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1 Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change, and the Costs of War Neta C. Crawford 1 Boston University June 12, 2019 Summary In its quest for security, the United States spends more on the military than any other country in the world, certainly much more than the combined military spending of its major rivals, Russia and China. Authorized at over $700 billion in Fiscal Year 2019, and again over $700 billion requested for FY2020, the Department of Defense (DOD) budget comprises more than half of all federal discretionary spending each year. With an armed force of more than two million people, 11 nuclear aircraft carriers, and the most advanced military aircraft, the US is more than capable of projecting power anywhere in the globe, and with “Space Command,” into outer-space. Further, the US has been continuously at war since late 2001, with the US military and State Department currently engaged in more than 80 countries in counterterror operations. 2 All this capacity for and use of military force requires a great deal of energy, most of it in the form of fossil fuel. As General David Petraeus said in 2011, “Energy is the lifeblood of our warfighting capabilities.” 3 Although the Pentagon has, in recent years, increasingly emphasized what it calls energy security — energy resilience and conservation — it is still a significant consumer of fossil fuel energy. Indeed, the DOD is the world’s largest 1 Neta C. Crawford is Professor of Political Science at Boston University and Co-Director of the Costs of War project. Crawford thanks Matthew Evangelista, Anna Henchman, Catherine Lutz, Nathan Phillips, Stephanie Savell, Adam Sweeting, and Alexander Thompson for their critical comments and helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. Crawford also benefited from feedback at Ohio State University in April 2019. 2 Crawford has previously estimated that the budgetary costs of the post-9/11 wars, including Homeland Security and our future obligations to care for the veterans of these wars, are nearly $6 trillion dollars. Neta C. Crawford, “United States Budgetary Costs of the Post-9/11 Wars Through FY2019: $5.9 Trillion Spent and Obligated,” Costs of War Project, November 2018. https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Crawford_Costs%20of%20War%20Es timates%20Through%20FY2019.pdf. 3 General David Petraeus, quoted in Department of Energy, “Energy for the Warfighter: The Department of Defense Operational Energy Strategy,” 14 June 2011, https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-war-fighter- department-defense-operational-energy-strategy.

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Page 1: Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change and the Costs of War Final Fuel Use...1 Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change, and the Costs of War Neta C. Crawford1 Boston University June 12, 2019

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PentagonFuelUse,ClimateChange,andtheCostsofWar

NetaC.Crawford1BostonUniversity

June12,2019

Summary

Initsquestforsecurity,theUnitedStatesspendsmoreonthemilitarythananyothercountryintheworld,certainlymuchmorethanthecombinedmilitaryspendingofitsmajorrivals,RussiaandChina.Authorizedatover$700billioninFiscalYear2019,andagainover$700billionrequestedforFY2020,theDepartmentofDefense(DOD)budgetcomprisesmorethanhalfofallfederaldiscretionaryspendingeachyear.Withanarmedforceofmorethantwomillionpeople,11nuclearaircraftcarriers,andthemostadvancedmilitaryaircraft,theUSismorethancapableofprojectingpoweranywhereintheglobe,andwith“SpaceCommand,”intoouter-space.Further,theUShasbeencontinuouslyatwarsincelate2001,withtheUSmilitaryandStateDepartmentcurrentlyengagedinmorethan80countriesincounterterroroperations.2

Allthiscapacityforanduseofmilitaryforcerequiresagreatdealofenergy,mostofit

intheformoffossilfuel.AsGeneralDavidPetraeussaidin2011,“Energyisthelifebloodofourwarfightingcapabilities.”3AlthoughthePentagonhas,inrecentyears,increasinglyemphasizedwhatitcallsenergysecurity—energyresilienceandconservation—itisstillasignificantconsumeroffossilfuelenergy.Indeed,theDODistheworld’slargest

1NetaC.CrawfordisProfessorofPoliticalScienceatBostonUniversityandCo-DirectoroftheCostsofWarproject.CrawfordthanksMatthewEvangelista,AnnaHenchman,CatherineLutz,NathanPhillips,StephanieSavell,AdamSweeting,andAlexanderThompsonfortheircriticalcommentsandhelpfulsuggestionsonanearlierdraftofthispaper.CrawfordalsobenefitedfromfeedbackatOhioStateUniversityinApril2019. 2Crawfordhaspreviouslyestimatedthatthebudgetarycostsofthepost-9/11wars,includingHomelandSecurityandourfutureobligationstocarefortheveteransofthesewars,arenearly$6trilliondollars.NetaC.Crawford,“UnitedStatesBudgetaryCostsofthePost-9/11WarsThroughFY2019:$5.9TrillionSpentandObligated,”CostsofWarProject,November2018.https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Crawford_Costs%20of%20War%20Estimates%20Through%20FY2019.pdf.3GeneralDavidPetraeus,quotedinDepartmentofEnergy,“EnergyfortheWarfighter:TheDepartmentofDefenseOperationalEnergyStrategy,”14June2011,https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-war-fighter-department-defense-operational-energy-strategy.

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institutionaluserofpetroleumandcorrespondingly,thesinglelargestproducerofgreenhousegases(GHG)intheworld.4

ThispaperspecificallyexaminesmilitaryfuelusagefortheUSpost-9/11warsandthe

impactofthatfuelusageongreenhousegasesemissions.ThebestestimateofUSmilitarygreenhousegasemissionsfrom2001,whenthewarsbeganwiththeUSinvasionofAfghanistan,through2017,isthattheUSmilitaryhasemitted1,212millionmetrictonsofgreenhousegases(measuredinCO2equivalent,orCO2e).In2017,forexample,thePentagon’sgreenhousegasemissionsweregreaterthanthegreenhousegasemissionsofentireindustrializedcountriesasSwedenorDenmark.

DODemissionsforallmilitaryoperationsfrom2001to2017areestimatedtobeabout

766millionmetrictonsofCO2e.Andofthesemilitaryoperations,itisestimatedthattotalwar-relatedemissionsincludingforthe“overseascontingencyoperations”inthemajorwarzonesofAfghanistan,Pakistan,IraqandSyria,5aremorethan400MillionMetricTonsofCO2e.

TheUSmilitaryispreparingforthreatsofattackfromhumanadversaries.Thethreats

ofterrorism,Russian,Iranian,ChineseorKoreanaggressionareallreal,butterroristsandthesecountriesarenotcertaintoattacktheUS.Armscontrolanddiplomacycandeescalatetensionsandreducethreats.Economicsanctionscanalsodiminishthecapacityofstatesandnon-stateactorstothreatenthesecurityinterestsoftheUSanditsallies.

GlobalwarmingisthemostcertainandimmediateofanyofthethreatsthattheUS

facesinthenextseveraldecades.Infact,globalwarminghasbegun:drought,fire,flooding,andtemperatureextremesthatwillleadtodisplacementanddeath.Theeffectsofclimatechange,includingextremelypowerfulstorms,famineanddiminishedaccesstofreshwater,willlikelymakeregionsoftheworldunstable—feedingpoliticaltensionsandfuelingmassmigrationsandrefugeecrises.Inresponse,themilitaryhasaddedthenationalsecurityimplicationsofclimatechangetoitslonglistofnationalsecurityconcerns.

UnlikesomeelementsofthepresentUSadministration,whichisinvariousmodesof

climatedenial,theUSmilitaryandintelligencecommunityactasifthenegativesecurityconsequencesofawarmingplanetareinevitable.TheDODhasstudiedtheproblemfordecadesandbeguntoadaptitsplans,operationsandinstallationstodealwithclimatechange.

TheUSmilitaryhasanopportunitytoreducetherisksassociatedwithclimatechange

—andthesecuritythreatsassociatedwithclimatechange—byreducingtheirrolein 4Theseemissionsarearesultnotonlyofwar,butalsoofon-goingnon-waroperationsandmaintenanceofmilitaryinstallations.Foradiscussionoftheconceptofgreenhousegasequivalencies,seeAppendix1.Alsoseehttps://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator.5SeeAppendix1.Thisisaconservativeestimate.Notincludingbiogenicsourcesorreductionsfromrenewableenergyuse;thelatterwerelessthan1percentofemissions.Inthemostrecentyearforwhichstatisticsareavailable,totalgreenhousegasemissionsbytheDODforFY2017wereabout58.4millionmetrictonsofCO2equivalent.

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creatinggreenhousegasemissions.Whilesomesealevelriseandmassextinctionwillcertainlyoccur—thesechangeshavealreadybegun—themostdireconsequencesofclimatechangeandtheassociatedthreatsandconsequencestonationalsecurityarenotalreadybakedintothesystem.6Thereistimetoacttoreducegreenhousegasemissionsanditisurgenttodoso.IftheUSmilitaryweretosignificantlydecreaseitsgreenhousegasemissionsitwouldmakethedireclimatechangecausednationalsecuritythreatstheUSmilitaryfearsandpredictslesslikelytooccur.

PartIofthispaperoutlinesthescaleandpatternofUSmilitaryfueluse,includingthe

oilthattheUSusestoprotectaccesstoPersianGulfoil.PartIIestimatesgreenhousegasemissionsbytheUSmilitaryandtheportionofthoseemissionsthatareaconsequenceofthemajorpost-9/11USwars.TheUSmilitaryhasbegungreenhousegasemissionsreductions,butthereisroomformuchsteepercuts.Forreadersinterestedinfurtherdetail,Appendix1elaboratesontechnicalissuesandsummarizesthesourcesofdataandassumptionsforthebestestimatesofgreenhousegasemissionstheUShasmadeinwarfrom2001to2017.

PartIIIofthepapersummarizesthewaytheUSmilitaryunderstandsthenational

securityimplicationsofthemilitary’soildependencyandclimatechange.ThePentagonviewsclimatechangeasathreattomilitaryinstallationsandoperations,aswellastonationalsecurity,whenandifclimatechangeleadsmassmigration,conflictandwar.YetthePentagondoesnotacknowledgethatitsownfueluseisamajorcontributortoclimatechange.ThemilitaryusesagreatdealoffossilfuelprotectingaccesstoPersianGulfOil.BecausethecurrenttrendisthattheUSisbecominglessdependentonoil,itmaybethatthemissionofprotectingPersianGulfoilisnolongervitalandtheUSmilitarycanreduceitspresenceinthePersianGulf.ThePentagoncanalsoreduceUSmilitarygreenhousegasemissionsinotherways.ThesealternativesarediscussedmoreinAppendix2,whichsuggestsspecificmeasuresCongressmightconsidertoreduceDODfossilfuelconsumption.

AbsentanychangeinUSmilitaryfuelusepolicy,thefuelconsumptionoftheUSmilitary

willnecessarilycontinuetogeneratehighlevelsofgreenhousegases.Thesegreenhousegases,combinedwithotherUSemissions,willhelpguaranteethenightmarescenariosthatthemilitarypredictsandthatmanyclimatescientistssayarepossible.

Reductionsinmilitaryfossilfuelusewouldbebeneficialinfourways.First,theUS

wouldreducegreenhousegasemissions.Thiswouldtherebymitigateclimatechangeanditsassociatedthreatstonationalsecurity.Second,reducingfossilfuelconsumptionwouldhaveimportantpoliticalandsecuritybenefits,includingreducingthedependenceoftroopsinthefieldonoil,whichthemilitaryacknowledgesmakesthemvulnerabletoenemyattacks.IftheUSmilitaryweretosignificantlydecreaseitsdependenceonoil,theUScouldreducethepoliticalandfuelresourcesitusestodefendaccesstooil,particularlyinthePersianGulf,whereitconcentratestheseefforts.Third,bydecreasingUSdependenceon 6Keepingglobalwarmingtolessthan1.5°Cyieldsamuchmorelivableplanetthaniftheclimatewarmsmorethanthat.IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC),“GlobalWarmingof1.5°C,”SummaryforPolicymakers,(Switzerland:IPCC,2018).

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oil-richstatestheUScouldthenreevaluatethesizeoftheUSmilitarypresenceinthePersianGulfandreevaluateitsrelationshipwithSaudiArabiaandotheralliesintheregion.Finally,byspendinglessmoneyonfuelandoperationstoprovidesecureaccesstopetroleum,theUScoulddecreaseitsmilitaryspendingandreorienttheeconomytomoreeconomicallyproductiveactivities.

I.USMilitaryEnergyConsumptionandFuel

Warandpreparationforitarefossilfuelintensiveactivities.TheUSmilitary’senergyconsumptiondrivestotalUSgovernmentenergyconsumption.TheDODisthesinglelargestconsumerofenergyintheUS,andinfact,theworld’ssinglelargestinstitutionalconsumerofpetroleum.

