklisis, bending, 497,9 (see note)proskunein, say ‘hello’ to, 528,18proslêpsis, minor premiss, 447,21.24;

448,1-2.24.28; 449,18;451,7-9.12.21.24; 457,9.10

prosomilein, come close to, 494,35prosphoros, to the point, 486,13

apt, 589,22prosthêkê, addition, 472,11.14; 473,1protasis, proposition, 543,6.7.19-21;

546,1.2.12premiss, 488,5; 590,16; 593,22.24.32

proteraios, preceding, 469,6; 470,19protereuein, come before, 554,10.11

to take the lead, 581,24prothesaurizein, store up in advance

a treasury, 511,29; 580,8prothesis, connective, 591,1prôton, deuteron, primary,

secondary, 446,26-7first, later, 546,35; 551,10-11prôton aition, prôtê aitia, first

cause, 474,11; 535,20.22.24;537,11.14.18-20.23.26.27.32.37;538,21-2

psêlaphan, feel, 577,35-6pseudês, false, 463,25; 480,31;

505,20; 506,5.6; 544,19; 555,19;556,14

pseudesthai, run into falsehood,491,13.21; 495,33; 496,26;

Greek-English Index 201

502,19-21; 503,17.22; 506,9-10;509,15-16.21.22; 513,12.17.18;545,4.13.21; 553,28.33; 554,4-5;556,15-21; 569,19.20

pseudodoxia, false opinion, 491,34pseudos, falsehood, 491,25; 504,22-4;

544,20-30; 545,4.11; 556,13psittakos, parrot, 495,26; 590,3psophêsis, sounding, 470,12; 472,23;

474,21.34 psophos, sound, 451,34; 452,2.4.12;

462,16; 474,20; 602,16psukhê, soul, 446,6; 563,3; 570,13.15

see aisthêtikos, alogos,logikos, phutikos

psukhikos, psychical, 534,27;537,18.19; 539,15.19; 553,11;575,14.15

psukhros, cold, 477,15-17; 601,31psuktos, cool, 477,12.13.16psuxis, chill, 602,20 ptênos, winged, 449,12ptoeisthai, be agitated, 488,34;

489,3.4ptôsis, case, 529,4pur, fire, 448,7; 452,33puramis, pyramid, 450,31

rhabdos, rod, 604,25; 605,3.4rhaithumos, careless, 486,30rhakos, rag, 491,21.23rhanis, drop, 513,19rhembesthai, be wool-gathering,

465,14rhepein, incline, 519,28rhêseidion, rhêsidion, gobbet, 522,8;

530,29; 531,26; 538,10; 595,37-8rhêton, passage, 459,32; 468,8;

520,31; 529,29rhis, nose, 449,3.5; 601,36rhizousthai, be rooted, 576,23; 595,8rhônnusthai, stand firm, 509,2;

526,31

saphênizein, to clarify, 467,23sarx, flesh, 529,33; 530,1.11.15.17selênê, the Moon, 511,3.4sêmainein, signify, 454,25; 461,2;

510,10.27; 518,9-16.20.26.30;520,12-16; 532,9; 543,10-12.14.16

sêmasia, way of signifying, 529,2meaning, 607,18

sêmeion, sign (astronomical), 590,10point, 515,22.24; 589,23.24

sêmeiousthai, note, 531,25sêpsis, infection, 602,15sigan, be silent

sigêtheisa aporia, unspokendifficulty, 451,31

simos, snubnosed, 531,9; 566,14simotês, snubnosedness, 529,34skelos, limb (of a division), 467,20;

502,5; 527,23skepazein, protect, 453,8skeparnos, adze, 467,10; 567,34skepê, covering, 585,8.10skhesis, way of being related,

470,4.7.9.11-18; 471,4relation, relationship, 537,40;

560,32.33skhesei, in how disposed, related,

469,31.33.35skhêma, shape, 453,29.30; 456,13;

458,21-30; 531,16figure (of syllogism), 485,28;

496,30.36; 579,25; 580,1skhêmatizesthai, to have shape,

458,30 skia, shadow, 545,32

shade, 585,11skiagraphia, sketch, 519,9skôlêx, grub, 453,12; 495,5.13.14.19;

