persuasion, self-persuasion and rhetorical discourse

Persuasion, Self-Persuasion and Rhetorical DiscourseAuthor(s): Don M. BurksSource: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring, 1970), pp. 109-119Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40236711 .

Accessed: 17/01/2014 11:52

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Penn State University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy&Rhetoric.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 138.251.14.35 on Fri, 17 Jan 2014 11:52:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=psup

http://www.jstor.org/stable/40236711?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


Persuasion, Self-Persuasion and Rhetorical Discourse

Don M. Burks

The main objective of this paper is to présent self-persuasion as a

phenomenon which is similar to interpersonal rhetorical discourse, and one which suggests that as we may persuade ourselves in an

authentic way, so we may persuade others authentically. Much of

the discussion will hâve référence to certain of the essays on rhetoric

and philosophical argumentation by Maurice Natanson and by

Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. The first part of the paper is a brief dis-

cussion of a terminological problem concerning the concept of

persuasion. I

In the second issue of Philosophy and Rhetoric (Spring, 1968) Richard Zaner ofFers a criticai discussion of certain essays in the

volume edited by Natanson and Johnstone.1 At one point Zaner

says, "An argument may, as Natanson emphasizes ... exhibit an

intent to persuade or it may be intended to convince. Rhetoric,

say most of the authors in this [Natanson and Johnstone] volume

is distinctively concerned with the former and not the latter."2 One

would be immediately certain of what Zaner means hère were it not

for his association of thèse terms with Natanson, for Natanson

frequently uses them, or terms very similar to them, in an unusual

way. Traditionally, "argument to persuade" refers to situations where

both "logicai" and "psychological" appeals are used, whereas in

"argument to convince" "logicai" appeals are chiefly used. Perhaps the distinction, however tenuous, may best be thought of as one

between "attitude-establishing" and "knowledge-establishing" characteristics of argument.3

For Natanson, however, the "rhetoric of persuading" refers to

argument where self is risked as distinguished from the "rhetoric of

Now at the University of Washington, Don M. Burks has accepted a position as Associate Professor of Communication at Purdue University.

109



1 10 PERSUASION, SELF-PERSUASION, RHETORICAL DISCOURSE

convincing," where self is not risked. Hère it appears that Natanson uses Johnstone's thesis regarding risk, his thesis that "the point of argument is not to provide effective control over others," but to introduce all the participants of argument into "a situation of risk in which openmindedness and tolérance are possible."4 The con-

cept of risk as stated by Johnstone and amplified by Natanson is, I think, thè most meaningful idea yet to be suggested in newly developing thought concerning philosophy and rhetoric. It is the one concept which the black militant in the undergraduate class, thè graduate student in the seminar, and colleagues of differing interests all find significant.

The "rhetoric of convincing" not only does not involve risk but, according to Natanson, is a species of rhetoric involving techniques for attempting to control others, "to convince them of this or that. . . . The issue is one of manipulation."5 One's subjective being, his

personal reality is not at issue. The techniques of argument hère are so impersonal as to be équivalent to the bidding of North or West around a hypothetical bridge table where any player might take over the hand of another. An example Natanson gives is that of a stockbroker and his client; risks and motives may certainly be involved in such an exchange, but he maintains that personal subjectivity is not risked.

By contrast, the "rhetoric of persuading" involves genuine argument and risk, "the commitment of the self to the füll implications of a philosophical dialectic."6 What one risks is the possibility that the conséquences of an argument may make one see, realize more fully, the structure of his immediate perceptions and feelings. That is, as the resuit of entering into an argumentative situation involving a shaking up of the Gestalt (or perhaps in this case, the Welt- anschauung), one may corne to be more fully aware of the value System by which he actually lives. An example Natanson gives to show where the "rhetoric of persuading" cannot occur is an en- counter with a racist whose Statement that "the niggers are certainly taking over the South ..." so infuses a conversation with bad faith that genuine argument is not possible. Says Natanson, "To persuade the Other in this case would mean to force the présence of the self, the riskingof the self."7

Apparently, the "rhetoric of persuading" reveals the existential self, the self which includes not only ail that is ordinarily meant by integrity but more too, the self willing to set aside ail ego défenses in order to gain awareness from a reading by another, the self that



