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Unitd Stats Institut of Pac www.usip.og Tl. 202.457.1700 Fax. 202.429.6063

UNITED STaTES INSTITUTE of pEacE

USIP 2011 All rights reserved.

Th onfit inAghanistan is sn not onlyas a struggl or owr and r-

soursit is also a lgitimay

risis stmming rom a systm

o owr and atronag.

June 3, 2011

Afghan Perspectives on AchievingDurable Peace

SummaryAghans across dierent groups see the United States as a key party to the conict whose

direct participation in a peace process is crucial to its success, and thereore question the e-

ectiveness o U.S. emphasis on an Aghan-led reconciliation strategy.

The U.S. must engage directly in negotiating a settlement because o its control over the issue

o withdrawal o NATO orces. The Taliban demand or ull withdrawal prior to talks appears to

be an opening position. A challenge will be linking a structure or drawdown to necessary ste

by insurgents to allow a cessation o violence and prevent Aghanistans use or terrorism.

A settlement process will entail discussion o the composition and uture o the Aghan Na-

tional Security Forces, and the current transition strategy o a large army and expanding loc

deence initiatives will almost certainly need re-examining during such a process.

The conict is not only a struggle or power and resources; it is also a legitimacy crisis stem-

ming rom a system o power and patronage that eeds conict. From this perspective, a

settlement should address the concentration o powers in the presidency through incremen-

tal reorm to appointments, elections, or arther-reaching changes to the structure o govern

ment over time.

There is a tension between reorm and using political appointments to accommodate powe

sharing demands. A durable settlement will need to involve political and social agreements

among Aghans taking into account the views o a range o stakeholders. To manage this

tension, the intra-Aghan peace process should be oriented toward broad inclusion o non-

combatants while balancing the secrecy required to make progress.

IntroductionWhile momentum in pursuit o a peace settlement or Aghanistan increases, ambiguities remain

in the U.S. strategy, and there are questions about the ability o the Aghan government to succe

ully lead a process and the insurgents interest in one. A burgeoning body o commentary ocus

on international and U.S. strategy, but to be durable a settlement will need to incorporate politic

agreements that take into account the views o a range o Aghan stakeholders.

This Peace Brie reviews ndings rom 122 interviews with Aghan leaders in political, military

economic and social arenas about the conict and the issues that a peace process must address.

This work represents part o a project by three leading international institutions to identiy and

HamisH NixoN

E-mail: [email protected]

peAceBrIeF94

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USIP 2011 All rights rese

Afghan Perspectives on Achieving Durable Peace

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clariy realistic options or Aghanistan to achieve durable peace.1 Ongoing work analyzes the

issues ramed by Aghan stakeholders more deeply and draws on comparative experience.

Understandings o the Confict

Aghan stakeholders have diverse views o the conict, but several prominent themes haveimplications or crating a successul peace process. While the conict is driven by external and

internal actorsincluding longstanding issues o regional politics and actional competition

grievances resulting rom the presence and actions o NATO troops and the deep legitimacy

problems o the Aghan government have become increasingly important. Aghans across

dierent groups perceive the United States as a party to the conict with its own interests. They

identiy a contradiction between the U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) claim

that they are not ghting or themselves but supporting the Aghan government on one side,

and the governments apparent eagerness or a peace settlement on the other. For many Aghan

including but by no means limited to the Taliban, this contradiction calls into question the eec-

tiveness o the U.S. emphasis on an Aghan-led reconciliation strategy. In addition, ambiguity o

the withdrawal timetable and divergent signals rom dierent U.S. ofcials and agencies on theobjective o reintegration o lower level ghters, indicate the need or urther clarication o U.S

policy. The result is lingering distrust o U.S. claims to support a political solution, and skepticism

about the viability o an Aghan-led peace process.

The poor quality and predatory behavior o the Aghan government is almost universally ac-

knowledged as a driver o the conict, and a core issue that a peace process must conront. Ther

is a crosscutting perception that the benets o government are captured and divided among a

small elite who are appointed through political deals based on their past roles and who act with

a combination o ethnic, actional, economic and criminal motivations. Both regime insiders and

outsiders believe that this system generates interests in continuing the conict that may challen

a peace process.

