pfd response - dac d'orsi - westminster bridge …...mc3: given the figures for usage of the...
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Deputy Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations HQ
By email
New Scotland Yard 1 - 8 Richmond Terrace Victoria Embankment London SW1A 2JL Telephone: Email:
Reference: 24/DACSO/2019/RW 18th February 2019
Dear HH Judge Lucraft QC,
I write on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in response to your Regulation 28 Report
to prevent future deaths dated 19th December 2018. This followed the conclusion of the inquests
into the circumstances of the deaths of Kurt Cochran, Leslie Rhodes, Aysha Frade, Andreea Cristea,
PC Keith Palmer and the attacker Khalid Masood on 22 March 2017.
The Coroner’s report to prevent future deaths has been read and considered by the Commissioner
and at the highest level within the PaDP command. It will also be disseminated and discussed widely
with officers on the command.
In this letter I will address the specific recommendations within the report. This response should be
read alongside the representations made by the MPS in advance of the report being issued. A copy of
the MPS’ submission is attached to this letter.
Recommendations:
MC1: I suggest that the MPS gives consideration to providing revised Post
Instructions to relevant groups by direct emails, in hard copy and/or via
electronic devices (as well as their being accessible through ADAM) and to
providing them in a way that requires the recipient to respond indicating safe
receipt.
METROPOLITAN POLICE
1. ADAM is an IT system, with limited storage space and there are therefore restrictions on the
volume of data that can be put on it. ADAM is a comparatively slow system and it can be
difficult for officers to quickly log in and check for updates. Furthermore, the set-up of the
ADAM system presents difficulties for an effective audit of some functions. Whilst space has
now been cleared to improve the audit function, it is accepted that the data provided does
not easily enable analysis.
2. The Commissioner accepted at the inquests that there were deficiencies with the ADAM
system and in particular that there was too great a reliance upon ADAM which at the time
was the primary means of communicating changes to post instructions.
3. Following the inquests, a great deal of work has been carried out within PaDP in relation to
the ADAM system, post instructions and auditing compliance. A temporary system has been
introduced whereby officers sign a form before they take over a post to say that they have
read the post instructions and are aware of their role. This must be completed before an
officer can sign out a firearm. Changes to post instructions are now emailed directly to all
officers on PaDP, not just supervisors (see para 7 below). Further improvements will be made
following the introduction of a digital system currently on trial called AIRBOX (see para 6
below). All Sergeants and Inspectors have been briefed on their operational responsibilities
for supervision of officers on posts. Supervisors are set performance targets for post
knowledge checks on every shift.
4. As stated above, the MPS is currently procuring a system to replace ADAM and a trial of a
new system called AIRBOX will begin in February 2019. This system will not only be able to
store post instructions but is also capable of allowing the command (i.e. supervisory officers
within PaDP) to view the location of every officer, to identify any officer who is not on post
and any officer who is on a post and ought not to be. It is a system which is already being
used by other forces nationally, by counter terrorism specialist firearms officers (CTSFOs)
nationally, and is soon to be rolled out in the MPS within the Firearms Command (MO19).
Should this system be adopted in PaDP, all officers will be issued with a mobile data device to
view and use AIRBOX. The finance to procure and purchase devices has already been
approved in advance of the trial.
5. As the Chief Coroner notes, whenever post instructions are updated, all AFOs on the
command are now emailed directly informing them of this and a voting button is attached to
the email for an officer to confirm that they have read the email and will log into ADAM to
read the revised post instruction(s). The voting response forms part of a compliance audit.
Previously, notifications were routinely sent to supervisors for briefing purposes. Officers are
now required to log in to MPS information systems on a monthly basis. Supervisors monitor
whether emails have been read. This is audited where an email relates to an update to post
instructions.
6. Supervision and knowledge checks are carried out on posts by all supervisors on a daily basis.
A minimum of five checks each shift for armed and unarmed officers are completed, which
amounts to a minimum of 20 checks each day. Since the new system was implemented in
October 2018, 2643 checks have been completed. This represents an 86% increase since the
introduction of new processes and the results of these checks are shared with the senior
leadership team (SLT) in a fortnightly report and discussed at the SLT meeting. The data
forms part of monthly, quarterly and annual performance reports for the command. The
data is broken down and shared with supervisors and teams. It is used to identify any key
learning themes and these are then disseminated and addressed within the command.
7. As the MPS stated at Annex 1, all post instructions are now available to officers in hard copy
form at every post location on the POW estate and at every diplomatic post location where
suitable storage is available. These are also available in hard copy in the Sergeant’s office at
the Palace of Westminster and in every base room in PaDP buildings (Apex House, Lillie Road
base, Kensington base). Previously, hard copies of the post instructions were only available in
the mess and armouries at Palace of Westminster.
8. It is not possible to provide individual hard copies of post instructions to all officers due to
the security sensitivity of these documents. There are also restrictions upon emailing such
documents to large groups. The MPS has introduced the procedure detailed above as a
means of ensuring compliance without compromising security.
9. PaDP has developed an Innovation and Development Team (IDT) who are responsible for
compliance, audit and governance. This reports to and provides a performance pack for the
PaDP senior leadership team. This (initially temporary) team is currently one Sergeant and 12
constables. Agreement has been made for a permanent team comprising two Sergeants and
seven full time PCs.
10. A knowledge management manual has been produced online and the link shared with all
officers. Officers are also sent the relevant sections of the knowledge manual in advance of
the scheduled knowledge management checks conducted by supervisors, so that they are
able to familiarise themselves with the area about to be checked. An annual audit schedule is
in place, which enables oversight of all themes over a 12 month period. Each audit takes
place over periods of 14 to 21 days. It is planned that this manual will be stored on a system
which will enable the MPS to monitor which officers have logged into the manual, at what
time and for how long. This will be audited by the IDT. The command is looking for a suitable
system to provide this data as it must be compliant with the requisite security levels. These
improved procedures are already in place. The timeframe for the improved IT system is
addressed elsewhere in this response.
MC2: I suggest that the MPS considers making it mandatory for officers on the
Command to register for ADAM and to access it at specified intervals (perhaps
supplemented by an instruction to confirm review of material on the system).
11. Registration on ADAM was mandatory at the time of the attacks. The Commissioner accepts
that the inquests revealed that an unacceptable number of officers had not registered at the
time of the attack and that the number of officers who had accessed ADAM in the months
before the attack was also unacceptable.
12. Compliance has substantially improved and the proportion of officers on the PaDP command
who have now registered on ADAM is 100%. This is a mandatory element of the induction
course into the command which takes place in the first week of joining PaDP. This sets the
tone around knowledge requirements when officers arrive at PaDP. For existing officers,
separate instructions have been issued around registering and logging into the ADAM system
regularly. In addition, there is a separate regime of supervision checks conducted on posts to
check that officers are aware of the post instructions and complying with them. These checks
are recorded, analysed and produced in a performance report by the IDT. In addition, PaDP
has developed a ‘Skills Loss Policy’ to enable officers to be exited from the Command where
there is a loss of confidence due to a failure to comply with instructions. There has been a
significant amount of work in the background to clear enough space on the ADAM server to
be able to enable the audit functionality. This is now complete and the audit functionality is
live.
