(7.c'7 t

Regime Change and Foreign Policy:Portugal, Indonesia, and the

Self-determination of East Timor

PAULO GORJAO

This article argues that the narure of interim govemments is not a satisfactoryexplanation of foreign policy initiatives, or their absence, during particular types oftransition to democracy. The proposal is rejected for two main reasons. on ihe onehand, both the Portuguese (1974-76) and Indonesian (1998-99) transirions rodemocracy provide evidence that contradicts it. on the other hand, the propositiondoes not explain which foreign policy decisions are taken and the t"o.oni why. Thisafticle argues that we should focus instead on the new individual and corporareevaluations and strategies that come about inside a country as a result of new elitealignments, following the installation of a democratic regime, which opens a windowof opportunity for making foreign policy changes- Moreoveq the perieptions of theinternational community also influence the decision-making of individual anrlcorporate interests and their strategies. Where the preceding authoritarian regimepursued foreign policies that the international community regarded as illegitimate,then there wili be incentives to change policy. This approach sheds more light on thecase. studies involving Portugal, Indonesia and East Timoa by identifying correclly theforeign policy initiatives that were taken during the regime transitionslo democracyand by explaining the underlying reasons.

Introduction

Among democratic theorists, it is cornmonly accepted that every regimechange from an autocratic to a democratic government will constrain andinfluence not only decision-making procedures but also the domesticpolitical agenda. In fact, the majority of democratic transition studies aim todescribe, explain and, ifpossible, predict how regime change constrains andinfluences domestic politics.

A topic not well represented in the literature is the relation betweenregime change and foreign policy. Contrary to the position taken by Altison6

Paulo Gorjdo is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at Lusiada Univenity,Lisbon and doctoral candidate in the bepartment ofsocial and Political Sciences at the Catholicuniversity of Louvain. He thanks Anrhony Smith for helpful commenrs on an earlier draft, andPeter Burnell and anonymous referees of Denocratizatian for useful suggestions. The researchwas

-supported by Fundaqdo para a Cidncia e a Tecnologia, portugal. programme PRAXIS XXI,

BD 20380.

Democratization, Vol.9, No.4, Winter 2002. pp.l42_l5gPUBLISHED By FRANK CASS. rO:,rOOfr

REGIME CHANGE AND FOREIGN POLICY 143

K. Stanget'lr I will argue that the nature of interim goYemments is not a

satisfactory explanation for foreign policy initiatives, or their absence,

during particulir types of transition to democracy.'] Their nature does not

explain which specific foreign policy initiatives are taken, and why'

This article i.gu", that by introducing into the analysis the new domestic

individual and corporate evaluations and strategies - a consequence of the

new alignment ofthe new elites - the installation of a new democratic

regimemayopenawindowofopportunityforspecificforeignpolicych-anges. Furthermore, this approach explains which foreign policy

initiatives are taken, and why, and why some foreign policy decisions can

face resistance, or are not taken at all. I will also argue that the perception

of the international cornmunity of the foreign policy options is a powerful

influence upon the decision-rnaking procedures followed by the individual

and corporate interests and strategies. If an authoritarian regime followed a

foreign policy orientation that the intemational community perceived as

illegiiimite, then there would be strong incentives to change it'th. pro."rr leading to the self-deter'rination of East Timor was chosen

o, o .oi. study. This started with Portugal's transition to democracy

between 1914 and 1976 and ended with Indonesia's comparable experience

during 1998-99. The East Timorese experience contradicts the 'nature of

ihe interim government' explanation for foreign policy changes. In contrast'

East Timorese self-determination is explained by the emergence of new

individual and colporate interests and strategies during the transition to

democracy in Portugal and Indonesia.

The case allows us to test the explanation offered here in two totally

different contexts. For while Portugal's democratic transition occurred

during the cold war in the 1970s, Indonesia's came after the end of the Cold

War, in the 1990s. One is a Catholic country and the other is largely Muslim.

