1. BASIC INFORMATION

a. Basic project data

Project title: Markets and Agricultural Trade Improvement Project – I (MATIP-I)

Project code: P-UG-AAZ-001 Instrument number(s): ADF Loan No. 2100150019294

Project type: Investment Sector: Agriculture and Agro-Industry

Country: Uganda Environmental categorization (1-3) : 2

Processing Milestones Key Events Disbursement and Closing date

Date approved: 25 Mar 2009 Cancelled amount: N/A Original disbursement deadline: 31

Dec 2015

Date signed: 13 May 2009 Supplementary financing: N/A Original closing date: 30 Sept

2015

Date of entry into force : 5 Feb

2010

Restructuring: The original target of 21

markets was revised down to just 7 (33%

of planned output) at a mid-term review

(MTR). No corresponding change in

funding was made. MTR not available to

evaluation.

Revised disbursement deadline:

N/A

Date effective for 1st

disbursement: The date given in

the PAR is Sept 2009. The date

given in the PCR is 5 Feb 2010.

Extensions (specify dates): N/A Revised closing date: N/A

Date of actual 1st disbursement:

19 Mar 2010

b. Financing sources

Financing source/ instrument

(MUA)

Approved amount

(MUA) :

Disbursed amount

(MUA) :

Percentage disbursed

(%):

Loan: ADF loan No.

2100150019294

38.00 (PAR)

36.34 (PCR) 95.63%

Grant: N/A N/A N/A N/A

Government: 4.22 (PAR)

3.76 (PCR) 89.10%

Other (ex. Co-financiers): N/A N/A N/A

TOTAL : 42.22 (PAR)

40.10(PCR) 94.98%

Co-financiers and other external partners:

Execution and implementation agencies: Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), Uganda.

c. Responsible Bank staff

Position At approval At completion

Regional Director N/A Gabriel Negatu, EARC

Country Manager Mukaila Ojelade, UGFO Jeremiah Mutonga, UGFO

Sector Director Ali Abou-Sabaa Chiji Ojukwa OSAN1

Sector Manager Chiji Ojukwa OSAN1 Josephine Mwangi, OSAN1

Task Manager Justus Kabyemera, OSAN1 Mekonnen Loulseged, OSAN1

Alternate Task Manager Asaph Nuwagira, UGFO/OSAN1 Onyema Damian IHEDIOHA,

PCR EVALUATION NOTE FOR PUBLIC SECTOR OPERATIONS

OSAN1

PCR Team Leader Mekonnen Loulseged, OSAN1

PCR Team Members Mekonnen Loulseged, OSAN1

Asaph Nuwagira, UGFO/OSAN1

Meng Lihinag Jean-Marie,

OSAN1

d. Report data

PCR Date : 24 Jul 2015

PCR Mission Date: From: 15 Jun 2015 To: 30 Jun 2015

PCREN-R Date: 21 August 2018

Evaluator/consultant : Arthur Neiland, IDDRA Peer Reviewer/Task Manager: un-named

2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION Summary from Appraisal Report including addendum/corrigendum or loan agreement, and taking into account any modification that

occurred during the implementation phase.

The Markets and Agricultural Trade Improvement Project – I (MATIP-I) was to be implemented in 21 markets in 19

Municipal/Town Councils in the four regions of Uganda, namely the Municipal Councils (14) of: Jinja, Entebbe, Masaka,

Mbarara, Kabale, Fort Portal, Arua, Lira, Gulu, Moroto, Soroti, Mbale, Tororo, and Kampala (3 markets); and the Town

Councils (5) of: Hoima, Kasese, Busia, Kitgum and Lugazi. At MTR, implementation was reduced by 66% to just 7 markets.

The three components of the project were: i) Market Infrastructure Development, ii) Market Management and Trade

Enhancement (including Capacity Building); and iii) Project Management and Coordination.

The project was approved on 25 March 2009. It was to be implemented over five years (2009-2014) and was estimated to

cost UA 42.22 million. The Bank’s share was UA 38 million (90%) and that of GoU UA 4.22 million (10%). The evaluation has

seen no evidence that that budget was reduced at MTR by 66% in line with the reduction in the number of markets to be

constructed.

a. Rationale and expected impacts: Provide a brief and precise description on the project/programme rationale (concerns/questions raised), expected impacts and the

intended beneficiaries (directly or indirectly impacted by the project/programme). Highlight any change that occurred during the

execution phase.

Rationale: Market places (retail/wholesale) are a key part of the value-added chain in the agricultural sector. A Feasibility

Study characterised the existing market places in Uganda as dilapidated, under-capacity and badly managed. Given the

bank’s experience from its past portfolio of agricultural infrastructure projects in Uganda, it saw a good development

opportunity in the reconstruction of Uganda’s physical agricultural market places (please see Needs Assessment in the

Project Summary of the PAR). This was to increase the amount of agricultural (and other) products marketed and lead to a

rise in average household incomes, which in turn would contribute to the overall project Goal of poverty reduction and

economic growth in Uganda (Please see RLF, Hierarchy of Objectives, Goal).

Intended Impacts: The intended impacts of the project (listed in the RLF as Impacts under the column heading Expected

Results and Theme) were:

1.1 Increased marketing of agricultural produce (and general merchandise), and

1.2 Increased average household income.

Intended Beneficiaries: The intended beneficiaries of the project {listed - but not actually referred to as ‘beneficiaries’ - in

the RLF under the heading of Reach (Target Population)} were: ‘Urban and rural communities as a whole’.

It was estimated that over 900,000 households within the catchment of the markets would ‘benefit directly or indirectly’ from the project. It was estimated that 150,000 to 200,000 of these household were headed by women (and presumably a

much larger number of them included women – and girls).

Evaluator’s Comment: All of these figures needed to be radically revised downwards (by 66%) with the re-orientation of the

project after the Mid-Term Review. It is unclear to the evaluation that they were. The revised figures for the intended

beneficiaries would be: 300,000 households – 50,000 of which were headed by women.

However, it is analytically doubtful and probably naïve to believe that ‘whole’ (and both) urban and rural communities, can

be beneficiaries, as individual groups within these communities have contradictory goals e.g. producers want high prices

and traders want to pay them low prices. Traders then want to charge high prices whereas consumers want low prices.

Traders want low costs (and high profits) whereas consumers want high quality (and low prices).

b. Objectives/Expected Outcomes: Provide a clear and concise description of the project objectives, expected outcomes, and intended beneficiaries. In so doing, highlight

any revision/amendment.

Project objectives: The RLF, under the heading Project Purpose, states: ‘Improve market place economic and social

infrastructure for about 900,000 households in 19 districts’. The quantification would need to have been reduced at MTR by

66% to 300,000 households in 7 municipal/town councils.

Expected outcomes: The RLF, under the heading Project Outcomes, states:

1. Improved marketing opportunities for farmers and vendors

2. Improved marketing conditions

3. Post harvest losses reduced and quality and prices increased

4. Increase in income of both urban and rural communities participating in (the) project, especially women.

Intended beneficiaries: The RLF, under the column heading Reach (Target Population) lists the following groups as the

‘beneficiaries’ (though they are not named as such) of the above Project Outcomes:

1. Urban and rural communities in the project areas

2. Women(‘s) groups in (the) project area(s)

3. Neighbouring countries

Evaluator’s Comment:

Beneficiary 1. The RLF and PAR are unclear about which ‘communities’ they actually mean and also about the mechanism

through which the project will deliver benefits to them.

Beneficiary 2. See (1.) above.

Beneficiary 3. As the overall Goal of the project was ‘poverty reduction and economic growth in Uganda’ (Please see RLF,

Hierarchy of Objectives, Goal), it is unclear why ‘Neighbouring countries’ are identified as intended beneficiaries (although

welcome from a pan-African perspective).

c. Outputs and intended beneficiaries: Provide a clear and concise description of the expected outputs and intended beneficiaries. In so doing, highlight any

revision/amendment.

Expected (Intended) outputs: The RLF under the column heading Expected Results and Theme, lists 6 Project Outputs

under the three Components. They are:

Component 1: Market Infrastructure Development. Outputs:

1. Markets reconstructed and maintained.

Component 2: Market Improvement and Trade Enhancement. Outputs:

1. Improved income to vendors and Councils

2. Market Information systems established and information management improved and in use at Municipal/Town

Councils

3. Increased access to market information and new skills, especially for women groups but also for all vendors and

market service providers

Component 3: Project Management and Coordination: Outputs:

1. Timely and problem-free implementation

2. Maintain operations within budget

The intended output of the project was 21 new markets to be constructed in 19 municipalities/districts together with 21

sets of service infrastructure. This figure was revised down to 7 markets in the mid-term review (MTR). The MTR was not

made available to the evaluation. This is regrettable as it contained a revised RLF for the project and a justification of the

66% down-scaling of intended project outputs. The evaluator notes that the project budget remained unaltered, implying a

300% increase in the project funds available for each market.

Intended beneficiaries: The RLF under the column heading Reach (Target Population) identifies the following intended

beneficiaries (although they are not named as such). Again they are listed by Component:

Component 1: Market Infrastructure Development. Intended beneficiaries:

1. 22,000 vendors in 19 Municipalities/districts

2. Staff/communities of 19 Municipalities/districts

Evaluator’s Comment:

Beneficiary 1. This would have to be reduced 66% to 7260 traders (‘vendors’) and 7 Municipalities/Districts/Towns after

MTR. The PAR, under the heading Project Overview in the Project Summary, states: ‘2. The primary beneficiaries of the

project will be the 16,600 vendors…’ Furthermore, the evaluation has seen no evidence to justify why this particular cohort

of the population has been singled out to benefit from the project, when - in the evaluators experience - traders generally

have higher incomes than the producers and consumers between whom they intermediate. The evaluation therefore seeks

more evidence to justify the rationale of the project.

