PHI 232

INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS

Dr. Geoffrey Roche

Lakeland College Wisconsin

Japan Campus

2007

(New Lectures: Watsuji Tetsuro, Stirner and

Rand on Egoism)

Lecture 1

Ethics Lectures Fall 2006; updated for Fall 2007.

Dr. Roche Lakeland College Wisconsin

1.1 What is Philosophy?

I would define philosophy as “critical debate on anything worth arguing about. “ But

philosophers typically disagree about everything, including their definition of

philosophy. Perhaps philosophy is more of an ethos of how to think rather than a body

of theory. Philosophy is not religion or science, but to understand why this is so

requires that we do some philosophy first.

Philosophy could be said to concern the prior, most fundamental questions on any

topic are philosophical questions, including the question as to what philosophy is.

1.2 Philosophy’s Main functions

Philosophers are mainly concerned with analyzing ideas, and clarifying viewpoints.

Philosophers have also traditionally attempted to come up with how things work (the

Universe, society, the mind) but this job has largely been handed over to more

qualified disciplines. It is worth noting though that science, sociology and psychology

simply did not exist as separate disciplines only a few centuries ago: until then, they

were subjects dealt with by philosophers.

1.3 Traditional questions

The following are some traditional philosophical questions: What does it mean to

know something? Is there a God? Does the soul survive the physical death of the

body? Is man merely an animal? Why is there something rather than nothing? How

should I live? What is the meaning of life? What is art? Is it important? What is the

nature of reality? What is the best form of government? In this course we will be

concerned with ethics.The first question of ethics is: What is Morality?

James Rachels (the author of our coursebook) defines morality as “the effort to

guide one's conduct by reason” and “to do what there are the best reasons for doing

while giving equal weight to the interests of each individual who will be affected.” I

would say that this is a controversial statement. The first statement presupposes that it

is logical to be moral, and the second statement presupposes that it is morally required

that we help other people. As we shall see, neither statement is straightforwardly true.

(That is not to say that they are straightforwardly false).

Other suggestions as to what morality is about:

“Making distinctions between right and wrong.”1

Others hold that morality provides a guide for the behaviour of the people in a

society.

Ethics is held to be a universal code of conduct that would be endorsed by all rational

persons (at least, that is the standard view of all modern Western ethical theorists

since Kant).

For Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, morality refers to any

behavior that affects others, and the choices we make that may affect others.

1.4 Basic Questions concerning our Definition of Morality

a). Is it immoral to harm yourself without harming anyone else?

(I.e. Staying permanently drunk, or become a complete recluse, just living inside your

bedroom and playing computer games all the time?) if so, why is this immoral?

b). Is it immoral to not help others, even if you could do so easily ?

(Note that philosophers disagree strongly with each other over these questions).

1.5 How are Philosophy Essays Marked?

1 Bernard Gert: http://plato.standford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

A full guide on writing philosophy essays will be distributed shortly. But the

following points sum up what is required.

• Have you shown that you understand the problem?

•Do you understand the essay question?

•Have you answered the essay question?

•Have you shown that you have thought about the problems

by yourself?

•Have you expressed your reasoning clearly, and in a structured, orderly way? (We

will go over structuring an essay before the first essay is due).

•Have you removed all text that does not directly discuss the argument?

Showing that you understand the material is more important than showing that you

have done lots of reading.

Avoid:

• Mere expression of opinion

• Dogmatism

• Excessive quotation that does not show that you

really understand the ideas. (This is not to say that quoting is incorrect- but you

should only quote when it is inappropriate to use your own words).

Opinion is nothing. Argumentation is everything.

1.6 The Baby Theresa Case (discussion).

1.7 Preliminary Questions:

1).What is a person? (That is, how are people different to, say, dogs or powerful

computers?)

2).What is death? That is, does death occur when the heart stops, the breathing stops,

or when something else happens?

3).How are your answers to 1). and 2). above connected?

1.8 The Case

Theresa Ann Campo Pearson was born in Florida in 1992. She was born with a

condition called anencephaly ( ‘ an-’ in Greek means 'without,' '-cephaly' means

something to do with the head). Important parts of the brain were missing. However,

parts of the brain responsible for breathing and heart rate were still working.

Theresa's parents made an unusual decision. They knew that Theresa would not live

for more than a few days, and that she would never wake up (she would never have a

conscious life). So, Theresa's parents volunteered her organs for transplantation. (In

the USA, at least 2,000 infants need transplants each year, and there are never enough

organs available). The doctors agreed that this was a good idea. There were problems,

however. The organs had to be removed from Theresa before her heart stopped to still

be usable. Florida law defines death as brain- death, so this was not in itself a

problem. Yet, when the case went to court, the judge rejected the reasoning of the

parents. As he knew that part of Theresa's brain was still alive, he decided that

Theresa was not, in fact, brain dead. A few weeks later, Theresa died, and her organs

were not donated.

Questions for Discussion.

1).Do you think that organ donation is a good idea? Why, or why not?

2).Do you think that Theresa's parents made the right decision?

3).Do you think that Florida law on the question of death is sound?

4).Do you think that the judge made the right decision?

5).How does Japanese law define death? (As heart/lung, cardiovascular death, or as

brain death?) Should the law in Japan be changed, do you think? Why?

6).Are organ transplants done in Japan?

1.9 Possible Responses to the Baby Theresa case (actually stated by professional

ethicists, as Rachels notes):

The Benefits Argument

The Argument that we should Not Use People as Means

Argument against the Wrongness of Killing

Reading before Lecture 2 and Week 2:

RTTP: 1-28 ; 144-153. EMP 1-14 (book available Wednesday)

Discussion Preparation: Read over the Iceberg Case.

Read the text, and think of what you would decide if you were on the jury. Think of

the basic reasons behind your decision. Note that you cannot merely say that this is

the decision that 'feels right.'

Ayn Rand and Max Stirner

Dr. Geoffrey Roche

Lakeland College Wisconsin

Waseda University

Introduction Questions. 1). Is Kim Jong- Il Irrational?

2). Suppose your friend had found a magic ring that made them invisible. Suppose that she got

frightened of its power and destroyed it. Was this the right thing to do, do you think?2

3). Is driving a hot- rod or powerful motorcycle irrational, do you think?

1.1 Egoism: Introduction

Egoism (riko- shugi) is the tendency to place one’s own interests and well- being

ahead of anyone else’s. Psychological Egoism is the view that, as a matter of

psychological fact, everybody is an egoist. (This view will not preoccupy us here;

Rachels explains why the theory is unsound in pp. 68-74). Ethical Egoism is an

ethical theory. Its central claim is that we are not morally required to concern

ourselves with others, and that we are concerned with ourselves. The implications of

accepting this theory are serious: it undermines all normative ethics. In the first class

we will look at Rachels’ treatment of Egoism, and the arguments of Russian- born

American writer Ayn Rand (1905-1982). Rand’s philosophy is so poor that you may

wonder why we bother. I think that her work is an important exercise in logical

fallacies. If this handout appears long, keep in mind a). the arguments here are

extremely simple; b). this covers the same material as in Rachels, so you only really 2 This question is based on the story of the Ring of Gyges, discussed by Glaucon and Socrates in

Plato’s Republic. Glaucon argues that anyone who would not use the ring to become all- powerful is an

idiot. Plato disagrees.

need to read the handout. In the second part of this section we’ll look at the arguments

of Max Stirner, a German philosopher (1806-1856).

1.2 Ayn Rand (1905-1982): Biographical Note

Ayn Rand (born Lisa Zinov'yevna Rosenbaum) was born in Saint Petersburg, Russia.

Her family was ethnically Jewish, but were not religiously observant. Her father was a

chemist. She was precocious, was greatly interested in literature, and began to write

screenplays at the age of seven.

During the Russian Revolution her father’s pharmacy was confiscated by the

Revolutionaries. Studying history and philosophy at the University of Petrograd now

Saint Petersburg) she graduated in 1924. Her favorite philosophers were Aristotle and

Nietzsche (she later rejected Nietzsche for his doctrine of “Might is Right,”

essentially the same idea in Stirner).

In 1925 Rand migrated to the United States, settling in New York. (She never set

foot in her homeland again, and in 1937 she stopped all contact, after hearing that

letters from Americans may imperil their recipients). She changed her name and

found work as a script reader. She later began writing film scripts. Her first novel, We

the Living, appeared in 1936. The Fountainhead appeared in 1943. Both novels are

philosophical novels: the first explains Rand’s disgust for the Soviet ‘morality’ that

destroys individual freedom, whereas The Fountainhead expresses Rand’s egoist

philosophy. The Fountainhead was made into a movie in 1949 (you can see the

conclusion on Youtube). Atlas Shrugged appeared in 1957, and like its predecessors

became a bestseller.

In 1950 Rand set up the Rand Institute, an organization that promulgated Rand’s

philosophy (one of the first members was Alan Greenspan, the economist). She spent

the rest of her life writing both fiction and non- fiction (philosophers may beg to

differ on the distinction). She died in 1982. Alan Greenspan attended, and a huge

wreath in the shape of a dollar- sign was placed near her casket.

An estimated 500,000 copies of Rand’s books sell each year, and 22 million of her

books have been sold so far. There are also branches of her organization, the

Objectivist Society, throughout the world. Libertarianism is the political version of

her doctrine.

1.3 The Self- Defeating Argument.

Rachels states four arguments (p.76) that each purport to undermine the view that

advocates altruism (that is, the principle of helping others). In standard form:

1.3.1 The bungler argument: P1. to aid others, we must know exactly what they want and need, otherwise we will

bungle the job and cause unhappiness.

P2. We do not know what others want and need

∴ we will bungle the job and cause unhappiness.

1.3.2 The privacy argument P1. It is immoral to invade the privacy of others

P2. Helping others is an invasion of the privacy of others

∴ it is immoral to help others

1.3.3 The insult argument P1. It is immoral to rob people of their dignity and self respect

P2. Helping others robs them of their dignity and self respect

∴ It is immoral to help others

1.3.4 The moral corruption argument

(Note that Rachels runs 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 together).

P1. It is immoral to promote immoral behavior

P2 It is immoral to promote dependence

P3. Altruism promotes laziness and dependence

∴ Altruism is immoral

1.3.5 The ‘great cause’ argument

Max Stirner offers a similar argument, although the formulation is quite loose:

‘ […]Man must make sacrifices for a great idea, a great cause! A ‘great idea,’ a

‘good cause,’ is, it may be, the honour of God, for which innumerable people have

met death; Christianity, which has found its willing martyrs; the Holy Catholic

Church, which has greedily demanded sacrifices of heretics; liberty and equality,

which were waited on by bloody guillotines. (Stirner: 70).

As Rachels notes, there are two problems with these arguments. Firstly, they do not

question the basic assumptions of Utilitarianism and Deontology. That is, they

presuppose either that we should respect rights (the right not to be interfered with, for

example) or that the infliction of pain is morally wrong. The arguments merely assert

that altruistic behavior is the wrong way to go about promoting happiness. The second

problem is that these arguments do not support egoism. On the contrary: If one was a

selfish, (that is, egoistic) sadistic person, who actually believed these rather forced

premises, these arguments would encourage them to give money to poor people so

that they could upset and humiliate them.

Secondly, each one of these arguments has premises which are highly questionable.

None of these arguments makes any sense when applied to, say, supporting Amnesty

International, ending slavery in Yemen, or banning animal abuse.