13. The recommendation in MC2 will be communicated to all PaDP supervisors and the
Professional Standards Unit to ensure that this improvement continues and that steps are
taken in the event of non-compliance. There are already formal sanctions in place through
the Unsatisfactory Performance Procedure (UPP) and Misconduct regulations. In addition,
please see Para 12 above regarding the skills loss policy which will be instigated following
UPP or misconduct proceedings. The “Skills Loss Policy” will be in place within one calendar
month.
MC3: Given the figures for usage of the ADAM System, it is a matter of concern
whether officers have (a) adequate time to access the System regularly and
review their Post Instructions and (b) adequate facilities to do so (e.g. ready
access to computer terminals). I therefore suggest that the MPS considers the
time and facilities available for officers to access the ADAM System and review
their instructions.
14. As a result of matters which came to light at the inquest, the briefings for AFOs at the POW
have changed. A bespoke briefing is mandatory whenever there has been an update to post
instructions. This is auditable through the METBATS system which is the system used by the
MPS to brief officers.
15. AFOs have periods of standby time between posts of at least one hour, but this can be two
hours or more. Officers are aware of their postings three weeks in advance and this time
must be used to refresh and improve familiarity with post instructions. All officers are
reminded of the need to refresh their knowledge when they come on duty and sign to accept
their postings for the day. An agenda item will be raised at the next challenge meeting on
01.03.19 as to whether this time is sufficient. This has also been raised with supervisors on
the PaDP command.
16. As set out above, all officers must now sign a declaration before commencing duty
confirming that they have read and understood their post instructions. Officers are not
permitted to commence post duties or sign out a firearm without singing the declaration.
Auditing of this requirement has shown a 100% compliance rate.
17. As stated above, a bespoke IT solution is being developed for the command as a priority. It is
anticipated that this will include the use of hand held devices upon which post instructions
can be viewed.
18. Work to upgrade the network at POW is ongoing and has been delayed due to cabling and
heritage issues at the POW. There are already 30 terminals currently available across PaDP
and following the upgrade and completion of works, there will be over 40 terminals available
to officers across 4 sites, 24 hours a day. More terminals are available overnight and at
weekends when office based staff are off duty. Additionally, 140 officers have personal issue
mobile tablet devices and there are docking stations at the Lillie Road base and at Charing
Cross police station.
MC4: I suggest that the MPS considers a periodic audit of all extant Post
Instructions for the Parliamentary Estate to ensure their consistency and fitness
for purpose. This might be part of the supervisory audit discussed at MC7
below, or separate from it.
19. It is accepted that different opinions were expressed at the inquests as to whether post
instructions were “open to interpretation” or not. To the extent that there was uncertainty
and a lack of precision in the wording of a small number of post instructions relating for
example to phrases such as “short patrol”, this has been addressed and such wording is no
longer used.
20. The increased and improved communication between AFOs, supervisors and tactical advisors
(as detailed in these submissions) is also used as a means of ensuring understanding and
compliance with post instructions.
21. A review of post instructions is currently taking place with the inclusion of the Counter
Terrorism Command (SO15) and the National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters
(NCTPHQ) to ensure that there is no ambiguity in post instructions. This has already resulted
in the creation of orders and instructions which have been separated from the specific post
instructions. This will be further reviewed by MPS senior managers and lawyers who were
present at the inquests, who will be able to assist in light of matters which emerged in
evidence and to ensure that the Chief Coroner’s recommendation is fully addressed. It is
expected that this will take three months to implement.
22. A new post has also been created at PaDP for a Sergeant with responsibility for reviewing
posts and post instructions. The skills criteria for this role include the requirement to be an
Operational Firearms Commander (OFC) with the ability to provide day to day tactical advice
on posts. This post reports to the Inspector with responsibility for operations and post
instructions. This post has been created, ratified and advertised internally. A Sergeant has
been selected and is in the post with support pending his OFC Course scheduled for May
2019.
MC5: It was a matter of concern that, at the time of the attack, one of the most
vulnerable and public entrances to the Parliamentary Estate was not protected
by armed police. In my view, the MPS should consider (a) imposing a standing
order that there should be armed officers stationed at all open public entry
points to the Palace of Westminster (and possibly to some other buildings on the
Parliamentary Estate) and (b) introducing a provision that this standing order
may only be varied with the written approval of an officer of very senior rank.
23. At the time of Masood’s attack, Carriage Gates should have been protected by two AFOs in
accordance with the post instructions. Steps have since been taken to ensure that this
entrance has a static armed post (two AFOs) at the gates and the gates are always protected
by at least this number of armed officers during sitting hours. This was introduced as a result
of a new tactical assessment which was conducted immediately after the attacks. The Chief
Coroner will also be aware of what he observed on the site visit and the Sir Jon Murphy
report.
24. Carriage Gates presents unique challenges for the police in providing protection and
security. The balance between the democratic symbolism of an open Parliament and the
need to protect those who work and visit the estate has been reviewed after the attack. It
remains the commitment of both the MPS and the Parliamentary authorities to ensure that
terrorists do not change our way of life or the operation of Parliament which remains open
to the public. The Chief Coroner’s observations in this regard are respectfully endorsed. As
the Chief Coroner will be aware, this is an area upon which the MPS requires the consent of
the Parliamentary Authorities.
25. The MPS does not have a relevant system of “standing orders” which could precisely and
effectively deliver that which the Chief Coroner has recommended. However, the
Commissioner recognises and accepts the rationale behind recommendation MC5.
26. The present armed policing model ensures that all open public entrances to the
Parliamentary Estate are protected by armed guards when Parliament is sitting.
27. The Commissioner can confirm that in the unlikely event that tactical advice were received
and accepted which recommended that a public entrance would not be protected by armed
guards during sitting hours then this would require the authority of an officer of at least the
rank of Chief Superintendent before implementation. At present this would be the PaDP
Commander. To the extent that this requires action it will be implemented immediately.
MC6: It was a matter of concern that officers were unaware of their Post
Instructions and that supervisory systems had not identified limited usage of the
ADAM System. I therefore suggest that the MPS considers auditing use of the
ADAM System periodically, by checks to confirm use at sufficiently regular
intervals over the period.
28. This is noted. The Commissioner respectfully submits that the answers to MC1 and MC2
above deal with this recommendation. ADAM registration and usage will continue to be
regularly audited and supervision and knowledge checks by supervisors will continue on a
daily basis until such time as a new system is commissioned and delivered.
MC7: I suggest that the MPS considers instituting regular supervisory audits of
policing at the Palace of Westminster (and perhaps other parts of the
Parliamentary Estate), preferably by officers outside the PaDP Command.
29. As the MPS explained in the Regulation 28 submission, supervision of armed officers at the
Palace of Westminster has been substantially improved. This has taken the form of increased
training for AFOs and supervisors and a significant increase in the number of checks of AFOs
by supervisors with clearly auditable records kept and monitored by senior management.
30. The review of risk assessments for posts is conducted by a Tactical Advisor from MO19. As
explained in the response to MC4 above, an additional OFC Sergeant post has been created
within the PaDP command to review posts on an ongoing basis in addition to the tactical
advice received from MO19.
