QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY

PARTITION OF THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT:

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

RABIA UMAR ALI

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

2009

CANDIDATE’S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the dissertation presently submitted bearing the title “Partition of the Indian Subcontinent: Planning and Implementation” is the result of my own research and has not been submitted to any other institution for any other degree.

Rabia Umar Ali

Ph.D. Candidate

Department of History

Quaid-i-Azam University

August 12, 2009

SUPERVISOR’S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the Ph.D. candidate Rabia Umar Ali has completed her dissertation titled “Partition of the Indian Subcontinent: Planning and Implementation” under my supervision. I recommend it for submission in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Dr. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah

Professor and Chairman

Department of History

Quaid-iAzam University.

QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

FINAL APPROVAL

Dated: _________

We hereby certify that we have read the dissertation “Partition of the Indian Subcontinent: Planning and Implementation” submitted by Rabia Umar Ali in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History. We deem the said dissertation to be of sufficient quality to merit the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History to Rabia Umar Ali.

_____________________

External Examiner A

_____________________

External Examiner B

_____________________

Supervisor

_____________________

Chairman

Department of History

For all those who ever thought that the land

of their ambition was unachievable.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Praise be to the Almighty to whom I owe my attempt at completing this work. The struggle and effort to initiate and fulfill this task has been the blessing and mercy of Allah. I don’t consider myself worthy of it without the constant strength and direction that He bestowed upon me at every stage of research and writing.

That I was able to finish the work in time, is the sole accomplishment of my guide, teacher, colleague, friend and supervisor Prof. Dr. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah. He became a source of intense support and inspiration at a time when I had relapsed into a state of confusion and uncertainty. He has definitely, in my case, played the role of the legendary mentor. His encouragement infused a new spirit in me and enabled me to pick up the threads from a near to lost endeavour. I will never be able to thank him enough.

My very profound and emotional gratitude is due to Prof. Dr. Dushka H. Sayyid with whom I started working on this dissertation a couple of years ago. Her presence and very qualified academic assistance propelled me to this work. I deeply appreciate and admire her understanding of my problems, both personal and professional, in the various sittings that we had in a comfortable, conducive and warm environment of her home. I am very proud of having had the opportunity to work with her and thank her from the core of my heart.

My late parents, must be smiling down at this achievement. I owe to them what I am today and miss them beyond words can express. What they inculcated in me in the early years is what I have as their legacy. May their souls rest in peace and may they get good tidings from this world. I am sure they are proud and happy.

Bhai, my elder brother, has always been the source of my strength after Abu. I don’t think I could have even thought of treading on this path without him, always far ahead of me in academics, and very much beside me in life. His life and work became the major incentive, never pushing but always there to enquire about my progress, with guidance, suggestions and lots of helpful insight. To my younger siblings Fakiha and Hamid, to my brother-in-law Hamza and

sisters-in-law Shaista and Afreen, I am lovingly grateful for their prayers, support and encouragement.

To Umar, my husband and my partner in life, I am thankful for more than I can say in words. He bore with me, and my professional needs in a manner that invaluably facilitated my work. His constant encouragement that I should not give up and his unflinching support made this work see the light of the day. My accomplishment is basically his effort. My gratitude is also due to his parents, whose prayers and generous accommodation of my frequent and prolonged absences made my work very easy.

I am grateful for the delightful presence of my lovely five and a half years old daughter, Ayesha. She is the reason for the delay in the completion of this work but also my most precious possession and the most needful distraction. In many ways she made my work pleasant by her cheerful being, keeping away moments of insanity that one usually has to confront in the process. Equally special have been my nieces and nephews, Zaynab, Valeed, Mustafa, Rahem, Samah and Moosa in giving me their blessed and joyful company, when and where possible.

My friends have always been there for me. To name and thank them would require volumes. But I owe to some more than I thought I would in the end. Farooq stands out among the rest. He patiently and tirelessly pushed me on until I finished. Here I must acknowledge the support and encouragement I received from Nadeem Siddiqui, my late colleague whose friendship and company I miss and would always cherish with great fondness. To Dost and Kulsoom I owe the final and the most difficult stage. They restored in me a lost confidence and their youthful energy led me to wind up my work in the best possible way. Naveed, Ishaq, Fakhar, Shumaila, Shahid, Suleiman, Adeela, Huma, Saira, Junaid, Faizan, Nauman, Omar and Babar, were my persuasive factors. May Allah bless them, always.

I owe a special gratitude to Dr. and Mrs. Saeed-ud-Din Ahmad Dar and Chacha and Chachi for their faith in my abilities, not only supporting and encouraging me but giving me the joy and blessings of their parental prayers.

The department of History is my second home. I am what I learnt from it. My teachers have always been my incentive to prove myself in an ever better way. They are my beacons of light. Dr. Aslam Syed, Dr. M. Naeem Qureshi, Dr. Rafique Afzal, Dr. Sikandar Hayat, Dr. Riaz

Ahmad, Dr. Dushka Sayyid, Dr. Wiqar Ali Shah and Mr. (late) Aziz Ahmad Chaudhry have contributed immensely to my progress and growth. I also wish to thank my colleagues Dr. Javed Haider Syed, Dr.Tanvir Anjum, Dr. Ilhan Niaz and Fouzia for their encouragement.

The staff at the department of History is my extended family. Altaf sahib, Akbar sahib, Sarwar, Sarwar Masih, Raheem Dad, Faheem and above all Qaim and Zahid have given to me and my work a support that comes from only very dear people with whom a special bond of longevity of association is shared. At home, Nazakat made my life very comfortable by taking most of the domestic responsibilities off my shoulders in the most crucial days of writing. I wish to thank him for those frequent cups of tea that made the burden of my work lighter.

Lastly, I must acknowledge the cooperation of the institutes where I worked and from where I was able to collect my research material. I am deeply indebted to the Razi-ud-Din Siddiqui Library, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, National Documentation Centre, Islamabad, National Library, Islamabad, National Archives, Islamabad, Lahore Museum Library, Lahore, Quaid-i-Azam Library, Lahore, Department of History, Punjab University, Lahore, Punjab Public Library, Lahore and Baha-ud-Din Zakriya University, Multan for the research facilities they provided. In the U.S.A., University of California, Santa Barabara and Brown University, Rhode Island deserve a special thanks. In the U.K. I had the opportunity of working for a considerable period of time. My gratitude is due to the Charles Wallace Trust Fellowship, which enabled me to work at the School for Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) University of London, at British Library, London, Newspaper Collection Colindale, London, The National Archives, Kew Gardens, London and University of Glasgow, Scotland. I am especially thankful to all those who helped me out in these institutions and made my work considerably easier.

The responsibility of all factual details and errors is entirely mine.

Rabia Umar Ali

August, 2009

ABSTRACT

India’s Partition was an event of momentous significance for the three major communities, the Hindus, Muslims and the Sikhs who were at the time residing in the subcontinent. It was an equally important phenomenon for the British who were to withdraw their rule and thereby signify an imperial retreat from India. Independence was announced on the 15th of August 1947 after which the two sovereign States of India and Pakistan emerged on the map of the world. The Muslims of the subcontinent had gained a separate homeland and the struggle for freedom by the Indians in general had reached fruition.

Partition as a landmark and a milestone was achieved. The manner it actually came about and the numerous stages that its making and implementation went through, is mainly the subject of this study. Lord Mountbatten’s role in the capacity of the last Viceroy of United India gets the major part of attention as he was not only the Crown representative in India, but also the man on the ground taking major decisions. His relationship with other political leaders and his handling of the situation was crucial in the communally tense and volatile Indian situation.

The planning for partition and more so its implementation required a meticulous and impartial approach. It was a highly sensitive matter where communities were turning into nationalities and an imperial power was foregoing its control of almost a century. The decisions regarding schedules and time frame, division of assets, handling of Princely States, the issue of Governor-Generalship and choice of personalities to manage the various departments had to be taken carefully. It was a British responsibility, India still being a subject state. The task, however, was not delivered in the spirit of an unbiased arbitral approach with much left to be desired. The result was a hasty and flawed partition and its repercussions so strong that they still hang visibly on the region’s horizon, determining and defining the nature and character of the relationship between the two major of States of South Asia, India and Pakistan.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements vii-ix

Abstract x

Introduction 1-33

Chapter One

British Approach to Partition 34-77

Chapter Two

Evolution of Partition Plan 78-115

Chapter Three

Radcliffe Award and its Dictates 116-146

Chapter Four

Administrative Consequences 147-177

Conclusion 178-187

Appendices 188-210

Select Bibliography 211-232

1

INTRODUCTION

The British arrival in India was an act propelled by trade incentives under the

patronage of the East India Company. For hundreds of years the English had been the

‘humble petitioners of the Mughal Emperors.’ This situation, however, underwent change

and by the middle of the eighteenth century their influence began to rise in all quarters.

By means of diplomacy, force and exploitation the process of their acquiring the Indian

empire continued for another hundred years. The War of Independence, an indigenous

struggle for freedom culminated in a debacle in 1857, after which the British rule

formally started in India. The core of British command and control remained a policy

based upon promoting a communal schism between the two major communities of

India___ the Hindus and the Muslims___ to facilitate and secure their occupation. The

differences among these two groups already existed and varied from religion to culture

and from economy to politics, but grew out of proportion under the aegis of imperialism.

The Hindus and the Muslims organized themselves into political organizations, the

Congress and the Muslim League respectively, to focus on communal issues and the

safeguard of their interests. The demand for independence and freedom from the British

became a unanimous cry all across the subcontinent and to it was finally added the

insistence on partition from the Muslims who did not wish to slip under a Congress

majority rule after the Raj ended. A century of political struggle led to the creation of two

independent and sovereign states, India and Pakistan.

2

India was partitioned in August 1947 as the culmination of a long struggle for

freedom and independence. Power was transferred from the British hands to India and

Pakistan on the basis of dominion status in accordance with the 3 June Plan, which was

accepted by and acquiesced in by the principal Indian leaders.1 It was a task of

tremendous responsibility and entailed all the complications of partition of territory and

division of resources, at a time of heightening tension and turmoil, when a smooth

running of government, both at the centre and the provinces, had also to be carried on.2

It was in the 1940’s that the forces for partition gathered momentum.3 In other

words it was the decade of 1937-1947 that was crucial for decision making in respect of

what happened eventually in 1947.4 The British policy, the Indian demands, and the force

of circumstance, all combined into the making of this period. However, the British

attempts to reach a settlement, as illustrated by the protracted and tortuous negotiations

initiated by the Cripps offer (1942) and the Cabinet Mission (1946), remained largely

unproductive.5 Moreover, the conflict between the goals of Congress and the Muslim

League was of unity and independence versus partition and independence, respectively.

That was the dilemma that the Indian political situation faced, until both the Congress

and the British authorities came to terms with the Muslim demand for partition as the

only solution to the Indian crisis. In fact each step that took India nearer to independence,

also marked a stride towards partition.6

Acceptance of the demand for independence and division, however, formed only

part of the solution. In theory, though, the conflict had been resolved but all the

3

practicalities of the decision remained to be worked out. The planning for partition was a

process that put to test both the abilities and the efficiencies of the planners and the

executors. India had never been a homogeneous entity, as claimed by many scholars, and

therefore, not one that could be easily governed. The Indian constitutional dilemma had

intrigued the British mind for more than a century, and had prevented them from giving a

generally acceptable formula, mainly because of the diversified religious and political

cross currents that defined its contours. This became a major handicap in the period of

transition. Furthermore, it was the communal divide between the Hindus and the

Muslims, which brought matters to a head turning the demand for independence into a

cry for partition. In order to govern and administer fairly and impartially, this last call to

duty proved to be the most challenging task faced by the British in their entire period of

rule over the subcontinent.

Despite the voluminous literature that exists on the last phase of united India, the

making of a partition plan and its implementation remains a neglected subject. The debate

over the Partition plan and its implementation is as inconclusive as it was sixty years ago,

with a number of issues and problems that have not received much attention from

scholars working on the period. V.P.Menon’s Transfer of Power in India (1957), is

perhaps one of the earliest records of the freedom struggle in the subcontinent. It begins

with the Indian War of independence of 1857, highlights the Indian constitutional

dilemma and narrows down on the last decade of united India. It gives meaningful insight

into the policies and plans of the British government regarding Indian demand for greater

representation and self governance in the years between the two great wars and

4

particularly after the Second World War. Its merit rests mainly on the fact that Menon, in

his official capacity as constitutional adviser to the Governor General, worked in close

collaboration with Mountbatten,7 the last Viceroy of India, and was therefore, well

informed about the working of the Viceroy’s office. However, the very same fact, as well

as his association with certain Congress stalwarts,8 also brings to question the objectivity

and credibility of his narrative. Moreover, his silence on certain issues of outstanding

importance, such as Mountbatten’s involvement in the working of the boundary

commission, seems quite incomprehensible.9

Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India (1966), by

Penderel Moon, discusses the growth of the idea of the partition of India and why it

became inevitable. His contention is that it was a general lack of wisdom and

statesmanship on the part of the British in the crucial years of 1937-42 that made Pakistan

unavoidable.10 This argument seems to downplay the importance of the political

movement for freedom and independence. He might be justified in saying that the

violence and turbulence that marked the period of transition resulted from a “singular

want of prevision and failure of statesmanship”,11 but to attribute the division of India to

that factor is not only a fundamental distortion of reality, but a negation of the Indian

struggle. First published in 1961, it is nevertheless, an informative source on the

communal violence and the efforts to prevent the breakdown of civil government.

Penderel Moon was an officer in the Indian Civil Service, and was serving as the revenue

minister for the state of Bahawalpur at the time of partition.12 His work, therefore, carries

much weight as a vivid first hand account of one of the greatest human convulsions of the

5

century, but does not have an archival base, cites very few sources of information, and

lacks a detached and objective critical approach.

Chaudhri Muhammad Ali’, The Emergence of Pakistan, (1967), is a very lucid

and interesting account of India’s partition. It is a valuable source on the subject, having

been written by one who was not only a witness to the proceedings of partition, but was

also a member of the Steering Committee that conducted the administrative partition, and

supervised the work of ten commissions which worked under its authority.13 The work

devotes a chapter to the making of the Plan that divided India, yet the intricacies of its

conception and execution are conspicuously missing, as it lacks the necessary hindsight

so important for historical writings. Therefore, like the above cited works, its merit as an

objective study suffers from a serious handicap. Furthermore, after the lapse of more

than fifty years, and the comparatively recent availability of certain private collections

and documents, this work has become outdated.

The Great Divide:Britain-India-Pakistan, by H.V.Hodson (1969), also offers a

study of the period. Hodson was one of the first to consult the Mountbatten Papers for his

book. However, it is basically a one sided account of the Partition of India, the sources

and the outlook being predominantly British. In particular the role of the last Viceroy,

Lord Mountbatten, in whose name General Lord Ismay requested the author to undertake

the task, has been unrealistically glorified. Like most scholars belonging to the Raj and

like many other official British historians, Hodson also tends to explain partition and the

end of the empire as the completion of the English mission, projecting independence not

6

as the fulfillment and culmination of a hard fought freedom struggle, but a generous gift

of British liberalism.14 Working in the typical imperialist framework, he approaches the

Indian problem with a stereotyped and pre-determined mindset, justifying the colonial

deeds and absolving the authorities of any major responsibility. Moreover, Hodson’s

undying veneration of Mountbatten, and his defence of the actions and decisions of the

last Viceroy under all circumstances, at times leads him to exaggerated and biased

conclusions. Therefore, The Great Divide, like most of the imperial writings needs to be

read very carefully and viewed as a study that was deliberately and consciously

undertaken to create an aura of invincible colonial rule, which aimed at preparing the

Indian people for self- government to the extent that they were able to govern themselves.

Ayesha Jalal’s The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand

for Pakistan (1985), deserves special mention in the context of the present debate. This

work concentrates mainly on the political career of Jinnah, in the backdrop of Indian

partition. The book is a valuable addition to the existing literature on the tumultuous

developments in the subcontinent, that led to the creation of two new and independent

states. Having analyzed the pre-partition scenario from the Muslim League, Congress and

also a British perspective, the author makes no attempt to exonerate the last

representative of the Raj of “a complete failure of responsible political leadership”.15

Very pertinently questioning the motives and contentions of the British, she describes the

great operation as an ignominious scuttle, enabling them to “extricate themselves from

the awkward responsibility of presiding over India’s communal madness.”16 On the other

hand the main argument of the book, that it was mainly Congress that was insisting on

7

partition and that Jinnah was opposed to it, using Pakistan only as a bargaining counter to

get parity in the Central Government,17 has provoked a lively controversy. The work has

thereby come under serious criticism from different segments of scholarly thought,

making it necessary to look at official documents afresh. Nevertheless, her emphasis on

parity has thrown new light on the demand for Pakistan, and to the question as to who

was actually responsible for the partition of India makes it a very relevant and interesting

study.

R.J.Moore’s Endgames of Empire: Studies of Britain’s Indian Problem (1988),

raises a few important questions about the 3 June Plan itself. His claim that it was a

‘Mountbatten-Nehru deal’ shifts the responsibility of partition to Congress.18 However,

if this had been factually true, partition could never have taken place, as it was neither the

demand nor the goal of the Congress. The Congress had all along argued in favour of

independence for a united India, and the British also wanted the two parties, Congress

and the Muslim League, to settle for the same, in the eventuality of their withdrawal. It

was very late in the day that Congress accepted partition as the only solution to the

political impasse, thanks to the communal strife, and the British reluctantly conceded to a

division of India.

Patrick French’s Liberty or Death: India’s Journey to Independence and Division

(1997), is the first book on the topic to use reports of the intelligence agencies. It is a

source that has been quite sparingly utilized in the past by the students and scholars of

partition history. Apart from that, the work relies mostly on earlier researches and studies

8

and has a style reminiscent of Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre’s Freedom at

Midnight, (1982) which offers revealing and very interesting reading in simple and easily

comprehensible manner. However, it has very little to add to the existing knowledge of

the subject, as it attempts to address issues that have already been discussed at length in

earlier studies.

The edited work of Ian Talbot and Gurhapal Singh, Region and Partition: Bengal,

Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent (1999), offers a rich and scholarly

assortment of very well argued articles on a variety of themes relating to partition.

However, it cannot be regarded as a specialized study of the plan to partition India. With

the exception of a few essays on the Boundary Commission that was appointed to

demarcate the boundaries of India and Pakistan, its constitution, working and Award, it

covers a vast variety of subjects, which attempt to address partition historiography in a

more general way.

Mushirul Hasan’s edited works India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and

Mobilization (1993), and Inventing Boundaries: Gender, Politics and the Partition of

India (2000), provide further insight on partition, in the form of collected essays that

cover various aspects of partition, ranging from political to social, economic, religious,

cultural and even gender issues. The broad based nature and scope of the contributors’

interests and priorities within a single framework, adds to the merit of these works, but

they lack a focused approach on the subject.

9

Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India, by

Gyanendra Pandey, (2001), is a recent addition to the subject that attempts to define

partition in terms of communal violence, and its profound impact on the communities that

it gave birth to. It is a worthy contribution that sheds light on community as the subject of

history in the backdrop of Indian partition, a significant political happening. The work,

however, seems to have been conceived more in a theoretical fashion, with analytical

overtones, that does not dwell much on historical details.

Suvir Kauls’s edited work, The Partitions of Memory: The Afterlife of the

Division of India (2003), discusses the many causes and the ‘lingering and myriad’19

effects of partition on the region. It highlights the need to ‘rethink partition’,20 which the

author believes has been in a way forced upon us, and has become a necessity due to the

shift away from ‘high political’ histories of partition,21 with a number of related branches

and off shoot aspects having sprung into prominence. Despite stressing upon the need to

work on partition and re-establish its essential and basic significance, the book does not

focus on the planning that brought about the divide itself.

D.N.Panigrahi’s book India’s Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat

(2004), is one of the more recent works on the partition of India, and is a good critique of

British thinking vis-à-vis the fate of the Indian subcontinent, which, in his opinion, was

further complicated by the denial of liberty and a democratic form of governance to the

subject people.22 He regards Churchill and Lord Linlithgow, India’s Viceroy from 1936

to 1943, to be in the vanguard of a policy of non–recognition of the nationalist upsurge in

10

India, and blocking of all moves for any political advance.23 It was a losing battle, the

author argues, that they were fighting to keep India united by force.24 With a good

discussion on partition, its main actors, and a discourse on the reasons for the legacy of

hatred that the British bequeathed upon the Indians as they divided and departed India,

the book is an interesting addition to the existing partition literature. However, it does not

discuss the planning and implementation strategy of the rulers, which was so central and

crucial to this division.