Figure1tracksUSFederalgovernmentenergyuse.From1975until1990,theenergyconsumedbytheDODwasessentiallysteady.Duringthe1991GulfWar,USalliancepartners,namelySaudiArabia,providedmuchofthefuelusedinthatwar.Afterthe1991GulfWar,andwiththeendoftheColdWar,USmilitaryenergyconsumptiondeclineduntilthe9/11attacks.In2001,asaconsequenceofbeginningamajorwarinAfghanistan,energyconsumptionbytheDODincreased,andin2005hititshighestlevelinadecade.Since2001,theDODhasconsistentlyconsumedbetween77and80percentofallUSgovernmentenergyconsumption.Figure1.DODandTotalUSFederalGovernmentEnergyConsumption,1975-2017,inBTUs7

7InTrillionsofBritishThermalUnits.Sourceofdata:USEnergyInformationAdministration.https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/dataunits.php.

0

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The

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U.S.DepartmentofDefenseConsumption U.S.GovernmentTotalConsumption

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Sincethe2007EnergyIndependenceandSecurityActtheUSgovernmenthasgraduallydecreaseditsoverallenergyuse.8OnlyinFY2013didDODenergyconsumptionreturntothelevelitwasin2000.TheheadlinefromtheEnergyInformationAdministrationannouncingthetransitionsaid“DefenseDepartmentEnergyUseFallstoLowestLevelSince1975.”9Yet,evenasithasrealizedsignificantreductionsinfossilfueluse,thePentagon’sconsumptionremainshigh.Indeed,themilitaryannuallyconsumesmorefuelthanmostcountries.

Asthenextfigureillustrates,jetfuel,dieselfuel,andelectricityproductionarethe

largestelementsofDOD,andthereforeUSgovernment,energyconsumption.Figure2.CategoriesofEnergyConsumedbytheUSGovernmentandDOD10

WhydoestheUSmilitaryconsumesomuchenergy?It’sfighting“tooth”employsequipmentthatguzzlesfuelatanincrediblerate.Thelogistical“tail”andtheinstallationsthatsupportoperationsarealsoextremelyfuelintensive.Eventhemilitary’snon-armoredvehiclesarenotoriouslyinefficient.Forinstance,theapproximately60,000HUMVEEsremainingintheUSArmyfleetgetbetweenfourtoeightmilespergallonofdieselfuel.11 8EnergyIndependenceandSecurityActof2007,https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-110hr6enr/pdf/BILLS-110hr6enr.pdf/.SeetheDepartmentofDefense,“OperationalEnergyStrategy:ImplementationPlan,”March2012https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/operational-energy-strategy_implementation-plan201203.pdf.9USEnergyInformationSystem,“DefenseDepartmentEnergyUseFallstoLowestLevelSince1975.”https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19871.10Source:U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration,“U.S.FederalGovernmentEnergyCostsatLowestPointSinceFiscalYear2004,”2October2017,https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=33152.Overall,gasolineledtotalUSpetroleumconsumption,followedbydieselfuelandhomeheatingoil,andnaturalgases(HGLs)ofvarioustypes.11DanielGouré,“TheU.SArmy’sAll-ButForgottenVehicleFleet,”RealClearDefense,22August2017,https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/22/the_us_armys_all-but_forgotten_vehicle_fleet_112116.html.ThegashungryFordF-150pickuptruckgets17milespergalloninthecity;thehungrierChevroletSuburbangets15milespergalloninthecity.

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InstallationandOperationalEnergyUse

TheDODtracksitsenergyconsumptionintwobaskets.Energyusageforinstallationsisabout30percentofPentagonconsumption.AlthoughthesemilitaryinstallationsintheUSandabroadnecessarilysupportoperations,theDODtracksinstallationenergyuseseparately.12But,asthePentagonnotes,“Inmanyways,installationenergysupportswarfighterrequirementsthroughsecureandresilientsourcesofcommercialelectricalenergy,andwhereapplicable,energygenerationandstorage,tosupportmissionloads,powerprojectionplatforms,remotelypilotedaircraftoperations,intelligencesupport,andcyberoperations.”13

TheinstallationtailthatsupportsUSoperationsandpowerprojectioncapability

includesmorethan560,000buildingsatabout500installations,locatedonover27millionacresoflandintheUSandacrosstheglobe.14InFY2017,theDODspent$3.5billiontoheat,cool,andprovideelectricitytoitsfacilities,downfromthepreviousyear,whenitspent$3.7billion.15Eachinstallation,ofcourse,canproducegreenhousegasemissions.ThePentagonbuildingitselfemitted24,620.55metrictonsofCO2ein2013.16

DespitethefactthatinMay2018theTrumpadministrationrescindedtheObama

administration’sfederalenergyefficiencygoals,theDODremainscommittedtoreducingitsenergyconsumptionforpragmaticreasons.17ThePentagonandeachservicebranchhavemultipleprojectsunderwaytoreduceinstallationenergyuseandtheoveralltrendininstallationconsumptionoverthelasttenyearshasbeendownward.Effortstodecreaseenergyconsumptionatinstallationsincludegraduallyreplacingsomenon-tacticalfleetvehicleswithhybrid,pluginhybridandalternativefuelvehicles,reducingengineidling,developingsolarinstallationsatsomefortsandbases,andconcludingpowerpurchaseagreementsforwindandsolarenergy.18Theseeffortshavebornefruit,buttheretheUSmilitaryhasroomformorereductions.

12OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforSustainment,“InstallationEnergy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/IE/FEP_index.html.DepartmentofDefense,“2016OperationalEnergyStrategy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/2016%20OE%20Strategy_WEBd.pdf,p.4.14Eachinstallationconsistsofoneormoresites,whichmayormaynotbelocatedcontiguoustotheinstallation.15StatementofHonorableLucianNiemeyer,AssistantSecretaryofDefense,Energy,InstallationsandEnvironment,beforetheSenateCommitteeonAppropriations,SubcommitteeonMilitaryConstruction,VeteransAffairs,andRelatedAgencies,”26April2018,p.13.https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/Testimony/FY19%20EI&E%20Posture%20Statement%20-%20SAC-M.pdf.SeeOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforEnergy,Installations,andEnvironment,“DepartmentofDefenseAnnualEnergyManagementandResilience(AEMR)Report,FiscalYear2016,(July2017)p.15.https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/IE/FY%202016%20AEMR.pdf.16SeetheEPA,https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghg-reporting-program-data-sets.17ExecutiveOrder13693of19March2015“PlanningforFederalSustainabilityintheNextDecade”wasrevokedbyPresidentTrumpwithExecutiveOrder13834on17May2018.Seehttps://www.fedcenter.gov/programs/eo13834/andhttps://www.fedcenter.gov/programs/eo13693/.18TheDepartmentofDefenseEnergyPerformanceMasterPlanwasdevelopedinFY2011.

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Asfigure3belowshows,whiletheArmyisthemostenergyintensiveatitsinstallations,energyconsumptionatinstallationsisrelativelyequallysharedbytheservices.Figure3.DODInstallationEnergyConsumption,inBTUs,byService19

Theprofileoffossilfuelenergyconsumptionlooksdifferentwhenweconsider

“operational”energy.Operationalenergyuse,definedastheenergy“requiredfortraining,moving,andsustainingmilitaryforcesandweaponsplatforms”accountsfor70percentofDODenergyconsumption.20Mostoperationalenergyconsumedisintheformof“bulkfuel”purchasesofjet(JP-8andJP-5)anddieselfuel.21Operationalusevaries,ofcourse,dependingonwhattheUSmilitaryisdoinginanyparticularyear—itsongoingandoccasionalmissions.WhentheUSisengagedinwar,asonewouldexpect,consumptionofjetanddieselfuelsincrease.Theirratiowilldependonthetypesofoperationsthemilitaryisperforming—whetherthewarorparticularphaseofthewarislandorairintensive.

19Source:“Figure4.1:FY2017InstallationEnergy(GoalSubject)ConsumptionbyMilitaryService,”fromtheOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforEnergy,Installations,andEnvironment,“DepartmentofDefenseAnnualEnergyManagementandResilience(AEMR)Report,FiscalYear2017,(July2018)p.12.20DepartmentofDefense,“OperationalEnergy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/OE/OE_index.html.21TheservicesmaypurchasefuellocallyandbereimbursedbytheDefenseLogisticsAgency.UnitedStatesGeneralAccountabilityOffice,“BulkFuel:ActionsNeededtoImproveDOD’sFuelConsumptionBudgetData”(GAO-16-664)(September2016),p.6.https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679682.pdf.

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ThefigurebelowshowsoperationalenergyuseinFY2014,whenDODoperationalconsumptionwas87.4millionbarrelsofpetroleum.Jetfuelconsumptionbyallthearmedservicesaccountedformorethan70percentofoperationalenergyusethatyear.Althoughallserviceshaveaircraft,theAirForceisthelargestuserofpetroleumjetfuelamongthearmedservices.In2014,theUSwaslargelyabsentfromIraq,hadreduceditsforcesinAfghanistan,andbeganitswaragainstISISinSyria,whichstartedinAugust2014withairstrikes.

Figure4.OperationalEnergyUsebyDomainandMission,FY201422

Becauseoperationalfueluseisgreaterthanforinstallationfueluse,theUSspends

moreonit.InFY2017theDODconsumedover85millionbarrelsofoperationalfueltopowerships,aircraft,combatvehicles,andcontingencybasesatacostofnearly$8.2billion.23

22DepartmentofDefense,“2016OperationalEnergyStrategy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/2016%20OE%20Strategy_WEBd.pdf,p.4.23OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforSustainment.TheDODnotesthat“Traditionally,thescopeofoperationalenergyexcludesnuclearenergyusedforthepropulsionoftheU.S.Navy’saircraftcarriersandsubmarines,aswellastheenergyusedformilitaryspacelaunchandoperations.Operationalenergydoesincludetheenergyneededtooperatethecarrier’sembarkedaircraftandhelicopters.”DepartmentofDefense,“OperationalEnergy,”[emphasisintheoriginal]https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/OE/OE_index.html.TheUSNavyusesmorethan180nuclearreactorstopowerover140submarinesandsurfaceshipsincludingall11USaircraftcarriersand70submarines.SeeDepartmentoftheNavy,“UnitedStatesNavalNuclearPropulsionProgram,”September2017.https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/migrated/nnsa/2018/01/f46/united_states_naval_nuclear_propul

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Operationalfuelconsumptionvariesmorethaninstallationfueluse.Forexample,operationalfuelconsumptioninFY2017waslowerthaninFY2016.24

Unsurprisinglythen,totalUSmilitaryfuelconsumptiontracksUSengagementinwars

andoccupations.Alltold,from1998to2017theUSpurchased2.4billionbarrelsofpetroleumfuel.25Sincethe9/11attacks,annualfuelpurchaseshaveaveragedmorethan120millionbarrelsofalltypesoffuel.Between2010and2015,thearmedservicespurchasedanaverageof102millionbarrelsoffuelperyearfromtheDOD.26PurchaseshavedeclinedinrecentyearsastheUShasreduceditsoperationsinIraqandAfghanistan,averagingabout100millionbarrelsayearfrom2013-2017.Figure5.DefenseLogisticsPetroleumProductPurchasesinMillionsofBarrels,FY1998-FY201727

sion_program_operating_naval_nuclear_propulsion_plants_and_shipping_rail_naval_spent_fuel_safely_for_over_sixty_years.pdf.24InFY2016theDODconsumedabout86millionbarrelsoffuelforoperationalpurposes.OfficeofUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,TechnologyandLogistics,“FiscalYear2016OperationalEnergyAnnualReport,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/FY16%20OE%20Annual%20Report.pdf.25The1999spikeinjetfuelpurchasescorrespondswiththe78-dayNATOairwarinKosovotowhichtheUScontributedmorethan500aircraft.ForstatisticsontheUSrole,seehttps://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458957/operation-allied-force/.26TheDODthuslikelyitselfemittedanaverageof44millionmetrictonsofCO2fromburningpetroleumperyearforthisperiodfromoilusealone.GAO,“BulkFuel:ActionsNeededtoImproveDOD’sFuelConsumptionBudgetData,”p.9.Carbonemissionsperbarrelofoilare0.43metrictons.SeeUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,GreenhouseGasesEquivalenciesCalculator,https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gases-equivalencies-calculator-calculations-and-references.(Theaverageheatcontentofcrudeoilis5.80mmbtuperbarrel(EPA2018).Theaveragecarboncoefficientofcrudeoilis20.31kgcarbonpermmbtu(EPA2018).Thefractionoxidizedis100percent.5.80mmbtu/barrel×20.31kgC/mmbtu×44kgCO2/12kgC×1metricton/1,000kg=0.43metrictonsCO2/barrel.)27SourceofData:ReportsbytheDepartmentofDefensevariousyears.ForFY2017,seeDefenseLogisticsAgency-Energy,https://www.dla.mil/Portals/104/Documents/Energy/Publications/E_Fiscal2017FactBookLowRes2.pdf?ver=2018-03-29-073051-897.DefenseEnergySupportCenter,DESC,renamedtheDefenseLogisticsAgency-EnergyinFY2010.Alsoseehttps://www.dla.mil/Energy/About/Library/Publications/.AlsoseeThomasP.Frazier,etal,“FuelPriceEffectsonReadiness,”InstituteforDefenseAnalysis,May2014,p.C-2. https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA.../P-5087.ashx.

