persons, minds and brains

8/8/2019 Persons, Minds and Brains

1/20

Section 1 Page 40

'CHAPTER 1

SETTING THE STAGE:PERSO II S, M D'S A liD BRA S

MassimO' MarrafJa

Over the last thirty years- thphilo .opby of . clence ha ' become i n c r e a s m g l y ~ ' l o c .Us focus has shifted from the g,eneral featur,es of scientific ,enterprise to tbe conceptstheorie '- and practices of particular di -ciplin .s. Philosophy of neur.ociencephilosophy of psychology and philosophy of ,eognitiv,e ' cienoe ar,c three results ofthi . growing specialization. I

This chapter i. a very hon introduction to the phi'losop.hy .of cogJtitilJ;ep s y c 1 t t o ~ o g y , ,especiaUy in its computational incarnation. Cognitiv,e p s y c h o ~ o g y investigate complex organisms at the iltjormation-processing level of analysis andit can be defined a pecuHar e v e ~ in the en e that it: i u-pended between twoworld . On the one hand, there i the ordinary image of ourselve ' a person':f nailleiya. self-con .dou . imtentional t ratiQnal agent... Om the otJher hand we ha e thesubpersonal sphere of the cer,ebral events, as investmgated by neuroscience.T h e r e : f o r e .one of the main tasks for the philosopher o f p s y c h o ~ o g y is to unra thispeculiarity trying to shed some light upon tine relations between tbese different waysof descr ibing .ourselves.

The fol owing p a g ~ ,are dedicated to orne clasi,cal attempts to accomplm h_ i - ta k In the cour ,e of doing .0, we haU draw a very qui,ek ketch of ' he ri e anddey lopm nt of oognitiv psychology and oognitivle science setting the ' C De for theother hapters. ofthi book .

L FRO MO LK PSYCHOLOGY TO COG ITIVE SCIE CE

1.1 Thefonn and the tatus of olk psychologyFolk psychology as a theOlY .. To navigate througb the social world normaladuU advert to a pontaneou capacity to ' m e n t a ~ i 2 e ' or 'mindr,ead that i, tode ,cribe explam and predict th.eir ,own and other people s behavior on thebai . ,ofm.ental state attributions.2According to. the so ,called 'theory v b e ! Q r y ~ mindreading rests on a theory .or

rather a p r o t o ~ t h o o r y oft n caUed folk pycbology . This i it t h e o ~ in the s useof b e ~ n g an integrated and coherent body of knowl,edge whkh .organizes thet i f o n n sp.here of the mental essenti.aHy througb tw.o categories: quaba and

3M. Marraffa, M. De Caro'and F. Fer,.,elli (eds) , Carlograplu"es of he MilIci 3- 22 .

2001 Spring "


2/20

Section 1 Page 41

4 MA WMO MARRAfFA

intentional stale. The fonnerare th.e e x p e r i e n t ~ or introspectiMe properties ofmental states., Their e ' ence se'em . to consist in 'their being ,captured from ,aubjecti e r fl f (-per on pomt of t b e r e i omething that it i lik to. percei 'ea had ' of rod or to regret that Brutu kiUed Cae: ar. s a whole, these mentale n t i ~ i e definetbe domain ofphel'lOmetwl COl!' 'cio'u ne . .In c'ontra -t intenfonal -tat a n ~ ; -tate , fu e l ab ]ieving de-iringregn.;')tting etc.) which have ' d ~ r e c t i . o r n toward an .object' or 'reference to a 'oOllteot t. )If I believ,e that Brutus kined Caesar my b e ~ i e f i directed toward an object o.r refersto a c o n ~ e n t - that i what the : ,entence 'Brutu killed Cae at e' pr1 e . I n t e n t i o n a ~ states are often termed 'propositional attitudes s:nc as the ,example shows- inascribing them to a subj.ect we use sentences of tbe 't:o.rm S believes (or desires,etc,,) 'that p" here the propo ition p e-pr-e e the content of the , ubject mentalstate.. In any intentional state , the object. .on which the state i directec.d arepresent,ed in a certain way namdy it has a repre entational character. When Ibelie e tha.t London is north of Paris I represent a state of affairs intbe form of aparticularpatial r,elation between 0 objects,. Thi ' point i . often madebyayingt h a . t i n ~ e n t i o r n a l states are seman.ti.cally evaluable t h a t i s ~ they can be true or false-my ~ i e f that London i north of Pari i tru.e if there i ' a fact in the orld thatmake it true. 6

C o m p a t . i b i l ~ m vs. Eliminativism. ' OCtal p ychologi t ha e inv . tigatedmindreading . ince a! lea t: th 1940 . In Heider and Simm r cia ic tudie.subjects were p.re',ented w'th geometric shapes that were animated as if movingaround in relation to e'ach other. When a ked to. rleport what they saw, the subjedsa l m o s ~ invariably trcated these figures as intentional agents with. mo,[ve .' andpurposes, uggesting the existence of a universal and largely automatic ,capacityormentalistic attribution.7Pursuing th i line ofr 'e earch would lead to Fritz Heider The Pychology ofIntelper onal Relations (] 95 ,8) a. seminal book that is the main histoOrical referent .ofthe inquiry "nto fo 'lk p_ ychology. In particular i t p ~ a . y e d a. central role in theorigination and definition .of attribution theOJY . a field .of 0 p ychol gy thatinvest igate- the m cbanisms underlying oldinary explanation- of our own and otherpeople' beha ior.

A t ~ r i b u t i o n theo.ry is an offspring of Heider s isionary work, but a 'qUItedifferent way of ap'proaching folk p ychology. He"der tak'e folk pychology in itreal value of 1m wledge,arguing that cientific p y c h o ~ o g y ha a go d deaf to learnfrOiID common- en e p o g y ' " In contrat ,most lie earch on. cau - al attribution itrue to behaviori m' . methodological 1- -on and focuse .on folk p' ycho.logyn a i v e ~ e s

The contrast between these two attitudes toward the explanatory adequacy .offolk p ychol.ogy ha hap 'ed the philosophical debate oon the; fat,e ,of the .ordinaryimag of ours lves in light of the tumultuous d ;velopment of cognitiv, science. Onlhi matter the bask issue is: wiU the t h e o r e t k a entities invoked in folt p s y c h o ~ o g y be a,part of the ontology of a serious scientific p s . y c h o ~ o g y ? ' And the answer rang,e


3/20

Section 1 Page 42

SETTING THE STAGE: PERSO S MrND ANn BRAr -s 5

from Jerry Fodor - Hdefinitely yes'; based on the idea. that propositional attitudes ar,ethe bedrock ,of a ' cientificaHy adequate p ychology' toO St,ephen -tic:h' 'posiblyDot -, motivated by doub about tbe folk ,concept of belief rat ed inter alia ju ,t byattribution tboory 10 to Paul C b u r c h a n d ~ a b olutely not " ba ed .on the idea that thedeliverance Born folk concept i the condition of p ychology being r,educibleneur'o cienc and henc-e having a -,cientific nature.These two peEpective, on the ' lams of folk psychology- the former'compatibilist the latter e ~ i m i n a t i v i s t '-,are the coordinates that help us tomwigat,e through theoomplex cono _ tuatlandscap of the c o g n ~ t i v e :revolution., As'\ e an .e'e the ri e of cognitive p y c h o ~ o g y i the result .of the rejection .of thebehaviorist liminativlsm (subs ctio:n l2 ) in favor .of a ,compatihir -1 project whi.cbrepn sentsa sort of experimental mentaHsm",' l (subs ction 2.1). N verthel.ess theeliminativi t ghot ha c'ontmued t'o haunt ,eogoitiv,e PY'cmology takLng on alw.aynew fonns (subs, ction 2.2).1.2 The rise andfall a/behaviorism