1.4 Ayn Rand’s Argument for Egoism

Rachels is a little too fast with Rand, but his summary of her theory on pp. 78- 79 is

essentially sound. We’ll go into Rand in more detail however. Here’s the argument

Rachels discusses, in very basic terms:

P1). Altruistic theories of morality demand from the individual total self sacrifice,

their money and lives wasted on supporting unproductive people.

P2). A doctrine that demands of the individual total self sacrifice is a violation of

individual rights (in particular property rights)

P3). A doctrine that violates individual rights is immoral

P4). One must choose a moral theory that is not immoral

P5). One must choose between Altruistic theories of morality and Ethical Egoism.

∴ One must choose Ethical Egoism

Rachels notes that P4 is simply untrue. That is, Rand offers a false dichotomy. She

also runs a severe straw man fallacy.

We will look a little more closely at Rand’s essay “The Objectivist Ethics,” given

at the University of Wisconsin in 1961.

1.4.1 Premise 1: Altruistic Theories of Ethics demand Total Self Sacrifice

Rand makes the following claims concerning ‘Altruistic Ethics’:

Every code of ethics is derived from a metaphysics, that is: from a theory about the

fundamental nature of the universe in which man lives and acts. The altruist ethics is

based on a “malevolent universe” metaphysics, on the theory that man, by his very

nature, is helpless and doomed- that success, happiness, achievement are impossible to

him- that emergencies, disasters, catastrophes are the norm of his life and that his

primary goal is to combat them.” (VS: 48-49).

Altruism declares that any action taken for the benefit of others is good, and any

action taken for one’s own benefit is evil. Thus the beneficiary of an action is the only

criterion of moral value- and so long as that beneficiary is anybody other than oneself,

anything goes.

Hence the appalling immorality, the chronic injustice, the grotesque double

standards, he insoluble conflicts and contradictions that have characterized human

relationships and human societies throughout history, under all the variants of

altruistic ethics (VS: viii).

[Altruism is] “the ethical theory which regards man as a sacrificial animal, which

holds that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only

justification of his existence, and that self- sacrifice is his highest moral duty, virtue

and value.” (34).

In short, Altruistic ethics is invalid as an ethics because it a). causes unhappiness, and

b). violates personal rights to liberty and one’s own property. That is, when a state (or

a moral system) demands that one assist others, through taxation or other means, it is

a total violation of a person’s rights and liberty. Any socialist ethics is therefore

“cannibalism,”(VS: 81); “Altruism is incompatible with freedom, with capitalism and

with individual right […] One cannot combine the pursuit of happiness with the moral

status of a sacrificial animal” (p.95). State health plans, paid for with tax money, are

morally equivalent to robbery:

“Medicare” is an example of such a project. “Isn’t it desirable that the aged should

have medical care in times of illness?” its advocates clamor. Considered out of

context, the answer would be: yes, it is desirable. Who would have a reason to say

no? And it is at this point that the mental processes of a collectivized brain are cut

off; the rest is fog. Only the desire remains in his sight- it’s the good, isn’t it? […]

The fog hides such facts as the enslavement and, therefore, the disintegration of all

medical practice, and the sacrifice of the professional integrity, the freedom, the

careers, the ambitions, the achievements, the happiness, the live of the very men who

are able to provide that “desirable” goal- the doctors.

Note that Rand does not attack any specific moral philosophy, lumping them all

together as ‘altruistic ethics’ (as they all make non- egoistic demands). Note that she

frequently presupposes a). Utilitarian ethics (in suggesting that altruistic ethics causes

unhappiness)3 and b). deontology, in particular the right to be free and own property.

Many of her statements on particular issues seem quite sensible (spaceflight is a waste

of money, Soviet Russia is immoral as its policies are cruel) but have more to do with

Utilitarian or Kantian principles than egoism (84,88). What has gone wrong here? 4

1.4.2 The Argument from Naturalism (in Rand’s terms, ‘Objectivity’).

The following is Rand’s ‘Naturalistic Argument’ for egoism. I call it a naturalistic

argument as she argues that ‘egoism’ is somehow in nature. (Rousseau, similarly,

argued that we are naturally moral so should be moral; Nietzsche argued that we are

naturally aggressive so should be aggressive, and so on). (Rand thought that this

theory was ‘objective,’ so called her theory ‘Objectivism’).

3 On p. 17 of “The Objectivist Ethics” she also argues that pleasure and pain are the only guides we

have to distinguish right and wrong, which makes her a hedonist. 4 This is really the tip of the iceberg: Rand also states that, according to Altruistic ethics, man’s desire

to live is considered an ‘evil,’(ix), that paying taxes is morally equivalent to having your eye removed

and given to a blind person (85), that nobody has a right to sufficient food to hold off starvation, that

“Those who advocate laissez- faire capitalism are the only advocates of man’s rights” (100). Finally

she asserts that to accept any altruistic ethics shows that a). you lack self esteem b). you lack respect

for others c). you think existence is a nightmare d). you are a cynic as you will never deal with these

problems. (43).

P1. Every living thing tries to stay alive, for its own sake. [for the sake of being

alive].

P2. Therefore, for any living thing, its own life, and nothing else, is valuable for its

own sake.

P3. Because all people are living things, it follows that everyone should do what

keeps them alive. (for this is what they should value).

P4. A person can only live if they are rational. (corollary: Irrational behavior leads to

death).

P5. [‘Rational’ means “do only what is good for me.”] (implied premise)

P6 [‘Rational’ means ‘do productive work’]

P6 [‘Rational’ means ‘do not hurt or exploit other people or live off their labors’]

(implied premise)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

∴ We should only do what is good for ourselves, but should not exploit other people

There are some problems with this argument.

1.4.3 The is- Ought Fallacy (premise 3).

A simple is- ought argument:

Humans are logical

∴Humans should be logical5

Dogs have four legs

∴Dogs should have four legs

Looks reasonable enough. But what about this one?

I am 183 centimeters tall

∴ I should be 183 centimeters tall

5 Rand states that “Man has to be man by choice- and it is the task of ethics to teach him how to live like man.”(VS:25). Note the tension here: if man is already man, what does the imperative “be like a man!” mean? Rand has some idea of a good man, which presupposes some other non- natural principle.

Tokyo is full of air pollution

∴Tokyo should be full of air pollution

There is war

∴There should be war

Women are polite and pretty and bad at studying

∴ Women should be polite, pretty, and bad at studying6

There’s a problem with this type of argument, and some very dangerous ideas have

the same form:

Life is a painful, pitiless struggle for survival

∴ Life should be a painful, pitiless struggle for survival

Note that the naturalistic fallacy and the appeal to tradition fallacies are essentially

the same.

In Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume explains the problem with this sort of

argument (book III, part I, section I):

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd,

that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and

establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs;

when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of

propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an

ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last

consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or

affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same

time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this

new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

What does that mean? It just means: we cannot go from a description of the world to

making prescriptions that is rules about how things should be.

So, back to Rand’s argument: she argues that humans are a). logical and b). want to

be alive, and that we need to be logical to be alive. That premise has something wrong

with it. But then she argues that these facts mean that people should be logical and 6 This is Jean-Jacque Rousseau’s actual argument, in his book Emile.

alive. But that just does not follow. “People typically have bad breath” does not entail

“people should have bad breath.” “Most people do not understand calculus” does not

entail “most people should not understand calculus.” Maybe logic dictates that we die

(such as when fighting in a war).

Rand is aware that this objection will come up, but she attempts to argue that there

is no is- ought fallacy (page 17). But her argument is essentially question- begging:

she is just saying “everyone else is wrong.”

In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established

between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that

living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an

ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of

value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a

living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation

between “is” and “ought.” (VS:17).

1.4.4 Questionable Premise: P2

Rand assumes that the only ‘end’ (or goal) for living things, including humans, is

staying alive. As such, she contradicts some basic facts about living things-

reproduction is more important than merely staying alive, and in any case, all living

things die whatever they do.

1.4.5 Fallacy of Equivocation: P2-P3.

Rand slips from one meaning of the word ‘value’ to another. She makes the following

claims:

It is a value to an animal to stay alive

Human values are based on the will to stay alive

And assumes that the term ‘value’ is the same in both. Is this correct?

1.4.6 Questionable Premise: P4.

Rand gives two reasons as to why you have to be fully logical. Firstly, we need to be

logical to make things we need. Secondly, she states that if we are not logical, we die.

When man unfocuses his mind, he may be said to be conscious in a subhuman sense

of the word, since he experiences sensations and perceptions. But in the sense of this

word applicable to man- in the sense of a consciousness which is aware of reality and

able to deal with it […] an unfocused mind is not conscious. (VS: 21).

Man is free to choose not to be unconscious, but not free to escape the penalty of

unconsciousness: destruction. (VS: 22).

Of the latter claim, it is not clear if she means we are merely inferior, or if we actually

die in the normal sense of the word. (p.21 paragraphs 2 and 3). (If she thinks that we

are morally inferior, the question is: how can this make sense, assuming pure

egoism?)

1.4.7 Questionable Premise: P5. “Rational” means “Do only what is good for

me.”

Rand never gives a reason why this is true. Instead she relies on her ‘refutation’ of all

other ethical theories (1.4, 1.4.1 above).

1.4.8 Questionable Premise: P6 “Rational” means “do productive work.”

Rand holds that it is morally wrong to be lazy, and morally good to do productive

work. As she assumes ‘rationality’ to mean ‘morality,’ she assumes that doing

productive work is rational.

Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man’s life, the central value that

integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values. Reason is the source,

the precondition of his productive work- pride is the result (VS: 25).

There is no argument here as such: it’s just added on without explanation. (She holds

that ambition and self- assertiveness are good qualities, but these do not follow from

mere egoism. And they don’t collide with normative ethics even Kant thought that

it was immoral to waste talents, and Utilitarians can easily explain why ambition is

good for society). If we reject any moral principle besides egoism, Rand has to

explain why the following:

1.4.9 Questionable Premise: P7: Enslaving, stealing from or killing others is

irrational.

P6 [‘Rational’ means ‘do not hurt or exploit other people or live off their labors’]

Rand argues that rationality is necessary for survival, and to survive requires that one

needs to be rational. So, it seems that whatever we do is good, so long as we don’t

die. So, if we are egoists, why not enslave or rob others? This is what Rand says:

The men who attempt to survive, not by means of reason, but by means of force, are

attempting to survive by the method of animals. But just as animals would not be

able to survive by attempting the method of plants, by rejecting locomotion and

waiting for the soil to feed them- so men cannot survive by attempting the method of

animals, by rejecting reason and counting on productive men to serve as their prey.

Such looters may achieve their goals for the range of a moment, at the price of

destruction: the destruction of their victims and their own. As evidence, I offer you

any criminal or any dictatorship (VS: 24).

Arguments from analogy:

P1. A person using force to get what they want is like a person behaving like an

animal

P2. Animals do not use reason

∴So a person using force to get what they want is behaving like an animal.

∴So a person using force to get what they want is not using reason.

P1. A person behaving like an animal is like an animal behaving like a plant

P2. An animal behaving like a plant will die.

∴A person behaving like an animal will die.

Are these strong analogies? Note that Rand does not explain why it is irrational to use

force (or deceit, or whatever) to get what one wants. She tries to show that it is

dangerous: she asserts that “any individual or any dictatorship” that loots will be

destroyed instantly. But this is neither a). obviously true7 nor b). a moral reason: it is

merely prudent. Why is Kim Jong- Il, for example, irrational? Rand can’t say.