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TheDODdoesnotreportfuelconsumptioninformationtoCongressinitsannual

budgetrequests.Indeed,althoughthePentagoncalculatesfuelconsumptionforinternalplanningpurposes,thisinformationisexplicitlywithheldbytheDODinitsreportingtoCongress.28TheDepartmentofEnergy,however,doesreportthefuelconsumptiondataformobilevehicleemissionsbytheUSmilitaryfrom1975to2017.Figure6illustratesthemixoffossilfuels,bytypefrom1975to2017.29

Figure6.DODVehicleFuelConsumption,1975-2017,inMillionsofGallons30

II.EstimatingUSMilitaryGreenhouseGasEmissionsandEffectsofRecentWarsHowmuchgreenhousegasdoestheUSmilitaryemit,andhowarethoseemissions

distributedbetweenbaseandoverseascontingencyoperations?Therearemanysourcesofgreenhousegasesrelatedtowarandpreparationforit.Specifically,therearesevenmajorsourcesofgreenhousegasemissionsonecouldconsider.31

28Actualandestimatedfuturepetroleum,oilandlubricantsconsumptionandcostsforaircraftareanalyzedontheDOD’sOP-26Aforms“POLConsumptionandCosts”whichexplicitlystatesthatfuelconsumptiondataisnottobesharedwithCongress:“TheOP-26AexhibitwillnotbeincludedinjustificationmaterialforwardedtoCongress.”Emphasisintheoriginal.DepartmentofDefense,Comptroller,DODFinancialManagementRegulation,Chapter3,p.3-108.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/archive/02aarch/02a_03old.pdf.29TheUSAirForceandArmyuseJP-8fuel;theNavyusesJP-5fuel.In2017jetfuelconsumptionaccountedforabout394TrillionBTU.Thiswasaslightdecreasefromthepreviousfiscalyear,whenitaccountedforabout398trillionBTUs.SeetheUSDepartmentofEnergy,ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityPerformance,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/SiteDeliveredEnergyUseAndCostBySectorAndTypeAndFiscalYear.aspx.30DatafromtheDepartmentofEnergy,https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/HistoricalFederalEnergyConsumptionDataByAgencyAndEnergyTypeFY1975ToPresent.aspx. .31Biogenicemissionsareexcludedinthesecalculations.TheDepartmentofEnergydoestracktheseforrecentyears.

6,296

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JET FUEL

NAVY SPECIAL FUEL

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1. Overallmilitaryemissionsforinstallationsandnon-waroperations.2. War-relatedemissionsbytheUSmilitaryinoverseascontingencyoperations.3. EmissionscausedbyUSmilitaryindustry—forinstance,forproductionofweapons

andammunition.4. Emissionscausedbythedirecttargetingofpetroleum,namelythedeliberate

burningofoilwellsandrefineriesbyallparties.5. Sourcesofemissionsbyotherbelligerents.6. Energyconsumedbyreconstructionofdamagedanddestroyedinfrastructure.7. Emissionsfromothersources,suchasfiresuppressionandextinguishingchemicals,

includingHalon,agreenhousegas,andfromexplosionsandfiresduetothedestructionofnon-petroleumtargetsinwarzones.

IfocushereonthefirsttwosourcesofmilitaryGHGemissions—overallmilitaryand

war-relatedemissions—andbrieflydiscussmilitaryindustrialemissions.Domesticandoverseasmilitaryinstallationsaccountforabout40percentofDOD

greenhousegasemissions.32AsweseefromFigures5and6above,jetfuelisamajorcomponentofUSmilitaryfueluseandthereforeofgreenhousegasemissions.Duringeachairmission,aircraftputshundredsoftonsofCO2intheair,nottomentionthesupportactivitiesofnavalandgroundbasedassetsfortheseairmissions.TheUSwarsinAfghanistanandIraqbeganwithdaysofmassiveairstrikes.Moreover,ineachcase,materialwasflowntothewarzonesandbasesweresetuptoprosecutethewarsandoccupations.Similarly,theUSwaragainstISISinSyriaandIraq,whichbeganinAugust2014hasentailedtensofthousandsofaircraftsortiesforvariousmissions—fromreconnaissance,toairlift,refueling,andweaponsstrikes.33AB-2BomberonamissionfromWhitemanAirForceBaseinMissourimightberefueledmanytimes.Forexample,on18January2017,twoB-2Bbombers,accompaniedby15KC-135andKC-10aerialrefuelingtankersmadea30hourroundtripmissionfromWhitemanAirForceBasetoLibyatodropbombsonISIStargetsinLibya.34

Forpurposesofillustration,Table1,below,showsthecapacitiesandrelativefuel

efficiencyofseveralAirForceaircraftandemissionswithoutaerialrefueling.Notethatthefueleconomyoftheseaircraftismeasurednotinmilespergallon,butgallonspermile.35

32SenateAppropriationsCommittee,Report(S.Rept.112-168,22May2012).QuotedinMosheSchwartz,KatherineBlakely,andDonaldO’Rourke,“DepartmentofDefenseEnergyInitiatives:BackgroundIssuesforCongress,”CongressionalResearchService,10December2012,p.48.33SeeDatafromUSCentralCommand.https://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower%20summary/(U)%20APPROVED%20Dec%202018%20APS%20Data.pdf?ver=2019-02-08-022732-933.34SeeTomDemerly,“AllWeKnowAbouttheU.S.B-2Bombers30-hourRoundTripMissiontoPoundDaeshinLibya,”TheAviationist,29January2017.https://theaviationist.com/2017/01/20/all-we-know-about-the-u-s-b-2-bombers-30-hour-round-trip-mission-to-pound-daesh-in-libya/.35Fuelusedependsontheflightprofileoftheaircraftandotherfactors,suchasload.Bycontrastwithmilitaryaircraft,acommercialBoeing747getsabout5gallonspermile,andcancarryover500passengers.

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Table1.ExamplesofUSMilitaryAircraftJetFuelConsumptionandCO2Emissions36Aircraft Mission Internal

FuelCapacitypoundsandingallons37

Rangeinnauticalmilesoninternalfuel

Fuelconsumption,gallonspernauticalmile

MetricTonsofCO2eEmissions,withoutaerialrefueling.38

B-2 Bomber 167,000lbs/25,692gal

6,000 4.28gallons/mile

251.4MetricTons

F-35A(CTOL)

Fighterbomber

18,499lbs/2,846gal

1,199 2.37gallons/mile

27.8MetricTons

A-10 CloseAirSupport

11,000lbs/1,692gal

500 3.38gallons/mile

17.5MetricTons

KC-135R RefuelingTanker

50,000lbs/7,692gal

1,500(loadedwith150,000lbsoftransferfuel)

4.9gallons/mile

75.3MetricTons

KC-46A39

RefuelingTankerandCargo

Estimated16,000gal

6,385(loadedwith210,000lbsoftransferfuel)

Estimated2.9gallons/mile

156.5MetricTons

ThePentagondoesnotpubliclyandregularlyreportitsfuelconsumptionor

greenhousegasemissions,andthereisnoofficialpubliclyavailableDODsourceforallmilitarygreenhousegasemissions.40Itispossible,however,toestimatetheoverallgreenhousegasoftheUSmilitaryusingpubliclyavailableemissionsdatafromtheDepartmentofEnergyforrecentyears,FY2008andFY2010-2017andfuelconsumption

36Calculatedbytheauthorfromdataabouteachaircraft.Forinstance,theB-2carries167,000poundsofjetfuel(almost25,000gallons)totravel6,000nauticalmiles(c.6.900miles)andiscapableofmid-airrefueling,takingonanadditional99,000poundsoffuelateachrefueling.TheF-35A,withacombatradiusestimatedtobeabout584nauticalmileshasaninternalfuelcapacityof2,761gallons.TheA-10hasaninternalfuelcapacityof1,642gallonsofjetfuelhasacombatradiusofabout250nauticalmiles.37Assumingeachpoundofjetfuelweighsanaverageof6.5pounds.38SeetheAppendix.39TheKC-46Acanrefuelitself.Boeinghasnotreleaseddataonitsinternalfuelcapacity.TheestimatehereforfuelcapacityandconsumptionisbasedontheBoeing767-400ERrangeandfuelcapacity.40SomehavetriedtoestimatethegreenhousegasemissionsofthePentagoninwar.See,forinstance,NikkiReischandSteveKretzman,“AClimateofWar:TheWarinIraqandGlobalWarming,”OilChangeInternational(March2008),http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2008/03/A%20Climate%20of%20War%20FINAL%20(March%2017%202008).pdf.

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datafortheperiodof1975to2017.Thisdataallowsanestimateofhowmuchoftheseemissionsmaybeattributabletowar.

WhiletheDODcategorizesitsenergyuseintoinstallationsandoperations,the

DepartmentofEnergyusesdifferentcategories,dividinggovernmentdepartmentsCO2equivalentemissionsintothreecategories—standardoperations,non-standardoperationsandbiogenicemissions.41Becausethepaperfocusesongreenhousegasemissionsresultingfromfossilfueluse,biogenicemissionsarenotincludedintheestimates;biogenicemissionsaremuchsmallerthanstandardandnon-standardemissions.

ByDepartmentofEnergydefinition,non-standardoperationsare“vehicles,vessels,

aircraftandotherequipmentusedbyFederalGovernmentagenciesincombatsupport,combatservicesupport,tacticalorreliefoperations,trainingforsuchoperations,lawenforcement,emergencyresponse,orspaceflight(includingassociatedground-supportequipment).Non-Standardoperationsalsoincludethegenerationofelectricpowerproducedandsoldcommerciallytootherparties.”42Standardoperationsappeartobeeverythingelsethatadepartmentdoestoaccomplishitsfunctions,rolesandmissions.TheDepartmentofEnergyreportsthattheUSDODhasproducedatotal(standardandnon-standard)of527millionmetrictonsofCO2equivalentfrom2010to2017,anaverageofabout66millionmetrictonsperyearinthisperiod,roughlythesamegreenhousegasemissionsof14millionpassengercarsdrivenforoneyear.43

DepartmentofEnergydata,wereusedtoestimatethetotalgreenhousegasemissions

forstandardandnon-standardoperationsoftheDODfromFY2001-2017tobeatotalof1,212millionmetrictonsofCO2equivalent.Inanyoneyear,thePentagon’semissionsaregreaterthanmanysmallercountriestotalgreenhousegasemissions.Forexample,in2017,USDODgreenhousegasemissionswere59millionmetrictons(notincludingbiogenicemissions)ofCO2e.Inthatsameyear,PentagonemissionsweregreaterthanFinland,whichemitted46.8millionmetrictons,Swedenwhichemitted50.8millionmetrictons,andDenmarkwhichemitted33.5millionmetrictonsofCO2e.44

41DepartmentofEnergyFederalEnergyManagementProgram.EnergyInformationAgency,ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityPerformance,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalYear.aspx.ThesecategoriesdonotcorrespondtotheEPAGreenhouseGasInventoryReports,nortotheDODcategories.42BesidestheDOD,onlytheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityperformsasignificantamountof“non-standardoperations.”DepartmentofEnergy,https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalYear.aspx.43Therewereabout268millionpassengervehiclesintheUSin2016.SeetheEPA,passengervehiclesperyear,https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gases-equivalencies-calculator-calculations-and-references#vehicles.44M.Muntean,D.Guizzardi,etal,FossilCO2EmissionsofAllWorldCountries:2018Report(JointResearchCentre,EuropeanCommission,2018)https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/fossil-co2-emissions-all-world-countries-2018-report

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Figure7.EstimateofDODGreenhouseGasEmissions,MillionsofMetricTonsCO2efromTotalandNon-StandardDODoperations,2001-201745

HowmuchofthetotalGHGemissionsshouldbeattributedtoUSpost-9/11wars?AsdiscussedinAppendix1,therearevariouswaystoestimatethis.TheestimateofgreenhousegasemissionsinthemajorwarsisbasedontheproportionoffuelusebyCentralCommand,whichisthecommandresponsibleforoperationsinAfghanistanandIraqandSyria.InFY2014(seefigure4)thiswasabout24percentofthetotalnon-standardoperationalfuelconsumptionbytheDOD.ButbecausetheUScounterterroroperationsareunderwayallovertheworld(inabout80-90countries)theCentralCommandisnottheonlywarzoneintheglobalwaronterror.TheportionofallgreenhousegasemissionsrelatedtoCentralCommandincludingoverseascontingencyoperations,andtheGlobalWaronTerror,isestimatedtobeabout35percentoftotalgreenhousegasemissionsfornon-standardandstandardoperations.

