passivity phenomena: implications for the concept of self

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Passivity Phenomena: Implications for the Concept ofSelfDr Ralf-Peter Behrendta

a Consultant Psychiatrist, The Retreat Hospital, York, U.K.Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Dr Ralf-Peter Behrendt (2005) Passivity Phenomena: Implications for the Concept of Self,Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 7:2, 185-207, DOI:10.1080/15294145.2005.10773495

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Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 2005, 7 (2) 185

Passivity Phenomena: Implications for the Concept of Self

Ralf-Peter Behrendt (York, U.K.)

Philosophers and theoretical psychologists have in the past tried to elucidate the nature of self, volition, and agency from afundamental position of determinism. Although the idea that we are driven to action by instincts has fallen out of favor in an age ofcognitive psychology and information-processing paradigms of the mind, deterministic approaches predicted principles of theorganization of voluntary behavior that can now successfully integrate psychological and neuroanatomical data. Motor acts (andthoughts) form part of a “total performance” in that they serve as tools for higher-level drives and motivations. At the same time,there is evidence to suggest that dispositions to actions (and thoughts) are induced by perceived events or objects—consistentwith behaviorism—and that the actualization of these dispositions is promoted or inhibited by currently prevailing drives. Theorganization of the basal ganglia–thalamocortical system normally ensures that only those response tendencies are acted uponthat are consistent with the organism’s current drive state. It is argued here that drive reduction experienced in conjunction withthe perception of our movements and thoughts is responsible for the sense of self-generation, or “coming from me,” which ischaracteristic of our actions and thoughts, and that, when dispositions to such actions and thoughts are excited by environmentalor “inner” stimuli in a manner that defies prevailing drives, passivity experiences can arise.

Dr. Ralf-Peter Behrendt: Consultant Psychiatrist, The Retreat Hospital, York, U.K.Correspondence to: Dr Ralf-Peter Behrendt, The Retreat Hospital, Heslington Road, York, YO10 5BN, U.K. (email: [email protected]).

Passivity phenomena (actions and thoughts experi-enced as unwilled or unintended) in patients withschizophrenia pose a challenge not only to widelyheld views on the nature of the self, but also to contem-porary theorizing in the field of schizophrenia. Ex-planatory theories of passivity phenomena such ascentral monitoring deficits (e.g., Frith, 1992; Frith,Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000) or failure of agencyattribution (Jeannerod, 2001) are problematic becausethey presuppose the existence of the self as an agentand are therefore vulnerable to the charge of infiniteregress. The philosophically alternative position wouldbe to regard the self as a mere experiential phenom-enon, thus undermining notions of free will and agencythat are commonly attributed to the self. We will seethat in “exorcising” the self as an agent (Zuriff, 1985),we arrive at a more economical and evolutionarilyconsistent understanding of conscious or “voluntary”behavior and at the same time will have prepared theground for a more parsimonious model of passivityphenomena.

Philosophers and psychologists, both within andoutside the tradition of psychoanalysis, have arguedthat conscious behavior is deterministic, in that it is“energized” and organized by instincts or drives. A

model of passivity phenomena that crucially hinges ona deterministic position will—if successful—not onlypose a challenge to neuropsychological theories ofpassivity phenomena but also help to underminecognitivism more generally and strengthen the theo-retical basis of psychoanalysis as a rival framework forunderstanding the mind. It may not be a coincidencethat opposition to psychoanalysis emanates from disci-plines such as cognitive psychology and sociology thathave a fundamental investment in regarding the self asgoal-oriented, responsible, and free in its decisions.The view that human behavior is wholly instinct-driven (a position that will be clarified and supportedbelow) may be perceived as threatening the founda-tions of our social and “scientific” belief systems andwill not be accepted lightly by many neuroscientists inan age of computational and information-processingmodels of the mind/brain. Yet, as we will see, passivityphenomena remain an insurmountable obstacle fortheorists influenced in this way.

One may object that psychoanalysis is not directlyrelevant to passivity phenomena. After all, psycho-analysis is a developmental theory of interpersonalbehavior; it considers the ego (or “social self,” asWilliam James, 1890, would have called it) as it nego-

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186 Ralf-Peter Behrendt

tiates the organism’s aggressive, sexual, and affiliativeimpulses with those it faces from other individuals inthe group. It needs to be remembered that Freudfounded psychoanalysis—being a science mainly ofinterpersonal behavior and its intrapsychic corre-lates—on a more general theory of instinctive needs,psychic energy (tension), object seeking, and cathexis(Freud, 1915). It is on this general level of consciousinteraction with the environment that we discuss thenature of self-experience, concerning ourselves withthe way in which the “stream of consciousness” “fallsasunder into two contrasted parts, one realized as‘Self’, the other as ‘not-Self’” (James, 1890, p. 304).

Movements and thoughts in patients with acuteschizophrenia sometimes lack their characteristic qual-ity of “coming from me” or “being mine” and areexperienced instead as being “made” or imposed by anexternal agent. Schneider (1957) recognized such pas-sivity phenomena as schizophrenic symptoms of thefirst rank. When experiencing their apparently un-willed or unintended movements or thoughts, schizo-phrenic patients come to the conclusion that they arecontrolled by television sets, implants, aliens, or reli-gious figures (secondary elaboration into “delusions ofalien control”). Some passivity experiences may ariseonly when patients find themselves unable to resistspontaneously occurring actions or thoughts (Jaspers,1946). “Made actions,” which are characterized by aloss in the awareness that one’s actual performance isone’s own, need to be distinguished from hallucinatedmovements, including hallucinations of the speech ap-paratus, which likewise may be accompanied by a“vivid experience that they have been contrived fromoutside” (Jaspers, 1946).

Passively experienced limb movements occur out-side schizophrenia in certain types of brain damage,where they are referred to as “alien-limb” or “alien-hand” signs. In this syndrome, apparently purposefulmovements of an upper limb are experienced by thesubject as unintended and uncontrollable (Della Sala,Marchetti, & Spinnler, 1991; Gasquoine, 1993). Theaffected hand is experienced as pursuing its own pur-pose, having a mind of its own or being controlled byan external agent; nevertheless, the patient acknowl-edges that the hand belongs to him or her. Graspingmovements and intermanual conflict are the most com-mon alien behaviors (Gasquoine, 1993). The alienhand tends to compulsively perform activities withsurrounding objects or interferes with intentional ac-tivities begun by the other hand (Banks et al., 1989;Feinberg, Schindler, Flanagan, & Haber, 1992;Goldberg & Bloom, 1990). The patient may even feelthat their alien limb anticipates these activities

(Feinberg et al., 1992). Patients are often frustrated attheir inability to prevent their hand’s alien behavior,and they develop strategies to restrain or distract it(Banks et al., 1989; Goldberg & Bloom, 1990).

The alien-hand syndrome commonly arises fromlesions in the contralateral medial frontal lobe (usuallyin the dominant hemisphere) and the anterior corpuscallosum (Banks et al., 1989 Gasquoine, 1993;Goldberg & Bloom, 1990; Trojano, Crisci, Lanzillo,Elefante, & Caruso, 1993). An isolated lesion to theanterior corpus callosum tends to produce an acutesyndrome (Della Sala, Marchetti, & Spinnler, 1991)characterized by intermanual conflict (Feinberg et al.,1992), whereas additional damage to the frontal medialcortex causes a chronic condition (Della Sala,Marchetti, & Spinnler, et al., 1991; Trojano et al.,1993) with compulsive grasping as a prominent feature(Feinberg et al., 1992). Spence (2002) conceptualizedthese types of alien-limb phenomena as disinhibitedmotor behaviors that are released from “higher” con-trol. Alien-limb symptoms due to lesions in posteriorcortical (particularly parietal) and subcortical areashave also been described (Bundick & Spinella, 2000;Groom, Ng, Kevorkian, & Levy, 1999); however, theydiffer phenomenologically in that arm movements tendto be purposeless or accompanied by lack of recogni-tion of the arm as one’s own (Leiguarda, Starkstein,Nogues, Berthier, & Arbelaiz, 1993; Spence, 2002).

Penfield (1975) reported that direct electrical stimu-lation of the motor cortex resulted in passively experi-enced arm movements. We propose here that passivityphenomena in schizophrenia and the alien-limb syn-drome represent actions induced automatically byperceived objects or anticipatory images, which—like actions induced by direct electrical stimulation—cannot be suppressed by currently prevailing desires,urges, and impulses (the organism’s conscious motiva-tional state). Motor acts that are induced in this mannerwould be experienced by the subject as passive, simi-larly to actions induced by exogenous electrical stimu-lation. To be able to uphold this model, we first have todevelop the notion that it is a reduction in motivationalpressures or “psychic energy,” which normally accom-panies all motor acts (including speech and verbalthoughts, as we will discuss in due course), that ex-plains the sense of self in its most basic dimension—that is, the sense of “belonging to me.” In other words,we argue that a “breach in symmetry” is introducedinto the primarily undifferentiated stream of con-sciousness through the association of some consciousevents, but not others, with a sense of drive reduction,giving rise to self- and nonself-experiences, respec-tively.

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Passivity Phenomena: Implications for the Concept of Self 187

Cognitivist approaches to passivity phenomena

The problem of passivity phenomena touches on im-portant philosophical questions, and without theircareful consideration we will not be able to fullyunderstand these symptoms. First, though, we need toconsider cognitive-psychological models of passivityphenomena that are currently in favor. Especially, onehas to comment on the theory advanced by Frith thatpassivity phenomena in schizophrenia are caused bydeficits in the self-monitoring of actions or thoughts(e.g., Frith, 1992; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000).

Central monitoring

According to the central-monitoring hypothesis, an“efference copy” that is produced in parallel with amotor command is compared automatically to the sen-sory consequences of one’s action, on the one hand,and to the motor intention, on the other. The sense ofself-ownership is based on the comparison of an ac-tion’s efference copy with sensory feedback followingthe action. If sensory consequences can be predictedcorrectly based on the efference copy, then the event islabeled as self-produced and its perception is attenu-ated accordingly. If a sensory event cannot be pre-dicted by the efference copy, then it is recognized asexternally generated and is not perceptually attenuated(reviewed in Blakemore & Decety, 2001). In contrastto the sense of ownership of action, the sense of agencyarises when a match is registered upon comparison ofthe action’s efference copy with the corresponding“motor intention.” The sense of agency would be dis-turbed whenever the efference copy is not properlygenerated or the comparator fails to register a matchwith the motor intention. Hence, thought insertion anddelusions of control, which are characterized by adisturbed sense of agency and an intact sense of self-ownership, are explained as deficits in “forward” or“pre-action” monitoring of movements (Frith, 1992;reviewed in Gallagher, 2000).