A hot- rod: irrational? Kim Jong- Il: irrational?

Rand does not merely argue that using force to get what one wants, or being lazy,

are immoral: any pleasure or hobby she does not approve of is described in the same

way: the road to instant death or sub- human status. This is what she has to say about

Hot- Rods:

Happiness is that state of consciousness which proceeds from the achievement of

one’s values. If a man values productive work, his happiness is the measure of his

success in the service of his life. But if a man values destruction, like a sadist or

self torture, like a masochist or life beyond the grave, like a mystic, or mindless

“kicks,” like the driver of a hotrod car his alleged happiness is the measure of his

success in the service of his own destruction. It must be added that the emotional

state of all these irrationalists cannot be properly designated as happiness or even as

pleasure: it’s merely a moment’s relief from their chronic state of terror (VS: 28).

Again, notice how Rand sneaks normative ethical principles in through the back door.

As an egoist, she is committed to saying that only I matter, and that other people do

not matter. Yet she presupposes a non- egoistic principle in assuming that sadism is

morally wrong. The only way she can reject sadism is that it leads to self destruction.

That’s just naively optimistic.

7 “I have done my homework as well. I counted 34 dictators who are known as history's worst

dictators, folks who are responsible for the death of 10 thousand to 20 million people. The list runs

from Joseph Stalin of former USSR to Omar al-Bashir of modern-day Sudan […]

Nearly half of them died peacefully, mostly in office, a quarter of them fled and died in exile and six of

them were killed or executed.” Mohammad Badrul Ahsan “About Dictators” 2007- 09-07.

http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=2893

1.4.10 Rand’s Objectivism

In conclusion, we can say of Rand’s doctrine:

1). Her arguments have premises which are false

2). She begs the question (she has premises that are the same as the conclusion)

3). She attacks a straw man

4). She presupposes non- egoistic moral principles

So how did such a bad arguer become so popular? I think it’s because she said what

people wanted to hear: it is morally okay to be selfish. That is, her conclusions are

appealing. She writes in a style which appears to be philosophical, which seems

impressive for people who don’t know philosophy, and revolting to anyone who does.

Rand is to philosophy as McDonalds’ is to food.

1.5 The Compatibility Argument

Rachels discusses this argument on pp. 79-81. It is simply this: ethical egoism is the

‘background theory’ behind all normative ethics. We follow moral rules out of self

interest. Don’t lie, and people will trust you. Do not harm others, and we will not be

shunned and hated, and so on. This is essentially the same theory as Hobbes’ Social

Contract.

The theory, according to Rachels, has one basic problem: it explains why it is best

to do the right thing when nobody is watching. So long as one is intelligent or

powerful enough to avoid the Police, there is no pressing reason to follow the moral

rules of society. Ethical Egoism is not compatible with normative ethics (but may be

compatible with Hobbes).

1.6 Arguments Against Ethical Egoism.

Rachels offers four arguments against Ethical Egoism: the Wickedness Argument, the

Conflicts of Interest argument, the Inconsistency Argument, and the Arbitrariness

Argument (pp. 81-88).

1.6.1 The Wickedness Argument

As Rachels notes, the most obvious objection to Ethical Egoism is that it endorses

wicked actions (p. 81). Yet note that this presupposes some traditional notion of the

good. That is, it begs the question, as it presupposes a non- egoistic notion of

morality.

Three options are open here to the Ethical Egoist: a). give up; b). deny that Ethical

Egoism really leads to accepting immoral acts, or c) bite the bullet (that is, accept the

unpleasant implications), and assert that Ethical Egoism is superior to any theory that

holds to traditional notions of right and wrong. (Friedrich Nietzsche {1844-1900}

most famously rejected all such notions of morality, declaring his ethics ‘beyond good

and evil’). These options are discussed below.

1.6.2 The Conflicts of Interest Argument

Kurt Baier, in the text The Moral Point of View, argues that Ethical Egoism can

provide no solution for conflicts of interest. Normative ethics exists so that we can

resolve conflicts of interest. He takes this to be an essential quality in a moral theory.

Ethical Egoism has no such power, so it is inadequate as a moral theory.

Rachels cites an example from Baier’s book: two men, B and K, are both egoists

and both want to be the president. So it is in B’s interest to kill K, and in K’s interest

to kill B, yet this contradicts B and K’s self- interests to not be dead.

Rachels notes that this argument only works if one accepts Baier’s assumption

about what a moral theory needs. An Ethical Egoist might simply not care about

resolving disputes. (This is where Ethical Egoism completely separates from Hobbes).

A true Egoist might simply accept the ‘law of the Jungle.’

1.6.3 The Logical Inconsistency Argument

Baier offers a more sophisticated argument, based on the example above (taken from

Rachels p.84).

1). Suppose it is each person’s duty to do what is in his own best interests

2). It is in B’s best interests to murder K.

3). It is in K’s best interests to prevent B from murdering him.

4). (sub- conclusion). Therefore, it is B’s duty to murder K, and K’s duty is to

prevent B from doing it.

5). But it is wrong to prevent someone from doing his duty.

6). Therefore, it is wrong for K to prevent B from murdering him.

7). Therefore, it is both wrong and not wrong for K to prevent B from murdering

him.

8). But no act can be both wrong and non- wrong; that is a self- contradiction.

9). Therefore the assumption with which we started- that it is each person’s duty to

do what is in his own best interests- cannot be true.

Rachels (p. 85). Notes that Baier fails to reveal a real contradiction. Premise 5 is not a

Ethical Egoistic principle. An Ethical Egoist is concerned only with their own duties,

so premises 5 and 6 presuppose the claim that Ethical Egoism is untrue. (Writes

Rachels, “ [for the egoist,] whether one ought to prevent someone from doing his duty

depends entirely on whether it would be to one’s own advantage to do so.”

1.6.4 The Arbitrariness Argument

This argument is the real monster- killer. It also emphasizes the importance of dealing

with egoism as a philosophical problem.

Rachels notes that racists and other bigots, whenever forced to articulate their

views, fall back on the following principle:

The Principle of Equal Treatment: We should treat people in the same way unless

there is a [morally] relevant difference between them.

Racists and sexists argue that there are relevant distinctions between themselves and

others that justify differential treatment. (Kant and Hume argued, for example, that

Africans were intellectually deficient). 8 Any group, whether national, tribal, religious

or criminal, that treats non- members as morally less significant than its own

members, must (on pain of contradiction) either reject the Principle of Equal

Treatment or find some morally relevant difference.

As Rachels notes, Ethical Egoism has essentially the same basic logic as racism or

any other doctrine that makes an arbitrary in- group out- group distinction. Just as

racists draw an arbitrary line between people of their own phenotype [physical

appearance type] and everyone else, and the Yakuza draw an arbitrary line between

themselves and the general public, Ethical Egoists arbitrarily draw a line between

8 For discussion and quotes: http://www.philosophicalmisadventures.com/? cat=4

themselves and everyone else. That is, Ethical Egoism reduces the logic of racism

down to a single person. (See Rachels pp. 85-88).

1.6.5 Further Note

Ethical Egoism may seem a fairly exotic idea: an idea so bizarre, in fact, that very few

would want to actually follow it. This is not the case. Firstly, as a personal doctrine,

the work of Ayn Rand is massively popular, most probably the most popular

philosopher in history. Secondly, all groups, nations, corporations etc. that justify

wars of conquest, imperialism, etc. for reasons other than defense, were they to

attempt to justify their acts, would need to cite some theory resembling Ethical

Egoism. If we can refute EE, we can refute such justifications.

Egoism Lecture 2:

Max Stirner

Drawing of Stirner by Engels Translation by Tsuji Jun. uiitsusha to sono shoyû", 1920

2.1 Introduction: Stirner’s Thought.

We are looking at Stirner for one reason: we need to know what Ayn Rand’s premises

actually lead to. She thinks that everybody living selfishly will lead to a flourishing,

healthy society in which proud, hardworking people will get what they deserve, and

everyone else should just stop complaining and get a job. But she also complains

about, for example, the injustice of tax money spent on pointless public monuments,

and the cruelty of Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany. She agrees with Stirner that you

should be an egoist, if you are free and rational, but she thinks that you shouldn’t hurt

anyone else. By contrast, on this point, Stirner just does not care. Egoism for Stirner

means nobody else matters.

This is the central question: who is the more logically consistent egoist: Rand or

Stirner? Remember: egoism by definition means you do not care about other people.

Instead of explaining why the leaders of nations are immoral, he wants to become like

them. He wants to, in the language of Starwars, ‘turn to the Dark Side.’

2.2 Stirner: Biographical Note.

Max Stirner (born Johann Kaspar Schmidt, 1806-1856) was born in Bayreuth,

Bavaria, on October 25, 1806. His father, a flute maker, died when Stirner was six

months old. At the age of 20 Stirner attended the University of Berlin, where he

studied philology (the analysis of ancient texts), philosophy and theology. During his

studies he attended lectures by the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

(1770- 1831).

In 1841 Stirner joined a discussion group of intellectuals called “The Free” (Die

Freien), which included Bruno Bauer, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx and

Ludwig Feuerbach. Stirner found work teaching at a girl’s high school (university

work was impossible as he was an avowed atheist) and in 1844 published his only

book, The Ego And Its Own, in which he attacks religion, the government, morality,

Communism, Hegel, and Feuerbach. The text was not a commercial success; an early

ban on the book was immediately lifted because it was judged “too absurd” to be a

danger to society.

Stirner married twice; his first wife died in childbirth; the second left him after he

had wasted all her inheritance on a failed milk business. He had continual money

problems, and was imprisoned for debt in 1853 and 1854. In 1856 he was killed after

being bitten by a ‘winged insect.’ His life was quite unhappy, but happiness was less

important to him than being unique.9

Nobody is really sure of Stirner’s influence. Marx hated his work, once writing

400 pages explaining why Stirner was wrong. Yet it seems likely that the text

influenced Marx a great deal. 10 Stirner is recognized as being the pioneer of the

Anarchy movement, in particular the American anarchist Benjamin R. Tucker. In

1939, Sidney Hook stated that the debate between Marx and Stirner involved “the

fundamental problems of any possible system of ethics or public morality,”11 and in

1939, Isaiah Berlin noted that “the theory of the alienation of the proletarians was

enunciated by the Max Stirner at least one year before Marx.”12 It is also suggested

that Stirner greatly influenced Nietzsche’s moral thought.

Stirner was also discovered in Japan; seven editions of The Ego and Its Own were

published in Japanese between 1900- 1929.

2.3 The Genealogy of Morals argument.

9 Stepelevich, Lawrence S. “Max Stirner and Ludwig Feuerbach.” Journal of the

History of Ideas Vol. 39, No. 3. (July-Sept., 1978): 451- 463, p. 462.

10 Demythologizing Marxism, ed. Frederick J. Adelmann (The Hague, 1969), 64-95. 11 S. Hook, From Hegel to Marx (Ann Arbor, 1962; New York 1936), 165. 12 Isaiah Berlin Karl Marx (New York, 1963): p.15.

Stirner’s central argument against morality is that it has a Christian origin. Originally,

morality was simply a matter of doing what God, that is, the Church, wanted you to

do. As Protestantism challenged the authority of the Church, its authority was

transformed into that of the State. The ‘spirit’ of God has become replaced with the

‘idea of humanity,’ and the idea of morality was transformed from doing God’s will

to doing the Will of the State. “Society,” for Stirner, “is a new master, a new spook, a

new ‘supreme being,’ which ‘takes us into its service and allegiance’! (111).