The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan by Yasmin Khan (2007)

and The Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire by Alex Von

Tunzelmann (2007) are interesting additions on the subject of partition. Yet they do not

speak about the enactment of partition and the exhaustive planning of its major architects

in an extensive or specific manner. Peter Clarke’s The last Thousand Days of the British

Empire: Churchill, Roosevelt and the Birth of the Pax Americana, (2008) is an

elucidating account of the partition of India with a chapter devoted to the scuttled affair

that it was ultimately made to be. However, the focus is altogether different and deviates

considerably from the Indian context to other aspects of the decline of Empire. Similarly,

Madhav Godbole’s The Holocaust of Indian Partition: An Inquest (2007), and Vazira

Fazila_Yaqoobali Zamindar’s The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia:

Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (2007) have added to the plethora of literature on

Partition, highlighting the need and significance of the momentous event, but do not

address the issue of its making and execution. That aspect remains unaccomplished in a

specific context, since the thrust of these works is mostly on the ramifications of

11

Partition, such as the violent massacres, riots, dislocation of population, the plight of

refugees and their rehabilitation in a post independence scenario.

There are a few recent scholarly publications by Indian authors that have covered

partition in a variety of ways, raising interesting questions and shifting the burden of

attention from traditional themes, to subjects like the human dimension, religious

motivations, economic implications and the socio-cultural trends initiated by the division

of India, and the birth of two new nation states. The works of Ajit Bhattacharjea,

Countdown to Partition: The Final Days (1997), Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, Borders

and Boundaries: Women in India’s Partition (1999), Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of

Silence: Voices from the Partition of India (2000), Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and

Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India (2000), Amrik Singh ed., The

Partition in Retrospect (2000), and Sukeshi Kamra, Bearing Witness: Partition,

Independence, End of Raj (2002), stand out in their treatment of socio-cultural issues. Yet

none of the writers have been able to give any profound attention to the planning of an

episode that changed the map of South Asia and the destiny of millions. Moreover, for

most of them, particularly of an Indian orientation, the premise is that partition was a

tragedy that should not have happened and not the fulfillment of the demand for self-

determination for the minority community of the Muslims of India. It is in the quest for

learning about the planning and its execution that the present work is being conceived, to

give an explanation of what actually happened, with the advantage of the hindsight that

the lapse of time and the recent availability of certain official documents and private

papers has made possible.

12

Much has already been said and written on how and why partition became a

reality, when a united India served the interests of both the Congress and the British. The

“reasons, rationalizations, hopes and weaknesses”25 that accompanied the acceptance of

partition by the Congress, and the expediency of His Majesty’s Government in

relinquishing the reins of power and not intervening determinedly in favour of unity,

though it suited its “post-imperial, strategic defence interests in South Asia”26, have been

the favourite themes of authors of freedom struggle. It is from the fixing of a time limit

for withdrawal as laid down in the British Prime Minister’s Statement of 20 February

1947,27 to the birth of two new states, India and Pakistan, that the present work primarily

relates and concerns itself. This period involves enquiry into one of the most sensitive

periods in the history of India, and demands a close look at issues that have so far not

been adequately addressed, mainly the planning and implementation of partition.

Unfortunately, they have escaped the academic attention of scholars of freedom struggle

and decolonization of India, as no book length study specifically dealing with this aspect

of partition has surfaced so far.

The first chapter of the present research deals with the British approach to the

issue of partition itself. Post-war India demanded a very careful handling of the then

existing political and communal situation. The Muslim League had become closer to the

British in their war time needs, during the Second World War, as it had supported the

Allied cause. The League’s overtures to the British Government in India were

conditional, as it wanted a safeguard of Muslim interests in the Congress ruled provinces,

and also wanted an assurance that no constitutional advance for India would be made

13

without the consent of the Muslim League. The Muslim League was opposed to the use

of the tactic of mass agitation, which was employed by the Congress.28 It is also

noteworthy that since all attempts of the British, aimed in the past decade or so, to bring

the parties to a mutually acceptable constitutional formula had been unsuccessful and

unproductive of a concrete solution,29 to what extent were they ready to come up with an

alternative plan, particularly if the Cabinet Mission also failed? It was undoubtedly an

effort on which their last hopes for the unity of India were based, as the British preferred

to bequeath their rule to a single authority in case all other possibilities of perpetuating

their rule were exhausted. Is it correct to consider and regard Prime Minister Attlee’s

Statement of 20 February 1947, a ‘genuine British intention’ to withdraw and transfer

power to the Indians?30 If so why was Lord Wavell replaced at such a critical juncture,31

an announcement which came along with the fixing of a time limit for the termination of

British Raj in India, when the need was to concentrate on administrative problems of

dealing with the mechanics of a tricky transfer of power? Wavell’s experience of India

and its people was in all respects superior to that of his successor, and he was in no way

lacking in expertise of handling critical situations.32 If partition and independence were

genuinely on British agenda, how could a mere change in personality33 make such a big

difference as to bring it about at a time when other pressing matters demanded greater

attention? It would, therefore, be worthwhile at this point to question the nature of the

decisions that were being taken by the India Office, as far as its intentions to partition the

Indian subcontinent, and the methods to be employed for the purpose, were concerned.

Issues of this nature have always raised very significant and pertinent queries, but

14

attempts to answer them have not been successful in fulfilling the requirements of

scholarly academic research.

The Second chapter focuses on the period of transition for which Lord

Mountbatten was appointed as the new and the last Viceroy of India, and which also

marked the unceremonious departure of Lord Wavell34. Very aptly called the

‘Mountbatten phase’,35 it is not without controversy. Why was the need felt to replace

Wavell? Why was Mountbatten chosen and sent to India and what was the nature of the

instructions that he carried with him, apart from the publicly announced and trumpeted

withdrawal? It was obviously not a routine changeover, or one that could not have been

done without. Was it the ‘totalitarian Congress’36 as Sucheta Mahajan calls it, the

dominant factor in Indian politics, which the British wanted to appease? The Viceroy

designate, Lord Mountbatten, was known to have ties with a few Congress leaders,

particularly Nehru whom he knew and liked from the days of his Singapore Command.

With amicable relations with the Congress leadership, the British could hope to have a

comfortable grip over events in India, as the majority party could be expected to act in a

less hostile mood to the government policies and plans. Or was it an attempt to glorify the

event through the personal charm and appeal of someone linked to the royalty, thus,

making it look more like a victory than an embarrassing retreat37?

The ‘antedating’38 of partition poses yet another interesting query that had far

reaching consequences for the history of South Asia. The February 20 announcement that

carried with it a specific deadline for the transfer of power, clearly laid down that by June

15

1948 the British would transfer power to the two new states India and Pakistan, 39 which

consequently emerged as sovereign and independent countries on the map of the world.

The sixteen months given to the administrators in India and the policy-makers in London,

to work out the modalities of this complex move, were by no means sufficient to ensure a

smooth and uneventful transfer. Why did the authorities then agree to a further pushing

forward of the date to August 15, 1947? What were Mountbatten’s motives for the

‘haste’40 with which he carried out the division of India? Was it a premonition41, or a

deliberate act to wreck what Britain could not keep, or a mere gesture for pleasing the

Congress high command which would benefit from a ‘scuttled affair’42 at the cost of a

truncated Pakistan? 43 It seems odd that the masters of so vast an empire, which they had

held and ruled for more than a century, could be naïve enough to think of wrapping it up

in a matter of months.44 Was it a matter of turning their backs to a responsibility they

could no longer shoulder effectively? Sir Stafford Cripps is quoted to have said in the

House of Commons that, “there is no possible alternative other than to run out of India,

irrespective of to whom we hand over power, in the course of the next sixteen months.” 45

Or was it sheer indifference as the civil war, which they let unfold, did not affect them

directly and the violence did not target them,46 as it engulfed the Hindus, Muslims and

Sikhs? Questions of this nature are critical to why planning for partition was such a

hurried and mismanaged affair and led to the ‘holocaust’47. In the opinion of many, this

has tarnished its validity as the logical outcome of independence.

It would be worthwhile to enquire into the reaction and response of the political

parties viz-a-viz a sudden change in the schedule for partition. Not many scholars have

16

dwelled upon the implications of this drastic act, on the future orientation of the new

states. In particular, Jinnah’s opinion and approval of the new date gives rise to a few

interesting questions, as to how far it influenced his plans and to what extent any

significant delay would have been acceptable and helpful to him? The independence

announcement of 20 February had stipulated June 1948 as the date for the transfer of

power in India. However, partition was not on the cards at that time. The 3 June Plan

brought with it revised priorities of the British, the most significant being an acceptance

of the demand for partition and that too at the earliest possible date. In this scenario the

Congress stood at an obvious advantage, being the successor to the elaborate structure of

government and administration based in Delhi. It was the Muslim League that was

required to make necessary arrangements for erecting a new edifice out of its share of

resources. Time was, therefore, of crucial importance, which proved to be one of the most

serious and crucial outcome of having moved partition forward almost a year. It directly

influenced the modalities of planning for partition, which in its turn had long term

repercussions for the history of the two states born out of the division of India.

The ‘formative moment’48 in the history of India, was undoubtedly the pinnacle of

the nationalist struggle, the end of colonial rule and the formation of the states of India

and Pakistan. But before it was actually reached, the struggle went through some very

critical moments, one of them being the making of the 3 June Plan.49 Its formulation and

the stages of its acceptance by the Indian parties, as its contours evolved and crystallized,

have offered interesting avenues of research in partition historiography. If Attlee’s

announcement was the first realistic step towards independence, the 3 June Plan was the

17

initial round of practical politics aimed at partition, a date and a landmark event from

which also began the hectic preparations for the division of India. The Plan posed a few

very pertinent questions which have been raised time and again in the last sixty years, but

are far from resolved. It has been allegedly called the ‘Mountbatten-Nehru deal’50, as its

finalization had the latter’s approval and blessings,51 whereas Jinnah or any of the League

leaders were not informed, in the early stages of its making. It was only after a signal

from Nehru that Mountbatten felt confident enough to table it for debate. Why was the

opinion of leaders belonging to important political parties in India, not incorporated in

formulating a plan? Was Mountbatten taking advantage of a lack of consensus between

the political parties to impose a solution of his own?52 Did it have the dual purpose and

ambition of pleasing the Congress and also His Majesty’s Government for achieving the

almost impossible target of a speedy withdrawal and a smooth transfer of power?53 On

what grounds could it be given a final shape, when it ignored the future prospects of the

princely states and also the sensitivities of the Sikh community? The absence of adequate

safeguards in the Plan for these two entities, i.e. the Sikhs and the princely states, led to

long-term conflict for the entire South Asian region in the days and years that followed

independence and partition. And above all, why did the different political parties accept

the Plan, either as a compromise which the League called it, or as a settlement as the

Congress dubbed it,54 if there was a realization that it suffered from serious limitations

and discrepancies? Did it meet their nationalistic demands, or was their acceptance the

result of an ultimatum from the Cabinet, that if it was not accepted it would have to be

imposed as an award by the British Government?55

18

The 3 June Plan gives the impression of being a very simplistic attempt to find a

way out of the political impasse and the constitutional deadlock that for a decade had

baffled the most learned and experienced British minds. None of its features seem to

address or tackle the core issue of administrative organization or security structure, which

were the crux of planning for partition or handling its aftermath. Issues of management

and organization, as well as safety and protection of the population on either side of the

proposed boundaries were liable to crop up. A law and order situation was also bound to

occur in the intensely sensitive and volatile communal climate, to which the level of

preparedness did not match. The ingredients of responsible governance were either

lacking or sacrificed at the altar of a quick and hurried departure. Was it a proof that the

British intention was only to find a solution to the communal issue that loomed large in

the face of any amicable constitutional effort, as it challenged their capabilities as rulers,

and threatened to disrupt their image of impartial arbiters and administrators? It also

questions their motivation for a peaceful political settlement of granting independence

and conducting a smooth transfer of authority after dividing India. The hurriedly

compiled document, rubber stamped by the Congress, and approved by the British

government, was not consistent with the gradual and steady policy that the previous

century had seen the British adopt in granting constitutional reforms to India, and solving

the political impasse. Having irrevocably committed themselves to independence and

partition they seem to have been left with limited options and little concern with India’s

future.

19

The Third chapter discusses the implementation of the Plan with reference to

Partition of territory. This critical issue became a test of British ability and impartiality.

The provision for the two Boundary Commissions had been made in the Plan.56 These

Commissions were to demarcate the boundaries of India and Pakistan. But that too was

fraught with ambiguities, as the territorial basis underlying the idea of partition had never

been clearly defined.57 It became the most difficult, challenging and controversial aspect

of implementing the plan for Partition. The lack of efficacy on the part of British

planning is considered largely responsible for the ultimate difficulty in the working of the

Commissions, as is vagueness in the concept of Pakistan.58 Congress pressures as well as

Nehru’s manipulations, particularly in terms of showing a willingness to accept makeshift

boundaries that could be later modified, influenced the decisions taken to determine the

boundaries.59 His advice carried a lot of weight with the Viceroy. It seemed that getting

the different political parties to come to terms on the issue of Partition of the

subcontinent, was among the easier of Mountbatten’s options in India.60

The Radcliffe Award, as the findings and decisions of the Commissions popularly

came to be known, turned out to be the ultimate arbiter of the geographical fate of the two

new countries, and the fate of millions on both sides of the border. Chaired by a member

of the English Bar Sir Cyril Radcliffe,61 the Commissions were given a little more than a

month to dissect a subcontinent,62 a task probably too great for one person, even if his

expertise had been boundary-making rather than constitutional law.63 Among his many

virtues and qualities, his recommendation for the job also carried the merit of being

absolutely unfamiliar with India and the local politics.64 He was neither an officer of the

20

Indian administration nor a person known for adjudicating disputes of this nature,65 but

almost a complete non-entity whose credentials as an eminent British jurist were

‘invoked to compensate for his lack of knowledge and experience of the subcontinent.’66

This too might have been overlooked, but how could his complete ignorance of India’s

territorial and geographical terrain, which he had come to dissect, satisfy the Indian

leaders in order for them to justify and support his appointment? The short time available

for completing his task, and the ambiguities inherent in the Commissions’ formulation

and terms of reference,67 could only lead to chaos. It had been earlier decided for each

Commission to elect its own chairman,68 along with four other persons, two of whom

were to be nominated by the Muslim League and two by Congress.69 This, however, was

later modified and a European chairman, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, was appointed to perform

the task, with a casting vote,70 in case there was disagreement. Again it was not clear who

was to decide if a deadlock ensued in the midst of deliberations between the Muslim and

non-Muslim members? This was all the more important and crucial since the members

were not by any means ‘impartial non-Indians’,71 rather active representatives of their

communities, appointed by political parties.72 This ambiguity in the 3 June Plan, left a lot

to the personal whims and discretion of the Chairman,73 who ostensibly kept away from

official influence, but could nevertheless be affected by the priorities of his home

government.74 Finally, how and by what mechanism were territories to be dissected and

divided? This question has been at the root of all the criticism that planning for partition

has so far received from various scholars. Except for expounding the broad principles of

geographical contiguity and notional representation,75 the Plan did not envisage any

definition of a territorial unit, or any specification of these geographically contiguous

21

areas as to what they were supposed to represent ______ districts, towns, tehsils, thanas

or qasbas?76 The 3 June announcement further instructed the commissions to ‘take

account of other factors’77 in the matter of demarcating the boundaries on the basis of the

two principles of geographical proximity, of areas to be placed in one state, and

numerical strength, of the population belonging to any of the two dominant and specific

belief structures that were determining the constitution of the new states. What these

other factors were, and how, as well as by whom, were they to be interpreted? Such

queries remain unexplained and unanswered, thus leaving endless scope for assumptions,

manipulations and interference, and by virtue of these ambiguities the implementation of

the 3 June Plan was also bound to confront serious administrative problems. The haste,

which the British seemingly chose as a guiding principle in the last phase of their rule

over India, exhibited itself in the planning of partition and in its implementation.

Much has to be understood and reviewed in the time frame that was granted to the

Commission for completing its task.78 From the time of the arrival of Cyril Radcliffe to

the moment it was publicly announced, i.e. from 8 July to 17 August, there were hardly

five weeks. The initial reaction of the Chairman to the short availability of time and the

gigantic nature of the task, was one of profound shock,79 but why did he agree to the task

if he realized that it would take years to demarcate the boundaries of India?80 Despite all

proclamations to the contrary, was he working under some hidden pressures and fulfilling

some secret agenda,81 or was he himself being kept in the dark with regard to the real

intentions of the government and the status of his findings and decisions?82 Why did the

political parties not safeguard the interest of their communities when they realized that

22

the Award could be detrimental to their struggle? It must have been obvious to the Indian

leadership that the Award would shape the very contours of control and influence in the

two divided successor states.83 Finally the question arises as to why Mountbatten did not

announce the Award before independence? This is a matter of critical importance, for he

had earlier pledged that the Awards would be published well before 15 August, so as to

allow time to make security and administrative arrangements on both sides of the

border.84 Was he aware of the intensification of violence and bloodshed that his decision

would result in, and the administrative ramifications of a delayed announcement, or the

question of law and order that would arise and soon go beyond control, particularly in the

communally sensitive areas of the Punjab? If he was convinced that the Award was fair

and judicious, and neither dictated nor tampered with, that the privacy provided to

Radcliffe and his staff was absolutely fool proof,85 why was the announcement delayed

which obviously cast a cloud over it? Was it a deliberate attempt to shield His Majesty’s

Government from any direct involvement in the outbreak of violence, letting it thus

appear to be the responsibility of the two states that had come into existence? Historians

of partition have tried to discern the rationale behind these decisions, but concrete

findings as to the actual motivation of the last Viceroy’s handling of partition, are still

awaited.

The fourth chapter looks at the second aspect of implementation of the June Plan,

i.e. the declaration and implementation of the Boundary Awards. The law and order

situation had to be reviewed and security beefed up for the actual transfer of power, and

secondly assets had to be divided to the two legitimate heirs of united India. The main

23

problem was an acute shortage of time for planning all these matters, in an increasingly

complex and frightening situation.86 In such critical circumstances what came to be

ignored was the risk of violence.87 The Viceroy refused to take seriously the threat of

large-scale violence, despite the fact that detailed information about possible trouble was

reaching Delhi on a regular basis, and news of communal attacks was pouring in from

western Punjab from early March 1947.88 Evan Jenkins, Governor of the Punjab, was

constantly sending warnings of trouble brewing in the province, clearly stating that police

in Lahore and Amritsar had become unreliable, and that there were cases of serious

indiscipline among troops who could not be used for emergency duties.89 However, it did

little to alarm the central administration, that was seemingly more occupied with

Independence Day celebrations, designing flags and the etiquettes of addressing Indian

leaders.90 No proper evaluation of the potential danger was being made, nor did the

Viceroy seem fully cognizant of the explosiveness of an extremely volatile situation.91

No attempt was undertaken to pacify the very tense and restless Sikh community in the

Punjab,92 or to arrange for a smooth and safe movement of populations across the

borders, which the authorities were expecting to be the natural outcome of the boundary

decisions. In order to pre-empt ‘an extensive civil war’93 the Viceroy only expedited the

whole process of partition. The outbreak of violence and communal disturbances that

shook the Punjab for almost two months, before migrations, began to show some early

signs of settlement. Two important questions have been raised whether power was

transferred all too quickly, and whether the administration was prepared to handle any

unlikely and unanticipated situation that could stem out of mutual conflict? It is indeed

strange that when the Viceroy was aware of the very real threat of communal strife in the

24

Punjab, Bengal and even on the borders of Hyderabad,94 no adequate measures were

taken to counter it and save thousands of innocent lives. In Chaudhri Muhammad Ali’s

opinion, no action was taken against the Sikh leaders in the Punjab who, to

Mountbatten’s certain knowledge, were organizing a genocide campaign.95 A military

action was ruled out on the plea that only political action could bring the people to their

senses and stop them from murdering one another.96 And that political action was, not to

delay matters any further, very clearly reminiscent of Attlee’s shock treatment of the

Indian politicians.97

The division of assets, from a breakup of the armed forces, railway networks,

telegraph and communications and water resources, to a duplication of files and the

replication of bureaucracy, all needed careful and expert handling. Though the issue of

princely states can hardly be termed a question of division of assets, the decision-making

process regarding their fate, was little less than a real scramble for prestige and territory.

The integration of 562 Indian states into the new political setup, was a genuinely

formidable task.98 The accession of Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh, proved extremely

difficult to resolve in the final round. These states had not acceded to Pakistan or India by

15 August 1947.99 The story of these three states, as it unfolded on the subcontinent

horizon on the eve of independence, also raised questions about the British claims to be

impartial arbiters of the two nations’ destiny. The Kashmir problem, which became a

running sore between the two states for decades to come, was born in August 1947, and

‘might have been resolved peacefully before partition if only there had been more British

attention to the whole position of princely states and fewer British ideological hang ups

25

on that subject.’100 In the entire episode of planning for and implementation of partition,

the British seem to be caught in a quagmire of misplaced priorities; intervening where

they should not have, and not playing their part where administrative needs pressed for

direct and stern action.