The central-monitoring model presupposes the ex-istence of a self; it assumes that without a mechanismthat labels the consequences of one’s actions as beingproduced by one’s own intentions, an entity “self”would be unaware of its actions. As long as we adhereto the notion of “I” as an agent, we have to face aparadox: How can I have a thought and at the sametime insist that it is not me who is thinking the thought(Thornton, 2002)? Other questions arise— for exam-ple, how can a copy of motor output predict the vari-able sensory consequences of an action, and how

accurate does the match have to be to allow self-attribution? While Woodworth (1926) recognized thatvoluntary action is preceded by imagination of somechange to be effected (anticipatory image), he also sawthat such imagery of action effects could not amount tothe prediction of action effects. Moreover, efferencecopies are unlikely to play a role in the awareness ofone’s movement. William James (1890) already sawthat consciousness of movement is an afferent notefferent sensation; it is a consequence, not an anteced-ent, of the movement itself. Thus, our awareness ofmovement is secondary to the actual occurrence ofmovement in the physical realm. What we experienceare not movements as such, but perceptions of move-ments. Motor acts enter awareness not at the point theyare executed by some agency, but when they are per-ceived.

Experimental findings that have been provided insupport of the central-monitoring hypothesis can beinterpreted differently. Patients with schizophrenia,particularly those with experiences of alien control,fail to correct errors in their movements when beingdenied direct visual feedback from their movements(Frith & Done, 1989; Mlakar, Jensterle, & Frith,1994). This has been interpreted as evidence for adeficit in “central monitoring” of actions in schizo-phrenia (Frith & Done, 1989; Mlakar, Jensterle, &Frith, 1994); however, alternatively, as pointed out bySpence (2002), these findings may indicate abnormali-ties in proprioreception. Indeed, a more parsimoniousexplanation would be that proprioreceptive reaffer-entation in these patients fails to adequately constrainintrinsic thalamocortical activity (Behrendt, 2003) inparietal somatosensory areas, leading to uncoupling ofkinesthetically perceived movement from the move-ment that actually occurs and, accordingly, an increasein patients’ reliance on visual feedback.

Evidence has been provided that explicitly contra-dicts the notion of deficient central monitoring ofaction in schizophrenia. Fourneret, Paillard, Lamarre,Cole, and Jeannerod (2001) asked patients with schizo-phrenia and control subjects to draw a line toward atarget under control of video feedback that introducedan angular deviation, whereby the first two-thirds ofthe trajectory were obscured from vision. In order totrace the line to the target successfully, subjects had tobecome aware of the visuomotor discordance betweentheir proprioreceptive sense of movement and thevisual feedback and then switch to an anticipatorystrategy. Patients with Schneiderian first-rank symp-toms were more likely to switch to conscious monitor-ing of their hand movement in order to correct for thevisuomotor conflict. According to Fourneret, Franck,

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Slachevsky, and Jeannerod (2001), these results con-tradict the assumption that first-rank symptoms resultfrom failure of central monitoring of action.

Further evidence against the central-monitoringhypothesis in schizophrenia comes from a study byDelevoye-Turrell, Giersch, and Danion (2003). Pa-tients with schizophrenia correctly scaled their gripforce to the mass and texture of manipulated objects(intact predictive scaling of force levels), which isinconsistent with the notion that in schizophrenia thereis a disorder of predictive mechanisms in anticipatorycontrol of motor actions (Delevoye-Turrell et al.,2003). Instead, the authors found that patients had dif-ficulties in the fluid sequencing of multiple subgoalswithin actions.

The central-monitoring model may not only fail tosufficiently explain passivity phenomena, it may gen-erally be inappropriate as a model for voluntary move-ment. Fourneret et al. (2002) studied a hapticallydeafferented patient who had lost her proprioreceptiveposition sense and had to rely on visual feedback toform an awareness of her movements. In a task thatinvolved drawing a straight line under control of videofeedback that was systematically distorted (visuomotorconflict), the patient showed average performance but,unlike control subjects, never reported any sense ofdiscordance between the movement she saw on ascreen and the movement she actually carried out. Thiswould have been expected had she produced anefference copy of her movements (to compare it to thevisual feedback from her action). Fourneret et al.(2002) concluded that efference copies of motor com-mands could not be, in themselves, a source of actionawareness.

Agency attribution

Some studies were conducted to demonstrate difficul-ties in patients with schizophrenia to attribute an ob-served action to its proper agent. When performingwrist and finger movements without direct visual con-trol and, at the same time, observing their own hand oran alien hand performing the same or different move-ments on a TV screen, schizophrenic patients withhallucinations and/or delusional experiences weremore likely to misattribute the alien hand to them-selves (Daprati et al., 1997). Instead of implicatingdeficits in “agency attribution” (Daprati et al., 1997),one could again interpret this finding in terms ofreduced accuracy of kinesthetic movement awarenessin those patients. That is, if kinesthetic perception isless accurate, movements perceived kinesthetically are

less likely to impress as being discrepant to movementspresented and perceived in the visual modality. Per-ceptual processes that are insufficiently constrained bysensory input would also be subject to greater suggest-ibility (Behrendt, 2003), as demonstrated by tactileillusions in patients with schizophrenia who were pre-sented with an artificial hand stroked by the experi-menter while their own hand was hidden behind ascreen (Peled, Ritsner, Hirschmann, Geva, & Modai,2000).

Jeannerod (2001) advanced the notion of agencyattribution of actions as an alternative to the central-monitoring hypothesis. Neuroimaging studies showthat brain regions activated during movement execu-tion are also activated during mental action simulationor mere action observation. There are, however, dif-ferences in that, for instance, imagining or observationof an action tends to activate more rostral parts of thesupplementary motor area and more caudal regions inthe posterior parietal cortex than action execution (re-viewed in Jeannerod, 2001). Jeannerod (2001) sug-gested that the existence of nonoverlapping activationsin action-related networks “allows each agent to dis-criminate what belongs to him from what belongsto the other.” This idea, which forms the basis forJeannerod’s “Who-system,” can be objected to be-cause it again presupposes the existence of a self—thevery notions it tries to elucidate—assigning to it therole of a supervisory agency that is concerned withmonitoring patterns of cortical activation. Jeannerod(2001) proposed that changes in the pattern of acti-vation in these cortical networks could lead to mis-takes in the attribution of a perceived action to self orother.

Decety and Sommerville (2003) also thought that theright inferior parietal cortex plays a crucial role indistinguishing self from other because experimentaldata show that (a) it is activated when subjects mentallysimulate actions of another person (Ruby & Decety,2001) and (b) activation in this region correlates withthe subjective sense of ownership of an action (Farrer etal., 2003). With regard to right inferior parietal lobeactivation when subjects were imagining the experi-menter performing an action (compared to them imag-ining the performance of the same action themselves)(Ruby & Decety, 2001), this may not necessarily reflecta distinction between self and other since the two typesof motor imagery employ different attentional perspec-tives and may require coding in different types ofaction-space representation (see section on parietalassociation cortex below). In a similar study, Farrer andFrith (2002) found that mentally attributing a movingtarget to one’s own movements was associated with

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activation in the anterior insula, while attributingthe moving target to the experimenter’s action wasassociated with activation in the right inferior parietallobe. They suggested that these two regions contributeto the sense of agency. However, again, the observedactivations may be more reflective of the differentattentional requirements in the tasks; imagery of one’sown actions but not imagery of others’ actions mayinvolve greater reference to the somatosensorymodality.

Spence et al. (1997) measured regional cerebralblood flow during joystick movements in schizo-phrenic patients with passivity phenomena. Theyfound regional hyperactivity in the right inferior pari-etal lobule and cingulate gyrus (Spence et al., 1997).Most patients in the index group reported passivityexperiences while performing joystick movements.According to Jeannerod’s (2001) model, the increasedright posterior parietal activation would in itself ex-plain the experience of alien control. Interestingly,though, when Farrer et al. (2003) experimentally intro-duced a discrepancy between executed joystick move-ment and visual feedback in normal subjects (by usinga video system), they found an increased activation ofthe right inferior parietal lobe (along with increasedanterior cingulate activation and reduced activation inthe insula). Farrer et al. (2003) interpreted this findingas evidence for a role of the right inferior parietalcortex in agency attribution, but they acknowledgedthe possibility that it may simply reflect the sensorydiscordance experienced by their subjects. Indeed, de-spite the fact that subjects experienced a lack of con-trol over the movement that they saw, they still wouldhave been aware of their own joystick movement in thekinesthetic modality. Increased activity in the rightinferior parietal lobe may then reflect subjects’ in-creased concentration on their hand-movement inten-tions in an attempt to compensate for the distortedvisual feedback.

This suggests an alternative interpretation of thefinding by Spence et al. (1997): underconstrained kin-esthetic movement perception in schizophrenia mayproduce a similar discrepancy between visual and kin-esthetic feedback, complicating the on-line generationof intentional movement-direction vectors (see below).Thus, the increased right inferior parietal lobe activityfound by Spence et al. (1997) in patients with passivityphenomena may not be related directly to the mecha-nism that produces passivity phenomena, but may rep-resent another consequence of an uncoupling ofthalamocortical activity from sensory input that hasbeen hypothesized to underlie symptom formation inschizophrenia (Behrendt, 2003).

A philosophical perspective on self and action

In discussing self, volition, and agency, we adopt aphilosophical position of determinism. It will beshown that, on these grounds, a more economicalmodel of “voluntary” behavior, in general, and passiv-ity phenomena, in particular, can emerge, whichshould give us confidence that our choice of philo-sophical framework is appropriate. Proponents ofcognitivist models, on the other hand, who implicitlyconsider the self as an agent or subscribe to the notionof “free will,” will continue to face an insurmountabletask in trying to reconcile their fundamental positionwith the existence of passivity phenomena.

Recent endeavors by Damasio (2000) and Panksepp(1998) to explain the self in neurobiological terms donot question the validity of common-sense notions ofself but proceed from the assumption that primitiveforms of self have evolutionary origins and are essen-tial for behavior. Distinguishing between “the feelingof [an] emotion and knowing that we have a feeling ofthat emotion,” Damasio (2000) proposed that the senseof self was needed “to make . . . the feeling of emotionknown to the organism” (p. 8). The sense of self wouldalso allow “images of an object” to be “sensed as theunmistakable mental property of an automatic ownerwho, for all intents and purposes, is an observer, aperceiver, a knower, a thinker, and a potential actor”(pp. 10–11). For Damasio, the problem is “how, inparallel with engendering mental patterns for an ob-ject, the brain also engenders a sense of self in the actof knowing.” What we need to look for, Damasioargues, are the biological underpinnings of “mentalpatterns which convey, automatically and naturally,the sense of a self in the act of knowing.”

In the very least, then, the neurobiology of conscious-ness faces two problems: the problem of how themovie in the brain is generated, and the problem ofhow the brain also generates the sense that there is anowner and observer for that movie. [Damasio, 2000, p.11]

As we shall see, philosophers have long argued thatthere is no owner, observer, or actor involved in volun-tary behavior and that what we experience as—and callby the name of—“self” is not concerned with owning,observing, or acting. Damasio (2000) and Panksepp(1998) make relevant contributions in highlighting thatthe sense of self is closely related to the interactionbetween emotional states and bodily actions. However,to argue with Panksepp, the fact that the periaqueductalgray plays a key role in affective responsivity does notnecessarily imply that this midbrain structure is the

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neuronal substrate of primordial self-experience or thatit institutes a “self-centred affective awareness,” asPanksepp (1998) proposes. It remains unclear why an“emotional self” should be implicated in the generationof “neural resonances” or “various coherent acts (“inresponse to archetypal survival challenges”), whichPanksepp says create the binding of perceptual experi-ences and other “psychic activities of the brain,” unlessone shares his basic assumption that symbolic brainprocesses that represent organisms as “coherently ac-tive creatures in the world” are needed to “informanimals of major survival issues” (and that thereforethere should be a “neural architecture” that permits aprimitive sense of self).