The lack o transparency and the illegitimate manner through which some have gained powe

allow leaders o all ethnic groups to stoke perceptions that others are benetting disproportion-

ately. Such perceptions exist across all groups, eeding increasingly ethnic and negative-sum

politics. The 2010 National Assembly elections and the discourse o political reconciliation o th

government have heightened these ethnic readings, deepening cleavages that the Taliban explo

and exacerbating the potential or ethnic conict.

The Military Dimension o a Peace ProcessThe U.S. must engage directly in negotiating a peace settlement because it has control over a ce

tral issue that such a settlement must address: the withdrawal o most or all NATO orces in retur

or the Talibans agreement to cease violence and prevent terrorist activities. While some Aghan

leaders see negotiation as undesirable and military action as the only option until the Taliban are

signicantly weakened or deeated, many believe that elaborating a clear ramework or NATO

withdrawal or changes to military posture linked to steps by the Taliban on the prevention o

terrorism may oer possibilities within a peace process. Even some leaders o vulnerable groups

such as minorities and women with the greatest concern over a deal with the Taliban acknowled

the need or NATO withdrawal to bring peace.

Evidence on the Taliban suggests that ull withdrawal o international orces may not be nece

sary or a process to begin. Ex-Taliban and Hezb-e Islami leaders suggest that changes to opera-

tional patterns, ceasing aerial attacks, legal recognition and timetables or changes to military

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posture could orm part o a settlement. For their part, several operational insurgent commande

in both the north and the south suggest that two interrelated conditionsan agreement on NA

withdrawal and a ceasere order rom Taliban leader Mullah Omarwould be necessary or a

decision to cease ghting, and that they would welcome such an order. One agreed to stop ght

ing in return or local limits on NATO operations. The implication is that the Taliban precondition

o withdrawal o oreign orces may be an opening position or peace negotiations. The challengwill be to leverage the presence o NATO orces by linking the possibility o a structured drawdow

to necessary steps by insurgents. At the same time, to balance Pakistani interests with Taliban

autonomy, the U.S. should support and participate in channels with both.

Views on reintegration and the Aghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Program (APRP) vary rom

suspicions that it is a patronage device to doubts about its impact due to the Aghan governmen

inability to provide security and address the presence o oreign orces. At the same time, there ar

concerns about the morale o Aghan security orces while reconciliation initiatives are ongoing.

A peace process will likely entail discussion o the composition and uture o the Aghan National

Security Forces, and will require a ramework o demobilization or integration that can satisy the

concerns o large groups o insurgents while not provoking remilitarization by others. Regardless

the mechanism, the current transition strategy o very large national armed orces and expandin

local deense initiatives may need re-examination during a settlement process. Discussions o any

longer-term U.S. presence will also have to careully consider the aims o a peace process, perhap

through monitoring o the prevention o terrorism or guaranteeing the provisions o a settlemen

The Political Dimension o a Peace ProcessThe conict in Aghanistan is seen not only as a struggle or power and resources it is also a

legitimacy crisis stemming rom a system o power and patronage. These viewpoints are oten

expressed in terms o the lack o any system to appoint worthy individuals into government

positions through some legitimate criteria.

From this perspective, a settlement must address reorm to be sustainable. Most suggestions

ocus less on large-scale institutional restructuring o the state than on balancing an over-centra

ized presidency and increasing the legitimacy o appointments. While dierent criteria or leade

ship appearexperience and skills, national eeling, or moral and religious virtuea recurrent

theme among diverse interviewees is that when political deals and opaque reasons determine

appointments, the nation suers. As expected, there are constituencies or decentralization and

parliamentary system o government within minority ethnic parties and the political opposition

but these also emphasize incremental reorm such as stronger roles or local councils and electio

o governors, or a more eective parliament.

Taliban reorm proposals are vague and ocus on the alleged un-Islamic character o the state, a

tend to suggest interest in reorm rather than just participation in an illegitimate system o powersharing. Justice and deense institutions are mentioned, including changes to the model o the

security orces rom large paid orces coupled with militias to a conscript-based army. One ex-Taliba

ofcial said that the Taliban view o an Islamic regime can correspond to a presidential system, but

needs a mode o consultation or guardianship to protect the Islamic nature o the system.