One is a European state and the other is in Southeast Asia. One couutry

experienced a iransition to democracy through a provisional revolutionary

government and the other had an incurnbent caretaker government' Yet,

clespite the political, cultural, economic, social and religious differences

between poriugal and Indonesia, the approach suggested here illuminates

the foreign policy decisions of both, in regard to East Timor'

Tlpe of Democratic Transition, Nature of the Interim GoYernment'and Foreign Poticy

A transition*is 'the interval between one political regime and another''' In

other rvordi a transition occurs after a 'process of dissolution of an

authoritarian regime' has been triggered and entls with 'the installation of

some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule' or

r44

t}te

DEMOCRATIZATION

W

_r trfltT,ff::ffi*::::|::".:'"9*:b:,lTnreformaandruptu,o..e,r,irJ"-r'urrii.u,ionidentifies rransaction, breakdown/colrapse and extrication.; rr*rilllllation, reforma and transaction correspona to th" a*.iiio*'to;|il;**where the initiative to begin the regimi change is taken uy tr,, uutrroituriunelites. Replacement, ruptura and breakdown/collapsl Oescrii" nosesituations where the authoritarian governments were overthrown by theopposition. Transplacement and extrication occur when both theauthoritarian government and the opposition work togethe, t"ii"g""il"i,new democratic regime. --:r'.' s(

EachthatQt

of transition

breakdown/collapse. But if the .members of the

#'.srrua[lons.,,

governments correspond to those situations wh||

r@Thblel.

TABLE I

LinzlStepan Share/lVlainwaring

Transformation Transaction

Breakdown/collapse

Extrication

Soarce: Adapted from S. Huntington , The Third lfave (Norman, OK and London : lggl),p.ltA.

Reforna

Ruptura

transition until the

REGIME CHANGE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Each interim government evaluates the foreign policy of the former

authoritarian regime differently. As Stanger thas pointed out, incumbent

caretaker govemments

face a unique dilemma in formulating an international agenda for the

interim period. The external policies of the outgoing authoritarian

order are, for all practical purposes, creatures of the caretakers'

creation. Though renouncing those policies might further the task ofconsolidating democracy, ruptura in the state's international relations

would also undermine the legitimacy of the interim arrangement.

Consequently ... caretaker interim governments were unlikely to

undertake major foreign policy initiatives prior to the first elections,

especially when the military either administered the transition or was

a powerful independent force in transition politics."

The situation is different from that of revolutionary provisional

govemments because theY

typically seize power at a time when the authoritarian regime has

steered the ship of state into profound international crisis. Often the

nation is at war at the time of revolution, and systemic factors serve

as a catalyst for revolutionary change. The interim governments ...

[are] united in their pursuit of a radical reorientation of the ancien

r6gime's foreign policy.'o

According to Stanger's analysis, each ideal type reflects a balance ofpower between the main actors, and this is quite evident in their domesticand international political agendas. Therefore, only in specificcircumstances will the process leading to the exit of the former authoritarianelites constrain and offer incentives for foreign policy change. In short, thenature of the interim government reflects the type of regime transition, andthis will lead to specific foreign policy options. It would seem that the typeof transition to democracy limits foreign policy options as well as the kindof interim government.

However, the interim governments in Portugal between April 1974 andJune 1976, and in Indonesia between May 1998 and October 1999, do notfit the above model well. Among other things the model does not identifythe mechanisms involved in the selection of foreign policy issues. Why dorevolutionary provisional governments choose to reorient certain policieswhile keeping intact some existing foreign policy options, namely, thosetnat are a natural consequence of geographic and economic realities?Funhermore, the reality is that incumbent caretaker governments dosometimes undertake major foreign policy initiatives. Why is this so?

The answers to these questions will lead us to reject the assertion that a

145

146 DEMOCRATIZATION

causal relationship exists between the type of democratic transidon, thenature of the interim government and foreign policy. In fact the nature of theinterim government is not the main variable explaining foreign poticyinitiatives, or their absence, during the rule of provisional cabineti. '

An Alternative Account of Foreign policy Change during RegimeTransitions

Here an issue will be considered foreign poricy when at least theinternational community perceives it as such. whether the country inquestion admits it or not is irrelevant. often governments - especially inauthoritarian regimes - when confronted with international criticisnr areprone to argue that an issue is a purely domestic one. This was true ofPortugal between 1960 and 1974 with regard to the decolonization of irsoverseas territories (Angola, cape verde, East Timor, Guinea Bissau,Macau, Mozambique, and sdo Tomd and principe), and of Indonesia'sapproach towards East Timor between 1975 and 1998. Nevertheless in bothcases there was an international dimension that put the issues in the realmof foreign policy. For, ultimately, both countries had to face internationalcriticism.