[…] one thing certainly happened, and visibly guided the progress of post-Christian

history: this one thing was the endeavor to make the Holy Spirit more human, and

bring it nearer to men, or men to it. Through this it came about that at last it could be

conceived as the ‘spirit of humanity,’ and, under different expressions like ‘idea of

humanity, mankind, humaneness, general philanthropy,’ appeared more attractive,

more familiar, and more accessible. (p.87).

As ‘the brotherhood of man’ is both a Christian idea and a basic assumption of ethics,

Stirner rejects it: Is not ‘right’ a religious concept, something sacred? Why, ‘equality of rights’ […] is

only another name for ‘Christian equality,’ the ‘equality of the brethren,’ of ‘God’s

children,’ ‘of Christians’; in short, fraternité [‘brotherhood,’ in French] …When the

[French] revolution stamped equality as a ‘right,’ it took flight into the religious

domain, into the region of the sacred, of the ideal. Hence, since then, the fight for the

‘sacred, inalienable rights of man.’ (168-169).

Stirner makes the following claims (those claims which are necessary for the

argument to make sense, but are not stated, are in square brackets).

‘Morality’ means ‘following the dictates of society.’

Society is an abstract idea.

Abstract ideas have their origins in fictions, not in facts.

[Fictions are not sound grounds for morality.]

The idea of society has its origins in religious beliefs.

The idea of morality has its origins in religious beliefs.

[Religious beliefs are irrational].

The conclusion is that morality is essentially a religious fiction. More simply:

Morality and society are myths, because they have their origins in religion, which is

itself a fiction.

The following quotes illustrate this idea.

The Christian people has produced two societies whose duration will keep equal

measure with the permanence of that people: these are the societies state and church.

Can they be called a union of egoists? Do we in them pursue an egoistic, personal,

own interest, or do we pursue a popular, an interest of the Christian people, namely, a

state, and church interest? Can I and may I be myself in them? May I think and act as

I will, may I reveal myself, live myself out, busy myself? Must I not leave untouched

the majesty of the state, the sanctity of the Church? (189).

If the church had deadly sins, the state has capital crimes; if the one had heretics, the

other has traitors; the one ecclesiastical penalties, the other criminal penalties; the

one inquisitorial processes, the other fiscal; in short, there sins, there crimes, there

inquisition and here- inquisition. Will the sanctity of the state not fall like the

church’s? The awe of its laws, the reverence for its highness, the humanity of its

‘subjects,’ – will this remain? Will the ‘saint’s face’ not be stripped of its adornment?

(213).

Stirner also takes the ban on homicide to be essentially religious, for the same

reason.13 p.213. [On Homicide]. “A man who lets a man’s life continue in existence because

to him it is sacred and he had a dread of touching it is simply a- religious man.

2.4 The Injustice of Society

The second central argument in Stirner appears to be something like this:

P1 ‘Ethics’ simply means ‘doing that which society demands of us.’

P2 ‘Society’ (the Government, economic forces etc.) is unjust

∴ we should reject ethics

13 If Stirner seems radically anti- religious, consider this: Stirner seems to think that the only way of

being a good person, in the usual sense, is to be religious. This seems to be a deeply conservative

belief.

Stirner also believes that the people in power (the government and the wealthy) are

also entirely egoistic, and that the Law is merely an instrument for protecting their

own wealth. (Note how different this to Rand, who would say that wealthy people

deserve their wealth, and that property rights are absolute). If you do not fight and die

for the country’s leaders, or if you refuse to follow their laws, you will go to jail. We

see this in the Justice system: white- collar criminals who steal millions of dollars

often get light sentences, whereas those who merely steal cars can get heavier

sentences.

Just observe the nation that is defended by devoted patriots. The patriots fall in

bloody battle or in the fight with hunger and want; what does the nation care for that?

By the manure of their corpses the nation comes to ‘its bloom’! The individuals have

died ‘for the great cause of the nation,’ and the nation sends some words of thanks

after them and- has the profit of it. I call that a kind of lucrative egoism.

But only look at that Sultan [ruler of a Muslim country- here Stirner means the

rulers of our own societies] who cares so lovingly for ‘his people.’ Is he not pure

unselfishness itself, and does he not hourly sacrifice himself for his people? Oh, yes,

for’ his people.’ Just try it; show yourself not as his, but as your own; for breaking

away from his egoism you will take a trip to jail. The Sultan has set his cause on

nothing but himself; he is to himself all in all [he only cares about himself], he is to

himself the only one, and tolerates nobody who would dare not to be one of ‘his

people.’ (p.6).

But Stirner goes a little overboard here. He is committed to saying that “Every state is

a despotism” (175). [ …] I am free in no state. The lauded tolerance of states is simply a tolerating of the

‘harmless,’ the ‘not dangerous’; it is only elevation above pettymindedness, only a

more estimable, grander, prouder- despotism. (201).

Why does he say this?

2.5 Freedom as Absolute Value

Stirner thinks that anything that limits freedom is bad. Hence, he is committed to

saying that freedom is the only good.

But the social reformers preach to us a ‘law of society.’ There the individual becomes

society’s slave, and is in the right only when society makes him out in the right, when

he lives according to society’s states and so is- loyal. Whether I am loyal under a

despotism or in a ‘society’ à la Weitling [1808-1871, a Utopian socialist], it is the

same absence of right in so far as in both cases I have not my right but foreign right.

(168).

One influential idea in Stirner is that workers are enslaved by their employers (recall

that Stirner had a large, if unacknowledged, influence on Marx).

The labourers have the most enormous power in their hands, and, if they once

become thoroughly conscious of it and used it, nothing would withstand them; they

would only have to stop labour, regard the product of labour as theirs, and enjoy it.

This is the sense of the labour disturbances which show themselves here and there.

The state rests on the – slavery of labour. If labour becomes free, the state is lost.

(105).

But note the tension here: Stirner thinks that slavery and injustice are morally wrong.

Stirner presupposes a morality, according to which slavery is evil, and freedom is

good. Now […] when every one is to cultivate himself into man, condemning man to

machine- like labour amounts to the same thing as slavery (108).

How can a pure egoist recognize a morality that makes such claims?

2.6 Might Makes Right

“Your property is mine. My property is also mine!”

Jaian, of Doraemon.

If there is no ‘equality of rights,’ what, for Stirner, is the basis of rights? One answer

could be ‘there is no basis to the idea of rights.’ But Stirner thinks there are rights—

the rights of the powerful.14 For Stirner There are no other rights. “You long for

freedom? You fools! If you took might, freedom would come of itself. See, he who

has might ‘stands above the law.” (p.151).

But let the individual man lay claim to ever so many rights because man or the

concept man ‘entitles’ him to them, because his being man does it: what do I care for

his right and his claim? If he has his right only from man and does not have it from

me, then from me he has no right. His life, for example, counts to me only for what it

is worth to me. I respect neither a so- called right of property (or his claim to tangible

goods) nor yet his right to the ‘sanctuary of his inner nature’ (or his right to have the

spiritual goods or services, his gods, remain unaggrieved). His goods, the sensuous as

well as the spiritual, are mine, and I dispose of them as proprietor, in the measure of

my- might (219).

What then is my property? Nothing but what is in my power! To what property am I

entitled? To every property to which I- empower myself. I give myself the right of

property in taking property to myself, or giving myself the proprietor’s power, full

power, empowerment. (p.227).

As such, the only solution to social injustice is a War of All against All: “the property

question cannot be solved so amicably as the socialists, yes, even the communists,

dream. It is solved only by the war of all against all. The poor become free and the

proprietors only when they- rebel, rise up.” (230).

Stirner also argues that this view is not unusual. In fact, he argues that it is the actual

thinking of any truly powerful person. Many people in positions of power may talk of

morality, but in reality they are not moral. They are egoists, they care only about

themselves, and they function like (immoral) Gods. Instead of basing his ethics on

making everyone happy (Utilitarianism) or duty (Kant) or a social contract (which he

would dismiss as a hoax), Stirner thinks: “who has the best ethics for survival in this

unfair, horrible world?” The answer:

14 (This is why, I think, this is an important idea: this is essentially the same argument as that given by

Adolf Hitler, as expressed in his book Mein Kampf [My Struggle]).

And will you not learn by these brilliant examples that the egoist gets on best? I for

my part take a lesson from them, and propose, instead of further unselfishly serving

those great egoists, rather to be the egoist myself… let me hen likewise concern

myself for myself, who am equally with God the nothing of all others, who am my

all, who am the only one [der Einzige](EH: 6).

Discussion question: Is this a good argument? Are there any other alternatives that

have better reasoning behind them?

Note the implication: if the Government decides that Stirner is a dangerous writer

and should be locked up, and it has the power to arrest, sentence and imprison him, or

even kill him, Stirner has no argument against this. Why? Because might makes right.

A second implication: nothing is forbidden to the egoist. If you can do a particular

action, and you want to, it is the right thing to do.

I decide whether it is the right thing in me; there is no right outside me. If it is right

for me, it is right. Possibly this may not suffice to make it right for the rest; that is

their care, not mine: let them defend themselves (170).

Stirner (and all other egoists, including Rand) may be able to avoid contradiction only

by making this assertion: I am totally selfish, and I think you should be too, but I must

accept that you may harm or destroy me because of your own selfish motives. This

may be logical, but it is psychologically unlikely. It seems more logical to just accept

Hobbes (which is essentially ‘cooperation amongst egoists’ anyway).

2.7 Implications: The Poor

Stirner, unlike Rand, is more explicit in the economic consequences of Egoism as a

doctrine: people will have whatever they can steal or earn; anyone who cannot fight

or work for food will starve.

If you are competent to furnish pleasure to thousands, then thousands will pay you an

honorarium for it; for it would stand in your power to forbear doing it, hence they

must purchase your deed. If you are not competent to captivate anyone, you may

simply starve (235).

If your person is of consequence to me, you pay me with your very existence; if I am

concerned with only one of your qualities, then your compliance, perhaps, or your

aid, has a value (a money value) for me, and I purchase it (s; 235).

There is clearly something seriously wrong with Stirner’s philosophy, but it is

important (and good practice) to concentrate on the internal contradictions in Stirner’s

thought, rather than the implications.

2.8 Marx’s Critique

Marx argued that Stirner’s whole system is self- defeating. If we live with a group

(which requires that we follow its rules and conventions) we are better placed to

follow our projects and live our lives than in a war of all against all. Even if we were

totally free in a non- society of egoists, we would be too busy avoiding being killed or

robbed to do anything else. Stirner’s philosophy is essentially Hobbes without the

contract.

2.9 Other Problems with Stirner

[internal contradictions]

[questionable premises].

2.10 Conclusion

We can at least credit Stirner with being more thorough and more honest than Rand.

Further, Stirner’s criticism of the State will not simply go away: we should always be

wary of governments who attempt to convince the people that the Will of the

Government, the Will of the People and Morality (capital ‘M’) are one and the same

thing.

2.11 Egoists in Movies

Kill Bill

It’s mercy, compassion and forgiveness I lack, not rationality.

Arlene Machiavelli /Beatrix Kiddo

Quentin Tarantino Kill Bill Volume 1.