Beneficiary 2. See above. Also, it is unclear to the evaluation to whom ‘communities’ refers, especially as in regard to

markets, different groups have contradictory goals, so that a benefit accruing to one group through the project may be a

loss to another group. As such, the project could have no net beneficial outcomes but have distributional consequences

instead.

Component 2: Market Improvement and Trade Enhancement. Intended beneficiaries:

1. Market vendors/users

2. Municipal/Town Councils

Evaluator Comment: Use of the term ‘markets vendors’ is analytically inaccurate. The evaluation recommends that this

group should be called and characterised as ‘traders’, not vendors: ‘Vendors’ sell, ‘Traders’ buy and sell. Also, ‘market users’ is an imprecise term. The evaluation recommends the use of the term ‘consumer’ instead, and for it to be disaggregated to

‘retail consumers’ and ‘wholesale consumers’. The evaluation notes that producers are not explicitly sited here as intended

beneficiaries.

Component 3: Project Management and Coordination: Intended beneficiaries:

1. Contractors, consultants and suppliers

2. MoLG and Municpal/Town Councils

3. Market users

d. Principal activities/Components: Provide a clear and concise description of the principal activities/components. In so doing, highlight any revision/amendment.

The principal activities - shown by component – are listed in the PAR RLF under the titles Activities and Target. Numbers in

parentheses are the reduced post-MTR numbers consistent with the building of 7 markets instead of 21 markets.

Component 1: Market Infrastructure Development. Activities:

1. Construct 21 (7) sets of economic market infrastructure: 3100 (1033) Lockups/kiosks, 8200 (2733) stalls, 590 (197)

meat/fish units, 90 (30) cold storage units, 7 (2.33) hectares of paved open pitches.

2. Construct 21 (7) sets of service infrastructure: Power supply to all 21 (7) markets; Water supply, sanitation,

drainage and fire equipment for all 21 (7) markets.

Component 2: Market Improvement and Trade Enhancement. Activities:

1. Management Information Systems (MIS) and Market Information: MIS established by PY2 {in all 21 (7) markets}.

2. Capacity building and development: 42 (14) training-of-trainers sessions, 216 (72) person sessions in Market

management training, 420 (140) person sessions in entrepreneurship training, 48 (16) environmental training

courses, 4280 (1427) person sessions of specialised training.

Component 3: Project Management and Coordination: Activities:

1. Submission of good quality and timely Quarterly Progress and Audit Reports:

3. PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

RELEVANCE

a. Relevance of the project development objective: Evaluation of the relevance ex-ante and ex-post (including during the implementation phase). The relevance of the project objective

(during the evaluation ex-ante and the post-evaluation) in terms of alignment with country’s development priorities and strategies, the

beneficiary needs (including any changes that may have occurred during the implementation), applicable Bank sector strategies, the Bank

country/ regional strategy, and general strategic priorities of the Bank.

The PCR score for relevance of the project development objective is 4, ‘Highly Satisfactory’. The PCREN score is

3, ‘Satisfactory’.

The project development objective was relevant to:

1. Uganda’s second Pillar of the third Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP – 2005/2008 and extended to 2009)

2. Pillar 7 of the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA)

3. the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS, 2005/06 to 2008/09),

4. Pillar 2 of the NEPAD’s Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP)

5. the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015

6. the AfDB’s Agriculture Sector Strategy

7. the AfDB’s Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Uganda (2011-2016)

This criterion equally assesses the extent to which the project’s development objective was clearly stated and focused on outcomes and the

realism of the intended outcomes in the project setting.

b. Relevance of project design (from approval to completion): The evaluator should provide an assessment of the relevance of the project design regardless of the one provided in the PCR. The evaluator

will also comment on the PCR conclusion for this section, and will provide an evaluation of the relevance of the project design. The latter

assesses the soundness and the timing of eventual adjustments, or technical solutions to ensure the achievement of the intended results

(outcomes and outputs), the adequacy of the risk assessment, environmental and social protection measures, as well as the implementation

arrangements.

The PCR score for Relevance of Project Design is 4, ‘Highly satisfactory’. The PCREN score is 2, Unsatisfactory’.

The fact that the scale of the project was reduced by two-thirds at MTR (although the budget wasn’t) indicates that the

project design lacked relevance to the project setting and development objective (or goal). The evaluation is critical of

many aspects of project design.

The evaluation is critical of the RLF listing ‘increased prices’ as an intended project outcome and ‘Better prices of farm

produce obtained’ as a performance indicator. Firstly, prices are set by the market. The bank or the project has no

legitimate role in determining prices. Secondly, if higher prices were project objectives, this would have a directly negative

impact on incomes and livelihoods of the urban communities who shop at the markets: their real income would be

reduced. This would be contradictory to the rationale of the project. A higher price may be a benefit to a vendor

(depending on the price elasticity of demand for the product), but it is always a loss to the buyer. For poorer consumers

who spend a disproportionately large percentage of their income on essential foodstuffs (a high inelasticity of demand),

higher food prices cause a very large reduction in real income and loss of welfare. Neither does the RLF consider the real

possibility that if higher prices do result from the project, traders will not pass these onto farmers in higher prices but

simply take higher profits themselves.

The evaluation is also critical of the RLF in listing a Project Outcome Objective of ‘Increase in income of both urban and

rural communities participating in the project, especially women’. Rural incomes may increase if the markets lead to

increased trade and prices of agricultural products supplied from rural areas. Urban incomes may increase for those

‘participating in the project’ i.e. market traders (‘vendors’), but not for those in non-project markets, which may decrease

as a result of the project. Also, if the project leads to a rise in prices of agricultural products on the domestic retail and

wholesale markets this will lead to reduced real incomes not increased incomes for consumers in urban and rural areas.

This would be contradictory to the rationale of the project. It is an illogicality in the Logical Framework.

The evaluation is critical that the RLF confuses the volume of agricultural trade with its value, ‘Volume of agricultural trade

(will be) increased US$300 per vendor p.a. in the project area’. Volume is a physical measure, usually weight, such as tons.

Value is a measure of worth in terms of other goods and services that can be bought and is usually expressed in money as

the numeraire, e.g. US$. Volume could increase but value not, or value could increase with diminished volume.

The evaluation is critical that the PCR states that the objective of MATIP I is ‘revenue maximisation and wealth creation

among the vendors and local governments’. This is a much narrower goal and a much more closely defined group of project

beneficiaries than envisaged in the RLF. The evaluation doesn’t deny that local councils need tax incomes in order to

provide services. However, it questions the contradiction in the RLF and project implementation, that, on the one side, a

project performance indicator in the RLF is ‘Increase in revenue generated by councils’ and on the other, the identification

of the risk that, ‘District Councils may not have adequate resources for periodic maintenance of the markets’. If the

additional revenues expected to accrue to the local councils from the project are not spent on maintaining the project

infrastructure or are insufficient to do so, then the project design is financially unsustainable and so lacks relevance.

The PCR maintains that ‘all stakeholders’ were involved in decision making and project implementation. It appears from the

PCR Mission report that the inclusivity of the design was much less than was necessary for successful project

implementation and to achieve project objectives.

From the PCR, the ‘Lessons learned’ relating to relevance of project design are as follows:

1. The PCR sites ‘Lack of adequate monitoring and evaluation’. The PCR states that ‘the project was to provide

capacity building at the Ministry and local levels which did not take place due to lack of resources’. The evaluation

questions how an infrastructure project which cuts its infrastructure output – but not its budget – by 66%, can

possibly have a lack of resources for service components of the project.

2. The PCR states: ‘Some markets where multi-story building, third floor and above are not being utilized to their full

capacity. The reason cited include slow business in upper floors, non-compatibility between the use of the facility

and the business area of the vendor, and lack of capital, etc. These floors are best suited for office use. However,

multi-story building was necessitated by lack of land to develop the markets to accommodate the original vendors.’ If it is true that multiple storey buildings were constructed as markets, the architectural design element of the

project was obviously not relevant to project objectives and needs. If market traders cannot afford to use the new

market facilities, then the design of the pricing structure of the markets and perhaps of their management

structures lacks relevance to project objectives. If the point about the lack of land is correct, then it seems

selection of the site was not relevant to project objectives and goals.

3. The PCR sites: ‘Termination of Lease agreement of the old markets.’ The fact that the transition of user rights from

the old markets to the new markets ran into considerable problems, shows a failure of relevance of the project

design. The issue of legal and customary rights and the smooth transfer of these between old and new markets,

was an issue critical to the success of the project. The PCR states that the project office was ‘transparent’ in its

handling of this issue to achieve fairness and ownership of the transfer process. However, it appears project

provisions for this were inadequate and that some intended project beneficiaries actually suffered as a result of

the project. The evaluation questions whether in the design phase, alternative models of implementation were

explored. For example, choosing new sites for the new markets which could then be built while the old markets

continued to function.

4. The PCR lists a number of design features for the infrastructure which were not relevant to the situation. The

evaluation questions why basic design features failed given the Bank’s declared expertise in similar infrastructure

projects in East Africa. Again, consideration of new markets on new sites with new infrastructure might have

avoided some of these problems.

EFFECTIVENESS

Evaluator’s Note: the Outcomes section d., and the Outputs section c., have been reversed in order here so that they

appear in the same order as on all other project documentation.

d. Effectiveness in delivering outcomes: Evaluation of the extent to which the project achieved its intended set of outcomes. The evaluator should make an assessment based on the

results of the last project Implementation Progress and Results (IPR). The evaluator shall indicate the degree to which project outcomes

(intended and unanticipated) as well as reasons for any eventual gap were discussed in the PCR.

The PCR score for effectiveness in delivering outcomes is 4, ‘Highly satisfactory’. The PCREN score is 2,

‘Unsatisfactory’.

1. The summary Narrative Assessment of the PCR makes many assertions that are not backed up by the evidence

presented.