More pertinent, then, is to define what is meant by politically legitimatc.A foreign policy option is considered internationally $gitimatd when irserves international peace and compliel rvith the i&urity nonns andprinciples of international conduct. It must conform to international law andinternational norrns. Even the most militarily powerful states in thcinternational system usually follow politically legitimate paths in order tounderpin their foreign policy goals. Where major powers seek and valueinternational legitimacy, less powerful states will also tend to do so,. Incontrast, a foreign policy is perceived as legitimate inside the country.whenit incorporates not only national values and beliefs but also domesticpolitical and economic interests. Of course, neither interests nor policy are

likely to be static. So, over time, perceptions concerning international anddomestic legitimacy can, and usually do, change.

Theoretically, there are four possible scenarios. First, the foreign policydecision is considered legitimate both domestically and intemationelly.Second. the issue is seen internationally as legitimate but domestically as

illegitimate. Third, the forei-tn policy option is perceived internationally as

illegitimate and domestically as legitimate. Fourth, the issue is seen bothinternationally and domestically as illegitimate.

Given these different possible scenarios, what u,ill detennine a regime'sforeign policy options? Mainly, it will be a consequence of its owrtstrategies and evaluations of the costs and benefits. A policy perceived

REGIME CHANGE AND FOREIGN POLICY

domestically and internationally as legitimate does not present relevant

costs. It can offer significant benefits with low costs and consequently there

are no motives to change it. Alternatively, a policy seen internationally and

domestically as illegitimate has high costs and low benefits. From a rational

point of view, there are very few reasons - if any - which could lead a

government to maintain such an option. However, policies seen

intemationally as illegitimate and dornestically as legitimate - or perceived

domestically as illegitimate and internationally as legitimate - present

situations that are less clear cut. Knowing that a policy is illegitimate does

not mean that it is not worthwhile. If a government perceives the costs to be

comparatively minor then the policy will be maintained. On the other hand,

if the maintaining a policy implies relatively high costs there will be more

incentive to change it.The costs of an illegitimate foreign policy may vary. Among other

possibilities, a government may face international politibal condemnation

without further political consequences, whether the impact of UnitedNations resolutions, economic sanctions or war. Domestically, and in the

worst-case scenario, it can face high levels of social turmoil and political

divisions among elites threatening to undermine the regime's survival. The

repressive nature of authoritarian regimes usually allows them to respond to

domestic criticism with devices like propaganda that might go unchallengedat home. What is more likely to persist is international condemnatio-n. Bycontrast, democratic governments are constrained by any perceived lack oflegitimacy. Foreign policy issues that 'impinge on domestic well being and

stability, have the potential to arouse the attention of the general public and

to mobilize the public opinion'.'s'When an authoritarian state does undertake a foreign policy initiative

seen internationally as illegitimate it will often react to criticism in twoparallel ways. One is to denounce the criticism as an unacceptable violationof national sovereignty. The other is 'to demonstrate that it still considersitself (and the other states) bound by the rule in questio.n. In some cases the

state may deny that any violation has taken place ... or may admit that a rulehas been broken but appeal to some conflicting principle of overridingimportance'.'6 Whatever the argument, a decision to implement or maintaina policy that is against international legitimacy will be grounded on twobases, first, a judgement that the costs will be low or at least affordable, and

second, a concern that the foreign criticism could be construed as achallenge to the prevailing policy and to the government itself. Therefore,the government has to demonstrate its authority to the domestic audience,for signs of weakness might raise questions about its ability to maintaincontrol and about the stability of the regime. If it fails to shorv suchdetermination, the support of the political and other coalitions upon which