Table2.EstimatedDODandWarRelatedOverseasContingencyOperationGreenhouseGasEmissions,MillionsofMetricTonsCO2e,2001-201746

TotalDODCO2eEmissionsinMillionsofMetricTons

OCO-relatedCO2eEmissionsinMillionsofMetricTons

Standard 445 155.84Non-standard(directlysupportcombat) 766 268.21TotalEmissionsbyCategory 1,212 424.06

45BasedonDepartmentofEnergydata.MethodsaredetailedintheAppendix.46BasedonDepartmentofEnergydata.

-

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

MillionsofM

TCO

2e

StandardEmissions Non-StandardEmissions TotalCO2eEmissions

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TheestimateabovefocusesonDODemissions.Yet,acompleteaccountingofthetotal

emissionsrelatedtowarandpreparationforit,wouldincludetheGHGemissionsofmilitaryindustry.Militaryindustrydirectlyemploysabout14.7percentofallpeopleintheUSmanufacturingsector.47AssumingthattherelativesizeofdirectemploymentinthedomesticUSmilitaryindustryisanindicatorfortheportionofthemilitaryindustryintheUSindustrialeconomy,theshareofUSgreenhousegasemissionsfromUSbasedmilitaryindustryisestimatedtobeabout15percentoftotalUSindustrialgreenhousegasemissions.48Ifhalfofthosemilitaryrelatedemissionsareattributabletothepost-9/11wars,thenUSwarmanufacturinghasemittedabout2,600millionmegatonsofCO2equivalentgreenhousegasfrom2001to2017,averaging153millionmetrictonsofCO2eeachyear.

Figure8.GreenhouseGasesAttributabletoMilitaryIndustryfrom2001-201749

Finally,otheremissionssourcesthatarenotcalculatedorestimatedheremaybesignificantsourcesofgreenhousegasses.Specifically,itwasnotpossibletoestimatetheemissionsduetotheburningofoilbysabotageanddestructionofoilinfrastructureby

47In2016,839,171peopleworkedinUSDefenseIndustriesoutofatotalof12,348,100jobstotalintheUSmanufacturingsector.SeeDeloitte,“2017AerospaceandDefenseSectorExportandLaborMarketStudy,”p.13.https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/manufacturing/us-2017-us-A&D-exports-and-labor-market-study.pdfandtheUSBureauofLaborStatisticshttps://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/employment-by-major-industry-sector.htm.LouisUchitelle,“TheU.S.StillLeansontheMilitary-IndustrialComplex,”TheNewYorkTimes,22September2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/business/economy/military-industrial-complex.html.In1992,about14.4percentofmanufacturingjobswereinmilitaryindustries.AnnMarkesonandS.S.Costigan,eds.,ArmingtheFuture:ADefenseIndustryforthe21stCentury(NewYork:CouncilonForeignRelations,1999)p.341.ManufacturingaccountsformostoftheindustrialsectorsgreenhousegasemissionsaccordingtotheannualEPAInventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasesandSinks,1990-2017.Themostrecentisfoundathttps://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-main-text.pdf.48Thisdoesnotincludeindirectjobsandthereforeindirectmilitaryrelatedemissions.49CalculatedfromU.S.GreenhouseGasEmissionsbyEconomicSectorwithElectricity-RelatedEmissionsDistributed(MMTCO2Eq).EPA“InventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasesandSinks,1990-2017.”

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

MillionsofM

etric

Ton

s

GHGAttributedtoMilitaryIndustry EstimateofMilitaryIndustryGHGattributabletowar

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belligerents,theenergyconsumedbyreconstruction,inparticularinmakingcement,andemissionsfromothersources.Ofthese,theemissionsfromburningoilinfrastructureinIraqandSyriamaybethelargest.Inthe2003invasionofIraq,oilwellsweresetalightbytheIraqimilitaryandburnedforseveralmonths.50Oilinfrastructurewastargetedagainin2015,whentheUSbombedoilinfrastructureinIraqandSyriaasameansofreducingISISrevenue.AndwhenISISretreated,itsetoilwellsandpipelinesonfireinIraqandSyria.51Inmanycases,thesefiresburnedforseveralmonths.Forinstance,startinginSeptember2014theUStargetedtankertrucks,andoilrefineryandstoragesitescontrolledbyISISasameansofcuttingofftheirrevenuestream.InOctober2015,theUSattackedmoreoilproducingISIScontrolledoilinfrastructure.52Further,NATOtankerswereoftenattackedbymilitantsandburnedduringtheirtransitthroughPakistanintoAfghanistan.

Inaddition,itwouldbepossible,usingthemethodsusedhereforUSmilitary

greenhousegasemissions,tocalculatetheemissionsofotherbelligerents.Morethan60countriesjoinedtheUSintheirwarinAfghanistan,37foughtwiththeUSintheIraqWar,andmorethan60werealliedwiththeUSinthewaragainstISIS.Theseemissionsmaybesubstantial.

Inadditiontoaccountingforgreenhousegasemissions,afullassessmentoftheclimate

changeconsequencesofwarwouldincludethelossofactualandfuturecarbonsequestrationduetodeforestation.Deforestationmayoccuraspeopledisplacedbywaruseforestsforshelterandfuel.Insomewars,suchastheUSCivilWarandtheVietnamWar,forestsweredeliberatelyburnedtodepriveadversariesofplacestohide.InAfghanistan,warcausedmigrationandillegalloggingappeartobethechiefcauseofdeforestation.ThecausesofdeforestationinIraqarecomplexbutincludewar.53

50Iraqdidthesameinthe1991GulfWar,settingoilproductionfacilitiesinKuwaitalightastheyretreated.InAprilandMay1991,anestimated3millionbarrelsofoilwereburningeachday,1or2milliontonsofcarbondioxide,orabout2percentofworldwideCO2emissionsfromfossilfuelandbiomass.CongressionalResearchService,“TheEnvironmentalImpactoftheGulfWar,”fortheUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeonEnvironmentandPublicWorksGulfPollutionTaskForce,March1992,pp.10and24.Outofthe82millionbarrelsreleasedonlandandatseaduringthe1991GulfWar,anestimated11millionbarrelsofoilspilledintothePersianGulf,coatingthecoastlinesofnotonlyKuwait,butothercountriesintheGulf,includingSaudiArabia,andIran.Morethanadecadelater,muchofthatoilremainedincoastalareas.SeeErichR.Gundlach,JohnC.McCain,andYusefH.Fadallah,“DistributionofOilAlongtheSaudiArabianCoastline(May/June1991)asaResultoftheGulfWarOilSpills,”MarinePollutionBulletin,vol.27,(1993)pp.93-96.DagmarSchmidt-Etkin,“SpillOccurrences:AWorldOverview,”inMervinFingas,ed.,OilSpillScienceandTechnology(Amsterdam:Elsevier,2011)p.8andJacquelineMichel,“1991GulfWarOilSpill,”inFingas,ed.OilSpillScienceandTechnology,pp.1127-1132.51SaifHameedandDominicEvans,“IslamicStateTorchesOilFieldNearTikritasMilitiaAdvances,”Reuters,5March2015,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0M10Z420150305.52ThiswasknownasOperationTidalWaveII.SeeMatthewReed,“BlowinguptheIslamicState’sOilCompany,”ForeignPolicy,26October2016,https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/26/blowing-up-the-islamic-states-oil-company-isis-abu-sayyaf/.53ZabihullahGhazi,“Afghanistan’sForestCoverIllegallyStrippedAway,”EnvironmentNewService,29August2013,https://ens-newswire.com/2013/08/29/afghanistans-forest-cover-illegally-stripped-away/.UNEnvironment,“SalvagingIraq’sRemainingWilderness,”10July2018.https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/salvaging-iraqs-remaining-wilderness.

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III.NationalSecurityThreatsPosedbyOilDependencyandClimateChange

Threenationalsecurityconcernsoverlap.First,theUSgovernmenthaslongbeenconcernedaboutdependencyonPersianGulfOil.Atthesametime,someportionofthemilitary’soperationalfuelconsumptionisrelatedtomissionsassociatedwithprotectingaccesstooilandprotectingtheregimesthatassureUSandglobalaccesstooil.Somebelievethismissionisvital,whileothersquestionwhetheritisstillnecessary.Whetherornotthismissionisessential,operationstoensureaccesstooilareexpensive,nottomention,fuelintensive.Byoneestimate,theannualincrementalcostofUSoperationstoprotectagainstthreatsagainstPersianGulfoilisabout$5billion.54Byanotherestimate,ataminimumtheUSspendsabout$81billionannuallydefendingtheglobaloilsupply.55

Second,theDODhasbecomeincreasinglyconcernedthatclimatechangeposesthreats

andchallengestothemilitaryasaninstitution,specificallytomilitaryinstallationsandoperations.ThisiscoupledwithaconcernthatfueldependencymakestheUSmilitaryvulnerable.TheUShasreducedfuelconsumptionsothatitislessdependentonfossilfuel.

Andthird,thePentagonisconcernedwiththethreatsclimatechangeposeto

internationalsecurity,namelymassivemigrationandpotentiallywar.However,themilitaryseemsunawareofhowmuchitseffortstoprotectaccesstoPersianGulfOil,itsothermilitaryoperationsincludingwar,andconsumptionatinstallationsareamajordriverofgreenhousegasemissions,andthereforeultimatelyofclimatechange.

Insum,theDODassumesthatclimatechangewillbeadisasterfortheinstitutionand

theplanetnomatterwhattheydo,evenastheybelievethattheymustcontinuetoprotectaccesstoPersianGulfoilsothattheUSandtherestoftheworldcanburnasmuchoilasitwantsataslowapriceperbarrelaspossible.ThePentagonfocusestheireffortsonadaptingtoclimatechangeandpreparingforclimatecausedinsecurity,evenastheycontinuetoensurethatAmericanscontinuetohaverelativelyinexpensiveaccesstoimportedoil.ProtectingPersianGulfOil:IsthisStillaVitalMission?

Theconcernaboutaccesstooilistwofold.TheUSeconomyremainsheavilyreliantonoil.Themilitaryhasdefendedagainstseveralscenariosregardingacut-offofPersianGulfoil.ThefirstscenarioisthethreatthatahostilepowerwouldgaincontrolofoilinthePersianGulf—forinstancebyoccupyingSaudiArabiaandKuwaitorbyblockingtheStraitofHormuz—andbeabletocontrolworldsupplyandincreasethepriceofoil.Inresponsetothefirstfear,theUScreatedtheStrategicPetroleumReservein1975andtheRapidDeploymentForce(RDF)in1979,whosespecificmissionwastodefendUSinterestsinthe 54EugeneGholz,“U.S.SpendingonItsMilitaryCommitmentstothePersianGulf,”inCharlesL.GlaserandRosemaryA.Kelanic,eds.,CrudeStrategy:RethinkingtheU.S.MilitaryCommitmenttoDefendPersianGulfOil(Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress,2016),pp.167-195.55SecuringAmerica’sFutureEnergy,“TheMilitaryCostofDefendingtheGlobalOilSupply,”21September,2018,http://secureenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Military-Cost-of-Defending-the-Global-Oil-Supply.-Sep.-18.-2018.pdf.

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MiddleEast,includingoil.InJanuary1983,whenUScommandswerereorganized,theRDFbecameUSCentralCommand(CENTCOM).Figure9.ZonesofUSMilitaryCommands

WhenIraqinvadedKuwaitin1990,theBushAdministrationreiteratedtheimportance

ofoilintheregioninNationalSecurityDirective45.“U.S.interestsinthePersianGulfarevitaltothenationalsecurity.Theseinterestsincludeaccesstooilandthesecurityandstabilityofkeyfriendlystatesintheregion.TheUnitedStateswilldefenditsvitalinterestsinthearea,throughtheuseofU.S.militaryforceifnecessaryandappropriate,againstanypowerwithinterestsinimicaltoourown.”56In1991theUSevictedIraqfromKuwaitnotonlybecausetheIraqiinvasionofKuwaitwasillegal,butalsoinpartbecauseitfearedthatIraqposedathreattoSaudiArabia,andthustoAmericanaccesstooil.