31. The recommendation for an external (non PaDP) audit is noted. The MPS will introduce a
system which will require a supervisory audit to be completed at least bi-annually by officers
who are not part of the PaDP command on a trial basis. The first external audit will take
place in the summer of 2019, by which time the review of post instructions will have been
completed and any revisions implemented.
MC8: I suggest that the MPS, with the Parliamentary Authorities, reviews the
adequacy of training to ensure that it involves AFOs, unarmed officers and
security officers and their co-ordination.
32. All armed and unarmed officers on the PaDP command undergo joint officer safety training
and emergency life support training every year.
33. The MPS currently provides joint training involving AFOs, unarmed officers and security
officers. There is an extensive joint training, testing and exercising programme with
Parliament. This includes monthly table-top operations. This programme commenced in April
2018. Plans are in place to undertake a significant live testing exercise this year. These
exercises include armed and unarmed officers at all ranks and Palace Security.
34. The PaDP command has created two new roles for specialist Firearms Instructors who will
form part of the command. The instructors will advise and assist in the training of all officers,
armed and unarmed, and any training which is negotiated with Parliament to include, in light
of the Chief Coroner’s recommendations, security officers. Finance has been agreed for these
posts which will be advertised imminently. It is anticipated that due to the recruitment,
selection and workforce planning process it will take approximately three months for these
officers to be in post.
35. All unarmed supervisors on the PaDP command have observed tactical refresher training for
armed officers at the MPS firearms training facility at Milton and this will form part of the
induction to the command for unarmed supervisors going forward. The inclusion of all
unarmed officers, at all ranks, will now be factored into ongoing training.
36. Joint training with security officers will require assistance from the Parliamentary
authorities, who we are in discussion with. The MPS will negotiate with the Parliamentary
authorities to ensure that this recommendation is implemented. There are joint exercises
scheduled for March and July 2019.
MC9: I suggest that the MPS reviews the adequacy of training of officers
stationed in the Parliamentary Estate to ensure it includes lone actor and multi
actor marauding attacks.
37. Police officers within the Parliamentary Estate are trained in tactics which relate to both lone
and multi actor marauding attacks as well as knife defence. This training will be built upon at
the next round of officer safety training where it will include scenario based input and will be
shared with Royalty and Specialist Protection and Aviation Policing. The training has been
observed and noted by MO19. The Chief Coroner will appreciate that this is a matter which is
regularly reviewed at the highest level both within the MPS and nationally.
38. The MPS constantly seeks to improve training of this kind and PaDP is currently discussing
the Chief Coroner’s recommendation with MO19 and the National Police Chief’s Council. This
will feed into MPS training forthwith.
MC10: I suggest that the MPS considers the possibility of the firearms assessor
/adviser briefing officers as to the rationale for any changes to their Post
Instructions.
39. As the Chief Coroner notes, trained tactical advisers attend challenge panels and are
available to discuss post instructions and tactical planning with the PaDP Operations team.
40. The MPS notes and accepts the Chief Coroner’s recommendation and will ensure that there
is appropriate input from tactical advisers at challenge panels which are held bi-annually or
in the event of an incident requiring such.
41. The newly appointed PaDP OFC Sergeant with responsibility for internal tactical advice will
ensure that AFOs fully understand not only relevant changes to post instructions but also the
rationale behind the changes. This will happen as and when post instructions change.
MC11: I suggest that the MPS considers a periodic audit of Tactical Firearms
Reviews.
42. Tactical firearms plans are constantly reviewed on at least an annual basis. The
Commissioner notes the Chief Coroner’s recommendation MC11 and will ensure that this
continues.
Conclusion
43. As Assistant Commissioner Basu said at the conclusion of the inquests: even the possibility
that the MPS lost the chance to prevent the murder of a brave and courageous officer is
unacceptable. For the loss of that possibility to protect him from Khalid Masood, we are
deeply sorry. On behalf of the Commissioner those comments are repeated and endorsed. It
is hoped that the Chief Coroner and PC Palmer’s family will recognise from this document
and our earlier response that everything possible is being done to protect both the public
and police officers in the future.
Yours sincerely,
Lucy D’Orsi - Deputy Assistant Commissioner
IN THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT
INQUESTS ARISING FROM THE DEATHS IN THE WESTMINSTER TERROR
ATTACK 22 MARCH 2017
______________________________________________________
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF
THE METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE
REGULATION 28
______________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
1. Following receipt of the documents drafted on behalf of the family and widow of PC
Palmer, the MPS submits the following response to assist the Chief Coroner in whether
he should make a report to prevent future deaths, the areas the report should cover and
the extent of any such report.
2. The MPS notes and endorses the submissions made by CTI at paragraphs 18 to 26 of
the submissions on findings and determinations. Paragraphs 3 to 8 below are set out for
completeness.
LAW AND PROCEDURE
3. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (the 2009
Act) the Chief Coroner is required to make a report where:
(a) a senior coroner has been conducting an investigation under this Part into a
person’s death,
(b) anything revealed by the investigation gives rise to a concern that circumstances
creating a risk of other deaths will occur, or will continue to exist, in the future, and
(c) in the coroner’s opinion, action should be taken to prevent the occurrence or
continuation of such circumstances, or to eliminate or reduce the risk of death
created by such circumstances
the coroner must report the matter to a person who the coroner believes may have
power to take such action.”
4. Under the 2009 Act, the Chief Coroner is required to make a report only if the criteria
in paragraph 7 are met.
5. Before making a report, the Chief Coroner must find based on all of the available
material that there is a concern that ‘circumstances creating a risk of other deaths will
occur, or will continue to exist.’
6. A report will only be required if the Coroner is satisfied that preventative action is
required to address that risk. It is therefore open to a Coroner to decide not to make a
PFD report on the basis that, although the evidence has revealed the existence of a
concern falling within paragraph 7(1)(b), the Coroner is not satisfied that action should
be taken in order to address that concern. This will often be because the Coroner is
satisfied that action has already been taken to address the concern or that he considers
that the information available to him is insufficient to enable him to reach an adequately
informed judgment that further action is required.
7. The Chief Coroner’s Guidance No.5, at paragraph 5, identifies the need for PFD reports
to be ‘clear, focused, meaningful and, wherever possible, designed to have practical
effect.’ This is of obvious application in a case where substantial steps have already
been taken to address areas of concern raised at the inquest. It is also of relevance in
areas where concerns are raised which relate to matters of professional judgment which
require specialist knowledge (for example the relative benefits of mobile patrols and
fixed posts in armed policing).
8. The Coroner must therefore determine whether the information available to him
establishes that circumstances exist which create a risk that further deaths will occur
and if so, whether specific action needs to be taken in order to address that risk.
STEPS TAKEN SINCE THE ATTACKS OF 22.03.17
9. Immediately following the attack on 22nd March 2017, armed protection at Parliament
was reviewed and additional armed posts were introduced to strengthen the security
model. A further tactical assessment was conducted by a Tactical Firearms Assessor
and all assessment recommendations have been implemented (see statement of
Commander Usher para 84).
10. The Chief Coroner is aware that a full and comprehensive review of security
arrangements at the Palace of Westminster (POW) was undertaken by Sir Jon Murphy
following from the attack. This was a significantly wider review than the scope of these
inquests. It is of course acknowledged that Sir Jon Murphy would not have been aware
of matters revealed during the forensic examination conducted at the inquests.
