pay for performance – a critical assessment (using recent estonian experience) “improving...
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Pay for Performance – Pay for Performance – a critical assessmenta critical assessment (using recent Estonian experience)(using recent Estonian experience)
“Improving primary care in Europe and the US: Towards patient-centered, proactive and coordinated systems of care”
April 3, 2008
Ain Aaviksoo, MD MPHPRAXIS – Center for Policy Studies
Why?Why?
• Encourage most rapid feasible performance improvement by all providers.
• Support innovation and constructive change throughout the health care system.
• Promote better outcomes of care, especially through coordination of care across provider settings and time.
IOM. Rewarding provider performance: aligning incentives in Medicare. (2006)
• Motivate family physicians to actively engage in disease prevention and monitoring of chronic patients, and to provide the insured with a broad health service (monitoring of pregnant women, perform minor surgeries, etc.).
Estonian Health Insurance Fund Annual Report 2006
The Context (Estonia)The Context (Estonia)
• Area 45 000 sqkm
• ~1.4M inhabitants
• GDP per capita 12 300 EUR (2006)
• Health expenditure per capita 496 EUR; 5% of GDP (2006)
• Single public Health Insurance Fund (85% of public and 63% of total HC costs)
• ~800 family doctors practicing as private entepreneurs (61% in solo practices)
Map source: www.parks.it
High penetration of ICT in High penetration of ICT in primary careprimary care
Source: Development of the information society in Estonia as mirrored in European surveys in 2003. Estonian Informatics Centre. Data from „eEurope+ Health Survey”, June 2003. http://www.ria.ee/atp/?id=762 (Accessed January 12, 2006)
The case of Estonia (timeline)The case of Estonia (timeline)
2002 Family Doctors’ Association started accreditation
2003 no payment differentiation by accreditation possible
2005 concept for P4P agreed between family doctors and Health Insurance Fund (based on NHS example)
2006 first year of reporting on performance
2007 first payment according to results from 2006 (max 8% of annual revenues);second year of reporting; adjustment of criteria
Organisation mattersOrganisation matters
Solo practice (N=35)
Group practice (N=65)
Polyclinic type practice(N=13)
Total sample (N=113)
Proportion of bonus payment
recipients66% 52% 85% 60%
Proportion of higher bonus
payment recipients
4% 24% 0% 13%
Bonus payment by capital area family physicians in 2006Bonus payment by capital area family physicians in 2006
Confounders and facilitatorsConfounders and facilitators
• Introduction of the P4P parallel to robust growth of overall healthcare and primary care budget
• Initiative of family doctors’ leaders to praise the colleagues who do good job
• Universal ICT backup
ChallengesChallenges
• Decreasing participation trend plus differentiation(?) by performance
• Financial reward very small
• Future improvements of the programme planned “carefully” and resistance is growing
• Integration of overall health care system is rather poor
ObservationsObservations
• Large scale implementation of P4P: USA, UK, Estonia
• Ideas evolving in most countries• Actively promoted by the World Bank
(P. Schneider. “Provider Payment Reforms: Lessons from Europe and America for South Eastern Europe”. WB Policy Note. October 2007)
International comparisonInternational comparisonLessons learnt (by P Schneider) “Trial” in Estonia
Cost and administrative burden are key barriers Relatively low (ICT already implemented), but
still the issue causing most resistance
Careful monitoring needed to avoid unexpected
side effects
Ongoing; some independent analysis and
evaluation embedded
Incremental introduction to reduce risks Easy to start, but missing the final (even if
temporary) goal
Public information to put pressure Results publicly available; local media covers
extensively
Supporting wider health strategy necessary Health insurance fund leadership is there, but
general health policy is too scattered
Performance effect is probably relatively small Initial results vary promising among those who
participated voluntarily. Overall effect – too
close to call …
Back to basicsBack to basics
Adapted from M Roberts et al. “Getting health reforms right”. OUP 2004POLITICAL DECISIONS