pat is like racism

8/13/2019 Pat is Like Racism

1/8

Patriotism is Like RacismAuthor(s): Paul GombergReviewed work(s):Source: Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Oct., 1990), pp. 144-150Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381896.

Accessed: 01/08/2012 15:06

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The University of Chicago Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toEthics.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpresshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2381896?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2381896?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress


2/8

DISCUSSION

Patriotism Is like RacismPaul GombergStephen Nathanson's "In Defense of 'Moderate Patriotism"' tries to showthat there is a moderate patriotism that does not collapse into an unpatrioticuniversal morality or become an immoderate patriotism that no universalistcould endorse.' It fails. I will argue this much in the first part of thisnote. In the second I will draw some more constructive lessons, arguingthat, on the most plausible assumptions about our world, patriotism isno better than racism.NATHANSON'S MODERATE PATRIOTISM AND ITS PROBLEMSNathanson defines moderate patriotism as preference (presumably, inaction) for one's nation, its traditions and institutions, and one's fellownationals, but within the limits of morality, that is, provided one doesnot violate the "legitimate needs and interests of other nations" and theirnationals (p. 538). He argues that there is a moderate patriotism that iscompatible both with the imperatives of commonsense morality and withmoral universalism. I will not dispute compatibility with commonsensemorality. Since I will question compatibility with moral universalism, itis important to characterize it. Let us say that moral universalism impliesthat actions are to be governed by principles that give equal considerationto all people who might be affected by an action.

Moral universalism is often thought to be uncontroversial and coex-tensive with commonsense morality, but I believe it is neither. Christianuniversalism is often based on an interpretation of the parable of the.good Samaritan: Jesus is explicating the principle, "Love thy neighboras thyself," by answering the question, "Who is my neighbor?" The pointof the parable is that the Samaritan helped a Jew, thus transcending thenarrow loyalty of nationality. Jesus concludes his discussion by saying,"Go, and do thou likewise." His purpose is to take what is already anexacting morality love your neighbor as yourself-and to make it moreexacting by adding that nationality is irrelevant to this commandment.This is one kind of moral universalism, and it is pretty clear that this isnot identical with commonsense morality, either of that time or ours.

1. Stephen Nathanson, "In Defense of 'Moderate Patriotism,"' Ethics 99 (1989):535-52. Page references to Nathanson are in the text.Ethics 101 (October 1990): 144-150C 1.990 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/91/0101-0007$01.00

144


3/8

Gomberg Patriotism Is like Racism 145Of course, a moral universalism that commands us to love our neighboras ourselves is not the only possible one, but part of moral universalismis that moral regard is universal-all count equally and positively indeciding what to do. And, at first glance, this does seem incompatiblewith a preference for one's fellow nationals or for one's own traditions

and institutions over those of others. Nathanson tries to show that uni-versalism and national preference are compatible in his discussion ofexamples of two sorts conflict, examples that are raised by AlasdairMacIntyre.2 MacIntyre's argument is that in conflicts between nationalitiesthe moral universalist will not be patriotic. Nathanson's reply is that inconflicts between nationalities the moderate patriot will act differentlyfrom both the unpatriotic moral universalist and the nonuniversalistpatriot.The first example is of conflict between nations over resources, typicallyland and its products and often population. In the extreme case, the wayof life of a national community might be at stake (although claims thatthis is so are often hyperbole-does the U.S. national way of life dependon imported oil?). MacIntyre claims that the patriot will fight for thenational community while the moral universalist will not. Nathansonreplies that moderate patriots will follow a third course, seeking a justcompromise between nations, but supporting their nations when andonly when such compromise is impossible or conflict is unavoidable (heputs his condition in both ways) (pp. 541-42). The two formulations aresignificantly different, and in the difference lies the problem of establishingthat there is a genuine third alternative between chauvinistic patriotismand unpatriotic universalism.On the first formulation of the condition-that compromise isimpossible-the moderate patriot must be reasonably assured that thereis no possible just compromise. This is a huge burden that moderatepatriots may be unable to fulfill, and it may, in practice, lead to a neutralitythat precludes patriotism. Are the conflicts between Jews and Arabs onthe West Bank impossible to compromise in a just way? the conflictbetween the United States and Japan over trade? In considering realcases, whether contemporary or historical, it seems hard to find a clearcase of conflicts of national interest where just accommodation is or wasimpossible. If so, then Nathanson has not shown that the moderatepatriot will be different from the unpatriotic moral universalist.But Nathanson's other condition-that conflict is unavoidable-seems to imply that the moderate patriot will support the national com-munity once conflict has started, when "either/or choices must be made."Would the moderate patriot have supported the U.S. war effort againstMexico in 1846? the war effort in Southeast Asia? The second conditionfails to distinguish the moderate patriot from the chauvinist patriot.

2. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" Lindley Lecture (University of KansasPhilosophy Department, Lawrence, 1984).


4/8

146 Ethics October1990The second sort of conflict is over competing conceptions of thegood life-MacIntyre gives the example of peoples for whom the goodlife involves raids on their neighbors. Here Nathanson strongly endorsesthe moral universalist conclusion that such a conception of the goodmust be abandoned because it fails to respect the humanity of others.Then his task is to show how the moderate patriot is different from themoral universalist-what the moderate patriot would do that the moraluniversalist would not. His answer is that "moderate patriots would realizethe genuine value of... the goods associated with that way of life. Unlikeoutsiders, they might work to foster the development of other practicesthat preserve some of the community's traditional values. They wouldnot be indifferent to the community's losses" (pp. 543-44). But this failsto distinguish the moderate patriot from the moral universalist. The

moral universalist can hardly be "indifferent to the community's losses."And, like anthropologists and others who know of and cherish the tra-ditional way of life that was practiced by Khoisan (bushmen) of thenorthwest Kalahari Desert, the moral universalist might well "work tofoster the development of other practices that preserve some of thecommunity's traditional values."Would the moderate patriot be more committed to the preservationof the institutions and traditions of his or her own nationality than tothose of other nationalities? If the answer is yes, this can be construedin two ways. On the one hand, it might be a division of moral labor,where universal duties must be divided among us and where the equallyvaluable traditions of all nationalities are best preserved if members ofeach nationality take care of their own traditions. In that case, the devotionto the traditions of one's own nation is contingent and dependent onthis claim about ends and means. It is a consequence of this view thatif, for some reason, some national traditions cannot be preserved by theirown peoples, we are equally duty bound to uphold those. On the otherhand, this greater commitment to our own nation might not be contingentin this way and might represent assigning greater value to one's ownnational traditions than to those of other nationalities. But this looks alot like racism, at least in the broad sense in which I will use that wordhere, where it includes ethnic and national chauvinism.PATRIOTISM AND MORAL THEORYConsider two ways to define the relationship between universal moralityand moderate patriotism. Moderate patriotism might be allowed by uni-versal morality, but not required by it. Alternatively, the duty to bemoderately patriotic might be a consequence of a universal morality andfacts about an individual's particular situation.In the first case, where moderate patriotism is allowed but not requiredby universal morality, it would have to be the case that universal moralitydoes not render judgments about all acts. For if it did, it would eithercommand or forbid patriotic acts. Universal morality would have to contain


5/8

Gomberg Patriotism Is like Racism 147a significant zone of discretion, where acts are neither required norforbidden. This zone may be occupied either by acts that are indifferentor supererogatory or by acts that are required by special moralities, suchas patriotism or moralities of kinship.It is not hard to imagine moralities that meet this condition, andcommonsense morality may indeed have this logical structure. Supposeuniversal morality requires only respect for minimal rights of all others,for example, the right not to be killed without cause, these rights specifiedby an objective list of injunctions and prohibitions. Special moralitiesmay specify duties to others with special relations to the agent, such askin or fellow nationals. While universal morality would prohibit killing,deceiving, and exploiting others, it would leave a large area where onemay (or must, by the injunctions of a special morality) pursue one's owninterests or those of one's family, community, or nation with relativeindifference to others.Surely, a moderate patriotism, including preference for fellow na-tionals, is consistent with universal morality so conceived. In this sense,one might also speak of a "moderate racism" that would be compatiblewith universal morality, for surely someone could discriminate againstblack or Hispanic people or against immigrants or noncitizens in hiringand promotion without violating their fundamental rights-unless wesay that their fundamental rights include being treated impartiallywithoutregard to race, nationality, or citizenship. But if we say this is a fundamentalright, then doesn't this preclude favoring others of one's own nationality?In order to appreciate the difficulty of finding a significant distinctionbetween racism and patriotism, we must consider an example in somedetail. In our society money earned is considered our own, so that it ispermissible and even obligatory to spend a significant portion of ourearnings in providing for our families.3 Whatever is required by universalmorality, most think that this practice does not violate those requirements.And if one owns a small business, a travel agency, let us say, there isnothing wrong with hiring a teenage daughter part-time to do paperworkfor pay. (In contrast, a public employee who hires a family memberviolates a public trust because the money spent is not her own.) As longas the business is your own, you may hire your family if you wish.Now suppose you need more employees, more than your family canprovide. Is it morally permissible to hire old school chums and peoplefrom the neighborhood? Given the degree of residential and school seg-regation in most big cities in the United States, it would not be surprisingif these were of a single ethnic group, and it would be quite likely thatif they were either white or Hispanic, they would not include any or