11. The evidence of Commander Usher in relation to reviews since the attack was that:
There have been two recommendations made since the attack, which relate to Carriage
Gates and/or NPY, and nine individual sub recommendations. All recommendations
are being implemented unless there is a clear recorded rationale for any
recommendation not actioned. There is a live action tracker which is capturing
progress. Professional judgement is that it is likely to take approximately 3 years for
all recommendations to be fully implemented although some physical security projects
are likely to take much longer due to the complex nature of the estate. Physical changes
are being progressed by PSD and authorities.
12. It is comparatively unusual that a Coroner will be considering a PFD when there has
already been a thorough and independent review wider than the inquiry he conducted.
The Chief Coroner has had the advantage of a further report from Sir Jon Murphy
completed shortly before the inquests commenced examining the progress of his
recommendations. It is submitted that this document should be of substantial
reassurance to the Chief Coroner that steps have already been taken to enhance security
at POW. Of the 38 recommendations made to the Metropolitan Police Service and the
Security Director at Parliament by Sir Jon Murphy, Sir Jon was satisfied that 31 of the
recommendations had been completed and that progress was being made on the
remaining seven. His assessment was that progress had been more rapid and more
extensive than he had expected. The evaluation of all posts continues to be under
constant review. These reviews are conducted annually in any event.
13. It would be inappropriate to make recommendations which cut across or duplicate the
Murphy report (unless the criteria under the 2009 Act are none the less made out.)
14. The MPS is aware that none of the documentation relating to the Murphy report has
been disclosed to the IPs. In the interests of transparency therefore the concerns raised
by IPs are addressed below.
POST INSTRUCTIONS
15. The family of PC Palmer identify the following areas of concern relating to post
instructions at the Palace of Westminster.
(i) Post Instructions have been shown to be insufficiently clear and capable of
misinterpretation.
(ii) Post Instructions do not appear to have been widely accessible or visible beyond
the ADAM system.
(iii) No maps and/or visual aids are said to have accompanied the Post Instructions
accessible on the ADAM system.
(iv) The maps that were provided to the AFOs of Sector 3 of New Palace Yard
(“NPY”) did not accord with the Post Instruction.
(v) Changes to Post Instructions were not adequately communicated and/or
understood by AFOs in respect of Sector 3 and NPY.
(vi) Post Instructions were not amended after significant terrorist attacks, leading to
changes in practice that were contrary to the Post Instructions.
16. Some of these areas are also raised by the widow of PC Palmer and in particular:
(i) The MPS should reconsider the availability of tasers for all unarmed officers
working in New Palace Yard.
(ii) The MPS and the Parliamentary Authorities should consider whether the Carriage
Gates which are presently operated manually by unarmed officers could be
operated electronically to enable officers at the gates to focus on potential hazards.
(iii) The MPS should consider the adequacy of the arrangements for registering with
ADAM and consider whether there should be a mandatory requirement that AFOs
be registered to ADAM before being permitted to perform AFO duties.
(iv) The MPS should consider the adequacy of the arrangements for the dissemination
of Post Instructions and assess whether there ought to be a mandatory requirement
for officers to acknowledge receipt of and their understanding of the Post
Instructions before being permitted to carry out duties.
(v) The MPS should review the adequacy of access to computer terminals to access
the ADAM system and the reliability of the system itself.
(vi) The MPS should consider the adequacy of the arrangements for defining the scope
of non-fixed post patrols and consider whether diagrams should be provided to
ensure that the scope of patrols are adequately understood.
MPS RESPONSE REGARDING POST INSTRUCTIONS
17. These matters have been addressed by PaDP where appropriate. In particular.
(i) “Post logs” have been implemented across the command. All officers must sign a
declaration on every occasion that they are deployed on post to acknowledge they
have read and understood the current instructions (or ‘post notes’). An example is
given at Annex 1. A similar declaration is shortly to be introduced when each officer
is issued with their firearm as an additional method of ensuring understanding.
(ii) Whenever post notes are updated notification is sent to all officers (not just
supervisors) informing them of the update and that they must view the new post
notes on ADAM. An example of such an email update is at Annex 2.
(iii) The details of post notes are available to all officers in hard copy form at every post
location. Previously hard copies of the post notes were available in the mess and
armoury only as the Chief Coroner heard at the inquest.
(iv) Should any post in the future include a patrol function then an accurately
illustrated map will be included in hard copy which details the precise limits of
that patrol. Further details cannot be given on this point due to security
sensitivities relating to the current armed policing model at POW.
(v) Any changes to post notes are also communicated in daily briefings to all staff by
the Sergeant. Such changes are also included in main briefings and are recorded
on the METBATS system, which is auditable. This ensures consistency of
approach and removes any possibility of confusion in interpretation of post notes.
(vi) There are to be bi-annual “Challenge Panels” in which officers of any rank, armed
or unarmed, can constructively challenge the details of an individual post note or
the wider security model. This can be done in person at the Challenge Panel or by
submitting questions in advance. This ensures not just input from armed and
unarmed officers at POW into the review of post notes but is also an important
method of ensuring communication and understanding between all ranks around
areas for improvement. Tactical Firearms Assessors will attend these meetings
and respond to questions raised by email. The first Challenge Panel is scheduled
for December 2018.
(vii) Limitations of the ADAM system were acknowledged at the inquest. Enhanced
supervisory functionality to improve the position will be enabled by December
2018. Additionally a bespoke IT solution is being developed for the command as a
priority. The matters raised elsewhere in this document ensure that ADAM is only
part of the means by which officers are aware of and fully understand their post
notes.
(viii) The provision of TASER to unarmed officers is an area which has been addressed
in the witness statements of Commander Usher. TASER has very limited
applicability in the context of a marauding terrorist attack. Its primary function is
to stop an unarmed assailant and in particular to protect such an individual
(including those with mental health problems) from the impact of lethal firearms.
In such a situation, the MPS would expect assistance from armed colleagues and
the improvements already made are designed to protect unarmed officers in these
circumstances. As previously noted not all officers would meet the fitness level
requirements to carry TASER. Additionally not all unarmed officers would pass
the training necessary to carry TASER. It is not therefore possible for all unarmed
officers to be armed with TASER. Notwithstanding the above, PaDP are currently
in the process of delivering a TASER training programme for unarmed officers,
with twenty unarmed officers already having completed this training. Twenty
further unarmed officers await training. The aspiration is that 62% of unarmed
officers will be trained to carry TASER. For the reasons set out above regarding
TASER applicability in the context of a marauding terrorist attack, there are no
specific unarmed TASER posts.
(ix) The Chief Coroner will have seen from the site visit that Carriage Gates are now
permanently closed save for access / egress and there are armed officers at a static
post “dressed back” from the gates at all times Parliament is sitting.
(x) Automation of Carriage Gates is a matter for the Parliamentary Estate. The New
Palace Yard redesign is expected to commence February 2019. Automation of
gates is a matter being discussed between POW and the MPS.
SUPERVISION
18. The family of PC Palmer identify the following areas of concern relating to
supervision of AFOs at the Palace of Westminster.
(i) There is evidence that a substantial number of AFOs and/or supervisors regarded
post instructions to be advisory rather than mandatory.