DON M. BURKS 111

is manifested with every one of thè significant choices of life. For Natanson thè traditional concepts of conviction and persuasion, even when thought of together, appear to be less than what he means by persuasion; for him persuasion involves thè risking of self for both speaker and listener. In an argumentative situation where risk is established, where there is willingness for individuals to engage in mutuai persuasion, the affective world of feeling and attitude or "the total subtle range of [the selfs] affective and conative sensibility"8 is, in Natanson's phrase, "existentially dis-

rupted."9 Hère, surely, are important insights into the nature of that type of rhetorical discourse which Natanson calls the "rhetoric of persuading": (1) it directs itself to the conative, to "intentional-

directedness,"10 as much as to thè cognitive, and (2) such a persuasive situation is mutuai - one who would persuade thè Other must be willing to be persuaded by the Other. Although Natanson does not emphasize either of thèse last-mentioned points, both are implic- it within his discussion of the "rhetoric of persuading."

II

Even though Natanson never makes référence to self-persuasion, his treatment of argumentation is most suggestive of this concept. In his essay "Rhetoric and Philosophical Argumentation" he says, "Self-knowledge ... présupposes an epistemic condition: knowledge is within thè person, and teaching must be restricted to a process of

dialectical occasioning."11 In this essay he adumbrates a treatment of persuasion as "a dialectical transformation of the self through indirect argumentation,"12 such as that used by Kierkegaard. Natanson says this fusion of philosophy and rhetoric is in the

Socratic tradition; and, indeed, hère as elsewhere when Natanson discusses persuasion one is frequently reminded of the discussion of

the subject in the Phaedrus where there is so much stimulation to

self-scrutiny and to self-realization through anamnesis.13 In his discussions of rhetoric Natanson emphasizes the impor-

tance of the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic. He suggests that traditional rhetorical theory has ignored thè link between dia-

lectic and rhetoric, that "by itself ... rhetoric is blind, for it has not

truth"; but "combined, dialectic and rhetoric constitute an instru- ment for reapproaching the multiple problème of politice, ethics,

linguistice, and literary criticism."14 Natanson speaks of "rhetoric



112 PERSUASION, SELF-PERSUASION, RHETORICAL DISCOURSE

in the wider sensé," a rhetoric which includes dialectic. The dialectic he has in mind is essentially Platonic in that the heuristic benefits of the dialectical exercise are primarily the end-in-view. By "heuristic" is hère meant an approach to learning that encourages one to discover for himself, the method of self-discovery.15 Thus, R. G.

Collingwood has characterized the Platonic dialectic as "the inter-

play of question and answer in the soul's dialogue with itself."16

Although the original meaning of thè word dialectic is "discourse ... between two or more speakers expressing two or more positions or opinions,"17 there has from thè beginning been a second meaning signifying individuai délibération. Emile Janssens, in reporting on Livio Sichirollo's book Dialectic from Homer to Aristotle, remarks

upon this contrast in meaning of "dialégesthai." He says, "As Sichirollo points out ... the verb early took on ... a sensé in which it signified something like 'to converse with oneself ' or 'to deliberate.'"18 Mortimer Adler also suggests an internai dialectic when he

says, "What is required formally for dialectic is not two actually diverse minds, but rather an actual diversity or duality, an opposition or conflict, and this may occur within thè borders of a single mind. When it does, that mind is likely to carry on dialectical

thinking. ,.."19 This second meaning of dialectic is relevant to this discussion because of the similarities between internai dialectic and self-persuasion.

The thesis I wish to propose is that just as there is an internai or self-dialectic so there is self-persuasion, and as internai dialectic is

analogous to dialectic with others, so self-persuasion is analogous to

persuasion of others. There is I suggest no intrinsic différence in the

persuasion of another and the persuasion of self. The movement from dialectic to rhetoric, from investigation or thè deriving of a

position to promulgation or advocacy is best understood as a movement along a continuum, and, whether the advocacy is directed to self or to others, one of the highly characteristic features of the rhetorical end of thè continuum is the présence of appeal or urging. In other words, once a position is arrived at through investigation and/or argument, there often needs to be an urging or appeal to take action in accord with or to accept a commitment to the finding. The urging or appealing may be to self or to others or to both at once. So far as it is to self we are using rhetoric on ourselves.