Rather than attempting to translate “the myth of a‘self’” into the language of neuroscience (as criticizedby Bennett & Hacker, 2003), we shall try to philo-sophically clarify concepts relating to self-experiencebefore underpinning them with neuroscientific data.Philosophical clarification will support notions that“voluntary” behavior is continuous with stimulus-re-sponse contingencies and that motivational pressures,which play a mediating role in voluntary behavior,directly drive motor actions (including thoughts) with-out there being a need for a “primordial self ”(Panksepp, 1998) or “proto-self” (Damasio, 2000). Notonly will the philosophical review presented in thissection be selective—in that it focuses on the traditionof determinism in approaches to self and action—but itmay also appear to lack internal consistency or anunderlying theme. The patient reader should be reas-sured, however, that the material reviewed collectivelypoints to a coherent theory of motivation, perception,and action—one that will come to resonate with em-pirical findings and their modern understanding, asdiscussed in the next section. In fact, how these data fittogether may only become apparent to the reader withthe benefit of a philosophical perspective that he or shewould be reluctant to accept if it were not to beformulated with thorough reference to the authority ofsometimes unjustly forgotten philosophers and psy-chologists.

The self is not an agent

In the Cartesian philosophical system, “cogito” (“Ithink”) is a fundamental axiom. We usually assumethat thoughts are volitional and appear in conscious-ness under direction of the self, but in fact they mayarise spontaneously. Lichtenberg, an eighteenth-cen-tury scientist, suggested: “We should say, it thinks, justas we say, it thunders. To say cogito is already too

much, as soon as you translate it by I think. Theassumption, the postulation of the I, the Self, is apractical need” (quoted in Stern, 1963).

For Nietzsche, the notion of “I think” is based on“daring assertions” that there must be something that“thinks” and that thinking is “an operation on the partof a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an‘ego’” (Nietzsche, 1886, s. 16). He asked: “What givesme the right to speak of an ego, and even of an ego ascause, and finally of an ego as the cause of thought?”(Nietzsche, 1886, s. 16). Even “it thinks” would go toofar as an assumption. When we assume that thinking,like any other activity, requires an agent, it merelyreflects our adherence to grammatical habits(Nietzsche, 1886, s. 17).

Heidegger (1927) saw that the “I” cannot be takenas a subject but is a noncommittal formal indicator.Not only should the “I” be discussed in the context of“I think,” for instance, or “I take action,” as Kant hadalready suggested, but more appropriately—accordingto Heidegger—the basic characteristic of the self is tobe found in the “I think something.” Heidegger (1927)pointed out that the “everyday interpretation of the Self. . . has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the‘world’ with which it is concerned” (p. 368).

Gilbert Ryle (1949) described mental events as“self-intimating”: “If I think, hope, remember, will,regret, hear a noise, or feel a pain, I must, ipso facto,know that I do so” (p. 152). However, contrary to theCartesian doctrine, self-consciousness does not entailself-monitoring—the mind cannot “look” at its ownoperations. Ryle (1949) stated “there are no occur-rences taking place in a second-status world, sincethere is no such status and no such world and conse-quently no need for special modes of acquainting our-selves with the denizens of such a world” (p. 154). ForRyle, the “I” is just an index word, like “there,” indi-cating “the person who utters it” (p. 188), which is aperson adapted to a world of “dealings of people withone another” (p. 189).

What, then, if not the self, thinks the thoughts? Ryle(1949) argued that the “progressive operation of rea-soning [is] a display of . . . effort to reach [a conclu-sion]” (p. 170). Echoing McDougall’s (1924) cycle ofmental activity (see below), Ryle (1958) found that “athought comprises what it is incipiently, namely whatit is the natural vanguard of.” Specifically, “a piece ofthinking of something as something is natively incep-tive of, inter alia, subsequent thinkings.” A feature ofthinking is that “any attempt to catch a particularthought tends to develop into an attempt to catch upwith something further.” It is therefore “not incidentalto thoughts that they belong to trains of thought”.

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Similarly, Jaspers (1946) suggested that events inthe stream of consciousness such as percepts, ideas,and feelings follow each other automatically—that is,not through the operation of an agent. “Determiningtendencies” resulting from target awareness constituteone of the mechanisms responsible for the automaticselection of psychic events in the stream of conscious-ness (Jaspers, 1946). For Hume, likewise, the mindbears no responsibility in the succession of “ideas” and“impressions”; these are bound by “some gentle force”and “some associating quality, by which one ideanaturally introduces another” (Hume, quoted in Joad,1955). Such sense of striving is what Damasio(2000)—and James (1890) before him—may havemistaken for “the presence of you” (self):

The sensory images of what you perceive externally,and the related images you recall, occupy most of thescope of your mind, but not all of it. Besides thoseimages there is also this other presence that signifiesyou, as observer of the things imaged, owner of thethings imaged, potential actor on the things imaged.There is a presence of you in a particular relationshipwith some object. If there were no such presence, howwould your thoughts belong to you? [Damasio, 2000,p. 10]

Hume denied that there is anything else besides thestream of consciousness; there is no self that can be saidto have ideas or sensations or to think the thoughts(reviewed in Joad, 1955). If there is no self, there can beno free will. In Joad’s (1955) words, “it is only if we areentitled to conceive of the Self as an enduring entitywhich is more than the sum of the experiences whichoccur in and to it, that we shall be entitled also tomaintain that it is free” (p. 234). Kant held that insofaras humans are considered from the standpoint of biol-ogy and act in accordance with desires, we could not befree (reviewed in Joad, 1955). The empirical self (asopposed to the transcendental self), according to Kant,is “as completely determined as the movements ofmatter in the physical world” (Joad, 1955, p. 390).

Ultimately, no agent can be held responsible for ourthoughts, feelings, and actions. Behaviorism strictlyrejects any notion of an agent as the “originator ofaction” (Zuriff, 1985). There are no autonomous pro-cesses in the brain that initiate behavior; all behaviorcan be traced causally to environmental variables andinternal physical causes. In what appears to be “volun-tary” behavior, the relationship between environmentand behavior is mediated by chains of covert behavior(intervening variables, including anticipatory goal-reactions), and this may be the reason why voluntarybehavior does not appear automatically imposed byexternal stimuli (Zuriff, 1985).

The alternative to determinism would be teleology(e.g., Zuriff, 1985). Determinism, which states thatwhatever happens is the direct result of the precedingstate, tends to eliminate the self and deny the reality offree will, while teleology usually presupposes the ex-istence of free will (Joad, 1955). The question is, thus,are we (and our apparent choices) determined by ten-dencies and impulses that operate unconsciously, orare we influenced—as teleology would suggest—by “adominating end or purpose conceived of as somethingwaiting to be achieved” (Joad, 1955, p. 190)? If wesettle for “determinism” and accept that the “will, then,is helpless” (Joad, 1955), how can we understandcomplex behavior, social behavior in particular, whichappears willed and goal-directed?

Modern theories of psycho-analysis . . . represent hu-man beings not as drawn from in front but as pushedfrom behind; as motivated, that is to say, not byrational desires to achieve ends and to fulfil purposesenvisaged by the imagination as desirable, but as im-pelled by a drive from below whose strength is derivedfrom forces which are both incalculable and irrational.[Joad, 1955, p. 189]

It is interesting to note that behaviorism at the height ofits theoretical development converged on the notionof “drive,” despite its traditional preoccupation withstimulus-response relationships. Hull (1943) sawdrives as important “intervening variables” in abehavioral input–output system. Learning, accordingto Hull, took place when needs were satisfied anddrives underwent reduction. Stimulus-response rela-tionships are not random and had to be linked to theregulation of the organism’s homeostasis, and here itwas rapid drive reduction resulting from successfulresponding that was considered to strengthen the asso-ciation between stimulus and response (Hull, 1943).

Drives and instincts

Nietzsche (1886) recognized that man’s behaviorand thought are an expression of the interplay ofnatural forces that seek discharge but do not havean inherent purpose. Conscious thinking is secretlyguided and forced into certain channels by instincts.Understanding, self-deception, and morality are noth-ing but the mere instruments of man’s innermost drives(Nietzsche, 1886, ss. 3, 6).

Husserl recognized that drives and instincts arecontinuously operative throughout all conscious life(Smith, 2003). Interwoven drives provide the organismwith the essential structure of “intentionality” thatinstitutes the world as it is experienced by the subject

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(Husserl, as reviewed by Smith, 2003). According toHusserl, there is an instinctive interest in sensory dataas well as their recognition, identification and differen-tiation. The instinctive drive toward objectification (ofappearances) derives satisfaction from stable experien-tial unities (Smith, 2003). Instincts, by giving percep-tion its intentional directedness, play a crucial role inconstituting increasingly complex and stable objects ofour perception and determining our relationship tothem (Smith, 2003). Thus, our consciousness of theworld—according to Husserl—is an explication of ourendowment with instincts.

According to Freud (1915), psychic energy or ten-sion, which originates in instinctive physiologicalneeds, is expressed in behavior or psychological per-formance and invested into objects (cathexis). The aimof instincts is to eliminate the underlying instinctiveneed, and, once this is satisfied, a reduction in tensionensues. An instinct can be suppressed and “trans-formed,” giving rise to “secondary tendencies”(Baudouin, 1922). Thus, “instinct is often at work inmatters with which at first sight it seems to have noconcern” (p. 79). Secondary or derived tendenciesmanifest in many aspects of psychological life, such asinterests or dreams. Baudouin argued that our “affec-tive life, including the higher feelings, represents anevolution of instincts” (p. 81). Freud chiefly consid-ered the sexual instinct with its pathological suppres-sions and transformations in neurosis. However,energy relating to other instincts can be shown to “flowin lateral channels, and may there give rise to newderivatives which are sometimes of great moral andsocial value” (Baudouin, 1922, p. 88).

McDougall (1924) saw in instincts the “springs ofenergy” and “prime movers of all human activity.” Aninstinct has an end or purpose of which we may notnecessarily be aware. The driving power that the in-stinct supplies (“instinctive energy”) is discharged orredistributed in the course of behavior and persists foras long as the instinct has not reached its end.McDougall defined instinct as “a mental disposition,whose nature is revealed to us in, and inferred by usfrom, the modes of behaviour and experience which itdetermines” (p. 106).