498,31; 590,1; 595,31-2; 600,33skoliôs, out of order, 451,18skopos, aim, 446,12.13; 447,15;

485,15; 530,34skotos, darkness, dark, 464,1; 547,8;

552,25.26; 602,33smênê, comb, 501,2smênos, hive, 495,22sôma, body, 481,19; 483,15;

517,14.17.22.23.27; 521,5.6;563,9.10; 581,20.23; 587,27.28;588,13-16; 591,22.24.25; 599,2.4;603,4.20

augoeides sôma, body of luminousform, 597,18

pempton sôma, fifth body, 448,5-6pneumatikon sôma, 481,20

sômatikos, bodily, of body, 453,20;588,3

sophia, wisdom, 491,4 sophistês, sophist, 504,15spêlaion, cave, 472,18

202 Indexes

sperma, semen, 558,1.2spermatikos, seminally, 542,30sphaira, sphere, 511,3; 590,10spheterizesthai, make its own,

554,28spongos, sponge, 600,31spoudaios, sound, 507,5

what is good, 576,11stasis, being stationary, 543,19stephanoun, crown, 593,28.29stereos, solid, 450,30; 552,12sterêsis, privation, 552,4.5.15-18stigmê, point, 482,1; 484,26; 543,13;

552,6.14.18stikhos, line, 486,25stoikheion, element, 448,5; 451,27;

453,19; 594,34; 597,14; 600,23letter, 561,10

stokhazesthai, surmise, 463,30stoma, mouth, 600,31strongulos, round, 511,6sullabê, syllable, 475,29sullogizesthai, infer, 461,7.15

syllogise, 488,6-7; 590,13.14; 593,5-6sullogismos, syllogism, 455,10;

491,22; 496,29.30.33; 579,25;580,1-4

inference, 490,26.27.30sullogistikôs, syllogistically, 500,12sumbainein, kata sumbebêkos,

incidental, incidentally,454,2.4.6-7.9-15; 455,1.3.34-5;456,4.7-9; 457,16.18-22.28; 458,5-6

sumballesthai, help, 507,10contribute to, 508,12; 515,16

sumbebaiosthai, confirm, 450,28(see note)

sumbolaiousthai, 450,28, meaningunclear (see note)

summetria, commensurability, 477,2;530,11-12

summetros, proportional, 469,13commensurable, 547,35

summetrôs, proportionally, 476,1-2sumparatheon, fellow traveller,

461,26sumperasma, conclusion, 460,25;

488,5-6; 532,10; 564,27; 567,7.8;600,6

sumperatoun, end together, 588,4.5 to terminate together, 484,26

sumperilambanein, include, 462,2;473,5-6; 540,5; 586,16

sumplekein, interweave,491,21.24-5.27; 521,16

sumplêroun, go to make up,536,32.33

sumplokê, interweaving, 501,9.28;502,1-3; 505,12.16; 506,14

sumptôma, side-effect, 595,14; 598,31sumpheresthai, cohere, 572,17sumphônein, chime in with, 471,19sumphônia, consonance,

472,6.7.26.31; 473,1; 477,9; 596,30sumphuia, natural junction, 471,25sumphuein, make to grow together,

471,23sunagein, conclude, draw (a

conclusion), 473,11; 517,34;564,27; 580,5.12

derive, 475,9attach, 467,34collect together, 513,5; 542,31; 587,22

sunagesthai, follow, 527,33.37sunaisthanesthai, be conscious,

451,8; 580,7.24.32-3sunaisthêsis, consciousness,

580,2.5.6.15.18.20.26.31-6;586,21-3; 592,4; 595,23

sunamphoteron, two together,528,35; 529,7.8

sunaptein, join on, 600,28; see alsosunêmmenon

sunathroizein, bring together, 515,27sundesmos, connective, 475,30;

492,5; 592,23sundromos, concurrent, 535,24.28sunêgorein, plead as advocate, plead

for, 503,9 529,31; 531,14; 563,22sunêgoria, plea, 529,29; 535,19;

