1.11 a.nl cy 1 :") od 2:5 S:-:pi'(-'rrd':>2 r 1. 97-1

M.l'. Bonne'Y: Thi s ;-.. HernDon we are p-::).v-lle ge d to i .!l~.:e '::'view j\1anJ .. cy Hood, a lo ng ti1.ne v::;.lued ern.plo 'iee of 'Lhe :\\iACA. 1'b i~, inte.r.view is beind c.or..ducted ai: tb r., Arnes Re38arch Center on th~~ 2.3rd. day of Septef':lb~r J.97:'), . Jv:L:.u~Jr:oy.

I'd like to ask YOll a que3tio ~1 that Jhrc aske d rnan:,r Ofi1. '~ l· peopi.c. When did 'y-ou COlIte to wOl'l' for the COJ.TIYni 'r.tee a21d v'hat c ;;;.u~ed yo\.:: to COtTle ;:0 \vork for the Committee?

J'vlL j'1:ood: V!e 11. , I was a student at tho:! lTnivel'sity of Kan~:a8 and WZ~~l intel·,:· ~:,ted i.n 2.eronu..'J.i:ics. I took th~ fir st con:.",:;> offered. there which 'was ta\)Ght }Yv' ;"\. PJ:ofessor who h o . ..1 nev'er stud ip.d aero r)al.~ics. So, we h a C. 2.

thJ:(~(; .. l.lOl' }.' COUI' se ill aerodyn.arnic s u si!1 g Ed,.\! ,d"\~ ''vi ar ner' ~1 textbod:: w'o:' ch "\~: as j r:' f;t nCO··'N . .I\s I approached gl'aciu,).b.on :in tl1 ~ Sr.Jr:i.ng of 1 SZ9 - - '.:h a.:t e:aTl}" in. the 'year ther.e V'lel' e a lot of jor::; , but I was interested in a job in ;:.>.e:"(;tlctu;:ict;, I was torn 'beL'V'een takir g 0118 a'c StearrHc.n J\.irc1' 2 h, a.nd one

1 \,/2,:-; ::,ffeJ.·cd a t the Langley HI.'!search C,~r..tcr afi tbe result oJ h:tvir:'b t;;..kell i.}:; 2! (~~ 1/11 Se T vi ce E:J::arnination upon my pr of,~ :3:ol o J: ' S re cOl1.1.rr"Cncl2t.ioTl. It s e ,: .. n. i~, that I got enough anfJW8J.'S li gh'" ~:G I got the offer, and I fLl.l:li l y tOQt;:

ti'..e Nh,CA job e,xp~~ctiJ.lg to wode the r;:: aIle or hvo year8 at the .rr~",st so I '\, ' ou.~d J.t~~rn aJJ about aerol1;:>.utics and tben go out a nd get a big joh in ind.:.lsi:ry . Vle.l1, by the tilne thre e 1no))Lh::: Vi f,:l"C f~ one n1.0 ,q t of Illy" clas~:,··

r:rl. <:lte.~j were Ollt. ~)£ work because of the J e·pressio .'l. r.ct .!1d the Buddc:n cxi.cf'. 81ve tl. n~rYJP10yrn, ent, so I VJan vr::.ry 11arp~y to h a ve th;:>.t job and b'/ t1.1~ ti.mt., t 'NO Y(:,U"S had ex pired .. I likcJ. it so weLt that I s t <:,:~reci br the test 0.;: .rn.y ca.reE::r.

}3: J. thirlk d 13.t is very t:-ypi.:.:al of ~,J~·'::·'Y of the y :-)l!::~5 !':D(};ir:.e cring gr:;. ·.],p.i.,::,? o f th<lt period , Th.ey fi gu.re d that tlH-:!)' rY0U.l C:; nse e.l.1lploy:ncl1t wiY() t hl.~ Cornrnit.l.ee :J~ : a so :rt: 0:;: ;'!. g1' adu.c:t ,~ schc /)l ,-:.nd then go s(JrLlewl·;. e X' e iJ

:. 1:; ,· , but once the';! sl~artcdl:o \,1)::', .rk J.o"!: the N/\C 1\., they were hooked (J,Dn

they nr~ve.r Got aV/o.y f: onl. it.

}I: Yon rn.2.y :c e rT'CHlbt~ J' , "iNuHe :r' , it \'las so f~y.t\:,·.n8ive tha.t ilbont ~·.h3.t

tiJTI {~. /.':':~.:~:~Jc::!;. Magwt:i ne (':a.rri.~d <'>n ~ ci l t .J"rial Sl1g w:; ~ting thcd: theT(~ be scnnr: '\',t~J.y ~:o c. ld.i "'(! i.h ,:··:<3 e yOlln g engjnc(~ J:~> Lo ~1tay !.O ll.-;er , 50 the N.L'1.C"t\. could Gf.i; tbd r rnon.e y' ::( worth out of th ,,: e~ .. rJ y train.i.n[; the y gave t1:1.e1'1'.

):{: Vlel;p for the first year r workeu in what w a s called. the Physics .Ld'LU.l' atCJ.i.·)i',. which was insb~um.ent c?li.b.ratio:n. a.td. instrllrnent de,(reloprrlent,

·H • ....... Wh.o was in charge of that?

H: Hobert Iv'l:ixon. I"gUE:t;!S I \-V<-18 put in th2.t b F.)cause 1 eal' J !(~cl rny \vay tJ~}l.'ouf,;1 ) collegf'! building and repairing instrurne n'CD for tLe A [:;h'onOll:1Y Dcp3.r-rrne nt at t he University of Kansas. But: .. b;.i' '~lw end of l:llat -:rea:r I decide2 it wasn ' t to rny perma.nent liking , so T aske.d fo r a t:cans.ter and wv.s fOl·tunate in. be in.g i:rans.:erred to Scniti:y Dey':r< __ ncf.; ! g ;:;ectiOtl, 'Tlhich Vlc.S ju st then starting c:onHtTuc:tiO:l 0.[ the full .. scaie wind funnel. So, sorne ()f :.:1117 first af;.:lignxnents were t() tap ri"\I'(:!'i:s with a Lanlmer to see ii they \-vere tigbt, and inspect the :?,:'\)[,ti:lg and chrnb <,,.11 over t1: ;~. l; ste e l structure to 3(;~e if '::hings were built :right.

/

Mr. Ho od Page 2

B: T hat pro ved t o b e one of the lY10 st va.lua'J1.e j'esearch t.ool s that the Com.rnittee ever had.

H: I b e lieve it' s had the long e st useful lifE- o f ar:.y Ina ja!" piece of equipm.e nt.

B: And., it could g ive full - scale ans'vcr. s.

H: Yes. It could t est a full·-s cale figh ter-sb: e ai.rpla:le up to 100 Iniles an hour or so , a nd th at was the first tin'H: that wa.s possible.

B: Did you get i nto the p:.-:oblem. of turbulence in the tun.nel?

II : Yes, rrlUch l a ter.

but the i onportance of. that problcn:'l becam .. e fuJ.ly recognized By that tilDe,. I was in a different s~ction.

:8: You ' d gone where t hen?