Most stakeholders believe that constitutional reorm should not be a barrier to peace, but also

that it is not the most pressing issue. The Taliban themselves have not publicly identied detaile

demands regarding the constitution, and some ormer Taliban ofcials predictably underplay

their views on constitutional change beore a oreign audience. Analysts suspect they may wish

create new institutions and alter certain provisions in ways that would risk human and womens

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rights, but may agree to more modest and non-constitutional adjustments to institutions such a

the Ministry o Haj or educational curricula. Some ex-Taliban suggest that articles o the constitu

tion that enshrine both Islamic and human rights could be preserved to build condence.

This implies that a negotiation might occur between those avoring local devolution as an op

ing or Taliban inclusion, and the Taliban interest in changes to national structures. It also sugges

that a settlement might not involve a radical restructuring o the state. A range o actors may nd

common ground in their diagnosis o lack o balance in the presidential system and corruption,

suggesting a negotiating agenda around oversight and procedures to address how people recei

power and privileges. An early step might be to clariy the crucial elements o the constitution,

and consider the process or amendments among other political arrangements on the negotiati

agenda.

There is a tension between reorm and using political appointments to accommodate power-

sharing demands. To manage this tension, the intra-Aghan peace process could be oriented

towards broader inclusion o non-combatants, and identication o cross-cutting interests, while

balancing the secrecy required to avoid getting bogged down. Exploring multitrack diplomacy,

civilian commissions, ombudspersons, national dialogues and other means o inclusion should b

a priority. The High Peace Council is widely seen as unsuited to mediate an intra-Aghan process

nor is it likely to be empowered as a government delegation, and may best play a role advising a

generating proposals.

Getting to a SettlementSpecic mediation and logistical arrangements seem less important to stakeholders than are the

mutual acceptance by the parties, in keeping with Aghan customary practice. Elections are still

quite widely considered a necessary mechanismincluding by some operational Taliban or

transitioning rom interim to long-term arrangements, though there are problems with the electo

system and indirect methods such as that used in the Emergency Loya Jirga also enjoy legitimacy

These ndings raise questions or combatants and interested third parties to consider in iden

tiying what kind o peace processes might succeed. These questions also point to where urther

research, discussion, and the experience o other conicts could help.

How can the U.S., the Aghan government, and the Taliban develop and communicate mili-

tary proposals and counter-proposals about withdrawal and short and long-term measures

to prevent terrorism?

How can a negotiation encourage independent Taliban decision-making on Aghan issues,

while balancing the interests o Pakistan?

What are workable options or interim and longer-term arrangements in the security sector

that will be acceptable to dierent parties?

What scenarios or international supportwhether nancial, monitoring, verication or

enorcementare possible?

What methods o promoting inclusion o non-combatants, women, minorities and vulner-

able groups will neither compromise negotiating progress nor cause the marginalization o

these groups?

How should the peace process manage the transition rom interim measures to a longer-

term consensus on reorm, possibly including constitutional change?

Any understanding o the conict in Aghanistan will orm only one part o a multiaceted

story. Yet, a peace process must necessarily reduce these complexities to a discrete set o issues,

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SIP provides the analysis, training andools that prevent and end conicts,romotes stability and professionalizeshe eld of peacebuilding.

or media inquiries, contact the ofcef Public Affairs and Communications,02.429.4725

2301 constitution Av., NWWashington, D.c. 20037

about tHis brief

Hamish Nixon coordinates a jointproject of the Chr. Michelsennstitute (CMI), the Peace Researchnstitute Oslo (PRIO), and the

United States Institute of PeaceUSIP), on durable peace inAfghanistan. This brief outlineskey ndings from the rst phaseof research on Afghan stakeholderviews on the conict. The authorworked in Afghanistan for theWorld Bank and the AfghanistanResearch and Evaluation Unit from2005-2010, and has researchedgovernance and peace processesn Southeast Asia, Central Americaand Afghanistan.

agreements and assurances. To succeed, and to be durable, it must take into account the diversi

and depth o Aghan views on what will bring peace to their country.

Endnote

1. More detailed discussion o the research project and ndings can be ound in Hamish NixonAchieving Durable Peace: Afghan Perspectives on a Peace Process, PRIO paper (Peace Research Insti

Oslo/United States Institute o Peace/Chr. Michelsen Institute: Oslo, May 2011). The paper is avai

able or download at http://www.prio.no/News/NewsItem/?oid=651456 or at http://www.prio.n

Research-and-Publications/.



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