111

148 DEMOCRATIZATION

the regime depends could erode. Furthermore, if the policy followed isperceived internally as legitimate then there are more reasons to continuewith it. Where an adjusrment is made to

-31]Sn the policy more with

internaiional demands, as often as not it will ne just u'.orr.,i.".iung",However, once a foreign policy orientation begins to inflict costs on nohbledomestic groups, then the importance of those groups or certain prominentindividuals to the regime's support base or a ruling coalition will be a majorfactor in determining what happens next. Even so, internationalcondemnation of a given foreign policy will remain unacceptable to hard-liners, whose position could be owing to particular economic interests thevhave in maintaining the status quo or to a genuine conviction that the policiis in national interest. But from the point of view of an authoritarian regirnca radical change in foreign policy is always likely to presenr difficulties if itimplies an admission that costly mistakes were made in the past. Thcproblem is compounded where policy has the personal imprimatur of anautocratic leader. Major reversals of foreign policy may then have to awlita change of regime. That said, where there is internatioual criticism this nrayprepare the way by facilitating a diplomatic opening during transition todemocracy. The higher the costs the policy inflicted on the elites and on ther

population before democratic transition, the greater the probability thatduring transition the policy will be changed.

Nevertheless, it is possible that democratic transition will not trigger anyforeign policy changes. After all, if the existing policies are sccninternationally and domestically as legitimate, then why shoukl they bc

changed, even where a newly founded democratic polity alters the state'swhole outlook in many other respects? Ultimately the balance of powerbetween different individual and corporate evaluations and strategies willdecide which policies are changed and in what measure. This is becausc

transition may elevate new actors to positions of power and influence or

give to the previous actors a revised set of evaluations and strategies. It is

even possible that regime change provides just the opportunity lo

implement policy innovations that were desired but not enacted by tlre

preceding authoritarian regime. A different scenario is where the

responsibility lies entirely with the new actors. The evaluations and.

strategies will be constrained not only by the actors' values and beliefs but

also by the emerging democratic rules of the game and what these mean lor

the chances of being elected or re-elected to office. If a policy change

increases the chances ofbeing elected or re-elected, then the relevantactors

will be happy to comply, and the international approbation that will follow

might in turn enhance the individual's claims to be regarded as a statesntan

at homg. Of course, one possibility is that individual and colporate interests

could dictate opposing views on the desirability of making a change rn

REGIME CHANGE AND FOREIGN POLICY 149

nOlicy. Here, the outcome could well depend on which side the military

tker; in the worst-case scenario there might be violent confrontation or

evencivil war. Also. just like the transition to democracy itself, the foreign

oolicy initiatives could undergo substantial evolution during the process of

regime change, especially if that is a protracted process.,But changes are

m6st likely to be made where both individual and co{porate actors reckon

they will benefit or have a shared interest; conversely, change will be more

Oi'oblematic where they cannot agree' Therefore, during the transition to

dr*o.ru.y, the probability of a foreign policy change is high in a 3+4

situation, moderate in I +4 and 3+2, and low in l+2 (see Table 2).

TABLE 2

LIKELIHOOD OF POLICY CHANGE

lntemationallY legitimate ( 1 ):: il' 'lnternational illegitimate (3)

Domestically legitimate, (2)

Domestically illegitimate (4)

Portugal's Democratic TFansition and Self-determination forEast Timor

Portugal's transition to democracy took place as a replacement, ruptura and

breakdown/collapse. The opposition overthrew the authoritariangovernment. As mentioned above, revolutionary provisional governmentsare expected to pursue a radical reorientation of the preceding autocraticregime's foreign policies. Howeve( this was not the case in Portugal. Infact, the only foreign policy change that took place - allowing the self-determination of the overseas territories - was sought domestically by some

people even before the regime change. Therefore, their rise to power duringthe transition to democracy contributed to the shift. In a few months,Portugal would change its foreign policy from one seen internationally as

illegitimate to one seen as legitimate both internationally and domestically.The regime change meant a shift from a foreign policy aiming to maintainthe colonial empire towards a new one favouring the self-determination ofthe overseas territories.