H: A fter a few y ea.rs there, Russ Robinsou wa.s rna de responsible for d e s i gning a nl:!w 8 - foot hi gh- speed wind tunnel to b:: built with funds p rovi ded by one of the luake-work ... PW~t1).-t:ype agencies . " . and I was hi 5 ;:'.S si stant. So , then I was de signiD g rcinfo rced concrete structure s for a ye ar or so. They'r e still there, so I gue s s :hey" ere all righJ

,;.

13: \ ·'lJ1en yo u say J'ligh speed tunrlel , YO ll n:lean 1..1rJ to 500 miles an b..Ollr ?

H: This v/ ent a little o ver 500 J:nile s p c r hO ll r, I 1:hi r;}~ it ' ~3 a cO!:L1J.nel1.t on the Urnes that th e first n alYle for ;:hat v/ind tun.nel wa£: the Full-Speed wind tunnel, as thou gh that was full speed. {oreyer ;::':'t.e1', ju s t a.s the first wind tunnel I worked on wag ca lled the FuJ1. .. Scale winr.~. tLlnnel. Since i:b.e n , we have s t a rted caning wind tunne l s by their size i nsrc:J.d of by sorne ,<I'<1.ch irnpo::;si Jle adje cbv~. I stD. yed w5th th at wind hatrwl fo r quite a while a.nd H happl:~ned _ ... yepJ rne nLic.ned tUl blllence - - f.h?L WUHJ tunnel had r; t.h~~r :low turbulence because we were beginning to l"ecognizE! t he i.,rn po rtance of havi.ng low tu.rbulence, and it was designed. w ith tbat in nlLnd.

B: Dr. D r y den up at the Bureau o f Standards - - h e had n.ot y e t corne with the Cornmittee - - was v e ry much a l eadel' in low turbulenc e work as I rem.ember ,

H: He was, and h e deve l oped the in strulnent~~ £01' rneas\Jr'lIl,Z t urbulence among the fir st such instruments .... and was a re al leader i .D that field . I b e lieVe also that a lot o f that w ork was supported by the NACA, was it not, Walter?

D: SOIne of it, at least. Some of it I think W8.S done by the Bureau on its o wn funding . But, you'r e quite co rrect, r igl;:c n'luch of it wa s fin. anced by the N A CA.

H: Well, Hu gh Dryden was a ITlan we all always adm.ired. for hi:: ability and integr ity and l ead e rshi p all throughout our careers.

.• l'vlr. Bond. Page 3

B: Tria is In.t~ \;h·~nG I bope to bri.ng out in rny history that when Dryden b E:came Directol' ~)f th .... N·ACA. in 1948 01' ' ':i7~ he 'Na.S no strange r to the C ornrnitt€e. I-Ie h:.\Q b ·:;cl! (ll nlany of i:he tech n"i.-::al c:olnnlittees and as vice chai r:rn a n nl the j.~eJ.'ocl.ynan"li(;s Cornmittee he :;:cally was t he le ad.e r of that, and h e bn)Ll.~:ht aJ.sc· with him Gl rapport with the il"lilitary that was absolutely p:ri c8.1e S::J at tb at particular tim.e .

H: He had rapport with everyone, I think , around the whole world . One "?hase I ho pe yom: book will show,. 'Nalter, i s the; bas i c ho ne sty and i ntegrity of t hat. NACA oTt3 anization and the efficiency.. Most of the e rnployees were young me·I). 'Nho 'Nel'e ja it bec;'i.use they were interested in it and then the badersll:ip o f Hugh D:r-lden~ J o seph Ames, George Lewis, Snl.i tty De F'r<.\ncE' , l:Ienry Reid, the esprit wa.s such we were all intere sted in work:L,1g. iVeE, in the Full-Sc:ue wind hlnnel at 3:00 a. m. u nce I \vas S Ne(=ring floors a l ong with Henry Reid,. w h o was Engineer in C hal"ge, and :CHon lvfiJler- ·who was second rna_n in -::harge at the Laboratory at t1H~ ti.rnc- Th:.;se ~.h ·!_llg .S wen t on and on., and there was no suggestion ev·er of ·3.ny h anky pc:.nky. Everything '}las honest .~ln.d straightforward, or we d i d n ' t do il:. VIe 11eVer would h ave tho ught or ~~nything except fo r the nost straightforvV'::;.:.:d honest approach to all the cOl~tr acts and to all the

i'el ations with irlcl.llst"ty, 3.nd everythi.ng we d id .

B: Yoc.. never cT<:.nked :;n 3. " bu gger factorl' to lYlake the answers co nl.e Oi.:t:i: t:t. little hit different.

H; No . And·he :;··,.ev"-l thoL.ght of doiIlg anything that was dishonor 3..hle o r ::ro", b:~d i n any wc:.y_ 1 think that ' s Cl. very inl.pcHtant factor ... it ' s one ·(.hi.ng that rYl.dl~F~." ;De shocked rnore than ever ')Jitrrthe r evela.tion.s c orning nul: of the conduct of high go v e rnrncr,t i n. W <.t:::.hington a t thi s titne, and I find tJ.1'? public looki.l1 !l. down on all Civil Service b ec au sE; (and all Goverru"nent o p er<t~ion~; ) (" f the3e th1.ugs, and 1 hope yo u ca.n do sornething t o t.?U the \:ruth abour. how it was in our delY.

3: Vl n. I do wa.nt 10 .rncnt:iort, Iv1a.nlcy, ar<.l this may be a.s good a placr~ as ;:wy to hl':iug it out. I do want to teLl the sto ry' , wart s and aU, if you v/jH, so that it ·win be .reditable because: there were strengths , very grca.t fit.lcr.g-hs :.,d tb ,erc '",ere also wei).kne~seg . One of the weaknes ses, and onywhcl'cs along THere that you f<:;ellike corn.ment1.ng , I ·wish you would ••. one of tbe \T,'ca"knes ses that I see was that the rnernbe rs of the NACA, ·~he \In!-'c:dcl l ea.dcr::: H you will of the Agency .• b ccaJTl.e o l d lnen who were sj ck 2.nd cou.ldn't g,i.·ve the innovative, courageo u s, " let ' s give it a t r y 'l leadf>l" sh.ip thac 10 ~,r ea:),';;;; 01' so earlier they had b een able to, and P m talkIng about Dr. ?.rncs who for years continued as Cha irnl. an of the N'JI.CA alth::)Ugh he '.va:,:, confined to ")-,js bedroo rn b y a stroke. I ' rn thi nking a bu\d; AcI.roi r al David \V, Taylor who was v ice chai rn'lan of the C omlnitiee for a lo,ng time who was co:rtin.ed to ? wheel chair up at the N aval ho spital. I'm thinking . of Dr. W;:Ucot.t, if you will, who tT~ed t o resign as C hairman an.d wa3 talked·inl:o accepti.'.1g it y ear afte r y ear when he was infi r m, and ready to die of a stroke, which he did.

".".,

-- .,'

1.\111". Hood

H: Well, I didn ' t .fee l m u ch of that effect , WaH(~r. Yo u probably tracked that. clown rnore than I could. quotP., bt.;.t I ITligh(: say· such Inental gi a nt s as those, were rno re valuable at half strength 'Chan I "'.vas at full st ren gth for in s t ance .

B: That I would not b e able to a.ccept.