Sincethen,theUShasstationedlargenumbersoftroopsinthePersianGulfatArmy,

Navy,andAirForcebases.TheAfghanandIraqwarsincreasedtheUSpresenceintheregion,aswellasUSmilitarypetroleumconsumption.Inlate2008,inadditiontotheconcernthatalocalstatemighttrytocontroltheflowofoilfromthePersianGulf,PresidentGeorgeW.BushaddedtheconcernthatextremistsmightcontroloilandtrytoblackmailtheUS:“Youcanimaginethemsaying,‘We’regoingtopullabunchofoiloffthemarkettorunyourpriceofoilupunlessyoudothefollowing.Andthefollowingwouldbealongthelinesof,well,‘Retreatandletuscontinuetoexpandourdarkvision.’"57

TheideathattheUShastoprotecttheglobalflowofoil,andmorespecificallyoilfrom

thePersianGulf,haslargelybeentakenforgrantedbytheUSmilitaryandnationalsecurity 56NationalSecurityDirective45,20August1990,https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd_45.htm.57PeterBaker,“BushSaysU.S.PulloutWouldLetRadicalsUseOilasaWeapon,”WashingtonPost,5November2006.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/04/AR2006110401025.html.

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experts.AreportbytheCouncilonForeignRelationsnotedin2006,“Untilverylowlevelsofdependencearereached,theUnitedStatesandallotherconsumersofoilwilldependonthePersianGulf.”58

PerhapsinpartbecausedependenceonPersianGulfoilhasdeclinedsignificantlysince

2006,someanalystshaverecentlyquestionedwhetherthelargeUSpresenceinthePersianGulfregion,andtheinfrastructureinEuropethatsupportsit,isnecessary.59TheargumentisthattheUSislessdependentonPersianGulfoilthaninthepast,thatpriceshockswillnotnecessarilybeassevereifoilflowsweredisrupted,andthatevenifasinglecountrycontrolledsupplies,theywouldstillwanttoselltheoil.TheexceptiontothelatterisIraq,whichburnedKuwaitiOilfieldswhentheyretreatedfromKuwaitin1991andtheIslamicState,whichburnedoilfacilitiesastheyretreatedfrom2015-2018.Inanycase,theargumentgoes,eveniftheUSwerecompletelyabsentfromtheGulf,theUScouldreturntotheGulfandrestoreoilflowatsomelaterpoint.USforcesintheregionhavealreadydeclinedfromtheirpeakofabout230,000troopsin2008.60

Whatwouldhappenintheworst-casescenario—ifoilflowsfromthePersianGulf

werecurtailedorceasedforaweekorseveralmonths?TherewouldbesomedisruptiontotheUSeconomy,buttheeconomywouldnotcollapseifoilflowsfromtheMiddleEastweredisruptedforsometime.ItisarguablethatatotallossofGulfoilforuptothreemonths,wouldbe,atworst,quiteexpensive.Intheshortterm,itislikelythattheUSwouldadapt—asitdidwhentheoilimportsfromIraqandKuwaitwerehaltedafterIraq’sinvasionofthatKuwaitin1990.Theprinciplereactionofworldmarketswouldbeanincreaseinthepriceofoil.

Thiswouldnotbeadevastationforthreereasons.First,theUSislessdependenton

PersianGulfoilthaninthepast;theUShasamorediversesupplynetworkofpetroleum,includingincreasesindomesticproductionandincreasedimportsfromCanadaandothercountries.Second,theUShasastrategicoilreservecontaining727millionbarrelsofoil,whichcouldcarrytheUSthroughseveralmonthsofshortagesinsupply.Andthird,andperhapsmostimportant,overalldemandforoilhasdecreasedintheUS.Petroleumconsumptionpeakedin2005at40percentoftotalUSenergyconsumptionandhas

58CouncilonForeignRelations,NationalSecurityConsequencesofOilDependency:ReportofanIndependentTaskForce(Washington,DC:CouncilonForeignRelations,2006)p.29.https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/0876093659.pdf.59SeeGlaserandKelanic,eds.,CrudeStrategy;JohnGlazer,“DoestheU.S.MilitaryActuallyProtectMiddleEastOil?”CatoInstitute,9January2017.https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/does-us-military-actually-protect-middle-east-oil;EmmaAshford,“Unbalanced:RethinkingAmerica’sCommitmenttotheMiddleEast,”SecurityStudiesQuarterly,vol.12,no.1(Spring2018)pp.127-148.AlsoseeMiltonR.Copulos,“America’sAchillesHeel:TheHiddenCostofImportedOil,”TheNationalDefenseCouncilFoundation,(Washington,DC:October2003).http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=DD3F77E8166A096D9F1BB3B615199125?doi=10.1.1.186.7523&rep=rep1&type=pdf.60JoshuaRovner,“AfterAmerica:TheFlowofPersianGulfOilintheAbsenceofUSMilitaryForce,”inGlaserandKelanic,eds.,CrudeStrategy,pp.141-165:160.

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declined10percentsincethen.In2017,petroleumaccountedfor37percentofUSenergyconsumption.61ChinaismorevulnerablethantheUStoPersianGulfoilsupplydisruptions.

Nevertheless,economiststendtoassociateoilpriceshocksduetorestrictionsonthe

flowofoil(suchastheArabOilEmbargo)withrecessions.Thisistrue.Yet,becausemilitaryspendingislessproductivecomparedtootherformsofspending—sayoneducation,healthcare,infrastructure,orrenewableenergy—militaryspendingisarguablyanoveralldragontheUSeconomybecauseitproducesfewerjobsthanspendingonothersectors.Whichraisesthequestionofwhether,inprotectingagainstapotentialoilpriceincrease,theUSdoesmoreharmthanitrisksbynotdefendingaccesstoPersianGulfoil.Insum,thePersianGulfmissionmaynotbeasnecessaryasthePentagonassumes.NationalSecurityImplicationsofClimateChange

TheUSmilitary,theintelligencecommunity,andscholarsofinternationalsecurityhave

beenwarningofthedangersposedbyclimatechangeforseveraldecades.Themilitaryandintelligencecommunitytendtoclusterthenationalsecurityimplicationsofglobalwarminginducedclimatechangeintotwooverlappingareas:howclimatechangewillaffectUSinstallationsandmilitaryoperations,includinghowrespondingtoclimatedisasterswillstressmilitaryoperationsandpotentiallydetractfromothermilitarymissions;andhowclimatechangeposespoliticalandnationalsecuritythreats,uptoandincludingwar.62

Themilitaryhasemphasizedhowclimatechangechallengesmilitarysystems,

operations,andinfrastructure.Forinstance,inMay1990,TerryP.KellyproducedapaperfortheNavalWarCollege,“GlobalClimateChangeImplicationsfortheUnitedStatesNavy”emphasizingthreatstoNavy“navaloperations,facilities,andsystems”incomingdecades.Theanalysisfocusesitsrecommendationsonmonitoringandadaptingtoclimatechange.63Morerecently,theDODoffereda“ClimateChangeAdaptationRoadmap”in2014thatstressedthenecessityofpreparingforandadaptingtoclimatechange.64Inearly2018,theDODreportedthatabouthalfoftheirinstallationshadalreadyexperiencedclimatechangerelatedeffects.65Ayearlater,theDODreportedthattheUSmilitaryisalreadyexperiencingtheeffectsofglobalwarmingatdozensofinstallations.66Theseincluderecurrentflooding

61USEnergyInformationAgency,https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/?page=us_energy_home. 62Forinstance,seetheUSNationalIntelligenceCouncil,“ImplicationsforU.S.NationalSecurityofAnticipatedClimateChange,”21September2016.63TerryP.Kelly,“GlobalClimateChangeImplicationsfortheUnitedStatesNavy”NavalWarCollege,May1990.https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf.64DepartmentofDefense,“2014ClimateChangeAdaptationRoadmap,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/CCARprint_wForward_e.pdf.65OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,TechnologyandLogistics,“DepartmentofDefense,Climate-RelatedRisktoDODInfrastructureInitialVulnerabilitySurvey(SLVAS)AssessmentReport,”(January2018).https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/tab-b-slvas-report-1-24-2018.pdf.66DepartmentofDefense,“ReportontheEffectsofaChangingClimatetotheDepartmentofDefense,”OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisitionandSustainment,January2019.

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(53installations),drought(43installations),wildfires(36installations)anddesertification(6installations).Vulnerabilitywillonlyincreaseoverthenexttwentyyearsunlesstheworldbeginstodramaticallyreduceallgreenhousegasemissionsandsequestercarbondioxide.67

ThemosturgentthreattoinfrastructurehasperhapsbeentheNavy’son-goingconcern

thatrisingsealevelsandmajorstormswillinundatecoastalinfrastructureandlimittheuseofnavalbases.68Forinstance,meltingpermafrostintheArcticthreatensthephysicalstabilityoftheUSmilitaryfacilitiesthere,NorfolkNavalBaseisbeinginundated,andKeeslerAirForceBaseisregularlyflooding.TheNationalClimateAssessmentreleasedinlate2018showedimagesoftheUSNavalBaseatNorfolkVirginiaasparticularlyvulnerable.Figure10.USMilitaryAssetswithClimate-RelatedVulnerabilities.69

ThePentagon’sresponsetotheinfrastructuralandoperationalchallengesofclimatechangehasbeentourgemilitarypreparations.Theseincludepotentiallymovingorclosingmilitarybases,developingtrainingandequipmenttooperateinhotterandwetterordrierclimatestomeetclimatechangerelatedthreatstooperationsandresiliency.

https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_effects_of_a_changing_climate_to_dod.pdf.67DepartmentofDefense,“ReportontheEffectsofaChangingClimatetotheDepartmentofDefense,”p.5.ThawingpermafrostisalreadyoccurringatFortGreeley,Alaska.68SeeU.S.Navy“ClimateChangeRoadmap,”April2010,DepartmentoftheNavy,https://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/ccr.pdf.69Source:Figure1.9.UnitedStatesGlobalChangeResearchProgram,FourthNationalClimateAssessment:VolumeIIImpacts,RisksandAdaptationintheUnitedStates,(2018)https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/.

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InadditiontotheconcernthatadeclineinaccesstooilwouldhurttheUSandtheglobaleconomy,theDODhaslongbeenconcernedthattheUSmilitaryitself,byrequiringenormousquantitiesoffuelforitsoperations,istoodependentonoil.Specifically,highfuelconsumptionratesduringwar—forweapons,equipment,heatingandcoolingtents—increasetheneedtotransportfueltoconflictzones,whichisitselfavulnerabilityandalossofefficiency.Further,fuelhastobeprotectedintransitandisvulnerabletodisruptionsinsupply.

Forexample,duringtheUSoccupationofAfghanistan,USandNATOforceswere

dependentonthetransitoffuelthroughPakistan.ImportingfuelintoAfghanistanthroughPakistan—whereitcomprisedbetween30and80percentofeachconvoy—madethetankersvulnerabletoattack.Between2008and2014convoyswereattackedenroutethroughPakistantoNATObasesinAfghanistan485times,causing167deathsand450injuries.AsthethenSecretaryoftheNavy,RayMabussaid,“FossilfuelistheNo.1thingweimporttoAfghanistanandgettingthatfueliskeepingthetroopsdoingwhattheyweresenttheretodo,tofightorengagethelocalpeople.”70Further,tankerconvoysthroughPakistanweredisruptedfromlate2011toearly2012aftertheUSinadvertentlykilledPakistanitroopsandPakistanhaltedthoseconvoysforseveralmonths.

In2003,thenMarineCorpGeneralJohnMattissaidthattheUShadtobe“unleashed

fromthetetheroffuel.”In2011,whenaskedbyCongressmemberAdamSmithduringArmedServicesCommitteeHearingsMattiselaborated.

Onthefuel,itisasignificantAchillesheelforuswhenyouhavetohaultheamountsoffuelthatwehavetohaularoundthebattlefieldforthegeneratorsandforthevehicles.WeareworkingwithDARPA[DefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency],weareworkingwithanumberofcivilianorganizationstotryandfindsolutions.Thereareeffortsunderwaytomakemoreexpeditionarybaseswhichwouldactuallygeneratesomeoftheirownenergyrequirementsusing,forexample,solarpower.Inmanyoftheseplaces,thereisalotofsunshine.Ifwecangetexpeditionarycapabilitytocapturethatandthenbasicallyrechargeourbatteries.Imean,itisanamazinglycomplexefforttomaintainthefuellines.Anditalsogivestheenemyanabilitytochoosethetimeandplaceofattackingus.WeareengagedwithScienceandTechnology,weareengagedwithDARPA,andwearelookingatverypragmaticwaysofdoingthis.Wearealsolookingatwhatwecandotoactuallychangehowwedistributefuel,toreducetheenemy'sopportunitiestocomeafterus.71

70ElisabethRosenthal,“U.S.MilitaryOrdersLessDependenceonFossilFuels,”TheNewYorkTimes,4October2010,https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/science/earth/05fossil.html.71MattisattheCommitteeonArmedServices,HearingonNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2012,3March2011.https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg65114/html/CHRG-112hhrg65114.htm.