3. The reader should not assume that the author believes that family-centered morality,the money economy, and the wage system are compatible with promoting a better worldfor all. For a communist critique of these, see "Road to Revolution IV-a CommunistManifesto (1982)," PL: A Journal of CommunistTheoryand Practice (1989), pp. 9-14.


6/8

148 Ethics October1990many black people, and if black, not many white or Hispanic. Now, inthese circumstances is it morally permissible to hire employees from one's"natural"circle of friends and acquaintances, which happens to be severelylimited in ethnic composition? Or suppose that one has benefited bybeing raised in an ethnic community and trained in one's vocation byone's co-nationals. Is it now permissible to show gratitude by favoringone's nationality in hiring and promotion?I imagine that seventy or eighty years ago most people saw nothingwrong with these practices. How was it argued that they were wrong? Ithink the crucial argument is that, given residential and school segregationand given the greater initial disadvantage of most black people in accessto capital and business opportunities generally, the practice will tend tomaintain or exacerbate poverty in intensely impoverished inner-city blackghettos.4In a society where all ethnic groups had roughly equal economicresources, a practice of favoring one's own nationality or ethnic groupmight not be unjust. We-or at least I-believe it is racism, undermininghuman equality. The belief that favoring one's own nationality is wrongis based on the estimation that the practice contributes to segregationand subordination of black people.It is at least plausible that considerations parallel to these apply inthe case of favoring compatriots (citizens of the same state). Considerthe practice of a U.S. citizen's favoring compatriots in employment. Theconsiderations that were convincing regarding racism against black peoplecan be applied internationally. People from other countries immigrateto the United States because of international inequality. Internationalincome gaps are vastly greater than domestic racialinequality. So favoritismtoward a more prosperous nationality or discrimination against nationalsfrom poor nations contributes to a morally objectionable inequality.Large percentages of the populations of many countries, particularlyin the southern parts of the world, fail to get enough calories to lead anormal, active life, making for short life expectancy. Moral universalismmust regard this as very bad. If, as seems plausible, favoritism by nationalsof more prosperous countries for hungry compatriots over others whoare hungry would contribute to this situation, then such favoritism is,from a universalist viewpoint, no better than racism. The question, "Howare patriotism and moral universalism related?" is primarily a questionabout the effects of patriotism. There seem to be plausible, but notconclusive, arguments that the effects are bad and that favoritism towardone's compatriots is as objectionable as ethnic favoritism.5

4. William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1987), p. 60, cites the absence of social networks linking ajobless individual to otherswho have jobs to explain joblessness, especially in inner-city black ghettos. On wideningblack-white disparities, see U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstractof the United States:1988, 108th ed. (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 427.5. It has been common in left-wing circles to distinguish between the nationalism ofmore prosperous nations and that of oppressed nations or oppressed nationalities in mul-


7/8

Gomberg Patriotism Is like Racism 149A different argument can be made against patriotism that is notdirected against oppressed nationalities. Consider the imperative, "BuyAmerican " which is certainly presented as a patriotic duty. Now, if directedagainst Philippine, Brazilian, or Chinese imports, the earlier argumentapplies. But suppose it is directed against Japanese imports. Here theJapanese are regarded as both privileged and unfair (although the mainconsideration offered in favor of this imperative is common nationalinterest). This imperative, however, may contribute toward a climate ofwar, as did similar movements toward national autarky in the 1930s.Anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States has already been reciprocatedin Japan. The effect of the imperative, "Buy American " is likely to beincreased national antagonism. Once again, this is not a conclusive ar-gument against the imperative but a substantive question which wouldstrongly affect whether a moderate patriotism can be distinguished from