H: Men like Jimrny Doolittle, V annevar Bush, Willi a...Yl, Frederick Durand was a rnernber of the Com.mittee for years J and during the war­time, I beli eve h e was in. hi·s 80 ' s, he was m.ade Chc'irnlan of the Jet Propulsion Cornrnitte e , bec ause they wanted s o meone who would pursue the problems vigorou sly. and. he did and in Washi.ng ton he would not accept a ride over to an office over o n the other :.:: ide of to\vn when he had 3.n appointment t h ere . He would go ont a n d get on th e bus, and the staff there had to result to subterfuge to get him. to r ide v.ri th them or to do something a bout it. Of cour se, that ' s a rare man, and I gue s s the point Ilrn trying to make i s that chronological age is not a m.easure of C'~

"nan's aware n es s of a situation, and his ability and value .

B: No, but I point od to you though. you lTJ.entionf: o. Bu sh a...-,.d you. rnentioned Do olittl e . ~ .. Doo little, incidentaJJy lin) going to see o n Thursday. I ' ve tal ke d to him at great l ength once aJ.ready, now I ' m going aiter h im th e s ~ cond h .me. Both Doolittl e a nd Bu sh di3e n g::tge d tnern.s elves f r orn these t rem.e ndous l ea.dership · respon s ibilitie e v/he n they were in thei r mid -sixties . Th.ey didn;t try to keep going iorp.veJ:.

p. No , but they went on and had othe r career s ",-ften"',' aJ.'d3.

B: W e ll , that 's fine, but what I' .tn sayjng is for sOIY.'.eth3ng that i s a treyne ndoll. s ly i n llo rati-o;t e, j ust revo lu.tionizing all of ae ror..aub c s such as jet propu l s ion . r think i t l S ;:;' fl in ju stice to Williarc~ F . Durand to haul hin 1 o ut. of retiren-le nt; in the rni<ldl.== 80 ' s and expect hint to hav{~ the gmYlpti n tllat h. h. '.1 ','iI"hf:."n. }v~ waf: hI bin 40 ' s.

H.: Vlell , <311 th e capable I~ople were fn'etty hlll;Y JurLlg those y e ar ::; an.d they were ~l ·.rd 1(' (ell ·,e 1 y {or one thing. J rni.ght rnake one other po in t abo •. l t George Le-.,.,·j:;. Li. h i s res pect , it did sc(::n1. t.o lTIe that w h en the W·ar came on, the organi2;ation grew so fast with the J-'llnes H ese-a.rch C enter (A.1TIes Aeronautical L aboratory, at that time) and the n e w Laboratory at Cleveland (w hich ber::arrlE=, the Lewis Laboratory cl.ite r George L ewi s! death I b elieve it was) but George Lewis tried to run tb e \T'hole thing in the sam.e -Nay h e had a l ways run it . ..

B: Vlhen the re was just L angley.

H: Yes, and h e o f cou rse was the top mal::.ager .• he w as the ope rating m anage r. He w as the boss under the Committee and he killed himself really by trying to carry t hCi:t bi g lo ad. The War' kille d him. as rnuch as it k ille d the fighting soldiers, and he tried to tun it that '-/ a.y for too l o ng. That ' s one o f the problems like you're sugge sting.

.. Mr . Hoad Page 5

B: VieU .. i n the middle ' 30's v:ith Ame s and. ~C ay·lor , the C hainnan and Vi ce Chairma.n, re ally o ut of kilte r> hoth 0£ them, the tunning of the N A CA fell enti rely on Doc Lewis ' shou.lde rs and John Victor y ' s shoulde rs.

H: Yes. Yes. ·

B: But, that i sn' t the v/ay it was GGt up Cl.l'lci t~1.:lt: :3 not the way it w as suppo sed to run.

H: Well, I;omehow it ran.

B: Yes, it did . Yes , it did. The recor d nee ds to be clear, though. as to what happened. in tho se years.

H: There ' s sorne i mpo rtant a sp ects about the o l d 0 rgani zation, the way trle law set up the old NACA which I think ',x/ e Te ve r.y importa.nt. It was a unique ty p e of organiz aHo n. I won! t try to outhne it here.

B: Well, I talk e d to Bush three y ears ago and h e went o n at great length abo u t how he in t-;is te d that the N ational ,science Found ation be p a tt e rne d after the NACA way of do ing things , and how he f e lt. And Jirruny Doolittle fe e l s th i s way ar;.d others w ho v/ c re rne mbe rs of the Comnlittee at one time or another have f e lt the same way, th at NASA w ould h ave b een w e n a dvised to have been se t up . " . •

H: A lot of us fe e l t hat v/c-y.

B: The re ' s >:J"lUch to b e Baid )11.e way or a.nother on that.

H: See ~ w e had CIS a Bo a rd of D irect.ors, for fre e , the b est brains We

could l ind, and we had. in addition t o tho sc: we had the· te chnical cOlnn:i.ittees p

and technical su.b corprnitte.e s and rnen1.he r·~ hip o n those co r.~Hn · . t.t ee8 ""/c-13

BO U ght , Jb~r by a Jet o f di :f£e r e.(l l· people. T+:)w J a lot of the valu{\ble r.n er[lb (~X' () of the s. · C:~:-(l mi-rtee 8 were indus t r y peopJ.,.~, a nd they b rought tbe :nduBI"l'· jt vi e wpr)lnt to t110tl e o f. us in f h.!;:: resea.r c h job and a lot of UJe'.·n were rn:i.lit ary and ther. e wa s a good angl e there . T here were sorneU.:rne~1 thou ghb, in Co ng;:e:.1~. th at NAC.A ~hould h r.' rnade pa.. 't o f the Ar.my or of the Navy, or of the Air Force l ate r when it b ecar.n.e t b.e Ai r Forc e , but the N avy didn't war..t it t o b elong to the Air Fo rc e ar:d the Air .Force didnft want it to b e lon g t o the Navy, so we h ad good iri e nofl a ll aro und. Industry was ou. :r good f riend becau se we supported them with the res ear ch results they needed, re sults they could not obt a in i n thl:; ir o ·w~ fa c iliti e s and during those years we were not their best cu ston:: c-; :r <l~; NP_SA b2c2.ID~ later. We weren ' t impo rtant as a custom .er: so t he relaticJ):lship was easy to rr-l a i ntain o n a f air, honest. ethical l evel.

B: Well , NASA is a quite different k ettle of £i 3h.

H: Yes. Yes, NASA is a big buye r and NACA was not.

Mr. I-food Fage 6

B: vVell, i i's a d eveloprnent o;. .. ganizati.on. It' s an ope rating o~gani-

zation a nd "vh·~the r v·re like it or no·t, the thi ngs that: NASA does have political motivat jol1s 8nd pol:ii:ical overtones. r;m not saying this critically . J'm. just sayi ng it ,,,8 a fact. The t dp to the mool1. wo uld not h ave been ul1.de d akell except foY.' overriding political considerations.

H: I think that's true, yes.

B:. And so to hope that you could h ave h a d an objective , non-paid boa.rd o f directors i.n tl1.ere, Il rn alraid it just wouldn' t have worked. Yo u needed sornebody lil:e Jim 'Webb who was right in there w alking over •.•

II:. A. real organi7:el' ,. yes. I think it ' s inte i.'esting how each a.ge seeITlS to bd.ng out the m .an reqr:.ired. for the cir<;:u:q1.stance~ in that age.