563,27.32.34.36; 364,7.14.18;568,10; 569,21

suneidenai heautôi, be conscious,465,15.16; 555,12

sunekheia, continuity, 531,9.11.12;532,2

sunekhês, continuous, 459,3.4.12;531,10.16; 543,11

sunêmmenon, conditional premiss,447,20.24.25; 448,1; 449,31 (seenote); 451,7-9.20-1

sunergein, act together, 455,14.19sunesis, conscience, 465,16

Greek-English Index 203

sunêtheia koinê, common usage,467,9; 496,7

sunexerkhesthai, be common exit,484,28

sunkatarithmeisthai, count alongwith, 497,34

sunkatathesis, assent, 489,1,5;497,8; 500,29

sunkatatithesthai, assent (v.),489,3.4; 497,10; 500,29

sunkekhumenos, confused, 589,39sunkhein, confuse, 485,19.30; 486,34

fuse, 478,23sunkhusis, confusion, 487,6sunkinein, change along with, 582,16sunkrinein, compare, 512,3

compact, 472,17; 481,29; 510,5;517,15; 547,6

sunousiazein, lie with, 513,6suntelein, contribute, 587,22.28;

591,22; 602,22sunthêma anaplattesthai, form a

composite representation, 508,6sunthesis, composition, 546,3.7-11;

547,26.28; 548,11.12sunthetos, composite, 527,10; 603,4-7suntithenai, put together, 546,4suntithesthai, agree with, 465,31suntomos epagôgê, in brief the force,

454,32sunupakouein, understand along

with, 560,17surein, drag, 582,18sustellesthai, close up (intrans.),

592,28sustoikhos, ranged along with,

589,36-8; 590,4suzeugnunai, yoke together with,

584,1suzeuxis, linkage, 553,8

taphos, tomb, 563,10tarattein, agitate, 573,17tauros, Taurus, 511,3tekhnê, skill, 490,33tekhnêton, (thing in) the field of skill,

539,16tekhnitês, man of skill, 490,34têkein, waste, 472,20tekton, carpenter, 474,26.31têlaugôs, from afar, 486,16teleios, complete, 453,5.6

perfect, 518,31teleiôtikos, perfective, 516,35;

517,3.4 aition teleiôtikon, perfective cause,

547,18teleioun, perfect (v.), 539,34.35telikos

telikon aition, final cause, 547,19;571,2; 581,31.32

telos, end, 576,10-13; 587,10.11teôs, already, 547,27

for the moment, 563,7 teôs to proton, as to the first, 532,32

thateros, one or the other, 452,26thaumasios, marvellous, 515,20thea, look, 508,35

seeing, 512,17theios, divine, 528,4; 542,10; 552,29;

553,6.12; 563,38; 564,1.10.12;567,13; 590,8

themelia, foundations, 585,12theologikos, theological, 518,36theos, God, 518,35; 527,30.31; 528,13;

529,3; 536,11.12.17; 538,20;545,27; 587,11

theôrein, to contemplate, 569,5to look at, 570,6can see, 586,31

theôrêma, speculative thought,469,33; 583,7

speculation, 473,31; 538,20hupsêlon theôrêma, lofty

speculation, 538,19-20theôrêtikos, contemplative, 520,26.28

nous, contemplative intellect,490,17.27.35-6; 554,13-38; 558,12;576,6.7; 578,7-9; 584,22.23

theôrêtikôs, contemplatively, 524,20theôrêton, thing we contemplate,

490,31thêreuein, try to capture, 570,15thermantos, warm, 477,12.13.16thermos, hot, 452,33; 453,1;

477,15-17; 480,5; 530,7.10.17to thermon, heat, 588,12

thermotês, heat, 595,21theros, summer, 580,32; 585,8thixis, contact, 487,18.26;

489,30-490,5tholoun, muddy, 519,27threptikos, nutritive, 576,6-26 etc.

204 Indexes

to threptikon, that whichnourishes, 576,17.21

thrix, trikhes, hair, 595,1.15.16thumikos, spirited, 565,25-6; 574,28thumoeidês, spirited, 575,9-10thumos, anger, 515,32

spirit, 565,29.30; 566,2; 571,20.24;572,6; 574,6

thumousthai, become spirited,465,1.21; 597,33.38

thura, door, 545,16thurathen nous, intellect from

outside, 518,8.16.31.36; 519,4.6.8;520,17; 535,5.34.36; 536,2.4;537,39; 538,9.29; 539,9; 541,14;542,5; 584,35.37

ti ên einai, to, essence, 531,18.20-1.27timios, superior, 446,23tithaseuein, domesticate, 497,7.10;