The Indian civil services and armed forces had to be divided between the two

successor states and was perhaps the most critical of all decisions. Nurtured and raised as

cherished institutions, both services were the pride of the British rulers, and undertaking

their division meant undoing the work and achievement of more than a century. Early in

April 1947, General Auchinleck, the British Commander-in-Chief, wrote that not less

than five to ten years would be required to divide the Indian army.101 Such professional

advice should have carried weight with the authorities, particularly when the peace and

security of the region were at stake, but the task was still given the same amount of time

as other matters, pertaining to the implementation of partition and its planning. By

August 15 everything had to be completed, but in what form, and with what

repercussions? The ratio adopted for the division of assets was 75/25 for India and

Pakistan respectively.102 Even if the consideration was the relatively small population and

area of the Muslim state, the need of the hour was to help the nascent state stand

comfortably on its feet, with at least its due share of the joint resources of a united India.

How could the British ensure a safe and secure future for the region if the balance was so

drastically tilted in favour of one, to the detriment of the other? A disinterest verging on

apathy seemed to prevail as the British prepared to depart, or was it a general incapacity

to hold on firmly any longer and resolve crucial issues of the time?

26

Finally the work assesses the British desire to disengage rapidly from their rule

and responsibilities in India, which squeezed them into a corner, with a tight schedule at

hand for the transfer of power. Why was the ‘haste factor’ so pronounced in all their

affairs, and what benefits did they hope to gain by an accelerated departure? Was

Mountbatten justified, and as some might question, ‘authorized’ to bring forward a

reasonable date by nearly a year, and force his decision upon the Indian political parties

as well as the British government, by the public announcement of 4 June 1947?103 No

matter how powerful and dynamic, he was still the agent of the British Government and

his area of ‘independent decision’ had its limitations and boundaries.104 The trauma and

tragedy that his brainchild entailed for millions in the shape of partition massacres,

unplanned migrations and dislocated nationalities at the dawn of independence, cannot be

overemphasized. However, at the same time, what needs to be examined is whether the

situation would have worsened, as a few writers claim, if transfer had been delayed,105 or

if, as Lionel Carter says, Mountbatten had proceeded more circumspectly, trying to heal

wounds and reconcile political opponents?106 Far from exonerating the British from their

erroneous planning, it only subjects their role in the implementation of India’s partition to

an altogether different interpretation.

The methodology used in this research is primarily descriptive and analytical and

the historical narrative style has been applied. Both primary and secondary sources

accessible, available and declassified to date have been utilized with main thrust on the

Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-47

(Vols. VII-XII) edited by Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon. It presents a day to day

27

official documentation of the proceedings that the British authorities were in the process

of going through in order to grant independence and partition to the Indian subcontinent.

This source, however, needed corroboration which has amply been done by private

papers and other published and un-published official sources.

28

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, eds., Transfer of Power, Vol. 12, The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Princes, Partition and Independence, 8 July-15 August 1947 (London: Her Majesty’s Office, 1983), xi. Cited as T.O.P. in subsequent references. 2 Ibid. 3 Salil Mishra, ‘Explaining Partition: Congress- Muslim League Coalition in UP’, in S.Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, eds., Pangs of Partition: The Parting of Ways, Vol.1 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002), 137. 4 Amrik Singh, ‘The Struggle for Pakistan: Before and After’, in Amrik Singh, ed., The Partition in Retrospect (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers and Distributors (P) Ltd., 2000), 413. 5 Mushirul Hasan, ‘Memories of a Fragmented Nation’, in Amrik Singh, ed., The Partition in Retrospect (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers and Distributors (P) Ltd., 2000), 341. 6 Raj Mohan Gandhi, ‘A Perspective on Partition’, in Amrik Singh, ed.,The Partition in Retrospect (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers and Distributors (P) Ltd., 2000), 328. 7 Jean Alphonse Bernard, From Raj to the Republic: A Political History of India 1935-2000 (New Delhi: Har-Annand Publications (Pvt.) Ltd., 2001), 112-114. 8 Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaysia, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia (London: Routledge, 2000), 10. Many other writers have also pointed to Menon being close to the top Congress leadership particularly Sardar Vallabhahai Patel, the key figure in the Congress High Command, whom he advised as to the making of a blueprint of the partition plan as early as Jan. 1947, which Mountbatten later presented as his 3 June Plan. Also see Percival Spear, ‘Britain’s Transfer of Power in India’, Pacific Affairs, Vol.31, no.2 (1958): 173. In this review article of Menon’s book he comments on his deep involvement in all negotiations from the latter part of the war until independence. “He managed to be a confidant on both sides, without ever losing the confidence of his own or the respect of the other. Indeed in the final stages he became something of a go-between and can with some justice claim authorship of the plan which eventually produced partition and independence.” Chaudhri Muhammad Ali also writes that V.P.Menon being the trusted confidant of Vallabhbhai Patel was ‘thereby not only kept informed of the inner councils of the Viceroy, but was able to influence the Viceroy’s policies through his mouthpiece.’ Emergence of Pakistan (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1973),125. Lord Wavell records his observation of Menon as most dedicated to the Congress cause and although honest but ‘too much the mouthpiece of Sardar Patel.’ Penderel Moon, ed., Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1974), 384. 9 V.N.Datta, ‘Interpreting Partition, in Amrik Singh,ed., The Partition in Retrospect (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers and Distributors (P) Ltd.), 2000, 278. 10 Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India (New Delhi: Oxford India Paperbacks, 1961), 274. 11 Ibid., 283. 12 Mark Tully, Introduction to Penderel Moon’s Divide and Quit, in Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit,.xv. 13 V.P.Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1957), 397. 14 Bishwa Mohan Pandey,, “The Imperialist Distortion of the Partition of India: A Historiographical Critique of the Writings of Percival Spear and H.V.Hodson”, in S.Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, eds., Pangs of Partition: The parting of Ways, Vol.1 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2000), .340. 15 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 293. 16 Ibid. 17 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), 33. 18 Ibid.

29

19 Suvir Kaul, ed., The Partitions of Memory: The Afterlife of the Division of India ( New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003), 26. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 D.N.Panigrahi, India’s Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat (New York: Routledge, 2004), 2. Even if some form of responsible government was introduced, such as ‘dyarchy’ or double government, it was a half hearted attempt, with major portfolios in British hands. 23 Ibid..,5. 24 Ibid. 25 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India, 37. 26 Ibid. ,33. 27 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, 30-32. The author cites Anita Inder Singh in regarding this to be a landmark decision in the process of British retreat from India. He himself, however, finds obvious difficulties in looking for a turning point in imperial consciousness and considers it to be one of the phases of realization and moments of clarity in colonial perception. 28 Gowher Rizvi, “Transfer of Power in India: A Restatement of an Alternative Approach”, Journal of Contemporary History, no.2 (January 1984): 127-144. Rizvi elaborates the argument that by giving up office and confronting the British at such a critical time, it had in fact left the field open for the Muslim League. In the given scenario the Muslims were not unjustified in expecting a fairer treatment, from the British, of their war time allies. It was no doubt one of the last tests of the rulers’ ‘impartiality’. 29 With the failed attempts of Simla conference and Cripps Mission, looming large in the background, the British needed a new platform to work for preserving the unity of India, which was a dream commonly shared, by Attlee and the British Commander-in-Chiefs, as a basis of Britain’s world influence. 30 Bearing Witness: Partition, Independence, End of the Raj (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002), 35. Many writers of different shades and opinions have questioned the sincerity of the British in moving towards the goal of granting independence to India. Sukeshi Kamra talks of the policy of ‘divide and rule’ and how conscious a policy it was or not, and also of the British ‘intention’ to hand over power. To many of them the colonial policy was itself responsible for aggravating the communal situation and not letting the Indian crisis resolve. The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 208. Anita Inder Singh also clearly mentions that Attlee was not particularly interested in making the statement. She writes “Attlee’s heart was not in the announcement, and even as the cabinet decided that the withdrawal statement would be made soon after the British Parliament met on 21 January 1947, he was looking for a way out of it.”. In ‘A Perspective on Partition’ in Amrik Singh, 337, Raj Mohan Gandhi mentions the same hesitation in acquiescing to the independence of India when he writes that the ‘alien rulers… until the end of the story of the empire, were reluctant about independence.” Penderel Moon in Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 451-452 also brings the ‘dishonesty of the British’ on record when he writes, while editing Wavell’s diaries, that their two Viceroys, Linlithgow and Wavell had discovered and observed on different occasions that the British promises of granting independence to India were not sincere and the Cabinet was not honest in ‘its expressed desire to make progress’. Churchill’s Government in particular ‘habitually disregarded India’s needs and aspirations, blocking even small concessions to Indian sentiment…’ As Moon writes the judgments of these two Viceroys go a long way in justifying the ‘deep Indian suspicion of British intentions.’ . 31 Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (New York: Atheneum, 1985), 27. 32 D.N.Panigrahi, India’s Partition, .260. He cites Wavell’s remarkable handling of the Bengal famine and continues to praise the Viceroy for his outstanding will, and his ideas and plans to resolve outstanding issues. Penderel Moon in his epilogue to Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal is greatly surprised at Churchill’s naivety in not being able to appreciate Wavell’s remarkable intelligence and thinking that he would act merely as a ‘stop-gap’ viceroy who in the political field would be content to maintain the status-quo, passively

30

contemplating the Indian situation while making no effort or endeavour to challenge political problems of the day. 446-447. 33 Penderel Moon, ed., Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, 459-460. Atlee, Cripps and other leading members of the Cabinet felt that he was ‘tired and stale and that a fresh eye and mind’ was required to resolve the difficult problems of Indian political situation. Alan Campbell Johnson in Mission with Mountbatten, 16 also points to the British move of replacing Wavell by Mountbatten mainly as a much needed change, more of personality than of policy, to convince the Indian leaders by his personal charm and persuasion, the critical nature of the Indian political situation, a task of which Wavell seemed to have proved himself quite incapable. 34 The only comment which the Journal carries on his abrupt termination was ‘not very courteously done’ as the editor writes in the epilogue, “but his terse understatement concealed intense indignation at the way in which he had been treated.” Penderel Moon, ed., Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, 459-460. 35 Jean Alphonse Bernard, From Raj to the Republic, 107. 36 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, 388. 37 India and Burma Committee Meeting on 11 and 17 December 1946, CAB 134/342. 38 Ian Talbot, “Mountbatten and the Partition of India: A Rejoinder”, History, Vol. 69, no.225 (1984): 29. 39 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1973), 98. 40 “India Partitioned as Raj Withdraws”, History Today, Vol. 47, no. 8 (August 1997): 36. The author prefers to call it ‘indecent haste’ with which the British conducted their first and largest decolonization. 41 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-47 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 232. According to her, both H.V.Hodson and Alan Campbell-Johnson are of the opinion that the choice of 15 August 1947, occurred to Mountbatten at his press conference on 4 June, 1947. Also see Bishwa Mohan Pandey who refers to H.V.Hodson to state that the choice of the final date was declared by accident. ‘The Imperialist Distortion of the Partition of India’, in S.Settar and Indira Baptista, eds., Pangs of Partition, 351. 42 A term which has come to be associated with the hurried departure of British from the subcontinent and attributed to Churchill’s speech in the House of Commons. Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, 27-28. 43 Raj Mohan Gandhi, “A Perspective on Partition”, in Amrik Singh, The Partition in Retrospect, 337. The author talks of a ‘small’ and ‘truncated’ Pakistan and tries to bring the losses suffered by her on an equal footing with India. The two, however, cannot be compared on any level if British treatment of the matter and approach towards the issue is to be taken into consideration. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali is also of the same opinion. “The secret deal between Mountbatten and the Congress for advancing the date for the transfer of power from June 1, 1948, to August 15, 1947, was deliberately intended by the Congress to deny Pakistan time to organize its administration and to establish itself on a sound basis.” Emergence of Pakistan, 254-255. 44 V.P.Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 386. Making of a plan to partition India and having it accepted by the concerned parties was an altogether different job from getting it worked out and practically implemented. It was a task that should have taken years but had to be accomplished in a matter of a few weeks. 45 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 213. 46 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, 386.Unity was only one of the options for the British and not a conviction for which they could sacrifice anything, let alone their lives. They were, therefore, quite content to let events take their turn, and were not really bothered about the violence that was threatening to assume ugly proportions. Their attitude would not have been so casual had they been in the line of direct fire as the Indians were. Moreover, division could always be exercised as a real option if no agreement could be reached on unity. 47 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 254. The massacres that accompanied partition particularly in the Punjab were in magnitude and intensity not only on a far larger scale, they also differed in kind from all previous civil disorders, thus attributing to it the dimensions of a ‘Great Holocaust’. 48 Sukeshi Kamra, Bearing Witness: Partition, Independence, End of the Raj (Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 2002), 6.

31

49 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 129. By the middle of April 1947 Mountbatten had worked out the broad principles of a plan if partition became inevitable which laid down that provinces should have the right to decide their own future; Bengal and Punjab should be partitioned; Sylhet district in Assam should have the option to join east Bengal; and that general elections should be held in North-West frontier Province. It also made the fact very clear that partition, as and when it came, would be entirely the responsibility of the Indians. 50 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, 33. 51 See V.P.Menon, The Transfer of Power in India,.359-365. The highly dramatic episode of Mountbatten showing the draft of a plan to Nehru at Simla and getting alterations to it approved by London, as the latter suggested and demanded, has been documented by a number of other historians. 52 Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia (New York: Routledge, 2000), 14. 53 The former was in a highly advantageous position of gaining from an early withdrawal of the British as it would inherit the profits of the Raj and benefit from the weakness of the League which was bound to be the case if partition was planned and implemented hurriedly. Whereas His Majesty’s Government would obviously prefer holding on to an image of grandeur and glory by withdrawing gracefully when circumstances permitted a smooth passage out, rather be the victim of a violent and embarrassing retreat. 54 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 154. 55 Hugh Tinker, “Jawaharlal Nehru at Simla, May 1947. A Moment of Truth?”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 4 (1970): 356. 56 V.P.Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 377-379.The administrative mechanism required and responsible for demarcating the boundaries of the regions to be partitioned was provided for under section nine of the 3 June plan. 57 Tai Yong Tan and Gynesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia, 82. 58 Ibid. The Lahore Resolution of March 1940 has been criticized by many as a vaguely articulated document in which the term Pakistan was never used, nor were the geographical areas that would form part of the Muslim state clearly defined. On this basis the Muslim leadership, in particular Jinnah, has come under fire of not actually wanting a separate state and using the demand only as a bargaining counter to win certain safeguards for the Muslim population of India. 59 Nehru to Mountbatten, 12 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 158. 60 Tai Yong tan and Gynesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia, 82. For details see Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province 1937-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 217-231. 61 Ishtiaq Ahmad, “The 1947 Partition of Punjab: Arguments put before the Punjab Boundary Commission by the Parties Involved”, in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Indian Subcontinent (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 122. For details see IOR, R/3/1/257, Secretary of State to the Viceroy, 2 July, 1947. Cyril Radcliffe accepted the chairmanship of the Boundary Commissions on the condition of a handsome salary, accommodation in India without expense, free travel for his wife and a competent personal assistant-cum-secretary. 62 Bidyut Chakrabarty, The Partition of Assam and Bengal: Contour of Freedom (London: Routledge Curzon , 2004), 156. Radcliffe arrived in India on 8 July and was asked by Mountbatten to complete his task well before 15 August, 1947____ less than a month after he assumed responsibility. 63 O.H.K.Spate, On the Margins of History: From the Punjab to Fiji (Canberra: Australian National University, 1991), 53. 64 Ajit Bhattacharjea, Countdown to Partition: The Final Days (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 1997), 59-60. The only briefing that Radcliffe received before embarking upon his journey to India to perform the very sensitive task of demarcating the boundaries was a half hour session with an India House official in London. 65 Bidyut Chakrabarty, The Partition of Assam and Bengal, 156. 66 Mushirul Hasan, ed., Inventing Boundaries: Gender, Politics and the Partition of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 16. 67 Tai Yang Tan and Gynesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia, 85. 68 Extracts of proceedings of the Special Committee of the Cabinet, 26 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, .64.

32

69 Minutes of Viceroy’s Miscellaneous Meeting, 10 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 328. 70 Listowel to Mountbatten, 13 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 182. 71 Mountbatten to Listowel, 9 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 226. 72 Tai Yong and Gynesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia, 83.The fact that the members of the boundary commissions were to represent political parties suggests that the task of boundary–making was not merely to be technical exercise but its findings were bound to be influenced by partisan political considerations and its impartiality and professionalism would be of an academic importance only. Although the members of the commissions were men of ‘high judicial standing’, their communal interests made it a foregone conclusion that there would be disagreement and deadlock on all matters of crucial importance. The 3 June Plan did not envisage explicitly what would happen in case of a row and this ambiguity gave to the Chairman enough room to manipulate. 73 Ibid. 74 Major Short to Stafford Cripps, 3 August 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 326 75 Joya Chatterji, “The Making of a Borderline: The Radcliffe Award for Bengal”, in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, Region and Partition, 178-179. 76 V.N.Datta, “Lord Mountbatten and the Punjab Boundary Commission Award”, in S.Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, eds., Pangs of Partition, 20. 77 See Statement of 3 June, 3 June 1947, T.O.P. Vol. 11, (texts of broadcasts by Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh) 94-104. 78 Lionel Carter, ed., Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty 22 March-15 August 1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003), 220. Also see V.N.Datta, ‘Lord Mountbatten and the Punjab Boundary Commission Award’, in S.Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, ed., Pangs of partition, 25. It was basically the shortage of time that did not allow Radcliffe to directly hear the concerned parties as he was unable to attend the public sittings of the Commission when the Counsels argued their case. The judges heard the case without the Chairman being present. Some parts of the proceedings or summaries were flown daily to New Delhi for the Chairman by a special plane and he was supposed to give his verdict by seeing papers, not people or sites, at a place far way from the actual scene of happenings. Andrew Roberts in Eminent Churchillians (London: Widenfeld and Nicholson, 1994), 91, has quoted Radcliffe to have later expressed that he could have done the job properly had he been given two years instead of the 36 days at his disposal. 79 Leonard Mosley, The Last days of the British Raj (London: Widenfeld and Nicholson, 1964), 195. 80 Ibid. 81 Though Mountbatten made it very clear at the time of Radcliffe’s arrival in India that he or his staff would have nothing to do with the Chairman of the Boundary Commissions and that the latter would be given all the privacy and his work all the secrecy that was the demand and requirement of such a sensitive task, the very fact that Radcliff knew nothing of India or the job that he had been asked to undertake as well as the pressure of the time limit that he had been assigned to work under was enough to place him at the mercy of the administration. 82 Viceroy’s Personal Report no. 12, 11 July, 1947, T.O.P. Vol. 12, 93. 83 Joya Chatterji, in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, Region and Partition, 190. 84 Chaudri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 220. 85 T.McGrik, ‘Making the Cut”, Time (11 August, 1997): 31. V.D.Ayer an assistant commissioner working on Punjab and Bengal with Radcliffe has been termed as the leading suspect for transmitting information to Congress circles. Despite all proclamations of impartiality the placement of an Indian Hindu on the Commission staff was a doubtful act that rightfully questioned the integrity of the Award, its making, as well as its outcome. 86 Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British India (London: Cassell, 1963), 177. 87 Ibid., 176-177. 88 Ishtiaq Ahmad, in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, Region and Partition, 116. 89 Sir Evan Jenkins to Lord Mountbatten. Telegram No. 230-G, 12 August, 1947, OIOC, R/3/1/71. Communal trouble in the Punjab had been brewing since January 1947, and the reports of Governor Evan Jenkins to the Viceroy and other high officials on these disturbances had become a regular feature.