13: I think i n that context that it 's fairly clear that for hi.s tiITle, Doc L ewis wa s ju st ;).bout ideal.

H: H e was.

B: And for his time, Hugh Dryden was just about id.eal.

H: Yes. That l s v/h at .t rnean exactly.

B: They were quite d i fferent peopl e in·their outlook and in thei r way of doing things ,

H: Yes, and J ohn Vi ctory had a differ e nt outlook. a .J.d co ntribute d in quite a different way.

B~ Indeed he did, and I worked directly for John for years so I was p rivi leged to see hl)w he wcrked. Nobody was l'Do:ce devote d to the concept of the i:·V.l,.C .t.... If Dr . Antes bad said t o John, II CO jurnp off the en.d of the pier" .. he woul d h a re h~ld hi s nof'€ and jurnped.

JI: Ee s ur e woul d, He su.re ·V'v' o u ld.

B: He wo uldn 't have argu e d o r' anythin.g else.

I"I ~ B ut h e w::',s another factor 1n the integrity of the organization. I think one of the big things W<1S the inherent interest of all of the resea.rch. peo pIe in what they we re doing .

. B: To Get on to another matter that may b e a little cont rove rsi al, the rnore I st.udy the picture, the nlOre I feel that during t he 1950' s, the NACA was inexo rably be ing ground betwe en two millstones: one was the rnillstone of a fixed appropriation , st::1rvation for dollars, if yo u will, and the o ther wa s 3. rni ll stone o f expandi::1g requiremerlts and e xpanding needs in aeronautics.

H: That 's quite true.

Mr. Hood

B: And, at the end of the 1 9 SO I s, something was go ing to hav!~ to give .

H: Right. W e h a d to grow o r shrink, one or the oth e r.

B: Thatls right. Suryive or p e r ish, one of the other.

H: I think so . Of course, that! s what w a s f1naJJy rCEolvecl by the formatio n of NASA.

B: But you l ook at the hundrecls and hundreds of millions o f dollar s that were being i.nvested in, say, the ICBM, and the Air Force used Borne of tho s e many, many rn.illions of dollar s to buy problem solving f rom indust r y, and indu s try built up resear ch and developrnent organizations that rnade NACA look puny in size.

II: Oh, NACA was los ing its monopo ly on aeronautic al researr.::h.

B: It was . It was.

H~ Yes, inde ed,

B: From the ccol1ornics of the thing, it got to the point w he re people just couldnlt afford ::?g_~ to accept SOl1.1.e of the dollars .

H: No. On t h BJ budgetary side , I mentione d to Aubrey I-Iarris ju s t i"he otber day, th a t h.e and I were fortunat e that our organi :zation was growing rnost of our care ers, e nd ies much easier to nl3.nage a grcwing organiza.hon tha.n it is a s hrinking organization. I think o f that whe n :r. 100k a t: the pl"oblern.'3 ()f the Ames E esearch Center today. It l s rnu c.:J:.l rnO }: ' 7~

dHficlllt to ke e p gOlvd mor ale , good spirits, efficiency arld all tha t goes with it , than it us ed to b e. Sinc e I mentioned effic iency, I would like to st l" ens h0'.11 eff.ici (mt t ht.! o ld srnall NACA w as . 1 was perhaps the ZOeth en1plo Y(\ ~ i is() rru~ j- h;. ! ; g ') ik e tha t p and in tho se days when there wa.s to be a fl e w b uil '.Hr:. g , TI e .... " 'I.'y j 11 "/ t l.J nl'l,.~ l ~ w h atev'er, w e d e s i gned i t. V/e di d.a~t knOVl th at WI~ d i d r.l ! t Icu yv,!(ww. i"o w vd ays t they hir e a consulti ng c:ngine e r ir.lg fi l'J:n,. a n ;l.J:'chitec t [. ) ( ,m office b u ildin.g. Maybt~ our buildii1.gs looked. as though they Wer re d ,;,;~;;j . sr.\I~ d by ()J:nate\lr ~ . But, they worked and served the pll r po se and t.he.y- "Nere d e l3i gned and built ','ery econornic ally cornpa.red to the cUJ: :tent: sys tem. Not only in NASA, but eV'2 q r -Nhere e l se, Noi: only in Governm.ent, but I n the indu s try, in big business. I think NAC .A wa.s uniquely efficient i n it s use of funds for such purpos es.

B: Well. 1' rn going to make very clear in my hi story, the f act that over the years the Age ncy ',vas c e rtainly one of the bi ggest dollar hargains that the taxpayer ever h;:td . I added up what the total appropriations fo r the N ACA were horn 1915 u!'ltil it went out of busine s s in 195 8 and it comes to ju st a little o ver $1 bi.llion. But, of that$l billioIlp about 95% of it was the last. ten yea.rs ..

H: Oh, yes ; .Oh .. yes~

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Mr. I-lo od Page 8

B: The thre e \ .w~l ;'ll'y w ind tunnel s c o s t $150 rniHion right there.

II: That was a la.ndrrld. :ck in expenditur· e s. Spe aking of the ba.rgain, because of the early ·w(Jrk in ~eronautical res e arch done by NACA, still to tJ1is day the b igeest. SOUl-ce of forei g n trade fund s in this country is a.ircraft, at least it w;:;. s th e l as t ti.m .e I s aw the figure . I h aven ' t Seen any for tb.e last year 0:;:' two . You c a n attribute a lot of that to the o ld NAC A work.

B: Of rnanufactured products, I thin.k: prob ably so., Grain, 1. t hink i s •••

H; Grain _may have o'fe l ·taken it no w . I don't knov/.

B: Of cour set you c a n ' t credit it a U t o the NACA, by any rneans. It's the e x c e U e nce of the Ar.neric a n m a nufa cturing indu stry.

H: No, bu t ~ t v,Iould h av~ been diffi cult if that industry had had to look to Fal'nr-orough or to France for thi s s u pport.

B: Sure . I won1t quarl' e l with that.

H: I don 't \'·;-011,t (;0 clairn that we get all the credit. No.

B: My fear i s th a t 1'( add s up to so nlUch of the NACA effort being d e voted or £0 eli se d on ae r o dyna nlic pro bl e nls, and relatively spe aking so little on sorne oth~ t: problern s w hich a l s o are critic:a.ily hnportant.

H: I can give you Z\ go od C':x;:rnplc o f t h a t. We were very late to rea1.ize the conli.n. g i ll"),p(wta n ce o f .J e t p ro pul s ion.

B: We>, \v e l'e j'.l s t a31 f,~e p at the switch.

H : H lx a13 cr irn inaL

B:We ll, 1 think Lt;,d: on ,:~ o{ t h e w art s tha t I'll i ind ill the NACA st:c..r~r

i s the f a ct nnt onc e tll<:: Y 3!;a -t e d wo rkin g on a prot,lern, they never gave up workin g o n it a,nc: J C,'.o. tj ck 'JJ!. , .

H: That' s a pro bl e rn with any dedicated re se a rch wo rker.

B: Of course it is, but you n ee d sorneboc1y to say " All right. I,Ve've got it to eight decim.al poin t s or eight pl a ces rJe yond the de::imal point. It i sn ' t paying off any m.ore. II

H: A corollary problem IS to get hi rn to stop e x pe:t'irnen.ting long enough to write a report so s omeone can use the r e sults he already has.