2. The evaluation notes that there is discontinuity between the Project Outcome indicators in the RLF and those in

the PCR. (see below).

RLF 2009

Impact indicator - Average household income increased (by 30%)

Indicator 1. Increase of agricultural and other merchandise marketed

Indicator 2. Increase in revenue generated by Councils

Indicator 3. Increase in women representation on VA management committees

Indicator 4. Increase in new businesses at new markets

Indicator 5. Increase in agro-processing and value-addition businesses.

PCR 2015

Indicator 1. Household income of vendors increased by 15%

Inidcator 2. Increase of agricultural commodities marketed

Indicator 3. Increase in revenue generated by Councils

Indicator 4. Increase in women representation on VA management committees

Indicator 5. Increase employment levels in markets

Indicator 6. Increased income to vendors

PCR Outcome Indicator 1 – Household (HH) income of vendors

There is a methodological problem with the PCR form which makes reporting in the PCR misleading. The result column does

NOT show ‘Progress towards target’ as a direct result of the project. It shows the end of project value for the outcome

indicator as a percentage of the target value for the outcome indicator. Thus, for example,

208,000 / 230,000 = 0.9043 x 100 = 90.4%

Interpretation: The outcome value has achieved 90.4% of the target value.

However, this 90.4% includes 200,000 UGX household income that existed at the baseline year i.e. prior to the project. This

income cannot therefore be attributed to the effect of the project which is currently being evaluated. Thus, the correct

methodology to show the ‘progress towards target’ as a direct result of the project is as follows:

Evaluator’s note: This is the same methodology as used for Outcome Reporting in the IPR. The evaluator does not

understand why this correct methodology is then dropped for the PCR.

Thus,

[208,000 – 200,000] = 8,000 Interpretation: There has been an increase in the outcome indicator during (‘as a result of’) the project of 8,000 UGX, = 4%.

divide this by,

[230,000 – 200,000] = 30,000 UGX Interpretation: The project needs to achieve an increase in the Output Indicator of

30,000 UGX if the project is to reach the Outcome Indicator target.

x 100 = the ‘progress towards target’ as a direct result of the project expressed as a percentage.

Thus,

8,000 / 30,000 = 0.266 x 100 = 26.7% Interpretation: the project was 26.7% successful in moving from the baseline figure

towards the target figure for the Outcome Indicator.

Note that an important assumption here is that: all gains in the project indicator during the project period were attributable

to the project and not to other autonomous influences.

1. The PCR notes that Household Income for vendors varies depending on the market. It would have been interesting

to see the calculations above disaggregated by market, to see how (and think why) one market might perform

better on the Outcome Indicator than another. It also raises the question of what the income figures shown

actually represent: the average of the 7 markets? If so, the evaluation questions whether it has any meaning. The

evaluation also questions the ‘roundness’ of the figures and the methodology of their measurement and

calculation.

2. There is no discussion in the PCR whether the income figures are nominal or real i.e. whether they are discounted

for inflation during the project period. It is only real income that is of interest. The headline inflation rate over the

course of the project began at around 15% in 2009, reached a peak of around 25% in 2012, before declining to

around 5% in 2015.1 Nowhere did it become negative. The implication for the outcome indicator is that if the

figures are nominal, a 4% rise in income over the project life actually shows a substantial decrease in real income.

If this is the case, the debate might then be about what the decrease in real income might have been without the

project.

3. The evaluation notes that the target for household income given in the PCR is a 15% increase. This is only half of

the 30% increase target Impact indicator in the RLF.

PCR Outcome Indicator 2 – Increase of agricultural commodities marketed.

The figures presented are again unclear.

1. The PCR doesn’t explain what its percentage figures are a percentage of, therefore the figures are meaningless.

2. The stated ‘Progress towards target’ figure of 113.2% is wrong. It should be 138%.

3. By the IPR methodology (above), the true ‘progress towards target’ figure is 429%.

4. The performance indicator from the RLF Outcomes section, is income in US$ per vendor per annum. The baseline

was US$1500 and target US$1800. Unfortunately, the evaluator does not have access to any document which

shows the end of project figure and so cannot calculate the actual performance of the project with respect to this

Outcome Indicator. However, the evaluation doesn’t consider this a relevant indicator to measure the ‘increase of

agricultural commodities marketed’. The project should be clear if it wants a volume indicator e.g. tons, or a value

indicator, e.g. US$ or UDX.

5. Neither outcome indicator can be used to measure project performance.

6. The PCR quotes what are presumably revenue figures for the sale of meat and fish. If this level of data is available,

the evaluation wonders why it is not properly employed to measure project performance.

PCR Outcome Indicator 3 – Increase in revenue generated by councils

Again, the figures presented are unclear.

1. The PCR does not say whether the income figures are real (i.e. adjusted for inflation) or nominal. Without this

1 https://tradingeconomics.com/uganda/inflation-cpi, last accessed 10 August 2018, 07.30.

information, no conclusions can be drawn.

2. The IPR methodology (see Output indicator 1, above) yields the correct ‘progress towards target’ figure (‘as a

result of the project’) of 65%.

3. Figures disaggregated by market would have been more analytically interesting.

4. Figures presenting revenues as a percentage of O&M costs for the markets would have been more analytically

interesting.

PCR Outcome Indicator 4 - Increase in women representation on VA management committees

Again, the figures presented are unclear.

1. The IPR methodology (see Output indicator 1, above) yields the correct ‘progress towards target’ figure (‘as a

result of the project’) of 50%.

2. The figures are again very round, casting doubt on their validity.

3. Figures disaggregated by market would have been more analytically interesting.

PCR Outcome Indicator 5 – Increase in Employment levels in markets (N.B. RLF Output Indicator 4 – ‘Increases in new

Businesses in reconstructed markets’)

Again, the figures presented are unclear.

1. The units in the PCR are just identified as ‘Employment Levels’. It is not reported if this is workers, or vendors, or

businesses, nor at which site or sites. The baseline figure of 2000 is very ‘round’.

2. The IPR methodology (see Output indicator 1, above) yields the correct ‘progress towards target’ figure (‘as a

result of the project’) of 5%.

3. In the RLF, the baseline figure for ‘vendors’ was 16,600 (5,478 for a 7 market project) and the target was 21,100

(6,963 for a 7 market project). Neither the units nor the numbers in the PCR seem to bear any relation to those in

the RLF. The indicator is ‘% increase in businesses at the new markets’, the baseline figure is given as ‘vendors’ but

the target figure is referred to as ‘Employment levels’.

4. Both PCR and RLF mention a disaggregated proportion for women, but neither present disaggregated data for

women.

5. It is not possible to make any conclusion about the Outcome Indicator without further (valid) information.

PCR Outcome Indicator 6 – Increased income to vendors

Again, the figures presented are unclear.

1. The documentation is inconsistent about what the target figure is, a 15% increase (PCR 2015) or a 30% increase

(RLF 2009).

2. The ‘Baseline figure’ and ‘Most Recent figure’ are very round figures indeed, at US$ 1000 and US$ 2000

respectively, with the end figure being exactly 200% of the baseline figure. The evaluator finds this extraordinary.

3. The IPR methodology (see Output indicator 1, above) yields the correct ‘progress towards target’ figure (‘as a

result of the project’) of 667% for the 15% target and 333% for the 30% target. Such large figures suggest that

something is wrong with the data.

4. It is unclear why income is valued in US$ and not UGX.

5. No figures disaggregated by market are presented.

6. There is sufficient doubt about the figures to make any conclusion about project performance impossible or

meaningless.

RLF Outcome Indicator 5 – Increase in agro-processing and value addition businesses (N.B. there is no corresponding

Outcome Indicator in the PCR)

This Outcome indicator appears in the RLF but not in the PCR. The Baseline value is 200 and the target 500.

1. As no further figures are supplied, the evaluation can make no judgement about this Outcome Indicator.

2. The Outcome Indicator of value-added businesses at the markets appears to have been dropped between PAR and

PCR.

c. Effectiveness in delivering outputs:

The PCR score for effectiveness in delivering outputs is 3.5, ‘Highly satisfactory’. The PCREN score is 2,

‘Unsatisfactory’.

1. The summary Narrative Assessment of the PCR is largely invalid.

2. The PCR comments on the reduction in project targets from 21 to 7 markets, ‘This change in targets was

necessitated by the outcome of the design process that resulted in fewer markets being accommodated within the

available loan resources.’ If this is so, the evaluation questions how the project could proceed through the

feasibility, preparation, design and approval stages and yet get the scale of the project so completely wrong (300%

wrong).

3. The PCR reports no activity in the capacity building and development sub-component of the project, which it

attributes to ‘resource limitations’ as ‘resources were diverted to construction of the infrastructure’: this despite

the infrastructure budget per market being 300% of that originally planned.

Output 1 – Number of markets designed

1. The PCR reports that 21 out of 21 markets were designed. The evaluation queries why the project proceeded to

design 14 markets which would not be constructed in the current project and not wait so that lessons learned

from the first 7 markets could be incorporated into their design and the cost be correctly attributed to a future

project within which they would be constructed.

2. 7 of these markets were built in the current project. It is planned that 11 will be built in a follow-up project MATIP

II. No mention is made about the remaining 3 markets.

Output 2 – No. of markets constructed

1. The 7 market project was 100% successful. The original 21 market project was only 33% successful.

2. The evaluation notes that ‘constructed’ does not necessarily mean ‘(fully) operational’. The PCR Mission Report

makes it very clear that the markets were far from fully operational at the end of June 2015.

Output 3 – No. of economic infrastructure built.

It is interesting to compare the targets for Infrastructure construction between the RLF and the PCR.