The Third Man

In Italy, for thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder, bloodshed, but they produced

Michelangelo – Leonardo Da Vinci, and the Renaissance ...in Switzerland, they had brotherly love. They had

five hundred years of democracy and peace, and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock.

Harry Lime, in Graham Green The Third Man (screenplay)

Egoists in Real Life

This is rat eat rat, dog eat dog. I'll kill ‘em, and I'm going to kill ‘em before they kill me. You're talking about

the American way – of survival of the fittest.

Ray Kroc, founder of McDonald’s (1902-1984)

The greatest pleasure is to vanquish your enemies, to chase them before you, to rob them of their wealth, to see

their near and dear bathed in tears, to ride their horses and sleep on the white bellies of their wives and

daughters.

Ghengis Khan (1167-1227)

Bibliography

1). Max Stirner

Carlson, Andrew. “Max Stirner (1806-1856).” (Chapter 2 of Anarchism in Germany: The Early Movement).

http://tmh.floonet.net/articles/carlson.html (Accessed

September 14th 2007).

Feuerbach, Ludwig. “’The Essence of Christianity’ in Relation to ‘The Ego and Its

Own.’”(1845). Trans. Frederick M. Gordon. The Philosophical Forum Vol. 8, no.2-

3-4 (1976).

http://nonserviam.com/egoistarchive/stirner/articles/essence_feuerbach.html

Accessed September 14th, 2007.

Harvey, Lawrence R. “Max Stirner: A Snapshot.” The Philosopher’s Magazine

http://www.philosophersnet.com/magazine/article.php?id=914&el=true

http://www.philosophersnet.com/magazine/printer_friendly.php?id=914

(accessed September 14th 2007).

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Thakrar. Die Zeit Nr. 5, 27. January 2000, p.49.

http://www.lsr-projekt.de/poly/eninnuce.html. Accessed September 14th, 2007.

Leopold, David. “Max Stirner.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy substantive

revision Fri August 4th 2006. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/max-stirner/

Myers, David B. “Marx and the Problem of Nihilism.” Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Dec 1976): 193-204.

Nishitani, Keiji. The Self- Overcoming of Nihilism trans. Graham Parkes and Setsuko

Aihara. New York: State University of New York Press, 1990.

Stepelevich, Lawrence S. “The Revival of Max Stirner.” Journal of the History of

Ideas Vol. 35, No. 2. (April- June, 1974): 323- 328.

Stepelevich, Lawrence S. “Max Stirner and Ludwig Feuerbach.” Journal of the

History of Ideas Vol. 39, No. 3. (July-Sept., 1978): 451- 463.

Stirner, Max. The Ego and Its Own. trans. Steven Byington; ed. David Leopold.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Thomas, Paul. “Karl Marx and Max Stirner.” Political Theory Vol.3, No.2. (May,

1975): 159-179.

Stirner: Online resources

Non Serviam Magazine

http://nonserviam.com/egoistarchive/stirner/

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http://www.nonserviam.com/egoistarchive/stirner/bookhtml/The_Ego.html

http://www.nonserviam.com/egoistarchive/stirner/TheEgo.pdf

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Huemer, Michael. “Critique of ‘The Objectivist Ethics.’”

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1964.

————. The Fountainhead. London: Panther, 1959.

————. Atlas Shrugged. New York: Signet/New American Library, 1959.

3). Others.

Barney, Rachel. “Callicles and Thrasymachus” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Wed 11 August, 2004.

plato.stanford.edu/entries/callicles-thrasymachus/ - accessed September 14th 2007.

Rachels, James., Stuart Rachels. The Elements of Moral Philosophy. 5th Ed. Boston:

McGraw-Hill, 2007

Lectures 15 and 16:

The Kyoto School and Ethics:

Watsuji Tetsuro (1889- 1960)

Dr. Geoffrey Roche

Lakeland College, Wisconsin (Tokyo Campus)

Fall Semester 2007

unblinkinggaze@hotmail.com

15.1 Preliminary Questions

15.2. Introduction: The Kyoto School.

The Kyoto School was an early 20th Century Japanese philosophy group, originating

at Kyoto University. Their project, broadly construed, was to integrate traditional

Japanese thought and Buddhist (in particular Mahâyâna Buddhist and Zen) concepts

with Western (typically German) philosophical language and concepts.

The first, and unintentional, founder of the Kyoto School was Kitarô Nishida

(1870-1945), widely regarded as Japan’s greatest thinker. Although Japanese

philosophers had been studying Western thought (‘tetsugaku’) since the Meiji period,

Nishida was the first to attempt to formulate his own theory. He studied at Tokyo

Imperial University, reading Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer under the first

philosophy professors in Japan. He graduated in 1884 with a thesis on Hume on

causation.

Nishida’s first text, An Inquiry into the Good (1911), earned him a position at the

Philosophy Department at the University of Kyoto. It was here that Nishida inspired

the principal Kyoto School members Hajime Tanabe (1885- 1962) (who Nishida met

for the first time in 1918, and considered the co-founder of the Kyoto School), and

Keiji Nishitani (1900- 1990). The following generation of Kyoto school members

comprised Kôsaka Masaaki (1900- 1969), Shimomura Toratarô (1900-1995), Kôyama

Iwao (1905-1993), and Suzuki Shigetaka (1907-1988). I will give an outline of the

school before discussing Tetsurô Watsuji (1889- 1960). Also associated with the

group (although not an actual member) is Suzuki Daisetsu, famous for introducing

Zen Buddhism to the West.

Classifying the group is not straightforward. Writes Bret Davis:

The […] Kyoto School should be understood neither as Buddhist thought forced into

Western garb, nor as universal discourse (with the West happened to have invented

or discovered) dressed up in Japanese garb. Rather, it is best understood as a set of

unique contributions determined by its historical layers of traditional culture at the

same time as being essentially conditioned by its most recent layer of contact with

the West- to a nascent worldwide dialogue of cross- cultural philosophy. 15

15.3 Main Themes:

The Kyoto School philosophers were preoccupied with a broad range of philosophical

themes, including metaphysics, ontology (theory of what exists), cultural criticism,

political theory, and aesthetics. They are most well known for their religious thought

(in fact, the Kyoto school is typically only discussed in religious studies departments

in the USA, rather than in philosophy departments). Here we will be concerned with

ethical thought, in particular that of Keiji Nishitani.

15.4 Absolute Nothingness (Zettai- mu).

15 Davis, Bret W. “The Kyoto School” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

First published Mon 27 Feb, 2006 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/

The Kyoto philosophers had in common a preoccupation with the idea of nothingness,

rather than being, as their primary focus and ground for theorizing. This is a difficult

idea, so we will not dwell on it for too long.

In short, the first real face- to –face contact that any Japanese philosophers had

with Western philosophers was when Hajime Tanabe, Kôichi Tsujimura and Nishitani

went to study philosophy in Germany (Tanabe returning to Japan in 1924). While

there, their principal philosophy teacher was Martin Heidegger. (Tanabe was in fact

the first person to publish an article on Heidegger; Nishitani studied with Heidegger

between 1937 and 1939, when Heidegger gave his famous lectures on Nietzsche, and

in turn taught Heidegger Zen thought). 16

I will quote Bret W. Davis:

“First philosophy” in the Western tradition is ontology, which asks the question of

“being qua being,” and tends to answer this question either in terms of the most

universal “being-ness” or in terms of the “highest being.” For Aristotle, the essence

of being was “substance,” ambiguously thought either as the particular (Socrates) or

the concrete universal form (human being), and the highest being was the “unmoved

mover.” Greek ontology later influenced the Christian theological tradition to think

of God as the “highest being,” such that the dual threads of the Western tradition as a

whole took shape as what Heidegger calls “onto-theology.” Hence, the fundamental

philosophical question of the onto-theological mainstream of the West is, “What is

being?” On the other hand, the counter-question which the Kyoto School finds in the

East is, “What is Nothingness?” In place of an ontology, first philosophy in the East

is more often a “meontology”: a philosophy of non-being or Nothingness.17

In short: for Western thinkers, the very first question of philosophy- the answer to

which is the beginning of all other philosophy, is “what is being?” that is, what is the

basic substratum of existence? What is the ‘thing’ behind existence? The Kyoto

16 Davis p. 24. James W. Heisig writes of the Japanese ‘affinity’ for Heidegger: Heisig, James W. “The

Religious Philosophy of the Kyoto School.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 1990 17/1. Pp. 1-

81, p. 56.

17 Bret W. Davis “Kyoto School.”

school philosophers, on the other hand, believed that the real ‘ground of being’ is

Nothingness, an idea with its origins in Buddhist thought (although, as the Kyoto

school thinkers knew, also occur in the works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

(1770- 1831) and the mystic Meister Eckhart [1260–c.1328]). 18 The Kyoto school

philosophers explicitly associated the idea of Nothingness with the Sanskrit term

śûnyatâ, (kû in Japanese), which means ‘emptiness.’ Later Kyoto school thought

preferred the Chinese term mu (“Nothingness”; wu in Chinese), the term that appears

in Zen thought.19

Nishitani considered the ‘question of nothing’ as the defining distinction between

Western and Eastern thought. (Another distinction he made was between the ‘Logic

of Things,’ and the Eastern “Logic of Heart- Mind” (kokoro).20 In the essay “ The

Types of Culture of the Classical Periods of East and West Seen from a Metaphysical

Perspective,” he wrote

How then are we to distinguish between the types of culture of the West and East

from a metaphysical point of view? I think we can do this by dividing them into that

[i.e. the culture of the West] which considers the ground of reality to be being, and

that [i.e. the culture of the East] which considers this ground to be Nothingness.21

Tanabe did not think of philosophy as being an open inquiry into ethics, law, science,

or the nature of truth; he considered all true philosophy to be preoccupied with a

single question:

18 Books and essays typically describe the Kyoto school as reacting to the Western idea of ‘being,’ and

to the Western idea that ontology is basic to philosophical practice. In fact, only one Western

philosopher is known for making this controversial claim:— Martin Heidegger. As such, all Kyoto

school philosophy can be said to be a reaction to a single German thinker. 19 Davis pp. 14-15. 20 Cited in Davis p. 17. 21 Kitarô Nishida Nishida Kitarô Zenshû [Complete Works of Kitarô Nishida] VIII, 429- 433. Cited in

Davis p. 14.

All science needs to take some entity or other as its object of study. The point of

contact is always in being, not in nothing. The discipline that has to do with

Nothingness is philosophy. 22

Why this distinction is so crucial is not clearly addressed, however. Nishida’s own

reasoning tends towards ancestor- veneration or perhaps even mysticism rather than

philosophical analysis proper (a criticism that can be leveled at the entire Kyoto

School tradition).23 As James Heisig puts it, the Kyoto school thinkers, unlike

Western thinkers, lack “a clear delineation between philosophy and religion.” 24 From

the 1926 text From That Which Acts to That Which Sees, Nishida states:

It goes without saying that there is much to admire, and much to learn from, the

impressive achievements of Western culture, which thought from being and the

giving of form as good. However, does there not lie hidden at the base of our Eastern

culture, preserved and passed down by our ancestors for several thousand years,

something which sees the form of the formless and hears the voice of the voiceless?