607,2tmêma, division, 485,6; 511,37;

512,1.2; 516,3toikhos, wall, 585,11toioutotropôs, in the following way,

591,1; 593,3tolmêtias, temerarious, 580,1; 586,19tomê, cutting, 549,14topos, place, see 493,7 notetrakhutês, roughness, 490,20tragelaphos, goatstag, 488,17-18;

492,14; 503,32; 507,36tragikos, (thing said) in a tragedy,

486,27tragôidos, tragic actor, 533,32tragos, goat, 508,4tremein, fear, 500,33trephein, nourish, 452,32.33; 595,27;

599,17; 601,15-18tropeisthai, undergo a conversion,

607,2

trophê, nourishment, 595,24.25;599,16.19.20.22; 603,33.34; 607,14

tropheia, nursling’s dues, 450,20;467,4

truphan, have a passion for, 558,14tupos, imprint, 448,11;

455,22.23.26.27.29.35;456,1.2.5.9.10; 461,10; 464,11;493,7 (see note); 512,16; 516,26;538,5; 546,35; 551,10

tupoun, imprint (v.), 508,17tupousthai, receive imprints,

605,13.14.17tupôtikôs, by way of imprint, 574,15

xanthos, yellow, 455,17; 460,1; 461,3;478,2

xêros, dry, 530,12; 601,31xiphos, sword, 555,23

zên, be alive, live, 600,1; 601,35-602,1zêtein, enquire, 446,7zêtêma, object of enquiry, 528,10.11zêtêsis, enquiry, 462,28zôê, life (i.e. soul), 568,24; 589,21zôgraphia, painting, 476,23; 545,8zôogonos, life-giving, 449,20.21zôon, animal, 572,32.33; 589,28;

594,20; 599,30.31; (defined)600,12-17

zôoun, endow with life, 588,24.30-1zôophuton, zoophyte, 577,7.12.14;

589,28.29.34; 592,26.27; 594,22;595,28.33-4; 600,13.15.18.30;601,3; 604,11

zôtikos, vital, 465,12.15; 597,29.31.32zôtikon idiôma, peculiarity of what

is living, 572,30-1.37zôtikê prosklisis, vital bending,

497,9

Greek-English Index 205

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affections, perfective and destructive,526,30-527,3

Alcibiades, as example, 514,2Alexander of Aphrodisias,

470,18-471,10; 489,9; 521,12-28;522,22-6; 523,4-11; 523,20-3;529,22-3; 530,5-7;535,4-5.18.20.27; 536,6.11;537,9-41; 539,36; 558,5; 571,35;590,39-591,1

on perceiving we perceive, 464,20-3;464,30; 465,24-7

on intellect, 518,6-18; 518,32;519,14-37; 520,7; 520,10-28

on heavenly bodies, 595,38-596,14;596,33; 599,35

Alexandria, 10Ammonius, 2, 5, 9, 12-14; 473,10-19;

518,32-3 and n.Ananias of Shirak, 4Anaxagoras, 522,33-523,4; 526,21angels, 527,27; 535,38; 536,13.18;

537,15animals, defined, 600,16

composite and have touch,601,4-602,33

Anonymous Commentator on deInterpretatione, 12-14

Antiochus, 8appetition, 579,22-39; 585,5-16;

586,29-587,6Aristotelian, 464,18; 572,17; 586,25;

596,36-598,6Aristotle, 450,3.9.20; 452,7.10;

456,16.18.26-7; 458,11.27; 462,10;463,31; 464,14.31-2; 465,35;466,28; 467,4; 469,20; 470,18;471,10-11; 480,31; 482,16; 486,23;487,5; 489,16.22-3.31-2; 496,6.14;500,13.14; 501,14-15; 503,5.8.10;