33

However from June onwards the situation took a turn for the worst and by August it had quite slipped out of hands to the extent that the law enforcing institutions were helpless in controlling the mounting tension and increasing incidents of violence. 90 Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British India, 175. 91 Ibid., 176. 92 W.H.Morris Jones, “Thirty-Six Years Later: The Mixed Legacies of Mountbatten’s Transfer of power”, International Affairs, Vol. 59, no.4 (Autumn 1983): 625-626. 93 Lionel Carter, Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty, 62. 94 Ibid., 284 95 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 197. 96 Lionel Carter, Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty, 284. 97 Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British in India, 177. The idea of getting the job of handing over power to Indian hands over as quickly as possible had an immediate appeal once the cabinet in London accepted the fact that by June 1948 everything would be lost as the administrative services would be incapacitated long before that. Atlee was firmly convinced that the only option left with the British to arrive at a suitably workable solution ‘without having to contend with the organic procrastination of Indian politicians, was to keep them in a state of shock’ He and many others believed that this was the only way that the Indian leaders could be made to face reality. 98 B.R.Nanda, The Making of a Nation: India’s Road to Independence (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 1998), 307. 99 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 276. 100 W.H.Morris Jones, “Thirty-Six Years Later”, 627. 101 B.R.Nanda, “Lord Mountbatten and the Punjab Boundary Commission Award”, 307-308. The question of dividing the Indian Armed Forces on communal lines had not been seriously contemplated before 30 June 1947, when the decision to split up the army was taken, just six weeks before partition. However, there had been proposals to nationalize the officer cadre of the Indian Armed Forces and in the spring of 1946 it was formally placed in the Council of State to ask the government that the complete replacement of British by Indians should be finalized within ten years. For this purpose a committee was also constituted, on the one hand to convince the general public that the government was doing all that it could to speed up the nationalization process and on the other to suggest means for recruiting suitable Indians to the three fighting services. 102 Jean Alphonse Bernard, From Raj to the Republic, 123. 103 It has been suggested that the decision was made by Lord Mountbatten and announced at the 4 June Press Conference. The plan that was redrafted by Menon at Nehru’s suggestion and that he himself carried to London, had no specification of the 15 August as the deadline for the transfer of power. It was later accepted by the British government as the only practical and workable solution. June 1948 seemed too late a date by which time the administrative services could not be expected to function. The idea of a quick transfer of power, that left little or no grounds for complaints against the British, therefore, had an immediate appeal. 104 Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British India, 177. 105 Ibid,., 178. 106 Lionel Carter, Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty, 7.

34

Chapter 1

BRITISH APPROACH TO PARTITION

The Indian Independence Bill passed in the British Parliament on July 18 1947,

marked the end of British rule in India and initiated the process of partition.1 It was an

event of landmark importance, not only for South Asian history, but also for the British

Empire, whose first and largest decolonization process was, thereupon, set in motion.2

The liquidation of British rule in India was certainly linked up with major changes on the

global scene, but it was nonetheless, also an outcome of Indian struggle for freedom and

independence, and the logical culmination of the denial of liberty, self rule and a

democratic form of governance to the subject people. For a very long time the British

upheld ‘the white man’s burden’ as their justification to rule and ameliorate the condition

of the common lot to an elevated level of cultural finesse. This concept that the empire

was a ‘moral enterprise’ that existed and worked for the benefit of the Indians, so as to

raise them to a higher level of civilization, however, was steadily loosing its grip over the

masses.3 The early decades of the twentieth century saw a growing demand, from the

educated middle class Indians, for power sharing and responsibility to run their own

institutions, to which the British response was reluctant and evasive.4 The ‘English rule

being a blessing’ for the Indians was the crux of the imperial approach. But the Second

35

World War exposed the weakness of a system that had been forcibly imposed and

compulsorily maintained for over a century. It clearly suggested that throughout their

period of rule, the policy of the British government in India had been the result more of

reacting and responding to the exigencies of time and circumstance, than the outcome of

deliberate planning.5 This tendency, continued to influence British approach almost up to

the date of transfer of power.

The British government in India, imbued with a deep sense of its imperial

mission, and centered, for all practical purposes, in Whitehall, had, nevertheless, kept

itself occupied with granting certain political and constitutional concessions to the

Indians, particularly after the turmoil of 1857. The event pointed to the dangers of

‘continuing to legislate, for millions of people with few means of knowing, except by a

rebellion, whether the law suits them or not.’6 A series of bills, reforms and acts,

admitting the need for increased representation and greater participation of Indians in

legislative matters, originated from London in the hope of assuaging the common

sentiment. However, right from the Act of 1858 and through all the reforms of 1909 and

1919, down to the Government of India Act 1935, the principle of autocracy was

retained, with the responsibility of the administration remaining undivided.7 They were

mostly ‘reluctant concessions to unremitting agitation’,8 and largely aimed at finding a

solution to the political crisis that threatened to disrupt the peace and order of the Raj,

rather than settle the Hindu-Muslim conflict in earnest. Such conflicts and discords were

exploited as practical aids, to govern and administer the vast Indian empire with a small

force.9 There existed hardly a way, or even a desire to know the will of the Indian

36

people, on whose strength and active involvement, the power of British imperialism in

India ought to have been based. A strong element of self-interest dominated all the

dealings of the rulers, under the garb of acting for the benefit of India and its

inhabitants.10

The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, apart from setting the stage for

major changes on a global level, also hastened the process of initiating a much needed

dialogue between the British rulers and their Indian subjects. The new development also

seemed to invoke a sudden awareness in the British minds, that to govern a great oriental

empire with a few thousand soldiers and civil servants, something more than a passive

consent of the people would be required.11 Consequently the era which dawned on the

political horizon of India with the beginning of the war, saw perhaps a greater number of

incentives, promises, proposals and offers, to resolve the communal and political

problems, than the entire period of British rule in India had witnessed. Not only did the

attitude of the administration underwent a marked change and became conducive to the

demands for increased Indian representation in the government, the tenor of the rulers

became sympathetic and favourable to their cause. Immediately after the declaration of

war, Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, invited Jinnah for talks, for the suspension of

the federal provisions of the 1935 Act till the end of the war, on an equal footing with

Gandhi.12 It was first the Congress leadership that was consulted and on their refusal to

support the war efforts unconditionally, Jinnah was invited by the Viceroy. This was to

prove to the outside world that even in the absence of Congress, the political groups and

organizations were supportive of the British. Jinnah’s position was elevated and he was

37

satisfied that the League and its leadership was at least recognized as a political entity.

Jinnah, however, knew the working of the British mind. He was to remark later, “After

the war…suddenly there came a change in the attitude towards me. I was treated on the

same basis as Mr. Gandhi. I was wonderstruck why all of a sudden I was promoted ...”13

For a while the Indian politicians were treated to hopes and promises of a secure and

stable political future.

To enlist and ensure the support and sympathy of the Indians in their war effort

and to prevent any major distraction from the war front, the British Government

contemplated the grant of concessions to the Indian leaders. It could not at this critical

juncture, afford to risk its global status or loose its imperial prestige, by getting

unnecessarily entangled in communal disputes and constitutional quibbles, that the Indian

political scene presented. Lord Linlithgow was particularly in favour of allowing some

concessions to the Congress and the Muslim League that would give them an excuse for

cooperating with the British in their war goals.14 His prime concern was to turn India into

a war base, by providing men and money from India to the Allied cause, and ensuring the

loyalty of the fighting arms.15 He also proposed to enhance the association of the Indian

public opinion to the conduct of the war, by establishing a consultative group represented

by all major political parties and the Indian princes, presided over by himself, and hinted

at a temporary expansion of the Viceroy’s executive council.16 All these attempts were

meant to secure substantial Indian cooperation, on a physical and moral plane, for at least

the duration of the war. However, the growth of Indian political consciousness had been

38

gaining momentum with the passage of time, and could not easily be lured in for

unconditional support of a purely imperialist cause.

That India had been dragged into the war against her will, and that her resources

were being exploited without the consent of its people, mainly for imperialist ends, were

the major grievances of the Indian politicians, particularly of the Congress leaders.17

They wanted an immediate explanation of the war aims, in terms of democracy,

imperialism and the new order that were envisaged, and how they were to apply to India

and its peculiar political situation. The Muslim League, though, did not outrightly

denounce or question the British war agenda, demanded a safeguard of the Muslim

interests particularly in the Congress governed provinces, and an assurance that no

constitutional headway in the country would be made without their involvement and

acceptance.18 It was a conditional overture to support and cooperate in the war effort, and

though equally desirous of attaining independence, the League’s stance echoed neither

the Congress’s ‘full-blooded, positive and unambiguous’ demand for absolute freedom, 19

nor reflected its left wing attitude of trying to convert Britain’s hour of difficulty into an

opportune moment for India.20 It also did not hinder participation in the war effort, and

continued to assist the defence authorities, particularly from the Punjab, known to be ‘the

sword-arm of India.’21 The Viceroy’s assurance to the Muslims that “full weight would

be given to their views and interests”, and that it was unthinkable for the British to

proceed with planning India’s future constitution without taking them along, who had in

the past been so closely associated with His Majesty’s government and with Parliament,22

was a befitting reply, and a definite leap forward for the Muslim League. On the other

39

hand, the Wardha session of the Congress Working Committee held on 22 and 23

October 1939, once again condemned the British policy as imperialistic, and called upon

its ministries to resign.23 It was clear that, as opposed to Congress non-cooperation,

threats of agitation and blatant demands of British withdrawal from India,24 Jinnah was

proving to be the most convenient instrument and best guarantee for the British against a

united political demand.25 For the time being it also suited Jinnah’s interests, as he

needed time and support of the government to rebuild the League, and put it back on the

road to recovery after its, brief but insightful, encounter with the experiment of provincial

autonomy.26

The British policy of appeasing the League was the outcome of its failure to win

over the support and sympathy of the Congress, to the war effort. The Viceroy attached

the greatest importance to gaining the goodwill of Gandhi and Nehru, mainly because of

their immense popular appeal.27 The Congress was after all the largest political party in

the country with governments in seven out of eleven provinces of India. Its ‘nuisance

value’ was substantial as it possessed the power to ‘cripple our capacity to exert our

maximum strength in the war’, wrote Linlithgow to the Secretary of State.28 But the

frequently repeated and strong-worded statements of the Congress Working Committee

sessions, denouncing the war and condemning the British attitude, did not leave much

choice with the administration. The League option was the only alternative, for despite

the congeniality between Jinnah and the Viceroy, the nature and spirit of the alliance

remained fragile. Linlithgow did not consider Jinnah reliable, feared a volte face of the

most drastic character at the shortest notice and thought that his demands were

40

exorbitant.29 Moreover, “he represents a minority, and a minority that can only

effectively hold its own with our assistance.”30 To him, despite all his outward gestures

and loud proclamations of cordiality, Muslim political communalism stood no chance

against Indian nationalism at the end of 1939.31 Jinnah, on his part, was not unaware of

the exploitative measures of the government, equally conscious of the fact that his

policies were exposing him to the serious charge of supporting imperialism.32 He,

nevertheless, continued to sit on the fence and take advantage of the British-Congress rift,

in the hope of utilizing it to the League’s interests.

The war not only exposed the hollowness of the imperial strength to deal with

practical problems of the Indian political situation, it once again made it clear that the

hallmark of British rule in India was to keep the two parties divided and pitched against

each other. It was just a matter of stretching the divide and waiting ‘until the pieces on

the political chess-board had taken their place.’33 Therefore, it aptly matched their goals

to give the situation a communal colour, which for all practical purposes was a

misleading interpretation of the issue, as it was largely a political impasse. The Viceroy’s

public pronouncements stipulated that he was trying his utmost to help bring the Indian

leaders on a common platform of agreement, which was clearly not the case. The

Congress leadership refused to believe in these overtures. Gandhi remarked that ‘the

Congress had asked for bread and it has got a stone’,34 in reply to the Viceroy’s wartime

objectives declared on 17 October 1939, whereas Nehru charged that he does not seem to

have learned much from events during the past twenty years. Similarly the Viceroy’s

support of Jinnah and the League was also motivated by nothing but a practical approach

41

to satiate the imperial demands of the time; as he wrote to Lord Zetland, the Secretary of

State for India, that he had a ‘vested interest’ in Jinnah’s position,35 which was to

promote the British cause during the war, and to keep the League-Congress differences

alive and kicking. It was obvious that it mattered less to Linlithgow that Jinnah was not

fully cooperating with the war effort, than that he was opposing the Congress.36 The

period of Congress rule in the provinces (1937-39) had been extremely detrimental to the

Muslim interests, and Jinnah was particularly sore about its mass contact recruitment

campaign among the Muslims. In such times of change and crisis, the unity of Indian

political leadership was an unattainable commodity, much to the advantage of the British.

The experiment of siding with the British and securing their good will, even if

temporarily, had considerably strengthened Jinnah and his hold over the League. His

position was gradually being accepted by the Congress and acknowledged by the British,

as the leader of Muslim destiny in India. A new direction to the struggle for freedom had

also been given, by spelling out the broad, if still vague contours, of a new state for the

Muslims of India in the Lahore Resolution of March 1940. This altered the character of

Indian politics. Partition became synonymous with independence in the Muslim

definition of the struggle. The Congress, on the other hand, was in a difficult and weak

position. By resigning from office, it lost whatever effective control it had, and by

launching Satyagraha campaign it gave up its bargaining power. Linlithgow termed the

Congress leaders as traitors for behaving in such a way,37 when the empire was fighting

for survival, whereas earlier their stance had been much different when Gandhi had stated

that his heart like every other Briton goes for the safety of the Empire. With the change in

42

the tide, however, the administration was now all the more dependent on the League as a

counterpoise to the Congress.

Although the League had supported the British on the issue of war, it was neither

an unconditional offer nor a compromise on principles. Freedom and independence,

remained the ultimate goals of the Muslims of India, for whom Jinnah was now solely

beginning to speak. It was from this platform that he vouched for the Muslim cause in all

the political and constitutional developments of India, from the August Offer of 1940 to

the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, initiated and presided over by the British, in the

attempt and hope of preventing a division of India and a retreat of imperial control. The

Cripps offer of 1942, prompted by the fall of Rangoon on 21 February, and that of

Singapore on 8 March 1942, was the nearest the British came to a settlement for the

Indian problem, but it foundered on the lack of a motivated striving for a real transfer of

power to Indian hands. It was to create an impression in the Indian political mind, that

the British were in fact fulfilling their war time pledges to bring Indian parties together

and resolve the constitutional issues, and also to convince international opinion of their

liberal intentions in India. Sir Stafford Cripps was sent to India under American pressure,

in fact on the request of Mr. Roosevelt,38 to stem the rising tide of Indian unrest,

particularly in the wake of an impending threat of Japanese attack over India. Whitehall

was confronted with the challenge of ensuring its allies, particularly the USA, that all

possible constitutional moves were underway in India to solve the political deadlock.39

The inability of the Congress and the League to come to a rapprochement, was also one

of the stumbling blocks in the failure of the Mission’s attempt, but then this factor had

43

always been there, and had by now come to be associated almost permanently with

Indian politics.

Although the British-League alliance did not last for long, the Muslim League

emerged from the war, as a far more organized and focused body, both in terms of its

aims and its strategy. Partition and the division of India, before the grant of

independence, became its unbending objective and slogan. Its stance had secured a great

political feat in the Cripps proposals which had acknowledged, even if by inference, the

demand for Pakistan by recognizing ‘the right of any province of British India that was

not prepared to accept the new constitution, to retain its present constitutional position.’40

It meant indirectly conceding the demand for Pakistan, as it accepted the principle of

non-accession of an unwilling province. Cripps’s visit to India also made it clear, for the

first time, that the principal parties in case of a transfer of power, were to be the Congress

and the Muslim League, and that without taking their views in consideration no

settlement could be achieved. Both rejected the Mission’s proposals, though on different

grounds, the Congress because it dealt a severe blow to the concept of Indian unity, and

the League because it did not explicitly recognize the demand for Pakistan.41 The British

were unperturbed, as their motivation at this stage was more to appease and pacify the

allies and thwart a possible Japanese danger of attack on India, than to actually bring a

settlement in the Indian political stalemate. The manner in which the negotiations had

broken down left little doubt in the mind of “the political leaders that there was no

genuine desire on the part of His Majesty’s Government to part with power.”42 A divided

Indian political opinion had always been their goal, and its value and worth was deemed

44

no less necessary even at this point in the history of the empire. Churchill had not been in

favour of this move from the beginning, and was able to defeat the venture with the help

of the Viceroy.43

Lord Linlithgow’s viceroyalty ended on a note of turmoil and chaos for India as

well as the empire, with the war knocking on the doors of India and the political parties in

a state of uproar against imperial rule. Congress raised the banner of ‘Quit India’ on

Gandhi’s counsel in August 1942, demanding the withdrawal of British power from

India, and the League replied by the slogan of ‘Divide and Quit’. The difference between

the strategy of the two parties was of involvement in a direct confrontation with the

government. The League stayed away from an open and hostile anti-British policy,

whereas Congress chose the war path with the Government. It started with the launching

of individual Satyagraha followed by months of struggle with heavy losses to both life

and property. Thousands were sent to prison with the outbreak of widespread riots and

disturbances across India after the ‘Quit India’ movement was launched by the Congress.

It once again gave Jinnah the opportunity to work on the consolidation of the League,

rallying the Muslim strength around the demand for Pakistan. Moreover, he advised the

Muslims to stay away from the Congress initiated Civil Disobedience. When three years

later, at the close of the war with Germany, most of the Congress leaders were released,

they found Jinnah as intractable as ever and much stronger with almost all Muslims

solidly behind him in his struggle.44 The launching of the Civil Disobedience also termed

as Quit India campaign, in fact, seemed like the second big mistake of Congress after the

45

resignation from the provincial ministries in 1939, as it served the British cause of using

the pretext to intern its leadership, and unwittingly supported the League’s rise.

Lord Wavell replaced Lord Linlithgow as Viceroy in October 1943, and was

faced with the grave responsibility of securing the internal peace and external defence of

India. It was no doubt a war appointment,45 as Whitehall justified sending a serving

Commander-in-Chief, for a sensitive political job. However, having chosen an illustrious

soldier, for the extremely responsible political task that the position of a Viceroy of India

symbolized, the British government quite clearly demonstrated its priorities. Wavell’s

personal efforts to convince the Cabinet of an urgent need to review Indian policy, and to

approach the Indian leaders with the explicit purpose of breaking the political deadlock,

fell on deaf ears.46 He was frustrated with regard to the general lack of interest and

enthusiasm towards affairs in India; all attention was focused on events in Europe and the

war, where tide was turning in favour of the Allies.47 As Wavell departed for India, he

had concluded that, the ‘Cabinet is not honest in its expressed desire to make progress in

India; and that very few of them have any foresight or courage.’48 Immediately after his

arrival in India, he realized the danger and mistake of ignoring India’s political future and

the pressing need of a solution to its problems, until after the war. He regretted the fact

that his first reaction to the acceptance of viceroyalty was taken in the spirit of a military

appointment, whereas it should have been treated as a political assignment with a

concrete guideline as to ‘what the policy to India really was to be.’49 The conspicuous

attitude of neglect and unfriendliness of the British Government in general and the British

Cabinet to the Indian affairs,50 was felt by Wavell on many occasions, and in his opinion

46

it was an obvious and deliberate attempt to delay the moment ‘when they have to take a

decision about India.’51 It was like avoiding a situation for which they had no solution,

but still wanted to ignore its realities, in the hope that if they continued doing so, it could

be reduced to nothingness. To Wavell, who thought India to be ‘very urgent and very

important’, 52 it amounted to ‘just a contemptuous wave of the hand’, as he aptly recorded

Whitehall’s apathy in his Journal, “Tell India to wait till it’s more convenient”.53

Wavell’s policy, as all other political moves initiating from Britain, was mainly to

preserve the unity of India, largely to the benefit of the empire’s prosperity and security.

So far independence and freedom for India was all that came up for debate and

discussions in the Cabinet, and that too with little enthusiasm. The question of Partition

and the demand of the Muslim League and Jinnah for a separate Muslim state of

Pakistan, was still not being taken seriously in the corridors of British Power.

Withdrawal of the British from India was in itself a subject that did not inspire much

eagerness, and therefore, as little talk of it, as justifiably allowed in the given

circumstances, was given to the issue. It was convenient also to ignore the India question

as the war had gone over its phase of active belligerency, with victory in sight for the

Allies. As the world started moving towards peace once more, the destiny of millions in

India also began to change its character and shape. Lord Wavell’s visit to England in the

spring of 1945 and then again in December 1946, where he confronted the Cabinet again

and again on the Indian political dilemma and faced the India Committee that obstinately

preserved a ‘deep inertia and silence’54 on the question of Indian freedom, turned out to

be extremely frustrating and annoying even in his personal capacity, particularly when he

47

found that the India Committee was holding meetings without him.55 The new Prime

Minister Clement Attlee, who came to power in July 1945, also did not disguise his

dislike of Wavell.56 His open criticism of the Viceroy’s policies was no more a secret, as

he did not agree with his handling of affairs in India.57 Churchill’s contemptuous remarks

in the British parliament, directed at Wavell’s initiatives to grant self-government to

India, helped solve neither the issue of settling India’s future nor made the task any easier

for the Viceroy.58 The Secretary of State, Lord Amery had complained as early as 1942

that the then Prime Minister, Winston Churchill had not “the slightest idea of the extent

to which we have been kicked out already, or how impossible it is to hold our present

position indefinitely except on terms which mean that we shall certainly be kicked out in

the end.”59 Consequently, the belief of many die-hard imperialists including Mr.