RLF (2009) - Infrastructure / target / average per market

Stalls / 8200 / 390

Lock-ups/kiosks / 3100 / 148

Meat/fish units / 590 / 28

Cold storage units installed / 90 / 4.3

Paved open pitches/spaces / 7 hectares / 0.33 hectares

Power supply installed / 21 / 1

Water supply installed / 21 / 1

Sanitation / 21 / 1

Drainage / 21 / 1

Fire fighting system / 21 / 1

PCR (2015) - Infrastructure / target / average per market

Stalls / 8492 / 1213

Lock-ups / 5491 / 834

Pitches/open spaces / 1603 / 229

Stores / 13 / 1.86

Restaurants / 225 / 32

Office spaces / 12 / 1.7

Health clinics and pharmacies / 7 / 1

Banks / 7 / 1

Child day care centres / 7 / 1

1. The PCR states that all the infrastructure it lists in its targets was built: exactly the same number of everything. The

evaluation notes the remarkable accuracy of project implementation for this output.

2. There is little similarity between the infrastructure envisaged in the PAR/RLF and that reported in the PCR. The PCR

implies that none of the following planned infrastructure was built: meat/fish units, cold storage units, power

supply, water supply, sanitation, drainage and fire fighting systems. All would seem to be essential to a market, as

envisaged in the original design.

3. There is even less similarity between the average infrastructure per market, between the RLF and the PCR. The

PCR indicates a 311% increases in the number of stalls per market and a 563% increase in the number of lock-ups

per market.

4. Taken at face-value, the project was 100% successful for this Output indicator. However, the evaluation is

unconvinced by the data presented.

Output 4 – Market Information Systems established

There were no outputs for a whole and crucial component to the project. The Marketing Improvement and Trade

Enhancement component of the project failed completely.

e. Project development outcome: The ratings derived for outcomes and output are combined to assess the progress the project has made towards realizing its development

objectives, based on the rating methodology recommended in the Staff Guidance Note on project completion reporting and rating (see IPR

Guidance Note for further instruction on development objective rating).

The PCR score for the project development outcome is 3.75, ‘Highly Satisfactory’. The PCREN score for

effectiveness in delivering both outcomes and outputs is 2, and so the PCREN score for the project development

outcome is also 2, ‘unsatisfactory’.

f. Beneficiaries: Using evidence, the evaluator should provide an assessment of the relevance of the total number of beneficiaries by categories and

disaggregated by sex.

The figures provided in the PCR are unexplained and so are valueless. No other information is provided about who

the beneficiaries of the project were and by how much they may have benefitted.

The PAR states: ‘The primary beneficiaries of the project will be the 16,600 vendors whose numbers are expected to

rise to over 22,000 after reconstruction of the markets. It is estimated that over 900,000 households

(approximately 4.5 million people) within the catchment of the markets will benefit directly or indirectly from the

project. According to the Socio-Economic Gender Disaggregated Profile conducted by the Project Feasibility Study,

approximately 150,000 to 200,000 household will be headed by women.’

1. From the documents reviewed, and for a ‘poverty reduction’ project, it is unclear to the evaluator why the welfare

of traders (‘vendors’) should be put before that of rural farmers or urban consumers. In the experience of the

evaluator, the incomes of traders are very often higher than the incomes of both the producers – from whom they

buy - and the consumers - to whom they sell.

2. It became a very big point of contention within the project about who actually qualified to be included in this

traders group and so who could and should share in any benefits accruing from the project. It is clear from the PCR

Mission that many had been excluded who protested a right to be included, either on the basis of precedent -

having been traders in the old markets – or on the basis of ‘equality of distribution’ – those trading (or wishing to

trade) but who were outside of the old market and so outside the scope of the project. These people exist and

they suffered a loss of welfare due to the project which, in a reckoning, should be deducted from any benefit

accruing to the included traders.

3. As the numbers refer to a 21-market project, they should be cut by two thirds for a 7-market project, thus: 5478

rising to 7,260 traders (‘vendors’), 300,000 households, of which 50,000 will be headed by women.

4. From the documents reviewed, it was not clear to the evaluator exactly how the general urban population in the

vicinity of the markets were to benefit from the project, either ‘directly or indirectly’. Without an M&E system, it is

impossible to say whether or not this group benefitted. They could equally have suffered welfare losses due to

disruption during project implementation and price rises following project completion. It is unacceptable to

assume that this group benefitted just because that was the intention.

5. The evaluator suggests that the best way to find out if women benefitted from the project, is to ask them: traders,

employees, producers, consumers, heads of households. In the documents reviewed, there was no such survey.

Neither was any other evidence presented about how many women benefitted from the project and by how

much.

6. Nobody benefitted from the ‘Capacity Building and Development’ sub-component of the project because it was

not implemented. That is: 42 (14) people were not trained as trainers, 216 (72) people were not trained in market

management, 420 (140) people were not trained in entrepreneurship, 48 (16) people were not trained in

environmental management, and 4280 (1427) people did not receive specialised training.

g. Unanticipated additional outcomes (positive or negative, not taken into consideration in the project logical

framework):

The PCR lists two unanticipated positive outcomes:

An increase in youth employment. Positive. High.

New businesses opening around the market. Positive. Medium. The businesses are non-agricultural, being in the

telecoms, financial, food and beverage, and transport sectors.

A third, mentioned by the PCR Mission is:

The solar stove used for cooking at Wandegaya market is ‘highly favoured by women and should be replicated to

other markets’.

The PCR does not make any comment about any unanticipated negative outcomes of the infrastructure component of the

project (described in the PCR Mission Report). These were:

The existing vendors’ associations were scrapped and new ones put in their place. This created conflict between

the old and the new associations: Negative. High.

Vendors (registered and un-registered) have occupied corridors, car parks and other public spaces, causing

problems at the markets: Negative. High.

The PCR Mission reports under-utilization of markets, especially Hoima and Wandegya, due to conflict over the

allocation of market spaces to traders (‘vendors’): Negative. High.

The PCR Mission reports negative local press coverage about the markets, with the conflicting vendor associations

seeking public support for their cases. Negative. High.

EFFICIENCY

h. Timeliness: The timeliness of project implementation is based on a comparison between the planned and actual period of implementation from the date

of effectiveness for first disbursement.

The PCR score for Timeliness is 4, ‘Highly satisfactory’. The PCREN score is 3, ‘Satisfactory’.

1. The project was approved on 25 March 2009, but the first disbursement was not made until nearly a year later, on

19 March 2010.

2. The disbursement deadline was 31 December 2015. This was 12 months after the date stated in the PAR.

3. The PCR Mission Report states that as of 26 June 2015 project implementation was 98% of the revised MTR targets

and would be 100% complete by September 2015.

4. The PCR states: ‘The project was completed as planned without any time extension’.

5. However, the PCR later highlights problems with release of funds (processing payments, VAT re-imbursements)

which it claims inhibited timely implementation of the project.

6. The PCR Mission states: ‘The Mission noted that five out of seven contracts periods were extended ranging from 3

to 12 months’.

7. At the time of the PCR Mission, although 7 markets had been completed and handed-over to the municipal and

town councils, vendors were re-settled in only 5 of these, with 2 still in the process (and facing difficulty) and 5

markets were still in the process of correcting defects.

i. Resource use efficiency: Provide and assessment of physical implementation (based on outputs delivered) against resources used (based on cumulative

commitments) at completion for all contributors to the project (the Bank, Government, and others).

The PCR score for Resource use efficiency is 4, ‘Highly satisfactory’. The evaluator suggests a score of 2 for the

PCREN-R.

Taking the figures in the PCR at face-value we have four output indicators of; 0%, 100%, 100%, 100%. The median is

100+100/2=100. The total disbursement rate is 40.1 / 42.22 *100 = 94.98% (not 98.1% as reported in the PCR). This gives a

Resource Use Efficiency ratio of 100 / 94.98 = 1.053. This is greater than 1, so the score is 4, ‘highly satisfactory’.

However, the change in the target number of markets also changes the nature of column A as a meaningful indicator. The

approach adopted in the PCR is a variant of the old Texas sharpshooter trick: first shoot, then draw the target.

The evaluator is not convinced that resources have been used efficiently for the following reasons:

1. Output 2 – number of markets constructed – is 100% successful as it uses the post-MTR figure of 7 markets. If the

PAR figure of 21 markets had been used, the output measure would have been only 33% successful.

2. The evaluator is circumspect about the validity of the figures presented for Output 3 – the number of economic

infrastructure built (see comments above, section 3.c.)

3. There is no output indicator for the capacity building outputs of the project.

4. There is no output indicator for the Project Management and Coordination component of the project, which was

focussed on the gender analysis of the project.

5. Using the median removes the only output indicator for the Market Management and Agricultural Trade

Enhancement component of the project, as the PCR recorded 0% output here. For the Bank to sanction this is to

condone the view that physical infrastructure – concrete – alone is a sufficient and acceptable project output and

that its management, institutional and social setting is unimportant.

6. The evaluator makes the point that a project designed for 21 markets that builds only 7 markets but with the same

budget as the 21 market project is using 300% more resources to complete the 7 markets than originally planned.

It is unlikely, therefore, that resources have been used efficiently.

j. Cost-benefit analysis: Provide an assessment of the timeliness of the development outputs, and the extent to which costs of the costs have been effective and have been provided in

the most efficient manner (Evaluator’s Note: what does this sentence mean?). The PCR rating should be discussed. The evaluator should verify whether the

benefits of the project (achieved or expected) exceed its actual costs. To achieve this, evidences will mainly be based on a comparison between Economic

Rates of Return (ERR) calculated at appraisal, the mid-term review and completion. When commenting PCR ratings, the degree of utilization of valid

sources for evidence justifying the rating assigned should be taken into consideration (Evaluator’s Note: what does this sentence mean?). The evaluator

should ensure of the validity of assumptions and that the same model was used for the calculation of others ERRs.

The PCR scores its CBA as a 4. The PCREN agrees based on the guidelines.