504,4.27; 508,24; 509,2.12-14.27;516,25; 518,9.21-2.36;519,34.35.38; 520,3.4; 521,11;523,2; 524,14; 525,11.14.18.25;526,21; 527,28.29; 528,5; 529,4.23;530,18; 531,26; 533,32.34; 535,32;536,3.6.10.14.16.20;537,29-30.36.41; 538,6; 539,36.37;540,27; 541,28; 553,1.13;555,17.23; 558,21; 563,12.27.34;565,2.27; 571,2; 572,6.30;573,4.29; 574,1; 575,4-5; 576,28;579,17; 580,23.27;581,20.23.30.31.34.36; 583,6;584,8.29; 585,32; 587,25; 597,5.17;599,33.36; 600,4.12.23.24

purpose in writing de Anima 3,446,12-18

Analytics, 527,12n; 568,29 and n.Categories and Physics, 528,34nCat. 3a29-32, 571,17-18; 10a11,

458,25-6de Int. 16a9-16, 544,24-9; 16a12-13,

546,3n; 16a13-18, 580,28-30;16a19-21, b6-9, 543,9; 23b3-7,481,27-30

HA, 591,23nMA 703b4-13, 575,19nMetaph., 563,28-31Metaph., 9 1051b17, 544,26-545,2Phys. 2 193b6, 538,15Phys. 3 201a11-15, 558,24n;

201b31-3, 558,27; 202a31-b22,469,30-5; 473,31-3

Phys. 4 222a21-3, 549,11-12n.Phys. 6 (i.e.7 243a1ff.), 589,8-9Post. An. 1 72b23, 543,1Respir. 470b6-480b3, 575,19nSens. 437b10, 605,30-1Somn. 575,32, 455a20-1, 597,27-8n.

Subject Index

References in italics are to pages of the Introduction. Other references are to pageand line of Hayduck’s text. Indexes refer to chapters in this and the companionvolume.

assent (sunkatathesis), 489,1-5;497,8-10; 500,29

attentive faculty, 464,35-465,22;555,12

Bernard, W., 2, 4; 466,34nBlumenthal, H., 1, 5; 528,26n.; 535,4n.body of luminous form, 597,18-20

causes, 501,17-502,9; 571,2-8; 581,33-6change, distinguished from making,

473,33-474,2change of place (i.e. movement),

575,12-33; 581,20-3; 587,8-18;587,21-8; 590,6-36; 591,22-34;594,19-27; 604,23-605,9

factors not responsible for,576,5-579,8

and appetition, 579,9-39; 591,14-19and sense, 595,9-27

Christianity, 4-5, 10-12, 14Cleon, as example, 454,22;

460,12.14.27; 514,2.3; 548,22cognition, division of, 490,20-34Colophonian resin, 455,31common sense, 477,21-30;

560,9-561,18differentiates objects of different

senses, 478,1-481,34and perceiving we perceive,

465,25-31and intellect, 555,2-11; 555,24-556,7common sense-objects, 453,28-31how common, 458,17-25not proper objects of a sixth sense,

454,1-455,9why there are common sense-objects,

456,18-26; 461,26-32perceived by change, 457,28-458,17compared with incidental,

509,23-510,31coarse-grained and accurate,

510,31-4error concering, 510,34-511,16

conscious, consciousness, 465,15-16;555,11-17; 572,38-573,2; 580,1-5;592,4

consciousness of time, 580,1-581,19;586,19-27

Delium, 573,1demons, 500,33

denial and assertion, 546,1-12cognition, thinking by denial,

459,3-13; 547,1-10; 552,3-26Dionysius Telmahrensis, 2, 4divine illumination, 486,38-487,1;

539,3divine things, 492,16; 515,28; 541,30;

542,10; 547,22; 552,16;552,28-553,15; 563,35-564,2;564,10-14; 567,13

Elias, 3, 4Empedocles, 452,6-7; 487,5-27;

489,17.26-9; 547,31B 57, 545,17-20B 106, 485,23-4B 108, 486,12-18; 486,34-487,5B 109.1, 469,19-20; 489,27-8; 570,24

Empedoclean Friendship, 545,17-18Euripides, Hippolytus 612, 492,28-9;

701, 486,27-8Orestes 396, 465,16

Evrard, 2, 4-5

Galen, 3Genesis 1, 547,12-14God, 474,2.11-12; 507,9; 518,35;

526,26; 527,29-32; 528,4.13;529,3; 535,25.28; 536,11-13.17;537,11-39; 538,20-2;539,3.9-10.31-8; 540,12;541,13-17; 542,5; 547,8-17;557,30-558,4; 584,35-7; 586,5;587,11; 590,8

good, and evil, relative, 555,18-21;559,10-12; 562,11-14; 586,6-8

and pleasure, 560,4-7

hair, 595,13-22Hayduck, M., 1, 6, 9, 10, 13, 15heavenly bodies, 595,34-598,6;