(ii) There is evidence that supervisors had expectations of AFOs that were not
reduced to writing and not communicated in a uniform and clear way.
(iii) There is evidence that the record keeping of checks on AFOs by supervisors was
inadequate and incomplete.
(iv) There was undue reliance on the part of senior officers on individual AFOs
accessing ADAM and understanding written instructions, as opposed to ensuring
that the briefings given were in accordance with Post Instructions and provided
clear guidance.
(v) There is limited evidence of any checks to ensure that AFOs had in fact read
emails and accessed relevant Post Instructions on ADAM.
(vi) The patrol maps provided to the supervisors giving the briefings to AFOs, are
misleading and inaccurate with regards to the area that AFOs are required to
cover.
19. Some of these areas are also raised by the widow of PC Palmer and in particular:
(i) The MPS should review the arrangements for recording supervisory checks of
compliance with post instructions so as to ensure that there is an effective
system in place.
SUPERVISION – MPS RESPONSE
20. There is a degree of overlap between the measures taken by the MPS summarised above
and these further points. The MPS has not sought to repeat matters set out above. These
include steps taken to deal with interpretation of post notes and auditing of compliance
with post notes.
21. There has been a significant turnover of supervisors at both Sergeant and Inspector level
since 22.03.17. The command has used this opportunity to review the supervision model
and implement a number of significant changes namely:
(i) Supervisors now collate post note logs each day. These are then analysed as a
performance management function to ensure compliance.
(ii) Sergeants must undertake “knowledge checks” on all posts across the command
for both armed and unarmed officers. This is currently recorded in an auditable
format through the hard copy handover post note logs completed daily. This is
then fed into the performance management data mentioned at (i) above. A copy of
a record of knowledge checks is at Annex 3.
(iii) The Overt Protection Officer Course, which is completed by all officers joining
the command, has been developed to include elements specifically for supervisors
on the command. Sergeants are trained on the process described above relating to
compliance checking and complete a log to audit this. They undertake attachments
on the command, spending a day with an unarmed sergeant and a day with an
armed sergeant to understand roles of both armed and unarmed officers.
TRAINING
22. The family of PC Palmer identify the following areas of concern relating to training at
the Palace of Westminster.
(i) There has been no evidence that AFOs and unarmed officers deployed in NPY
have ever been involved in collective training, with one another, or been provided
with guidance, that would have informed them as to the appropriate action to take
in respect of a marauding terrorist attack involving possible distraction techniques.
(ii) There has been evidence that PCs Ashby and Sanders were not sufficiently aware
of relevant radio communications from officers at Carriage Gates suggesting that
this was not adequately addressed in training.
(iii) There has been no evidence of any appropriate table-exercise at NPY,
notwithstanding the clear risks of a terrorist attack at this location. The only
evidence was of a table-exercise involving an attack from the Thames.
TRAINING – MPS RESPONSE
23. The precise nature of MPS training of armed and unarmed officers was not within the
scope of the inquest and disclosure was not requested of all AFO training or officer
safety training documentation.
24. AFOs complete training which covers officer response to a possible terrorist attack.
This includes the use by terrorists of distraction techniques. It is not possible to train a
response to every conceivable attack.
25. There was no evidence of a failure in radio communication. It is understandable that
officers would have different recollections of what (if anything) was heard via the
radio during a traumatic incident such as a terrorist attack. All officers armed and
unarmed are on one channel: “DPG Despatch.”
26. There is an extensive joint training, testing and exercising programme with Parliament
that includes monthly table-top operations. This programme commenced in April 2018.
Each of the seven exercises that have taken place so far has resulted in an auditable
learning document that was shared with key stakeholders to disseminate wider learning.
Plans are in place to undertake a significant live testing exercise in April 2019. These
exercises include armed and unarmed officers at constable, sergeant and inspecting
rank.
TACTICAL FIREARMS REVIEWS
27. The family of PC Palmer identify the following areas of concern relating to tactical
firearms reviews at the Palace of Westminster.
(i) There is evidence that relevant information within the Tactical Firearms Review
was not passed on to the AFOs, namely the areas that had been assessed to be of
highest risk and the most vulnerable persons at such locations.
(ii) Tactical Firearms Reviews do not appear to have sufficiently taken account of
significant terrorist incidents that suggest the need for greater numbers of AFOs to
deal with a marauding terrorist attack involving possible distraction techniques.
TACTICAL FIREARMS REVIEWS – MPS RESPONSE
28. Between 22nd March and 27th March 2017, immediately following the attack a MPS
Security Coordinator and Tactical Firearms Assessor conducted a review of all posts.
This review led to an increase in the number of firearms posts both in New Palace Yard
(NPY) and the wider Parliamentary estate. A firearms equipped mobile armed response
capability was also stationed in NPY.
29. The bi-annual Challenge Panels mentioned above at 17 (vi) outline how officers of all
ranks can feed into the review of all posts.
30. Several of the recommendations from the review were concerned with the redesign of
NPY. These redesign plans have been approved by Parliament, Westminster City
Council and English Heritage, with a significantly more robust protective security
infrastructure.
31. In October 2017 permission was given by the Commissions of both Houses for the
default position of the vehicular gates to NPY to be closed and this remains the case.
The redesign work is expected to commence in February 2019 and as an interim
measure ballistic shields have been purchased, and will be delivered imminently, to
provide additional cover to this location and other posts at the Palace of Westminster.
METVEST
32. The widow of PC Palmer raised the following point
(i) The Physical Protection Group should consider to whether the Metvest design
could be altered to provide greater coverage and protection from knife attack.
METVEST MPS RESPONSE
33. It is submitted that it was clear from the evidence of Mr. Fenne that this is a matter
which is anxiously considered by the MPS. There is no evidence that the Metvest
design requires greater protection from knife attack. The evidence was that where the
knife engaged with the armour it was not defeated and could have withstood an attack
many times the ferocity of that unleashed by Masood.
34. As to coverage, the evidence (which was not challenged) was that there is no product
nationally or internationally which would better protect police officers and allow them
to work in relative comfort. If an officer is immobile then the risks from other forms
of attack (to them and to the public) are of course significantly increased. Police
officers undertake complex movements during their daily duties, and armour schemes
need to accommodate limb articulation and neck rotation, as well as enabling the
officer to twist, sit and bend. The design of Metvest also needs to consider sweat and
heat management of the officer, as well as interacting with MPS equipment. The
balance is a challenging one. The Physical Protection Group will continue to
encourage manufacturers to innovate new designs of armour schemes. The Chief
Coroner heard comprehensive evidence to this effect at the inquests.
WHISTLEBLOWING/OFFICER SUPPORT
35. The family of PC Palmer raises the following point:
(i) There has been evidence that suggests that officers at POW felt unable to
effectively raise their concerns about changes to security arrangements at
Palace of Westminster, particularly in respect of their belief that a patrol of
NPY would leave others more vulnerable.
WHISTLEBLOWING/OFFICER SUPPORT – MPS RESPONSE
36. It is not accepted that there was evidence to this effect heard at the inquests. The MPS
refers the Chief Coroner to the “Challenge Panels” outlined above which would deal
with such concerns as have been raised by the family.
37. The MPS has for a considerable period of time had a Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP) dealing with reporting of wrongdoing and a dedicated online and telephone
system (the Right Line and Right Line online) enabling officers to report concerns
about wrongdoing.