B: That's true too. Look at the Root s blLY\ll c :t, for exarnple. I can read you chapter and ver s e of te s~ s that sho \;..'ed that the Roots blower b egan to falloff vis-a-vis the GE Sanfor(,~ Moss turbo blower after, say. 25, 000 feet. It dropp e d o f f markedly.

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MY'. Hood Pa.ge 9

H: Yes , Y014'll find Oscar Shea ' s nCl.J.lle on sorne of tho 8e .

B : But, they continued to work on the Root's 1,lov.lc1:", r i ght up to the b eginning of WO o Id War II.

H: I b eli0.ve even. a.fter, was that Lt. Chal.npioT.i set an altitude record with the G E turbo. .

B: Well, Soucek set o ne with a Root's blov.,rer.

H: Maybe it W 2.S Soucek I was thinking of. No. later one. Ch am.pion .. . I forget. P...nyway there the GE turbo ~ll.perchaj:ger.

I ' rn thinking oJ the was 2. :recor d. set with

B: But, i n the '30 1 s I think it was, at leas t with all o f tbe vision o f hindsight it was pretty clec:..r th at the Root ' s blower 'Na s st rictly perforrn:mce limited no rnatteJ~ how nLUch work you diel with i J,~. Simila.rly, look at an of th.e \vork that w ent into the Diesel engine •

H: Yes.

B: On and on and on and on and ON,

H: Yes. That's right.. PH agree to that. I think ·we w e re s low in d.E>'-'eloping a group th<l.l couJ.d do re al sophi s tica .. ~e d instrument worl'C, to o . We depended on the simple. little in s trum.ents like. I wo rked on i1 . xny J::'rst year do ·wu there. Tb.8Y served up to a poirJt~ but I think we \~· · ere s].o··,lJ in getting to the real l<:.incl, but .finally WhCL, wdl b.-tel" I think it was only when VJe got in N.f>SA that we got real fine in s tnu;:lcnt g rou ps.

B: ""Ye ll, were b'.ldgct EJnited. as far as electronic ip.strumeni.:aticxl was cor.tce rr:e d .

. H~ 01.1, yel3. 1 d(Ul't bc-!lieve therl':: vIas a vacuum. tube :l . th Lc\l1f!,},ey l"ield. l abox'atory when I Ji I':.; l; went there ..

B: ·Well, I rern·,,~:mhe!" listening to D rycle n b'Y to j·atio nali:.:-;c J.t. and defe :o.d the position that deliberately we were calling ou r shots with a :cHIe , but the ia.ct was that "'.Ie haa. fewer and fe we r rifle ·!:;uUets to t'f:toot, bec ause of the dollar lilYJitation, and th e whole . r-! peci:rurn u; ,;.crDn2x.ticzu res ear ch going into miF.lsiles al1.d then go ing on ~:ctc ~pac:e C' onsjdeI'ations; was just exploding arld that is one of the tragic ::t~}pects .

H: Ye s. We fir st shot ro cleets just to do aerodynaInic research at tran.sonic speeds.

B: That's right.

H: Course, I suppose one of my questions would be whether our Charter would have perm.itted in regard to space research, but actually we were doing some two-thirds of our work witl-l space resear ch before we becam.e NASA.

Mr. Hood Page 10

B : Wellll .. ..

H: But, it was reaDy j ust introductory sp2..ce research.

B : I r ernember tl:.e v.:eeke nd following Sputnik and there was an Inspection out at Lewi s , Ll.nd I went out the:::e with o ne or two o t h e rs and we to re the t alks apar t andw::; to re the booklet apar t and over the weekend w e r ewrote the bo ,) klet and rew rote the talks and y ourd b e surprised how all of a sudden r' space was the thi ng." (Silverstein was also m.uch i nvQlved. i n thi s exerci se. WTB 1. 0/ 25 /74 . )

H: Oh, I'nl not surpri sed;

13: On the other h2.nd _. - I just got a.hold o f i t t e n days ago - _. a copy of a l ette r th a t John V i c1;or7 h2.d written in re s po use to a query t h at h ad COD1.e t o a conglessrnar: a'Jout why wa.s the NACA Eipending m.oney o n interpl a.netary t rave l --- all. of this r.onsense. John beat his breast and s a id, 011., we don't thi Ilit:: v e::y m .uch of space and we rr e not doing any wo rk, and tha t w as l ess than six: Tnonths r ior to Sputnik.

H: I r en'1 2 rnb er o ne tirne - - I didn ' t hear Dry de n say thi s - - but I was t o l d t hat h e h3.cl said in some m eeting we were h a.vi n g. that w e should not speculal:e on putting rnar.:. o n the 10100n 3.t that time . . ,:l m.ean we shouldn 't do it public:ly . We w ere do;.ng it p rivate l l{'~ All r ight, b ut w e weren ' t to do it publicly. 01 cony s e there was thi s conte st as to wh.J w as to get the space r:!xpl orabon reBponsibility which I'm. s u re you ' ll cover and i n which y ou ' ll k now rna re than 1 do .

B: Yes, but t h <1 t qu(~ sH.on really ui.dn ' t get cl.~~ k e d u.ntil afte r Sputnik.

H: That r s r i ght. . But, then i~ ","as a !.!ked pretty fast and furiously.

B: Yes .

H: We 've l e ft a lot of tim.e '1'1 bet-wce n.

B: Ye s . '{o u 'vegot to go back: to y'onr story. After you h ad worked. on the design of the 8 -foot tunn el, did you get into the running of i t?

H : Yes, Rt!sS H objnson was section head and. I was his as s i.'Jtant, and t h e n h e transferred to 'Washington a.rd abo ut thc'-t tirne we were seeking fund s and authority to build a n additio nal research center, b ecaus e Dr. Lew~ s was wise eno u gh to see the \Var clouds corning and see that we n eeded it. Either Dr. L e""is or somebody .

B: It was General Westover. .

H: But, anyway, all together they needed it, so I was switche d off to go to work on the d esi g.n and planning of faciliti e s for the new .?...rnes Aeronautic al L abor atory . That nan'1.e, of cou rse, carne l a ter. In the m .eantime I was doio ;S things in the 8-£oot tunnel like' study i ng the effects

Mr. Hood Page 1 J.

of w in g roughness, expo se d riveth eads , and so on. on dr ag , and I showed thern how much extl" a horsepower and gasoline it u.sed to Hy ac ross t he. co untry, so the y soon started making them Hush and started making thern amooth. Of course fh. at subj ect b ec am.e more irnportant w h e n t hey l ate r got into the low-· dra.g wings, which are generally credited to Eastrnan .r aco be: .

B: Yes, the so-called larrlinar flow w ings.