Although we may not be able to control what motives, interests, or desires enter our thinking, we can choose to act on some and not to act on others. Where truth alone is insufficient to persuade our-



DON M. BURKS 113

selves, we may turn to rhetoric. As Richard Whately wrote, "A man of sense practices rhetoric on himself."20 The expérience of self-

persuasion being suggested here, however, is a more authentic

expérience than Whately is likely to have meant. The ancient Greeks may have been familiär with thè concept of

self-persuasion. The Greek word peitho which when in active voice is translated as persuade may when in thè middle voice be translated by thè English word obey. One wonders if thè subtle mind of thè Greek was not conveying thè idea that selfhood is often involved in rhetorical expérience, as when, after interior dialectic and

perhaps a struggle with seif, we at last arrive at a feeling of cer-

tainty, a feeling that we are now doing what we ought to do. We

may then say even as thè Greek might have said, "I persuade myself," or even, "I obey myself." Possibly Isocrates had in mind such self-persuasion when he said, "The same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own thoughts ; and, while we cali eloquent those who are able to speak before a crowd, we regard as sage those who most skillfully debate their problems in their own minds."21

Among modern writers we have for some time associated I. A. Richards with one aspect of thè philosophy of rhetoric or with what Natanson calls "one subsidiary line of approach, that of the

analysis of linguistic structure and meaning."22 Richards has contrasted what he calls "Scientifically Ascértainables" with moral décisions. He says Scientifically Ascértainables are "sup- ported by Verificatory Performances resting on Comparings."23 In contrast, moral décisions are ultimately validated by "Some-

thing speaking to Itself o/what It is speaking/or."24 The expérience of moral décision is one "where the récipient feels that in spite of ail the strangeness : 'This is my very thought, my very Self, address-

ing itself in me."25 Richards goes on to say, "... we can directly compare our mental activity in moral décisions with our mental

activity in dealing with scientifically ascértainables ... and can discern that they are différent; but ... we cannot at présent, give any intelligible account of the différence."26 What Richards states is essentially the philosophical problem of how it is that a

person becomes aware of moral constraints or demands, of the moral dimension of life, a problem so directly concerned with moral

persuasion that it is an appropriate study for the philosophy of rhetoric. When Richards writes of "Something Speaking to Itself

of what It is speaking /or," and of "my very Self, addressing itself



1 14 PERSUASION, SELF-PERSUASION, RHETORICAL DISCOURSE

in me," one may assume he is suggesting the expérience of self-

persuasion. Or if not self-persuasion, he is at least pointing to the

expérience of moral décision, which may be an instance of internai dialectic leading to moral self-persuasion.

Moral self-persuasion appears similar to Kierkegaard's edifying discourse . In his article, "Kierkegaard's Theory of Communi- cation," Raymond Anderson says, "The edifying address is essentially an earnest man talking aloud to himself. His discourse ... is such that, although he is the speaker, he also is a hearer who feels himself examined by his own présentation."27 In so far as Kierke- gaard intended his edifying discourses to be read aloud to oneself, which is precisely what he recommends,28 they would when used only in that way by a reader be examples of self-persuasion.

Edifying discourse and/or moral self-persuasion may culminate in the expérience of religious conversion wherein one suddenly sees his world as never before. Immediacy for him is changed, yet he has himself wrought the change. The resuit of persuasion as Natan- son conceives it and of conversion may be the same, an existential

disruption of one's old world, a transformation into a new self. Common to the early stages of religious conversion is the sensé of unfulfilled potential, of unattained possibilities. Sensing that he has been less than he could be, less morally good, less benevolent, less creative, a man sometimes is awakened to what appear to be new

possibilities within himself, and he affirms that he will henceforth be better, do better. He risks himself in commitment to his belief. Whether St. Paul literally saw a vision on the road to Damascus is of infinitely less importance than that he had a moral awakening. PauPs was a classic case of religious conversion, but many people through the âges hâve testified to the moral insight of such ex- périence, though they claim no vision. The individuai who was before uncertain becomes certain as when St. Paul asserts "I am persuaded. ,.."29

Of course thè feeling of assurance in conversion is in itself worth nothing. In fact affirmation alone may merely reflect provincial ignorance. No one is more sure of his private révélation than the "preacher" of some sect with a dozen followers. Such "assurance" may merely reflect thè circumstances of thè individuali makeup and environment. Yet, wrong though he may be in how he inter- prets his expérience, there are those - Piato, Kant and William James among them - who would say thè individuai was being moved by that something within himself which however badly he



