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Petros Oikonomakos Petros Oikonomakos Mark Mark Zwolinski Zwolinski Controller Self-checking in Controller Self-checking in a Controller / Datapath a Controller / Datapath Architecture Architecture Electronics and Computer Science University of Southampton, UK Electronic Systems Design Group 3 rd UK ACM SIGDA Workshop on EDA Southampton, UK, 11-12 September 2003

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Electronics and Computer Science. Controller Self-checking in a Controller / Datapath Architecture. Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski. 3 rd UK ACM SIGDA Workshop on EDA Southampton, UK, 11-12 September 2003. Electronic Systems Design Group. University of Southampton, UK. Outline. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Petros OikonomakosPetros Oikonomakos Mark ZwolinskiMark Zwolinski

Controller Self-checking in a Controller Self-checking in a Controller / Datapath ArchitectureController / Datapath Architecture

Electronics and Computer Science

University of Southampton, UKElectronic Systems Design Group

3rd UK ACM SIGDA Workshop on EDA

Southampton, UK, 11-12 September 2003

Page 2: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Outline

Introduction

Target Architecture

Parity-based Techniques

Intrinsically Secure States

Self-checking design theory

1/n self-checking

Conclusion

Page 3: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Introduction

Starting point : controller / datapath system, self-checking datapath [Oikonomakos et al, DATE 2003]

Goal : controller self-checking, integration with previous work

Requirements : technology independence, ease of automation (time to market), area efficiency, adherence to self-checking theory

Complete, automatically produced, controller / datapath self-checking solution!!!

Page 4: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Target Architecture

stat

e re

gis

ter

next state logic

……

.

….

dec

od

er

….

A B encoded state one-hot

control signals

N N+1

N+2

……

.

O1 O2

O3

O4

Controller / datapath architecture

Possibly several communicating FSMs

Previous work : self-checking at point A

Self-checking at point B is essential!!!

Page 5: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Per process parity-based self-checking

P1 P2 Pn-1 Pn

…… …

…..

……

..

……

..

……

..

……

.. …

…..

……

.. …

…..

Odd parity

checker PC1

Odd parity

checker PC2

Odd parity

checker PCn-1

Odd parity

checker PCn

……

Dual-rail checker / response compactor

Co

ntr

ol S

ign

als

Co

ntro

l Sig

nals

……

m2 mn-1

1 1

m1 mn

1 1

0

Page 6: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Single parity-based self-checking P1 P2 Pn-1 Pn

…… …

…..

……

..

……

..

……

..

……

.. …

…..

……

.. …

….. C

on

tro

l Sig

nal

s

Co

ntro

l Sig

nals

Odd parity checker

1

“dummy” inserted if n=2k

m2 Pd mn-1

1 1

0

1 1

m1 mn

Page 7: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

per process parity checking : ~(NS+5×n) gates

single checker : ~NS gates

NS : total number of states

n : number of processes

the higher the degree of parallelism, the more the hardware savings!!!

Hardware Costs

Viterbi encoder synthesis results (Target Technology Xilinx Virtex XCV 1000 FPGA)

Version Area (slices)

Delay (clock cycles)

Area overhead %

original 174 4 N/A controller (parity_1)

self-checking 184 4 5.7%

controller (parity_2) self-checking

178 4 2.3%

Page 8: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Intrinsically Secure (I.S.) States

N N+1

N N+1

(a) Zero-error latency duplication-based self-checking design

(b) Accepting an error latency of a single clock cycle

+1 +1΄

!=

+1 +1΄ !=

Page 9: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Exploiting I.S. States in a process

Normal State

Intrinsically Secure State

Co

ntro

l Sig

nals

Odd Parity Checker

basic scheme

detects all single control signal faults

possibly little hardware saving

several multiple faults are also detected!!!

Page 10: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Per process I.S. states-based self-checking P1 P2 Pn-1 Pn

IS

IS

no

n-IS

IS

n

on

-IS

……

……

..

……

..

……

..

……

..