H: Yes and we were j 8t getting into that when I was pulled off to work on the f a cilitie s for thi s Ames Aeronauti c al L abo ratory. Then 1 carne \-vest with abCJllt 30 peapl e from LCLTlgley to ronn a nucleus at this new C e nter. We Vv'ere designing everythi ng. Harvey Alle n us e d to anSwer the t e l e phone and he: d say II The o retical AerodyncL!nics and Heiniorced C O.l1crE;)~e. Se c tion ll a.nd thaP s what he was doin g . T h at showed wha t he was doing and we desi gned re infor c ed c onc re te structural steel. I de signed p art of th ::: loop of the full- scal e tunnel, structural design and the who le thing. A.s I said, in those days we didn ' t k no w that "'vve weren 't experts in all the.3e field s so we went on and did them. Then fo r a short time I was s ection he ad of the 7 by 10 fo ot w i nd tuane ls for ju st a fevJ nlOnths. Then Harry Gocti: took over that position a nd did it much b etter that' I had,. and I beca.Ine se ction h ead of the 16 -foot w ind tunnel which h a d 2.bout the S 2.rn e speed lim.its, that is up t o . 85 lvfach r.urn b e:::·, some­thing hke t h at i n the 8-·£00t t unnel a.t Langley. I h ad that responsibility (itl :d.n t5 the c ritical wa:r- Yf:ars w hen we were so bll.dy t ryi ng to irnpro "lle the a i r craft breed.

B: W e ll, then 2.-iter rhe War what did you get into ?

} ': Oh, I can ' t l' ,::fi.1emher d ates , 1)1..1t I hecarne Don Wood i s ass i stant. He was div-L8i.O rl chi. . f and I becarrle his ass i s t ant, a nrll ill {Jppak candidly here. You'll ha.v·~ t o t l 'C ;1.t this deli c at e ly. But , Do n 'w as fa.i ling and rny POgi.i"\.'JiW~(''), 'tf;!.'I"'Y d i ffi i:qU ·lie c;:2.\lse he 'was a.gin.g very p r e lnaturely a.nd it gr'l ,J) hI) w(, ,·!.l d W:. l"n a lef"p jn an i.xnpol'tant conferen.ce and p r oble;I!lS like th ::-.t and he l ,11 r~t: l.lon'H~ u q;ent paper li e in h i s d esk for 8 e Ve ]~ al weeks. W e U, 1 h a.d som.e d.i.fJic1J.l!: times to try to get t hose p apers out of h is ci E;:sk lH.:!cau se he l .] ge t t n. C.Uj(~ Llt .:tl o ut. it sornetlrnes . It was a v"'.~ ry trying thnc for nl.e anel for other 8. Of COUl'se, l ooking b ack, he should h ave be en rernoved delicately a.nd politely sooner - - cornpas sionately, b e cause it wa.s s om.e t.hing he couldn't help. It was a physiologi c al , p sychologi c a l proble m. Then a little l ate r I b ecam.e technical assistant to the Director. Y was a ge~nerdis1:; I wc"!.s givzn jobs that d idn ' t fit into the line o rganization. That's t he b est way 1 can express i t and responsibility fo r a lot of odd job s fo r t h e di:::- edol", of writing for him and this and that . There was 3, great miscellany of jobs. Of course, the biggest~~ was when I was i n t he wind tunnels getting my hands dirty, so to s peak .

B: Of COU1' se, administrative work is never as Inuch fun as doing it your s e lf.

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MJ.' . HUGci

H: One re sE'Cll'cb jc,t, it wa .~ .t110:;:'C! of a deve lopment. job, I remembe r-clearly and it was publicized 0.. 10:: , \vas when one day - - w h o wa;, chief enginee r of North J';"rn.e rica.n at th·,:: time ? Hi s narne slips m e. Atwood was Pre sident .

B : Ri ce ?

H : Rice , I b e li eve. c a11ed Smitty o n the phOl.1e and sa.id the y were i n t rouble , Theyb.adthis P - 5 1 airplane .•.

B : Yes, I know that story pretty well. Smi.tty told it again thi s after-noon.

H : We ll , o u r facilities here E:n a bled. us to solve the:5.r probl em in a few d ays , and -,vi t h i n a c. ouP!, F' of weeks after th;:;.t caJl we h a d teste d t he thing in t h e tunne l and had an answer. In fli ght i-: vvoul d h ave tak en much, much l onger unless they we ... e j ust very lucl{y, ~c caU.se we COLL1.d make rnodific ati.ons that y/eren1t safe to fly or weren1t st:i:ucturall y s2.fe~ o r car e fully de s i gne d t o fly, and te sf: t h ern out i n an bouT 0 r two , a n d c ha nge the.m again. That airp l a ne is still one of Iny favorites .

B: O h, it \h·as a s pl endid airplane.

I-I: It was , as YO ll 1010v! , one of the first to t ak e ad\"3ntage of the low ·· drag , l am.i nar flow wings.

II: Well, t hat ph:r2,se wa :.-J a.void e d officially by ·NAC .. A t oo.

:8: ' VeIl, i t was and it W;. :Ji). IL

H: ll'now , II: wal:> a rn jxe d bag. But o ur ip'~3t:)~\'H.:t io ;'Hl were to call it 0 ••

B : But Le\!iri;3 and ·\/i.::te:.·y both we ]~e go ing axon.eel lib.~ rnad teJ.lir/ g about thi s tr e m.endous i.llVen tion.

I-I: YeB. But f hey v,e r e telling us to call it low - d r ag wi n g .

B: Wh i ch it was .

H: Yes. Nort h An.1.E:ricall, of course, righl.ly , 'v-/ent f a irl y con servatively i n th at direction and it w orked. And as you prob a bly have in y our records t he Germans n ever d i d unde r s t a nd duri ng the "\Var -<vhy th r.;. t airplane could h ave th e performan ce and ran ge th a t it had. 1 think t h ey co uldn! t because th.e i r wincl tunnel in which they tried to check iL 0Ut had hi gh turbulence. I mean y ou got that l o w drag w h i ch would show .. ' .

B: Smitt y sai cl they used the full - scale tunnel a t Chalais Ivfe udon outside o f Pari s .

Iv1r. Food Page 13

H: I can l t say whic1-1 w'nd tunnel they used, but I d o rec all that they wer e IYlystifiecl. and they' cou.ld n' t ~xplain how that airpl ane could fly non- sto p at t hat speed ;':(01.1:1 Vvr i.ght Field clear. over t here, a nd ho w it c o uld escort 01]r B- J. 7 1 S 011 their full peneh'ation into Germ any and back again, and still h ave that perforrrlance.

B: Well, it :vas, sple .ndid aj.rplGl.ne, there I s no qu.e stioD a'0out it.

H: Well, itl s that ki li.d of thi ng we ta.ke SOlne pleasure i n, in retro-spect.

}3: 'Well , I thi.:!.k you h ave every right to. Vlhat about the post War: y ears ? Vlh at we T E; )/:::1\ doing in th at decade ?

H: \Vell, I was Tec!:l.nical Assistant to the Dire ctor during most of t hat peri:::.d and a s T. say. that was ju st 'a miscellany of this and that. I haven!t any speciHc acc,:nnt)lishments because it was just a l o t of gene r al d e tail.

B: Do you hav'c any feel for how lunes go t so far out in the field of hyper.so nic r esc3.. :;: ch, " the work tbat H arvey All en a.nd Eggers a nd .•.

H ; r wou.ld P'.Jt Hanrey jlJlen number one and I h ope you w ill get his s tory.