And we can confidently infer that the typical instinct isa complex disposition in which we may distinguish atleast two principle parts. There is the part whichrenders possible the perception of the specific object(the key to the instinct); this part is the lock into whichthe key fits. Secondly, there is the part which deter-mines the outflow of energy into all bodily organs thattake part in the instinctive activity. [p. 106]

Thus, instincts give rise to perceptual dispositions (i.e.,attention) and behavioral tendencies (i.e., dispositionsto generate actions that promote the instinct’s end).McDougall also discerned what he called the “emo-tional core” of an instinct, which mediates betweeninstinct-driven perception and behavior. Emotions ac-company and are evidence for the workings of in-stincts.

Conative experience is the felt impulse to action; and itis felt . . . in proportion to the strength of the workingof the impulse. It takes the form of mere craving forsome undefined goal, of definitely directed desire, ofconflict of desires, of resolving, choosing, willing;and, when we are actively occupied in working towardour goal, either by thinking or by bodily activity, thisconative experience is complicated and obscured forintrospection by the kinaesthetic sensory qualities setup by muscular strains. Now such felt impulse ispresent in all emotional experience. [McDougall,1924, pp. 320–321]

Instincts are not bound instantaneously to motor ac-tion. Instead, they exert a superordinate influence onthe organization of behavior. According to Jaspers(1946): “The instinctual certainty shows itself rather inan unconscious choice of the right way to gratify thedrive according to the situation” (p. 352). Each per-formance is necessarily embedded in a “hierarchy ofconnected function.” Jaspers suggested that beyondindividual actions or task performances lies the “totalperformance” to which individual performances oractions are conducive. “Only the performance that is infull harmony with the total performance will obtainfull realisation” (p. 165). McDougall (1924) consid-ered that instinctive impulses cannot always expressthemselves immediately in action and are “oftenchecked by difficulties encountered or foreseen”; un-der these circumstances, an impulse will continue towork as “desire,” which—according to McDougall—denotes a striving toward a remote object. Thus, “theanimal in which any instinctive impulse is excited doesnot suspend action” (McDougall (1924, p. 207).

The higher animal, we may reasonably infer, is capableof imagining the remote food or the remote danger;and, as it thinks of the one or the other, the correspond-ing impulse expresses itself in action. . . . Such sus-pension of action, while the impulse to actioncontinues to work in the form of desire kept alive byimagination of its object, is the essential condition ofall higher intellectual ability, of all our thinking in thefuller and more usual sense of the word. [pp. 207–208]

McDougall pointed out than “an instinct is to be de-fined and recognised not by the kind of movements in

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which it finds expression, but by the kind of change ofthe animal’s situation which its movements, whateverthey may be, tend to bring about and which, when it isachieved, brings the train of behaviour to a close” (pp.118–119). Instinctive action strives toward “a changeof situation of a particular kind, which alone cansatisfy the impulse and allay the appetite and unrest ofthe organism” (p. 119). McDougall regarded motormechanisms as the instruments of the instincts. Eachmotor mechanism serves as a “channel of outlet for theenergy liberated from any of the instincts,” while mo-tor mechanisms are in themselves “inert mechanismswhich require to be ‘driven’ by some impulse, by astream of energy derived from some instinct” (p. 117).

Each mode of instinctive activity requires, for its mostefficient execution, the co-operation of all the partsand organs of the body; for . . . an instinctive reactionis essentially a “total” reaction, and the processes ofevery part of the body are subordinated to . . . theattainment of the natural goal. [pp. 321–322]

These views emphasize that motor action is not gener-ated in isolation but always occurs in the context ofsome instinctive force. We may therefore suspect thatpassivity phenomena are actions or performances thatare not in harmony with the “total performance” or“total reaction”—that is, not conducive to the organ-ism’s overall striving. As argued below, perceivedactions that contravene drives and “desires” can onlybe experienced as passive—that is, as being outsideone’s control or imposed by an alien agency.

Conative aspects of thought

For McDougall (1924), “reasoning, like all other formsof intellectual process, is but the servant of the instinc-tive impulses”: by reasoning “we discover new meansfor the attainment of our goals” (p. 215). Mental activ-ity is cyclical and begins with the subject recognizingor thinking of some object; “[t]his evokes in him animpulse to effect some change, if only fuller cognition,more definite recognition” (p. 265). Mental activityhas a double aspect of knowing and striving, whichMcDougall called cognition and conation. In view ofits conative aspect, every “cycle of mental activity”naturally expresses itself in bodily movement. Forinstance: “Silent thinking by the aid of words is aseries of cycles of activity, each of which terminates inthe suppressed bodily behaviour of speech” (p. 289).

Every perception and every thought due to its cona-tive aspect produces a subliminal or overt motor act.From this perspective, James’s (1890) observation that

thoughts or “oscillations of my attention . . . are mostdistinctly felt as alterations of directions in movementsoccurring inside the head,” including the “rolling out-wards and upwards of the eyeballs,” “the opening andclosing of the glottis,” “contractions of the jaw-mus-cles,” and “movements of the muscles of the brow andeyelids” (pp. 300–301) reflects the conative aspects ofmental activity. Insofar as such sensations are accom-panied by tension reduction, they underpin the sense ofself—yet this is not a knowing or acting self. We cannow confidently reject Damasio’s (2000) assertion that“having a sense of self is . . . required for knowing” (p.19); the knowing is given by every cognition automati-cally giving rise to a response tendency or striving—that is, a state of conation.

The sense of volition

We may speak of volition or “will” when we introspect(or rather “retrospect”) a sense of hesitation or delib-eration prior to action execution. Ryle pointed out thatthere are authentic processes with which volitions aresometimes wrongly identified; in particular, processesof opting for a course of action among alternatives orof making up one’s mind to do something. These are,however, not to be seen as volitions—that is, mental“thrusts” that generate physical movement—becausethey do not necessarily lead to action. Moreover, mostvoluntary actions are not preceded by such processes(Ryle, 1949).

Woodworth (1926) related the terms “will” and“decision” to what we can introspect as “one tendencyrunning contrary to another and inhibiting it.” Herecognized that there are “multitudinous stimuli con-stantly playing on us and arousing contrary tenden-cies.” Humans cannot therefore “hope to escapeconflict of motives and the necessity of making deci-sions.” Decisions arise from resolution of conflict and“organising the individual’s reaction-tendencies,”which can be positive or negative with regard to theissue at hand (Woodworth, 1926). “The positive mo-tive must for an instant be stronger than the negative,in order to get action” (Woodworth, 1926).

For Jaspers (1946), too, our sense of volition stemsfrom the conflict of drives and not the deliberation of aninner agent: “We speak of will or volitional acts onlywhen there is some experience of choice and decision.When such experience is absent, the instinctual drivegoes into action uninhibited by any volitional act” (p.117). Choice and decision as characteristics of theexperience of volition are accompanied by a “sense of

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being ‘driven’ or of being ‘overpowered’” (Jaspers,1946), which highlights the close relationship betweenvolition and drives/instincts. For McDougall (1924),volition represents “the working of the conative im-pulses that spring from the instinctive dispositions,impulses working, not sporadically and in detachmentfrom one another, but within a delicately balanced andmore or less harmonious and unitary system” (p. 447).

The sense of self or “belonging to me”

For James (1890), the “central active self” (which iswhat he thought “presides over the perception of sen-sations” and “to which pleasure and pain, the pleasantand the painful, speak”) is “really a feeling of bodilyactivities” (pp. 297–298, 302), representing the senseof intimacy or “animal warmth” that emanates frommotor “adjustments,” such as the minimal cephalic andrespiratory motor adjustments brought about reflex-ively in response to our perceptions and imagery in theprocess of thought. It is argued here that it is not themotor adjustments themselves but the recurrent re-lief—afforded by motor activity—of impulses and de-sires excited by perceptions and imagery that isresponsible for the “animal warmth” of James’ “cen-tral active self.”

Jaspers (1946) indicated that the phenomenal expe-rience of “being mine” or having an “I”-quality islinked to “motor discharges of psychic effects.” Thissense of “being mine” or “belonging to me,” which iscontingent upon action or thought, has to be distin-guished from the sense of volition experienced prior toexecution of actions and thoughts. Jaspers (1946)wrote: “Besides these phenomena of urge, instinctualactivity, conflict and volition, there is the awareness ofdrive and will as they operate through motor dis-charges of psychic effects. These effects are then expe-rienced as willed or as due to a special kind ofimpulse—that is, as coming from me, belonging tome” (p. 117). The sense of “belonging to me,” which isarguably a reflection of the workings of drives andmay—more specifically—be related to drive reductionupon motor execution, may be the very aspect of selfthat is disturbed in passivity phenomena.

McDougall (1924) considered that “our belief in. . . continuously existing self-identical realities, isfounded upon our experiences of striving, of effort, ofputting forth power or energy in the pursuit of ourgoals” (p. 426). Similarly, Husserl came to see in-stincts or drives, which condition all of the subject’sintentions and perceptions, as “the primal predisposi-

tion of the I” (Husserl, as quoted in Smith, 2003, p.150).

Nietzsche (1886), who questioned the notion of selfas an agent and did not fail to recognize the force ofhabit in “volition,” observed that identification withthe executor of a command arises from a “state ofdelight” and “triumph over obstacles.” The “personexercising volition adds the feelings of delight of hissuccessful executive instruments . . . to his feelings ofdelight as commander. L’effet c’est moi: . . . thegoverning class identifies itself with the successes. . .” (Nietzsche, 1886, s. 19). If we remember here thatwhat impresses as “volition” is in essence a strivingtoward a goal temporarily held in check, then we caninterpret Nietzsche as saying that it is a relief from thetension of “volition” that is at the heart of the “syn-thetic concept ‘I’.”

Nietzsche pointed out that we presuppose—becauseof grammatical constraints—that “think” is the predi-cate and “conditioned” to which there must be a sub-ject—“I” or “it”—as cause or “condition.” Hespeculated “whether the opposite might not be thecase: ‘think’ the condition, ‘I’ the conditioned; ‘I’ inthat case only a synthesis which is made by thinking”(Nietzsche, 1886, s. 54). Given that Nietzsche recog-nized thinking as an expression of drives, his specula-tion would be consistent again with our thesis that thesense of self or “belonging to me” stems from drivereduction.

In summary, it is suggested that it is the experienceof drive reduction, rather than successful predicationon the basis of an “efference copy,” as suggested byBlakemore and Decety (2001), that attenuates the per-ception of actions and their effects and provides asense of self. It is difficult to envisage a theory of selfand voluntary action that does not account for theevolutionary insight that every action is embedded inthe organism’s overall motivational state and is anexpression of drives.

Physiological aspects of voluntary behavior

We shall see how recent advances in understanding theorganization and function of limbic and prefrontalcorticobasal ganglia–thalamocortical systems and psy-chological insights into the nature of voluntarybehavior converge in many respects with principles ofvoluntary behavior envisaged by philosophers and psy-chologists in the more distant past—at a time whensuch knowledge was not available. Having adopted acoherent perspective on the nature and mechanisms of

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voluntary behavior, we should then be able to formu-late a model of passivity phenomena.

