People vs Abrazaldo

The facts of the case as presented by the prosecution witnesses are as follows:

On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, accused-appellant, then intoxicated,[4] attempted to hack his uncle, Bernabe Quinto, but instead, hit the post of the latters house.[5] The incident was reported to the barangay authorities, prompting Delfin Guban, Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Alejandro Loceste (all are members of the barangay tanod), and Cesar Manaois to rush to the scene. Upon reaching the place, Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at his uncle, I will kill you! Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant coming out of Quintos house with blood oozing from his forehead.[6] At that time, the place was well lighted by a flourescent lamp. Guban tried to assist accused-appellant. However, for unknown reason, accused-apellant and Guban shouted at each other and grappled face to face. Accused-appellant pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban at the abdomen[7] and ran away. When Fajardo got hold of Guban, the latter said, I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo.[8] Fajardo, together with the other barangay tanod, rushed Guban to the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital where he was operated by Dr. Alberto Gonzales, a Medical Officer III. But after a few hours, Guban died. Dr. Gonzales issued a Medico-Legal Certificate stating that the cause of death was stab wound, epigastrium, massive hemothorax right.[9]

Gregorio Guban, the victims father, testified that he was the one who spent for his sons funeral expenses. For the burial, he spent P10,000.00;[10] for the 10-day funeral wake,P10,000.00;[11] for the 9

th day

novena, P3,000.00;[12] and for the hospitalization, P4,000.00,[13] or a total of P27,000.00.

On July 16, 1995, Fajardo learned that the knife used by accused-appellant in stabbing Guban was in Salay, Pangasinan. Together with SPO2 Roberto Fernandez, Fajardo went to the house of Francisca Velasquez, accused-appellants aunt, and recovered the knife. [14]

Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant presented a different version. On July 15, 1995 at about 10:00 in the evening, he was making fans inside his house at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan.[15] His wife Lydia and children Mary Jane, Melvin and Christelle were with him. Suddenly, Delfin Guban, who was then drunk, went to his house and shouted at him, saying, Get out Feding I will kill you![16] When accused-appellant went out, Guban hit him with an iron pipe. Accused-appellant ran towards his house and got his two children. Guban, now armed with a knife, followed him and they

grappled for its possession. In the course thereof, both fell down.[17] It was then that the knife held by Guban accidentally hit him. Accused-appellant did not know which part of Gubans body was hit. Thereafter, he got the knife in order to surrender it to the police.[18]

Marites Abrazaldo testified that accused-appellant is his brother.[19] On July 15, 1992, at about 6:00 in the evening, accused-appellant, Guban and Juan Quinto were engaged in a drinking spree.[20] At about 10:00 oclock in that evening, accused-appellant caused trouble at the house of his uncle, Bernabe Quinto.[21] He attempted to hack his uncle, but instead hit the post of the latters house.[22] While running away from his uncles place, he bumped an artesian well, causing a wound on his forehead.[23] Afterwards, accused-appellant killed Guban.[24]

The Solicitor General, in the Appellees Brief, asserts that in pleading self-defense, accused-appellant admitted he killed the victim and, therefore, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. Moreover, accused-appellants version of the incident is completely contradicted by the testimony of his sister. Also, the aggravating circumstance, under par. (5) of Article 14, Revised Penal Code, was clearly established because during the incident, Guban, as the Assistant Chief Tanod, was on duty and engaged in the maintenance of peace and order.

The Solicitor General though agrees with accused-appellant that there was no treachery. Evidence shows that he and Guban shouted at each other and struggled face to face before the stabbing incident. Thus, the assault was not sudden. Likewise, the Solicitor General is convinced that accused-appellant did not purposely and deliberately seek nighttime to perpetrate the commission of the crime.

Consistent is the jurisprudence that where self-defense is invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor;(2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel an aggression. On appeal, the burden becomes even more difficult as the accused must show that the court below committed reversible error in appreciating the evidence.[26]

Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge the burden. To show that he was not the unlawful aggressor, he testified that it was Guban who went to his house, threatened to kill him,[27] hit him with an iron pipe,[28] and attacked him with a knife

The foregoing testimony bears not only the vice of falsity but also isolation. It is uncorroborated and even opposed by Marites, accused-appellants own sister and lone witness. Contrary to his testimony that Guban hit him on his forehead with a pipe, Marites declared that accused-appellant sustained the wound on his forehead when he accidentally bumped an artesian well. Instead of fortifying her brothers defense, she virtually affirmed the prosecutions story by testifying that he created trouble in their compound, attempted to kill his uncle Bernabe Quinto and killed Guban. [31]

Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but in itself is extremely doubtful.[32] In the present case, accused-appellants tendency to invoke a melange of defenses renders his testimony dubious. While he admitted the commission of the crime in order to preserve his own life, he maintained that Guban accidentally stabbed himself. This shows ambivalence. Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes voluntariness, induced only by necessity.[33] Indeed, if there is truth to either of his claim, his natural course of action was to assist the victim, or at the very least, report the incident to the authorities. Certainly, the justifying circumstance of self-defense[34] or the exempting circumstance of accident cannot be appreciated considering accused-appellants flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident. Furthermore, that he did not surrender the knife to the authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience and, instead, indicates his culpability of the crime charged.[35]

In a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself, accused-appellant assails Fajardos testimony as tainted with inconsistencies and is contrary to the normal course. Accused-appellant cannot invoke these alleged weaknesses in view of the principle that one who pleads self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.Even if the prosecutions evidence is weak, it is still credible considering accused-appellants admission that he killed the victim. It bears emphasis that Fajardos testimony clearly points to him as the culprit. Not only did he pull out his knife, stabbed Guban[36] and ran away.[37] Fajardo also reiterated what Guban uttered to him, i.e., I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo.[38]

As Guban had succumbed to death and his opportunity to divulge the truth on his demise had been lost, we cannot but cast a quizzical glance on accused-appellants uncorroborated testimony. More so, when such testimony was contradicted by his own witness who happened to be his sister. Standing alone against the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, accused-

appellants own account of the killing must necessarily fail. We hold that his guilt has been established to a degree of moral certainty. The trial court did not err in relying on the testimony of Fajardo, an eyewitness. Time and again, we have said that we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood.[39]

Dela Cruz vs People

Doctrine of rational equivalence. [The] reasonable necessity of the means employed [to repel the

unlawful aggression] does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and

defense [but] [w]hat the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will

enter the principal factors of the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is

exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the

proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent

danger of such injury.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information3

dated March 2, 2005, which

alleged:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, petitioner went to the

office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th

Floor of Robinson's Summit Center, Ayala Avenue, Makati City.

When petitioner was already inside the building, he went to the work station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey

Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eyewitness Antonette Managbanag's sketch,

was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back towards the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey

from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at the back of Jeffrey's head. At the last second,

Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession of

the gun ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun.

Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffrey's face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally

discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey,

petitioner fled the office.

After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2) young children.

Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he received a copy of the blog

of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.

1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE, AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.

There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. What is left for determination by this Court is whether the elements of self-defense exist to exculpate petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide. The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of

sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.10

In other words, there must have

been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to

inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.11

chanrobleslaw

Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is well settled that when he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

he indeed acted in defense of himself.12

The burden of proving that the killing was justified and that he

incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him.13

As such, he must rely on the strength of his own

evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot

be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the killing.14

chanrobleslaw

Measured against this criteria, we find that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his petition must be denied. First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden,

unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action.15

There is aggression,

only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life.16

The peril sought to be avoided must

be imminent and actual, not merely speculative.17

In the case at bar, other than petitioner's testimony, the

defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioner's questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed an assault which may have caused petitioner to fear for his life. Even assuming arguendo that the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner had every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Accused admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard", then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed (Peo Vs. Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased (PeoVs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609). Accused alleged that the victim was about to smash the fire extinguisher on his (accused's) head but he parried it with his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful as nothing in the records is or would be corroborative of it. In contrast, the two (2)Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was not impeached, both

gave the impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shield himself from the accused who was then already in possession of the gun.

18

Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has

no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.19

To be sure, when the present victim no longer

persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the

offender.20

Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict

excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already

ceased. More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show that if there was unlawful aggression in the instant case, the same rather emanated from petitioner, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary In addition, other than petitioner's testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey continued when he blocked the path of petitioner while the latter tried to run away to avoid further confrontation with Jeffrey. We also agree with the findings of the RTC that there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire extinguisher on petitioner's head. Alternatively, the prosecution witnesses maintained an impression that Jeffrey used the same to shield himself from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a deadly weapon. Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case, the severe wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore, cannot be considered a justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.

Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim, Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert. As held by the Court in People v. Obordo:24chanrobleslaw

Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. Accused-appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part of the victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.

25

Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98). It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against the victim who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not a deadly weapon. Under the circumstances, accused's alleged fear was unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an imagined impending attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression (Catalina Security Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628). It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja v. Peo., 440 SCRA 695).

26

If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just run, despite any obstruction, considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He could have also immediately sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard stationed at the floor where the shooting incident happened. In fact, he could have reported the incident to the authorities as soon as he had opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident or a cry of self-preservation. Yet, petitioner never did any of that. We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling with Jeffrey, and in the end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but four times, the last shot finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Moreover, the Prosecution's eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that while there was prior struggle for the possession of the gun, it was nevertheless accused who was holding the gun at the time of the actual firing thereof (TSN, p. 30, October 10, 2005; TSN, p. 14, October 17, 2005). Witness Managbanag even alleged that while the victim (Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire extinguisher, and the accused were pushing each other,accused pointed the gun at the victim. She heard three (3) clicks and on the 4

th, the gun

fired (TSN, p. 12, October 10, 2005). Under the circumstances, it cannot be safely said that the gun was or could have been fired accidentally. The discharge of the gun which led to the victim's death was no longer made in the course of the grapple and/or struggle for the possession of the gun

27

The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot accidentally to the detriment of Jeffrey. The fire was neither a disaster nor a misfortune of sorts. While petitioner may not have intended to kill Jeffrey at the onset, at the time he clicked the trigger thrice consecutively, his intent to hurt (or even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be disregarded. We have held in the past that the nature and number of wounds are

constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense.28

Thus,

petitioner's contention that an accident simultaneously occurred while he was in the act of self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at best. There could not have been an accident because the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound on his head, a vital part of the body and, thus, demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim. Besides, petitioner's failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey and to

surrender the gun that he used to kill the victim militates against his claim of self-defense.29

chanrobleslaw

In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third element of self-defense since it is recognized that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of

sell-defense.30

If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no

basis.31

Hence, there is no basis to entertain petitioner's argument that a privileged mitigating circumstance

of self-defense is applicable in this case, because unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression

against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter.32

chanrobleslaw

People vs Apolinar

rt. 11: Defense of property People vs. Apolinar Facts: Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant and appellant Anastacio Apolinar alias Atong was at that time the occupant of a parcel of land owned by Joaquin Gonzales in Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan. Armed with a shotgun, Atong was looking over said land when he observed that there was a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder. Believing that he was a thief (of palay), the defendant called his attention but he ignored him. The defendant fired in the air and then at the person. The man, identified as Domingo Petras, was able to get back to his house and consequently narrated to Angel Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had been wounded in the back by a shotgun. He then showed the two wounds - one in each side of the spinal column - which wounds were circular in form and a little bigger than a quarter of an inch, according to the medical report of Dr. Mananquil. Petras died of the wounds he sustained. The defendant surrendered to the authorities immediately after the incident and gave a sworn statement (Exhibit F) before the Justice of Peace of Umingan on December 23, 1936.

Issue: WON the killing of Petras was justified by defense of property

Held: No; the right to property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. --------

PEOPLE V. NARVAEZ 121 SCRA 389 (1983) FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights. 3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to

the offended party.

HELD: 1. NO. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor. 2. YES. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites: a. Unlawful aggression - In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession

b. Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack - In the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack. c. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. - Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep. Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor. 3. NO. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC. Defendant was found guilty of homicide but with mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered. Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.

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BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (RA NO. 9262)

PEOPLE V. MARIVIC GENOSA

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death. On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or

psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self defense. 2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa. Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman. More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established. The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts. The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts. As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity. 2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx" ----------------------------------------------------------------------

C. STATE OF NECESSITY

TY V PEOPLE

[G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004]

Tys mother and her sister were confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for almost 2 years. Since the bill

reached 1,075,592.95, Ty drew 7 PDCs covering 30k each against Metrobank payable to the hospital. However,

they were all dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital filed 7 counts of

violation of B.P 22. For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a

greater injury. She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the

hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged

that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and

subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mothers food and

refusal to change the latters gown and bedsheets. The hospital also suspended medical treatment of her mother.

ISSUE: WON the justifying circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may

find application in this case.

HELD: No. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this

paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one

done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated, thus, the defense is not

applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own

admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her

obligation.

Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been

brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the

issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.