Churchill, that India could be governed as before for another thirty years, was hardly a

sound review of the Indian situation.60

The breakdown of talks at Simla in June 1945, on communal and not political

grounds,61 cast a gloomy shadow over future prospects of a British sponsored settlement

to the Indian political impasse. It had also narrowed their options to work out an

agreement and to avoid a major conflict. There were hardly any negotiations on any

major issue, as the question of communal composition of party representatives, with

Jinnah staying persistent on the League’s claim to represent Indian Muslims alone, led to

a deadlock. The persistence was, as Wavell acknowledged, born of a genuine fear of the

Congress permeating ‘the entire administration’ and ‘cannot be dismissed as an obsession

of Jinnah and his immediate entourage.’62 However, the failure of the talks brought the

48

much dreaded and ‘wholly impracticable proposition’ of partition and thereby of

Pakistan, out in the open, to be considered more objectively than ever before.63 The

pressure was gradually mounting on the British government to think in terms of not only

granting independence but conceding to a division of the subcontinent, a prospect least

acceptable to imperialist mind-set, yet getting more unavoidable by the day.

The landslide victory in favour of Clement Attlee’s Labour party in July 1945,

brought not only a change in the British administrative set up, but was to herald a

significant transformation of the Indian political scenario. As opposed to Churchill’s hard

core imperialism, Attlee was set on decolonization.64 A new approach to alter the

dynamics of the Indian problem began to surface soon after the new party settled in its

seat. The question of Pakistan began to come up for debate in the British parliament, but

the general opinion was still not favourably inclined to it, as it suited the strategic needs

of Britain to leave behind a united India. Some kind of ‘a federal solution’, reached

between the Muslim and Hindu politicians, was being thought about by Attlee’s Cabinet,

as a reasonable and practical answer to the crisis.65 However, no solution could be super

imposed, without the consent and mutual agreement of both the major parties. A British

sponsored attempt at resolving the conflict in India, had had no success in the past and

could not be expected to achieve any results in the new scenario. As Jinnah had remarked

on Wavell’s 17 February 1944 address to the Central Legislature budget session, that if

India’s constitutional future was for Indians to decide, then there was no need for the

Viceroy to offer any opinion about India’s future political disposition.66 But very few

sitting in London perceived the situation on these lines. Instead of letting the Indian

49

political parties negotiate among themselves, the British were intent upon forcing their

decision, mainly on the premise that the Indian leaders were ‘ill-adapted for delicate

constitutional negotiation’,67 and were not capable of reaching any conclusive political

arrangement.68 Such an approach to an issue that was largely indigenous, was fraught

with all sorts of risks, and the implications of such an act were not carefully analyzed,

when the Cabinet Mission was sent to India in the March 1946.

In all the political initiatives that came from the British government in the last

decade before partition, the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, with its provision of grouping

provinces able to set up their own executives and legislatures,69 was actually the first to

seriously consider and attempt a transfer of power. However, it still envisaged a Union of

India, ‘which the British had laboured to build up’, as the 16 May Statement envisaged,

embracing both British India and the States, which would deal with defence, foreign

affairs and communications.70 Essentially preserving the unity of India, the groups would

frame their own constitutions and exercise all powers except over the Union subjects. A

province was also given the right to call for a reconsideration of the terms of the

Constitution after every ten years by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly. While

the constitution-making was in process, the administration of India would be run by an

interim government in which all portfolios, except that of the Viceroy, would be held by

Indian leaders.71 Despite its earlier proclamations of bringing in ‘no recipe for Indian

independence’,72 and its inability to strike a compromise between Congress demand for

majority rule at the centre, and the League demand for a sovereign, independent and

viable Pakistan, the Mission had finally given recognition to the Indian struggle for

50

independence. The British readiness to divide the subcontinent, nevertheless, was still not

an explicit feature of the Mission’s plan, which was, in fact, making a last effort to

resolve the Indian crisis without having to confront partition. The imperial rule in India

had reached the point when it was quite clear that the failure of the Mission would mean

a total collapse of authority and a complete breakdown of administrative control, ‘with

disorders on a scale never before seen in India, and certainly unprecedented in Britain’s

experience overseas.’73

Between the Cripps Mission and the Cabinet Mission the political face and

configuration of India had irrevocably changed.74 The British had in principle conceded

to a transfer of power to Indian hands, and the Congress was gradually accepting the

League’s standing as the representative of Muslim India, particularly in the aftermath of

the elections of 1945-46, that clearly elevated the League’s image to an all India status.

The League had contested the elections on the ‘plank of Pakistan.... and its appeal went

home to the Muslim masses’, emerging in the Punjab legislative Assembly as the ‘largest

single party with 75 members, with the Congress coming next with 51 members.’75 It

had secured all the seats in the Central Assembly and 446 out of a total of 495 in the

Provincial Assemblies.76 The constitutional wrangle, however, was still far from over.

The Cabinet Mission’s proposals once again highlighted the tense and bitter communal

struggle between the Muslims and the Hindus, and failed to reconcile their differences,

either on the issue of joining the Constituent Assembly and the framing of a constitution,

or on the question of sitting in the Interim Government, as equal and mandatory aspects

of accepting the Mission’s plan. Both blamed each other for not having agreed to the Plan

51

in toto, and thus defeating the essential spirit of the idea.77 It also made the reality come

home to many in Britain that the Indian political situation had reached a point of no

return, and the Indian leaders despite all their outstanding mutual differences, could no

longer be harnessed to any scheme or plan falling short of their identified goal of

independence.

The Cabinet Mission did not fail as squarely as the previous initiatives had, for it

set the task of constitution making on a track. There was still much hope in the official

British circles, even when the Mission returned after three exhausting months in India,

that it would be able to bring the parties together in the best interests of both the

communities, in the Constituent Assembly as well as the Interim Government. However,

its working remained an ambiguous and tricky arena, as the British had failed to

guarantee the procedure of the Constituent Assembly,78 and were unable to forestall the

Congress from misinterpreting its spirit. They could not afford to ‘risk a break with the

Congress’ reducing them ‘to virtual impotence’, and making them ‘ridiculous in the eyes

of the League.’79 As Jinnah said, the Mission ‘had been imbued with the wrong attitude--

----they had come out pleading for agreement instead of laying down a solution’, and that

no decision was to be imposed on the Muslims without his endorsement as he was ‘the

one man to deal with.’80 It also added to an air of foreboding and suspicion in the rank

and file of the Muslim League, who resented the dishonesty of the Cabinet Ministers in

not honouring their word of inviting them to form a government, as earlier stipulated in

its promises for any of the parties that accepted the plan in its entirety, and which the

League did at one point.81 Jinnah was outraged at this betrayal and asserted that the

52

Mission was honour-bound to go ahead on the basis of paragraph 8 of its 16 June

statement, which clearly stated that, ‘In the event of the two major parties or either of

them proving unwilling to join in the setting up of a Coalition Government on the above

lines, it is the intention of the Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an Interim

Government which will be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the

Statement of May 16th.’82 Jinnah’s insistence that unless the Congress accepted the

Statement of May 16th and agreed to fundamentals in the clearest language, it would be

useless to summon the Constituent Assembly was an indicator of the worsening state of

affairs.83 And by not accepting the Statement the Congress had certainly revoked ‘their

plighted word.’84 As Wavell recorded, ‘Congress have been encouraged and will set their

claims higher than ever. The suspicion and dislike of Jinnah for the Congress have been

enhanced; and to them is added, I fear a mistrust of HMG, and perhaps of myself.’85

Having left India on 29 June 1946, the Mission was unable to remove the distrust and

bitterness now all the more rampant in the Congress and the League camps, and left them

in a quandary of bitter wrangling over constitutional matters. Reflecting on British

incapacity to govern effectively, it made clear that they could now argue, or at the most

persuade, but could not command.86 That phase of imperial rule had faded away, and the

Labour Party in England was not slow in awakening to the new reality, that the fragile

nature of British rule and authority in India, had grown to acquire.

Until 1945 the British had worked on the assumption that the empire had all the

potential to survive; they had used Pakistan only as a counterpoise to Congress demand

for independence.87 The Cabinet Mission altered this thinking pattern, but only to the

53

extent that independence to a united India could be considered as a solution to the

problem. Partition was not on the cards and thereby Pakistan still an unpractical dream of

Jinnah and his Muslim followers.88 It was the British intention to make the Congress and

the League ‘agree on how to make the Mission Plan work in the British interests’.89 It

was clear that the Mission’s proposals aimed at perpetuating the empire’s hold over India,

in one form or the other,90 even if an agreement to withdraw from had been ostensibly

reached in Whitehall. A united India was a far better possibility for their military and

strategic interests in the region than a divided one. This was one of the most outstanding

reasons for opposing the demand for Pakistan. At the same time the hold of the empire

over India had considerably slackened. It was no longer in a position to even guarantee its

own safe passage out of India, which had also led to Wavell’s breakdown plan of

retreating phase by phase,91 to avoid serious trouble that could target the British officials

and their families. There had been reports indicating the growing hatred of the Indians for

the British, and in certain areas more volatile than the Hindu-Muslim animosity.92 In such

circumstances a graceful withdrawal was the only option that they had, and working for a

united India offered some solace to the wounded pride of the builders of the grand Indian

empire. The law and order situation had worsened considerably and even the capital felt

insecure and incapable of dealing with communal outbursts.93 The British had to take a

decision, wrap up and get out of India quickly. Such an approach influenced all their

dealings and negotiations for the transfer of power, in the year 1946-47, and ruled out

‘any labeling of the Labour policy as one of an unforced voluntary withdrawal from

India.’94 Consequently a deliberate impression to this effect was generated by the Cabinet

54

to make the withdrawal look like ‘the logical conclusion....of a policy followed by

successive Governments for many years.’95

The decision came in the shape of Attlee’s 20 February 1947 announcement. It

was the realization that “without a clear idea of how and when we are to leave India”,96

the situation was ripe enough to get out of control any time, that a final assurance of a

major change in the Indian situation was given. A roadmap had been handed over to the

Indian political leaders to proceed to the much demanded and long awaited transfer of

power, with June 1948 as the specific deadline given for British withdrawal and

‘transference of power to responsible Indian hands.’97 The statement of Prime Minister

Attlee, while implicitly admitting the failure of the Cabinet Mission to bring the political

parties to some common platform of agreement,98 expressed concern and regret at the

differences among Indian parties ‘which are preventing the Constituent Assembly from

functioning as it was intended that it should.’99 The onus was, thus, on Indian shoulders

as the British prepared to leave, for they considered themselves to be ’giving a boon

rather than taking one.’100 The announcement also inadvertently exposed the weakness

that the British administration had been experiencing for some time, in matters pertaining

to the maintenance of law and order and keeping the situation under effective control.

There was a threat of a major breakdown of authority as the communalism that they had

so conveniently used to their advantage, for the previous century and a half, was

threatening to go out of proportions. ‘Ironically communalism, devised to delay the end,

hastened it in the last stage.’101 In case of further communal outbursts it was doubtful if

the loyalties of the army or the services could be relied upon.102 A longer stay was

55

inadvisable and unfeasible mainly from the standpoint of security. The Statement clearly

referred to the ‘present state of uncertainty’ being ‘fraught with danger’ that could ‘no

longer be indefinitely prolonged.’103 This danger, so explicitly outlined, was obviously

not to India or the Indians, who had been experiencing political and communal turmoil

since long, but had deserved no panacea to their ills, until the British faced a real threat

themselves and a steady but rapid decline of their power in India.104

The Labour Government’s ‘epoch making’ initiative, with reference to fixing a

time limit, was intended mainly to establish its ‘bonafides’,105 and recover the lost grip

that it presumably had over events in India. It was an answer to the Congress demand, as

Nehru’s warm welcome of it being a ‘wise and courageous document’,106 clearly echoed,

but like so many attempts in the past, fell short of the League’s demand for Pakistan. The

announcement of transfer of power was not accompanied with that of a division of the

land, a demand on which Jinnah was not ready to compromise or yield even an inch,

declaring vehemently that the ‘Constituent Assembly was dead’.107 If it was conceived as

a master stroke of British policy, aimed at gaining the majority’s support in presenting a

solution to the Indian crisis, and at the same time convincing the world of its commitment

to liberty and self-rule, it failed conspicuously to conceal the obvious lacuna of genuinely

intending to harmonize Indian political spirit. It had not shocked the Indian leaders into

cooperation, and had done little more than intensify the fight for succession, encouraging

them to take the decision in their own hands.108 To many, even in India, ‘it was a leap in

the dark.’109 Then there were those who thought that the Statement had been made rather

prematurely when there was still room for negotiations with the Indian leaders.110 Its

56

most obvious drawback was that it lacked a guarantee for the minorities, whose interests

would be hanging loosely and precariously, at the mercy of the majority, in the event of a

British withdrawal that the 20 February Statement stipulated. It would be as good as

leaving India to greater turmoil and chaos, a factor which had always been hanging as the

sword of Democles over the Muslim fate in India, whenever a plan or a scheme for

constitutional headway was initiated, as the Congress would certainly assert the authority

inherent in its majority status.111 An ambiguous phrase in the Statement, ‘preparatory

measures must be put in hand in advance,’112 calling for greater efficiency of the civil

and military apparatus, was all that the Statement provided for, in the crucial phase of

transferring authority to Indian hands. The British seemed to be operating without a

sufficient and effective directness of purpose.

Prime Minister Attlee’s defence of his statement and its motivation, that it was a

mission not of betrayal but of fulfillment, and the assurance that the transfer of power

would take place not later than June 1948,113 did not get a reciprocal support of the

motion from the opposition, in the House of Commons. The fixing of 1948 as a time limit

for British withdrawal was termed as an ‘unjustifiable gamble’ that had deprived Britain

of its bargaining power vis-a-vis India.114 Churchill turned out to be its strongest critic,

deriding the Indian politicians as ‘men of straw of whom in a few years no trace will

remain’, and to advance authority to such hands, he believed, would bring shame to

Britain, along with the ‘pangs of sorrow so many of us feel…’115 Earlier in the House of

Lords, a similar debate had ensued over the issue, with some describing the Statement as,

‘unconditional surrender’ that would ultimately ‘degrade the British name’.116 The cause

57

of concern was indeed, not the ‘hurried scuttle’ or the unprepared nature of the British

administrative structure for conducting such a major event, obviously to the detriment of

the successor government, rather it was the loss of the Indian empire---the jewel in the

imperial crown, that led to the uproar. On the other score, the ruling Labour party’s

consideration was to avoid the ‘dangers of delay’ and the ‘dangers of hanging on’ and

finally end the ‘Indo-British conflict in a manner worthy of civilized nations’.117 The

other option could lead to a complete breakdown of authority and endanger British

honour and prestige, given the delicate Indian political and communal circumstances.

Ironically, both benches, though sitting on the opposite sides in the British Parliament

and ostensibly taking opposite angles, were speaking the same language. Their common

objective was to safeguard the imperial interests, particularly its future concerns in the

region, that hardly tended to accommodate India, or its problems and prospects after a

hurried departure of British authority.

The 20th February Statement had another article to it, no less crucial for the future

turn of events in Indian political scenario, as the announcement of withdrawal. However,

its implications were to unfold later, so that at the precise moment of its intimation it did

not raise any commotion in the Indian political circles. Lord Wavell was to be replaced

and his Viceroyalty terminated in view of the changed circumstances.118 It was a decision

that was taken at a time when India was not only entering a new but a very sensitive and

critical phase, that ‘will be very exacting and may be prolonged’,119 and that called for

extreme care in handling all matters, if communal violence and bloodshed on a massive

scale was to be avoided. India’s future was hanging perilously on the wisdom and

58

astuteness of those in command of authority and administration, whose right judgment

and planning was of crucial importance at this juncture, more than it had ever been in the

past. Attlee’s pronouncement that it was the ‘appropriate time to terminate this war

appointment’ and ‘to approve as successor to Lord Wavell, the appointment of Admiral

the Viscount Mountbatten, who will be entrusted with the task of transferring to Indian

hands responsibility for the government of British India in a manner that will best ensure

the future happiness and prosperity of India’,120 led to serious questioning of the official

policy, in the particular context of the change that it brought. Once again Churchill was

up in arms, in the House of Commons, demanding the rationale for it. “Will the Prime

Minister lay before the House the reasons for the termination of the appointment of

Viscount Wavell at this particular moment?” to which he further added, “Will he indicate

to us what differences or divergences or disagreements have arisen between the Viceroy

and the British Government?” and continued to deepen his line of questioning, “Is it not a

fact that if Lord Wavell’s Viceroyalty had ended with the war, it would have ended

eighteen months ago, and if it had ended after three years it would have ended in June

last?”, and finally talking about the new appointment, “Is he to make a new effort to

restore the situation or is it merely ‘Operation Scuttle” on which he and other

distinguished officers have been dispatched?’ 121 Even if it was intended to be a political

gimmick, as Churchill was a master at invoking the drama of the occasion,122 his

persistent questioning and remarks before a crowded House were sufficiently provocative

and relevant, putting the Prime Minister on the defensive for using his prerogative, at an

inopportune time. Attlee was himself conscious of the fact that the policy proposals were

not well received by the opposition in either of the two Houses.123

59

The termination of Lord Wavell’s Viceroyalty came at a time when issues of a

more critical nature awaited the attention of the British government. India was to be

granted freedom and the administrative consequences of it to be weighed, planned, and

executed. British withdrawal was to be effected, in a very short time, which in itself was

a major responsible task. A well thought out, controlled, ordered and structured planning,

and a peaceful devolution of power was directly and squarely the responsibility of the

British Government. Except for the south that was relatively calm and silent, India was in

the grip of a powerful spate of communal fury.124 The riots in Calcutta were the ‘most

savage and destructive communal disturbances that have taken place in India for very

many years... resulting in something like 40,000 killed and 15,000 injured, with many

more rendered homeless and great destruction of property.’125 The Punjab was

particularly in a belligerent mood with its different communities collecting arms, raising

their private armies and coming in direct and fierce clashes.126 Whole streets were set

ablaze in the principal towns of the Punjab; official figures gave two thousand as the

number of lives lost but there were certainly many more.127 The services, both civil and

military, though still reasonably impassive could not be guaranteed to stay unaffected for

long. Nevertheless, however explosive the communal situation was and how

irreconcilably divergent the two major political parties were, the British rulers had to

resolve their outstanding conflicts, to prevent a collapse of the political and

administrative systems that was imminent in the wake of their departure. They had to

ensure the safety of both the communities in the ultimate eventuality of leaving the

country to Indian hands, which was a tough task, but more so if power was to be

transferred to a united India, with unwilling minorities to be left at the mercy of an

60

unsympathetic majority. The change of a Viceroy, in such times of crisis and

overwhelming turmoil, was neither an inevitable necessity nor an unavoidable constraint,

unless the new man sent in was to implement a certain line of action and discharge a

clandestine duty. To undertake such an act for which the history of British India offered

no precedent, as prior to Wavell’s dismissal no Viceroy had been removed from office,128

the authorities in London were indeed following a course that left little doubt of their

priorities and interests in solving the Indian question.

If transfer of power was genuinely on the cards, a change at the top, for a mere

fifteen months did not seem needful and urgent, as it meant replacing a whole set up. The

Viceregal establishment was by no means a modest concern, and each Viceroy designate

preferred to have his own staff and his own paraphernalia. A change in that meant

preparations on a grand scale, from the top to the bottom level, for both the incoming and

outgoing Viceroys. It needed time and effort which India of early 1947 could hardly

afford or indulge in. Moreover, if the British really meant to leave India, and if the

intention was the withdrawal of British authority and its delegation to an independent

India, Wavell was as suited for the job as any other Viceroy. He had the relevant

experience of Indian political affairs, had developed a certain rapport with the Indian

leaders, and though at times accused of pro-League leanings, had a commitment to see

through a mutually acceptable settlement, that was both genuine and steadfast.129 His

labours to mitigate the sufferings caused by the Bengal famine,130 his attempts to

conciliate the Congress and League differences at Simla131 and introduce a ‘fresh impetus

and fresh spirit’ in Indian politics,132 his repeated efforts to convince the home

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government of the urgency of attending to India and adopt a direct policy on it, and his

unflinching endeavours to break the political deadlock and make the Cabinet Mission

Plan work, had opened the ‘closed door’ and revived the Indian question that Churchill’s

conservatives had decided to put in ‘cold storage’.133 His ‘soldier’ approach had been

steadily replaced by a ‘statesman’ outlook in the complex political climate of India. Yet

he found little or no favour with the authorities in London, in both the governments of

Churchill and Attlee under whom he served his three and a half years. In his Journal he

frequently cites the attitude of the home government to his policies and suggestions as

‘contemptuously dismissing’.134 The India Committee, he soon realized on his first visit

back to England in early 1944, found his ‘presence troublesome’, and treating him like

‘an Untouchable in the presence of Brahmins’, preferred to take their decisions without

him.135 Very often he found it extremely frustrating and depressing.