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Figure11.AttacksonNATOSupplyConvoysThroughPakistan,2008to201472

ThePentagon’sresponsetoconcernsaboutfuelusehasbeentotrackfuelconsumption,andtofindwaystodecreaseconsumptionoffossilfuelsthroughconservationandincreasedinvestmentinrenewableenergy.Themilitaryeffortstoreducedependencyhaveincludedreducingenergyusedatmilitaryinstallationsandeducatingsoldiersabouttheneedtominimizeidlingvehicles—fromHumveestotanks,tojets.

Forexample,in2009thenewlycreatedMarineCorpsExpeditionaryEnergyOffice

begantocollectdataonMarineCorpenergyusagefrombulkdistributiontotheunitlevel.73TheMarineshavegonequicklyfromanalysistoaction.In2009,theMarinesmadetheirfirststudyoffueluseinAfghanistanandinthefollowingyeartheMarineCorpssentsolarpanelsandchargerstotheirforcesthere.74Afewmonthslater,thesolarpanelsdeployedintheGroundRenewableExpeditionaryEnergySystem(Greens)hadreportedlycutgeneratorfuelconsumptionbynearly90percent,from20to2.5gallonsperday.75In2010theDODestablishedaSeniorSustainabilityCouncil.Allofthisworkonefficiencyhas

72Sourceofdata:PakInstituteforPeaceStudies,annualPakistanSecurityReport,https://www.pakpips.com/publications#1512730923805-d52fde57-07fa.73See,MarineCorps,“UnitedStatesMarineCorpsEnergyExpeditionaryStrategyandImplementationPlan:BasestoBattlefields,”2010.https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/160/Docs/USMC%20Expeditionary%20Energy%20Strategy%20%20Implementation%20Planning%20Guidance.pdf.74SuzanneGoldenberg,“USMarinesinAfghanistanLaunchFirstEnergyEfficiencyAuditinWarZone,”TheGuardian,13August2009,https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/aug/13/us-marines-afghanistan-fuel-efficiency.75SpencerAckerman,“Afghanistan’sGreenMarinesCutFuelUseby90Percent,”Wired,13January2011,https://www.wired.com/2011/01/afghanistans-green-marines-cut-fuel-use-by-90-percent/.

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beenacceleratedandwouldnotonlysavemoney,themilitaryemphasizes,butalsoincreasetheresilienceofthearmedforces.76

Inaddition,thePentagonusesotherfuelsandhascontinuedtodiversifyitsenergy

supplies.TheUSmilitaryreliesonnuclearpowerforsomeimportantuses—mostnotablytopoweritsfleetof11aircraftcarriers.Itispossibletosubstitutesomealternativefuelsformilitaryapplicationsandresearchonusingbio-fuelinmilitaryvehicles,includingjets.

ThePentagonhasincreaseditsuseofrenewableenergysince2009.Themilitaryhas

madeamassiveinvestmentinsolargenerationandotherrenewableenergy,doublingrenewablepowergenerationbetween2011and2015.77Butsofar,switchingtorenewablesourceshasyieldedthesavingsinemissionsoffsetslessofthan1percentofUSDODGreenhouseGasemissions.78Takentogether,theseeffortshavebornefruit;themilitaryhassignificantlyreducedfueluse—evenwhilewagingwarinAfghanistan,Iraq,andSyria—andthereisenormousscopeforreducingemissionsevenfurther.In2017,themilitary’spushtoreduceenergyconsumptionranintopoliticswhentheTrumpadministrationdecidedtodenyclimatechange.ThePentagonwasputinanawkwardposition;aheadlineinFortunemagazineframedtheissuenicely“TheMilitaryisGettingGreener,butThatClasheswithTrump’sPromises.”79

Theotheroperationalconcernisthethreatclimatechangeposestothemilitary’s

capacitytoperformitscoremissions.Nationalsecurityofficialsanticipatingagrowingrolesupportingcivilauthoritiesindisasterreliefmissionsareconcernedthatnaturaldisasters,madeworseasaconsequenceofclimatechange,willstresstheoperationalcapacitiesoftheUSmilitary.Assealevelsrise,criticalcivilianinfrastructurewillbeatrisk.InSeptember2016,PresidentObamaissuedaNationalSecurityMemorandumthatsaid,“ClimatechangeandassociatedimpactsonU.S.militaryandothernationalsecurity-relatedmissionsandoperationscouldadverselyaffectreadiness,negativelyaffectmilitaryfacilitiesandtraining,increasedemandsforFederalsupporttonon-federalcivilauthorities,andincreaseresponse.”80 76OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefense,DepartmentofDefenseAnnualEnergyManagementandResilienceReport(AEMRR)https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/IE/FY%202017%20AEMR.pdf.77TimothyGarder,“U.S.MilitaryMarchesonTowardGreenEnergy,DespiteTrump,”Reuters,1March2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-green-energy-insight/u-s-military-marches-forward-on-green-energy-despite-trump-idUSKBN1683BL.AlsoseeReuters,“militaryGettingGreener,”http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/USA-TRUMP-ENERGY-MILITARY/0100400G00X/index.html.78AnnualDataonEnergyfromhttps://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/federal-facility-annual-energy-reports-and-performance.79AssociatedPress,“TheMilitaryisGettingGreener,butThatClasheswithTrump’sPromises.”Fortune,14January2017.http://fortune.com/2017/01/14/military-oil-trump-green-power/.80MemorandumfortheHeadsofExecutiveDepartmentsandAgencies,ClimateChangeandNationalSecurity,21September2016,https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/895016/download.

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ClimateChaosandWar

Themilitaryhasbecomeincreasinglyconcernedthatclimatechangeposesathreattointernationalsecurity.81Inthe2015NationalSecurityStrategy,theObamaAdministrationsaid,“Climatechangeisanurgentandgrowingthreattoournationalsecurity,contributingtoincreasednaturaldisasters,refugeeflows,andconflictsoverbasicresourceslikefoodandwater.ThepresentdayeffectsofclimatechangearebeingfeltfromtheArctictotheMidwest.Increasedsealevelsandstormsurgesthreatencoastalregions,infrastructure,andproperty.Inturn,theglobaleconomysuffers,compoundingthegrowingcostsofpreparingandrestoringinfrastructure.”82

InthemostrecentNationalSecurityStrategy,theTrumpadministrationignored

climatechange.Inresponse,morethan100membersofCongresswrotetothePresidentinJanuary2018tounderscoretherisksandtourgethePresidenttoincludeclimatechangeintheNationalSecurityStrategy.83Andatthesametime,RetiredAdmiralJamesStavridisarguedthatclimatechangewasarguablythemostpressingnationalsecuritychallengetheUSfaced.Stavridissaid,“Whatmakesclimatechangesoperniciousisthatwhiletheeffectswillonlybecomecatastrophicfardowntheroad,theonlyopportunitytofixtheproblemrestsinthepresent.Inotherwords,waiting‘tobesureclimatechangeisreal’condemnsustoahighlyinsecurefutureifwemakethewrongbet.Weareindangerofmissingnotonlythevastforestofloomingclimatechange,buttheabilitytoseesomeofthespecifictreesthatwillcauseusthemostproblems.”84

Themilitaryhasbeenconcernedthatclimatechangewillleadtoamorechaoticand

dangerousworld.TheyareconcernedforinstancethattheArcticSeaisnowopen,leadingtoquestionsabouttheneedtopatrolit.85NationalsecurityanalystsnowfrequentlysuggestthatdroughtinSyriafrom2007to2010,andthesubsequentmassmigrationtocities,createdtheconditionsthatcontributedtotheemergenceofthecivilwartherein2011.

Indeed,strategistspaintnightmarescenarioswhereclimatechangeleadstoarmed

conflict—suchaswhencropfailuresproducefamineanddroughtleadtoconflictsoverwaterandothernaturalresources.TheWhiteHousesaidin2016that“Thenational

81Forinstance,seeKurtM.Campbell,etal,“TheAgeofConsequences:TheForeignPolicyandNationalSecurityImplicationsofGlobalClimateChange,”CenterforStrategic&InternationalStudiesandCenterforNewAmericanSecurity,November2007.https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf.CenterforNavalAnalysis,NationalSecurityandtheThreatofClimateChange,CenterforNavalAnalysis2007.https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/national%20security%20and%20the%20threat%20of%20climate%20change.pdf.82WhiteHouse,“NationalSecurityStrategy,”February2015,p.12.https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf.83Theletterisfoundathttps://langevin.house.gov/sites/langevin.house.gov/files/documents/01-11-18_Langevin_Stefanik_Letter_to_POTUS_Climate_Change_National_Security_Strategy.pdf.84JamesStavridis,“America’sMostPressingThreat?ClimateChange”BloombergOpinion,11January2018,https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-01-11/america-s-no-1-enemy-climate-change.85USNavyTaskForceonClimateChange,“TheUnitedStatesNavyArcticRoadmap,2014-2030,”February2014,http://navysustainability.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/USN-Arctic-Roadmap-2014.pdf.

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securityimplicationsofclimatechangeimpactsarefar-reaching,astheymayexacerbateexistingstressors,contributingtopoverty,environmentaldegradation,andpoliticalinstability,providingenablingenvironmentsforterroristactivityabroad.Forexample,theimpactsofclimatechangeonkeyeconomicsectors,suchasagricultureandwater,canhaveprofoundeffectsonfoodsecurity,posingthreatstooverallstability.”86Similarly,inSeptember2016,theNationalIntelligenceCouncillistedarangeofconcernsfromincreasedmigration,tofoodshortages,togreaterconflictandwarcausedbyshortagesoffreshwaterandaccesstoarableland.87TheintelligencecommunityhaskeptitseyesonclimatechangeevenasPresidentTrumpdeniesthatglobalwarmingisaproblem.InJanuary2019,DanielR.Coats,DirectorofNationalIntelligencetoldtheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligencethat,“Globalenvironmentalandecologicaldegradation,aswellasclimatechange,arelikelytofuelcompetitionforresources,economicdistress,andsocialdiscontentthrough2019andbeyond.Climatehazardssuchasextremeweather,highertemperatures,droughts,floods,wildfires,storms,sealevelrise,soildegradation,andacidifyingoceansareintensifying,threateninginfrastructure,health,andwaterandfoodsecurity.Irreversibledamagetoecosystemsandhabitatswillunderminetheeconomicbenefitstheyprovide,worsenedbyair,soil,water,andmarinepollution.”88

PartofthePentagon’sresponsetoconcernsaboutclimatechangehasbeentocreateneworganizationswithintheDODandtostudytheissue.89Forinstance,theNavycreatedthe“TaskForceClimateChange”(TFCC)in2009.However,thePentagondoesnotacknowledgethatitsownfueluseisapartoftheproblemorthatreductionsinPentagonfueluseareapotentiallysignificantwaytoreducetherisksofclimatecausednationalsecurityrisks.ButthePentagoncouldmakethesameconnectionsthatHenryWaxmanmademorethantwodecadesago.InMay1998,CongressmanHenryWaxmansaid,“theKyotoProtocolwillimprovethenationalsecurityoftheUnitedStatesbyreducingtheriskofcatastrophicclimatechange,whichwouldcreateupheavalandunrestthroughouttheworld,includingthepotentialformillionsofenvironmentalrefugees.”Waxmanalsoarguedthat“measurestoimplementtheKyotoProtocolcanimproveoursecuritybyreducingourdependenceonimportedoilthroughimprovedenergyefficiencyandincreasedrelianceondomesticrenewableenergyresources.”90

86WhiteHouse,“FindingsfromSelectFederalReports:TheNationalSecurityImplicationsofClimateChange”May2015,p.3.87NationalIntelligenceCouncil,“ImplicationsforUSNationalSecurityofAnticipatedClimateChange,”NICWP2016-01,21September2016.https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/Implications_for_US_National_Security_of_Anticipated_Climate_Change.pdf.88DanielR.Coats,“WorldwideThreatAssessmentoftheUSIntelligenceCommunity,StatementfortheRecord,”SenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence”29January2019.https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf,p.23.89Ontheotherhand,a2017GAOreportsuggestedthattheUSmilitaryhadnotconsistentlytakenthelikelybudgetaryimpactsofclimatechangeintoaccount.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,“ClimateChangeAdaptation:DODNeedstoBetterIncorporateAdaptationintoitsPlanningandCollaborationatOverseasInstallations.November2017.https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688323.pdf.90Waxman,20May1998.CongressionalRecord,House,vol.144,part7,ProceedingsandDebatesofthe105thCongress,p.9983.