PAR:

Benefit/cost ratio = 1.45

Net Present Value = US$ 16.94 million

Economic Internal Rate of Return = 14.4%

PCR:

Economic Internal Rate of Return = 19%

The ratio of the PCR EIII to the PAR EIII is 19:14.4 = 1.32. In the guidelines, this gives a score of 4, ‘Highly satisfactory’ and on

this basis the PCREN agrees.

However, the evaluation makes the following points.

The assumptions of the PAR CBA were:

The analysis of the Economic Rate of Return (EIRR) has been undertaken over a 50 year span in line with the

projected economic life of the market infrastructure. The main assumptions that featured in the calculation include

the following: (i) 50-year design life of the Civil Works; and 15-year for Electrical/Mechanical works; (ii) 1% of initial

investment costs as annual maintenance costs for civil works; and 5% for electrical/mechanical works; (iii) the net

revenue to increase at 10% per year; (iv) market dues estimated to be 70% of market rentals; (v) 50% of the markets

will be operating from PY3 and 100% from PY4; (vi) the analysis looks at the incremental number of vendors and

revenue that is expected to be generated; (vii) the rent of the reconstructed markets (i.e. Incremental Revenue

Factor) is estimated to be 25% higher than without project situation; (viii) investments in social services are excluded

from the economic analysis due to the difficulty of quantifying them (It is assumed that the benefits will be equal or

greater than the costs); and (ix) a shadow price using a Standard Deviation Factor (SDF) of 0.9 has been used (see

Annexes B6/B7 for detailed calculations).

The PCR reports an EIRR of 19% and provides some explanation of the calculation in PCR Appendix 1. But this explanation is

not clear on exactly how this figure was generated and what it means. The evaluation finds it hard to understand how a

project based on 21 markets can return an EIRR of 14.4% and a revised project based on only 7 markets (a 66% reduction in

revenues – however calculated) but with the same costs can then return a higher EIRR of 19%.

The evaluator has not seen the detailed calculations in Annexes B6 and B7 of the PAR as these annexes were not attached.

The evaluator has not seen baseline data for the analysis that may have been included in the feasibility study, and upon

which the ‘incremental costs and benefits’ of the project appraisal would be based. The evaluator has not seen any

sensitivity analysis performed on the CBA to test the robustness of its assumptions.

k. Implementation progress: The assessment of the Implementation Progress (IP) on the PCR is derived from the updated IPR and takes into account the all applicable IP criteria

assessed under the three categories : i) Compliance with covenants (project covenants, environmental and social safeguards and audit compliance), ii)

project systems and procedures (procurement, financial management and monitoring and evaluation), and iii) project execution and financing (disbursement,

budget commitments, counterpart funding and co-financing).

The PCR score for Implementation progress is 4, ‘Highly satisfactory’. From the eight criteria that the PCREN

scores, the total score is 21 and the average score is 2.625. That qualifies as ‘Satisfactory’. That result may be

justified on the basis of the revised 7-market project. It is not justified on the basis of the original 21-market

project of the PAR.

Implementation progress is assessed by ten IP criteria in three categories:

a) Compliance with covenants.

1. Compliance with project covenants. Score 2. The PCR states that it took the GoU 11 months to fulfill the ‘Entry into

Force’ conditions and to open two accounts in the Bank of Uganda. This is an unsatisfactory delay.

2. Compliance with Environmental and Social Safeguards. Score 3. MATIP I was a category 2 project with an ESMP to

which, the PCR states, the project adhered. The planned training programme in environmental management and

special skills did not take place, lessening the chance that any environmental and social standards achieved during

the project will be sustained.

3. Audit compliance: Score 4. The PCR reports that the Auditor General of Uganda undertook all the required

external audits and submitted reports in time, and that all audit reports were accepted and approved by the bank.

b) Project Systems and Procedures.

4. Procurement performance. Score 2. In the PAR, 21 markets were to be built. This was reduced to 7 (33%) in the

MTR. Interestingly, the PCR implies that the project has procured market infrastructure for 21 markets, not for the

reduced number of 7 markets. The evaluation cannot explain this apparent inconsistency without further

investigation and access to the MTR. The Bank Mission of March 2011 reported delays in the procurement

process. The PCR Mission noted that, ‘…five of the seven contract periods were extended ranging from 3 – 12

months’. 5. Financial Management. Score 2. The Bank missions throughout the project report delays in the justification of

funds in the special account and delay in reimbursing contractors for VAT. Both hindered implementation.

6. M&E performance. Score 1. The PCR states that no M&E system was put into operation due to ‘lack of resources’.

c) Project execution and financing.

7. Disbursements. Score 4. The PCR Mission reports: ‘The total disbursement rate for the ADF loan is 95.6% (UA

36,336,191.64) as at 26 June 2015.’ 8. Budget commitments.

9. Counterpart funding. Score 3. The PCR states that ‘…as of 26 June 2015, the (government) contribution was UGX 14,690,157,909 (UA 3,766,707) representing 89.3% of the expected commitment.’

10. Co-financing.

SUSTAINABILITY

l. Financial sustainability: Provide an assessment of the extent to which funding mechanisms and modalities (e.g. Tariffs, user fees, maintenance fees, budgetary

allocations, other stakeholder contributions, aid flows, etc.) have been put in place to ensure the continued flow of benefits after

completion, with particular emphasis on financial sustainability.

The PCR score for Financial Sustainability is 3, ‘Satisfactory’. The PCREN score is 2, ‘unsatisfactory’.

1. The PCR reports the following with respect to Financial Sustainability: ‘To ensure financial sustainability, vendors

and other users of the facilities are paying rent to the Councils out of which the Councils allocate a minimum of

15%. Some councils have allocated up to 18% to cater for the cost of routine maintenance. The money was

deposited in a dedicated account, for which both the VA/MMCs and Councils, are co-signatories. As the vendors

gradually establish, the remaining balance of the O&M cost shall be covered from the contribution of vendors.’

2. In theory, as the markets create their own income stream in terms of rental fees paid by traders to the municipal

or town council, there should be no problem with funding on-going operation and maintenance activities.

However, from the documents reviewed, it is not clear to the evaluator precisely with whom the responsibility for

O&M of the markets lies and precisely how and by whom this activity will be funded. The PCR seems unclear itself

(section iV.2.1). It suggests that no funding mechanism is in place in ‘several’ of the markets.

m. Institutional sustainability and strengthening of capacities: Provide an assessment of the extent to which the project has contributed to the strengthening of institutional capacities – including for

instance through the use of country systems – that will continue to facilitate the continued flow of benefits associated with the project. An

appreciation should be made with regards to whether or not improved governance practices or improved skills, procedures, incentives,

structures, or institutional mechanisms came into effect as a result of the operation.

The PCR score for Institutional Sustainability and the Strengthening of Capacity is 3, ‘Satisfactory’ (NB This is

incorrectly transcribed in the Overall PCR Rating Table as 3.5). The PCREN score is 2, ‘Unsatisfactory’.

The project paid particular attention to this in the design stage with a full ‘Market improvement and trade enhancement’ component with a budget of 3.78m UA. The two sub-components were, i) Management Information Systems (MIS) and

Market Information, and ii) Capacity Building and Development. The Component activities were to be:

Establish Management and Market Information Systems in each council including market survey, traffic flow

assessment;

Undertake Training of Trainers (TOT) courses for 42 Commercial/Community Development Officers of which 50%

are women;

Provide market management training to Councils, MOLG/MTTI/MOWT staff, Vas, private operators and

transporters, (216 person-sessions each of which will target at least 50% women participation)

Provide Gender and Leadership training to Councils and Vas

Train Vendors/Vas in entrepreneurship all of which will target at least 50% female participation (420 person-

sessions); land-use, and environmental-green business (48 person-sessions); specialised training in improved

slaughtering and hide processing, meat processing, /preparation, live chicken dressing, fresh fish, food processing

including fresh fruit/vegetables handling including provision of agro-processing demonstration equipment; food

safety, hygiene and quality control, (4280 person-sessions).

The PCR Mission states that: ‘However, the mission was informed that (the) majority of these activities have not been

undertaken partly due to limited resources.’ And, ‘the mission urges the Government to ensure that adequate resources are

allocated to priority activities and continue building the capacity of beneficiaries to ensure sustainable use of the markets.’ This is a plea in the absence of the project putting any specific measures in place.

The PCR states: ‘There has been limited activity towards establishment of market management and trade enhancement

structures and systems in the urban councils due to limited resources. However, the Government is expected to continue

strengthening the capacity of these institutions to be able to supervise and maintain the established facilities. The project

also contributed to the strengthening of these institutional capacities and the existing country systems such as those related

to procurement and financial management continue to be built to ensure appropriate flow of funds for government

operations in these local governments.’ The project may have created a sustainable flow of funds to local governments, but

whether any of these funds go to support institution and capacity building in the markets has been left to chance by the

project.

n. Ownership and sustainability of partnerships: Provide an assessment of whether the project has effectively involved relevant stakeholders, promoted a sense of ownership amongst the

beneficiaries (both men and women) and put in place effective partnerships with relevant stakeholders (eg. local authorities, civil society

organizations, private sector, donors) as required for the continued maintenance of the project outputs.

The PCR score for Ownership and Sustainability of Partnerships is 3, ‘Satisfactory’ (NB This also is incorrectly

transcribed in the Overall PCR Rating Table as 3.5). The PCREN score is 1, ‘Highly Unsatisfactory’.