It was, in fact, the outlook and approach to Indian affairs that was thought to be

unsatisfactory and unproductive of a particularly desired result. Wavell believed in the

dual nature of his role in India; to carry out the British Government’s policy viz-a-viz a

smooth transfer of power and to ensure that in doing so it ‘did not neglect its

responsibilities to those it still ruled.’136 Whereas, for the wielders of power and authority

in London, India was no more important particularly if it was going in the direction of

self rule and independence.137 Attlee was careful to weigh his priorities; his first duty was

to those who had elected him to office, and the Labour party was ready to sacrifice India

to create and build a new Britain.138 The war years had neglected the Indian situation and

kept it under the carpet for as long as it was possible. Wavell’s attempts at keeping

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Whitehall’s interest in its affairs alive, had already earned him Churchill’s anger for

pressing on an issue that was low on the Prime Minister’s ‘list of priorities’.139 Generally

speaking it was a mistrust of Wavell’s policy, who was thought to be a bad administrator,

one who acted more like a soldier than a statesman.140 He was himself aware of this lack

of confidence in his political acumen, that the British Cabinet exhibited time and again. ‘I

feel that many of our troubles in India, both administrative and political, are due to

ignorance and prejudice among your colleagues,’ he wrote to Amery. ‘It is discouraging

work to serve an obviously hostile Cabinet, who seem to have no confidence in my

judgment on any matter.’141 However, while appointing him for the task, the nature of the

appointment and the difficulties of the job, were as clear and obvious to the authorities, as

was the role he was likely to assume in the circumstances.142 Churchill’s intentions of

sending him as the ‘stop-gap’ Viceroy, who would maintain a status quo in the political

field and keep things quiet at least till the war ended, was a gross under estimation of the

man and his potentials.143 A person of his caliber and experience could not be expected to

sleep over an intensely volatile situation that the Indian challenge presented, without

attempting to react and resolve the outstanding contentious issues.144 On the other hand

Attlee’s dislike and criticism of his policies ‘bewailing the fact that he was not a

politician’,145 remained a constant irritant in Wavell’s planning of a constructive

administrative approach to the Indian political situation. He never had the free hand or

enough maneuvering space required to effectively handle the myriad aspects of the

complex and critical Indian problem, notwithstanding his extreme desire to do so.

Ironically, despite all the ‘divergences’, the British Government ultimately came to adopt

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nearly the same date that Wavell had recommended for British withdrawal and transfer of

power in India.146

The British tendency to appease the Congress took the better of their abilities to

see the merits of Wavell’s role in India, and it was under the spell of a similar inclination

that Mountbatten was chosen for the task. Wavell’s tenure in India was marked by an

‘underground campaign’ of the Congress against the Viceroy,147 who had the ear of the

British Government.148 Wavell had lost the support and sympathy of the Congress which

blatantly accused him of being biased to the Muslim League cause, during all the hectic

negotiations that took place for a settlement. The Congress stalwarts hardly acclaimed

that as fair on the part of the Viceroy, and failed to see it in the context of the ‘evident

sympathy shown by both Cripps and Pethick-Lawrence towards the Congress party’.149 In

particular the maneuvering of Cripps,150 during the stormy days of Cabinet Mission’s

working in India, who had drafted paragraph 8 with the express purpose of preventing the

Muslim League from entering the Interim Government, and encouraging the Congress to

accept the 16 May Statement so that negotiations could start afresh,151 created a lot of bad

blood in the aftermath of the Mission’s departure. It wrecked the prospect of a settlement

and left Jinnah and the League deeply disappointed.152 Wavell did not approve of the

Mission’s ‘dishonesty’ in instigating Congress to accept the Plan publicly, whereas it was

clear that ‘their acceptance was never wholehearted’,153 thus thwarting the League’s

prospects of a major gain. In his opinion the Congress stance was not stable on this issue

which led to the League’s suspicion that it ‘had no intention at all of carrying out the

plan laid down in the Cabinet Mission’s statement of May 16th, and would put their own

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interpretation on any provisions of it which they did not like.’154 It was on such

occasions that Whitehall failed to restrain its annoyance at Wavell’s political judgment

being ‘unsound, i.e. not sufficiently pro-Congress’.155 Wavell was critical of the

Mission’s ‘apologetic’ attitude, which he regarded responsible for its failure,156 along

with the fact that Cripps and Pethick- Lawrence had been ‘so completely in the Congress

camp....’157 To the Congress anybody not supportive of their policies was unjust and

therefore unacceptable. Nehru, commenting on Wavell, wrote that though honest and

sincere, he had ‘lost all flexibility in his desire to appease Jinnah and the Muslim

League’.158 Gandhi had also cabled to Attlee suggesting that Wavell had been ‘unnerved

owing to the Bengal tragedy’, during the August 1946 riots,159 and in public had accused

the Viceroy of his pro Muslim leanings.160 As a matter of fact Wavell had never been

very fond of the Indian politicians,161 but less so of Jinnah for whom he could only claim

a ‘reluctant admiration’.162 Among other things, he also held him responsible for the

breakdown of the Simla Conference,163 but the Congress charge was leveled with great

malevolence, against a man who was sympathetic to the cause of Indian nationalism, in

certain ways more than any of his erstwhile colleagues in London, and who seldom

sacrificed the call of justice to political expediency.164

Wavell’s ‘summary dismissal’ without giving the customary ‘six months notice

of his replacement’ was ‘hardly in keeping with the dignity of the appointment.’165 Of

all the dismissals that he had experienced, ‘this last hurt the most.’166 ‘I hated the way

they chucked me out’167 was a Viceroy’s disappointment to his unceremonious departure.

The gesture that was ‘not very courteously done’, 168 had a sad imprint on his mind, but it

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had more to do with the dejection of leaving a job unfinished, than the loss of a prized

position.169 He was also annoyed at being given less than a month to manage his

departure, and carried with him the impression that an attempt was being made ‘to hurry

him away without the customary formalities,’170 that the dignity of his office demanded.

In fact, the move had been planned much earlier. With Mountbatten and Cripps, Attlee

had been working, since early 1947, on how to devise Wavell’s resignation instead of

having to dismiss him.171 Cripps, in particular, seems to have decided quite early, i.e.

soon after returning to England in June 1946, that Wavell ought to be removed and

replaced by a new Viceroy.172 Moreover, Whitehall’s attempt to combine the

independence declaration and the fixing of a time limit for it, with the announcement of a

new Viceroy to take over charge in India, overshadowed the importance of the latter

detail, and somewhat clouded the news of the critical appointment,173 which was lost

amid the euphoria generated by the British proclamation of an immediate transfer of

power. Wavell was particularly unhappy about it and had suggested that the

announcement should not include the date of withdrawal.174 He thought it was unfair to

his successor who ought to be given a few weeks to study the situation before embarking

hectically on a tight schedule for the transfer of power, as well as to himself, to be

burdened with the responsibility of carrying out a policy which in his opinion was

‘misjudged and ill-timed.’175 So it was basically a conflict of policy that had led to an

unnecessary and unprecedented change, at a very fragile moment in Indian history. If the

intention of His Majesty’s Government was that the change may not stand out and raise

tumbling hindrances, it was amply gratified, as very few found it of much interest in

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comparison to the momentous announcement that accompanied it. But its repercussions

were to taint and tarnish the planning for the partition of India, for all times to come.

Mountbatten’s appointment was largely motivated by the same Congress

influence, that had been so pronounced in the dismissal of Wavell. Soon after assuming

office, Attlee had come to realize how deeply Congress mistrusted Wavell.176 Referring

to the ‘wide divergence’ that he believed, existed between what Wavell thought to be the

right way of ensuring a peaceful and effective working of the interim government before

India gained independence, and what the British Government felt was the correct

approach,177 a new Viceroy was installed in the India seat, and ‘in the choice of options

the decisive factor was the Congress High Command.’178 That Mountbatten’s

credentials, among other things, should carry a Congress approval, was by far the most

suggestive feature of the imperial intentions, regarding the manner in which they planned

to undertake and execute a transfer of power to Indian hands. He had known Nehru, the

Congress leader, since their time together in Singapore, at the close of the war,179 and had

immediately struck a common liking, that was to last a lifetime and yield ‘fruits of mutual

advantage.’180 All along Cripps was in contact with Nehru mainly through his men in the

U.K., notably Krishna Menon, whose ‘information and advice Cripps seemed in course of

time to prefer to that of Wavell himself.’181 Nehru’s approval of Mountbatten’s

candidature was, in due course of time, conveyed to Attlee by Cripps who had been

informed of the much coveted consent by Krishna Menon, but the fact that the new

Viceroy was Nehru’s nominee, was kept as a scrupulously guarded secret, to prevent a

reaction from the Muslim League quarters. Nehru struck an immediate chord of harmony

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with Mountbatten, the new Viceroy designate, and this fact was not to remain hidden for

long. The Attlee Government was also ready to give Mountbatten what he wanted.182

The fog of the Cabinet Mission days was over. With Cripps and Attlee on their side, the

Congress leaders began to consider Wavell as the sole obstacle to their demands and

thereby launched a ‘subtle, insidious propaganda’ for his replacement, which was easily

swallowed by the Labour Government.183

The arrival of Lord Mountbatten on 22nd March 1947 opened the final and the

most formative phase of the history of united India, and with this the question was no

longer whether, but how and when a transfer of power was to be effected.184 The Viceroy

had been instructed and empowered by Attlee to achieve the ‘earliest possible transfer’ to

the Indian subcontinent.185 He had been sent on a decided and determined course, with

plenipotentiary powers, unprecedented in British Indian tradition. He had even asked to

be sent to India at the open invitation of the Indian parties, ‘in a capacity they would

define themselves.’186 To avoid Partition and obtain a unitary Government for India was

the crux of his instructions, and the hallmark was to secure British interests of keeping

the army undivided and retaining India in the Commonwealth.187 Moreover, the change

was being initiated in the spirit of preserving and developing a relationship rather than

destroying one, anticipating a continued involvement of Britons in India, even beyond the

achievement of independence.188 This perception hardly left any doubt where true British

interests had come to converge,189 and affected the manner and method of conducting

their part of the negotiations for the transfer of power. To deliver Britain from its Indian

responsibility, with the least amount of damage being done to the prestige of a fading

68

empire, whose will, resources and capacity had equally dissipated,190 was the task that

faced London, and it was accordingly shifted to seemingly more suitable hands. The

heavy responsibility of carrying out the new policy was, thus, ‘entrusted to a younger

man’ who could ‘take charge of the situation free from previous associations, prejudices

and predilections.’191 Mountbatten’s presence was deemed crucial to convert an

embarrassing retreat into a grandiose withdrawal, a task that was beyond Wavell’s

practical approach.

The British approach to the Indian problem remained a jumble of confused and

contradictory policies till almost the virtual end. There was no tangible scheme or plan

for the partition of India that could be announced as the solution to the Indian problem, or

as a provision of safeguard for the Muslims.192 An event that demanded years of

preparation was unfolding itself more as the outcome of circumstantial happening than a

meticulously calculated plan. Major changes, such as that of the Viceroyalty, only

months prior to the actual transfer of power, kept on being made with great poise, in the

hope of restoring the peace and prosperity of India. On the one hand this change was

initiated in the name of terminating an appointment that was necessarily a war time

placement, and on the other it was executed because it was not in ‘full agreement with the

policy of His Majesty’s Government’.193 Secondly, ignoring partition as the demand of a

potentially strong and viable political group, remained a matter of policy with the British

government,194 till there was no other workable option left to avoid a complete

breakdown of authority with a civil war threatening to disrupt the existing administrative

structure. Wavell had devised several schemes to bring a settlement of the major political

69

parties primarily for an Indian Union, which continued to negate the reality that partition

was gradually turning into. The British still hoped, at least till Mountbatten arrived, that it

would be somehow possible to get the Indian leaders agree to a single successor state.195

The unity of India was the coveted goal even when the third party had decided to quit.196

Such an approach was liable to create difficulties, as it ignored the making of a well

thought out and effective plan for partition and a peaceful transfer of power. The point

had been reached where the next step was to determine ‘the difference between progress

and anarchy for this country.’197 Despite having ruled over India for decades, and almost

always being locked in the tough struggle of a political triangle, the British in the end

game failed to heed the call of the changing times and circumstances, or accept the

ground realities, and persisting on a line of action that was hardly in tune with reason,

acted with a naivety that relegated an orderly planning for partition to an unnecessary and

unfortunate oblivion.

However, the Statement of 20th February had given a work plan to all the parties

concerned. It was the schedule including a timeframe that would be followed by the new

Viceroy as he was going to assume his responsibilities. It was indeed one of the most

crucial appointments made at one of the most sensitive times in the history of the

subcontinent. Independence and freedom had been spelled out for India and its planning

was about to be undertaken by a new leadership that was essentially conscious of its

purpose and also its role in history. It remains to be seen if that leadership was also

capable and worthy of the stupendous task ahead.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 Indian Independence Act, 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 233-249. 2 W.H.Morris, ‘Thirty-Six Years later: The Mixed Legacies of Mountbatten’s Transfer of Power’, International Affairs, Vol.59, no.4 (Autumn, 1983): 621. 3 D.N.Panigrahi, India’s Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat (London: Routledge, 2004), 1-2. 4 Ibid. 5 V.P.Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1957), 1. 6 Ibid., 3. 7 Ibid., 14. However, all parts of India were not the grantees of these reforms. The case of N.W.F.P. is worthy of mention here which did not come under the Umbrella, and hence the alienation and aloofness from the mainstream politics. 8 H.V.Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 5. 9 Ibid., 6. 10 Ibid., 3. 11 Ibid., 4. 12 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Sokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 47. 13 Menon, 59-60. Lord Linlithgow followed up his announcement of 3 September 1939, regarding the British declaration of war on Germany by getting in touch with Indian leaders with the explicit aim of securing their cooperation in the war effort. He met Gandhi, Jinnah and the Chancellor of the Chamber of princes separately on 4 September. 14 See Statement issued by the Governor General on 8 August 1940, T.O.P., Vol. 1, Appendix I, 877-879. 15 Linlithgow’s Report of his conversation with W. Philips, President Roosevelt’s personal representative, 19 February 1943, T.O.P. Vol. 3, 69. 16 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1973), 33. 17 See resolution passed by the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay, 16 September 1940, T.O.P., Vol. 1, Appendix II, 879-881. 18 See resolution passed by the Muslim League working Committee at Nagpur, 27 December 1941, T.O.P., Vol. 1, Appendix no. IV, 884-886. 19 V.P.Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 64. 20 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 47. 21 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Then Emergence of Pakistan, 34. 22 A.I.M.L. Working Committee’s Resolution, 18 September 1939, in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement (Lahore: 1970): 352. 23 V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 66-67. 24 See resolution of the Congress Working Committee, Wardha, 14 July 1942, T.O.P., Vol. 2, 385-387. 25 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 46. 26 Ibid., 49-50. 27 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 45. 28 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 11 October 1939, Zetland Collection., Vol. 26. 29 For details of what the Viceroy was thinking of the Muslim leader, see Interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah, 4 November 1939 and Enclosure no. 2 of Linlithgow to Zetland, 5 November 1939. Linlithgow Correspondence, Vol. 8. 30 T.O.P., Vol. 3, 1052-3. 31 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 52. 32 Ibid,, 51. 33 Ibid., 54.

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34 M.K.Gandhi, Collected Works of Mahatama Gandhi, Statement to the Press, 18 October 1939, Vol. 70, 16 July-November 30, 1939 (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1977), 267. 35 Patrick French, Liberty or Death: India’s Journey to Independence and Division (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997) 122. Jinnah’s prestige and status as the leader of the Muslim cause was deliberately built up for the British war aims, and his loyalty focused, in comparison to the ‘disloyal’ Congress elements whose ‘ill-timed’ opposition was affecting British concentration on the war front. Moreover, this strategy kept the breach between the two parties wide and open, much to imperialist advantage. 36 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 70. The Muslim League was by no means a ‘friend’ but the fact that it was the ‘enemy’ of their arch rivals i.e. the Congress, led the British to befriend the Muslim sentiment in the critical times of war. It was a ploy that suited their interests well, and could be easily discarded at any opportune moment when the pressure over the Congress had to be conveniently lifted. 37 Gandhi was in particular very passionate about the protest that he called ‘ahimsa’ or non-violent peace. On 9 August 1942 as he was driven to prison, his last words were ,’Satyagarahis must go out to die not to live…. It is only when individuals go out to die that the nation will survive.’ For details see Collected Works of Mahatama Gandhi, Message to the Country, Vol. 76, 1979, 403. 38 G.D.Khosla, Stern Reckoning (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 26. The American anti- -imperialist pressure to initiate constitutional reforms in India, was a constant source of irritant to the British, which they had been wanting to delay and if possible avoid, at least till the end of the war. Cripps Mission was one of the moves designed to appease and pacify world opinion in favour of British liberal and democratic intentions in India. 39 See T.O.P., Vol. 1, 509. There was significant pressure of the United States on the British Government to grant ‘complete independence to India which she demands’, and unless the Cripps formula was not designed to that effect the result could be disastrous. 40 Draft Declaration of Cripps proposals as published, T.O.P., Vol. 1, 30 March 1942, 565. 41 Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness account of the Partition of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1973), 26 42 V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 138. 43 G.D. Khosla, Stern Reckoning, 26. 44 Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit, 27. 45 See T.O.P., Vol. 4, Amery to Bracken, 16 June 1943, 7. As Wavell was sent for the sensitive political job of Viceroy in India, the fact that ‘the successful prosecution of the war’ was ‘the first consideration in the mind of the H.M. Government and of the Government of India’ was an openly stated policy. The choice of a distinguished soldier and a serving Field Marshal was made essentially in the nature of fulfilling this objective. Also see Attlee’s letter to Wavell, 31 Januray 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 583. Attlee clearly states Wavell’s Viceroyalty to be a war appointment along with the fact that the term for his nature of appointment was three instead of the usual five years. 46 Victoria Schofield, Wavell: Soldier and Statesman (London: John Murray, 2006), 298-299. 47 Ibid., 299. 48 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, October 8 1943, 23. Wavell’s dissatisfaction with the policies and decisions of a Cabinet that he called ‘contemptible’ raised a number of practical hindrances for him in the days to come with regard to the governance of India, in one of the toughest times of its history. 49 Ibid., 44-45. Wavell knew that his appointment had been the result of a curious chain of circumstances prompted by war conditions and also by the fact that the Prime Minister found it ‘the only way out of a difficult place’. He was, however, also conscious of the political nature of the job and regretted not having given his own conditions at the time of appointment. 50 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 299. Also see Muhammad Iqbal Chawala,“Lord Wavell and Muslim Politics in India”, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Quaid-iAzam University (Islmabad: 2007), 190-200. 51 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, January 7 1945, 109. 52 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 327. 53 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, March 15 1945, 117. 54 Ibid. April 12 1945, 124.

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55 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 328. 56 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal. 1-50 Wavell was acutely conscious of Churchill’s dislike for him, that the latter did not make any effort to hide, and it was on a number of occasions that the two leaders or their policies came in direct and ill concealed clash. The Viceroy recorded in his Journal, the ‘far from cordial’ greeting ‘’when I first met him on return home’, in June 1943 the ‘menacing and unpleasant’ demeanor of the Prime Minister in October 1943 when the Viceroy was in England for a brief visit to receive a clear guideline on India where the Prime Minister ‘accused me practically of playing to the gallery’ and ‘misrepresented what I had proposed’ and also the fact that he’ has never liked me’, rather ‘has always really disliked me and mistrusted me, and probably now regrets having appointed me’ as indications of the stormy relationship that the two were to have in the years and months to come. 57 John Barnes and Davis Nicholson, eds., Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries (London: Hutchinson, 1988), 1037. 58 Ibid., 1039. 59 Gordon Johnson, ‘Indian Independence, (1) Taking the Strain (2) Cutting the Knot’, Asian Affairs, Vol. 16, no. 3 (October 1985): 259. 60 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 333. For details on the relations of Wavell with Churchill and Attlee see Muhammad Iqbal Chawala, ‘Lord Wavell and Muslim Politics in India’, 190-197. 61 Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (New York: Longmans, 1960), 117. 62 Wavell to Amery, 14 July 1945, T.O.P., Vol.5, 1248. 63 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 340. 64 Ibid., 339. 65 India and Burma Committee, 14 January 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 6, 787. 66 The Times, 18 February 1944. 67 Wavell to King George VI, 31 December 1945, T.O.P., Vol. 6, 714-715. 68 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 344. To him the Indian political leaders _____Gandhi , Jinnah, Nehru and the others were not suited for resolving the intricate and difficult constitutional problems of India. In his opinion they were bound to ‘land one in the rough or some very deep bunkers.’ Wavell was extremely critical and at times scornful of Indian politicians and his frustration with them often found vent in his diaries. ‘I have less opinion than ever of Indian capacity for leadership and statesmanship and commonsense...’ 69 Statement of 16 May 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 7, 587. For details of grouping clauses see H.M.Seervai, Partition of India: Legend and Reality (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 60-65. 70 See Statement by the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy, 16 May 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 7, 582-591. 71 Ibid., 590. 72 Pethick- Lawrence’s press statement, 23 March 1946, T.O.P. Vol. 7, 1. ‘The precise road towards the final structure of India’s independence is not yet clear, but let the vision of it inspire us all in our renewed efforts to find a path of cooperation.’ 73 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 178. 74 S.K.Chaube, ‘The Last straw that Broke the Nation’s Back: The Formation of the Constituent Assembly of India’, in S.Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, eds., Pangs of Partition, Vol. 1, The Parting of Ways (New Delhi, Manohar, 2002), 104. 75 V.P.Menon to Gibson, 22 March 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 6, 130-1232. 76 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 48. 77 S.K.Chaube, ‘The Last Straw that Broke the Nation’s Back’, 105. 78 India and Burma Committee meetings on 11 and 17 December 1946, CAB 134/342. 79 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 456 80 Mountbatten’s interview with Jinnah, 5 and 6 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 138-139. Also see Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 251. 81 See Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 60-65. 82 Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947, eds., Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Vol.2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 602-603. 83 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 20 November 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 9, p.118. 84 Ian Stephens, Pakistan (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1967), 99. 85 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 315. 86 Percival Spear, India: A Modern History (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1961), 415.