599,32-600,8Heraclius, 3Hesiod, Works and Days 361-2,

456,37-457,2Hignett, C., 6Hippocrates, 3, 8; 472,20; 486,4 (n.)Hippocratic writings, 566,11Homer, 489,16

Iliad 8 281, 538,28Iliad 10 535, 601,1-2Iliad 11 466, 601,2

208 Indexes

Odyssey 12 92; 547,8Odyssey 18 136-7, 486,18-34Odyssey 22 1, 491,23

Iamblichus, 533,25-35imagination, defined, 507,16-509,2

why so called, 511,18-24division of, 589,36-590,4called ‘passive intellect’, 490,23;

506,24; 523,29; 542,3; 584,17without parts, 562,27-563,2why given us, 511,25-36voluntary and against our will,

492,31-493,4; 497,21-9reminiscent and teachable, 495,25-9and sense, 466,17; 494,18-496,20;

509,4-22and common sense, 507,18-31;

508,27-9and opinion, 488,15-489,5; 492,8-21;

508,13-16not a combination of opinion and

sense, 501,11-504,3compared with sense and thought,

488,9-15and appetition and movement,

574,24-30; 578,1-6; 592,2-593,11stirs up imprints, 455,23forms constellations, 461,30

immortality and eternity, 537,1-6incidental sense-objects, 454,15-24indivisibles, five kinds of, 543,5-16;

544,4-15intellect, signifies three things,

518,8-520,20potential and actual, 554,7-12actual, 534,20-539,10contemplative and practical,

554,12-37and sense, 487,30-9; 498,3-11;

516,22-517,3; 554,39-556,7;574,13-21

and imagination, 541,28-31;542,7-18; 546,30-5; 554,15-20;559,26-560,4; 561,23-562,8;563,11-564,25; 569,4-570,5;584,8-19

and appetition, 585,18-586,10object of thought to itself,

527,6-528,31not affected except perfectively,

526,12-527,4

and time, 546,17-27; 548,5-26;549,23-550,4

gives unity, 548,30-549,2thinks large things and small alike,

524,2knows things in matter,

525,10-526,11objects of, 527,33-5; 530,20-2;

542,24-543,4; 562,20-2; 563,11-13;568,14-25

from outside, see God

John Barbur, 2John Moschus, 2, 3Justinian, 5

knowledge, the same as its objects,557,18-25; 566,23-6; 567,18-29

Lautner, P., 2, 4, 5, 15, 537,28n.

Marinus, 535,5-8.18; 535,31-536,2;536,6.15; 537,9-24

mathematics, objects of, 456,20-3;461,30-2; 531,14-532,17;562,24-563,5; 566,10-21

matter, 539,15-17; 543,27-544,4matter, formless, 543,29-31movement, see change

new born children, 494,28-495,4nutritive power, 576,8-28

Olympiodorus, 6opinion (doxa), 446,10-1; 447,1;

496,29-32; 500,15-22; 593,4-11

perceiving we perceive, 462,29-467,12Philoponus, 4-6, 12, 518,33n.

in de Anima 18,26-8, 597,18n.in de Anima 240,7-15 and 254,23-31,

495,11n.in de Anima 440,13-23, 599,12n.de Intellectu 7,41, 520,34n.de Intellectu 43,18-45,59, 535,4n.de Intellectu 57,75-58,96, 538,27de Intellectu 77,63-86, 551,7n.

Phocas, 3Plato, 456,19; 481,34-5; 487,15;

504,4-30; 519,37-520,2; 523,25;524,6-16; 527,30; 533,33;535,10-11; 555,12;

Subject Index 209

573,22.26.28.31; 574,5.24.26;575,1; 586,12

as example, 479,29.31; 543,8; 590,33Phaedo 81C-E, 563,7-11Phaedo 105, 537,4n.; 541,13n.Phaedrus 245C, 524,11; 528,28;