Psychology as ph.enomenology. B o t h ~ h e cia ieal empiric! t and the cia lealrn.tiornalist pictures of mtrospective self-.knowledg (or :n up-to-date t e n n s ~ f l r s t -person mindreading ) have granted .it a s p e c i a ~ ,epistemic authority. According toDescartes for example . the subject is transparent. to itslel f ,and the renectiveawarene (conscientia) the mind ha . .of its. .own content pro ide knowledg,eegoying a -pecial ind of ,certainty which contra-t- with our knowledge of t ,ephysical world: the judgments about our current mental stat sand processe areinfallible Of, at lea t incorrigible.In light of thi tr,aditiooal optimisln about ,elf-knowledg, it is not at aUsurprising tbat in the late n i n e ~ e e n t h and early twenti,eth centuries sci ntifi,cp s y d h . o ~ o g y is predominantly 3. psychology of introspective consciousness.]2Pur uing the project to make iotro p tion a rigorou method of inquiry whichwould upgrade psychology to the' status of the other natural sciences ea:rlyexperimental psychologists meticulollslyprobed the content ,of consciousness in aneffort to offer a full de ,eription of the mental and cape a it appearrothe ubjeet.III short this psychology was ~ ~ a kind of phenomenological investig,ation .ofu ~ j e c t i e elf-awarene " . 13

Eliminative behaviorl m. By virtue .of the, m ntaH dc idiom, th sei n t r o s p e c ~ i o n i s t psychologists would not have' trouble talking to poets criticshi torians, ee-onomi t and indeed t h ~ b e i r own grandmothers. The non pecialistreader in 1910 would be in e,quaUy familiar territory in William J a m e s PrinciplesofP ,ychoiogy and in the novels of Ja.mes's brother Henry .14 John Watson s brand.of behaviorism put an end to the good r,etalionship b. tween scientific psychotogyand folk p ychology, urging to abandon the intro .pectioni t attempts to makeconsciousness a subject of experimental nvestlgation. . psycho,logy a plring toscientific respectabiHty had to r'ely instead on publicly observable data, that :s


4/20

Section 1 Page 43

6 MA ' WMOMARRAfFA

pattern of re .pon e (overt behavior) to , timuli (phy ical ev,ents in theeniromnent . The ,outcome was an extr-emely austere concepti,on of p s y c h o l o g i c aexplanation: the p ychologit equipped with nothing but Pavlo conditioning andThorndike law of effect ( p r e c u r of Skinner s .operant conditionmg) had to charta ociative c,onnection, betwen cla ,e of environmental input ' (,or ,ori ofexposur,e to, environmental input -) and da -ses ofbehavi,oral output -. What occurredin the h e a d ~ ' behvee:n input and output- was a topk for physiology (the ult imalebehavioral science). Th e organi,sm was regarded as a 'black box".In ofar a beha iori m remoes the inner tate and proce ,e fromp s y c h o ~ o g y s explan.ation and ontology it can be considered a variant .of thedoctrine of eliminativism. ls In its s,rongest form eHminativism predicts that part orall of our folk p y c h o ~ o g i c a l o n c e p t u a l apparatu wiUani hint-o thin air ju t a it

p e n e d ~ n l l i e p',ast. when scientific progress led 10 drop tbe f o ~ k t b e o r y ofwitchcraft Qf the protosclentific t h e O l i e of phlo,gi ton and c;aloricfluid. Thisprediction rests Oon an argument which :moves froOm the pr,emise of considering foUep s y c h o ~ o g y as a m s i v e ~ y defecti e theory to' the cO'nclusion that-just as witchesphlogi ton and c;31ormc fluidL-folk p ychologieal entitie do not exi t ( .orn:e tim'ehis negative ontological ,oonclusion is set by the weaker ,coOnclusion that folkp y d l o ~ o g k a l entities ill not be part of the ontology of .a mature cience.) Thebehavio,ri t vers ion of elim..inativi. m predicts that th dentific theo,y which

fi place , th s'eriou ly mistak n folk psychological theory win b couch.ed in thevocabulary ofphy .ieal beha lor.liminative bebav iorm Ul i a recurrent theme in the writing of Watson andSkiooer, although in some passages they waver between an eliminativeinterpretatioOn of behaviorism n ontological and e x p ~ a n a t o r y thesis: mental entiti,esdo not xi t and h nced! xplanatio.n .of a n i m a ~ behaVior wiU b non-me.ntahsticand other two interpretations: (i) the methodological claim that mental entities existbut are i r r e ~ e v a n t to the scientific study of animal behavior and Om) the s,emantic.alclaim-kno,wn a analytic' or "logical b ha i.ori m-that tatement containingp s y c h o ~ o g k a l terms are translatable intoO state:mentts containing just terms reFerringtoO p.hy' ical beha ior. Thi ' i a reductive program: mental ,enti ies are not eliminatedbut r-atber identified with di po iHon to behav,e in certain w a ~ und r certaincircumstances. 16 -

A ,po,int i w .nworth empha i .. A Larry Hau er rightly ay , althoughbehaviorism as an a ' owed movement may have few remaining advocates ' some ofits 'metaphy i c a ~ and methodo:logic.al. chanenge 'are till erym chali e.17 ' i r tand foremo .t the fundam ,ental obJection that Skinner had to the mentali ti,cexplana.tion in p _ychO'logynamely tjhe homunculus fallacy L a. vital con _traint onany ,erioumentaH tic p ychology. Thati a p,lau .bIe th ,eory of cognition mu 'tavoid the; infinit r s triggered by tb mpt to ' x.plain a cognitiv capacity bytacitly positing an internal agent with dIal very ,eap.aeity. 18

Cognitive map ,and syntactic ' tructures. Since the 1930s and 19'40s th,eincreas,ing p,er:ception of the limits of the S ( H m u l u s ) ~ R : ( e s p o n s e ) explanation mak,esbehaviorism eo l ,e toward what would be since t h e ~ 9 6 0 cognitive p s y c h o ~ o g y .


5/20

Section 1 Page 44

SE'ITI


6/20

Section 1 Page 45

8 MA WMO MARRAfFA

information is codified in the mind, thus becooling inner obje1cts-mentalrepresentations-that can undergo various types of processing. In particular theeo b j e c ~ can be transformed which mean .. that our repre entation of reality i not theproduct ofa pa siv assitnHatio.n of physic;alenvironment but an acHy :tructionthat can involve both a reduction: and an integration. Biological infonnationproce ing i c a p a c ~ t y - i m i t e d and hence nece arily ~ e l e c t i v e + We can attend to arelatively smaU number of s t i f n u ~ i and a still s.maHer alnount of them can berecalled. Hence it is possible that part of the input information gets lost and then areduction takes p ~ a c e . Alternati el:y, , en ory input may be integrat,ed ,enrk.hed , andit is in such a case that some weU ~ k n o w n poverty of the stimulus argumentsconcerning per,reption and e m o r y m a ~ e their appearance.