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87 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 244. Most British officials did not take the Pakistan demand seriously and were content at using it only as a convenient ploy to keep the Congress pressure at bay, which for them was a far more crucial issue than heeding to the unpractical and absurd slogan of the Muslim League for a separate state. 88 India and Burma Committee. I.B. (45) 2nd Meeting, 29 August 1945, T.O.P., Vol. 6, 175. In his review of the Indian political situation, Wavell debated the Pakistan idea as one that could not stand “objective analysis’ and if they (the British) could publicly show it as a ‘wholly impracticable proposition’ it would considerably reduce the vigour of the Muslims in support of it. 89 Ibid., 245. 90 H.V.Hodson, The Great Divide, 130. Such a hold was in the nature of a deep seated desire of ensuring India’s participation in the Commonwealth. The Secretary of State, Lord Pathick-Lawrence had categorically stated in the House of Lords on 4 December 1945, that His Majesty’s Government had ‘proposed to send out an all-party Parliamentary delegation to meet Indian political leaders and convey the general desire of the British people to see India speedily attaining her rightful position as an independent partner State in the Commonwealth.’ 91 Jean Alphonse Bernard, From Raj to the Republic: A Political History of India 1935-2000 (New Delhi: HAR-ANAND Publications, Pvt. Ltd., 2001), 104. For details of the Wavell Plan see Muhammad Iqbal Chawala, ‘Lord Wavell and Muslim Politics in India’, 208-223. 92 Cunningham to Wavell, 27 November 1945, Cunningham Collection, MSS EUR D670/7, OIOC, British Library. 93 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 178. The law and order situation had been gradually deteriorating for quite some time but the mounting collapse of the British administrative machinery in matters of controlling the conditions in and around the capital were a far greater threat to their security and prestige than it had ever before been. As Wavell wrote in his summary to the year 1946, (Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 368)‘Our time in India is limited and our power to control events almost gone. We have only prestige and previous momentum to trade and they will not last long. My task now is to secure the safest and most dignified withdrawal possible.’ 94 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 244. The British were hardly left with any other option, which though existed but only at the cost of a serious risk to their lives and image. The withdrawal decision was taken as a desperate move to save all that which could not be perpetuated by any continued length of peaceful rule over India. 95 Confidential annex to Cabinet C.M. (46) 108th conclusions, 31 December 1946, Cab. 128/8. “ The general feeling of the Cabinet was that withdrawal from India need not be forced upon us by our weakness nor to be the first step in the dissolution of the Empire. On the contrary this action must be shown to be the logical conclusion, which we welcomed, of a policy followed by successive Governments for many years... There was, therefore, no occasion to excuse our withdrawal: we should rather claim credit for terminating British rule in India and transferring our responsibilities to the representatives of the Indian people.” 96 Wavell to Attlee, 30 October 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 8, 839. 97 Statement of 20 February 1947, T.O.P. Vol. 9, 774. 98 Ibid.‘His Majesty’s Government desire to hand over their responsibility to authorities established by a constitution approved by all parties in India in accordance with the Cabinet Mission Plan. But unfortunately there is at present no clear prospect that such a constitution and such authorities will emerge.’ 99 Ibid., 773-774. 100 Wavell to King George VI, 8 July 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 7, 1092. 101 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), 384. 102 V.P.Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 338. In the given circumstances of communal tension and strife, with the British hold over the administrative set up slackening by the day, the Hindu, Muslim and the Sikh elements represented in the civil or military organizations could not be relied upon or expected to go against the interests of their respective communities. It only pointed to the artificial unity that the policy of ‘divide et impera’ had forced upon the divergent nature of communal feelings in the country, and which gave way under the strain of ideological priorities. 103 Statement of 20 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 774.

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104 Wavell to King George VI, 8 July 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 7, 1092. ‘We have neither the power nor, I think, the will to remain in control of India for more than an extremely limited period without, a complete reversal of policy...’ and this reversal of policy would obviously carry with it the danger of a severe Indian reaction. 105 Text of a leading article in Hindustan Time , (21 February 194)7 and quoted in T.O.P., Vol. 9, 776. 106 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 22 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 785. 107 Civil and Military Gazette, (25 February 1947). 108 Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British India (London: Cassell, 1963), 141. 109 V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 340. 110 J. Colville to Pethick-Lawrence, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 807. 111 T.O.P., Vol. 7, 586. The Cabinet Mission in its Statement of 16 May 1946, had clearly expressed a similar apprehension for the plight of the Muslims that ‘their culture and political and social life might become submerged in a purely unitary India, in which the Hindus with their greatly superior numbers must be a dominating element.’ 112 Statement of 20 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol.9, 774. 113 H.M.Seervai, Partition of India, 112. 114 V.P.Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 342. 115 Churchill in the House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons, 1946-47, Vol. CDXXXIV, col. 678. 116 V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 340. 117 Hindustan Times, (21 February 1947). 118 Ibid. 119 Attlee’s letter to Wavell, 31 January 1947, T.O.P., Vol.9, 583. 120 Attlee to Wavell. 12 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 679. Also see Menon, Appendix IX, Text of the Statement of 20 February 1947, 509. 121 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons). 5th Series, Vol. 434, cols. 663-678.Also see Churchill in the House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons, 1946-47. 122 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 373. The liberal leader Clement Davies has recorded that the announcement came as no surprise to Churchill who had been ‘forewarned’ about Wavell’s dismissal the previous evening by Attlee himself. When an important announcement was to be made in the House, it was customary procedure for the Prime Minister to intimate the leaders of the other main parties. 123 Attlee to A. Lascelles, 22 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 787. 124 Telegram from Chief Secretary, Government of Bombay to Secretary of State, 1 September 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 8, 384. 125 Wavell to King George VI, 22 October 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 8, 773-774. For details see Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal 1905-1947 (Delhi: oxford University Press, 1993), 161-206. 126 Jenkins to Wavell, 2 May 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 7, 401-402. 127 Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British in India, 140-141. 128 Minutes by Turnbull and D.Monteath, 21 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol.9, 782-783. Lord Curzon was the only Viceroy who had tendered his resignation in October 1905. 129 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 399. 130 Ibid., 304. By the time of his arrival in India the famine had already taken a million lives. Within a week of his investiture the Wavells had flown to Bengal to see for themselves the desperate situation caused by the terrible food shortage. The feeding of India remained a major preoccupation of the Viceroy for a greater part of his early tenure. 131 Moon to Abell, 28 November 1946, T.O.P. Vol. 9, 203. ‘At no time in my experience of over 30 years has a Viceroy had such universally good press and goodwill in India as H.E. had at that time.’ 132 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 11 July 1945, p.154. 133 Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, 194. 134Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 128-129. Wavell’s dissatisfaction with the behaviour and attitude of the home government on important issues regarding its India policy was insightful of the relationship that existed between the two. He was hardly able to swallow their apathy and confided it again and again to the pages of his Journal referring to colleagues in London as ‘what an extraordinary people they are! One would think that with the Viceroy at home and available they would have asked his opinion’ on matters (here Wavell is referring to Dalal’s request for revision of commercial clauses of 1935 Act) of great political significance instead of ‘contemptuously dismissing’ his counsel and denying him a chance to

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express his view. He was annoyed at ‘being kept hanging about’ and could not refrain from commenting on their lack of concern and indifference with the remark, ‘what a crew for a perilous voyage!’ 135 Ibid., 126-127. 136 Michael Edwardes, The last Years of British in India, 94. 137 Wavell’s letter to King George VI, 24 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 808. ‘I failed....to get any definite policy from your Majesty’s Government. Their chief difficulty was reluctance to face Parliament with any proposal which would make it clear that we were withdrawing our control very shortly.’ 138 Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British in India, 96. 139 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 330-331. 140 John W. Wheeler-Bennett, King George VI (London: Reprint Society, 1959), 710. King George VI remarked about Attlee’s mistrust of Wavell’s plan for leaving India, as resonating too much of a military retreat, not realizing that it was a political problem and not a military one. 141 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 320. 142 See, T.O.P., Amery to Bracken, 16 June 1943, Vol. 4, 6-7. While appointing Wavell for the job his merits and the circumstances in India were fully known to and appreciated by the British Government. The ‘ideal combination of outstanding organization and administrative ability and resoluteness of spirit and capacity for leadership’ were greatly admired along with the realization that the ‘responsibility falling upon a Viceroy’ in the existing situation, ‘had never been greater than that which will be the lot of the new incumbent.’ 143 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 446-447. 144 Ibid., 44. Churchill was initially pleased to find that Wavell had accepted and received the offer of Indian Viceroyalty in a cordial spirit, but was later horrified to ‘find I had liberal views about India and was prepared to express them.’ 145 Ibid., 453. 146 Wavell’s letter to King George VI, 24 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 808. ‘I put before the Prime Minister and Committee the absolute necessity for a definite policy of some kind; .... To recognize that we had failed to reconcile the two main parties, and that it would be better for the interests of both of ourselves and of India to remove our control as soon as possible, and leave Indians to determine their own future. This was the policy which I advocated, and I recommended the withdrawal of British control by stages, beginning with the south of India, as the safest method of proceeding. (I had put this proposal to a civil and military committee in India in the previous autumn, and they had been unable to recommend to me any better plan.) The date I recommended for final transfer of power was March 31st, 1948.’ 147 Michael Edwardes, The last Years of British in India, 121. The Congress accused the Viceroy of being biased to the League and its policies which motivated a campaign of removing and replacing him with a person more of their choice and inclinations. Being a party of the majority, His Majesty’s Government was always in need of placating it for the sustenance of their rule in India. Hence, a Congress propaganda against Wavell did not fall on deaf ears. 148 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 367 Wavell in the summary to the year 1946 writes, ‘Congress was aware of the fact that His Majesty’s Government was afraid of them and would never really stand up to them...’ 149 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 399. 150 Penderel Moon, The Viceroy’s Journal, 367. Wavell in the summary to the year 1946 records, ‘The fatal weakness of the Mission in their abject attitude to Congress, and the duplicity of Cripps, left behind a legacy which it was beyond my power to counter-act... I Have paid a heavy price for not being firmer in the last stages of the Mission and allowing myself to be double-crossed by Cripps.’ 151 Peter Clarke, The Cripps Version, (London: Allen Lane, 2002), 454. 152 Ian Stephens, Pakistan , 99. 153 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 358. 154 Wavell to King George VI, 22 October 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 8, 770. ‘... the Congress acceptance was not to my mind a genuine one. The Constituent Assembly has always been a secondary objective with them, their primary aim is complete and undivided control at the centre.’ 155 Ibid., 359. 156 Wavell to King George VI, 8 July 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 7, 1092. ‘... it was a mistake that the Mission should have had, outside the official discussions, such a continuous and close touch with one of the two

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main Parties, the Congress; this naturally aroused the deep suspicion of the Muslim League.... which contributed to the breakdown on the Interim Government.’ 157 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 402. 158 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 378. 159 Leonard Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj (London: Widenfeld and Nicholson, 1964), 46-47. 160 Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British in India, 122. 161 Wavell to A. Lascelles, 8 July 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 7, 1090. ‘The depressing thing is that one should have to hand over the control of India to such small men; the mentality of most of them is that of the small lawyer and bania.’ 162 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal. 442. On hearing the news of Jinnah’s death Wavell confessed that, ‘I never liked Jinnah, but had a certain reluctant admiration for him and his uncompromising attitude.’ 163 Note to Amery, 15 July 1945, Wavell Collection, MSS EUR D977/5, OIOC, British Library. Also see Wavell’s letter to King George VI, 24 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 807. ‘It took me however well over six months to get permission to make the attempt which I did at Simla; as you know it failed, mainly through the intransigence of Jinnah.’ In the same letter, commenting on Jinnah’s stance towards the Cabinet Mission’s Plan and his decision to join the Constituent Assembly, he writes, ‘Jinnah was even more dilatory than the Congress. He lingered in London, he conferred in Cairo----where I am told he made a poor impression on those of the Arab League whose sympathy he tried to enlist---- and retired to bed in Karachi.’ 164 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 357. 165 Wavell to Attlee, 5 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 624. 166 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 378. 167 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 438. The way his dismissal was initiated and effected left a lasting impact on the last Viceroy’s mind. He acknowledges that after his return from India, ‘I have been rootless and unhappy and ... unable to settle down to anything or to make a plan; taking things as they come, accepting invitations to lectures, to dinners, and to functions of all kinds without really wanting to do any of them, undecided where to live and what to do.’ 168 Ibid., 459. 169 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 397. Wavell’s main grievance was the inability of his government to understand and deal with the pressing problems of India’s political situation. He had not been able to develop a rapport with either of the two governments that he served and worked with, being the unfortunate victim of politician’s biases, first of Churchill and then Attlee. His regret at being dismissed was that of a man who had not been allowed to function effectively and having been called back at a time when the circumstances did not allow for such a change. 170 Victoria Schofield, Wavell, 374. 171 Ibid., 369. Wavell’s statesmanship was neither devoid of will nor ideas and plans to resolve the constitutional problem of India, but still, as Panigrahi (p. 260) says, he failed to achieve a final settlement largely because of certain factors and intangible circumstances he had no control over and ‘which were not of his making.’ 172 Peter Clarke, The Cripps Version, 455. 173 Attlee to A. Lascelles, 22 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 787. 174 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 17 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 733. 175 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 421. 176 Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British in India, 122. 177 Attlee’s letter to Wavell, 31 January 1947, T.O.P. Vol.9, 583. 178 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 250 179 Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians (London: Widenfeld and Nicholson, 1994), 82. 180 Waheed-uz-Zaman, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1985), 87. 181 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 453-454. 182 H.M.Seervai, Partition of India, 118. 183 Penderel Moon, ed., The Viceroy’s Journal, 453-454. 184 Cyril Philips, ‘Was The Partition of India in 1947 Inevitable?’ Asian Affairs, Vol. 17, no. 3 (October 1986): 243.

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185 Alan Campbell-Johnson, ‘Mountbatten and the Transfer of Power’, History Today, Vol. 47, no. 9 (September 1997): 34. 186 Mountbatten to Attlee, 20 December 1946, T.O.P., vol. 9, 396. He was keen to make his choice and appointment look in the best interests of the Indian people and the move thereby initiated by them. ‘... I do not feel I could tackle this job with confidence if the manner of my appointment suggested to the Indians that we wished to perpetuate the Viceregal system, or intended to exercise the right to impose our nominees to arbitrate in their affairs.’ 187 Attlee to Mountbatten, 18 March 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 972-974. 188 Gordon Johnson, ‘Indian Independence’, 255. 189 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 248. 190 Wavell to King George VI, 24 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 804. ‘Our power in India has always depended on prestige rather than the lack of numbers that has reduced our control in India to its present state of something approaching impotence.’ 191 Hindustan Times (21 February 1947) and quoted in T.O.P., Vol. 9, 777. Wavell’s approach was in the opinion of many in London ‘defeatist’ and having a ‘demoralizing’ effect on the army and the police, who must be immediately recalled and replaced by ‘somebody with Courage’, one who ‘even if he were the last man left there, would come out with dignity and uphold the British Empire and Commonwealth.’ Bevin to Attlee, 1 January 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 431. 192 India and Burma Committee. Paper I.B (45) 6, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, 31 August 1945, T.O.P., Vol. 6, 190. 193 Attlee’s letter to Wavell, 31 January 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 583. 194 Colville to Wavell, 2 September 1945, T.O.P., Vol. 6, 201. The assertion that, ‘His Majesty’s Government cannot accept Jinnah’s idea of Pakistan’ remained the British stance despite realizing the fact that by this time Muslims were solidly behind Jinnah and his demand for Pakistan, and denying this reality could lead to increasing communal tension particularly in the Punjab, causing a serious law and order situation in the country. 195 Gordon Johnson, ‘Indian Independence’, 262. 196 Attlee to Mountbatten, 18 March 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 972. 197 Menon to Abell, 28 November 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 202.

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Chapter 2

EVOLUTION OF PARTITION PLAN

Lord Mountbatten1 arrived in India on 22 March 1947, to take over charge as the

thirty fourth and the last Viceroy of India. British withdrawal having been decided and

also dated by the statement of 20 February, Mountbatten’s appointment was the first

practical step that His Majesty’s Government had taken towards the goal of transferring

power to Indian hands. Partition of the country was, however, still not a workable option

in British interpretation of freedom and independence. Prime Minister Attlee’s

instructions to Mountbatten had predominantly imperialist overtones, such as, to obtain a

unitary Government for British India and the Indian States, if possible within the

Commonwealth, to avoid a breach in the continuity of the Indian Army in order to secure

the defence requirements of India, and to ensure a continued collaboration with Britain in

the security of the Indian Ocean area.2 The basis of all this planning was to be the Cabinet

Mission’s recommendations, on which an agreement of all the diverse Indian political

opinions was to be acquired, so that the process of British withdrawal may go forward as

smoothly as possible.3 However, in doing so Attlee had failed to understand that

‘rescuing the Plan was a non-starter with Jinnah and the Muslim League’, and therefore,

no matter how much the Congress or the British Government preferred its application to

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the Indian situation, it could not be the ideal solution.4 It had taken considerable time and

effort on the part of the three parties involved but no solution to the communal impasse

could be derived out of the rounds of talks and negotiations. The Mission Plan foundered

on divergent hopes, in the sense that the Congress was unhappy for reading a grant and

concession to the Pakistan demand,5 whereas conversely the Muslim League refused to

accept it as a formula which did not seriously consider the idea of Pakistan. The political

deadlock had intensified by the time the Cabinet Ministers left India on 29 June 1946.

Planning for British withdrawal in case of emergency evacuation by ‘reducing the

number of non-essential British persons in the country’6 had begun even before the

formal announcement came in February 1947. Wavell was conscious of the fact that it

would be ‘undignified and dangerous’ to retain responsibility without power, as not only

the British power to influence events was rapidly diminishing, the prospects of an

agreement between the main parties was also receding with equal rapidity.7 His insistence

on a time limit from London mainly for planning purposes was thus needful, to be able to

assist effectively in the affairs of the joint Civil and Military Planning Committee that

had been set up for the purpose.8 A year’s notice was in his opinion, required and

essential from His Majesty’s Government to afford a smooth, organized and peaceful

transfer to all the institutions involved in the sensitive and precarious task.9 It was a job

that demanded time and could not afford rush. The joint Planning Committee came up

with a formal plan worked out in considerable detail and emphasizing a gradual and

phased withdrawal both of authority and territory.10 The end of 1948 was laid down to be

the final date for the transfer of power, a process that would begin with the winding up of

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the Secretary of State’s Services and culminate with the departure of British troops from

India.

A key feature of all the planning being conceived at this stage was to make the

Indians themselves responsible for the decision of India’s future status and also for the

manner it was to be achieved, so that whatever the outcome be, “Britain could not then be

blamed after the event.”11 The Punjab and Bengal were to be partitioned, thus offering

Jinnah his moth eaten Pakistan, though “no mention of Pakistan as such should be made

in the announcement giving the plan for India’s future.”12 There seems thus, to be an

ambiguity regarding the transfer of power to one or more successor states in the plan

being drafted at this juncture. At the same time an underlying principle of policy was ‘to

throw an increasing weight of responsibility on the parties’, as whatever was being done

ran a very high risk of either revolution or a paralysis of the administration.13 It was

becoming exceedingly clear that there were no definite directives to the government in

India from His Majesty’s Government on which Wavell had been insisting till as late as

February 1947.14 The paramount concern was the safety of British nationals in India, the

safeguard of British image in the world and a maximum amount of continuity. The policy

also enunciated its reservations with regard to a ‘spectacular debate’ in Parliament to get

authority for its approval, as it would be to the advantage of the Indians to secure the

transfer ‘as quietly as possible’.15 A strange element of secrecy was thus added to the

ambiguity, which obviously was neither practical nor logical given the grand operation of

independence and transfer of authority to Indian hands.