541,11; 600,1n.Phaedrus 246B, 596,28Phaedrus 247B, 596,26-7Philebus 39B, 538,6Republic 1 331C, 555,21-3Republic 6, 456,20Republic 6 496B-C, 578,30Republic 6 509B, 504,21n.Republic 6 511A-C, 596,30n.Sophist, 504,14-26Sophist 264B, 504,5-7Symposium 219E-221A, 573,1-2n.Theaetetus, 475,26-7Theaetetus 156A-E, 471,37nTheaetetus 184D, 482,16-18Theaetetus 186B-C, 564,23-5Theages, 578,31Timaeus 456,20n.; 504,21n.; 579,19Timaeus 35A, 504,9-10Timaeus 70D-71B, 583,16n.on parts and powers of the psyche,

565,20-566,7; 571,19-572,15on movement, 572,16-29; 581,24-36

Platonic, 450,28; 565,1; 572,17; 573,4-5Platonists, 572,24; 596,37-598,6pleasure, 477,5-18Plotinus, 466,19-20n. 528,25-31;

535,8-13; 535,28-31; 536,6;536,15-537,1; 538,33; 545,5

Plutarch of Athens, 457,34-458,3;458,9-17; 460,1; 462,7-10;464,23-31; 465,17-26; 485,5;489,10; 512,12-14; 515,13-29;517,34-5; 518,10.19-519,15;519,37-520,7; 520,11;520,34-521,10; 529,22-3; 530,5-7;531,25-6; 535,13-16.18; 536,2-5;541,20-4; 553,10; 571,35; 575,6-7;584,6-8; 591,1-7; 595,38;596,14-36; 599,36; 600,4.7

pneuma, 560,10; 587,24-589,26;591,26-7; 597,25-7

pneumatic body, 481,20Porphyry, 3practical reason, examples of,

592,15-593,3; 593,26-594,11

Protagoreans, 471,31-472,4; 475,23-7Protagorean argument, 487,16Providence, 527,31Pseudo-Elias, 4

Roueché, M., 1, 4

self control, lack of (akrasia),593,13-16

sense, potential and actual,469,3-472,4; 558,12-31

only five senses, 447,15-450,33nomenclature, 474,19-475,5destroyed by extremes, 472,4-20;

476,18-30; 602,7-20error about proper objects, 513,16-20see also intellect, thought

sense organs, 448,3-449,28shell-like body, 482,12Sicily, 479,29Socrates, 504,15.19; 573,1-2; 596,28

as example, 479,29; 488,26;502,29.30; 505,1.3.4; 511,10;539,6-7; 546,10; 590,32-3

Sophonias, 6, 11; 592,19n.Sorabji, R., 2soul, 538,12-19; 591,14-15

immortal, 516,1.13-14; 517,3-31;563,2-5; 585,1-2

division of, into parts and powers,565,21-2; 571,9-572,15

Stephanus, Introduction passimsubject and predicate, 543,7-8;

545,21-37; 546,1-12substance, secondary, primary,

446,25-7falls under no sense, 454,21-2

Syrian, 473,2

Tarán, L., 12taste, 603,25-604,2Thales, 571,6-7; 573,3-4; 583,9Theaetetus, as example, 511,10Theages, 578,30-1Themistius, as example, 590,33

Paraphrasis 81,15-17, 450,9-19Paraphrasis 92,4-7, 508,19-509,2Paraphrasis 93,16-17, 514,29-31

Theophylact Simocatta, 3Thrace, 580,8thought (dianoia), called ‘potential

intellect’ 491,9-15

210 Indexes

and sense, 487,39-488,9; 491,9-30and intuitive intellect,

545,12-546,12; 546,22-30;547,25-548,2; 553,25-554,7;556,31-4

Thucydides, 541,33time, 545,21-38; 580,16-17;

580,1-581,19; see alsoconsciousness, intellect

tragedian, anonymous, 492,31Trojan War, as example, 483,24;

545,24; 548,7Tychikos, 4

universals, 481,13-14; 528,5-6; 596,6-9

Usener, H., 2, 3, 4, 7

Vancourt, R., 1, 2, 14visual ray, emission of, 605,23-8

walking, 588,33-589,5Westerink, L.G., 1, 11William de Moerbeke, 1wisdom, 491,4Wolska-Conus, W., 1-4, 9

zoophytes, 577,7-32; 589,27-590,5;592,25-9; 595,28-33; 597,37-9;600,13-601,3

Subject Index 211