Goals and action tendencies

Ach (1905) suggested that imagery of a goal or desiredaction effect (i.e., an intention) can automatically elicita conscious “determining tendency.” In overcomingexternal and internal resistances, the determining ten-dency would generate the experience of a will to act(reviewed in Heckhausen, 1989). In Hull’s (1943)theory, a “drive-stimulus,” which is related to a physi-ological need, can elicit an “anticipatory goal reaction”with which it had previously been associated. Theanticipatory goal reaction corresponds to a cognitivestate of expectation and guides behavior toward thegoal that can satisfy the need. Spence (1956) devel-oped Hull’s theory by envisaging that the anticipatorygoal reaction can be elicited by external stimuli relatedto the reward, not merely by the drive-stimulus. Indoing so, these stimuli act as incentive—that is, moti-vational—factors.

Theorists like Lewin and Tolman in the first half ofthe last century emphasized the incentive nature ofsalient stimuli. Perceived or imagined stimuli that areimbued with incentive value have the potential tostimulate a behavioral response, in terms of both anenergizing and a directing influence. Thus, perceptionor anticipatory imagery of an object or event canstimulate a goal-directed reaction aimed at approach-ing the object. Tolman postulated a motivational factorcalled “demand for the goal object” that is elicited byperception or imagery of an object and depends bothon the incentive characteristic of the object and on themotivational state of the organism (reviewed inHeckhausen, 1989). These views allow us to conceptu-ally unify voluntary behavior with stimulus-evokedactions. There is no need to invoke an agent in volun-tary or goal-directed behavior, as little as there is aneed to invoke an agent in direct stimulus-responserelationships.

Atkinson and Birch (1970) recognized that, in theprocess of volition, at any one moment severalbehavioral tendencies might seek expression. Accord-ing to their model, the strength of the various actiontendencies not only depends on relatively stable moti-vational factors, but also fluctuates in relation to incen-tive stimuli present in the environment. Generally,there are several factors that dynamically eitherstrengthen or diminish a given behavioral tendency (bycontributing to an activating or inhibiting component

force within the tendency). Initiation of an action, then,occurs when the sum of activating and inhibiting forcesthat determine that tendency outweighs the strengths ofother tendencies. Once an action occurs, the behavioraltendency diminishes in strength, and the probability ofother tendencies gaining expression increases accord-ingly (after Heckhausen, 1989). Atkinson and Birch’smodel is consistent with current knowledge on actionselection in the basal ganglia, as discussed in the nextsection.

Corticobasal ganglia–thalamocortical circuits

There are multiple, anatomically segregated circuitslinking the frontal cortex with basal ganglia. Limbiccorticobasal ganglia–thalamocortical circuits originatein the anterior cingulate cortex and medial orbito-frontal cortex. The anterior cingulate cortex projects tothe ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens). The ventralstriatum also receives input from the amygdala, ento-rhinal cortex, and hippocampus and sends axons to theventral pallidum and part of the substantia nigra parsreticulata. The ventral pallidum, in turn, projects to themedial dorsal nucleus of the thalamus, which is recip-rocally connected to the anterior cingulate and medialorbitofrontal cortices.

Prefrontal corticobasal ganglia–thalamocortical cir-cuits begin and end in dorsolateral and ventrolateralprefrontal cortices, linking up parts of the dorsal stria-tum and globus pallidus in a topographically organizedmanner. The dorsal striatum consists of caudate nu-cleus and putamen and is modulated in its function bydopaminergic input from the pars compacta of thesubstantia nigra. GABAergic medium-spiny neuronsof the striatum send their axons to the globus pallidusinternal segment and the substantia nigra parsreticulata (“direct pathway”). Output neurons in theselatter structures are GABAergic, too. They fire toni-cally at high frequency, resulting in tonic inhibition inthe thalamus. The “indirect pathway” between striatumand internal globus pallidus or substantia nigra parsreticulata makes a detour via the external segment ofthe globus pallidus and the subthalamic nucleus.Dopaminergic modulation of activity in the striatum bythe substantia nigra (pars compacta) leads to activationof the direct pathway and inhibition of the indirectpathway, with both effects producing the same endresult—namely, tonic disinhibition of thalamocorticalneurons.

Similarly, skeletomotor basal ganglia–thalamocorti-cal circuits originate in the lateral premotor cortex, the

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supplementary motor area, and the motor cortex.Skeletomotor portions of the putamen, which receiveinput not only from precentral motor areas but alsofrom postcentral somatosensory cortices, project toskeletomotor portions of the globus pallidus internalsegment and substantia nigra pars reticulata (directpathway), which in turn project to specific thalamicnuclei in the ventral thalamus. Oculomotor circuitsbegin and end in frontal and supplementary eye fields.

Nucleus accumbens

Activity in the ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens)is modulated by dopaminergic projections from theventral tegmental area, as well as from the substantianigra pars compacta. Dopaminergic transmission fromthe ventral tegmental area to the nucleus accumbensplays an important role in motivational arousal andpreservation of effort, enabling the organism to over-come obstacles in search for a “reward.” Conditionedstimuli that predict a reward invigorate “instrumental”behavior directed at obtaining the reward by increasingthe release of dopamine in the nucleus accumbens(reviewed in Di Chiara, 2002; Parkinson, Cardinal, &Everitt, 2000; Salomone, Correa, Mingote, & Weber,2003). Dopamine is not released in the nucleusaccumbens in relation to stimuli that reliably predict areward, nor is dopamine release associated with re-ward consumption (reviewed in Horvitz, 2000;Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999). Apart from incentivestimuli, midbrain dopaminergic neurons also respondto novel stimuli and to aversive or motivationallyneutral stimuli of high intensity or sudden onset—thatis, generally, dopaminergic neurons are activated insituations that potentially require high levels ofbehavioral activity (Horvitz, 2000).

Contingent on dopaminergic activation, the nucleusaccumbens may switch between higher-level behav-ioral strategies and their motivational accompaniment(similarly to the role of the dorsal striatum in switchingbetween motor acts) (Parkinson, Cardinal, & Everitt,2000). As suggested by Parkinson, Cardinal, andEveritt (2000), dopaminergic input from the midbrainmay facilitate the selection of higher-level strategies ina winner-takes-all fashion. This may be relevant insituations where several motivationally salient stimulicompete for access to subordinate motor mechanisms.

Ikemoto and Panksepp (1999), and similarlyHorvitz (2000), stressed that—according to researchevidence—dopamine release in the nucleus accumbensplays an important role in mediating reward-seekingbehavior but is not directly involved in satisfactionexperiences (hedonic effects) or reward consumption.

Dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens from theventral tegmental area is a key element in a generalapproach system (“SEEKING system”) that initiates,invigorates, directs, and coordinates flexible approachbehaviors toward “rewards” (also called appetitivebehaviors) and avoidance reactions to aversive stimuli(i.e., “approach to safety”) (Ikemoto & Panksepp,1999). Berridge and Robinson (1998) had similarlyargued that the meso-accumbens dopamine system isresponsible for the attribution of incentive salience toperceived stimuli or events (“wanting”) but not fordetecting subjective hedonic effects (“liking”).

Thus, the meso-accumbens system is concerned notwith gratification of behavior or reward experience butwith the wanting of, striving for, craving for, or beingcompelled toward a goal. Ikemoto and Panksepp(1999) realized that “existing conceptual frameworksconstrain the way in which empirical findings areinterpreted.” They expressed concerns in the use of thereward concept, recognizing that it usually implieshedonic or pleasurable effects. Indeed, “reward” is ateleological concept in that it implies that animalsengage in behavior in order to be rewarded. Ikemotoand Panksepp (1999) redefined “reward” as an uncon-ditional stimulus that evokes approach behavior, but itmay be preferable to abandon the term completely andinstead speak deterministically of “incentive stimuli”that induce incentive motivation, which is a cognitiveand affective state—as Ikemoto and Panksepp (1999)recognized—that drives approach behavior.

Anterior cingulate

Activation of the anterior cingulate cortex afterpresentation of salient stimuli may reflect the subject’sresponse effort. Time characteristics of anteriorcingulate activation suggest that it may be related moreto the “motivational impact” of an event than to errordetection, conflict monitoring, or response choice(Winterer, Adams, Jones, & Knutson, 2002). Anteriorcingulate activation facilitates further informationprocessing in terms of evaluation of stimulus proper-ties in sensory association cortices (allocation of atten-tion) and preparation for action (Winterer et al., 2002).Suddenly appearing behaviorally highly salient eventsrequire reorientation of the motivational state, andindeed there is evidence that the presentation of suchevents is associated with activation of the anteriorcingulate, as well as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex(Casey et al., 2000).

Parkinson, Cardinal, and Everitt (2000) suggestedthat activity in the anterior cingulate reflects affectiveaspects of motivationally salient stimuli. Perhaps, the

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anterior cingulate affectively “disambiguates” suchstimuli (Parkinson, Cardinal, & Everitt, 2000) byspecifying their “motivational impact” or inherent im-pulse to action (which according to McDougall, 1924,is an essential feature of emotion). The anteriorcingulate cortex is functionally segregated, with thesite of activation being dependent on the nature of thestimulus. The neuroanatomy of pain perception mayserve to illustrate the function of the anterior cingulate.Pain is a highly salient stimulus, and it activates theanterior cingulate—possibly via activation of the amy-gdala. It is, however, the unpleasantness of pain spe-cifically that is associated with anterior cingulateactivation. The anterior cingulate is thought to mediatethe motivation to avoid pain but is not concerned withdiscriminative aspects of pain perception. This is evi-denced, for instance, by anterior cingulate lesions,which disrupt the motivational significance of pain butleave intact pain perception as such (reviewed inSchnitzler & Ploner, 2000).

Prefrontal cortex

Miller and Cohen (2001) proposed that the prefron-tal cortex maintains patterns of activity that representdesired behavioral goals as well as rules that allow theorganism to achieve these goals. Prefrontal cortex neu-rons can sustain their activity in the face of interfer-ence and beyond the time of the eliciting cue, whichallows them to exert biasing influences on motorpreparation and perception for as long as required. Inparticular, biasing signals from the prefrontal cortexguide lower-level processes of action preparation inpremotor areas in a way that promotes the achievementof the goal (reviewed in Miller & Cohen, 2001). Inpremotor areas, prefrontal biasing signals may operateby enhancing some premotor response dispositions andinhibiting others, all of which may be primed inde-pendently by environmental cues. Prefrontal activityalso guides attentional mechanisms in postcentral sen-sory association cortices, thus facilitating the percep-tion (or imagery) of behaviorally relevant stimuli(reviewed in Miller & Cohen, 2001).

Prefrontal representations of desired goals and re-lated rules can themselves be activated by relevantcues in the environment. For this purpose, the prefron-tal cortex, particularly its dorsolateral and ventrolateraldivisions, receives dense afferentation from sensoryassociation areas in posterior parietal, temporal, andoccipital cortices. The prefrontal cortex also has toobey higher-order motivational signals from the limbicsystem to which its orbital and medial divisions aremore closely related (reviewed in Miller & Cohen,

2001). Goals that are represented in the prefrontalcortex may actually be reward expectations—a notionthat is supported by the observation that neural activitycoding for such goals increases with the desirability ofthe expected reward (its magnitude or probability)(reviewed in Miller & Cohen, 2001; Schall, 2001).

