PolicyBrief0319November2017

PerilousJourneys:MigrationbetweentheHornof

AfricaandYemen

This policy brief highlights some of the keypolicyimplicationsfromthefindingsofarecentstudyonmovementbetweentheHornofAfricaand Yemen undertaken by the Research andEvidenceFacilityoftheEUTrustFundforAfrica.This study set out to explore how and whypeople continue to move in large numbersbetween the Horn of Africa to Yemen despitethe dangers of the journey and thedeteriorating security situation in Yemen. Theresearchwasconductedacross threecountrieswithfieldworkinPuntland(Bossaso,QardoandGarowe), Djibouti (Djibouti town and Obock)and Yemen (Sana’a, Aden, and Al Hodeidah)between January and June 2017. Throughinterviewswithmigrants, government officials,aid agencies, civil society and individualsinvolved in smuggling and trafficking, itexamined the factors driving people’smovement,theirexperiencesofthejourney,

thewiderangeofagentsinvolvedinfacilitatingirregularmigrationandtheimpactsofmigrationon the wider community in each setting. Thispolicy brief presents findings from the analysisof movements from the Horn of Africa toYemen.Itisimportanttonotethattheresearchalso explored movements in the reversedirection,fromYementotheHorn.

Thekeyfindingsoftheresearch:1. Over the last year there has been a

reduction in thenumberofmigrants fromtheHorncrossing theArabianandRedSeatowards Yemen. In particular, there hasbeenafallinthenumberofEthiopians(thelargest national group using these routes)making the journey; the State of

Emergency inEthiopiadoesnotappear to

haveresultedinlargerflowsofpeople.2. Most of those using these routes (and in

particular Ethiopians) aim to reach Saudi

Arabiatowork.3. A small but growing number of young

Somalis are crossing toYemenas the first

part of a new route to Europe (see mapbelow).Theycross theGulfofAdenor theDjibouti Strait, thenmove north over landthrough Yemen, then make another boatjourney across the Red Sea to Sudan, andthen over land through Egypt or LibyatowardstheMediterranean.Thisnewrouteismoreriskythanever,as it involvesthreedangerous sea crossings (back and forthacross the Red Sea and from Libya acrosstheMediterranean)andmanymigrantsend

MigrantsdetainedinCeelayo,Puntland

(Source:PMPF)

upinthehandsoftraffickinggroups.Therehas been little research on the latersectionsof this routeasmigrantsmoveonfromYemen.

4. There are a growing number of womenusing the Red Sea route: womenmake up20-30%of themigrants. (Inaddition,manywomenalsotravel toGulfCountriesbyair,their journeys facilitated by brokers oragents.) Most migrate with the aim offindingemploymentasdomesticworkersintheGulf.

5. Onaverage,Ethiopianmigrantsusingthese

routesarepoorerandhave lesseducationthantheSomalis.Asaresult,Ethiopiansaremorelikelytotravelonfootandstruggletocoverthebasiccostsof their journey (suchas food, accommodation, or medical care)leaving them much more exposed to

exploitation.6. Migration is driven primarily by the search

for better employment and livelihoodsreflecting the chronic poor economicconditions. A fewmigrants referred to thedroughtandpotentialfamineintheregionasafactorpromptingtheirdeparture.ManyOromo respondents cited political

upheaval in Ethiopia as a reason to leave,but the increased restrictions on

movement appear to have reduced theflowofmigrants.

7. WhilethecollapseoforderinYemenmakesitmuchmore insecure formigrants, italsoopens up a space where they can move

withoutformalcontrols.8. Manyof thoseon themovehaveprevious

experience of migration or have closeconnections with previous migrants. Theyare awareof the routes, the agents touseandthedangersinvolved.

9. Migrants distinguish between ‘good’ and‘bad’ smugglers and share details of themwithinmigrantnetworks.

10. Somali youths, both male and female, areleaving in a ‘Travel Now, Pay Later’

arrangement,withouttheconsentoftheir

parents and with little or no money,anticipating that their parents will payfees/ransomswhen theyaredemandedbysmugglers or traffickers along the way.Parents are very unhappy about theirexodusoftheyouthtoEurope.

11. Despite enormous and varied challenges,mostmigrantsdonotregret theirdecisionto leave their country. They are aware of,but are not dissuaded by, the risks anddangersofmigration.

12. Therehasbeenanexpansionofsmuggling

activities especially over land routes.Where migrants used to first come incontact with smugglers at the ports, ascontrols on irregularmovementhavebeenstrengthened,migrantsarenowmorelikelytousesmugglers tocross theborder fromEthiopiaandmoveacrossSomalia.

13. There is widespread evidence thatsmuggling activities and networks arefacilitatedbystatecollusion.

14. Host communities are ambivalent in theirfeelings towards migrants. For the mostpart, their interactions were rather verylimited as the migrants are in transit andoftenunderthecontrolofsmugglers.Localcommunities did not associate migrantswithinsecurity.

15. Official mechanisms of assistance,protection and support providedby states,UN agencies and NGOs are extremely

limited due to a lack of funding, capacity,

Map:MigrationroutesfromtheHornof

AfricaTo/ThroughYemen

political interest,challengesofsecurityandaccess,andapprehensionat thescopeandscaleoftheissue.