P,ercep'tual con mncie are ,a ca e in point. In the ca Ie ofiZie con. tancy 't7orinstance the v i s u a system takes account of the perceived distance of objects andcale pevceptual ize up accordingly. Therefore in this ca e a in that of lingui ticacquismtion. there is mOore i.nformation in thepercepmal response than there :s in theproximal stimulus and this ,extra information ,can be nothing but a.contribution madeby the perceiving organi .m.P,erceptual integration had attracted psychologists attention well before therise ofcognitivi m. Mo t, notably Hermann .on Helmholtz considered perceptualproce ,e a , uncon cious i l ' l f e l ~ e n c e s which take p .cification ' .of proxima .stimulations as premises and yweld hypodles s about theIr distal. 'cause ,asconclu :on , Thi c o ~ s t r u c t i v e conception of percepHon ha- b_ n named~ ' talbHshment Viw" 27 and ind -ed, nlot of the work, on vi i.onthat cognitivscieOlti . s have done since 1970.s r'esls on this .approach. In this lapse of timeh o w e v e constructivism did not go unchallenged. The advocates of J.1. Gibson secological optic ' have contended that the visual ystem far from reoon tructing ori n f e H ~ n g .merely e x t r a c t s p i c ~ out th.e information gresent in the stimulationattu:mng Itself' to. tjhe relevant mformatton tructures'. And we hall see belowCub ection 3.2) that ibon i the main 'ource of in piration for a recent th _ory ofcognition known as 'active e x t e m a H s m

omputational functionalism . According to a largely donlinantinterpretation, the proce- s e ; ~ of t r a n ~ fonnation storage r -cov,ery and use ,ofinformation ar _computation's, name y rule-goemed 'eq cnce- of operation upondata structures (mental representations) which. mediate the organism s behavioralrespon_ ,o perceptual. timuli.The notion of computation here pre uppo. ed goe. back to A ~ a n Turingwodc His "Tu:ring machines' are ab tract compu'ters _nee their charactedzati.ondo ,- not take into account con traint that ar 'e ential in planning a :r, al comput. r(e.g. memory spac1and computing time), and above al .. n that they are definedwithout allY reference 10 their phys.ical .makeup (Le. the type of .hardware thatrealize. ' tbem)+ In fact uring machine tate ar,e fill y defmable in term of (i) themachine s input, (ii) the output of th machin given its state and that input-and (Hi)the next state of the machine given the current state. That is the states Me


7/20

Section 1 Page 46

SETTING THE STAGE: PERSO S MrND ,ANn BRAr 9

functionally defined since aU tha.t matters to what they are, is what the machine doesrather ~ h a n its phy i,cal realization.- ow tf:ogniti e proce are comp1lltatio they al mu t be fUDctionallyindividuated that is" individuated by tbe causal roOle (or function) they play in the

cognitive y tem of which th _y are a part independently from how uch a rol!e iphy -ica ly (or b -tte neurologically) realized. T b i ~ tb .-i- on the 'e- ence ,of,oognltion is known as computational funcHonalism '.Insofar as cognitive p s y c h o ~ o g y subscribes to computational functionalism itcontribute ' to ,cogniti ,e "ci,ence, namely t e project of interdi .ciplillary study ofnatural and artificial inteUigence that begins its m a t u r a ~ i o n in t h e ~ a t e 19'50s andrea.ches a stable i n t e l l e c t u a ~ and institutional set-up in the ea:rly 19,80s.29

One point i orth emphaizin .ogni t i . e cience i the .tudy of cognitionas infonnation processing by a natural or artificial computer but research incogniti e '_dence i typi!cally about a specific type of computer: for in-tanceco.mputational psychology investigat,es the biological ,computer whereas artificialintelligence (AI) explores the artificial one. The[iefore cogniti e science is not adi cipHnebut rather a. 'doctrine'; that ha oriented and i , orientinginquiri ,e in. anumber of disciplines3 -s.ome descriptive and empirical (e.g. eognitiv,epsycn.o.ogy hngui tic and more r e c e n t ~ y neuroscience) some pe.culative andf o u n d a t i o n a ~ ( .g.,.pb'lo ophy), adome both peculativ . and applied ( .g." _ ).31

David Murr 's tripartite model of explan,ation. o m p u t a t i o n a ~ f u n c t i o n a H munderlie Marr' deeply influ ntial anaiy, i of how diffef1 nt lev, l of xplaoationcan b iot grated to understand a ,oognitivepheoomenon. 2 This analysis can beregarded as " the first f u l l ~ b l o w n version of computationalism' .ftel" attempting to ,elucidate how the bra'in perfonns cognitive task by

starting wlthfue re .ponsepatterns of individual neurons (e g., H u b e ~ and Wiesel Son-centered, and 'off-centered cells) Marr realiz,ed 'that discovering such patternsi ' o n ~ y a decription ,of what ihappening In the brain no an ,explanation ,of how it,discharges its tasks. Consequently he condudedthat a. ,oomputational account of acogniti e phenOomenon need _ Oo integrate 'the ~ e v e l of analysi .,of the 'wetware' withoth r two lev,el of analysi .t the rno -t all -tract lev -.1 of -xplanation i- the compurtationaltheory'where we pecify wb.a't a y tern i doing and why. In arr" theory of vi ion, 't7ore x a m p ~ e , the :function of the visual system is to .constnlct on the basis of mputs tothephotor _ eptors. a, 3-D object-centred hape repre _utaHon. At thi e v e ~ p ychological function are chara.ct .rized only in t,erms of their mput data the fmaloutput and ,the ,goa of the computation in ways that are neutral ,on ,themechani_m.Between the computa'tional theoryt. v e ~ and the level of ' imp],ementation' (a- ,aKterms thel,evel of analy is of the wetware) is a l g , m ' i t h m i c " level. This leve[whi.ch is the one spe,eific to psychology ooc' ms the ,cognitiv,e mechanism (thea ~ g o r i t h m ) t h a p rFonn the function decribed atth 1 vel of the co;mputationaltheory. For exampl Marr outlines at th algorithmic I vel the i n ~ e r m dialrepr,esentations between the retinal image and the final output ( p r i m a . ~ sketch and2Y2-D sketch) and uggest. some o f ~ h e subsystems that compute them. 34


8/20

Section 1 Page 47

10 MA ' MMOMARRAfFA

2. FOLK PSYCHOLOGYADO PUTATIO AL PYCHOLOGY2. J Folkpsychological ,computationali m

Mind as a syntax-driven machine. What kind ofr,elation is there between thecomputational ' tates and proc s po tulated at the algorithmic lev land th folkp s y c h o ~ o g i c a l mental states and processes? Accordi:ng to Fodor the r e ~ a t i o n is oneof legitimation. or groundin,g for our folkp . y c h o ~ o g i c a l explanatory practice: 'Onecan say in a phrase what it is t h a t c o m p u . t a ~ i o n a l psycbology has been proving sosllccessful at: viz. the 'Vindi.catiOlt ofgeneralizations about proposltional attitudespe'cifically., of the more or les comm.onense 'ort of generalization aboutpropo itiona! aUitud ',Therefore ~ [ w ] l h a t a. c o m p u t a t i o n a ~ theory doe i to makeclea.r the mec:hanism of intentiona l causation- to' show how it is ( n o m ( ) l o g j c a J ~ y ) po: iM . that purely computational-indeed , purelyphy ical-sy ern , hould act,out Qf theirbeh f: ,and d '. if, " ,15