Odd parity

checker PC1

Odd parity

checker PC2

Odd parity

checker PCn-1

Odd parity

checker PCn

……

Dual-rail checker / response compactor

Control Signals

Control Signals

……

OR

OR

Control Signals

OR

OR

Control Signals

no

n-IS

no

n-I

S

IS

1 1

m1 mn

1 1

m2 mn-1

0

Page 11: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Single I.S. states-based self-checking

IS

Pd

1

P1 P2 Pn-1 Pn

IS

no

n-I

S

…… …

…..

……

..

……

..

0

Odd parity checker

Control Signals

Control Signals

OR

OR

Control Signals

OR

OR

Control Signals

no

n-IS

no

n-I

S

IS

IS

no

n-IS

m2 mn-1

1 “dummy”

inserted if n=2k

1 1

1 1

m1 mn

Page 12: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

First experimental results

Qrs benchmark

Target Technology Alcatel CMOS .35 VLSI

Version Area (gates)

Delay (clock cycles)

Area overhead %

datapath self-checking 25132 52 N/A datapath and controller (parity_1) self-checking

25229 52 ~0.4%

datapath and controller (IS_1) self-checking

(27 IS states)

27465

51

9.3%

Page 13: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Self-checking design theory

Functional Circuit

Checker

Error

the fault-secure property

the self-testing property

the totally self-checking (TSC) property

checker structure + system operation

modelled faults Φ

code inputs A

code outputs B

Page 14: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Example

stuck-at-0 1

2

3

5-bit odd parity checker

A

B

C D

E

X Φ={all stuck-at faults}

A={01110, 01000, 00111}

B={01, 10}

Page 15: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Self-checking design theory

Four vectors required to achieve the TSC goal for a parity checker (Khahbaz and McCluskey, TCOMP

1984)

1 0 1…………..

0 1 1…………..

1 1 0…………..

0 0 0…………..

rows : distinct, same parity

each column : exactly 2 1s and 2 0s

Page 16: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Self-exercising parity checker design X1 X2 Xn

Q1 Q2 Qn ……….. D Q CK

D Q CK

D Q CK cn-1 c1 cn

.……………….…………………….

Conventional Parity Checker

taken from Tarnick, VLSI Design 1998

Page 17: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

1/n checker by Khakbaz, TCOMP 1982

2-R

AIL

CH

EC

KE

R

CO

DE

T

RA

NS

LA

TO

R

……

……

..

……

……

..

1-out-of-n 2-rail

TSC for n>3

generic

technology-independent

friendly to design automation

sometimes criticised as slow, but this does no harm here

Page 18: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Per process 1/n self-checking

P1 P2 Pn-1 Pn

…… …

…..

……

..

……

..

……

..

……

.. …

…..

……

.. …

…..

1/n

checker C1

1/n

checker C2

1/n

checker Cn-1

1/n

checker Cn

……

Dual-rail checker / response compactor

Co

ntr

ol S

ign

als

Co

ntro

l Sig

nals

……

m2 mn-1

1 1

m1 mn

1 1

0

Page 19: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Per process 1/n self-checking utilising I.S. states P1 P2 Pn-1 Pn

IS

IS

no

n-IS

IS

n

on

-IS

……

……

..

……

..

……

..

……

..

1/n

checker C1

1/n

checker C2

1/n

checker Cn-1

1/n

checker Cn

……

Dual-rail checker / response compactor

Control Signals

Control Signals

……

OR

OR

Control Signals

OR

OR

Control Signals

no

n-IS

no

n-I

S

IS

1 1

m1 mn

1 1

m2 mn-1

0

Page 20: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Version Area (gates)

Delay (clock cycles)

Area overhead %

datapath self-checking 6143 22 N/A datapath and controller

parity-based self-checking 6460 22 5.2%

datapath and controller parity-based self-checking,

utilising 7 IS states

6404

22

4.2%

datapath and controller 1/n self-checking

6325 22 3.0%

datapath and controller 1/n self-checking utilising 7

IS states

6307

22

2.7%

Experimental results

Diffeq benchmark

Target Technology Alcatel CMOS .35 VLSI

Page 21: Petros OikonomakosMark Zwolinski

Conclusion

self-checking at the raw, one-hot control signals

alternative controller self-checking schemes

datapath self-checking resource reuse (Intrinsically Secure States)

implementation within a synthesis system, providing full datapath and controller self-checking solutions