When Marcello Caetano succeeded Ant6nio de Oliveira Salazar as

Prime Minister in 1968 it was thought for a while that he would liberalizethe regime. Among other things, the liberals and moderates hoped that hewould seek a political solution to the colonial war. What they did not knowat the time was that in order to be able to rise to power Marcello Caetanohad promised the regime hard-liners the he would maintain the colonial war.However, it became progressively clearer that he would neither liberalizethe regime nor put an end to the colonial war. When this became obvious,conditions became ripe for a military coup.

I5O DEMOCRATIZATION

On 25 April l9ll,the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das ForgasArmadas or MFA) put an end to 46 years of authoritarian rule. ln nrprurasituations, the government that follows is according to its nature consideredrevolutionary. Between Apil1974 and July 1976, Portugal had six differentinterim governments. However, the expected radical re-orientation of theforeign policy of the autocratic regime did not take place. For example,despite the communist control of the government - and the Cold War -Portugal did not leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The explanation for this is that the new civil and military elites'alignments, their individual as well as corporate evaluations and strategies,

supported only the specific foreign policy change toward the self-determination of the overseas territories. The interim govemment's decisionduring the transition to democracy to allow the self-determination of East

Timor was the logical step in accordance not only with the growinginternational perception of foreign policy illegitimacy, but also inaccordance with the new domestic individual and corporate evaluations and

strategies. Where there were major disagreements were in the method and

timing of self-determination. Two main lines emerged.According to some, decolonization did not mean automatic

independence. The first Portuguese president after the coup, GeneralAnt6nio de Spfnola, pointed out this view in his book published in February1974." Spinola favoured a wide-ranging autonomy model, or some sort offederalist option, to link Portugal with the former colonies, East Timorincluded. Equally a supporter of a model pointing to wide-rangingautonomy for East Timor was the minister for inter-territorial co-ordination,Almeida Santos. He made clear this pref'erence during his visit to the capitalof East Timor, Dfli, in October 1974. The interpretation that self-determination did not mean automatic independence seems to have beenmore popular among high ranking military officers, some socialists andright wing political parties.'8

Others interpreted self-determination as meaning immediate andunconditional independence for the overseas territories. This was theperspective of the junior military officers and left-wing political parties, inparticular the communists, as well as some socialists. As events wouldshow, they were the most powerful groups during this period and, therefore,their views would prevail. Their perspective reflected in part a very popularpolitical slogan in those days, demanding 'no more soldiers for thecolonies'. The Portuguese people were tired of 13 years of colonial war.But, more importantly, it showed that the military were also tired of a

colonial war with no hope of ending soon. Like others, they knew that thesolution to the colonial war had to be political, not military. Furthermore,the military were afraid that they would be blamed for a predictable defeat.

REGIME CHANGE AND FOREIGN POLICY I51

owing to the reasons mentioned above and to others that are beyond thescope of this article, the junior rnilitary officers decided to trigger a militarycoup against the authoritarian regime.

when the armed forces were drafting the official programme that wouldset the political framework for the new govemment of portugal there wasresistance from some senior officers concerning the granting of immediateindependence to the overseas territories. In the absence of consensus, theprogramme was kept vague on this issue. It is known that spinola did notaccept the inclusion of the word 'self-determination' in the originaldocument, because in the context he knew that it would imply automaticindependence. The programme emphasized that a 'solution to the warsoverseas was political and not military', and it was necessary to establish a'policy that would lead to peace'.'n There was no reference to self_determination. Instead, the wording was vague enough to accommodateboth those who wanted to recognize immediately the independence of thecolonies and those who preferred a gradual transition to self-determinationand settlement of the final political status of the overseas territories at somelater date.

The progressive change in the balance of power towards the juniormilitary officers and the communists became obvious in the secondprovisional government. This shift allowed them to approye on 27 lnly1914 theLaw 7l'14 recognizing self-determination as a possible solution tothe colonial war. The second provisional government was less under theinfluence of Spfnola and the conservatives.'o Even so, the rise to power ofthe communists and junior military officers did not cause foreign policy tochange fundamentally. Instead it just made two things clearer. First, self-determination of the overseas territories would lead inevitably toindependence. second, the declaration of their independence wourd occuras soon as possible.