Tiler are two dim Ilsions to the problem of makmg clear .Htlle mechanism ofLnt ntional ,eau ation ' , of . howing how it i , po ibl that pur, ly physical y temshould act out of their propositional attitudes.The first problem concern the nature of the in.tentiona.1 m e n t a ~ tate. Tbeyare both sem'antt:cally evaluable and causally ejJicacious two properties thatapparently ne r occur together ,eI b re. ' hi puta'ti e uniqu 'me ha fI d ll1anyperplexitie about the per p e c ~ i v e of a physicali t explication of i n t e n ~ i o n a l tate. .For many m ~ o s h e r s they still .remain . +n Q u i n e ~ s famous phrase ~ c r e a t u r e s ofdarkne ' ,16

ctuallyth i om thing , 1 ' that i 'both mantically valuabl andcausally efficacious: mbols. They can be about things (e.g. the word' cat refersto ca s)' and they are physicaUy ins.tantiated ortokened, which makes them causallyefficaciou ' (the or1i 'cat con i t of e g. ink on paper). H .nee tJhere i an a n a ~ o - g y between thoughts and sYlnbol a n d ~ t h e hi tory of philo ophical andp ychologicaltheorizing aboutdte mind ,con.ists largely of attempts to exploit it by deri. in.g thecau aV ,emantie propertie. of the vonn,er from the c-au emantic properttie of thelatter' ,37 Fodor RJepre, entational Theory of Mind (RTM) is the most recent heir toIhis trndition ,claiming that i n t e n t : n a ~ s ~ a t e s are relations between an ag ,. nt andmental repre. ,entation r,egarded a ymbol of a QI'lguage o/Thought (l oT)..Th i ia formallanguag akIn to tll first-ord .rp r dicate calculus.The second problem concerns the mechanics of thinking Olver time. The folkp ychological laws that govern intentional mental processes ubsume caualinteractions among intentional . ates pr serving their semantic coherence. Forexampl,e reasoning (the mental process par exc,eUence)is a caJUsal sequence O!fintentional ctat,es that tend . toO preserve tbeir e m a n t i c (rati.onal t e m k ) properti,- , But what ifnot an Lnner interpreter might be en itive to -uch propertie ?Here RTM i at risk of the above-mentioned homunculus fallacy. ccordingly. amechanical explanation of rationalit t h a ~ i s ~ h e proof that a purely physicalmechani m call implem-ot ,causal interaction' among int,entionai tate pre erving


9/20

Section 1 Page 48

SEITING THE STAOE: PERSO . S MrND' AND BRAn - 11

their semantic coner,ence-need , a. strategy to prevent the regre of i11nerinterpreters,Tbi trafegy Fodor ugge t con i t of combining RT - with theCo,mputational Theo,ry of Mind (CTM) namely the hypothe is that n t j o n amental proce e are c,aual equence of ymbol tran fonnation driv,en byrul'ethat are -en -itive to tbe .syntactic forrn oftl'le '-ymbol - and not to their cont,ent.t the foundations of CTM there are the methods Oof proof theory and theTur ing rna,cbines. 8he' proof-theoretic ,approach in logic, has ' howed u how to ~ i n k upsemantics to syntax. fOor any fonnaHzable system of symbOols it is possilb.e tospecify a set of foonal derivation rules whi.ch albeit sensitive only to the syntacticform of ymbol allow u , make an and ,only the emantically ,alid inference . Inthis way e r t a i semantic r,elations between symbols Me ~ m i m i c k e d ' l by their purelysyntactic one _.The r,elevance of this result ,cannot be exaggerated. Aocordingto Fodor andPylyshyn the' classical ' co'gnitive science ,can be described as 'a n extended attemptappt . the m,ethod of proof theory to the modeling f ,thought (and imil8lrly . ofwhatever other mental processes areplausiMy viewed as involving inferences', preeminendy lea:ming and perception), .J9 Accordingly the hope is that yntactieanalogue can be c ~ n tructed for non-demon trative inference (or i n f o r m a ~ oommons nse reasoning) in something lik th way that proofth -ory has provid .dyntactic analogue. for vaHdity".40Formalization , ugge t a t r . a t e g y ~ o bridge the gap betweenemantic andcausal efficacy that blocks the mechanization of the semantic coherence of thoughtin fact given the connection that forrnal.ization makes between semantics andsyntax- if a link was s t up also b tween syntax and causal.efficacy, th n it would bep o s s i b ~ e t o connect semantmes with causation via syntax. Here :s where Turing stheory of computability com,es into. play.

Any formaHzable p:roce can be ch8lra,cerized in tenn of effectt. elycomputaMe functions (Le. functiOons for whi,ch an a ~ g o r i t h m can be given). As statedby ~ h e "' hur.ch-Turing thesi aU the effectiely computable function can becarried out by a Turing nlachine (a umjng tbat both the tape and tim are infinite).Since any Turing machme ,can b implemented bya phy ,ical mechani m (e.g. adig.i'tal computer) it f o l ~ Q o w that, for ,any finite f o r m a ~ ystem it i pO' ible devisea ma.,chine which is aMe to a.utomate the inFerences of that system. Becaus,e certain.ofthe emanti,c r.el.ation among the ymbol in .a formal y tern can be .'mimicked'by their ynta,ctic relation and b .cau 'e uch a .y tem can be implement .dby acomputer it foUow _ that it L po:sible ,to con _ruct a machine diiven byyntaxwho e , tate tran Lion ati fy emantic criteria ,of cohe:renoe. Becau digitalcomput-rs are purdy phy ical -yst ms., this hows us that it i po sible fo:r a pur lyphysical system to make inferences which respect the semantics Oof tile symbolswithout invoking a. quetion-begging homunculu +41ccordmg to the Representational and Computational Tl100ry of ind(RCfM) ~ b e mind is a p.articular .kind of computer and the ,causal interactionsamong intentional state' are i m p ~ e m e n ~ e d by ,computation on the yntactic


10/20

Section 1 Page 49

12 MA ' WMOMARRA ' A

properties of LoT synlbols, which ar,e physicaUy t o ~ e n e d intbe brain li.ke datastructures in a computer.. Lo T is a formal sy J:em a:nd hence i t rule _ pr'e _ lVe theelnantic propertie of the y m b o ~ + Mind . are , in Dennett' oft-cited phra esyntactic -ngin -s that can m+micthe co,mp tence ,of s mantic engines' ,42In ReT the propo itional attitude relation in RIM are idntHied witJh theco!mputational relation ' in CTM. ach propo itio,nal attitude i identified witbacbaracteJistic cornputationaVfunctional role played by the LoT sentence that it is thecontent of tilat kind of attitude. For example a LOoT sentence p mi.ght be tbe contentof a belief inee it i chamcteri . kallythe output of perceptual '. y.temsand input toan inferential system that interacts deoeision-theoreti.caHy with des .ires tOo producefurther sentences or action -commands .43 Or equivalently to b e ~ i e v e that p is for pto be avaHable to one set of computation whereas to de ir-e, to r-egretto ho-pe thatpis forp to be avai1ahleto otber sets of c o m p u ~ a t i o n s .