Our hearts and minds endlessly seek this something; and it is my wish to provide this

quest with a philosophical foundation. 25

Yet, as Robert Carter notes, there is a real question “whether this insistence on

nothingness as the primary and most basic focus in philosophy is intelligible and

justified”.26 Three questions come to mind here: a). what does it mean to say that

‘nothingness is the ground of being?’ b). how do we know that ‘nothing is the ground

of being?’ and c). insofar as this is a description of how things are, how does this

relate to ethics, which is prescriptive? Put more simply: in all of the ethical

22 Tanabe Kitarô Tanabe Hajime zenshû [Complete works of Tanabe Kitarô ]VI, (Tokyo: Chikuma

Shobô, 1964) p. 156. Cited in Davis p. 12. 23 See Davis p. 22 for discussion of this problem. 24 James Heisig. Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School. Honolulu: University Of

Hawaii Press, 2001. p.13-14. 25 Kitarô Nishida Nishida Kitarô Zenshû [Complete Works of Kitarô Nishida] VII: 429-33. Cited in

Davis p. 14. 26 Robert Carter “Philosophy 495 H (Fall 2002) Special Topics: Advanced Studies in Japanese

Philosophy: The Philosophers of Nothingness: The Kyoto School.” Trent University, Department of

Philosophy, Lady Eaton College, Peterborough, Ontario K9j 7B8, Canada.

discussions that we have had this semester, how relevant are questions of

‘fundamental ontology’ to these discussions?

The standard (‘Western’) philosophical assumption here is that the naturalistic

fallacy has been committed. 27 We will come to this question when we discuss the

specific ethical ideas of the Kyoto school.

15.5 The Influence of Esoteric Buddhism on Japanese Modes of Thought

A second dominant theme in Japanese thought is the assumption that all parts (in

particular the individuals of a society) constitute the whole, whereas Western thought

tends to think of the whole as being the sum of its parts. This idea, arguably,

originates in the Esoteric Buddhist thought that was introduced to Japan by Japan’s

first true philosopher, Kūkai (空海) (or also known posthumously as Kōbō-Daishi

(弘法大師). Thomas P. Kasulis outlines the significance of this idea for later

Japanese thought: […] Esotericism has a distinctive view of the relation between part and whole. The

whole is recursively manifest or reflected in the part. It is not that the parts constitute

the whole nor that the whole is more than the sum of its parts; rather, since the part is

what it is by virtue of the whole, if we truly understand the part, we find the whole

imprinted on it. In Shingon [Buddhism’s] case [the sect founded by Kūkai], for

example, since any individual thing is an expression of the cosmos as Dainichi, when

we truly understand the part (the individual thing), we encounter the whole

(Dainichi) [that is, the Universe] as well.

With this orientation as a cultural preposition, later Japanese philosophers would

seldom endorse either atomistic analysis or individualism […] Individualism, with its

attendant theories of social contract [that is, Hobbes, Rousseau etc.]. entered Japan

via the West only in the late nineteenth century. Since it viewed the social whole as

constituted by the parts, it ran counter to the esoteric assumption. Not surprisingly,

individualism has never taken hold in Japan for social, ethical or political theory. 28

27 In short: you can’t get an ‘is’ from an ‘ought.’ You cannot derive a decision of what to do or how to

act from a description. Hume is accredited with making this point. 28 Thomas P. Kasulis. (1998). Japanese philosophy. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of

Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved August 12, 2007, from

http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/G100

The writings of Kitaro Nishida, founder of the Kyoto School, also express this idea.

His 1921 work Zen no Kenkyu (translated as An Enquiry into the Good), the first

Kyoto School text, emphasizes the idea that subject and object are one, that God and

the Universe is one entity, and that ethics is a matter of understanding ultimate reality:

all ideas that can be traced back to Kukai. 29

15.6 The Kyoto School and The Greater East Asian War / World War II.

When we think about the relationship between philosophers and politics, it is

important to keep in mind that philosophers do not exist in some other realm up in the

clouds, separated off from the rest of humanity. Being a philosopher, as such, does

not excuse one for the political implications of one’s ideas, unless one wishes to admit

that their ideas are too obscure or too meaningless to have any persuasive force.

Philosophers frequently have quite a lot of popular respect and influence (though

of course not all the time), and their opinions can often shape, or give legitimacy, to

official policy or ideas that might otherwise appear merely foolish, brutal or immoral.

When the Nazis used Nietzsche’s ideas they were appealing to the authority of a very

famous and respected writer; when animal rights people argue their case they will

point out the cogent arguments of Peter Singer. In the same way, The Kyoto School

philosophers were hardly obscure writers, and as such had enough respect to be

influential. Nishida, for example, gave well received public lectures; his 1940 text

“The Problem of Japanese Culture” appeared it sold 40,000 copies. When his

completed works appeared in 1947, people camped out all night long to receive the

first copies.

The Kyoto School have been criticized for contributing to the political ideology

of the Imperialist period (interestingly, the most important Western thinker for the

school, Martin Heidegger, was also implicated in Nazism and was himself a member

of the Nazi party). Some Japanese intellectuals (‘left wing’ Kyoto school members

Jun Tosaka and Kiyoshi Miki, for example) were imprisoned and died in prison for

their anti- militaristic stance; Mitsuo Taketani [1911-], a philosopher of science, was 29 Nishida, Kitaro. An Inquiry into the Good. Trans. Masao Abe and Christopher Ives. New Haven and

London: Yale University press, 1990.

imprisoned for his anti- Fascist activities). The rest of the Kyoto school, however,

cooperated with the authorities, applying what they termed “cooperative resistance”

(hantaiseiteki kyôryoku). 30 This cooperation is highly ambivalent, however (see

Davis pp. 30-32 for discussion). On the one hand, the Kyoto School apparently

opposed the war. They had discussions on how to avoid it, and, once the war had

begun, had secret talks with the Imperial Navy to discuss ways of steering public

opinion against the more aggressive Land Army. On the other, comments made by

Kyoto School members suggest a certain complicity with the ideologies behind the

war. Hajime Tanabe, for example, in his 1940 text Rekishiteki Genjitsu (Historical

Reality), argued in favour of “training for death,” and inspired many students,

including future Tokko (suicide) pilots, to go to war. 31 Tetsuro Watsuji (who we will

look at in more detail in the next lecture) argued for the superiority of Japanese

theories of human nature and ethics, and argued for the negation of the self; views

that were compatible with nationalist and militaristic ideologies.

In November 1941 Masaaki Kosaka, Keiji Nishitani. Iwao Koyama and Naritaka

Suzuki participated in a round –table discussion entitled The World’ Historical

Standpoint and Japan, organized by the staff of the philosophy journal Chūōkōron.32

The discussions are interesting in that they express the Kyoto school’s preoccupation

with the problem of modernity and of Japanese national identity, along with their

thoughts on war, history and the role of philosophy. More troubling are, in particular,

Nishitani’s views on the ‘moral energy’ of the Japanese, and the Japanese state’s

obligation to control other nations. For Nishitani, the Japanese, a Herrenvolk (Master-

Race),33 are morally obliged by historical necessity to assist in shaping the character

of all East Asia.

30 See Davis p. 29. 31 See for example Emiko Ohnuki- Tierney, Kamikaze Diaries: Reflections on Japanese Student

Soldiers. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006. pages 47, 80, 194.

Tanabe, Hajime. Rekishiteki genjitsu. Tokyo: Kobushi Shobåo, 2001.

田辺元, 1885-1862. 歴史的現実 / 田辺元著; 編・解說黒田寬 一. 初版. 東京: こぶし書房, 2001. 32 Nishitani, Keiji et. al. The World- Historical Standpoint and Japan. Tokyo, Chūōkōronsha, 25 March

1943). Trans. J.W. Heisig, 1994. (draft) http://www.nanzan-

u.ac.jp/SHUBUNKEN/publications/nlarc/pdf/Rude%20awakenings/Chuokoron%20(Nishitani).pdf

(accessed August 2007). 33 “True, the Japanese are a Herrenvolk.” Chuokoron discussions p. 36.

I would like to return to the question of moral energy. The primary issue is the

concrete form that the ethical or moral dimension (moral energy) takes in East Asia.

This is fundamental, and is also, I think, tied to the resolution of the China incident. I

mean, the most basic issue is the “China Consciousness” of the Chinese, the

consciousness of always being the centre of East Asia, and of Japan as having been

educated through the grace of Chinese culture. In such a situation, the main thing is

somehow to make them see and to realize that Japan is now the leader in the

construction of the Greater East Asia of today, and must be the leader as a matter of

historical necessity…. […] [China] must call its people to an awareness of world

history, to make them leave aside their Middle Kingdom consciousness and

cooperate with Japan in the construction of Greater East Asia. This would make it

possible to think of a kind of manifestation of moral energy in Greater East Asia.

Because Japan’s contemporary role of leadership relies basically on Japan’s moral

energy. It was Japan’s moral energy that prevented the colonization of China.

(Chuokoron p. 26).

Hence the root of the ethics of the Greater East Asian sphere consists in transmitting

Japan’s moral energy to each of the races, and elevating them to a high spiritual level

where they can cooperate with Japan and where upright inter- racial relations can be

constructed (ibid p. 34).

Nishitani goes on to argue that ‘race’ is in fact a moral concept (an idea adopted from

historian Leopold Von Ranke, 1795-1886).

[…] for a race to be able to step anew into the midst of the established world order

and assert the continuation [of] its own existence positively, it must have moral

energy. Only then can a nation be shaped that is grounded on race as such. In such a

race, nation can be said to signify the manifestation of the moral energy of the race

itself. Thus, as bad as the terms racialism or nationalism sound to democracy, these

terms really contain great moral significance. However, it is morality as moral

energy, not formal morality as such. Furthermore, such a moral quality becomes

visible only when it can uphold a nation within history. If it is grasped merely as a

pure legal concept or in some other “academic” form, the moral energy is drained.

(ibid p.29).

Nishitani’s 1940 text Shukyo to Bunka (Religion and Culture), another problematic

work is also noteworthy. In a section entitled “Hittora undo no seishin” (“ The Spirit

of the Hitler Movement”), Nishitani favorably compares Hitler’s ideology with that of

Nietzsche (whom he had studied under Heidegger), and discusses Hitler’s rejection of

egoism and his exhortations to individuals to sacrifice themselves for the good of the

nation. 34

Ishikawa: Nishida Kitaro Museum of Philosophy 35

At left, a German edition of “Ethics as a Science of Man.” At right, Watsuji’s grave in Kamakura

(Tokeiji Temple, near Kita Kamakura Station).

34 Parkes, Graham. “The putative fascism of the Kyoto School and the political.” Philosophy East and

West Vol. 47 No. 3(August 1997) Pp.305-336, pp. 8-9. http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-

PHIL/graham.htm

35 http://www.city.kahoku.ishikawa.jp/nishida-museum/

Keiji Nishitani. 36 Nishida Kitarô, in Paris, 1940.

Tanabe Hajime, co- founder of the Kyoto School. At left: in 1930. 37

36 http://www.cnlpa.de/gif/nishitani.gif 37 http://home.uchicago.edu/~cwoakes/Week5ATD_files/image007.jpg

Lecture 16: Watsuji Tetsurô (和辻 哲郎) (1889- 1960).

16.1 Preliminary Questions. a). What is ethics?

b). What is the biggest problem with Utilitarianism?

c). Why is respect for the individual in law and ethics important, do you think?

d). Do you think that climate influences a culture’s ethics? If so, are there some basic ethical principles

that ought to be universal, regardless of the climate?

e). What is the Naturalistic Fallacy? And why is it fallacious to use this argument?

f). What is argumentum ad Antiquitatem? Why is it a fallacy? Can you think of an example that relates

to ethics?

g). What is argumentum ad populum? Why is it fallacious? Can you think of an example that relates to

ethics?