PolicyImplicationsCurrent interventions to respond to thechallenge of irregular migration between theHorn of Africa and Yemen have had limitedimpact.Thefullreportoutlinesawiderangeofgaps and opportunities for future policy andprogramming.Thispolicybriefinghighlightsjustfivebroadareasofpolicywhereanalysisoftheresearchfindingssuggestsnewapproachesthatcould help to strengthen the policy responseand increase their impact. While these havebeen identified through the research onmovements between the Horn of Africa andYemen, they are also likely to apply to othersettings, including other EUTF areas ofoperation.Thesearepresentedhere.

1. Support for local communities is critical.There is no realistic prospect that externalinterventions will grow sufficiently to provideadequateprotectionandassistancetomeettheneeds of all migrants in the region. It seemsinevitablethatlocalcommunitiesmustcontinuetoplayacriticalroleinrespondingtomigrants.It is therefore very important that theirambivalence isnotallowed to turn tohostility;instead their willingness to accept migrantsneeds to be nurtured. Measures to reducepossible points of tensions should includebolstering sanitation and health facilities inareas where migrants are staying; supportingcivil society organisations working withmigrants and local populations; broaderacknowledgement of role of migration andmigrants in local economy – rather thanfocusing exclusively on insecurity, criminalityandrestrictingflowofpeople.

2. More refined approach to anti-smuggling

and trafficking measures. For many in theregion, smugglers are seen as providing a vitalserviceinhelpingpeopletomove.Itmaynotbeconstructivetotarallsmugglersandtraffickers

with the same brush. Attempts to crack downonallsmugglingarehavinglimitedsuccess,notleast because many officials are involved indifferent aspects of the business and someprovide a good service in their eyes of theirclients. There needs to be more focus onidentifying common ground where a broadrangeofactorsagree theactivity iswrongandthat those involved in gross human rightsabuses, kidnappers, extortionists, and so forthshould be stopped. Alliances can then be builtaroundtacklingthoseperpetratorsaspriority.

3.Maximisinglegalmigration.Thedemandfortherighttomigrateis likelytoexpand,evenasconditions improve. It is important thatpeople’saccesstolegalmigrationopportunitiesare maximised. This may include increasingawareness of existing opportunities – such asthose under the bilateral agreements betweentheGovernmentof Ethiopia andKuwait,QatarandJordan;facilitatingaccesstotheseschemesby decentralising procedures so potentialmigrants do not have to apply via the capitalcity; and improved regulation of employmentagenciestoensurethecostsarecontrolledandtransparent. It is also important to promotenewagreementsthatopenuplegalavenuesforpeopleof theHorntomove forwork, studyoron humanitarian grounds in both theGulf andEurope.

4. Rethinking public information campaigns.Awareness campaigns that seek to determigrants by warning them of the dangers andrisksof irregularmigrationappeartobelargelyineffective;mostmigrantsarealreadyawareoftherisksanddecidechoosetomoveregardless.Instead, it may be more valuable to focus onother types of awareness campaigns: formigrants,focusingonsourcesofprotectionandopportunities for regular migration; for thewider community, eliciting understanding ofmigrants’ situationbyexplain their reasons formoving, with a view to reducing potentialtension.

5. The role ofmobility in people’s livelihoods

andaspirations.Manyofthecurrentresponses

quite rightly focus on the problem oflivelihoods.Much of the irregular migration inthe region is undertaken in the context ofextremely limited options for local livelihoods.Livelihoodprogrammeswillbemoreeffectiveifthey are primarily concerned with increasingpeople’s incomes and making them moreresilient to shocks such as droughts. Ifsuccessful, they may not dampen downmigrationdemand.Forsomefamilies,migrationmay be an important way of diversifyingincomes, thereby increasing resilience.Moreover, it is not the poorest who migrate.Somali youth who seek to reach Europe arethosewho think their familiescansecure largesums to pay for their safe passage.Others aretrapped in place by poverty and politicalrepression. Improving livelihoods needs to beseen as strategy to improve the quality ofmigrationratherthanpreventit.

Mobilityhasalwaysbeenafundamentalpartofthe livesofpeopleacross the regionespeciallyfor agro-pastoralists.With the transformationsof societies, growing connections with theglobal economy, and growingpopulations, it isinevitable that it will continue to play animportant role in the future. Achievingsustainabledevelopmentwillonlybepossibleifroomismadetoenablemigrationandmobilitywithin the framework of national andinternationalpolicy.

TheExecutiveSummaryofthereport:MigrationbetweentheHornofAfricaandYemencanbefoundhere:

https://www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/research-papers/file122638.pdf

AndtheMainReportisavailableat:

https://www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/research-papers/file122639.pdf

ResearchandEvidenceFacilityContacts:

IntheUK:DrLauraHammond,TeamLeader:laura.hammond@soas.ac.uk

DrOliverBakewell,MigrationandDevelopmentKeyExpert:oliver.bakewell@qeh.ox.ac.uk

InNairobi:MrVincentChordi,ConflictandGovernanceKeyExpert:Vincent@sahanresearch.org

MsHafsaMahboub,ActingResearchCoordinator:hafsa@sahanresearch.org

Forpressqueries:DrIdilOsman,CommunicationsExpert:io7@soas.ac.uk

Followus!FurtherinformationabouttheREFcanbefoundat:www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch

Twitter:@REFHorn

Facebook:‘Research&EvidenceFacility’

Blogseries:https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/

TheREF is fundedby theEUEmergencyTrustFundfor Africa. The Trust Fund has been created tosupport the most fragile and affected Africancountries. The Trust Fund aims to help fosterstability in the regions to respondto thechallengesof irregular migration and displacement and tocontributetobettermigrationmanagement.