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Conclusion

EvenastheUSsaysitwillscalebackthesizeofitsmilitarypresenceinAfghanistan,Iraq,andSyria,theUShasbegunamassivebuild-upofitsmilitarycapacities.TheUSmilitarybudgetislargerthanithaseverbeensincetheendoftheColdWar.TheUSseemstobeontracktocontinuepolicingthePersianGulfevenasitturnstowhatitperceivesisanemergingthreatfromChinaandhasanincreasingmilitarypresenceinAfrica.Alloftheseactivitiesdemandfuelconsumptionandarehencegreenhousegasemissionintensive. TheUShasanimportantpublicpolicydecisiontomake.Dowecontinuetoorientourforeignpolicyandmilitaryforceposturetowardensuringaccesstofossilfuels?Ordowedramaticallyreducetheuseoffossilfuels,includingthemilitary’sowndependency,andthusreducetheperceivedneedtopreserveaccesstooilresources?

Reductionsinmilitaryfuelusewouldbebeneficialinfourways.First,iftheUSweretodecreaseitsdependenceonoil,theUScouldreducethepoliticalandfuelresourcesitusestodefendaccesstooil.IftheUSfurtherreduceditsimportsofoilfromthePersianGulf,includingfuelusedbythemilitarytoprotectthoseimports,itcouldthenreevaluatethesizeoftheUSmilitarypresenceintheregionandreevaluateitsrelationshipwithSaudiArabiaandotheralliesintheregion.TheUSwouldreappoliticalandsecuritybenefits,includingreducingthedependenceoftroopsinthefieldonoilanddecreasingdependenceonoilandthosewhoprovideit.

Second,bydramaticallydecreasingfossilfuelconsumption,theUSmilitarywould

reduceoverallUSgreenhousegasemissionsandperhapspromotecarbonsequestration(takingcarbonoutoftheatmosphereandfixingitinthesoilandtrees).Therearemanywaystodothis,frommoremodestmeasuressuchasincreasingfueleconomyandusingalternativefuels,whichthePentagonhasbeguntodo.Somebaseclosureswillbenecessitatedbyclimatechangeitself.MoresignificantreductionsingreenhousegasemissionswillbegainedbyrestructuringtheUSmilitaryposture,includingreducingUSmilitaryoperationsandinstallationsworldwide,andclosingbasesintheUS.Baseclosurescouldalsoleadtosignificantcarbonsequestrationifthosepubliclandsarereforested.SeeAppendix2formodestsuggestionsforCongressionalaction.

Third,byreducingtheuseofgreenhousegas-emittingfuels(coupledwithemission

reductionsinothersectors)thePentagonwoulddecreaseitscontributiontotheassociatedclimatechangethreatstonationalsecurity.Indeed,thePentagoncouldplayamajorroleinreducingtheworsteffectsofclimatechange,andanypotentialsecurityconsequencesofglobalwarming,ratherthanreactingorcleaningupafterthoseeffectshaveoccurred.

Fourth,asaconsequenceofspendinglessmoneyonfuelandoperationstoprovide

secureaccesstopetroleum,theUScould,inthelongrundecreaseUSmilitaryspendingandreorientitseconomytomoreeconomicallyproductiveactivities.Indeed,iftheUSmilitaryconvertedmoreofitsenergyconsumptiontorenewableenergy,thiswouldstimulatethe

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renewableenergyindustryintheUS,withimportanteconomicbenefitsfortheentireUSeconomy.91

Insum,reducingPentagonfossilfuelusecouldhaveenormouspositiveimplicationsfor

theclimate.

Appendix1.CalculatingUSMilitaryGreenhouseGasEmissions

Duetogapsinreportingandaccounting,itisimpossibletoprovideaprecisecalculationofthetotalgreenhousegasemissionsoftheUSmilitary.MostUSgovernmentaccountingofUSgreenhousegasemissionsomitfiguresonhowmuchthemilitaryandmilitaryindustrycontributestoUSemissions.ThisisinpartbecausethePentagondoesnotreleasepetroleumfuelconsumptiondata.Further,asdiscussedbelow,emissionsfrominternationalbunkerfuels(formilitaryaircraftandships)andmultilateralwarswereexcludedfromnationalaccountsintheKyotoProtocolnegotiationsin1998.TheUSdoesnotappeartocountmostbunkerfuelsinitsGreenhouseGasInventorynationaltotals.92

AbsentafullPentagonaccountingoftheirfuelconsumptionandemissionsbyoperationtherearevariouswaystoestimateDODgreenhousegasemissionsinthepost-9/11wars.OnecouldbaseanestimateoftheproportionoftotalgreenhousegasemissionsthatshouldbeattributedtothewarontheproportionofthetotalmilitarybudgetspentonOverseasContingencyOperations.Inotherwords,onecanusetheaverageportionoftheDODbudgetspentonOverseasContingencyOperationsasanapproximatemeasureofenergyuserelatedtothewareffortandassumethatsomeportionofthebasebudget,andthereforebase/non-waroperationsandinstallationenergyuseiscorrelatedtowarrelatedspending.TheOverseasContingencyOperationsbudgetforthemajorwarzonesaccountedforanaverageof17percentoftheentireDOD(topline)budgetfrom2001to2017.Butthisruleofthumbwouldgiveanestimateofwarrelatedemissionsthatwouldbetoolowsincenon-standardemissionsaccountforsuchahighproportionofallDODfueluse.

Abetterwaytoestimategreenhousegasemissionsduetowarwouldbetofocuson

non-standardfuelconsumptionandtoestimatetotalgreenhousegasemissionsforOverseasContingencyOperations.Forexample,onaverage,between2010-2017the 91TheauthorthanksAlexanderThompsonforraisingthispoint.92SeeUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,InventoryofGreenhouseGasesandSinks:1990-2016,https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-01/documents/2018_complete_report.pdfandUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,InventoryofGreenhouseGasesandSinks:1990-2017,https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-main-text.pdf.AlsoseeAnnex3,PartA,Section3.8wherethemethodisto“omitallinternationalfueltransactions/deliveries”and“alllandbasedfuels.”https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-annex-3-additional-source-or-sink-categories-part-a.pdf.

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DepartmentofEnergyattributed65.9percentofallDODgreenhousegasemissionstonon-standardoperations.Buttoassumethatallnon-standardfuelusewasforthemajorwarswouldyieldanestimatethatwouldbetoohighsincetheDODperformsother,non-post-9/11warmissions.

Anotherandarguablyevenbettermethodwouldbetobasetheestimateofgreenhouse

gasemissionsonthemajorwarsontheproportionoffuelusebyCentralCommand.InFY2014(seefigure4)thiswasabout24percentofthetotalnon-standardoperationalfuelconsumptionbytheDOD.ButbecausetheUScounterterroroperationsareunderwayallovertheworld(inabout80-90countries)theCentralCommandisnottheonlywarzoneintheglobalwaronterror.TheestimatehereisthattheportionofallgreenhousegasemissionsrelatedtotheGlobalWaronTerror,inpatrollingthePersianGulf,andCentralCommandOverseasContingencyOperationsisabout35percentoftotalgreenhousegasemissionsfornon-standardandstandardoperations.

TheestimatesofgreenhousegasemissionsbytheDODinthisanalysisarebasedcalculationsofUSgovernmentdataonfuelconsumptionfromtheUSDepartmentofEnergy,ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityAnnualReports.93Dataforstandardandnon-standardgreenhousegasemissionsbyDepartmentisavailableontheDepartmentofEnergywebsiteforFY2008,andFY2010-2017.Inaddition,theDepartmentofEnergyprovidesnon-standardfuelconsumptiondataforvehicleandequipmentenergyuseforotheryears.94

ItispossibletocalculateannualDODvehicleandequipmentcausedgreenhousegas

emissionsforeachfueltypebasedonfuelconsumptionrates.Forexample,acalculationofCO2equivalentemissionsofjetfuelmakesthefollowingassumptions:eachgallonofjetfuelproduces0.135HHVMMBtu/gallon.Usingthestandardemissionfactorsforjetfuel—CO2of72.22kg/MMBtu;forCH4(methane)of.003kg/MMBtu;andforN2O(nitrousoxide)of.0006kg/MMBtu—onecancalculatethegreenhousegas,CO2equivalent,emissionsforagivenquantityofjetfuel.95TheGlobalWarmingPotential100yearvaluesaretheEPAandDepartmentofEnergyassumptionsof25formethaneand298forNitrousOxide.96

DepartmentofEnergyprovidedconsumptiondata,andtheEPAGlobalWarming

PotentialsforCO2,CH4andN2Owereusedtocalculategreenhousegasemissionsfor

93DepartmentofEnergy,“ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityPerformance,”AnnualReports,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalYear.aspx.Dataasof1June2018.94EnergyconsumptionfromtheDepartmentofEnergy,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/HistoricalFederalEnergyConsumptionDataByAgencyAndEnergyTypeFY1975ToPresent.aspx.95CO2,MethaneandNitrousOxideemissionfactorsarefromOfficeofEnergy&RenewableEnergy,FederalComprehensiveAnnualEnergyandreportingRequirements,https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/federal-facility-consolidated-annual-reporting-requirements.96GWPemissionscoefficients,https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/co2_vol_mass.php.

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gasoline,diesel,LPG/propane,aviationgas,jetfuel,andNavyspecialfuelfortheyearswherethereisnopublishedDepartmentofEnergyemissionsdata.97Forexample,calculationsofCO2eemissionsforUSDODjetfuelconsumptionin2017areillustratedinTable3.

Table3.CalculatingGreenhouseGasEmissionsforUSMilitaryJetFuelConsumption,FY2017

JetFuel UnitofMeasureAnnualConsumptionGHGNon-StandardOperations 2,915,738.50 thousandgallonsTotalEnergyConsumed 393,624,693.30 MMBTUCost $6,681,061.20 UnitCost $2.29 AnthropogenicCO2EmissionFactor 72.2 kgCO2/MMBtuCH4EmissionFactor 0.003 kgCH4/MMBtuN2OEmissionFactor 0.0006 kgN2O/MMBtuTotalQuantityEmittedAnthropogenicCO2 28,427,575,352.60 kgTotalQuantityEmittedCH4 1,180,874.10 kgTotalQuantityEmittedN2O 236,174.80 kgGWPFactorforCO2 1 CO2eGWPFactorforCH4 25 CO2eGWPFactorforN2O 298 CO2eTotalQuantityEmitted(CO2e) 28,527,477,299.80 kgCO2eTotalQuantityEmitted(MTCO2e) 28,527,477.30 MTCO2e

Assumingthatnon-standardemissionsfromvehiclefuelconsumptionwereveryclosetothetotalnon-standardfuelconsumptionfortheDOD,standardemissionswereestimatedforeachyear.DuringtheyearswherethereisDepartmentofEnergydataforDODemissions,non-standardemissionswereonaverage63percentoftotalemissions.Totalandstandardemissionswereestimatedassumingthattheratioswerethesamethroughtheentireperiod.TheresultsaregraphedinthefollowingfigureandshowninTable4.

97TheDepartmentofEnergyhaspublishedemissionsdatafornon-standardemissionsfor2008,and2010-2017.Theyhaveprovidedvehiclefuelconsumptiondatafortheyears1975-2017.AnnualGHGCO2eemissionsfromfuelconsumptiondataarecalculatedassumingthatvehicleconsumptionwasthemajorityofnon-standardconsumption.

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Figure12.EstimatedDODGreenhouseGasEmissions,1975-201798

Table4.EstimatedAnnualGreenhouseGasEmissionsoftheDOD,1975-201799

StandardEmissionsMillionsofMetricTons

Non-StandardEmissionsMillionsofMetricTons

TotalCO2eEmissionsMillionsofMetricTons

1975 40 69 1091976 35 59 931977 35 60 951978 34 58 921979 35 60 951980 36 61 971981 39 66 1041982 39 67 1071983 39 67 106

98ForFY2008andFY2010-2017,thisestimateusestheDepartmentofEnergyfigures.TheotheryearsareestimatescalculatedfromDepartmentofEnergyfuelconsumptiondata.99CalculatedfromDepartmentofEnergyfuelconsumptiondata.ForFY2008andFY2010-2017,usingtheDepartmentofEnergyreportedfigures.