16.1 Watsuji Tetsurô: Biographical Outline.

Tetsuro Watsuji was a moral philosopher, cultural historian, translator and

historian of ideas. He was born in Himeji, Hyogo prefecture. When he was young he

read Western literature and poetry. He discovered philosophy whilst at the First

Higher School (later renamed Tokyo University), graduating in 1909, and in 1912

completed a thesis on Schopenhauer (his first thesis was on Nietzsche, but was

rejected by the board as it was deemed unsuitable, Nietzsche deemed a mere

‘philosopher- poet.’). Both theses were later published, and Watsuji became

instrumental in introducing the work of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard to Japan. After

1918 he experienced what commentators have called a reorientation (tenko),

apparently inspired by the lectures of Natsumi Soseki. Watsuji turned against

Western philosophy and culture, in particular what he felt to be an excessive emphasis

on individualism, and its negative impact on Japanese life. (Nietzsche in particular is

extremely individualistic, to the point of rejecting all Jewish and Christian morality).

By contrast, ethics, according to Watsuji, should emphasize social interconnectedness.

This turning away from the West led to Watsuji’s investigations into Japanese

thought, in particular that of the mediaeval Zen Buddhist philosopher Dogen.

In 1925, after a number of less prestigious teaching posts, Watsuji became

professor of ethics at Kyoto University. He went to Germany to study for fourteen

months in 1927-1928, and upon return went back to Kyoto Imperial University. He

received his PhD (for a thesis on Buddhism) in 1932, and moved to Tokyo Imperial

University in 1934. He completed his key text Ethics as the Study of Man (Porisuteki

Ningen no Rinrigaku) in 1935, followed by his three volume study on ethics,

Rinrigaku, which appeared in three installments in 1937, 1942, and 1949, the year he

retired.

16.2 Watsuji’s Philosophy: Introduction.

Watsuji’s earlier writings (in particular Climate and Culture/ Fudo Ningen- gakuteki

kosatsu), concern the interrelatedness of environment on the development of culture,

although it is not clear how such descriptions constitute or are relevant to an ethics.

Robert Carter sums up the link between ethics and culture as follows: “ Climate

serves as the always present background to what becomes the foreground focus for

Watsuji, the study of Japanese ethics in practice and in theory. Ethics is the study of

the ways in which men and women, adults and children, the rulers and those ruled,

have come to deal with each other in their specific climatic conditions. Ethics is the

pattern of proper and effective social interaction.”38 This principle is called Fudo

(‘climaticity’). 39

38 Robert Carter “Watsuji Tetsurô” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

First published Thu 11 Nov, 2004http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/watsuji-tetsuro/ 39 This is essentially a Confucian concept of ethics: the good is Tradition and the authentic practice of ritual (Li) associated with it. The bad is whatever is opposed to Tradition. Tradition involves the judicious worship of ancestors and the veneration of family members.

16.3 The Rinrigaku (1937-1949) (倫理学)

The Rinrigaku has been celebrated as “the definitive study of Japanese ethics” and “a

study of Japanese ethical thought and practice that is still unequaled.” 40 Kazuhiko

Okuda, of the International University of Japan in Niigata, writes that The Rinrigaku

“a major critique of and challenge to modern (Western) philosophical anthropology

[…] and continues to generate considerable interest and even controversy.” 41 A

partial English translation first appeared in 1996.

16.3.1 The Falsity of Individualism.

Watsuji asserts that a). individuality is central to every Western moral theory, and b).

this assumption that people are individuals is essentially false. The Western idea of

individuality (quoting Robert Carter) “loses touch with the vast network of

interconnections that serves to make us human. We are individuals inescapably

immersed in the space/ time world, together with others. Individual persons, if

conceived of in isolation from their various social contexts, do not and cannot exist

except as abstractions.”42 Philosophers who discuss the rights of the individual can do

so, reasons Watsuji, because they ignore the ‘spaciality’ (in- space- ness) of the

ningen (person).

Why does Watsuji think that individuals do not exist? He offers three arguments,

which I will term a). the Robinson Crusoe Argument b). The argument from

Etymology, and c). The argument from authenticity.43

16.4 Ningen sonzai (人間存在)

16.4.1 The ‘Robinson Crusoe’ Argument.

40 Barshay, “Imagining Democracy in Postwar Japan,” pp. 388- 389; Robert Carter, “Introduction,

Watsuji Tetsuro, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku,” trans. Yamamoto Seisaku and Robert E. Carter

(Albany, SUNY Press, 1996). p. 6. 41 Okuda p. 1. 42 Robert Carter p. 8.

43 This view is related to the Buddhist view that the ‘self’ is an illusion.

Recall Hobbes’s description of the State of Nature: isolated individuals, without an

overruling authority to maintain control, will have no choice but to compete with each

other. According to Watsuji, this description of human nature is basically flawed.

Watsuji holds that we are not naturally isolated and selfish; that we are born into

social relationships, beginning with one’s immediate family. From the beginning of

our lives we are shaped and influenced by our teachers, friends, and communities.

Watsuji tries to illustrate this fact by referring to the story of Robinson Crusoe, from

the Daniel Defoe novel of 1719. Crusoe, trapped on a deserted island, behaved as if

he was around other people: he spoke in his own language, built a hut, and made food

and clothes based on what others had taught him. Further, he always hoped that other

people would come to rescue him. Therefore, Watsuji argues, the radically individual

person is a myth.

16.4.2. The Argument from Etymology.

Watsuji insists that ethics is the study of the human person, in Japanese, ningen. Yet

his study is not grounded on anthropological, psychological or sociological studies,

but on etymology, that is, the study of the origin of words. As such, he analyses the

origins of the word ningen to support his theory. He notes that the term ‘ningen’ is

made up of two characters, ‘nin,’ meaning ‘person’ or ‘human being,’ and ‘gen,’

meaning ‘space’ or ‘between.’ As such, he argues that a person is not merely an

individual but is connected with various social connections. Watsuji here presupposes

that the Japanese language contains within its ideograms metaphysical truths about

human nature. (Note also that Watsuji’s argument implies that only Japanese language

carries this truth).

16.4.3. The Argument from Authenticity.

Writes Robert Carter, One expresses one's individuality by negating the social group or by rebelling against

various social expectations or requirements. To be an individual demands that one

negate the supremacy of the group. On the other hand, to envision oneself as a

member of a group is to negate one's individuality. But is this an instance of poor

logic? One can remain an individual and as such join as many groups as one wishes.

Or one can think of oneself as an individual and yet as a parent, a worker, an artist, a

theatre goer, and so forth. Watsuji understood this, but his argument is that it is

possible to think in such ways only if one has already granted logical priority to the

individual qua individual. Whatever group one belongs to, one belongs to it as an

individual, and this individuality is not quenchable, except through death, or

inauthenticity. Nevertheless, Watsuji's conception of what he calls the ‘negation of

negation’ has a quite different, and perhaps deeper emphasis. To extricate ourselves

from one or another socio-cultural inheritance, perhaps the acceptance of the Shinto

faith, one has to rebel against this socio-cultural form by affirming one's

individuality in such a way as to negate its overt influence on oneself. This is to

negate an aspect of one's history by affirming one's individuality. But the second

negation occurs when one become a truly ethical human being, and one negates one's

individual separateness by abandoning one's individual independence from others.

What we have now is a forgetting of the self, as Dôgen urged (“to study the way is to

study the self, to study the self is to forget the self, to forget the self is to become

enlightened by all things”), which yields a ‘selfless’ morality. To be truly human is

not the asserting of one's individuality, but an annihilation of self-centeredness such

that one is now identified with others in a nondualistic merging of self and others.

Benevolence or compassion results from this selfless identification. This is our

authentic ‘home ground,’ and it rekindles our awareness of our true and original

nature. This home ground he calls ‘nothingness,’ about which more will be said

below.44

Carter’s explanation here clarifies several points:

a). Watsuji presupposes a particular description of human nature, according to which

our true nature is to be dependent on other people, and to have no self- centred nature.

Yet Watsuji also argues that we should follow this ‘essential nature.’ But if being ego-

less and dependent on others is our true nature, how could anyone stay from this

‘innate nature’? There is some sort of confusion of description and prescription here.

That is, one cannot go from a description of people to an ethics explaining how they

should be. Watsuji appears to be committing a naturalistic fallacy.

b). Note the contrast with Western thought. Western ethicists, in particular

deontologists, assume that the individual cannot be used as a means to an end; that no

individual can be sacrificed for the good of the community. Watsuji, on the other

44 Carter pp. 9-10.

hand, argues that the community is prior to the individual, and that the individual’s

sense of self should be annihilated. 45

c). Watsuji assumes that we must destroy our sense of being individuals (our

‘egoism’) in order to be good people, that is, to be compassionate. Is this necessarily

true? Could the opposite not be true: that being truly ethical requires that we retain a

sense of individuality?

16.5 Aidagara (間柄 ‘betweeness’) and Ningen sonzai (人間存在 ‘human

existence’)

Watsuji traces the term ‘gen’ (space, or ‘betweenenss’) back to the term aidagara

which refers to the location of people, in particular the space in which people interact

with one another. Watsuji’s student Yuasa Yasuo puts this idea in the following

terms:

This betweeness consists of the various human relationships of our life- world. To

put it simply, it is the network which provides humanity with a social meaning, for

example, one’s being an inhabitant of this or that town or a member of a certain

business firm. To live as a person means… to exist in such betweeness.46

Ethics is the study of these relational patterns between individuals. Watsuji uses the

term Ningen sonzai (人間存在) to describe ‘human existence.’ I will quote again

Carter’s summary of this position: Watsuji usually writes of ningen sonzai, and sonzai (existence) is composed of two

characters, son (which means to preserve, to sustain over time), and zai (to stay in

place, and in this case, to persevere in one's relationships). Ningen sonzai, then, refers

to human nature as individual yet social, private as well as public, with our coming

together in relationship occurring in the betweenness between us, which relationships

we preserve and nourish to the fullest. Ethics has to do with the ways in which we, as

human beings, respect, preserve, and persevere in the vast complexity of

interconnections which etch themselves upon us as individuals, thereby forming our

45 Whether or not this is in keeping with Buddhist philosophy is controversial.

46 Yasuo Yuasa The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind- Body Theory. T.P. Kazulis (ed), Nagatomo

Shigenori and T.P. Kazulis, trans. Albany: State University of New York, 1987, p. 37. quoted in Carter

p. 10.

natures as social selves, and providing the necessary foundation for the creation of

cooperative and workable societies.

The Japanese word for ethics is rinri, which is composed of two characters, rin and

ri. Rin means ‘fellows,’ ‘company,’ [nakama] and specifically refers to a system of

relations guiding human association. Ri means ‘reason,’ or ‘principle,’ the rational

ordering of human relationships. These principles are what make it possible for human

beings to live in a cooperative community. Watsuji refers to the ancient Confucian

patterns of human interaction as between parent and child, lord and vassal, husband and

wife, young and old, and friend and friend. Presumably, one also acquires a sense of

the appropriate and ethical in all other relationships as one grows to maturity in

society. If enacted properly these relationships, which occur in the betweenness

between us, serve as the oil which lubricates interaction with others in such a way as

to minimize abrasive occurrences, and to maximize smooth and positive relationships.