DON M. BURKS 115

misunderstands it is struggling for ethical expression, thè divine or heavenly eros,30 "thè moral law within ...,"31 a "higher part [that] is conterminous and continuous with a More of thè same

quality. ..."32 One of thè most discerning discussions of self-persuasion among

contemporary writers is presented by Charles Stevenson. He points out how people project their délibérations into pretended social

settings not always as a rehearsal for a future argument to sway others but to sway themselves. Moreover, he asserts that in actual

arguments when one does exhort another, "it is not always thè other whom he wishes to convince. His urgency may symptomatize an internai conflict, and his hearer may serve only to remind him of tendencies of his own which he is in thè course of trying to

strengthen or repress. He is an orator whose oration convinces himself."33

Stevenson discusses some similarities between self-persuasion and self-deception or rationalization, but he argues that they are not thè same. He says that "déception implies false beliefs, whereas

persuasion does not. And those of us who are ashamed of self-

deception, once it is pointed out to us, are perfectly free to feel unashamed or even proud of certain kinds of self-persuasion."34 In an article now thirty years old but recently reprinted Stevenson discusses persuasive définitions, and points out that "emotive

meaning is a reliable sign of persuasion - permits it to be noticed."35 In distinguishing between self-deception and self-persuasion and

in observing that emotive meaning permits persuasion to be noticed, Stevenson points up what I think is an overstatement in Johnstone's

argument that "rhetoric is perfect only when it perfectly conceals its own use."36 Johnstone maintains that thè rhetorician argues uni-

laterally toward his audience, using rhetorical devices and con-

cealing their use, while thè philosopher argues bilaterally or dia-

lectically toward his colleagues. One of Johnstone's points hère is that persuasive techniques are most effective when they work un-

recognized, that thè philosopher who seeks criticism rather than

victory will scrupulously avoid concealment of any persuasive device. No doubt there is truth in Johnstone's point, but thè importance of concealment as a distinguishing factor is overestimated

if one imagines that récognition of a persuasive technique neces-

sarily diminishes its effectiveness. Thus, Stevenson sees no incom-

patibility between thè récognition of a persuasive attempt and its

success. He points out that in self-persuasion one is aware of what he



1 1 6 PERSUASION, SELF-PERSUASION, RHETORIVAL DISCOURSE

is doing; and, as I hâve argued, there appears to be intrinsic dif- férence in the nature of self-persuasion and interpersonal persuasion. People are sometimes persuaded even though they fully recognize the persuasive device of the persuader, and there is not necessarily any irrational factor at work in such happenings. It

simply is not true that rhetoric is perfect only when it conceals its own use.

Professor Johnstone may answer that persuasion devoid of concealment is what he means by philosophical discussion or dialectic, but I am suggesting that where there is appealing and urging (and perhaps advising, another distinctly rhetorical mode) there is not the purely philosophical argument Johnstone seeks, even though there is not the slightest concealment.37 What we hâve hère is rhetoric without concealment.38

"Persuasion," "conviction," the "rhetoric of persuading," and the "rhetoric of convincing" tend to be ambiguous if not misleading terms unless carefully and specifically defined. These terms and concepts hâve hère been considered as I understand them to hâve been used in the writings of Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. In thèse conceptualizations there appears the suggestion, perhaps the récognition, that self-persuasion is not essentially différent rhetorically from persuasion of others. Elsewhere, too, the same suggestion can be found, as has hère been illustrated. I believe that even religious conversion, whether or not affected by divine immanence, can be conceived as the occurrence of self- persuasion. Therefore, I hâve proposed that self-persuasion can be viewed substantially as we view persuasion of others, as a mode of rhetorical discourse, and that such a view is enlightening.

NOTES

1 Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Argumentation (University Park: The Penn- sylvania State University Press, 1965). Références to the essays included in this volume will hereafter be cited by their respective titles. It should also be understood that in what follows I hâve in mind rhetorical situations involving the written as well as thè spoken word.

2 Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (Spring, 1968), 64. 3 See Edward . Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," Quarterly

Journal of Speech, XVIII (November, 1932), 599. 4 Johnstone, "Some Reflections on Argumentation," p. 7. Thomas Olbricht

has noted that Natanson "does not use convincing ... in the sensé of George Campbell and Hugh Blair as 'logicai' argument, but rather as argument in which there is no risk of selfhood." See Olbricht's article "The Self as a Philosophical



DON M. BURKS 117

Ground of Rhetoric," The Pennsylvania Speech Annual, XXI (September, 1964), 32, . 18.