It is worth quoting the PCR Mission report at length:

The Executing Agency (EA) has issued guidelines on resettlement, operation and maintenance procedures to all

municipal councils (MCs). However, some MCs do not seem to follow the laid out procedures by the Ministry. This

has caused problems in allocation of facilities to vendors, delayed rental fee collection, poor operation and

maintenance and overall poor management of the markets. In all the markets visited the vendors’ associations

have been replaced by new associations (and) in some instances the transition was not smooth leaving (a)

leadership vacuum for some time. At the time of the mission, a large number of vendors (registered and

unregistered) occupied corridors, parking areas and other public areas, leading to other technical problems and

making (the) business environment problematic. In some markets, electricity and water bills are unpaid and

markets remain in darkness. These issues are more pronounced in Mbale and Jinja Markets. The mission expresses

its dissatisfaction with the management of these two markets and recommends that swift actions are taken by the

EA in maintaining law and order in these markets, enforce the implementation of its own market management

guidelines, ensure a clear exit strategy is put in place and (that) urban councils take full charge of market

management.

Also ‘…some markets are not being used to their full capacity.’ ‘The markets that fall into this category are Hoima

and Wandegya. These markets are on the right direction of management but a few operational challenges remain

to be resolved by their respective councils. The Mission recommends that the right procedure and transparent

processes are followed to replace the originally allocated vendors.

‘The process to return vendors to the new markets in Gulu and Lira have commenced. The mission has urged the EA

to ensure the experiences and lessons learned from the resettlement process in the other five markets are used to

ensure smooth resettlement of vendors in these two markets.’

‘The Mission has taken note of the negative local press coverage related to the markets constructed by the project.

The Mission further notes that groups or differences within the vendor associations, one trying to portray the

success/failure of the other.’ ‘The mission urged the EA to contain and manage the local press coverage with a view

to call them to task about getting the facts right in what they publish as this may distort the perception of the

public, reputation of the Government and the Bank and ensure that the urban councils are adequately sensitized

about the issue.’

It appears that, far from the project effectively involving relevant stakeholders - promoting a sense of ownership amongst

the beneficiaries (both men and women) and putting in place effective partnerships - it has failed to involve certain groups

with a claim to be stakeholders, has created conflict amongst stakeholders about ownership of project benefits and has led

to the polarisation of stakeholders into opposing groups which are in open conflict with each other.

The PCR holds a more positive point-of-view: ‘Full participation and involvement of the urban councils in activities of the

programme such as vendor registration, vendor relocation, vendor resettlement as well as market management right from

the start was ensured to enhance ownership and sustainability. This participatory approach starting from project design

through implementation had enhanced ownership of project’s activities ensuring its sustainability. This was further

strengthened by the capacity building activities in the delivery of related services’ (which the PCR also states were not

undertaken). ‘At the time of the PCR, vendors and their associations showed a lot of enthusiasm and eagerness in the

markets which gave an indication of their interest in the ownership and long term sustainability of the project.’ The polite

way to remark on this is to say that it is in direct contradiction to the observations of the PCR Mission (above).

However, it goes on to say, ‘The Executing Agency spearheaded the exercise of vendor registration, vendor relocation and

vendor resettlement in the completed markets. While this may have been viewed as a good move to support the urban

councils, in some instances has resulted in councils abandoning their responsibility and a reduced sense of ownership. In

other similar projects, the councils should be sensitized and supported to undertake and be in full charge of these activities

right from the start of the programme. The project could provide some operational funds to the councils to support such

activities while the Ministry’s role could be focused on monitoring, providing guidance and technical support.’

It appears that the authors of the PCR have a strong belief that ownership of the project benefits resides wholly with the EA

and that it should exercise its ownership prerogative through the Municipal and District councils. The original project

funding of UA 3.78m proved insufficient to secure this intended project outcome.

The project has created benefits without simultaneously creating a viable, equitable, fair or accepted mechanism for

deciding to whom and how those benefits should be distributed. The result is conflict over the ownership of project

benefits.

o. Environmental and social sustainability: Provide an assessment of the objectivity of the PCR rating on the project’s implementation of environmental and social

mitigation/enhancement measures with regard to the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP), the capacity of country

institutions and systems, as well as the availability of funding to ensure the environmental and social sustainability of the operation.

The PCR score for Environmental and Social sustainability is 4, ‘Highly satisfactory’. The PCREN-R score is 3,

‘Satisfactory’.

The PCR states that an ESMP was designed and implemented during the project, especially with regard to construction

activities. Regrettably, the ESMP was not made available to the evaluation but based on the PCR it appears to have been

effective during the construction stage. It also appears that waste is being dealt with satisfactorily.

However, the environmental and special training programme of the project was not implemented, so the project has failed

to put in place trained staff to oversee on-going environmental and social standards.

4. PERFORMANCE OF STAKEHOLDERS

a. Bank performance:

The PCR score for Bank performance is 4, ‘Highly satisfactory’. The PCREN score is 2, ‘Unsatisfactory’

The Bank’s Appraisal Document is satisfactory (despite some ‘illogicality’ in the RLF). However, the project quickly ran into

implementation problems which resulted in a major re-design in the MTR. The PCR states, ‘At the design stage, there was

an increase in the total number of vendors from 16,000 to 39,000 in addition to escalation of price of construction materials.

This has resulted in increase of the size and cost of each market compared to the one envisages during appraisal. As a result,

it was only possible to implement 7 out of the planned 21 markets.’

However, the PCR also states that, ‘the project design has been implemented without major changes’. But it admits that the

Market Information System (Output 4) was not completed.

With respect to the 7 criteria of the Guidance Note, the evaluation tentatively scores the Bank’s performance as below.

i. Pro-actively identified and resolved problems at different stages of the project cycle, including modifying the

project development objective and/or design as necessary to respond to changing circumstances – SATISFACTORY.

The project re-design at MTR. However, problems over ownership and management were not resolved.

ii. used lessons learned from previous operations during design and implementation – UNSATISFACTORY. If it had

have done, a major re-design would not have been necessary and project implementation would have been

overall more successful. It is surprising and disappointing given the Banks existing portfolio of projects in Uganda

and especially in the agricultural sector.

iii. promoted stakeholder participation to strengthen ownership – HIGHLY UNSATISFACTORY. Ironically, the project

created the problem of who the stakeholders should be, and then did not resolve it.

iv. enforced safeguard and fiduciary requirements – UTS. Insufficient information although the PCR reported that the

auditing was acceptable.

v. ensured that the monitoring and evaluation system was well designed and implemented – HIGHLY

UNSATISFACTORY. No M&E system was implemented.

vi. undertook high quality and continuous supervision, including the adequate involvement of required expertise (skills

mix) – UTS. Insufficient information although it appears that the performance of some of the missions may have

been compromised by being sector missions, not project-specific ones, perhaps restricting time for detailed

investigation.

vii. provided timely responses to requests – SATISFACTORY.

b. Borrower performance:

The PCR score for borrower performance is 3, ‘Satisfactory’. The PCREN score is 2, ‘Unsatisfactory’

With respect to the 7 criteria of the Guidance Note, the evaluation tentatively scores the Borrower’s performance as

below.

i. Government and implementing agency performance in ensuring quality preparation and implementation –

UNSATISFACTORY. A whole – and vital – component of the project was ignored.

ii. compliance with covenants, agreements and safeguards – UNSATISFACTORY. It took 11 months to open two bank

accounts. The borrower failed to justify funds in the special account in a timely manner throughout the project.

iii. provision of timely counterpart funding – UNSATISFACTORY. The disbursement rate for counterpart funding was

89% at project end, but it was not timely delivered. Neither were the VAT refunds to contractors timely paid. Both

hindered implementation.

iv. implementation of the monitoring and evaluation system – HIGHLY UNSATISFACTORY. It was not implemented.

v. responsiveness to supervision recommendations – UTS. Insufficient information.

vi. measures taken by the Borrower to establish the basis for project sustainability, particularly by fostering

participation by the project’s stakeholders and involving the appropriate staff and institutions – HIGHLY

UNSATISFACTORY. It appears that actions taken by the EA with regard to vendor registration provoked conflict and

directly jeopardized the project’s objectives and sustainability.

vii. timeliness of preparing requests – UTS. Insufficient information.

c. Performance of other stakeholders:

The PCR states that the performance of the contractors was satisfactory, despite delays of 3 to 12 months in implementation of

individual markets. The PCREN has insufficient information to score this criterion.

5. SUMMARY OF OVERALL PROJECT PERFORMANCE

a. Overall assessment: Provide a summary of the project/programme’s overall performance based on the PCR 4 key components (Relevance, Effectiveness,

Efficiency and Sustainability). Any difference with the PCR and the reasons that have resulted in them should be mentioned. For cases

with insufficient evidence (from the PCR and other documents) available, the evaluator should assign a partly satisfactory rating (to be

revised) until a PPAR is complete.

The Overall Assessment score PCR is 3.75 (‘Highly satisfactory’); the PCREN disagrees and gives the project an

average score of 2.38 (‘Unsatisfactory’). The evaluator recommends a full investigation of the performance of

the project in a PPAR that has access to all project documents and ideally a field mission as well.

A brief summary of overall project performance with respect to the 4 key components of the PCR is given below:

1. Relevance: the development objectives of the project were highly relevant to the context. However, the

evaluation is critical of the relevance of the project design. In particular, in relation to: i) the recognition of

relevant stakeholders, ii) the consideration of alternative models of implementation, and iii) unclear analysis in the

appraisal and RLF. Additionally, the scale of the project at design was not relevant to the situation as a 66%

downscaling of the project occurred at the MTR. The evaluation has not had access to the MTR and so has not

seen the justification for this nor for the revised project design.

2. Effectiveness: The project ran into implementation problems that required a major project re-design. Several

important measures within the project were not completed, most especially measures in the monitoring and

capacity building components of the project. The project was not nearly effective in relation to its original design.

And even with the revised design there are important aspects of the project for which effectiveness has been

highly unsatisfactory.

3. Efficiency: the disbursement of Bank and counterpart funds was generally efficiently handled, although the PCR

makes some critical comments on timeliness. However, a budget for a 21-market project only incompletely

delivered a 7-market project.