-

20

40

60

80

100

120

1975

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MillionsofM

etric

Ton

sCO2e

StandardEmissions Non-StandardEmissions TotalCO2eEmissions

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1984 40 68 1091985 39 67 1061986 39 66 1051987 40 69 1091988 35 60 951989 40 68 1091990 39 66 1051991 41 69 1101992 32 55 881993 32 55 871994 30 51 801995 28 48 761996 27 46 741997 27 45 721998 25 43 691999 25 42 662000 23 39 622001 23 40 632002 26 44 702003 29 49 782004 32 54 852005 31 52 832006 27 46 732007 28 48 762008 27 50 772009 28 48 772010 27 50 772011 26 49 752012 25 45 702013 24 39 642014 24 38 622015 24 39 632016 22 37 592017 22 37 59Total 1,340 2,290 3,629

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Theseestimatesarelikelyconservativeforthreereasons.First,theimpactofmethaneandnitrousoxidegases,theirGlobalWarmingPotentials

(GWP)isnotthesameasC02butsignificantlyhigher.Whencalculatingthetotalgreenhousegasemissionstheseothergreenhousegasesarescaledintoanequivalentrelationtocarbondioxide,whichhas,bydefinition,aGWPof1.TheDepartmentofEnergyandtheEPAusetheUSEPA100yearGlobalWarmingPotentialswhichscalestheGWPofmethane,CH4,at25andnitrousoxide,N2O,at298over100years.100TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeFifthAssessmentReportusesdifferentGWPof34forMethane’sCO2equivalent.101IftheIPCCglobalwarmingpotentialswereused,estimatesofUSDODgreenhousegasemissionswouldbehigher.

Second,recallthatjetfuelisthemajorsourceofvehiclenon-standardmilitary

greenhousegasemissions.CO2isthemajorproductofjetfuelconsumptionbutjetfuelcombustionemissionsathighaltitudealsocontainthemuchmorepotentgreenhousereleasewatervapor,aglobalwarminggas,whichitselfcausestheformationofcirrusclouds.TheDODputsadditivesinitsjetfuelstoensuretheyperformaccordingtomilitaryrequirements.Forinstance,becausemilitaryjetsflyatmuchhigheraltitudesthancommercialjetstheyuseadditivestoensurethatthefuellinesdonotfreeze.Anyemissionsfromthoseadditivesandwatervaporarenotcounted.ScientistsagreethateventhoughCO2isthemajorproductofjetfuelconsumption,theimpactoftheseothergreenhousegasesissignificant.WhiletheDepartmentofEnergyfiguresandthecalculationshereincludenitrousoxideandmethane,itispossiblethattheadditionaleffectsofhighaltitudewatervaporandadditivesforjetfuelcombustion,whicharenotincludedinthesecalculations,maybesignificant.“Non-CO2impactscannotbeignoredastheypotentiallyrepresentapproximately60%oftotalclimateimpactsthatareimportantintheshorterterm(excludingcloudinessimpacts).”102Insum,thismeansthattheimpactofaviation

100PFCs,HFCs,NF3,andSF6haveglobalwarmingpotentialsthatrangefrom7,390to22,800.Whiletheglobalwarmingeffectsofmethane,nitrousoxideandwatervaporarewellunderstood,whentheyareemittedduringjetfuelcombustionathighaltitudestheeffectsarenotaswellunderstoodastheeffectsofCO2.SeetheUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,“EmissionsofFlourinatedGases,”https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#f-gasesand“UnderstandingGlobalWarmingPotentials,”https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials.TheDepartmentofEnergyusestheEPAGWPfactors.SeetheirEnergyManagementDataReport.https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/downloads/annual-energy-management-data-reportandCouncilonEnvironmentalQuality,“FederalGreenhouseGasAccountingandReportingGuidance,”17January2016,p.4.https://www.sustainability.gov/pdfs/federal_ghg%20accounting_reporting-guidance.pdf.101IPCCSecondAssessmentReport100GWPSeetheIPCCFifthAssessmentReport,ClimateChange2014:SynthesisReport.ContributionofWorkingGroupsI,IIandIIItotheFifthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange[CoreWritingTeam,R.K.PachauriandL.A.Meyer(eds.)].(IPCC,Geneva,Switzerland,2014).https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf.102EuropeanEnvironmentAgency,EuropeanUnionAviationSafetyAgency,Eurocontrol,“EuropeanAviationEnvironmentReport,2019”January2019,p.88.https://www.easa.europa.eu/eaer/system/files/usr_uploaded/219473_EASA_EAER_2019_WEB_LOW-RES.pdf.AlsoseeMartinCames,JakobGraichen,AnneSiemons,andVanessaCook,“EmissionReductionTargetsforInternationalAviationandShipping,”PolicyDepartmentA:EconomicandScientificPolicy,

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emissionswhenallgreenhousegasesareincludedmaybehigherthanthoseestimatedhere.

Third,thefocusisonthemajoremissionsoftheDOD.Specificallynotincludedare

estimatesforwhatarecalledScope3emissionsfrom,forinstance,employeeairandgroundbusinesstravel,wastewatertreatment,andsolidwastedisposal.Forexample,USDODScope3emissionsin2008were7.6millionMTCO2eandin2016,7millionMTCO2e.Norarebiogenicemissionsincluded.In2017,USDODbiogenicemissionswere.57millionMTCO2e.

Finally,internationalmilitarybunkerfuelsareexcludedfromgreenhousegasemission

accounting.AspartoftheKyotoProtocol,signedinDecember1997,theUSinsistedthatfuelsoldtoshipsandaircraftforinternationaltransportandformultilateralmilitaryoperations,“bunkerfuels”shouldnotbecountedagainstacountry’stotalemissions.103AstheUSUndersecretaryofStateStuartEizenstatsaidintestimonytoCongress,theKyotoProtocoldidnotlimittheUS:

Wetookspecialpains,workingwiththeDefenseDepartmentandwithouruniformedmilitary,bothbeforeandinKyoto,tofullyprotecttheuniquepositionoftheUnitedStates as the world's only super power with global military responsibilities. Weachievedeverythingtheyoutlinedasnecessarytoprotectmilitaryoperationsandournationalsecurity.

AtKyoto,theparties...tookadecisiontoexemptkeyoverseasmilitaryactivitiesfromany emissions targets, including exemptions for bunker fuels used in internationalaviation and maritime transport and from emissions resulting from multilateraloperations,suchasselfdefense,peacekeeping,andhumanitarianrelief.

This exempts from our national targets not onlymultilateral operations expresslyauthorized by the U.N. Security Council, such as Desert Storm or Bosnia, but,importantly,alsoexemptsmultilateraloperationsthat theU.S. initiatespursuant totheU.N.Charterwithoutexpressauthorization,suchasGrenada.104

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change continues to treat nationalmilitaryemissions,specificallyinternationalaircraftandnavalbunkerfuels,differentlythanotheremissiontypes.105

EuropeanUnion,November2015,pp.13-14.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/569964/IPOL_STU(2015)569964_EN.pdf.103SeeRoyK.Salomon,“GlobalClimateChangeandU.S.MilitaryReadiness,”FederalFacilitiesEnvironmentalJournal,Summer1999,vol.10,no.2,pp.133-142.104UndersecretaryofStateStuartEizenstat,testimony,HearingBeforeTheCommitteeonForeignRelations,11February1998,https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46812/html/CHRG-105shrg46812.htm.105SeeIPCC,“GoodPracticeGuidanceandUncertaintyManagementinNationalGreenhouseGasInventories,”https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gp/bgp/2_5_Aircraft.pdf.

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Appendix2.PossibleNextStepsforCongressionalActionontheDODandClimateChange

ThePentagonhasmadesignificantreductionsingreenhousegasemissionsinrecent

years.Bycontinuingtodecreasefossilfuelconsumption,theUSmilitarywouldreduceoverallUSgreenhousegasemissionsandcouldperhapspromotecarbonsequestration(takingcarbonoutoftheatmosphereandfixingitinthesoilandtrees).

ThereisroomfortheDODtocontinuereductions,usingmanymoremodestmeasuresincludingincreasingfueleconomyandusingalternativefuels.Moresignificantreductionsingreenhousegasemissionswillbegainedbyrestructuring,includingmakingtrainingmoreefficient,reducingUSmilitaryoperationsandinstallationsworldwide,andclosingbasesintheUS.Somebaseclosuresandrestructuringwillbenecessitatedbyclimatechangeitself.Baseclosurescouldalsoleadtosignificantcarbonsequestrationifthosepubliclandsarereforested.

Thisisawin-win-winstrategy.ReductionsinfuelusesavemoneyandmaketheUSmilitarylessvulnerabletofuelshortages;inthelongrun,reductionsinfueluseandconversionofbasesbyreforestationdecreaseclimatechangecausedimpactsincludinginsecurity;andconversiontorenewableenergysourcesandalternativefuelscouldsignificantlyboosttherenewableenergyindustryandelectriccarindustryintheUS.

CongressmightbecomemuchmoreactiveintrackingandreducinggreenhousegasemissionsbytheDOD.Specifically,CongressmightrequirethePentagontosupplymoreinformationonfuelconsumptionandenergyuseandrequirethePentagontoincreaseitsanalysisandplanningforatransitiontoreductionsinfossilfueluseandtoimmediatelyreducefuelconsumption.Somepotentialactionsareoutlinedbelow.

1.ComprehensivereportingofDODfuelconsumptionandenergyusage.

a.Inallfutureyears,theDODshouldreportfuelconsumptiontoCongressinits

budgetarysubmissionandinaseparateannualreportonDODfuelconsumption.Consumptionreportsshouldbebothaggregatedanddisaggregated(byfueltypee.g.jet,diesel,andotherfuels)eachyearbynamedoperationandwar,andforotheroperationsandinstallations,foreachoperationalcommandandeachservice.ConsumptioninformationshouldalsobeaddedtotheannualDefenseLogisticsAgencyEnergyFactbooks.

b.TheDODshouldreportthesesamefiguresfortheperiodfromFY2000throughFY2019inaseparatereport.

c.TheDODshouldreportfuelconsumptionfortrainingmissionsandpublicdisplayssuchasfly-overevents.

2.ComprehensiveAnalysisandPlanninga.DARPAshouldworkwiththeservicestoproduceastudyshowingcurrentDOD

non-tacticalvehiclefleetfuelconsumption,andtoidentifywaystoimmediatelyreducefuelconsumptionbeyondlevelsalreadytargeted.

b.Eachserviceshouldidentifywaystoreduceconsumptionoffuelbydecreasingthefueluseandincreasingthefuelefficiencyoftrainingexercises.

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c.Eachinstallationshouldinventoryitsenvironmenttoidentify“heatislands”bytheendofFY2020.

d.Eachinstallationshouldproduceplanstoreduceoverallenergyconsumptionby10percentand20percentbythestartofFY2022.

e.Identifyinstallationsthatshouldbeclosedorreducedinsizeduetoclimatechangeimpacts(suchasrisingsealevelsorextremeweather).Developaplanforconvertingtheseinstallationstositesforcarbonsequestration.

3.ComprehensiveApproachtoReductionsinFossilfuelusage.a.SwitchingtoalternativefuelsforelectricitygenerationatallUSmilitaryinstallations

sothatallDODinstallationsare90percentreliantonrenewabletechnologies,e.g.wind,solar,geothermalandhydropowerandlargestoragecapacitybatteriesthroughpowerpurchaseagreementsorlocalgenerationby2022.

b.Increasetherateofadoptionofallelectric,hybridandpluginhybridnon-tacticalfleetvehicles(NTV)basedontheresultsoftheDARPAstudyidentifiedabove.Moveto90percentelectric,orgas-electrichybridby2022.PrioritizefornewpurchasesthemostefficientvehiclesmadeintheUSthatmeettheDepartmentofEnergyNTVfueleconomystandards.

c.Toreducethe“heatisland”effectoflargeexpansesofconcreteandasphalt,andtherebyreducethenecessityforairconditioningonbasesandotherinstallations,eachbaseshallinventoryitspercentageoftreecoverandplantshadetreessothatthepercentageofshadetreecoverageisincreasedby10-20percentbytheendofFY2021.

4.MilitaryandInstallationBaseConversionsandClosuresa. Designatewhichmilitaryandnationalguardbasesandinstallationsshouldbe

closedduetoclimatechangeimpactsandwhichbasescanbeclosedforotherreasons,suchasdiminishedthreat.106

b. Asbasesandinstallationsareclearedoftoxiccontamination(suchaschemicalwasteandasbestos),changelandusesothatcarbonsequestrationispossiblesuchasbyplantingtreesorrestoringwetlands.

c. UseclosedDODbasesandinstallationsassitesofalternativeenergyproduction—wind,solar,orgeothermalasismostappropriateandefficientforthatbaseorinstallation.Similarly,convertedNationalGuardbasescouldbecomesitesofalternativeenergyproductionandcarbonsequestration.

106DepartmentofDefense,“ReportontheEffectsofaChangingClimatetotheDepartmentofDefense,”OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisitionandSustainment,January2019.https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_effects_of_a_changing_climate_to_dod.pdf.


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