The events in East Timor are partially explained by the evolution of thebalance of power among the two perspectives mentioned above. AlthoughAlmeida Santos had said in october lgi4 that he favoured a wide-rangingautonomy model, or some sort of federalist option, to link portugal withEast Timor, the reality was that in June 1975 during the Macau talks attmehble was agreed for East Timor's route to self-determination. In 1976,there should be general elections for a constitnent assembly that would thendraft a constitution and decide the future of the territory.:r However, this didnot take place. On 7 December 1975, Indonesian troops invaded theterritory, interrupting the path to self-determination.

To sum up, the individual and corporate interests and strategies thatelerged during the transition to democracy led only to one major foreignpolicy change. This occurred on the only foreign policy issue that was seen

r52 DEMOCRATIZATION

by the intemational community as illegitimate: the maintenance of thecolonial empire. With the regime change came a new government sensitive

to the opinions of the intemational community. The new policy favourable

to self-determination came to be seen internationally and domestically as

legitimate. What had not been possible during 13 years of colonial war tookplace in a few months, owing to the regime change and subsequent

emergence of new individual and corporate interests and strategies.

Indonesia's Democratic Ttansition and the Popular Consultationin East Timor

Indonesia's transition to democracy took place as a transformation, refonna

and transaction. The initiative to begin the regime change was taken by the

authoritarian elites. As mentioned above, incumbent caretaker governments

are 'unlikely to undertake major foreign policy initiatives prior to the firstelections, especially when the military ... are a powerful independent force

in transition politics'." However, this was not the case in Indonesia. Despite

the military's opposition, the fact is that foreign policy changes took place

and allowed the East Timorese to cast their ballots in a popular consultation.

In a few months, Indonesia would change its fnreign policy concerning East

Timor from one seen internationally as illegitimate to one seen as legitimate

- but domestically perceived by some as questionable. Still, the regime

change allowed a shift frorn a foreign policy aiming to maintain East Timor

as the 27th Indonesian province towards a new one allowing popular

consultation in the tenitory.From the time of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in December 1975

the territory's status was a source of contention. The United Nations

General Assembly Resolution 3485 on l2 December 1975 and the United

Nations Security Council Resolution 384 on 22 December 1975 both

confirmed the inalienable East Timorese right to self-determination (point

1) and demanded Indonesia's military withdrawal from the territory (points

5 and 7 respectively). These two resolutions meant that Indonesia's best

diplomatic efforts to legitimize its hold over the territory would remain

unsuccessful. But for Indonesia's President Suharto sovereignty was non-

negotiable, and the cost in terms of international criticism was considered

acceptable. However, the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1991 'together with the events the crisis triggered inside the country. were to

create in only a few months domestic conditions ripe for a regime change.

On 2l May 1998 B.J. Habibie's coming to office in place of Suharto

signalled the end of three decades of the 'New Order' (Orde Bsru) ofauthoritarian rule. The transition to democracy occurred by refornta.In such

situations, the government that follows is an incumbent caretaker

REGIME CHANGE AND FOREIGN POLICY r53

government. Between May 1998, when the transition to democracy began,

ind october 1999, when the consolidation of democracy started, Habibie's

interim government ruled Indonesia. Contrary to what might be expected, a

major foreign policy initiative took place prior to the first democratic

elettions in June 1999. The explanation is that the new civil and military

alignments, and in particular Habibie's desire to be elected as Indonesia's

prJrid"nt, supported just this one policy change favourable to the self-

betermination of East Timor. The interim government's decision' during the

transition to democracy, allowing the self-determination of East Timor was

a logical step that accorded both with international perceptions and with

Habibie's election strategy'

Although Habibie was vice-president of Indonesia during the

authoritariin regime and was the longest serving minister in Suharto's

governments, he did not seem to feel in any way that the East Timor policy'

iollowed for 25 years, had been his responsibility. Habibie thought that by

allowing an act of self-deterrnination in East Timor he would benefit in two

different ways. Besides winning the ballot he would be able to 'distinguish

himself from Suharto', and would 'establish himself as a figure

internationally'.I Dewi Fofiuna Anwar, assistant minister/state secretary for

foreign affairi during Habibie's govemment, pointed out that he wished 'to

make his mark by resolving the East Timor issue once and for all as part of

his plan both to strengthen his democratic credentials at home and his

credentials abroad'.t'What Habibie perceived as a golden opportunity was profoundly

distrusted by large and important elements in the military. This corporate

opposition explains rhe support they gave to militia activities during 1999.