The main function of the dorsolateral and ventralprefrontal cortex may be to learn stimulus–rewardassociations and activate reward expectations uponstimulus perception. The traditional view that the pre-frontal cortex is specialized for working memory hasbeen undermined by research findings (reviewed inKaldy & Sigala, 2004). Evidence also shows thatasymmetrical frontal brain activity induced by stimulior events reflects motivational direction rather than theemotional valence of stimuli (reviewed in Harmon-Jones, 2004). It could be argued that the prefrontalcortex adds a motivational, or conative, aspect to astimulus that has been defined perceptually or in im-agery in parietal and other sensory association areas (toyield a “desired goal” or “demand for the goal”—Tolman—or “determining tendency”—Jaspers). Moti-vational states in the form of drives toward a goal mayunderlie the ability of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortexto mediate the linkage across time of stimulus andresponse. Successful behavior that achieves a desiredgoal reduces the associated drive component, whichmay reinforce prefrontal representations of the goaland its related rules.

The sudden reappearance of a cue in the environ-ment that was previously associated with a rewardexperience activates midbrain dopaminergic neuronsprojecting to the prefrontal cortex (reviewed in Miller& Cohen, 2001). Burst activity of mesocortical dop-aminergic neurons then modulates afferent sensoryprojections to the prefrontal cortex (“gating signal”)leading to the activation of a different goal representa-tion that according to previous experience is likely toorganize behavior successfully toward procuring thereward. Such updating of behavioral goals via percep-tually elicited gating signals has been termed a “boot-strapping mechanism,” which highlights the ability of“voluntary” (i.e., goal-directed) behavior to self-organ-ize without the need for a supervisory agent or“homunculus” (Miller & Cohen, 2001).

Premotor cortex

The supplementary motor area (SMA) in the medialfrontal cortex is involved in the preparation and readi-ness for sequential motor responses—particularlythose that are initiated “internally by the subject”(Cunnington, Windischberger, Deecke, & Moser,

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2003). The SMA is connected to the pre-SMA, which isconcerned with switching between “superordinate setsof responses”—that is, sets of rules for the selection ofspecific voluntary responses (Rushworth, Hadland,Paus, & Sipila, 2002). With further acquisition of skill(habit formation), motor response organization andsequencing shifts to the primary motor cortex. Activityin the SMA persists during the interval between presen-tation of a cue to respond and the execution of theresponse (“motor set”). Along with the anterior cin-gulate cortex, the SMA generates the EEG readinesspotential preceding voluntary action. This may reflectthe sense of volition or behavioral effort, or the sense ofurge to move, which can be introspected in voluntaryaction (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990).

The lateral premotor cortex is activated by cuesrequiring a direct motor response. While the posteriorparietal cortex evaluates the motor significance ofsalient stimuli irrespective of the probability of a sub-sequent response or the appropriateness of a response,motor preparatory activity in lateral premotor areas is afunction of the likelihood of a subsequent response(Toni, Thoenissen, & Zilles, 2001). Specific prepara-tory activity in lateral premotor areas persists for aslong as the intended response awaits elicitation (“mo-tor set”) (Toni, Thoenissen, & Zilles, 2001), consistentwith the notion of response disposition. The dorsallateral premotor cortex receives rich afferentation fromthe superior parietal lobule in the posterior parietalcortex, which (in the monkey) is concerned with syn-thesizing visual and proprioreceptive informationabout arm position and movement with visual informa-tion about the location of a target (reviewed in Wise,Boussaoud, Johnson, & Caminiti, 1997). Based oninformation about arm and target position, the dorsallateral premotor cortex prepares for reaching move-ments (reviewed in Wise et al., 1997). The ventrallateral premotor cortex implements grasping move-ments in relation to visual information about shape andsize of objects. It receives input from parts of theposterior parietal cortex that are concerned with visuo-motor transformations of target shape and size intomotor signals for grasping.

Response selection

In cortical premotor areas, the balance of move-ment-promoting and movement-inhibiting neuralactivity controls the initiation of motor action. Forexample, gaze orientation to salient stimuli in monkeysis initiated in the frontal eye field when cumulativeactivity of movement-related neurons, which is coun-terbalanced by the activity of neurons that promote

gaze fixation, reaches a particular threshold (reviewedin Schall, 2001). The time taken for movement-pro-moting neural activity to reach the threshold varies,manifesting in the phenomenon of response-time vari-ability. When a planned motor response is abandoned,movement-promoting neuronal activity decreases priorto reaching the execution threshold. Neuronal pro-cesses that lead to the cancellation of a planned move-ment begin before there is evidence for the cancella-tion on the behavioral level (reviewed in Schall, 2001).For Schall, these findings indicate that action choicesare deterministic:

The brain is . . . a dynamical system that producesbehaviour with the signature of chaos. . . . Thus, statesof the brain, like clouds in the sky, happen because ofearlier states of the system. . . . [C]hoices derive fromstates of the brain, and states of the brain, althoughdeterministic, are not entirely predictable . . . [Schall,2001, p. 40]

The dorsal striatum plays a key role in the selectionof response dispositions and action components. Itforms—in conjunction with the nigrostriatal dopaminepathway—the central component in a “habit responsesystem,” which allows animals in familiar contexts toproduce well-established conditioned responses to in-centive stimuli (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999). Activa-tion of dopaminergic projections from the substantianigra in response to the perception of relevant stimuliproduces phasic changes of dopamine concentration inthe dorsal striatum, which facilitates switching be-tween action dispositions or movement components(reviewed in Horvitz, 2000; Parkinson, Cardinal, &Everitt, 2000). The dorsal striatum is a lateral inhibi-tory network that filters out all but one cortical inputpattern representing goals or action dispositions (e.g.,Kropotov & Etlinger, 1999). Dopamine released in thedorsal striatum helps to enhance one striatal pattern ofneuronal activity over all others in a winner-takes-allfashion. Downstream, GABAergic striatal neurons in-hibit neurons in the globus pallidus internal segment(and substantia nigra pars reticulata), which leads todisinhibition of a set of thalamocortical circuits andfacilitation of the selected response disposition or ac-tion component represented in these circuits (reviewedin Parkinson, Cardinal, & Everitt, 2000).

The dorsal striatum also implements competitionbetween goals based on reward expectation. For ex-ample, neuronal activity in the caudate nucleus wasshown to reflect the selection of goal-directed move-ments in accordance with the expectation of a rewardamong alternative response options (reviewed in Gold,2003). Perception of stimuli that have been associatedwith a reward may be accompanied in the caudate by

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an increase in a corresponding pattern of neuronalactivity. Gold (2003) suggested that neuronal activityin the caudate might be inherently “comparative” toenable response selection among alternatives (i.e., “de-cision making”). The pattern of neuronal activity in thecaudate that relates to a particular response option mayincrease in activity—at the expense of alternative re-sponse tendencies—up to a threshold at which execu-tion of the response is initiated (Gold, 2003).

Parkinson, Cardinal, and Everitt (2000) suggestedthat the interaction between limbic and skeletomotorcorticostriatal circuits is hierarchical: “Motor compo-nents can only be chosen when they are part of thechosen higher-level behaviour” (p. 276). While limbiccorticobasal ganglia–thalamocortical circuits selecthigher-level behavioral strategies (and while prefrontalcircuits select goals), skeletomotor corticostriatal cir-cuits implement these strategies by selecting lower-level motor acts in accordance with the environment.Baev et al. (2002) conceptualized the interaction be-tween limbic and skeletomotor circuits in terms of“neuronal optimal control systems.” Optimal controlsystems are concerned with minimizing an externallyimposed “initiating signal.” Basic physiological needscan be regarded as the initiating signals for the systemof limbic corticobasal ganglia–thalamocortical cir-cuits, and, being an optimal control system, the latterachieves their minimization (i.e, the satisfaction ofphysiological needs) by employing as its “controlledobject” the hierarchically subordinate system of skele-tomotor circuits. The skeletomotor system, in turn, isan optimal control system concerned with minimiza-tion of its own initiating signals, which are imposedupon it by the limbic system in the form of motivationalstates. Thus, motor behavior can be conceptualized as ameans for the reduction of motivational signals emanat-ing from the limbic system (after Baev et al., 2002).

Gamma oscillations

Functionally, binding of action components intosingle representations in preparation for action exe-cution is likely to involve gamma synchronization ofthalamocortical activity in premotor areas. Electro-encephalographic desynchronization (correspondingto gamma synchronization) can be seen over frontalmotor and premotor areas in relation to the preparationand execution of voluntary action (Pfurtscheller,Flotzinger, & Neuper, 1994), but it also occurs duringperception of salient stimuli and imagination of move-ment. Brown and Marsden (1998) argued that the basalganglia play an important role in gamma synchroniza-tion and the binding of distributed cortical activity.

Brown and Marsden were interested in the observa-tion that administration of levodopa ameliorates theimpairment in EEG desynchronization that is observedduring voluntary-movement efforts in patients withParkinson’s disease who have akinesia. In Parkinson’sdisease, neurons in the internal segment of the globuspallidus are hyperactive, resulting in excessive inhibi-tion of thalamocortical activity, and dopamine agonistssuch as levodopa can reverse the pallidal hyperactivity.However, excessive inhibition of the globus pallidusinternal segment with levodopa can lead to excessivefacilitation of thalamocortical gamma activity andbinding of unrelated elements of motor activity, mani-festing in levodopa-induced dyskinesia (Brown &Marsden, 1998).

Brown and Marsden (1998) raised the possibilitythat gamma synchronization may be exaggerated inschizophrenia, too. If thalamocortical cells are exces-sively disinhibited, either as a result of reticular tha-lamic nucleus dysfunction (Behrendt, 2003) or due toreduced pallidal input to the thalamus, inappropriateresponse dispositions would require less excitatoryinfluences to gain actualization and more inhibitorycontrol to prevent them from actualization. In otherwords, the threshold for action generation in premotor/motor regions would be reduced, allowing for responsegeneration regardless of higher-order motivational fac-tors. Kropotov and Etlinger (1999) spoke of a suppres-sion operation involving basal ganglia mechanismsthat would normally inhibit prepared but unneededaction in response to situationally irrelevant stimuli;they speculated that if the threshold for action selec-tion were low, schizophrenic symptoms could arise. Itis suggested here that failure of suppression of motoracts initiated by irrelevant sensory stimuli may repre-sent a mechanism for passivity phenomena in schizo-phrenia. Since irrelevant acts would be perceived onexecution and at the same time not be conducive to thehigher-level motivational state, they would be experi-enced as passive. We have to bear in mind here that itis only following their execution that we can be awareof our motor acts (with movement awareness being anafferent not efferent phenomenon), and it is at thispoint—as we witness our movements being enacted—that they would impress themselves upon us as beingdiscordant to our desires and strivings.