5 Natanson, "The Claims of Immediacy," p. 18. Ibid., p. 15. ? Ibid., p. 12. 8 Ibid., p. 15. 9 Ibid.. p. 19. 10 The phrase "intentional directedness" appears in a collection of Natan-

son's essays entitled Literature, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences: Essays in Existent iah sm and Phenomenology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 183.

u Pp. 153-154. 12 P. 153. 13 Natanson sometimes disavows interest in "traditional rhetoric" as in his

essay, "The Privileged Moment: A Study in thè Rhetoric of Thomas Wolfe," in which he says, "I am not interested here in anything that can be called traditional

rhetoric, i.e. in the history of rhetoric in Greek and Roman thought ... "(Liter- ature, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences, p. 132). Nevertheless, Natanson's

analysis explains the expérience of epiphany in such a way that one is reminded not only of the Phaedrus but of another monument in the classical tradition in

rhetoric, "Longinus" On the Sublime, wherein the expérience of transport is described. Perhaps it is in the moment of transport, those "privileged moments of consciousness," that rhetoric and poetic become one, and we see that re-

gardless of significant différences they may at their best be but two roads to the same sublime expérience, the privileged moment.

14 Natanson, "The Limits of Rhetonc, p. 98. 15 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (New York : Ran-

dom House, 1966), p. 667. See also Gilbert Ryle, Piato* s Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 127.

16 Spéculum Mentis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 77. Cited by Richard McKeon in "Dialectic and Politicai Thought and Action," Ethics: An

International Journal of Social, Politicai, and Legal Philosophy, LXV (October, 1954), 15.

? McKeon, p. 3. 8 Philosophy and Rhetoric, I (Summer, 1968), 174. 19 Dialectic(Nev/ York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927), pp. 10-11. What Adler speaks

of as "opposition or conflict" I should rather cali juxtaposition and contrast.

Juxtaposition and contrast of some sort appear to be the things common to ail

the various conceptions of dialectic, and it is juxtaposition and contrast of ideas

that characterize internai dialectic with oneself. Just as a playwright in the act of

composition juxtaposes and contrasts his characters to generate a scene, so do

we juxtapose and contrast ideas and generate new ones (or what are, for us, new

ones). We may do this consciously or unconsciously, but those who are unaware

of the need for juxtaposition and contrast, such as students new to the world of

ideas, are sometimes overly inclined to feel a gratuitous allegiance to or opposition toward a particular view or proposition when what they are really trying to do is generate a new idea. Such misunderstandings may turn a dialectical

discussion into something less than the "Buber" type of dialogue of mutuai trust

that it might otherwise become. A point that is incidental to this discussion but nonetheless important is that

the internai dialectic described above occurs late in the process of language

development. As Adler states, "Talking to oneself is a much later, and perhaps

higher, development than talking to others. The kind of thinking which goes on

in what is technically called sub-vocal talking is derivative from the earlier vocal-

ized speech of direct communication" (p. 9). In support of this view Adler cites

Piaget's The Language and Thought of thè Child. John Dewey wrote much the



1 1 8 PERSUASION, SELF-PERSUASION, RHETORICAL DISCOURSE

same thing: "Soliloquy is thè produci and reflex of converse with others; social communication not an effect of soliloquy. If we had not talked with others and they with us, we should never talk to and with ourselves" (Expérience and Nature [La Salle: Open Court, 1958], p. 141). In supporting the argument that there is no intrinsic différence between self-persuasion and persuasion of others, Dewey's point may be more than incidental. For a brief statement of his view that mind émerges out of social interaction and thè relationship of this idea to rhetoric, see my "John Dewey and Rhetorical Theory," Western Speech, XXXII (Spring, 1968), 118-126.

20 Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, éd. Douglas Ehninger (Carbon- dale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963), p. 183. The precise phrasing may not be Whately's since the statement is a marginal insert, but it is a succinct expression of the point of his paragraph.

21 Isocrates, "Antidosis," 256, trans. George Norlin, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928), 3 vols., II, 327-329.