Cognitive p y c h o l o g y a anti-phenomenology. Fod.orean mentalism is notintrospectionist mentalism in. a. new guise . As we have gleen the mind that Fodortak _ a . the ubject of cognitive p ychology i .not the intra, pective con ciou ne ,but a. kind .of formalization ofthepsychOol.ogy Oof propOositional attitudes. Thepropo itional attitude states can oCoCur both in explicit coOn dOl l judgments and inmental tate that the agent oould not po ibly intro p .ct, .ven in principle. Thipre 'uppose that eonsciousne sand int ntionaHty can be tudie:d inih absence ofon.e another, an . approach to mentartythat would not have been po ible in. the pre-udian ,cone ptual u ,v wi con ~ c i o u nand inte f onality wi n t r i n s ~ c a n y linked. However . a Fodor remmds us- Freud changed all t!lat. Hemade it s,eem p l a u s i b ~ e that e x p ~ a i n . n g behavior might require the postulation ofintentional but unoonscious stat s. Over t h . e ~ a s t 'Olimtu:ry and .mo t especiaUy InChomskian l:inguisti.cs and 'in cognitive psychol.ogy Freud s idea appears to. bavebeen amply vindicated :t4Actually on thi matter one can be moremdical than Fodor claiming that,cognitive psychology has not simply vindicated Freud, but has gone far beyond. Infact the reudian concept of the unconscious is par,asitic t() a concept ofcon ,ciou ne ideali tically taken as. ' ~ a primary q u a l i ~ of the mind' 45 where,acognitive psychology has given rise to a reinforcing overturning. of t r a d i t j o n a ~ p ychodynami c que lion and tart with a king, how con'ciou .ne " rather tJhanthe unconscio1lls ispossible. 46 In this way cogn.itive psychology amends Freud iniew of Da1Win. That i it follow Danvin anti-ideali tic m e t h o d Q o l o g i c a ~ Ie sonand proc bouom-upattempting to explain how the oomple p ychologicalfunctions u n d . e r ~ y i n g fir , -person awarenes-, ,e 'olve from the more bajc one _.47 Thisattempt do _ not appeal t our intro pectiv,e c I_ If-know]:edge, but aU tho ediscip.ines- fh t and o .mo t dey lop imental p y c h o l o g y t h a ~ inv stigat thegradual cOonstruction of self-awareness. In other words ,cognitiv,e psychologists seethe con ciou :ubjective experience a s ~ a n ,advanced or deriv,ed mental phenonlenonnot the foundation of aU intentionaHty aU mentality .8 or in mor Continentalterms cognitive psychology is an alfti-pheIfOln.enology that is ,a critique of thesubject, of its alleged 'gi.venness .. 9


11/20

Section 1 Page 50

SETTING THE STAOE: .PERSO MIND' ,AND BRA) .S 13

In the next section we shaH see how cognitive p c h o ~ o g y ha addr,essed itscritical potential not QJ11ly again t o u r phenomenologkal intuitions, aboutcon ,ciou ne ' and elf-collS ,ciou ne. " butal 0 again .t it own Lntentional groundthu ' op ning th door to new behavioristic and ,eliminativisHc objection ' .2.2 Behavioristic and e l i m . i n a t i i ' 1 t i c challenges to RCTM

Anti-introspection sm .. externalism an:d the yntactic theory of mind. Theoompatibili t view of the interfac,e between propo itiona attitude p ychology andscientific psychology takes the former aa g,ood working hypothesis. on the overallcomputational orga ' ization ,of the human . indo oteworthy work in cogoitiv,ecience ha ' a umed that the folk ,a,ccount of the architecture of the mind 1:, I.argelycorr,ectthougb .t is far from c o m p ~ e t e . However, there are also findlugs and theori,eswhich seiem suggest that our ,cognitive system is organi1Jed along Hnes ,quitedifferent fr,omthose ~ h e o r i z e d by 'Folk p ychology .Her . i a c]a '. ie example.In 1977 a8 r r i wing th-, p rim ntal oOciai p ychology lit ,atuJi ondissonance and self-attribution Richard E. 'isbett and Timothy D. Wilsonconcluded that the r,eport about the caue. of our behavior are not recoil trlllctioll ofreal mental states and proc'esses due tOo a dire,ct introsp. ctive awareness, but :rather aconfabulatory activity originated by the m p ~ o y m e n t of 'a priori cau altheorie t .so In thi per. pective intro pection booomesa form ofe/f-deception .sl,These ideas hav,e beenbugely influentiaL In d e v e ~ o p [ n e n t a l psychology andcognitive p-sychiatty, the hypothesis that behind th.e iUusion of a.direct introspectiveaccess therei . an inferential a.cti . ity ba .ed on _ocially shared e ~ a n a b ) r y theoriesha been develop d in tbe fr-amework of th.e theory-tbeory app ,roach t,o the inquiryinto the oogniti e mechanisms undedying mindreading . Here "theory' refers toO atacit k n o ~ ~ e d g e tructure a body of mentally r-epre 'entedinfonnation driving theoogniti e machinery und -rlying mentalization.52 For mO l t advocate . of thiapproach. thi ' theory underlie. botb elf-attributiml and hetero-attribution of mentalstates. Therefore, "even though we see'm to r c e ~ v our own m e n t a ~ states dire\ctlyfhi du,ect percpti,on is an iUuio:n. In fact ,OUf knowl-dge of ,ourselv- like ourknowledge of otheli ." i the reu]t ,of a ,theory;.l,eufopsycho,l,ogy is another r,esearch area that abounds with phenomenaundennining the reliabiHty ,of intllo pective oondou ne . '. on icLr for e x a . m p ~ e the L p ~ i t - b r a i n ; ' yndrome.5


12/20

Section 1 Page 51

14 MA WMO MARRAfFA

~ i n t e r p r . e t s ' the right hemisphere's r,esponse and tells a:n implau ible toryunconnected with the command.

We fmd a lery imilar bypotbe i ab ut the cognitive mechani , Iunderlying confabulation in Wilson (1985). He hypotheize two reiatiy lyindependent cogniive y e m s : an. une'lln dou ' y tern underlying nonverbalbehavior and a largely con-ciou - -y-tm who- unction i -, to attemp't to 'VI rbaliexplain and com:municate what IS occurring in the unoon CIOUS syst'em. The lattertakes information from the former as input and m a ~ e s inferences based onrepertorie of rati.ona .lizationaff


13/20

Section 1 Page 52

SETTING THE STAGE: PERSO S MrND ANn BRAr -s 15

functionali t philosophy of Inind witb the cognitive revo ution in psychology, andwith the tirst g e n e r a ~ i o n of Al O 'er the la t two decade howeer . thi ~ h e o r y hasbeen under attack rno tty owing to the expan ion f cognitive cience in twodirections: Hv,erticaHy :nto tb- brain and h o r i ~ o n t a l l y into the environment , .61 Th,e(moe proplling the e downward and outward d_v e ~ o p m e n ~ i' the pr'essure put onthe indi viduali . modular computationa] and repre entational conce,ption of tbemind by neuroscl,e,nces neocoooectlOnist cognitive mode,ling dynanric approacllesto cognit,ion artificial life l w o d d robotics, and other research programsometime grouped under the beading of ' noo- or po I-cia car" cognitive .cience .The clIJrrent debate on the ,conceptual foundations of cognitive science showsa range' of positions which ar,e characterized by the mor,e e s s radical attitudetoard the impH,cation. of the po t-