4. Sustainability: As the markets generate a substantial income flow from rental of space, they should be financially

sustainable. However, institutional, capacity and ownership problems call the project’s sustainability into question.

b. Design, implementation and utilization of the M&E (appreciation of the evaluator):

The PCR states that the M&E component of the project was not undertaken.

6. EVALUATION OF KEY LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Lessons learned: Provide a brief description of any agreement/disagreement with all or part of the lessons learned from the PCR after analysis of the project

performance with regards to each of the key components of the evaluation (Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability). List

the PCR main new and/or reformulated pertinent (and generic) lessons learned for each of these components here. It is recommended that

no more than five lessons learned are discussed. Key questions and targeted audience must also be specified for each lesson learned.

The PCR lists 6 key lessons learned, which the PCREN groups into 5:

1. Opening of an account for O&M of markets. NOT VALIDATED. This is not a lesson.

2. Community participation and Project Ownership. NOT VALIDATED. This is not a lesson. The PCR fails to take account of

the facts about this project and draw a lesson from them.

3. Delays in processing payments. And 4. Delayed VAT payment. NOT VALIDATED. These are not lessons.

5. Availability of detail design of markets at appraisal. NOT VALIDATED. This is not a lesson. The PCR indicates this as the

reason underlying the project re-design. The evaluation cannot comment without seeing the MTR.

6. Sustainability. NOT VALIDATED. The PCR suggests measures to help ensure sustainability should be built into the project

from design stage. The evaluation finds that they were but that they were not implemented.

The evaluation makes its own summary list of key lessons learned, based partly on those of the PCR.

PCREN 1 (PCR 1,3,4) - It is important to project success that the borrower and the implementing agency undertake certain

actions of financial management in a timely manner.

PCREN 2 (PCR 2) - It is important at project preparation stage for the bank to take a wide view of who the stakeholders (and

potential stakeholders) in a project may be and to include them all. As well as considering which groups of people might

benefit from the project, it is also important to consider which groups might lose as a result of the project, either absolutely

and directly, or relative to the beneficiary groups. If a project creates benefits (and losses), it also creates a question about

the distribution of those benefits (and losses).

PCREN 3 (PCR 5) - It is important at feasibility, preparation and appraisal stages to consider alternative project designs and

implementation strategies. An example from this project would have been an alternative implementation strategy based

on building new markets on new sites while the old markets continued to function.

PCREN 4 – Lessons are better learned in small-scale pilot projects, not full-scale projects. This approach would decrease

exposure of the Bank and increase the likelihood of implementing successful projects. The example from this project is a

one-market pilot project to be used as an experiment and study, from which a full-scale project could then be elaborated

incorporating the lessons learned (instead of the converse happening).

b. Recommendations: Provide a brief description of any agreement/ disagreement with all or part of the recommendations from the PCR. List the PCR main new

and/or reformulated recommendations (requiring more actions by the Borrower and/or the Bank) here.

1. Availability of detail design of markets at appraisal’ – the PCR indicates this as the reason underlying the project

re-design. If this is the case, it may be that for future multiple infrastructure projects like this, the Bank should

proceed with a 1 unit pilot project first in order to generate data and learn lessons that can then be built into a full

multi-unit project. This approach would greatly reduce the risk of poor project performance and exposure of the

Bank.

2. Considering and rigorously analysing alternative project designs could lead to better project implementation. An

example for the current project would be the decision to build the new markets on the sites of the existing

markets. An alternative strategy would have been to construct the new markets on new sites with new

infrastructure while the old markets continue to function. It may have helped to ameliorate (though not resolve)

stakeholder and ownership issues at change-over.

3. The Bank should cast its net widely in the search for, and inclusion of, stakeholders for any project. From this

project, the Bank might consider not only those constituencies that might benefit from the project as

stakeholders, but also those who might lose because of the project, either in an absolute sense or relative to the

project beneficiaries.

4. The Bank might consider making prior actions and triggers for release of funds in projects as it does in

Programmes.

7. COMMENTS ON PCR QUALITY AND TIMELINESS

The timing of the PCR is ON TIME (4)

The overall quality of the PCR is UNSATISFACTORY (1.67). It presents little hard data. The data and analysis that it does

present is confused and unhelpful. It makes many assertions but provides little if no evidence to back them up. It makes

contradictory statements within the PCR. It makes statements contradictory to those in the PAR and the Mission report.

Scores are consistently too high and sometimes in contradiction to the evidence presented. The EIRR looks to be wrong. It

does little to acknowledge and learn from failings of the project. It was fairly ‘complete’ in terms of filling in boxes, but the

evaluation questions the quality of the evidence presented. In all, the evaluation finds that the PCR does not present a

reliable and accurate picture of the project from which the AfDB can assess project performance and elucidate lessons for

future projects.

8. SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION

Criteria PCR PCREN Reason for disagreement/ Comments

DIMENSION A: RELEVANCE 4 2.5 Satisfactory

Relevance of project development objective 4 3 The outcomes were unclear and confused.

Relevance of project design 4 2 The outcomes were unclear and confused.

The project design largely failed

DIMENSION B: EFFECTIVENESS 3.75 2 Unsatisfactory

Development objective (DO) 3.75 2 One project component failed completely.

The infrastructure component was reduced

by two thirds and the evidence presented

for its completion and operation is

unconvincing.

DIMENSION C: EFFICIENCY 4 3 Satisfactory (at best – the CBA poses

problems)

Timeliness 4 3 Some delays reported.

Resource use efficiency 4 2 PCR scores 4 based on the guidelines but

the problem is that the radical change in

project design with the reduced number of

markets makes column A unhelpful as an

indicator and disguises the true resource

use efficiency (in the opinion of the

evaluator).

Cost-benefit analysis 4 4 But based solely on the guidelines. The CBA

raises many issues and is very unclearly

presented

Implementation progress (IP) 4 3 The precise calculation based on an analysis

of each criterion is 2.625 but this has been

rounded up to 3.

DIMENSION D: SUSTAINABILITY 3.25 1.5 Unsatisfactory

Financial sustainability 3 2 Questions over financing mechanism

Institutional sustainability and strengthening of

capacities

3 2 A key component of the project was not

implemented.

Ownership and sustainability of partnerships 3 2 Conflict over ownership

Environmental and social sustainability 4 3 The measures appear to have been used in

the construction phase but the training was

not undertaken.

AVERAGE OF THE DIMENSION RATINGS 3.75 2.38

OVERALL PROJECT COMPLETION RATING HS U

Bank performance 4 2 The main issues relate to stakeholder

engagement and M&E

Borrower performance 3 2 The main issues relate to delays,

stakeholder engagement and project

sustainability

Performance of other stakeholders

Overall PCR quality 1.67 Affirmative rather than analytical and

consistently scores far too high

9. PRIORITY FOR FUTURE EVALUATIVE WORK: PROJECT FOR PERFORMANCE

EVALUTION REPORT, IMPACT EVALUTION, COUNTRY/SECTOR REVIEWS OR

THEMATIC EVALUATION STUDIES:

- Project is part of a series and suitable for cluster evaluation

- Project is a success story

- High priority for impact evaluation

- Performance evaluation is required to sector/country review

- High priority for thematic or special evaluation studies (Country)

- PPER is required because of incomplete validation rating

Major areas of focus for future evaluation work:

a) Performance evaluation is required for sector/ country review

b) Cluster evaluation (institutional support)

c) Sector evaluation (budgetary support or public finance management reforms)

Follow up action by IDEV: Identify same cluster or sector operations; organize appropriate work or consultation mission to

facilitate a), b) and/or c).

Division Manager clearance Director signing off

Data source for validation:

Task Manager/ Responsible bank staff interviewed/contacted (in person, by telephone or

email)

Documents/ Database reports

Attachment:

PCR evaluation note validation sheet of performance ratings

List of references

Appendix 1

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION NOTE Validation of PCR performance ratings

PCR rating scale:

Score Description 4 Very Good – Fully achieved with no shortcomings 3 Good – Mostly achieved despite a few shortcomings 2 Fair – Partially achieved. Shortcomings and achievements are roughly balanced 1 Poor – very limited achievement with extensive shortcomings

UTS Unable to score/rate NA Non Applicable

Criteria Sub-criteria PCR

work

score

IDEV

review Reasons for deviation/comments

RELEVANCE Relevance of the project

development objective

(DO) during

implementation

4 3 Project Outcomes were unclear and confused.

Relevance of project

design (from approval to

completion)

4 2 Failings in relation to: i) scale, ii) beneficiaries and

stakeholders, iii) alternative models of implementation

considered, and iv) analysis in the PAR/RLF.

OVERALL RELEVANCE SCORE 4 2.5

EFFECTIVENESS* Effectiveness in delivering outcomes

Outcome 1 UTS

Outcome 2 UTS

Outcome 3 UTS

Outcome 4 UTS

Outcome 5 UTS

Outcome 6 UTS

Effectiveness in delivering output

Output1 UTS

Output2 UTS

Criteria Sub-criteria PCR

work

score

IDEV

review Reasons for deviation/comments

Output 3 UTS

Output 4 UTS

Development objective (DO)

Development objective

rating 3.75 2 PCR poor in data, analysis and choice of indicators.

Beneficiaries

Beneficiary1 N/A N/A

Beneficiary2 N/A N/A

Unanticipated outcomes (positive or negative not considered in the project logical

framework) and their level of impact on the project (high, moderate, low)

Institutional

development N/A UTS

Gender N/A UTS

Environment & climate

change N/A UTS

Poverty reduction N/A UTS

Private sector

development N/A UTS

Regional integration N/A UTS

Other (specify)

EFFECTIVENESS OVERALL SCORE

EFFICIENCY Timeliness (based on the

initial closing date)

4 3 Various financial, construction and operational

delays.