CONCLUSION
38. The MPS would submit that all the concerns raised by the IP’s and the court have
been considered in depth by the MPS and extensive steps have been taken to address
these matters making a PFD report directed at the MPS unnecessary.
Matthew Butt
Three Raymond Buildings
Gray’s Inn London
WC1R 5BH
09.11.18
OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE ,;_; METROPOLITAN
: .;J)' '. POLICE TOTAL POLICING
Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection
Date ... J..~ ... (!.~ .. (.J.~ ................. . -AIL Post No: ...... ~ ... ~ ...................... ....... .
This log sheet must be signed for a twenty-four hour period ONLY
I am on duty having assumed responsibility for this post (numbered above) having read and understood the published Post Note . I am aware of my role and responsibilities at this post.
' Time Name Su ervlsor
z._ z I, s
Completed forms MUST be emailed to PaDP Mailbox - Diplomatic Operations
OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE
Time . Name Warrant No Signature ./_ Supervisor
½o ~\Ji 5 ·1-.t-VV?'-( e,"t,,-1 "'~ . ~SO" 'lA o?M- - "\.. '\.,,,' q ')tf
•
-
..
Completed forms MUST be emailed to PaDP Mailbox - Diplomatic Operations
1
Shannon Audrey - Parliamentary & Diplomatic Protection
From: Shannon Audrey - Parliamentary & Diplomatic ProtectionSent: 05 November 2018 17:07To: Southall Damian - SO COGSubject: FW: POW Armed Post Instruction Updated.
This is the standard practice now Audrey
From: Harris Andrew A.J - Parliamentary & Diplomatic Protection Sent: 11 October 2018 12:17 To: PaDP - Operations < ; PaDP - Ranger >; PaDP - SLT < >; PaDP Mailbox - Grip & Pace ; PaDP Mailbox - Resource Planning < >; PaDP - All PC's
>; PaDP - Sergeants <S ; PaDP - All Inspectors <>
Subject: POW Armed Post Instruction Updated.
Link to Adam can be found via the PaDP Info Point. file:///S:\FP\SO6\370_Managing_Information\100_Sharing\SO6_CIP\index.htm Regards Andy H Andrew Harris PC 2312SO Diplomatic Operations Parliamentary & Diplomatic Protection (PaDP) Phone:
Parliam ,entary & Diplomatic Protection Prore-c1rvese-c1.1r:l1y Op,erall ons
ADAM It Is each o·ffllcer's responsibility to ensure they hav,e read the post notes tor their
deplQyment. Please make sure y'Clu are up-to-,5,peed by che,ckiingADAM regular1y.
As of 11.11 Of:2!018. The PoW Ar,med Officer Postl nstructions have been u pd'.at:&d.
If po--sted to PQW please view the Po--st I nstJ1Jc ion,5, on ADAM, Changes have been made to:
• ca rnage Gaites • Members Entrance • Peers Entrance • Bia-ck Rod's Entrance (both vehicle and pedestliian)
For strlcl compllanci!i PaDP St:T
2
Metphone: E-mail: Mail: 2nd Floor, William IV Street, London WC2N 4DH Unless otherwise stated the content of this email should be considered as RESTRICTED
DateOfficer completing
formOfficer questioned: Officer's Team Questions topic Please select option that best describes the answers given:
DD/MM/
YYYY
SURNAME Shoulder
No
SURNAME Shoulder
NoWhich post, Op Name etc
01/10/18 C PS FTT3 BRP and archive access arrangemtents Acceptable
01/10/18 PS Ped Gate and Lord Chancellors Breakfast Acceptable
02/10/18 PS Team 2 Carriage Gates S Post notes, First Aid Kits Acceptable
02/10/18 PS Team 2 6 PAT, Checks, Sigma, BWV Acceptable
02/10/18 PS FTT 6 Post 20CG temporary arrangements Acceptable
02/10/18 Insp Checked the Database and email sent to all Ps's Guidance Given
02/10/18 PS FTT 6
St Stephen's opening times and out of hour
protocols for PoW staff Guidance Given
02/10/18 PS FTT2 ped gate and CGS and acid kits Acceptable
02/10/18 PS team 3 6 pat and cordon distances Acceptable
03/10/18 PS Team 2 Sigma, First Aid, Lockdown Acceptable
03/10/18 PS Team 2 Lockdown First Aid, Post procedures Acceptable
03/10/18 PS Team 6
Location of First aid - 5.11 trauma bags CGS /
Who would a Brown pass holder be a member
of?, PRESS! Acceptable
03/10/18 PS Team 6
Where would an officer find copies of the post
notes, CGS? RCM PS office and PaDP shared
drive. Acceptable
03/10/18 PS Team 1 Location of acid attack kits, water bottles etc? Acceptable
03/10/18 PS Team 4
Corus - Post notes and officers positioning
inside of Tiger trap of CORX Acceptable
03/10/18 PS Team 6
Location of fite extinguishers CORX,
maintenance, use & operational order of fire
equipment. Acceptable
Supervisors are required to carry out regular knowledge checks with their deployed officers and record the results on the database below. The knowledge checks are primarily aimed at developing
knowledge regarding the content of the officers relevant post notes, but associated knowledge of powers and policy with particular regard to Parliament, and also contingency plans i.e. fire evacuations or
operations knowledge should be considered
Supervisors are requested to complete one line entry for each officer spoken to. The final column relates to the quality of the answers given, and it is stressed that this process is to assist knowledge
development, performance and professionalism of officers, and not for sanction purposes. If an officers answers are predominantly acceptable, then that would be the appropriate drop down option. If
officers require some guidance as a result of the questions asked, then that is the appropriate drop down to select and supervisors would be expected to follow up that development in future checks to
ensure the improvements are supported. If the answers are wholly unacceptable which thereby raise concerns of the officers knowledge and abilities, then the 'Not acceptable' drop down would be used
and the officers Line Manager
should be contacted to ensure a development process is initiated.