14/20

Section 1 Page 53

16 MA ' WMOMARRAfFA

f o r m a ~ i o n o f i : n ~ e m a l ',tate that de cribe partial ,a peet .of the world and pre cribes i b ~ e actions.6'9 These are "ac ion-oriented representatmons which u n l i ~ e Lo ,Tymbol. Me per, onal (in that th yare related to th agent' need and tbe kin thatit bas)1 lo'cal (in that tbey r e ~ a t to the drcumstanc currendy surrounding theagent) and computationally cheap (compared with Marr' rich inner model of thevicual scene).Clark's active externalism confmns a point we made eadi,er namely therelevance to the preent day of some behavioristic metap,hysica. and methodologicalcballenge, . In fact- in ofar a 'empha ' i on the outward or bella ioral a pect ofthought or intelligeno nd attendant de- mphasis of inward experiential or innerprocedural aspects-is ,tbe hallmark Oof behaviorism" 7U active externalism is

beha iori ' ic.Elbnil2ativ.e connectionism. lark s reVLlon of RCTM fOnows the antiindividualistic guideHnes that charact,erize the body of research on situated andembodied c'ognition. I ow we tum. to another r e v i s i o n ~ whkh r,efl.ects tbe mo ementdownw.ard into the brain ari ing from the connectioni t ccOgnitive modeHng andcomputational neuroscience.During the 1970 the funclionali t approach inclined some scientificany

minded phi 0 opbet to view computational p' ychology a mdicaUy aotonomoufrom neuroscience. For xarnple in. Spedal SCIence ' Fodor draws a principl .dargument for a ,ery trong .autonomy of p ychology from a combin.ation of6unoCtionaii m, multiple realizability the i , and to en-idenHty theory?' By the late1970s however. some philosophers were objectmg to the divorce of ,cognitivescience frOom neuroscience Paul M. and Patricia S. Churchland foremost amongstthem. They t oded tooontinu. to e n d o ~ a v rsion of til id nt 'ty th ory and -torejec the language of thought hypothesj .72The C h u r c h ~ a n d s ' version of the type-identity theory ,com.es from the attemptto u e the re 'ourc,e of neoconne,ctioni t cognitive modeling to de ,elop a mo,rebiologically respectable form of computational functionaHm. That istbey view th,eartificial n e u r a ~ nel ork a neurally inpired computational ystems and hen,ceendore the functionaH t idea that the explanation of a cognitive pr ce di r,egar-dthe fact that it mediUlll i made.of nervous tisue: ~ e l ! l r o n a l detail are no mor'ee e n ~ i a l to connectioni t conception of cognition than va.c1ilum .-tob _ or 'Ir-ani 'tordetails ar,e essential to the dassical conception of cognition embodied in orthodoxAI Fodorean pychology and [folk pychology] it df' ."What the turchland blame on da ical computational functionali m (akaRCTM) L tha't it failed to dLtinguLh the e v e l of cer,ebral matter from the 1evel .ofcer _ ral architecture. A functionali m that ,a pir'eafter ~ o g , l c a l p.au ibiJity needto vi -,W our knowl -Klg - ofth - functional, tructur .ofbrain as a SOUle - of con-traintsoQn tbe computational modeling. From this point of view the strength of artificialneural networl (c.apacitie;.oflearning and elf-.organization fl- ibility. , robu tnin the presence of perturbations , capadty of dealing with such l o w - vel tasks as theprocessing of sensory inputs and motor outputs) depend on just those structural


15/20

Section 1 Page 54

MrND ' AND BRAl 17

features of compu.tation (the high pa:raneli -m as opposed to von eunlarm;ssequ,entialproce sing) which are in pir-ed by how the brain work ' 74-According to the hurchland ' th i give , ri e to a dp f f e r e n c e betwe nclassical and connectioni t computabonal, functionalism. uming as paradigm ,ofmentation type, ofthinting tha.t lend them ,elv, " to bing ,oodified in formal modeluen ,a deductive ,ogic RCTM endo e a ~ I i n g u i tic-ratiooali t tradition" in thestudy of human ,cognition; which sticks to folk psychology and intentionaHstphilosophy .of mind in taking agents to represent ~ h e world through sentence-tiletruclure' and to perform,computation that mim " logical mference . 5 In contra tconnectionist computational functionalism is inspired by the functional organizationof the brain, which represents the world by means of very d i m e n s i o n a ~ acti a ~ i o n vector Le. by a pattern of acti ation e v e ~ acro _ a very large populationof neurons, and ~ ' p e r f o m l s computatEons o.n those representations by effectmgvarioOus complex vector-toO-vector transformations from one neur,al population tt)another,.76

The availabm.ty of a. brain-like co,mputational m o d e ~ i n g that breaks with the"propo Hional kinematic" and "logical dynamic. ,1 of folk P ychology 1ead theChur,chlands to reverse Fodor s approach to the autonomy of psychology issue.odor daims that the irreducibility ofpsychologkal states and process toneur,obiological one ' impli " a radical autono,my of p y c h o ~ . o g y from neur.o cienc .Tbe Churc.hland a.ccept this claUn but only to draw a totally diffirent implicationfrom it They think that we hould give up a c o m p 1 l l t a t i o n a ~ p y c h o ~ o g y irreduciblebecau ,- i tricably int rtwined with oUe p ychologyand. d dicat ou , Iv todevelop a reducible successor. This is the proces ', that Robert McCauley tenns 00 -evolution namely ' e v o l u t i o n producing the eliminations of theoriescba:racteristic .of scientific revolutions ,.77 ooording to the Churchlands; 00 -evolution is the phase which computational psychol.ogy has been going throughsince early 19800s, with the advent of ,connectionism. [n fact they claim that theintertheoretic difference between on the one hand the connectioni , repre entationasactwvation vectors and c o m p 1 l l t a ~ i o n s as vector to .ve:ctor transformations and onthe other hand the cla_sical sentence-like repre .entations and logical computationsi ufficiently grea1 to pro;mpt an ootolog"cally radical theory change, which willbrmg about the total ,eliminaHon of oUe psychology.After th _ eliminati e tage . the n _w neur.ally in. pired Pl ychQlogy andneuroscience wiU co-ev.olve until they are unified by ,an approximatemicroreduclion" where lower-I .' 'el theorie pre erve an ,equipotent image of upperlevel theorie without compreh nive mappmg. 78From the Churchland' ie therefor,e the app,roximate microre:d1llction ofp . ycho.ogy to neuroscienc,e i the pay-o,f fo f the ubtitution ,of ub ymbohcdi tribut d repr ntarion for LOoT tyl pr entations. But bow piau 'ibl i . theliminative-reductive model.of the co-evolution .of psychology and neuroscience?An obJ -- ction has been voiced by ome advocate of ,a plurah tic view on theexplanatory relations between p s y c h o ~ o g y and neuroscience. Explanatorypluralism' is a position in the p h i ~ o s o p h y of s d e n c e h o ~ d i n g that " theories atdifferent le ..els of description ~ i t e psychology and n e u r o s c i e n c e ~ can c o - e v o ~ e and


16/20

Section 1 Page 55

18 MA MMOMARRAfFA

mutually influence ,eadl other without t h e h i g h e r - l e v e ~ theory being r e p ~ a c e d by orreduced to, 'the lower-Ie el one ".79 From thi point of iew the mo _ eriouhort,conling of the hurchlalld; model i its uni,direclionality: ' tDce't give . ton e u r o s c i e n t h i c ~ e v e l a. priority , when thetheo,rie of p .ydl010gy and ciencef a i l ~ o ma.p onto on ,another neatly tbebla'me Ii exclu ively lonp y,cmology.80'Ho,wever, the p l u r a ~ i s t contend at: lea-t som - cae - of coO-evoOlution di -playbidirectionality that i .; p .ychology and neuroscience InutuaUy influence each otherwithout reduction of the h i g h e r ~ l e v e l theory to tbe l o w e r ~ l e v e l one. To a,ccountForthi bidirec 'tlonality we are (iequired to adopt a more pragmatic conception of 00 -evolutionary dynami,cs::a co-evolution in the perspective' of ex.planatory p,iuralisrn.8lExpllanatory p.uralism seems 10 fit in very weH wi 'th computationalneu.r-o cience.82 In fact"thi i a "bridge' di c i p ~ j n e be een p ychology andneuroscience which on the one hand puts bottom-up cons.traints on computationalmodeling, w h i ~ e on the other hand extends ,ome principle .of cOimputationalmodeling to neurosdentific research thus promoting theintegrat.ion ofneuroscientifk the()lretical con, tructs into c ' ) m p u t a t i o n a ~ p ychology. 83