Alihough they accepted a wide-ranging autonomy proposal' they were

againsi a popular consultation that could end with East Timor's

independence. In this sense, the domestic legitimacy of Habibie's steps was

contested.

A first sign of a possible change in foreign policy took place almost

immediately after Habibie became Indonesian president.25 On 9 June 1998'

he proposed a special autonomy status within Indonesia for East Timor, and

betrryeen June and August his government gradually refined this proposal.

The foreign ministers of Portugal and Indonesia, Jaime Gama and AliAlatas respectively, met in New York on 4-5 August 1998 under the

auspices oi the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. During this

meeting they agreed to hold discussions on Indonesia's proposals for a

special status based on wide-ranging autonomy for East Timor' without

prejudice to their basic positions on the issue of sovereignty'

Reiresentatives of both countries would meet again in October and

November 1998.

l<irJA DEMOCRATIZATTON

Owing to Portugal's refusal to accept wide-ranging autonomvfinal status for rhe territory, Habibie aecioeo to arrori;;ilffi:l,,Xl,:1:This possibility was discussed and accepted by the cabinet in tanuu.f ts$.As a consequence, the East Timorese would be allowed to vote uno ,uy iithey accepted or rejected a wide_ranging autonomy proposaf. If tireyrejected Habibie's autonomy proposal, he would advise the forthcomingdelegates of the people's consurtative Assembly (MajerisPenrutsvatvaratan Raxr\at, or MpR) session in octoberA.{ovember io annulthe 1976 decree integrating East Timor inro Indonesia. By establishing rhisprocedure Habibie aimed to guarantee two goals. First, he wouldimmediately diminish international pressure against his government overthe issue of East Timor. Second, if the final decision were to be made by theMPR, he would be partially protected against critics who might charge thathe had made decisions beyond his constitutional powers.26

This procedure also revealed a lack of national consensus. The mostpowerful institution against this proposal was the Indonesian National Anny(Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI). The commander of the TNI, DefenciMinister General wiranto, would later claim that the armed forces were notconsulted before the decision was made. Although this scenario seems veryunlikely,':T nevertheless it is good evidence that the military disagreed withHabibie's decision. Political, economic and moral reasons exptain thisdisagreement. Politically, the TNI saw in popular consultation a possibletrigger to the territorial disintegration of Indonesia.2s In their evaluationpopular consultation in East Timor would set a precedent that would begin adomino effect. After the East Timorese ballot, at least Aceh and Irian Jayawould want to follow the same process. In fact, and despite their differentformer colonial backgrounds, the East Timorese popular consultation didlead to the revival of secessionist claims by Aceh and Irian Jaya.Economically, an independent East Timor would imply the end of the trademonopolies linked to high rank military members as well as native pro-autonomy supporters.2e suharto's son-inJaw, General prabowo subianto,had been dismissed from the army after the demise of the authoritariangovernment. Still he, Suharto's family and other military men continued tohave important economic interests to protect in East Timor. Morally, amongnationalist circles and within the military it was thought that if East Timorwas to become independent then by implication all those Indonesian soldierswho had perished in the territory would have lost their lives in vain.

The Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs (Depafienrcn LuarNegeri, or DEPLU) also disagreed with Habibie's proposal. This wasadmitted later by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas. He made public thefact that when the self-determination proposal was discussed in cabinet hehad said the proposal was premature.r' These different views were a sign of

REGIME CHANGE AND FOREIGN POLICY

major splits between Habibie's individual agenda and that of DEpLU.The fact that there were TNI members who thought that the wide_

ranging autonomy proposal would be accepted explains the low level ofviolence before the ballot. Together with the militias the military sought tolead the population in the direction of voting for the autonomy proposal.The Indonesian elections for members of the House of Representatives(Dewan Penvakilan Ralqat,or DPR) on 7 June 1998 seemed to have playedan important role. It seems that the East Timorese pro-independence leaderscampaigned unofficially among the population to vote massively in the Juneelections.r' This decision was intended to tranquilize the Indonesiannationalist forces. As a result, the number of ballots cast in the Juneelections was very high - 346,454 valid votes - in the territory.r2 But, moreimportant, the four seats in discussion were won by B.J. Habibie's Golkarand Megawati Sukamoputri's Indonesian Democratic party - Struggle(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan, or PDI-p). Golkar and thePDI-P each won two seats with 49 per cent and 35 per cent of the votesrespectively. Their clear victory gave an incorrect signal of how thepopulation would vote during the forthcoming popular consultation.

On 30 August 1999, 98 per cent of those East Timorese who wereregistered to vote delivered an overwhelming rejection (by 78.5 per cent, ora total of 344,580 votes against) of the proposed special autonomy statusand expressed their wish to begin the transition to independence. only 21.5per cent (94,388 votes) cast their ballots in favour of autonomy as aprovince of Indonesia. Bearing in mind the considerable intimidationpe{petrated by the militias before the popular consultation, those who reallywished to remain part of Indonesia were probably an even smaller minority.Nevertheless, the announcement of the results triggered a scorched-earthpolicy, coordinated by members of the military and executed by militiagroups. Their concern was that East Timor might set a precedent forindependence movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya.

Habibie's domestic and international strategies failed completely and hewould not become the first Indonesian president to be electeddemocratically. Constrained by international pressure, Indonesia would becompelled to accept the ballot result..3 Inevitably, on 20 October 1999, theMPR endorsed the popular consultation outcome and on 28 October theIndonesian ambassador in the United Nations, Makarim Wibisono,delivered to the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, a letterending officially Jakarta's claim to East Timor. The outcome clearlycontradicts those theoretical approaches that suggest no foreign policychange would occur in situations like this. Nevertheless, East Timor aside,'lndonesia's foreign policy remains cont entional and largely (but notwholly) continuous with the New Order resime.',.

r55

156 DEMOCRATIZATION

Conclusions

This article has shown why the nature of interim governments is not asatisfactory explanation for foreign policy initiatives, or their absence.

during transitions to democracy. On the one hand, this proposal is tqodeterministic. On the other hand, an interim government's nature does netexplain which specific foreign policy decisions will be rnade, and wtry.

During the Portuguese transition to democracy between 1974 ana D16,radical foreign policy changes were expected. No such thing happened.During the Indonesian transition to democracy between 1998 and 1999,

major foreign policy initiatives were not expected. Nevertheless, they tookplace. The obvious empirical contradiction of the theoretical argumentsgives rise to an alternative approach to understanding the relation betweenregime change and foreign policy.

This article has argued that by introducing into the analysis newindividual and corporate domestic evaluations and strategies - a

consequence of the new elites' alignment - the installation of a nerv

democratic regime might open a window of opportunity for certain tbreignpolicy changes. This approach explains which foreign policy initiatives are

taken and why, and which foreign policy innovations might be resisted orare not taken at all, and why this is the case.

The corporate strategy of the junior ranking military in Portugal. aimingto allow the self-determination of overseas territories, and the individualinterest of Indonesia's B.J. Habibie, who wished to strengthen his domestic

and intemational democratic credibility, led to specific foreign policychanges that, ultimately, allowed the self-determination of East Timor. The

perception of the international community about one country's foreign policyoptions is shown to be a powerful influence upon decision-makingprocedures and, therefore, in part shapes individual and corporate interests

and strategies. Without international criticism, neither Portugal nor Indonesia

would have changed their foreign policy approaches - independently of the

nature of the future interim govemment. International criticism during the

1960s and early 1970s of Portuguese colonial policy, and between 1975 and

1998 of the Indonesian military invasion of East Timor, helped prepare the

conditions for democracy after the regime change.