Resource use efficiency

4 2 PCR scores 4 based on the guidelines but the

problem is that the radical change in project design

with the reduced number of markets makes column

A unhelpful as an indicator and disguises the true

resource use efficiency (in the opinion of the

evaluator).

Cost-benefit analysis

4 4 Based only on the guidelines and the reported

EIRRs. However the calculation by the PCR is

unclear and raises a number of issues

Implementation progress

(from the IPR)

4 3 Based on an average of the scored criteria,

precise value is 2.625

Other (specify)

OVERALL EFFICIENCY SCORE

Criteria Sub-criteria PCR

work

score

IDEV

review Reasons for deviation/comments

SUSTAINABILITY Financial sustainability

3 2 Systems not in place.

Institutional

sustainability and

strengthening of

capacities

3 2 A key component of the project was not

implemented.

Ownership and

sustainability of

partnerships

3 1 Conflict over ownership.

Environmental and

social sustainability 4 3 The measures appear to have been used in the

construction phase but the training was not

undertaken.

*The rating of the effectiveness component is obtained from the development objective (DO) rating in the latest IPR of the

project (see Guidance Note on the IPR).

The ratings for outputs and outcomes are determined based on the project’s progress towards realizing its targets, and the

overall development objective of the project (DO) is obtained by combining the ratings obtained for outputs and outcomes

following the method defined in the IPR Guidance Note. The following method is applied: Highly satisfactory (4),

Satisfactory (3), Unsatisfactory (2) and Highly unsatisfactory (1).

Criteria Sub-criteria PCR

Work

score

IDEV

review Reasons for deviation/comments

BANK

PERFORMANCE Proactive identification and

resolution of problems at different

stage of the project cycle

3 The project re-design at MTR. However,

problems over ownership and

management were not resolved.

Use of previous lessons learned

from previous operations during

design and implementation

2 If it had have done, a major redesign

would not have been necessary and

project implementation would have been

overall more successful.

Promotion of stakeholder

participation to strengthen

ownership

1 Ironically, the project created the problem

of who the stakeholders should be, and

then did not resolve it.

Enforcement of safeguard and

fiduciary requirements

3 The PCR reported that the auditing was

accetable.

Design and implementation of

Monitoring & Evaluation system 1 No M&E system was implemented.

Quality of Bank supervision (mix

of skills in supervisory teams,

etc.)

UTS The performance of some of the missions

may have been compromised by being

sector missions, not project-specific ones,

perhaps restricting time for detailed

investigation.

Timeliness of responses to

requests 3

OVERALL BANK PERFORMANCE SCORE 4 2.17

BORROWER

PERFORMANCE

Quality of preparation and

implementation 2 A whole – and vital – component of the

project was ignored.

Compliance with covenants,

agreements and safeguards 2 It took 11 months to open two bank

accounts. The borrower failed to justify

funds in the special account in a timely

manner throughout the project.

Provision of timely counterpart

funding 2 The disbursement rate for counterpart

funding was 89% at project end, but it was

not timely delivered. Neither were the

VAT refunds to contractors timely paid.

Both hindered implementation.

Responsiveness to supervision

recommendations UTS Insufficient information.

Measures taken to establish basis

for project sustainability 1 It appears that actions taken by the EA

with regard to vendor registration

provoked conflict and directly jeopardized

the project’s sustainability. The lender

response was not one of inclusive

resolution.

Timeliness of preparing requests UTS Insufficient information.

OVERALL BORROWER PERFORMANCE SCORE 4 1.75

PERFORMANCE

OF OTHER

STAKEHOLDERS

Timeliness of disbursements by

co-financiers

Functioning of collaborative

agreements

Quality of policy dialogue with

co-financiers (for PBOs only)

Quality of work by service

providers

Responsiveness to client demands

OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF OTHER

STAKEHOLDERS

N/A N/A

The overall rating is given: Very Good, Good, Fair and Poor.

(i) Very Good (HS) : 4

(ii) Good (H) : 3

(iii) Fair (US) : 2

(iv) Poor (HUS): 1

DESIGN, IMPLEMENTAION AND UTILIZATION OF MONITIRING AND

EVALUATION (M&E)

Criteria Sub-criteria IDEV

Score Comments

M&E DESIGN M&E system is in place, clear,

appropriate and realistic UTS

This component of the project was not

undertaken.

Monitoring indicators and

monitoring plan were duly

approved

UTS

Existence of disaggregated gender

indicator UTS

Baseline data were available or

collected during the design UTS

Other, specify

OVERALL M&E DESIGN SCORE

M&E

IMPLEMENTA-

TION

The M&E function is adequately

equipped and staffed UTS

OVERALL M&E IMPLEMENTATION SCORE

M&E

UTILIZATION

The borrower used the tracking

information for decision UTS

OVERALL M&E UTILIZATION SCORE

OVERALL M&E PERFORMANCE SCORE UTS The M&E system was not implemented.

PCR QUALITY EVALUATION

Criteria PCR-EVN

(1-4) Comments

QUALITY OF PCR

1. Extent of quality and completeness of the PCR

evidence and analysis to substantiate the ratings of

the various sections

2 Many assertions, little evidence. Inaccuracy with

data analysis. Doubts over data and methodology.

2. Extent of objectivity of PCR assessment score 2 Highly optimistic. Sometimes in direct

contradiction to the evidence.

3. Extent of internal consistency of PCR assessment

ratings; inaccuracies; inconsistencies; (in various

sections; between text and ratings; consistency of

overall rating with individual component ratings)

2 They are consistently too high, individually and in

aggregate.

4. Extent of identification and assessment of key

factors (internal and exogenous) and unintended

effects (positive or negative) affecting design and

implementation

2 It identified ‘key factors’ but were they the right

ones? It makes no mention of negative

unintended effects.

5. Adequacy of treatment of safeguards, fiduciary

issues, and alignment and harmonization 2

6. Extent of soundness of data generating and

analysis process (including rates of returns) in

support of PCR assessment

1 Poor data, methodology, explanation and

analysis. The EIRR looks to be wrong.

7. Overall adequacy of the accessible evidence (from

PCR including annexure and other data provided) 1 Poor. Insufficient data was provided on the EIRR

calculation.

8. Extent to which lessons learned (and

recommendations) are clear and based on the PCR

assessment (evidence & analysis)

1 Poor. The PCR does little to acknowledge and

then learn from weaknesses in the project.

9. Extent of overall clarity and completeness of the

PCR 2 The PCR was complete in terms of boxes filled-in,

but deficient in quality and very selective with the

evidence and interpretation.

Other (specify)

PCR QUALITY SCORE 1.67 Unsatisfactory

PCR compliance with guidelines (PCR/OM ; IDEV)

1. PCR Timeliness (On time = 4; Late= 1) 4

2. Extent of participation of borrower, Co-financiers

& field offices in PCR preparation UTS

3. Other aspect(s) (specify)

PCR COMPLIANCE SCORE

*** rated as Very Good (4), or Good (3), or Fair (2), or Poor (1)

References

Uganda MATIP 1 project documents and chronology.

19 Feb 2009 – PAR: Construct 21 markets. UA 34,991,100. = UA 1,666,243 each.

1 Apr 2011 – Aide Memoir – Supervision Mission: Designs complete for 15 out of 21 markets. Tender documents

reviewed and approved for 7 out of 21 markets. UA 34,991,100. = UA 4,998,729 each.

3 May 2012 – Inter-office memorandum – Supervision Mission: Construction begun on 7 markets

Initiation of revision of RLF, ‘A revised LFA will be submitted to the Bank by 15 May 2012 for review and ‘no

objection’.

MISSING - Mid-Term Review: Contains justification for revision of target output from 21 markets down to 7

(33%) and revised RLF.

9 Oct 2012 - Inter-office memorandum – Supervision Mission: ‘Construction of the 7 markets commenced 11 Oct

2011. Expected completion 3 Oct 2013. Disbursement committed up to 83.7%.

15 Apr 2014 - Aide Memoir – Supervision Mission: ‘4 of the 7 markets being constructed under the project have

been completed while the remaining 3 are expected to be completed by the end of August 2014,’ ‘Loan committed to 96%’.

31 Oct 2014 - Aide Memoir – Supervision Mission: ‘6 of the 7 markets being constructed under the project have

been completed while the remaining 1 (Gulu) is expected to be completed by the end of December 2014,’ ‘Loan committed to 99%’.

30 June 2015 – PCR Mission Report: 7 market completed. 5 out of 7 overran from 3 – 12 months. Designs for 21

completed. 11 of these to be constructed in MATIP 2. (And the other 3?)

List of Acronyms and abbreviations

ADF African Development Fund

AfDB African Development Bank

CAADP Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme

CBA Cost Benefit Analysis

CSP Country Strategy Paper

EA Executing Agency

EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return

ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan

GoU Government of Uganda

HH Household

HS Highly Satisfactory

HUS Highly Unsatisfactory

IP Implementation Progress

IPR Implementation Progress and Results

MATIP Markets and Agricultural Trade Improvement Project

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MC Municipal Council

MIS Management Information System

MMC Market Management Committee

MoLG Ministry of Local Government

MoWT Ministry of Works and Transport

MTR Mid-Term Review

MTTI Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industries

MUA Millions Units of Account

N/A Not Applicable

NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NPV Net Present Value

O&M Operations and Maintenance

PAR Project Appraisal Report

PCR Project Completion Report

PCREN Project Completion Report Evaluation Note

PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan

PMA Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture

PPAR Post-Project Appraisal Report

PY Project Year

RLF Results-based Logical Framework

S Satisfactory

SDF Standard Deviation Factor

TOT Training of trainers

U Unsatisfactory

UA Unit of Account

UGX Ugandan Shillings

UJAS Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy

US$ United States Dollars

UTS Unable To Score

VA Vendor Association