3. 10The tension between compatibilism and eliminativism is the d i a ~ e c t i c motor of thede 'elopmerrtof sdent.fi c psychology in the twentie'th century. On tbe one hand, th,erise of cognitiv,e psyc.hology was the resultant of the repudiation of the eliminativmstclaim ,of bebaviori m in fav ,or ofa compatibili t project that ha produced forms ,ofmentali m. mcilcally different from the intra. p e c t ~ o n t mentali m charac'eri tic ofthe beginnings of scientific psychology. On the other band the new merrtaH ticp ' y c h o ~ o g y ha , Ii ,ed a. pr-ecariou. balance c.on tantly at ri k of collap e under thepre ur,e of alway new behavioritic and e ~ i m i n a t i v i ticchaUenge .This dia.lectic is inescapable. S d f ~ c r i t i d s m is consbtutive of a _dence that.re t on uch ,a fragile theoretical ba e a our folk p y hological intuition about themental. We bav,e seen tha even Fodor tbe champion ,of compatibili-m radicallyrestri,cts the scop of his defen e of folk psychulogy . His scientific intentionalreali m i the hypotbe i that wh ichevr kind of tate will b p "tulated by amature cientific p .ycbology; they mustb ucb that1 like propo iHonal attitudes ,aresemantically v a ~ u a b l e , logically structured ,and causally efficadous. It is no troublefor Fodor to adm.t that many speci.fic posits of th,e folk-psychological c o n c e pch me (' p rhaps Ie en 'b lier and "de ire" 4) might rum out to b th or ticallyinadequate.On ~ h e other hand we cannot go '0 0 far .away from the fhlkpsychologicalintuition on pain ,of ~ o o ing the very concept ,of mind. A c c ~ r d i n g l y informationprocessing psychology is re 'quired to accomplish the very a.rduous task ofnegotiating ,a 'reflecti e equilibrium not only ith 'the bottom-up con traint fromneUf'O cience (a- required by the above-mentioned exp.ana1ory pluralim) but '0


17/20

Section 1 Page 56

MIND' AND BRA] - 19

with the top-downconstra.ints from the philosophical theorizing on our folkp y c h o ~ o g i c a l oonc,eptual ,cherne. 50

_OTEI Philosophy of neuroscience: Bechtel et al. (2001) Bickle and Mandik 20(2); Bickle (2003).PhHosophy of psychology: Hatfield (1995) Block and Segal (1998); B o t t e r i ] ~ and Carruthers(1999) Bermudez (2005) Mason S r ~ p a d a ,and Stich- (forthcoming) Wils on (2005 b).Ph m10 ophy ofoognitive ' cjence: Clark (2001);,Gru h (2002)- Havie (2005).2 Se thi olume. ,ehapiers 20-22_1 The "dea that folk psychology is ,ll theory can be differendyconstrued depending, on weadopt a personal or s l ! . l b p e r s o n a ~ perspectlve (see tich and Ravenscroft 1994 . At thoe personal] v ] folk p. ycholo,gy i a theory of mind implicit in our ryday talk about mntal tat(see LewIs 1972). At the subpersonal ]'evel, folk psychology can be defined a ~ ~ h e o r y " in thesens'e that it is a tadt knowledge structure, a body .of internally represented. informa ion w h ~ c h g,uides the cognitive mechanisms underlymng mindreading. In th"s perspective, the theoryimJ'IHcit in 'Our e eryd31y talk about the mind i ~ i k e l y to be ' an articulation o f ~ h a t fragment of[th _ u b p e r s o n a ~ f ' O ~ k p ychological til _my which i.s avaiJabl _ to oon do," refl _ tion"(Ravenscroft 2 0 0 4 Cm:rc/utii l'lg Remarks).4 BJock (1995) draws a distinc ion be ween '"phenomenal consciousness and "access,consciou ness". A mental state i acce_s c o n s c ~ o u s if ~ t s content is available for use in variousinfor-rnation-proce sing pmcesses, ~ i k e inference veiba1izafon and acti.on planning. See tbiv o ~ u m e . ppm 90 ff.S Brentano ([ 1874]11'973 ppm 8-89).6 It follows that in attributm.g a true (o r false) beli ft o an ag nt we buHd a .l:U?t'arepresentationthat rep,resents hislher t rue ( or fa lse)1 epr s.entation. See this vQlume. ,chap, er 22 pa . 'fm.7 Heider andimmel (1'944).Hider 1958 p 5).9 Se Jervm (1993 p.53 n. 12). See also this volume pp. l3-]4 ~ 5 5 - 1 5 7 W60-164 172-l7 '9.10 ' T h ~ s is tich (1983). tich ] 996. ,chapter m) has "deconstruct,ed; his fonner eHminativism.11Fodor .B v r and Garrett ( ~ 9 7 4 p. x ~ ) . 1- Very s litably, HaUl' ld critidZ! s "the conventional story .of psycho]ogy!s, nov I founding,ca. 1:879 (2002 ~ ) . 213}, and argues that the new experimental psycholQgy was the ,outcome.of graduaJ trm -formation of a p'reviou ... natura] philosophical p ycbology" (p. 209').I Jervis this v.olum.e, p. 147.14 Stich (1983 p. [).IS Stich 0(1996 1999').16 On ~ i m i n a t i v e b haviQrism. see Byrne 11994 and Rey (1997 chapter 4). Hadield (2.002pp. 215-217) convincingly argues against ~ h e r,eceived view. that I Q g i c a ~ behaviorism did not, xert a substantiv, influence Qn:n obehavio:rism.17 Hauser (2oQ05).I This point is emphaswzed by Dennett (1978 pp '. 58ff.) terelny (1990 p . 33) and WHso.n(1999, p. xix).19 Tolman ( ~ 9 4 8 .


18/20

Section 1 Page 57

20 MA ' WMOMARRAFFA

to ' computadon" albeit only in an f o r m

Empty organism is the term used by E.G. Boring to char.acterjze Skinneli s position(quoted in C\vell and Simon 1972 875).27 Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981).28 Pat moster. thi olume p. 55 .29 See Bechtel Abrahamsen .and Graham (1998); adel and PiaUeUi Palmarilli 2002).30 ee Block (1983 p. 521 I and Ma r,coni (2001 p . 18). Harm h (2002) oppo 'es thi "narrow",cone ptjon ofcogniti cience to a "broad" one .3:1See Bogdan (1993).12 Marr (1982).:n ord _ chi and Frixione thi ol,ume p. 39'.34 On Marr s theory o f v ~ s o n . see this volume, PP '. 55-56.s Fodor (1985 p'. 422 empbas"s in original). BenIludez ((000) glo ,sses this, pl ssage by

making a di tinction b _ween two different type of p ychologkal _planation. The,e -planation of folk p ychology are 'horizontal" (they " plain a particular.vent or t a ~ e Lnterms of amecdent tate and e ent). They are "strate,glc and predict! e", allowing u oOna i,gate th ocial world" (B rmud 2005 p. 33). By c{)ntra' t the xplanation of,computationa,l psychology are lyertic ,al : they aim to provide 'legitimation ' or ' groundingfor our f o ~ k - p y c h o ~ o g i c a l horizontal exp ,l.ana tory practice (p. 36). B .mllidez make dear thatthe latter ar the xp1ana.tion ,exten iJ y _udLd by philo oph .fS ,of c'enc ,. ho t nd tou tbe ocabulary of rduction (,. hich in my term , is imp y one typ , of vertical,e planation) I p. 336).36 Quine ([ 1956] 1'966).31 Fodor 1994a p.295).38 See ydede 2004) and Horst (1'99,6 1999, 2005) to which tbe present ubsection iindebt .d.39 Fodor and Pyly hyn([19'8 ] ]995, PI'. 112-1 ]3).40 Ibid p. 1B. S . . Horst (2005 , subsection 1.1).4,1 ee orst (1999 p.170; 2005, subsection 2.1) Aydede (2004 subsection 5.2).42 Denn _tt (19'9 _, p. 335)..4J ydede (.2004 .section 1).44 odor 1991, p,12). See also this volume, chapt,er 16, section 1.45 Jervis, this volume, p. 152.46 J_vL I m93 p. 301).47 Cf. Jervis: By n g a methodical bottom up'approach [scientific psychology],examines bow .our most basic psycbological med an"sms (akin to. the learning processes inr e ~ a t i v e simple org,anisms) cau be graduaUy revealed and provide us with tbe information