Knowledge Check Database
Page 1 of 7
I I
03/10/18 PS Team 1
Derby Gate - Post note checks, location of
ballistic first aid bag. Acceptable
03/10/18 PS Team 6 Curtis Green - Post note check Acceptable
03/10/18 PS Team 6
CGS - security, locking up and opening of Ped
gate. Guidance Given
03/10/18 PS Team 4 6 Pat use of SIGMA, radiation detection unit Acceptable
03/10/18 PS FTT3
BRP - access protocol and locking up
proceedure Acceptable
04/10/18 PS Team 3
CGS - ped gate protocol overnight and bergen
location Acceptable
04/10/18 PS Team 4
BRP - access protocol and locking up
proceedure Acceptable
04/10/18 PS Team 4
Corus Lane - location of ballist first aid
bergens? Guidance Given
04/10/18 PS Team 6 CGS - Lockdown procedure Acceptable
04/10/18 PS Team 6
CGS / Ped Gate opening & closing times and
staff pass colours Acceptable
04/10/18 PS Team 6
Corus lane - location as to where polcie
officers should be stood, i.e. in the box
entrance Guidance Given
04/10/18 PS Team 6 Ped gate - Post notes, location of? Acceptable
04/10/18 PS Team 4 Bergen first aid kit location? Guidance Given
04/10/18 PS Team B Terrace Acceptable
04/10/18 PS Team C Port Cullis Acceptable
05/10/18 PS Team B
Derby Gate - Post note checks, location of
ballistic first aid bag. Acceptable
05/10/18 PS Team B
BRP - access protocol and locking up
proceedure Acceptable
06/10/18 PS S/E Carriage Gate Post notes Acceptable
06/10/18 PS S/E St Stephens use of Bergens and acid kits Acceptable
08/10/18 PS Team 2
Colour of various HoC passes, what do they
mean? Acceptable
08/10/18 PS Team 2
Where are the post notes to be found for all
posts? Nearest Ballistic first aid bag (North
gate box) Acceptable
08/10/18 PS Team 2
TOR - Location of nearest ballistic bag? (CG
search point) Acceptable
08/10/18 PS Team 2
What are yopur roles and responsibilities at
PED GATE (CGS) entrance opening times etc. Acceptable
08/10/18 PS Team 2 6 Pat Patrol areas, areas of risk Acceptable
08/10/18 PS Team 2
6 Pat Patrol, crime report relating to maliscious
comms Acceptable
08/10/18 PS PADP Armed
Derby Gate - Post note checks, location of
ballistic first aid bag. Acceptable
08/10/18 PS Team B BRP Post notes Acceptable
Page 2 of 7
08/10/18 PS Team D Bergen first aid kit location? CGE Acceptable
09/10/18 PS Team 6
TOR - Pass holders, Pink / Yellow passes,
what do they designated? (Restrictions) Acceptable
09/10/18 PS CGS - Lock down procedure Acceptable
09/10/18 PS
Ped gate - location of ballistic bag? What does
a purple pass holder designate can and can't
do? Acceptable
09/10/18 PS
Lock down procedure at CGN, vehicle
entrance? Acceptable
09/10/18 PS Team A Bergen first aid kit location? Derby Gate Acceptable
09/10/18 PS Team C Curtis Green Post notes Acceptable
10/10/18 PS FTT 1
Ped gate 8P - closure, out of hours armed
protocol. Bergen location Acceptable
10/10/18 PS FTT1
WF duties, s128 SOCPA boundary and Peers
car park protocols Acceptable
11/10/18 PS FTT4
TOR 8S - new procedures surrounding opening
of ped lanes for CORUS, PAB alarms checks Acceptable
11/10/18 PS FTT5
TOR 8S - new procedures surrounding opening
of ped lanes for CORUS, PAB alarms checks Acceptable
11/10/18 PS FTT6 Curtis Green- acid kit Acceptable
11/10/18 PS FTT2 Central Lobby- cordon distances Acceptable
12/10/18 PS FT2 6 PAT Post notes, logs, patrols Acceptable
12/10/18 PS FT2 CGS, Post Notes, Lock Down Acceptable
12/10/18 PS FTT1 Corus. Enhanced first aid Guidance Given
12/10/18 PS FTT1 BR veh, cordon distances Acceptable
12/10/18 PS FTT5 BR ped, passes and enhanced fist aid kits Acceptable
12/10/18 PS FTT3 Curtis Green, lockdown procedures Acceptable
13/10/18 PS team 4 Carriage gates and enhanced first aid Guidance Given
13/10/18 PS FTT2 TOR and acid kits first aid Acceptable
14/10/18 PS Team 4 6 pat and acid kits Acceptable
14/10/18 PS Team 4 CGS and enhanced first aid kits Acceptable
15/10/18 PS Team 3 CGS / 8P new operating procedure Acceptable
15/10/18 PS Team CGN Acid kits - Advice given Guidance Given
15/10/18 PS Team POST 48 - PASSES and Lock down Acceptable
15/10/18 PS Team CGN - Lockdown process Acceptable
15/10/18 PS Team 6 CGN - Colour of HoC Passes Guidance Given
15/10/18 PS Team 6 PAT - response to chemical incidents Acceptable
15/10/18 PS Team 6 PAT - Acid kit - water location Acceptable
15/10/18 PS Team 6
CGS - Ped Gate security / positioning of
barriers Acceptable
16/10/18 PS Team C Peers post notes Acceptable
16/10/18 PS Team C BR Vehicle post notes Acceptable
Page 3 of 7
16/10/18 PS Team 5 Peers Car Park & Passes Acceptable
16/10/18 PS FTT 5 TOR (8S) EEFA Bergens & Locations Advice given
16/10/18 PS Team 4 6 PAT - Patrol areas & Sigma Acceptable
16/10/18 PS team 4 black rods vehicles Acceptable
16/10/18 PS team 1 Lower waiting - Post notes Acceptable
17/10/18 PS FTT1 St Stephens use of Bergens Acceptable
17/10/18 PS FTT2 Central Lobby powers for removal Acceptable
17/10/18 PS FTT5 Post 10 bergens Acceptable
17/10/18 PS team 3 TOR Acceptable
17/10/18 PS FTT4 St Stephens Acceptable
18/10/18 PS Team 2
Derby Gate - Post note checks, location of
ballistic first aid bag. Acceptable
18/10/18 PS Tasking Team 2 Post 45, Post Notes, First Aid Kits Acceptable
18/10/18 PS TT4 CGN, Enhanced First Aid, Posty Notes Acceptable
18/10/18 PS TT6 BRP, Acid Kits, Post Notes Acceptable
18/10/18 PS Team 2
TOR, Enhanced First Aid Kits, Acid Kits, Lock
Down Procedures Acceptable
18/10/18 PS TT1 St Stephens, Acid Kits, Lock Down, Post Notes Acceptable
20/10/18 PS FTT1 St Stephens, Acid Kits, Lock Down, Post Notes Acceptable
20/10/18 PS Team 2 CGS, Lock Down, Post notes Acceptable
20/10/18 PS Team 2 6PAT, First Aid Aits, Lock Down Acceptable
21/10/18 PS FTT1 3S ped gate opening protocol Memebrs off Acceptable
21/10/18 PS Team 3
6WF 128 boundary and offences committed
and points to prove Acceptable
22/10/18 PS Team 2 Enhanced First Aid, Lock Down Acceptable
22/10/18 PS Team 2 Post Notes, First Aid, Lock Down Acceptable
23/10/18 PS Team 3 CGN, Enhanced First Aid, Posty Notes Acceptable
23/10/18 PS Team 3 Ped gate Acceptable
23/10/18 PS Team 5
BR PED, Post Notes, First Aid Kits, Post Log,
Lock Down Acceptable
23/10/18 PS Team
Chancellors, Post Ntes, signed Log, First Aid
Kits and Lock Down Procedures Acceptable
23/10/18 PS Team
Chancellors, Post Ntes, signed Log, First Aid
Kits and Lock Down Procedures 2 checks
completed at change over time Acceptable
23/10/18 PS Team
Peers, Lock Down, First Aid Kits, Log book
signed Acceptable
23/10/18 PS Team Fixed 2
TOP Ramp, Lock Down, First Aid Kits Post
Notes Acceptable
23/10/18 PS Team Team 3 8P, Post notes, Lock Down, First Aid Kits Acceptable
23/10/18 PS Team