Sensorimotor induction

Priming experiments demonstrate that social stimuliactivate behavioral dispositions without the subject’sawareness or conscious intention (reviewed in

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Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). It seems that social behavioris not determined by conscious and deliberate choicesand does not involve carefully weighing behavioraloptions (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). Instead, perceptionof stimuli automatically activates in the observer ten-dencies to generate actions or knowledge. Generally,perceived stimuli as well as imagery and thoughtsautomatically activate behavioral tendencies anddesires for goals represented in the prefrontal cortexand thus inadvertently influence further attention andbehavior. Thus, voluntary action can be seen within theframework of instinct theory.

The essential condition of both interest in and attentionto any object is that the mind shall be so organized,either natively or through experience, that it can thinkof the object, and that such thinking shall evoke someimpulse or desire which maintains a train of activity inrelation to the object. [McDougall, 1924, p. 277]

Stimuli, whether attended in the “external” environ-ment or anticipated in the “mind,” are believed to elicitdesires and strivings, which, in turn, orchestrate themultiple response dispositions that are represented inpremotor areas. Other stimuli—those that tend to guidebehavior on a more concrete level—may excite motorresponse dispositions directly, and actions will be gen-erated in response to such stimuli unless they aredisplaced by alternative response dispositions or sup-pressed by higher-order motivational states, such asdesires to attain certain goals. It is argued that ifmotivational states fail to effectively orchestrate motorresponse dispositions, passivity phenomena may arise.

Parietal association cortex and intention

The primary somatosensory cortex, which sub-serves senses of body or limb position (position sense)and limb movement (kinesthesia) among other modal-ities, projects to the unimodal somatosensory associ-ation cortex in the anterior parietal lobe and to themotor cortex. The unimodal somatosensory associa-tion cortex, in turn, projects to multimodal somatosen-sory association areas in the posterior parietal cortexand to the premotor cortex. Apart from propriorecep-tive information, multimodal association areas in theposterior parietal cortex receive input from the audi-tory system and form part of the dorsal visual stream.Multimodal association areas in the posterior parietalcortex are connected with prefrontal areas. The poste-rior parietal cortex plays a crucial role in the formationof motor intentions, as well as in motion perception ofobjects in space.

Intention—defined in a more narrow sense—refersto a movement plan that specifies a target and the type

of movement to achieve it. The posterior parietal cor-tex represents intentions for reaches, grasps, andsaccades in anatomically segregated subregions. Thereare different representations of space in the posteriorparietal cortex that relate to different spheres of action:the space within reach, a virtual space representingshapes of graspable objects; and the space beyondreach, which can be best explored by eye movements(reviewed in Colby & Goldberg, 1999). Within func-tional subregions, intentions are typically encoded ineye-centered visual coordinates—independently of thesensory modality of the target (reviewed in Andersen& Buneo, 2002). Activity in the posterior parietalcortex is strongly modulated by attentional input fromthe prefrontal cortex. Activity in the posterior parietalcortex representing a particular intention persists for aslong as an action is planned in the course of behavior.Stimuli that are represented in one of the space repre-sentations of the parietal cortex tend to be those thathave motivational salience or appear suddenly. Therepresentation of a stimulus in the posterior parietalcortex allows premotor areas to determine the coordi-nates of an action in response to the stimulus, but thisdoes not imply that an action will be produced (re-viewed in Colby & Goldberg, 1999). If no action planor goal is actively pursued, default intentions areformed in response to salient stimuli, which can persistuntil alternative action plans are formed (reviewed inAndersen & Buneo, 2002).

These findings reviewed by Andersen and Buneo(2002) and by Colby and Goldberg (1999) are consist-ent with aspects of the phenomenology of passivityphenomena and further raise the suspicion that at leastsome “made actions” and even “made thoughts,” aswell as alien-hand movements, result from responsedispositions in premotor areas that are precipitated byintentions formed upon perception of salient stimulibut are then suppressed insufficiently by prefrontalbiasing signals.

Imitation

In monkeys, a proportion of neurons in the ventrallateral premotor cortex are activated not only duringexecution of grasping action but also during obser-vation of a similar action carried out by anotherindividual. These “mirror neurons” may even dis-charge when the observed interaction between handand object is partly hidden from vision and canonly be inferred. The inferior parietal lobule, which isconnected to the ventral premotor cortex, similarlycontains neurons that fire during observation of a goal-directed hand movement, such as grasping or reaching,

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and the majority of these also respond during theexecution of a similar action (reviewed in Rizzolatti,Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). There is neuroimaging evi-dence in humans that observation of others’ purposefulactions activates motor and premotor areas, includinglateral premotor cortex and supplementary motor area,as well as the posterior parietal cortex, particularlyinferior parietal lobule (reviewed in Grezes & Decety,2001; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). Similarly,parts of the posterior parietal cortex that are activatedduring the execution of manual actions are activatedupon the mere presentation of graspable objects (re-viewed in Jeannerod, 2001).

Many social behaviors are automatically triggeredby the perception of others’ action (reviewed inFerguson & Bargh, 2004). For example, people tend tomimic gestures or adopt the accent of a conversationpartner without being aware of this. Behaviors in aconversation partner that connote high or low statusautomatically induce people to adopt opposite posturesthat connote submissiveness or dominance, respec-tively (reviewed in Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). Echo-praxia and echolalia may represent pathologicalextremes of imitative behavior, where higher-leveldrives or strivings have lost their ability to suppressautomatic response dispositions excited by the obser-vation of others’ actions. Garrod and Pickering (2004)argued that oral conversations do not succeed becauseof conscious negotiation between conversational part-ners and complex reasoning on their parts, but becauseof automatic “interactive alignment” of their responsedispositions on multiple linguistic levels. This processis related to imitation. A partner’ words, sounds, gram-matical forms, and meanings activate matching lin-guistic representations in the other partner and thusautomatically influence the latter’s linguistic produc-tions. In interactive alignment, speakers automaticallyreuse linguistic structures that they have just perceivedas listeners (Garrod & Pickering, 2004).

The finding of premotor activity during observationof others’ actions may provide insight into the natureof understanding others’ actions and perhaps evenunderstanding others’ speech. Action understandingwas indeed shown to involve activation in premotorareas—more so than the mere imitation of others’actions (reviewed in Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese,2001). The main significance of premotor activationduring action observation may be that it produces“response facilitation” (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese,2001), which may explain the tendency to imitate anobserved movement—unless suppressed by prefrontalinput. Thus, understanding of observed action, pre-sumably including the understanding of speech, ap-

pears to involve the activation of action dispositions inpremotor areas. The activation of such pulls towardaction in response to observed (or imagined) goal-directed actions might contribute to what impressesphenomenologically in thought as the experience ofmeaning.

Movement plans (intentions) that appear to beformed automatically in posterior parietal areas uponperception of salient events or objects activate con-nected premotor areas, thus predisposing to a motorresponse. Jeannerod (2001) recognized the role of theprefrontal cortex in selective inhibition of intentions.Patients with orbitofrontal lesions cannot refrain fromimitating gestures performed in front of them or usinggraspable objects presented to them (“forced utiliza-tion”). Alien-limb phenomena and “made actions” maydiffer from forced utilization in that inhibitory influ-ences do exist; however, motivational factors thatwould normally subdue and coordinate automatic re-sponse dispositions remain isolated or ineffective. At-tention to graspable objects by concerned patients withalien-limb syndrome or attention to one’s movementsin delusions of alien control would maintain parietalactivation related to intentions and perpetuate theproblem by further producing inappropriate and incon-sistent response tendencies that cannot be integratedwithin the higher-level motivational state.

Anticipatory imagery

Already James (1890) considered that thoughtsabout actions automatically predispose to these ac-tions. What precedes voluntary action is an “anticipa-tory image of the movement’s sensible effects” (James,1890, cited in Pribram, 1976). Having adopted theview that “consciousness of muscular exertion, beingimpossible without movement effected somewhere,must be an afferent and not an efferent sensation; aconsequence, and not an antecedent, of the movementitself,” James came to the following conclusion:

An anticipatory image, then, of the sensorial conse-quences of a movement, plus (on certain occasions)the fiat that these consequences shall become actual, isthe only psychic state which introspection lets us dis-cern as the forerunner of our voluntary acts. [James,1890, quoted in Pribram, 1976, p. 81]

Elsner and Hommel (2001) pointed out that the antici-pated goal of a voluntary action is, in effect, an imageof the “intended and expected action effects.” Theysuggested that, in the process of learning voluntaryactions, sensory representations of actions are auto-matically associated with representations of their ef-

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fects. Learnt response–effect associations are bidirec-tional, so that the perception of an event that resemblesthe known action effect will automatically activate thecorresponding response representation. Thus, imageryof action effects (effect anticipation) can—acting as astimulus—elicit the response that produces the “to-be-expected effect” (Elsner & Hummel, 2001). In otherwords, anticipating the consequences of an action in-duces the action.

Stimuli resembling action effects may not immedi-ately elicit the associated response but may only elicita disposition to produce the effect. Elsner and Hommel(2001, p. 236) considered that “presenting an acquiredaction effect arouses only a tendency to react with theassociated response.” Several perceived stimuli or an-ticipatory images may activate “competing responsetendencies,” and a selection will have to be made inaccordance with the overall motivational state of theorganism. The organism needs to be “able to overcomeautomatic response tendencies if these are incompat-ible with other more important action goals.” Elsnerand Hommel (2001) suggested that this would involve“suppressing present, but unwanted, response tenden-cies.” Failure of such inhibitory mechanism in schizo-phrenia may give rise to passively experienced actionsthat patients will construe as “made actions.”

Earlier, Woodworth (1926) introspected this mecha-nism:

We think of a certain result and our muscles producethis result, though we did not really mean to do this actourselves. The thought arouses the movement becauseit has previously been linked with the movement. Athought which has previously served as the stimulus toan act will tend to have this effect again, unless inhib-ited by some contrary stimulus. There is no need of adefinite consent to the act, provided there is nothingpresent to inhibit it. [Woodworth, 1926, p. 528]

Volition and readiness potential

Voluntary or self-initiated movements and acts (in-cluding speech) are preceded in the electroencephalo-gram by a slow negative potential shift over parietaland precentral cortical regions, called Bereitschafts—or readiness—potential (Deecke, 1990). The readinesspotential begins at least 1 second before the onset ofmuscular contraction registered in the electromyo-gram, and it has two principal components. The earlycomponent, which is a symmetric potential shift overboth hemispheres, is principally generated in the sup-plementary motor area. It was suggested that the earlycomponent of the readiness potential might reflect

motivation or “intention” to carry out a motor act,whereas the late component is related to preparation offinal motor mechanisms (Deecke, 1990). Libet,Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983) reported that thereadiness potential prior to voluntary acts consistentlyprecedes the time of the subjective decision to act byseveral hundred milliseconds. Libet et al. (1983) con-cluded that volitional motor activity is initiated uncon-sciously—that is, before a conscious decision to act ismade.