H: He l s an ul'.usually b)~ o a.c1 type of ~e :r.son and a very u n u sual tYP E! of p erso n " 50 J would crec.it bin1 aml the fact that Sn:litty supported h irn and, well I s uppcse, an') ther reason i s that we had n10re e lectri.c power avaiL:l.b l e he r e at b ette r rdi:t~ S than t.h e Langl ey L a boratory so ... 'Nell, yO] C2,n cr edi t the N a v'Y tOG . I canlt rerneruber the nalne of the officer,)~ but you pror·"tl:J 'l havc~ ('he f:,t(Jry of th e Navy·1 s fUIlding of our s i x fooi: f:n.1p e :r'r.wnic viln rl I.Un.iel.

B: Yes. I do,

H: 1 ho pe you win h ave that. I think it wa.G i nteresting.. Dr. ,Lewi s had. in st ructed lUJ not to divert our attention {rorn the mo re in1.mediate pa yoff of t he War eifore to tl~,e desibn of a s upersonic w ind tunnel which would taLe (1 cf)uple of yeaj~ s to be t_seful. But, we none th3 l ess h a d n1d.de S')E1e rr e bm.inary dra."\'vings and estiluates and when this admiral, ,-",hose name I forge t, c a rne into Dr . Lewis ' offi ce and said. what are you cloing aboLlt supe r sor:.ic s, D r .. Le\vi s reached do wn i n his de sk dr awer and pull e d out our dr awing to prove we were doing something. As it developed, t he Na'vry fin anced t he construction of this wind tunnel because they fore­saw the J.1.eed for it, but you can get that story rnore completely and more a.ccurately.

>:< Radford

lA1". Eo a d Page 14

B: Ye s.

H: I remem.ber on e question about its desi g n. We could get Reynolds nur.-:,.b er, that is sCe' .. l e , by e:ther bi g size of hi gher pressure , and I don't kno w wheth e r it was Srnitty or I-Iarvey Allen who fil'st s aid, "Well, make it big eno ugh to stand u p in and the n get eno u gh pre ssure to get the Reynolds nUlnber 'lOt). n e e d. I ! That ' s the kind of philosophy th a t H arvey P..ll e n oi1: f'.n Gs cd. M a ke it big enough to stand up in. That is a very pr actical philosoph y .

B: vr ell, now continuing into t he t 5 0 1 S a little more. What would yon consider t o h d.ve been t h e outstandi n g ~6wne s Laboratory cont ribution i n that pe rio d '?

H: W eH, that l s p r e tty cliHicult , Walter. The s p e ciali s ts in different fi e lds wo uld e ach pick a d iffe!"cnt i tem ·in his own field.

B: Well, this i s v,.' }) el'c a ge n e r alist, if you i ns ist on that characterization of yourse lf, I think, is pe r hap s be s t e quipped to give an answer to that question b e cause you do h av e a m ore obj e ctive view of the who l e ..•

H: Well, one of. -;;h e bi. g de ve lo prne nt s whi ch starte d rrn .... ch earliel" co.nd st ar. t e d at L a r gl e y ~",' ?.s R. T. Jones, a n d wa s car r ied on here botb before a lLd afte r R" T . J OJ I C S WClS tran sfe r re d. to A rrl es a nel that i s the u se of l ar ge BWf,,:c::> pback f O T effi ci enc y at tr a n ::>onic a acl sli ghtly s u personic speeds .

. H: The r e ag a in a nd h e r e Il rn de liberat e l y b.:; ing the de\rE ' s advoc a te ,

,bl.1t there agz-tin th e NASA Vi a s consi de r a bly ly~hi nd the Germ.a.ns .

B ' No . I don1t; b (! )j ,~,{(·: th a t ' s t r u e , Walte r. A rnan na.m.ecl Betz ill G e rn1.an:y c :qHoes sed the iriea but he di d not, " . at l e ast it appeare d f r oni h i t! w r it-l n g s -- ti l;:!.\; h e dL~ no t a p preci a te t h e fun potentiaJ. of large s we ep­b ack . H·~, P lJ I.' ("c i. <\ l f.~d t

'.\; ·:, l1e c o u l d in eiie ct r -·duce the Ivf a c:h nu rnb e :t

aciiflg OV e\' a ,-".-i o g ; .. ocL"n, u u t I UO H't b elie<Te l-h: a ppreciated th a t h e could ke e p it Ga b soni.c u p i-o Ivl ac:h # 1. li Z 0 1" s o and I think , aga.in, Harvey .!..lJ.en 01" H . T . .lO de!, or B ()J'tl P. o f t h o se " .

B: Well! I e x pect t o talk to bo t h o f them. 1111 ask the m .

H: R. T. 'No nlt selfishly claim more cr e dit than is clue . He is very mode s t.

B: I know that. Jo ne s i ndepende ntly worke d out t he sweepb ack.

H: I think he 3.ppr e ci a ted the thing morc fli.Uy than Betz ' writings indicated.

B: Thi s is sorncthi.n.g I.need to ge t ...

H: That you ld ~p etter get from him in det a il, yes. And, of course. immediately Langle y 3.nd Arne s we nt to wo rk on experime n t ing with it,

Mr .. Bo o d

a.nd ag c..in North .Am eri can c arn e through fir st with th (;:~ fir st fighter usi.ng sw e ep.. I remem.ber 1 was at a confe renc e a ' 'Wright Field a na Harrison Storms of North j'.l mi:.!r ~. can \,va s t h e re and he said, ;1\Ve lve go t this fighter all de s i gned for compe titio 11 "\vith a strai ght wing and we I re thinking about scrapping it and putti~~ g in a sw e pt w i ng. What do you tb.ink? " INe had quHe rt long discus s ion about it. Then, of course, one of the bi g users was Boeing when they first c a rne back with a sweptback bomber.

B: Ye s, but they got theil-I s from Gerrnany. No question about that.

H:Why do you. say tha.t?

B: Because I c;'j,n docu.rne nt it. 'Wha t's his name, the chief engineer of Boeing vIas over r:;~a s in t.he summer and early Filll of 1945 and saw the G e rm a n research work on s w e epback and just jurnped on the idea and ran with it.

H: Tha t lnay h<J.ve sparke d his determination, but they,. I think, went. way out ahead. of anyone e ls e then. It w a s not only in the u se of sweep­back, ~)U.t that ai r pJ ane w a s way more fl exible than anyone h a d dared build b e fore, The structure c onseque nt l y w a s lighte r and they were able to do t b s becau sl~ t ll :." Y had a n appropri ate wind tunnel and. they b u ilt flexibl e n'1odels ir, w hich the fl exibility and. we i ght di slributions w e re all scaled, a nd watchin g rnovic s o f tho s e t e st E: were p.nough to frighten anyone aw a y fran .. tbern vv')le n they were building s 11ch a.n airplane, but they went on a nd built it a nd i1' W I.) eke d , The y de s e rve gre at c.)~ edit £0 r that. They had p; l.'e at courage . George S ch2.::' r er was. . . .

B: That ! s tllf: narne I ''';;:::I.S try 1.n g to r C lne n1.b p. T. He was over seas. Thi:~ is docurnented i n Boeing a c counts a !Lel in Ai..l' Force accounts, b , .. ca.us c h e w :a.s c)"-lcr Y '~1E~ re unde ' the Ail' For c e.

H : J :Hd n't; ]"0 ;"U :te t h a t hi ~; e n t.husi asn. c a n le from. the re, but the work 0.11 the Go ncep'c 'J;! ':',I-j 'd .11 derwa.y c':'HI.sidc r 2_bly b e for e th 21:.