CG, Post notes, Lock Down, First Aid, Log
Book signed Acceptable
23/10/18 PS SO18 Post notes BRV Guidance Given
Page 4 of 7
23/10/18 PS SO18 Post notes BRV Guidance Given
23/10/18 PS FTT1 Central Lobby/ Passes Acceptable
23/10/18 PS Team 6 Back of the chair, lockdown Acceptable
23/10/18 PS FTT5 Peers, enhanced first aid Acceptable
23/10/18 PS FTT5 Lower waiting - Post notes Acceptable
23/10/18 PS FTT5 Committee rooms and removal of persons Acceptable
24/10/18 PS Team 3 CGS and Ped gate notes, acid kit Acceptable
24/10/18 PS Team 3 CGS and passes Acceptable
24/10/18 PS Team 3 CGS and lockdown Acceptable
24/10/18 PS TT3 Chancellors Acceptable
24/10/18 PS Team 1 6WF Acceptable
24/10/18 PS TT5 007 Acceptable
24/10/18 PS TT5 CORUS Acceptable
24/10/18 PS TT5 Curtis Green - Post note checks Acceptable
24/10/18 PS Team 1 St Stephens - Post note checks Acceptable
24/10/18 PS TT5 Ped gate - Post note checks Acceptable
24/10/18 PS TT5 Derby Gate - Post note checks Acceptable
24/10/18 PS Team 1 West front - Post note checks Acceptable
25/10/18 PS Team 4 CGS and acid kits Acceptable
25/10/18 PS Team 4 6 Patrol and lockdown Acceptable
25/10/18 PS Team 4 Derby Gate Acceptable
25/10/18 PS TT 3 Curtis Green - Bergan Location Acceptable
25/10/18 PS Team 1 TOR - Bergan Location Acceptable
25/10/18 PS TT4 Corus - Bergan Location Acceptable
25/10/18 PS TT1 Black Rods Ped Acceptable
25/10/18 PS team3 post 24 PAB Acceptable
25/10/18 PS team 3 post 48 bergen checks Guidance Given
25/10/18 PS team 5 post 45 PAB Acceptable
25/10/18 PS team 3 007 and acid/bergens Acceptable
25/10/18 PS team 2 post 52 and lockdown Acceptable
25/10/18 PS team 3 bergens and lockdown Acceptable
26/10/18 PS Team 6 Bergens and Post Notes, Post 10 Acceptable
26/10/18 PS Team 5 First Aid Kits, Post Notes Post 12 Acceptable
26/10/18 PS Team 3 CGS First Aid Lock Down Procedures Acceptable
26/10/18 PS Team 5 CGN, Fist Aid, Lock Down Post Notes Acceptable
26/10/18 PS Team 3 Curt, First Aid, Lock Down, Post Notes Acceptable
27/10/18 PS Team 2 6 PAT, Checks, Sigma, Post Notes Acceptable
27/10/18 PS Team 2 3S, First Aid, Lock Down, Post Notes Acceptable
27/10/18 PS Tasking 6 A Richmond House, Post Notes Acceptable
27/10/18 PS Tasking 6 A TOR, Post Notes, Lock Down, First Aid Acceptable
27/10/18 PS Team 1 6 PAT, Checks, Sigma, Post Notes Acceptable
27/10/18 PS Team 1 6 PAT, Checks, Sigma, Post Notes Acceptable
Page 5 of 7
28/10/18 PS Team 1 Richmond House, Post Notes Acceptable
28/10/18 PS Team 2 Ped Gate, Post Notes, First Aid Acceptable
28/10/18 PS Team 2 6 PAT, SIGMA, Post Notes, First Aid Acceptable
28/10/18 PS Team 2 Ped Gate, post notes Acceptable
28/10/18 PS Team 2
Ped gate, restricted acces to contractors,
opening times Acceptable
28/10/18 PS Team 2 6PAT, security patrol area's Acceptable
28/10/18 PS Team 2 6PAT, Response to CBRN (steps 123) Acceptable
28/10/18 PS Team 2 Ped, post notes, lock down & first Aid kits Acceptable
28/10/18 PS FFT1 Richmond house - Post notes Acceptable
28/10/18 PS Team 1 6PAT and Sigma Acceptable
28/10/18 PS Team 4 CGS and night duty date proceedure Acceptable
28/10/18 PS Team 1 6PAT and first aids Acceptable
29/10/18 PS team 3 CGN and bergens Acceptable
29/10/18 PS team 4 chancellors and lockdown Acceptable
29/10/18 PS team 4 oo7 and acid kits Acceptable
29/10/18 PS Team 4 ped gate and post notes Acceptable
29/10/18 PS team 4 post 4 and lockdown Guidance Given
29/10/18 PS team 4 post 12 passes Acceptable
29/10/18 PS team 5 post 10 post notes Acceptable
29/10/18 PS team 4 post 11 and bergens Acceptable
29/10/18 PS Team 1A Post 45, Lockdown, Post notes First Aid Acceptable
29/10/18 PS Team 5B Post CL, Lockdown, First Aid, DFIB Acceptable
29/10/18 PS Team 5B Post 49, Lockdown First Aid, Notes Acceptable
29/10/18 PS Team 3B Post CGN, Lockdown, Post Notes Acceptable
29/10/18 PS Team 5A TOR, First Aid, Post notes Lockdown Acceptable
29/10/18 PS Team 5A Lockdown, First Aid, DFIB Acceptable
29/10/18 PS Team 4 First Aid, Lockdown, Post Notes Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Team 6
BRG Ped gate - function guest entry protocol,
archive access arrangements Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Team 3 6 Pat and Sigma 3 useage Acceptable
30/10/18 PS team 3 Post CGN, Lockdown, Post Notes Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Team 6 Post 10 and lockdown Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Team 3 post 11 and bergens Acceptable
30/10/18 PS FTT2 Post CL and first aid kits Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Team 2 TOR, Bergens, Lock Down Post Notes Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Team 5A CG, Bergens, Post Notes, Bergens Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Team 1 PL Bergens, Post Notes, Lock Down Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Team 1 Derby, Post Notes, Lock Down, First Aid Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Tasking 1 CL, Lock Down, Bergens, Lockdown Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Team 2 Sigma, First Aid, Lockdown Acceptable
Page 6 of 7
30/10/18 PS Tasking 5 Post CL and first aid kits Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Tasking 1 Post Peers Car Park and Bergens Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Tasking 3 Post Corus and Bergens Acceptable
30/10/18 PS Tasking 1 Post CL and first aid kits Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Team 2 corus x and BR vehicles Acceptable
31/10/18 PS team 2 CGS and Ped gate notes, acid kit Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Team 4 Chancellors and bergens Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Team 3 Ped gate lock down, passes Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Team 4 Derby gate, pass colours, vehicle access Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Team 4 CGS lockdown Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Team 4 CGN lockdown , first aid kit locaton Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Team 4 Lockdown procedure TOR Acceptable
31/10/18 PS FTT2 TOR, lockdown procedure Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Team 4 Ped gate, CGS passes, ballistic bag location Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Team 4 Lockdown procedure Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Tasking 1 CL, Lock Down, Bergens Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Tasking 1 Post 45, first aid kits Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Team 2 CORUS, Bergens Acceptable
31/10/18 PS Tasking 1 CHAN, Bergens Acceptable
01/11/18 PS CL and lockdown Acceptable
Page 7 of 7