a harmful national chauvinism.We have been investigating the possibility of a moderate patriotismwithin the framework of a limited universal morality of basicrights specifiedby an objective list. If we try to allow patriotism and forbid racism onthe basis of a universal morality that makes racial discrimination a violationof a fundamental right but makes discrimination based on national cit-izenship permissible, the universal morality with this structure looks im-plausible and arbitrary. We want to know by what criterion we decidewhat is on the list and what is not.Philosophical moral theory, in either a Kantian or a utilitarian vein,has attempted to provide a single principle or a closely related set ofprinciples from which a morality might be derived. Can either a universalistutilitarianism or a universalist Kantianism show why (some) patriotismis good and racism is bad? The task for the universalist utilitarian is easyto describe: it must be shown that we achieve the overall best results,everyone's interests counting equally, if we (or some of us) are patriotic,but that we do not achieve the best results if people practice racism. Suchan argument requires an estimate of the effects of patriotism and racismin human societies. Some of the arguments endorsing patriotism arefamiliar enough. It was common in the nineteenth century for Britishintellectuals to argue that the spread of British imperalism had a civilizingand uplifting effect on non-European peoples. We are familiar with U.Spoliticians who identify U.S. interests with the interests of all the world'speoples in human rights and democracy. Or one might argue, as Sidgwickdoes with respect to devotion to family and associates, that limitationson power, knowledge, and affection make it best overall that peopleconcentrate other-regarding concerns on members of their community.6tiethnic nations and to regard the nationalism of the oppressed as good. The above argumentshould not be understood as endorsing that position. The experience of black nationalismin the United States seems to indicate that the nationalism of oppressed peoples does littleor nothing to alleviate oppression. But that is another argument.6. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984), pp.433-34.


8/8

150 Ethics October1990These arguments are about the effect of patriotism or a particularpatriotism; needless to say, there is much room for argument. In theeighteenth and nineteenth centuries many believed that particular na-tionalisms, especially U.S. and French, represented universal human in-terests and progress.7 We are now more skeptical about the effects of

nationalism. Earlier in the century communists believed that nationalliberation struggles were part of universal human progress. But the out-comes in Algeria, Vietnam, and elsewhere leave much room for doubt.So it is hard to accept utilitarian arguments that some limited patriotismwill lead to the best results universally.The most plausible strategy for defending patriotism is to argue foran indirect universalism, either utilitarian or Kantian: in order to realizeuniversal principles (promoting well-being and respect for human rights)we need social norms that bind people together, and those norms createspecial relationships, with corresponding special duties. Hence universalprinciples can be realized only through relationships that require pref-erential treatment.8 I have no quarrel with this general conclusion. Butare nation-states and patriotic culture-a culture of preference for one'scompatriots and country-among the institutions that in fact realizeuniversal principles? I have argued that there are substantial reasons todoubt this.The problematic relationship between patriotism and moral uni-versalism derives from our history. Universalism arose fairly recently inhuman societies, perhaps first in the philosophies and religions of hellenisticsociety.9 The parable of the good Samaritan is a typical expression ofthe rejection of nationalism that characterized Christian universalism.This remained the dominant ethical ideal in Europe until the rise of thenation-state and, later, of conscious nationalism in the eighteenth century.There were various efforts to reconcile nationalism and patriotism withthe tradition of universalism. Efforts at reconciliation are essentially con-ceptions of human history that say that patriotism helps to realize universalwell-being or human rights. This positive estimate of patriotism can bederived either from an optimistic view that patriotism is a stage in ourprogress toward a more universal moral regard or from a pessimisticview that widespread patriotism is the closest most of us can get toconsciously practicing universal moral ideals. I am suggesting that neitherthe pessimism nor that particular optimism is warranted: a genuine uni-versalism is possible, but only as a result of a struggle against patriotismand nationalism.

7. Hans Kohn made this point in different places. See, e.g., The Age of Nationalism(New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 3-4.8. This argument is made convincingly, from a human rights perspective, by AlanGewirth, "Ethical Universalism and Particularism," Journal of Philosophy85 (1988): 283-302. 9. See, e.g., Hans Kohn, TheIdea of Nationalism:A Studyin Its Originsand Background(New York: Macmillan, 1944), chap. 2.

pat is like racism

Documents