B : Ob , a p; :;}.i.tl, 1 ~~{: J:nc r l ! lh,~at. JoneD deserved a n enormous atnount of cc'e~~ it for h <.J. '\!ing (l~'lle it a n.d h e didn't crib it from anybody'. He did it on h1.s own. The .'lad p ar t \vas .• though, th a t whc.n he did it 011 his own, he did it s ev.:~ ral yc ~iJ.-S a.ftc r the G e :rn1.ans had done it on their own and you look at the designs th a t were on the bo a rd s at the encl, V -E Day, and they wer.e all sweptw ing in G erm a ny.

H: Russ Robin soD. can J,r-d .[. you on th a t.

B: Yes. I've got a copy of a paper tha t he gave in the United States following his return. I 've worked hard on that one. Let m.e ask you

H: There were sorne o t her good examples .. I think one example which I believe was starte d a t NACA, w as Dean Cha.pman ' s analysis of Tektites and their origin. You m .ight b e st get that from him. I think he ' s . still around hc::re. But, 11m not 3ur e of the date s . I think rnaybe

Mr. B.ood Page 16

the biggest practical contribution to space operations, including 113M3, ICBMs, and our own pcaceiu] space flights was Ha.rvey AlIens enunci2.tion of th E. principal that to enter the atmosphere at h igh speed, the hody sh()t~ld.

b e blunt.

B: Yes.

H: I think that was a milestone and one of the most im.portant things that came out of here. That l s a typical Harvey Allen type of contdbution.

B~ Prn going to ask you a SOl·t of an aside question, Wl.H!i1. I first carne out here to visit the Am.es Laboratory and thi s wa3 i n the Vlinter of 1949, :c '.va.s struck by tl"le elegance of the curtains in the auditoriurn and in. the c2.feter~. a and possibly othe,~ places. As 1 rernem.oer ,. I was told that th ey were a stylistic. representation cf the Von Karrnan vortex streets.

H: 1 canVt tell you the exact history of tho See I do know that John Victory to ok personal pride in having SOTTle control over the appearance -- i.nternal appearance and external -- of our annex -- of Ollr admi.nistration building .- - and '.veIl the auditorium. really beca.me part of that attached to ii:, th at sl?iril. carried over i nto there.

B : Well, the c)luckle was.

H: He was going to fire Srnitty onc e beCaL1.Se Sm.itty had son'l.e wall.Ei pi3int,~ d a differ ent c.)lc;r fron:.t what John Victory -- or SOL"le color John Victory hadn't Sec'} and 2pproved.

13: I was pledged to se cr e cy not to say anything to John Victo ry about 1:he~,e curt ai.fi.S being 3. stylif:'tic representation of the Von Karrnan. v o !'tex streets .

H: The origin )f tho se (;urtain.~ I don ' t know.

J3: Beca.u Se "1lictory· 11ated allY me 11ti.O n. of VOll I(a.r.ma.nlJ

II: :He\,' <.lsn1t o. L,.nliiy man. He was outside of t}.tr! NAC.A fanlily .. Yes, I know .loh.n b.2.d that feeling, but we can1tbeliii:le Von Karn1.cm.

13: No, we canI1:Jt and I kno'.,,' that Dryden revered him., ~_nd ] think Dryden ' s technical as se s sment of Karm.an was n'1O re inclin·~d to be clo se to the mark.

H: J think Vie all had to, and. there are many of the later gl-eat lTlen who were students 0:£ Karman and who K2.rman in spir e d and taught. Kal-rnan was a shov,rrnan, of COllrse. 1£ he carne here f')T a conferen ce, he would arrive l a.te wi.th a retinue of four or five followers , wOl'shippers. and he would wear his black cape, and parade down the a i sle. There were always some seats in the front row save d fOJ: him and his retinue of admirers and follo v;ers .

Page 17

B: And h e WClS not ~1..bov .:! ITlaki ng co mrnents as t .e lecture went on.

H: That ' a right. 'I'hatl D r i gh t , but sti ll we cc;.n ' t deny his contr ibutbns .

B: Well, thel-e are so r:ne who will say that the NACA pra.ctice of the 12 0 ' sand ' 30' s, which work.ed b e autifully during tho se year s , of taking junior aeronautical e n ginee rs out o f school and training thern the NACA way to be NACA·.type researchers, was great £01' th at period, b ut in the post-·War year s wh en so many other dis c iplines were needed , when you needed Ph. D. ' s in thi 5 , that and the other.

H: I think that's a valid point, all right, Walter . In tho se ' 30! s the prohle rns were engineering problem.s and we we xe engineers. A ubr ey Harris is a Physicist, so he may take exception, hut he was rnore like an engin eer tha.n he 'Nas like an CJ.t ornic phys icisL, if I i1:1.ay say so.

B: Well, I li stened to Vanevar Bush chuckl e all the way through the story of how h e in one afternoon changed every NACA engineer into an NACA scientist becC'!.i..1 Se

H: V{hat did he do? Sign a document?

B: W e ll, h e said, II From now on, you I re all sci e n tists. 'I That's about what it a.moll .i1ted to, b e casue it was cl e ar. that on the Hill and else­where, scientists \V e re h e ld in high r gard and engi.neers were considered to b e a dim.e a do z e n.

H: L ate r on wb.en )\nl.es tool" over th e field of ::; pace biolo gy and me dicine , and it waf:! a \i~'hole new field for us i'! l1d .. )"Jf:. tooK on !1\'! W pE:ople, there was some sad .rnisiakes in the s e l ection a.t flx;~t, but one of these person s \.vho didn ' t stay lung said to n1. e onc e, lil,Vell, in our field , 2. rnan with a l',.1.a s t er l s d egl'ee if; a l a bor atory a::;s j tltanL II But, that i sn ' t a.lways tr.ue. vVe've b een ~1pe3ki1!g of Il. T. J ones ' contributions. H e doesn't have any degree.

B: 'Well, on the othe r h and , h e 's not enti :rely self·. tau.ght b e c a.us e he took all the courses a t . dtholic Uni~!ersjty that h e w as interested in taking.

H' Yes , but he Sele cte d h is own ..

B~ Yes, but today you 've got to hav e a union card, which i s another way of saying a Ph. D.

H: Well , I still arn. no t convinced that every res ~ arch man should have a Ph. D. In fact, are you going to talk to Glenn Goodwin'?

B: No.

H: He once t.old n"le that he'd rather have a lyfas terfs than a Ph. D. for \-vork in h i s section and Glenn was a valuaol e man h e re. He co ntributed a lot to atrr.o sphe:s,.e:. entry pre blems .. - v e ry im.po r t ant contributions that

, .. Mr. Hoo o P age 18

he and the !:Jt3.ff under hJ!;-, made. T' rn no t Slue hGW much of that carne b efore 1') 58; probably !;:<O f.-i t of it afte r f."lat.

B: I think it' s a .ftel· 'S 8 .

H: But, I think we need Cl. m.i xture . We ne e d Doth kinds.

B: Oh, you' r e Y:l ght. Well, Manley, I thank you very, very much fo r your gene ro8ity i n g iving me thi s tim.e and also for bringing Aubrey Harris with you,

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