22 Natanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric," p. 96. 23 I. A. Richards, Design for Escape (New York : Harcourt, Brace and World,

1968), p. 36. 24 Ibid. 2* Ibid., p. 35. 2e Ibid., p. 37. 27 Speech Monographs, XXX (March, 1963), 10. In documentmg this state-

ment Anderson cites Kierkegaard's Stages on Life' s Way, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 419 and 420. Certain passages on thèse pages are so relevant to the concept of self-persuasion that they bear quotation: "When he [the religious man] talks it is only a monologue. Being concerned solely about himself, he talks aloud - that is what preaching is. If there is somebody listening, he knows nothing of his relationship to this man, except this, that he owes him nothing, for what he has to accomplish is to save himself. Such a right révérend monologue, which bears witness in a Christian way when by its émotion it moves the speaker, thè witness-bearer, because he is speaking about himself, is what is called a sermon" (p. 419). "He [the religious orator] talks in such a way that though everything were to go amiss he is sure nevertheless that there is one auditor who is seriously moved ... the speaker himself, that though everything were to go amiss there was nevertheless one auditor who went home fortified ... the speaker himself, that though everything were to go amiss and everybody were to stay away there was nevertheless one who in the difficult complications of life longed for the edifying moment of the address ... the speaker himself... . The religious orator has always as his principal aim ... the orator himself" (p. 420). Long before Freud or Jung, Kierkegaard saw that in matters of great personal concera thè individuai is, as Wendell Johnson was much later to say, his own most enchanted listener. Despite his ingenious insight, however, Kierkegaard apparently accepted the doctrine of original sin and the egoistic assumption that man will necessarily have self as his primary object or end-in-view whether in worldly or religious pursuit.

28 See A Kierkegaard Anthology, éd. Robert Bretall (New York: The Mod- ern Library, n.d.), p. 270.

29 Romans 8:38. Of course this statement was made long after Paul's conversion, but it nevertheless reflects the assurance of the "twice-born" man. For discussions of the significance of religious conversion I have referred not only to the classic work of William James's The Varieties of Religious Expérience (see note no. 32 below), but to an equally provocative though less known work, Anton T. Boisen's The Exploration ofthe Inner World (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962). Also helpful has been the work of O. Hobart Mowrer whose interest in psychology of religion is perhaps best presented in his book The



DON M. BURKS 119

Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1961). 30 Piato, Symposium 180d; Phaedrus 242e. See also Anders Nygren, Agape

and Eros (London: S C , 1957), p. 51 ; R. Hackforth, Piato' s Phaedrus (New York: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1952), pp. 54-55; and Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals ofGreek Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1943), 3 vols., II, 190-196.

31 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (New York: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), p. 166.

32 William James, The Varieties ofReligious Expérience (New York: Mentor Books, 1958), p. 384. Perhaps the "indwelling persuasion" of which A. N. Whitehead speaks places him among those philosophers who sensé an immanent and persuasive moral voice. See Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Mentor Books, 1955), p. 75, and James R. Simmons "Whitehead's Metaphysic of Persuasion," Philosophy and Rhetoric, II (Spring, 1969), 72-80.

33 Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1944), p. 149.

34 Ibid., p. 150. 35 Charles L. Stevenson, "Persuasive Définitions (Parts I-II)," in New

Rhetorics, éd. Martin Steinmann, Jr. (New York : Charles Scr ibner's Sons, 1 967), p. 225.

36 Johnstone, "Persuasion and Validity in Philosophy," p. 141. 37 In an article appearing since the publication of Philosophy, Rhetoric and

Argumentation and prior to the inception of this journal, Johnstone présents the maxim that "one must persuade only in such a way as to maintain the possibility of persuasion." Moreover, he présents a criterion for ethical persuasion; he says, "The most responsible forms of persuasion are those that a speaker can freely place at the disposai of his audience, to be used by both sides alike." However, such a bilateral attempt to persuade is apparently in Johnstone's view more

nearly philosophical than rhetorical discourse. See "The Relevance of Rhetoric to Philosophy and of Philosophy to Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LU

(February, 1966), 41-46, especially pp. 45-46. 38 The point that concealment as the distinguishing charactenstic of rheto-

ric leaves no distinction between sophistical and authentic rhetoric is suggested by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in their essay, "Act and Person in Argument," pp. 102-125 of the Natanson and Johnstone volume. See in particular pp. 115-116.



persuasion, self-persuasion and rhetorical discourse

Documents