19/20

Section 1 Page 58

MIND' ,AND BRA 21

we need to und _ mndand identify our el ' ,a tmnking on iou b ng .. (thl volume p.52) e al 0 Meini and Paterno el'" "bo:tom-up," app,roaeh to ,cone ptchapter 8.48 o.enntt (1993, 193) . Objections to thi bottom-up approach to consciou ne hila ,e b .nraised by those philosophers wh o think that the only legitimate sense of consciousnessphenomenal consciousness and a n a c h r o n i s ~ i c a l l y restore the classic primacy of first-personphenomenology (see e.g. Seade 1992). Providentially however twO' much more a t t l ' a i c t ~ v e options ,are a v ~ a b l e : 0) it possible to argue that the only ~ e g i t i m a t e sense of consdousnessi Qcce:s oonciousne : ( 'ee. ,e.g. Denn,ett 1991- eeal 0- thi olume cbapter 17" .ction 6)'(ii) it i po ible to argue' that phenomena] ,con iou ne mu l be' e-xpJicated in. cau alfunctional or rep,resentational (i e. a c c e s s - r e ~ a t e d ' ) terms (see, e.g. th is,vO'lume ,chap'ter 14 ' .

Rkour r a . c ~ r i z e Freudian p ychoanaly ' ,as ''une anti-phenomenologi,e ,qui,exig,e, non laJ r'eduction a Ia conscience mads reduction de la conscience' (1969, p. 137).How .r a we have ju t een Fr,eud' , i.n.quiry into tl1 . unconscioOUS start from accmsdou ne . aken a ' giv,en A Jee . i note thi make p ychoanaly , a di.alectkalvari:mtoOr phnomenology' I 1993 p. 320 n. IS). In contrast" c.ogniti 'e psycJbotogy can be q u ~ t e rightly regarded as an anti.-phnomenology.50 isbett and Wilson (19'77 p. 233).5:1 Jervis (thi ' v'Olume pp . 149 '-]500) ". es 'n the '.mpha. L on .1 f-deception tb .. "'strength' ofth . Fr .udian conc .pt or the uncon clOUS. M (thi volume ,chapLr 12) d. fends adeflationary i,ew of , If-deception ba ed.on a r .cent theory .of 1ay hypothesi. Ie ting.52 See above ,n .3.

Gopnikand M'e1tz'o'f{ (1' 9 9 4 p"168),4 ee this volum pp .207-209.

S Gazzaniga. tt a-l. ( 998, p. 544).56 Stich (19 3 p. 231 ) ..Bu t see Rey (] 988 for a ""comp-at miHs U reply to this argument,Recently tich himself has rad'ca1ly downsized his anti.-introspectionism in. view of somew'Ork oOn first-person mindreading; ~ t l h e kinds 'Of mwtakes that are made in [tbe 'experimentsreported by isbett and Wilson]1are typical1y not mistakes in detecting on ..sown m ntalstate .. Rather, the studies show that ubject . make mi take in rea aning about their ownmental -tate ' ichols and Stich 2003, p . 16 ' .57 Stich 0( 1983 p . 230).58 Ibid. p. 188..9 ee Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979').

6(1 See tich 1983 chapter 8). Another option i Fodor' argument h a t scientifi,c p' ycho]ogyshould emp]oy a notion of "narrnow contenf'" t h a ~ is a kind of c o e n t tha t supervenes onformal properti,e Fodor 1987). Recently, howe 'er Fodor (1 9'94b) has cha.nged hi mind andhas abandoned the narrow ,content (see Cain 2002 chapt er 6).6] Be-ehtel . Abrahamsen and Graham ( 199 p. 77).62 Fodor 2000. p 1) .63 See the oft-cited an Gelder and Port (1995 pp. 2 4) .64 van Gelder (1999, p. 244).65 See this volume pp 40 f f.6(i See this volume pp 27 ff,67 e brrk (1997 p. ~ 2 6 ) .


20/20

22 MA ' WMOMARRAfFA

68 See tm 7 PP' 2 2 ff.69 On Gibsonian affordances see this volume. pp. 241ff.70 Haus'er (2005 section a v .7:1 Fodor 19'75, chapter ]). See ,al 0 Fodor (199 '7).72 . cchtel, Abrahamsen and Graham (1 '998 p. 65). See also Bickle and Mandik (2002)..7 ChUf hland and C h u r c h ~ a l l d (1996 p. 22 ,674 See Marconi (2001 pp,.29-30).1 See, g., P.M. Churchland (l98k) .76 P.M Churchland ~ 9 9 8 p. 41) Ho 'w er thi wew of th relationship betw n,eonnecdom mand propo 'tional attitude i contro ,e iaL .g. ' roolen ky ]995) thinks thatit i ' both ju tifiable and nece aty a cribe to certain conn .cd-oni t y t .m b, Ii . . Horganand Timson (1996) argue that LoT sty],e representation w both necessary in e n e r a ~ andrealizaJb]e within c O l l n e c ~ i o n i s architectures.71 McCauLey (1996. p. 26).'1 Ole - f o l u t i o n ~ t in ibwd P"2S .79 de Jong (2001 p,.731),.oMc' a ~ l e y (1996. p. 25).'I , Co- _olutioDp , in ibwd. p. 27.

82 Cf. Churchbmd ,and Sejlnowski: ''The co-evolutionary advice r,eg.ardi:ng mIlIethodological,efficiency i , let many flo er b,oonl (quoted in McCauley ~ 9 9 6 , p .33). On c o m p u t a f o n a ~ n e u r o s c j e n c e ~ see the classic Churchbmdand S e j n o w s k ~ ( ~ 9 9 2 ) and the ree'ent Eliasmith(20005).3 Cf. Clafik and Hwa .mith: "It i pred Jy the compl x r,Jation b,tw, n ImpL mentation andfunction that have spawned a, recent sur,geof interest in compu,a,ional neurodence. With thexpHc't goa] of taking biologica1 constroinL a riou]y a_ c o m p u t a t i . o n a ~ one_

,computational n UTO cience' ha bgun to xp]ore' a va t rang ofr a.li tic n urn] mod 1 . Such modJhould pro ,u eful in providing constraints ofthjrown . [ .. ] 0 ., not only do,sbiology inform the ' construction of c o m p u t a t ~ o n a l mod, 1 but i d e ~ U y tho am. mod, L canhelp suggest important experiments or neuroscien ists to. perfoml' (2002 p,.8 ,87).4 Lower and Rey (1991. p. x ~ v ) . 8S In thi olum the chapters 16- 9' focll on the top-d.own con t r a ~ n t whe:rea the chapter2 and 23 emp lha . re the bottom-up .one .

persons, minds and brains

Documents