Spence (1996) argued that free will or volition couldonly be seen as causing behavior if the reported deci-sion to act occurs before the actual initiation of thecorresponding act. Considering Libet’s findings, heconcluded that self-consciousness is not the initiator ofaction in the nervous system; the sense of agency isillusory. For Spence, the “deep problem” remained(Spence, Hunter, & Harpin, 2002)—why do subjectsperceive movements as chosen when the sense ofchoice lags behind movement initiation? The paradoxmay have arisen partly from an artifact of introspection(Keller & Heckhausen, 1990) and partly for conceptualreasons. What we experience is not our choosing orcausing of an action but merely an awareness of com-petition between response options, a sense of readinessthat is temporarily kept in check by response conflict.This—and not an agent’s “decision”—is what followsthe onset of neural activity related to the act as meas-ured electroencephalographically in the study by Libetet al. (1983). The common interpretation of Libet’sfindings presupposes that there is a self that makesdecisions. Reasoning then arrives at a contradiction:how can the subject have made a decision to act ifthe subject becomes aware of the decision to act onlyafter the initiation of neural activity relating to theaction?

Bennett and Hacker (2003) argued that Libet’s as-sumption that voluntary movement is movementcaused by an act of volition or a felt urge is miscon-ceived (which resonates with Ryle’s, 1949, views).First, antecedent feelings of urge or volition are notsufficient for the characterization of an action as vol-untary (e.g., sneezing). Second, feelings of volition arenot necessary for an act to be voluntary. An agent—asBennett and Hacker (2003) pointed out—does not holdhimself as having moved involuntarily if his movementwas not preceded by an urge or act of willing. In fact,most voluntary acts are not preceded by acts of voli-tion. However, even if they are, such an act of willingcannot be seen as being the cause of a voluntary action,otherwise “it too would have to have been caused by anantecedent volition,” leading to a “vicious regress.”The experience of volition—Bennett and Hacker

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(2003) reasoned—is merely a reflection of “determina-tion and persistence in pursuit of one’s goals in theface of difficulties,” in accordance with our discussionabove.

A model of passivity phenomena

When discussing passivity phenomena, one needs todistinguish between the sense of volition that may ormay not precede voluntary movement (pre-action) andthe sense of self-generation (“coming from me”) thatarises in conjunction with the perception of one’saction and its effects (post-action). This approach rec-ognizes that action awareness (being an afferent notefferent phenomenon, according to James, 1890) canonly arise when one’s action is perceived. Since voli-tion is neither necessary nor sufficient for voluntaryaction, passivity phenomena cannot be conceptualizedas loss of volition, contrary to the approach taken bySpence (1996). Rather than providing a window ontovolition, passivity phenomena may provide a windowonto the sense of self that arises after action execution.If self-experience is linked to drive reduction, which issuggested to occur in conjunction with the perceptionof movements, then we could conclude that passivityexperiences arise if this conjunction is absent. Givenwhat we know about the physiology of voluntarybehavior, this situation could arise when response dis-positions that are elicited by sensory cues (or imagery)cannot be suppressed by existing higher-level motiva-tional factors such as drives or goals. The observationthat some passivity phenomena can be resisted by thepatient or may be accompanied by a sense of forcedimposition (Jaspers, 1946) may indicate that automaticresponse dispositions are controlled ineffectively bysuperordinate behavioral tendencies.

Alien-limb syndrome

Spence (2002) explained alien-limb phenomena as re-sulting from failure of higher cortical control centers(dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cor-tex, and supplementary motor area) to prevent inappro-priate motor routines (which are represented inpremotor and motor cortices) from gaining expression.In other words, under conditions of medial prefrontalor callosal lesions, pre-potent motor acts can be re-leased from higher inhibition, giving rise to alien-limbmovements (Spence, 2002). However, the questionremained as to why movements that are released insuch manner are experienced as not being produced by

the self. The phenomenon appears less puzzling oncewe remember that the process of action choice is notone that is instigated by the “agent,” but one thatreflects the submission of pre-potent response tenden-cies to higher-level drives.

Alien-limb movements appear purposeful, typicallybeing directed at objects or interfering with the otherhand. It is tempting to suggest that these movementsare induced by the perception of objects in the environ-ment. For example, the sight of graspable objects willautomatically generate an intention vector in the poste-rior parietal cortex. This, in turn, activates a responsedisposition in the premotor area for grasping. In caseswhere the alien hand interferes with, or even antici-pates, activities begun by the other hand, it is conceiv-able that an anticipatory image not only guides thepatient’s coordinated voluntary action but also inap-propriately activates the alien hand at the same time.The disconnection from the anterior cingulate has theeffect of isolating a perceptually induced responsetendency from drives, overall goals, and emotions, thuscausing the movement to appear alien.

Schizophrenia

In the case of schizophrenic passivity we have lessclear evidence for an underlying neuroanatomical defi-cit, but we can speculate that disturbed interhemi-spheric integration (e.g., due to corpus callosum dys-genesis), which is a recognized neurodevelopmentalabnormality in schizophrenia, may constitute a causefor passivity phenomena in this condition, too. Further-more, as mentioned above, Brown and Marsden (1998)as well as Kropotov and Etlinger (1999) suspected thatschizophrenic symptoms might arise when the thresh-old that response tendencies have to overcome to gainaccess to executing mechanisms is low. There is evi-dence suggestive of pathological activation of tha-lamocortical circuits in schizophrenia (reviewed inBehrendt, 2003). Some studies reviewed above can beinterpreted as showing a tendency for kinesthetic per-ception, which is subserved by parietal regions of thethalamocortical system, to be underconstrained by pro-prioreceptive input. This does not fit directly into theproposed model but may indicate a more general ab-normality that could equally affect precentral regionsof the thalamocortical system where self-organizationof reverberating thalamocortical activity is normallyconstrained by basal ganglia input. If activity in frontalareas of the thalamocortical system were insufficientlyconstrained by basal ganglia input (possibly as a resultof dopaminergic hyperactivity characteristic of acute

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schizophrenia), then the threshold for action selectionwould be low and motor phenomena could arise thatare not integrated with the overall motivational state.

The automatic induction of action dispositions byactions observed in others may explain symptomsother than motor passivity. Jaspers (1946) thought thatsome stereotypies, such as repetitive grasping or han-dling as well as echopraxia and echolalia, are linked insome way with “sensory impressions.” Indeed, imita-tion phenomena in general illustrate that events such asother people’s actions automatically induce responsedispositions, which patients with echopraxia or echola-lia fail to suppress. Furthermore, sudden movements inpsychosis may be due to “autochthonous target-im-ages” that produce an impulse to realize them (Jaspers,1946, referring to Wernicke). This phenomenon maybe related to “made impulses,” which, similarly to“made feelings,” may represent prefrontal, as opposedto premotor, activations by perceived objects or eventsin schizophrenia that remain unsuppressed by higher-level limbic activations.

With respect to schizophrenic “thought insertion,”we have more than just philosophical grounds to as-sume that verbal thought is a motor process, consider-ing that it involves brain structures and mechanismsthat have evolved for the control of motor behavior(Graybiel, 1997; Leiner, Leiner, & Dow, 1991;Middleton & Strick, 2000; Schmahmann, 1991). Theillusory sense that the self is the agent in thoughtprocesses may arise from the association of cognitiveaspects of the thought process (in McDougall’s sense)with a sense of drive reduction or reduction in the“determining tendency” (Jaspers). In analogy to themodel for “made” actions, if percepts or mental imagesdue to their conative aspects induce motor action—thatis, subvocal speech—in defiance of drives or determin-ing tendencies, then the subsequent verbal thoughts—that is, perceived subvocal speech—would not beexperienced as self-generated but may impress as in-serted or “made.” In other words, patients experiencethought insertion when thoughts arise that do not com-ply with the general direction of the thought processand thus fail to reduce the sense of striving.

Summary

In an attempt to elucidate the nature and mechanism ofpassivity phenomena—that is, experiences that one’sconscious actions or thoughts have not been “willed”by oneself—we adopted philosophical positions thatwere advocated by philosophers and theoretical psy-chologists in the past and are now, in part, supported

by functional neuroanatomy. First, we experience ouractions not from the standpoint of the executive butthrough the perception of its effects. Second, the “self”is not an agent of behavior. Third, behavior is ener-gized and integrated by basic drives (instincts). Fourth,the experience of an acting self is related to drivereduction associated with voluntary actions. Themodel thus proposes that passivity phenomena areactions that are induced by the perception of salientevents but that are not integrated with or conducive tothe overall drive state of the organism.

Following the perception of salient events, competi-tion arises between automatic response dispositionsseeking expression. The prefrontal cortex appears toplay an important role not only in determining whichevents are to be perceived, but also which of thecorresponding response dispositions is to be selectedand actualized in overt behavior. Thus, action selectionis the outcome of competition between response ten-dencies in the context of prefrontal biasing signals thatrepresent drives and strivings for goals. Action selec-tion may be uncoupled from drives and strivings as aresult of a lowering of the threshold for action selec-tion—as is suggested to be the case in schizophrenicpassivity phenomena—or due to disconnection fromprefrontal regions—as may be the case in the alien-limb syndrome.

Effects of actions have to be perceived, since onlyperceptions can signal the achievement of a goal andmediate drive reduction or elimination of the “demandfor the goal.” How do we know whether something thatwe perceive is an effect of our behavior or a passiveoccurrence? How can we explain what Jaspers (1946)called “one of the major polarities in the psyche”—thepolarity “of intentional act and unintentional becom-ing, intention (activity) and occurrence (passivity)”?We may be tempted to answer: through the experienceof an associated drive reduction. If this does not occur,stimuli remain salient, furthering the organism’s inter-action with the environment by inducing new responsedispositions or causing strategic reorientation. If motoraction is selected in a way that contravenes the overalldrive state, then its perceived effects would be unlikelyto give rise to a sense of drive reduction, leaving thesubject with an impression of passivity.

Finally, is there a way to test our hypothesis? Itseems unlikely that self-experience can ever be meas-ured, even if agreement existed on what it represents.Many of the issues debated in philosophy cannot besubjected to empirical testing, and this is true also formuch of the theoretical beauty of psychoanalysis. Thisshould not, however, stop us from trying to identifyand clarify irresistible prejudgments inherent in the

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language and concepts we use to interpret phenomena.Conversely, the fact that experiments can be designedto “support” hypotheses does not necessarily mean thatthe view one proposes is correct, because it is all tooeasy to rationalize experiments and interpret their re-sults in terms of the theory one seeks to prove, thecentral-monitoring hypothesis being a case in point.Experiments carried out under the banner of centralmonitoring or related cognitive hypotheses of passivityphenomena can be interpreted equally, or even moreeconomically, as supporting the model proposed here.One experiment in particular would have suggesteditself as a test, but may still serve as a useful illustra-tion. Motivation-independent activation of movementdispositions is effectively what Penfield (1975) hadmodeled by electrical stimulation of the motor cortex.And what our model would have predicted is whatPenfield observed: movements experienced by the sub-ject as being passive.

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passivity phenomena: implications for the concept of self

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