One can think of the betweenness between each of us as a basho, an empty space, in

which we can either reach out to the other in order to create a relationship of positive

value, or to shrink back, or to lash out, making a bad situation worse. The space is

pure potential, and what we do with it depends on the degree to which we can

encounter the other in a fruitful and appropriate manner in that betweenness.

Nevertheless, every encounter is already etched with the cultural traditions of genuine

encounter; ideally positive expectation, good will, open-heartedness, cheerfulness,

sincerity, fellow-feeling, and availability. Ethics “consists of the laws of social

existence” writes Watsuji (Watsuji 1996, 11).

A quote from Watsuji clarifies this last point: Rin means nakama, which “signifies a

body or a system of relations, which a definite group of persons have with respect to

each other, and at the same time signifies individual persons as determined by this

system.”47 He also takes these ideas to be peculiarly Japanese: “we Japanese have

produced a distinctive conception of human being. According to it, ningen is the

public and, at the same time, the individual human beings living in it.”48

Again, we can make the following points: a). Ethics is reduced to harmonious living with other people.

b). Ethics is defined as ‘the laws of social existence.’

47 Rinrigaku p. 11. 48 Rinrigaku p.15.

Question: is anything missing from this definition of philosophy? That is, if Watsuji

was teaching this course, would he teach it in the same way?

16.6. Nothingness.

Carter again: The annihilation of the self, as the negation of negation “constitutes the basis of every

selfless morality since ancient times,” asserts Watsuji (Watsuji 1996, 225). The

negating of the group or society, and the emptying of the individual in Watsuji's sense

of the negation of each by the other pole of ningen, makes evident that both are

ultimately ‘empty,’ causing one to reflect upon that which is ultimate, and at the base

of both one's individuality and the groups with which one associates. The losing of

self is a returning to one's authenticity, to one's home ground as that source from

which all things derive, and by which they are sustained. It is the abandonment of the

self as independent which paves the way for the non-dual relation between the self and

others that terminates in the activity of benevolence and compassion through a

unification of minds. The ethics of benevolence is the development of the capacity to

embrace others as oneself or, more precisely, to forget one's self such that the

distinction between the self and other does not arise in this nondualistic awareness.

One has now abandoned one's self, one's individuality, and become the authentic

ground of the self and the other as the realization of absolute totality. Ethics is now a

matter of spontaneous compassion, spontaneous caring, and concern for the whole.49

Note the continuity between Watsuji’s thought and that of the Kyoto school

philosophers: an absolute reality (as ‘Nothingness’) is prior to all other philosophy,

including ethics. Also note the similarity with Esoteric Buddhistic thought: all

dualities are in fact incorrect, and conceal from us the truth that all people are in fact

one. Finally, note how radically anti- intellectual this doctrine is: ethics is not a matter

of calculating utility (as for Utilitarianism) or using pure reason (as with Kant) but

‘spontaneous compassion.’50 Whereas Western ethics emphasizes individual rights,

49 Carter p. 11. 50 “The tradition they are drawing on – Zen – is sometimes more or less anti-intellectual. Dōgen, the thinker they quote, regarded scholasticism as good, but only one arm in the movement towards bodhi. He viewed it as something to be cautious of, only because we tend to rely on it more than we should. (ii) The spontaneity arises out of the notion that we all possess a Buddha-nature. The Buddha-nature is the precursory state of seeing-things-as-they-really-are (yathabhutan). This involves seeing all component things as empty. This being so, we see the self as empty. This negates selfishness and enables compassion. That is the argument.” James Stewart, personal correspondence.

for Watsuji, the individual does not exist: “Hence, individuality itself does not have

an independent existence. Its essence is negation, that is, emptiness” (Rinrigaku: 80).

16.7 The State.

In the Rinrigaku, Watsuji Tetsuro explicitly rejects the individual’s role as a moral

agent. One must abandon one’s independence in order to authentically unite with

one’s social group. But in order to achieve ‘totality,’ moving beyond all of one’s

specific groups, one must turn to the State. Watsuji refers to the State as the ethical

community of all ethical communities. 51 What he means by this is that the State

eliminates all forms of egoism, something, he thinks, that other, smaller communities

(families, clans, local communities etc.) cannot accomplish. As such, the State is the

ultimate ethical community. By defining the State (in particular the Japanese Imperial

State) as the ultimate ethical state, Watsuji sees it as transcendent, as above all

communities, and the guarantor of the ethical character of all communities. As such,

the State alone can define ethics, being both the source of morality and beyond

morality. By definition, the Japanese Imperial State is the origin of morality. In the

passage below, Carter outlines Watsuji’s thinking here.

In America's National Character (1944), [Watsuji] contrasted this willingness to an

assumed selfishness or egocentrism found in the West, together with a utilitarian

ethic of expediency, which he felt was rarely able to commit to self-surrender in aid of

the state. What he saw as most exemplary in the Japanese way of life was the

Bushido ideal of “the absolute negativity of the subject” (Odin 1996, 67), through

which the totality of the whole is able to be achieved. There is no doubt that

Watsuji's position could easily be interpreted as a totalitarian state ethics. Yet, insofar

as Watsuji's analysis of Japanese ethics is an account of how the Japanese do actually

act in the world, then it is little surprise that the Japanese errors of excess which

culminated in the fascism of the Second World War period should be found somehow

implicit and possible in Watsuji's acute presentation of Japanese cultural history.

Perhaps the fault to be found lies not in his analysis per se, but rather in his all too

sanguine collapsing of the descriptive and the prescriptive. That the Japanese way-in-

51 here I am paraphrasing a thesis abstract by Bernard Bernier, of the University of Montreal: “The Transcendental State in

Watsuji Tetsuro’s Ethics.” In the seminar The Kyoto School: Neglected Themes and Hidden Variations. March 9-10, McGill

University. http://ara.mcgill.ca/events/kyotoabstracts.pdf.

the-world might include a totalitarian seed is something which demands a normative

warning. Surely this is not what should be applauded as an aspect of the alleged

superiority of Japanese culture, nor should Bushido in and of itself be taken as a

blameless path to the highest of ethical achievements. The willingness to be loyal,

whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation might be, in order to remain loyal to

one's Lord, however evil or foolhardy he might be, is not an adequate or rational

position, and it is surely not laudable ethically. It is, perhaps, the way the samurai

saw themselves, as martial servants loyal to death. But the ‘is’ here is clearly not a

moral ‘ought’.

In arguing that “the state subsumes within itself all […] forms of private life and

continually turns them into the form of the public domain,”52 Writes Carter, “in

attempting to move away from the selfishness of egoistic action, Watsuji has given

primacy to the state over individual and group rights.” Wu’s summary is similar:

“In short, in Watsuji’s dialectic, moral goodness lies with the negation of the

individual in selfless return to wholeness” (Wu: 99).

Morally worthless in and of itself, the individual functions as a formal category

whose value is derived solely from its own negation. In this sense, value is

externalized; the locus of value lies outside of the individual, who must relinquish the

self to embrace what is outside of oneself. Watsuji’s individual, then, clearly lacks

[…] value autonomy…Morality compels the individual to embrace the whole, yet the

latter is not bound by a similar ethical imperative.” (Wu: 100).

Wu adds:

“Since Watsuji’s idea of morality demands self- sacrifice, selves must exist, even

if only to be sacrificed.” (Wu: 100).

Watsuji was not, argues Carter, necessarily arguing in favor of a fascist state. Yet

Watsuji’s intentions here are not really relevant to assessment of his ethics or its

underlying assumptions. Jeffrey Wu expresses the main problem: Watsuji’s

philosophy is of a piece with the view that “ the nation is equated with value, not

subject to any moral code that supercedes itself.”53

52 LaFleur, 457. Quoted in Carter p. 16. 53 Wu, Jeffrey. “The Philosophy of As- Is: The Ethics of Watsuji Tetsuro.” Stanford

Journal of East Asian Affairs. Spring 2001, Vol. 1: 96-102, p. 32.

16.8. The Philosophy of As- Is: Jeffrey Wu’s Objection

Jeffrey Wu puts the basic problem of the Rinrigaku in these terms: “The bulk of

Watsuji’s ethical thought was composed during the Fifteen Year’s War [that is,

Japan’s ‘long’ World War II] [volumes appearing in 1934, 1937, 1942, and 1949].

[…] crucial here is the historical context of Watsuji’s ethical system. Was there

anything in Watsuji’s ethical philosophy that would have sanctioned resistance

against a state that was committing aggression and murder in the name of emperor

and nation?” 54 More generally, Wu notes that Watsuji’s schema prioritizes what is

over what ought to be (Wu: 99). As such, he asks, “How, then, does one distinguish

between the ethically good and the ethically bad?”

Discussion.

In his Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Watsuji, Robert Carter concludes with the

following assessment: By reintroducing a vivial sense of our communitarian interconnectedness, and our

spatial and bodily place in the betweenness between us, where we meet, love, and

strive to live ethical lives together, Watsuji provides an ethical and political theory

which might well prove to be helpful both to non-Japanese societies, and to a modern

Japan itself which is torn between what it was, and what it is becoming.

Jeffrey Wu, on the other hand, concludes with the following note:

All in all, the ethical choice that Watsuji offered was one of choosing what already

exists as the social totality. The question is whether that is really a choice at all. (Wu:

101).

Discussion.

a). What is Watsuji’s theory, summarized in a few sentences?

b). Would such a theory be useful to “non- Japanese societies?” That is, does it contribute anything that

we haven’t found in Western ethical theory so far?

http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal1/japan2.pdf 54 Wu p. 33.

c). Do you think Watsuji’s theory is relevant today, or is it simply an artifact of an earlier age?

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

You need to be able to explain Tatsuro Watsuji’s ethical theory (if you don’t think it is really an

ethical theory, you need to be able to explain why).

You should be able to articulate an answer to the following question: who has the more plausible

assessment of Watsuji’s ethics: Jeffrey Wu, or Robert Carter? (To write an essay on this you

should print off copies of both essays; the links are below).

16.x Bibliography

Thanks to Erik Schinkentanz (Department of Religious Studies, Tokyo University) for

advice on Kyoto School references and Tatiana Linkhoeva (Philosophy department,

Tokyo University) for fact- checking.

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published 11 November 2004. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/watsuji-tetsuro/

www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal1/japan2.pdf

Davis, Bret W. “The Kyoto School” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

First published Mon 27 Feb, 2006 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kyoto-school/

Heisig, James W. “The Religious Philosophy of the Kyoto School.” Japanese Journal

of Religious Studies, 1990 17/1. Pp. 51- 81.

Hubbard, Jamie. Review: “James W. Heisig and John C. Maraldo, eds., Rude

Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, & the Question of Nationalism.” Japanese

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6848(199724)23%3A1%3C214%3ARAZTKS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

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for Religion and Culture, 2006.

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McGill University. The Kyoto School: Neglected Themes and Hidden Variations.

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Mori, Tetsuro. “Nishitani Keiji and the Question of Nationalism,” in James W. Heisig

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Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi. Modern Japanese Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge

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William, David. “In Defense of the Kyoto School: reflections on philosophy, the

Pacific War and the making of a post- White world.” Japan Forum. Volume 12,

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Wu, Jeffrey. “The Philosophy of As- Is: The Ethics of Watsuji Tetsuro.” Stanford

Journal of East Asian Affairs. Spring 2001, Vol. 1: 96-102.

http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal1/japan2.pdf

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Online Resources:

Nihon Testugaku http://www.japanese-philosophy.org/