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Mountbatten’s mission to India was based on a two pronged agenda: grant

independence but avert partition. The subsequent planning was to be done on these lines.

It took him, however, just a few weeks and a couple of meetings with Indian leaders to

come to the conclusion that partition was inevitable, and the ‘only possible alternative’16.

To him Nehru seemed to be the ‘most sincere’17 and the only sensible person in his

approach to the Indian dilemma, who realized what a ‘terrifying problem’ it was to work

out the modalities of ‘handing over so much power by June of 1948.’18 Jinnah, in the

opinion of Mountbatten, was stubborn and Gandhi too idealistic to be able to understand

or resolve the situation in the best interests of all the parties involved. However, he was

convinced from the ‘incessant talks’ and discussions that he had with the leaders of all

the parties, that given the unsettled state of the country, ‘we have got to make up our

minds one way or the other in the very near future if we are to avert civil war and the risk

of a complete breakdown of administration.’19 In the meeting that was convened with all

of India’s governors in mid-April, he informed them that ‘the dominating impression

which he had gathered since his arrival was the necessity for a very early decision on how

power was to be transferred.’20 There seemed to be, in the opinion of the Viceroy, ‘a

complete unanimity of opinion’, both in Europe and India, with the governors showing

not a ‘shadow of doubt,’ on the need to act swiftly, leading him to the conclusion that

‘our decision must be announced before the end of May at the latest.’21

Despite the fact that partition was accepted as the last option, the earnestness of

the British government to agree to anything more than independence to a united India,

was still doubtful. Mountbatten also made it clear to the governors that the ‘Partition of

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India would be a most serious potential source of war… that a quick decision would also

give Pakistan a greater chance to fail on its demerits. The great problem was to reveal the

limits of Pakistan so that the Muslim League could revert to an unified India with

honour.’22 Planning to meet the major leaders in Simla on 15 May along with their

working committees, Mountbatten had decided ‘to fire his last shot’ in the shape of the

announcement of partition, in case he failed to ‘secure some compromise on the basis of

the Cabinet Mission Plan’.23 This was to be his last determined attempt to bring the

parties and their leaders around to accept what he had been appointed to accomplish: the

independent unity of India.

Prior to the proposed moot a draft plan was sent to London in early May 1947.

Lord Ismay, Mountbatten’s Chief of Staff in India, was asked to brief the cabinet on the

plan from Delhi. In a top secret meeting held at the Viceroy’s House on 10 April1947,

and attended only by the members of his personal staff, an outline was drafted on the

basis of the principles that Mountbatten worked out, having reviewed the Indian situation

at close quarters and after detailed discussions with all shades of political leaders.24 These

principles were the outcome of the preceding events, that had been unfolding since his

arrival in India, and were categorized as below:

(a) ‘Although Mr. Jinnah was determined to have Pakistan, and Congress, with the

exception of Mr. Gandhi, appeared to be prepared to let him have it, no mention

of Pakistan as such should be made in the announcement giving the plan for

India’s future.

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(b) There would be demission of power to provinces, who would be free at their own

discretion to join together into one or more groups. These groups would be free to

form their own constituent Assemblies. States would be free to join if and as they

desired.

(c) The Interim Government, possibly strengthened by the inclusion of Mr. Jinnah,

would remain in being until at least June 1948; Provinces would, however, be at

liberty to withdraw to themselves with subjects excluding certain reserved

subjects, as they wished.

(d) The Punjab and Bengal would be partitioned.

(e) There would be a general election in the N.W.F.P. and possibly in other provinces

also.

(f) Apart from the plan proper, which would simply be announced and not subject to

agreement, advice in the form of a charter would be tendered to the Indian leaders

on how certain points might be dealt with after the departure of the British. Their

agreement to these would have to be obtained. An example would be laid down

by the Commander-in-Chief before we left.’25

The essence of the plan was to make it known to all, that the Indians were being

allowed by their British masters the decision and the manner to transfer power. The

provinces were to be given the right to decide ‘whether they will all work with the

present Constituent Assembly; whether only some will adhere to it (Hindustan); and

whether others will wish to set to set up a new Constituent Assembly (Pakistan).’26

The three provinces of Punjab, Bengal and Assam were given the option to decide in

favour of partition or otherwise, for which the Viceroy proposed to set up a workable

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and effective machinery. The geographical position of the NWFP and its Congress

led government proved to be a tricky problem that was at this stage left largely

untouched.27

Mountbatten’s conclusions were, however, tentative and not very clear. Right

from the beginning, he had his doubts and an inclination of the reluctance his formula

would receive.28 Nevertheless, as India’s ‘best surgeon’ he had made up his mind that

‘the sooner he performed major surgery on its body politic the better it would be for all

concerned.’29 The ‘speed factor’ that Mountbatten was so obsessed with right from the

beginning was crucial not only in the planning for the transfer of power but also in its

outcome, and did not suit all parties and communities as was conveniently stated by its

architects.30 The intention was again to achieve the high moral ground of imperialist

victory even in retreat, ‘to make it clear to the eyes of the world that justice was being

done’ in reaching a solution.31 Lord Ismay, sent as an emissary to London by

Mountbatten, was also to press upon His Majesty’s Government that ‘failure to achieve a

quick decision was tantamount to failure to take the responsibility for civil war off the

Viceroy’s shoulders.’32 The consequences of a hasty decision were ignored at the altar of

keeping up a presentable world image, thereby exonerating the rulers from the prime

commitment to their role and responsibility as administrators. This seemed to be the push

factor for Mountbatten all along; to save the good grace of the Empire and of himself as

its representative, notwithstanding what it would entail for the millions whose fortunes

were perilously hung on decisions and deliberations of the authorities.

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The draft plan attempted to make a departure from the Cabinet Mission’s

proposals by avoiding arbitrary grouping and the intention was also to grant the greatest

possible measure of self determination with the onus of making a decision to be squarely

on Indian shoulders.33 The latter issue was repeated and reiterated frequently in

statements and speeches of this period from the representatives of His Majesty’s

Government either in London or Delhi, which seemed strangely contradictory to the

highly proclaimed intentions of resolving the situation in the best interests of India and its

people.34 In reaching a quick political solution the British seemed more in a hurry to give

a democratic look to the decision; ‘diplomacy by discussion and not by diktat’, thereby

resting the onus of choice as well as outcome upon the people and their representatives.35

As the sole authority in charge of managing affairs at a very critical moment in India’s

history, the level and magnitude of taking responsibility for decisions and their outcome

should also have been theirs. It was a clear indication of the turbulent times and chaotic

circumstances that the British were foreseeing, at this time of planning for power transfer,

and over which their grip was slowly but visibly slackening. In the shape of the

‘appalling responsibility’ that the last Viceroy had in his recommendations to the home

government, Mountbatten’s preference was primarily to work ‘on lines which might

ultimately prove correct [rather] than that mechanism [which] should be set up to avoid

bloodshed after the departure of the British.’36

The sword of ‘provincialism’ and ‘balkanization’ was kept hanging over India’s

political future by London almost till the end in the hope of achieving the goal of a

unitary government. However, soon after Mountbatten reached India it was clear that

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such an option could not be exercised, and the threat of using Plan Balkan to persuade the

Congress into accepting the League on the basis of parity in the interim government and

to induce it to keep India in the Commonwealth, or forcing Jinnah into accepting a union

with India was too simplistic a view of the situation. It was basically partition, which in

Mountbatten’s opinion ‘would be a most serious potential source of war’37 that was being

averted by all possible and available options. Nevertheless, Mountbatten’s use of the

scepter of a ‘truncated Pakistan’ to coerce the League and its leadership to a more

‘common sense solution’38 had driven Jinnah to the wall. Out of the two schemes for the

transfer of power he had to agree to one; either to accept a ‘moth eaten and truncated

Pakistan’ with the Punjab and Bengal divided or forced back into a union where the

Congress was ‘the real master’.39 The short time length available was also used as a ploy

by Mountbatten and Nehru to ‘frighten Jinnah into cooperation.’40 It was a tight corner

for Jinnah and the League since Congress also showed its willingness to remain within

the Commonwealth in case the British were ready to accept a transfer on its terms by

reference of which it would ‘preserve the unity of India and by the way its own unity and

authority.’41 This opportunity was far too attractive for the British to think of alternate

plans which would be beneficial for the League as well. In the choice of options the

determining and decisive factor was thus the Congress High Command justifying to a

large extent the speed with which a frantic search for a final settlement was being looked

for in all directions by Mountbatten. 42

Jinnah argued strongly against the proposed partition of the Punjab and Bengal

and called for a transfer of power to the provinces as they were then constituted which he

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predicted would lead ‘to terrible consequences, to confusion, to bloodshed.’ Replying to

Mountbatten’s criticism of his demand that the same principle of partition that he was

upholding should also be applied to the provinces, he argued that it would be a ‘grave

mistake to compare the basic principle of the demand for Pakistan for cutting up the

provinces throughout India into fragmentation’ and urged the Viceroy and His Majesty’s

Government not to fall into the Congress trap and thereby ‘commit a grave error’.43 His

argument was that the ‘Punjabis and Bengalis regarded their provinces as unified

territories which they would hate to see split up.’44 It was not only Jinnah but the

Governors of both Punjab and Bengal who had advised the Viceroy against the

possibility of dividing the respective provinces. Sir Evan Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab

had warned against an ‘immediate blowup’ where the three communities would never

take partition ‘lying down’, and a serious minority problem in each of the two parts could

not be prevented. He had also made it clear that partition of the province would lead to ‘a

military problem of considerable magnitude’ and to enforce the decision would require

‘at least four operational divisions and a separate army headquarters’.45 Unfortunately,

the Sikh community which made an important and not in the least negligible force of the

Punjab region was ignored altogether. A ‘dynamic, prosperous and enterprising

community’ with a strong agricultural base in the Punjab they contributed more to the

economy of the province than their notional proportion represented.46 They were to be

divided in to two fairly equal halves and were to accept such a partition with hardly any

alternative except negotiations.47 But their concerns with partition of the province were

apologetically set aside by Mountbatten, and this administrative naivety of the British

resulted in considerable damage to the process of transfer of power when the partition

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machinery actually started rolling. The Sikhs with the burden of history behind them

were in no way conducive, rather violently opposed to the idea of this division. The

Governor’s warning that unless ‘we are not very careful [in pursuing an agreement

between the parties] we shall be maneuvered into giving an award which we shall be

unwilling or unable to enforce’, was hardly given consideration in the draft plan.48

As for Bengal, its partition, in Sir Frederick Burrows words, would reduce the

eastern part of the province into a ‘rural slum’ as it was not a ‘going concern and never

would be’49 The drive for a united and independent Bengal supported by Jinnah,50 and a

few nationalist Bengali leaders was strongly opposed by Congress as, warned by Nehru,

it would mean the dominance of the Muslim League and the entire province going over to

the Pakistan area.51 His statement that ‘Congress could agree to Bengal remaining united

only if it remained in the Union of India’52 was again decisive in policy making at the

top. Nehru’s rejection of the plan led Mountbatten to quickly drop the idea of a united

Bengal, on which he had begun to persuade London to make an exception to Bengal and

allow it to become an independent Dominion.53 He took the plea that he did not want the

Balkanization of India and if he allowed it in case of Bengal, others would also want

independence.54

The Frontier with the Congress in power was also a troublesome area liable to

‘drop to bits’ as the state of tension was on the rise under the existing regime. The

partition scheme, according to the Governor Sir Olaf Caroe, was not viable and would not

be able to ensure the economic future of the province. Already two and a half crores of

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rupees were required from the centre to keep the tribes at bay and the demand for more

was always there. He asked for general elections in the NWFP ‘straight away rather than

at a later stage’ even though they had been held only a year ago, but in his opinion it was

the best remedy to cure the present situation of turmoil and confusion and reach a

moderately acceptable solution. A solid Frontier was India’s strength either way, divided

or united.55 But Mountbatten, keeping in view Nehru’s opposition to elections in the

province, rejected the idea as it would ‘fog the main issue and incur the annoyance of

Congress.’56 Like the partition of the Punjab and Bengal this was another of League’s

misfortunes resulting from the British-Congress liaison which intended to ‘torpedo’ the

Pakistan scheme, to their obvious and common advantage. Caroe’s misgivings about

Partition in relation to the Frontier province were seen by Mountbatten as a ‘splendid

opportunity to persuade the League to give up this problem region.’ NWFP would either

remain a Congress stronghold or be a ‘poisoned and expensive gift’ to the League.57

Liaquat Ali Khan, however, preferred to take up this ‘liability’58 with all its costs, both

political and economic, to be a part of Pakistan than that of Hindustan with hostile armies

on both sides.59 The Frontier nationalists, nevertheless, felt betrayed and indignant,

forced on the lines of re-thinking their future, as the Congress had accepted the Partition

Plan without consulting them.60 Referendum was equally not acceptable to them, and

their demand of Pashtoonistan was flatly rejected by Mountbatten.61 The situation was

explosive and very much capable of flaring up as independence of India grew closer.

The Plan had thus laid down a Pakistan that comprised a mutilated western

Punjab, a destitute eastern Bengal, a turbulent Frontier, Sind and Baluchistan. This

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‘compact little entity’,62 with a total of less than 10% of India’s population would hardly

be in a position to assert itself, interfere with or seriously destroy the unity of India. In

fact it could very well be regarded as a larger Indian State that had chosen to stay out of

the Constituent Assembly.63 This was the British mindset with which partition was finally

given acceptance at the official level and these were the terms on which the Congress too

came around to concede to the Muslim demand. It was thought to be a great sacrifice on

the part of Congress to have agreed to Pakistan so no large scale Balkanisation of India,

such as the option of a United Bengal, was to be contemplated, as it would mean ‘going

against everything that Congress stood for’.64 At the same time the Viceroy’s ‘honest

assurances’ were a necessary prequel to all the statements that he issued and all the

meetings that he chaired, that he was acting in complete harmony to the requirements of

his role as an impartial arbiter of India’s destiny in doing ‘complete justice’ to both the

Muslim League and Congress.65

The issue of the division of Indian Armed Forces was also a complex one which

was deliberated upon in considerable detail before the Plan was dispatched to London.

Once again it was a difference of opinion and divergence not only of views but interests

and priorities that defined and decided the moment. The British were far too attached

with the institution of the Armed Forces of India which they had nurtured and raised with

great devotion, skill and pride to let it split between the two new dominions.66

Mountbatten made it clear before sending the draft plan to London that ‘he would not

agree to the partition of the armed forces, which had already been so weakened by

nationalization that they could not possibly stand partition as well’.67 Moreover, he had

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been sent with explicit instructions to India ‘to avoid a break in the continuity of the

Armed Forces.’68 The Congress was equally opposed to the notion of such a division as it

would destroy the hopes of a central organization required to control the army for the

internal and external security of India. A joint military force at the same time would keep

Pakistan at the mercy of India, and as weak and ‘moth eaten’ as it was being conceived,

the latter being the larger entity with numbers and resources to its advantage. The

League, however, was asking for a reorganization of the armed forces in a manner that

they could be split up readily between Hindustan and Pakistan at the proper time.69

Jinnah insisted on the division to be on communal lines to prevent any discord of the

troops with the respective government of the country.70 To him a transfer of power to

Pakistan and Hindustan must mean a division of the defences as a sin qua non of such a

transfer’. He was clear on the issue and confident that the forces could be ‘completely

divided’ before June 1948.71 Moreover, he also wanted the assets to be disbursed and

Pakistan receive its share as long as the British were the masters in India. Any different

approach would be disastrous for the nascent Muslim state. The issue of the division of

Indian Armed Forces was, however, deferred until a decision on the general plan was

taken, though it was agreed that ‘some form of planning would be essential’ to work out

the modalities of partition.72

With these considerations and reservations the Plan was sent to London on 2 May

1947.73 The tentative conclusions that the Viceroy had reached on the Indian situation

were based on the following lines;

‘Both the Congress and the League consider division of India inevitable.

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The division will involve district-wise partition of the Punjab and Bengal and the

appointment of a boundary commission. In the alternative Bengal should have a

constitution on fifty-fifty basis, the status of Bengal corresponding roughly to the

position of Quebec in the Canadian constitution.

Before division is carried out the M.L.A.s of the districts concerned should be

given the opportunity to decide whether they would prefer to remain in the Indian

Union or have a separate state for their areas.

If the M.L.A.s decide in favour of partition then they will be asked to elect new

representatives to a constituent assembly or constituent assemblies for their joint

or separate areas on the basis of one representative for each million. The present

Constituent assembly for the Indian Union will remain intact. Only the members

representing the partitioned areas will cease to be its members.

If partition is to take place the N.W.F.P. should have fresh elections to decide

whether its people would desire to remain in the Indian Union or join Pakistan or

become an independent territory. Since there is a tug-of war in the province for

political power the present Governor will be replaced by another and section 93

administration will be set up to conduct elections.’74

The modus operandi of partition was also laid down as an Appendix to the plan contained

in the draft announcement that was sent to His Majesty’s Government for approval.75

Mountbatten feared the Plan to be still ‘immature’ with a number of difficulties

inherent in the draft statement.76 This realization came to him soon after Ismay’s

departure on 2 May 1947 even though the Plan had seemingly carried with it the consent

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of the major political parties of India. It was one of the issues of crucial nature that

Mountbatten had asked Ismay to convey to the British Cabinet that all of India’s leaders

either ‘acquiesced’ or ‘seemed to be reconciled to some form of partition’, which was

obviously not the case.77 Lord Ismay was, therefore, frantically cabled, updated and

informed of developments by the Viceroy’s staff in India constantly, in order to assist the

British parliamentarians in the legislation of the matter. Changes in the draft Plan were

also suggested accordingly to be put before the Cabinet, as the Indian situation continued

to evolve and transform constantly.78 The ‘swing speed’ with which the planning for

partition was being done was basically the root cause, not only of all the concerns and

doubts that were surging in the minds of the administrators in Delhi, but also of the grave

mistakes committed in its implementation, as it led to the overlooking of crucial issues

and neglect of some very essential matters. The ‘supreme need for speed’, ‘to help

forward the pace of the discussion’, ‘to release Ismay within a week or ten days at the

most’ were the instructions sent to London by the Viceroy on the warning of a ‘general

communal eruption’ in India.79 It all led to whirl wind decisions taken at both the ends

and complimented the loop holes already inherent in the Plan.

There were few, however, who were not so blind to the follies of hurried

planning. Jenkins for one, believed that the draft announcement in the Plan was based on

assumption of ‘acquiescence’ by the League, even the Congress and most definitely the

Sikhs.80 He was clear that no plan for the demission of power would work if it did not

carry with it ‘the consent or at least acquiescence of the communal and party leaders’ and

would in fact be a ‘dead letter’ unless enforced by the use of troops.81 His objection to

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the Viceroy’s plan was duly communicated to Ismay who relayed the message to the

Cabinet in London. The reservations of the Governor of Bengal with regard to the

partition of the province or to a referendum for the said purpose were also telegraphed

and presented to the Cabinet. In the North-West Frontier Province, described by the

Viceroy as the ‘greatest danger spot’ and ‘the bone of contention’,82 the holding of

elections or a referendum was not without a serious threat of violence as Nehru would

accept none of these options if they are to take place under pressure from the Muslim

League Civil Disobedience Movement. The disapproval of the Congress was the main

hurdle in the way of a common settlement.83 Mountbatten’s visit to the province in April

1947 had made it very clear.84 Moreover, the British also feared a resentment of the

Congress in case attempts were made to resort to section 93, which the British officials

had deemed necessary for holding fair elections in the province.85

Similarly, the timetable for partition had not been looked into from all angles and

in required details. Very soon it came to be realized that June 1948 was too far a date for

the transfer of power to take place; an early arrangement suited the interests and priorities

of both the British and the Congress.86 It was, nonetheless, an irony that such an approach

was adopted as the Viceroy had been quite candid in his broadcast statement of the plan

that the prospect of ‘implementing full partition’ by that date was remote.87 If June 1948

was early for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power, how much more disastrous any

decision to pull back that date would be, particularly in matters pertaining to its effective

and smooth implementation. One such issue of any form of partition of the Armed Forces

was cited as specifically difficult and complex with the question of replacing 12,000

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British Officers by Indian Officers by the end of June 1948.88 A strong and valid

argument was needed to support the volteface. The requirement of an early decision and

date was, therefore, emphasized on the pretext that the situation in India was turning

dangerous and out of control, with the communal situation deteriorating across India, and

bitterness mistrust and hatred on the rise. It was thus, essential that an early

announcement be made of the conclusions that were reached by His Majesty’s

Government on matters referred to them by Delhi.89

Mountbatten was in the meantime planning to meet the Indian leaders on the draft

plan and its feedback from London.90 The leaders of Indian political scenario presented a

wide divergence of opinion, interests and approach that made the plan to partition India a

question of considerable debate and dispute. Gandhi was in principle opposed to partition

and the plan was in no way agreeable to him. He believed that it ‘was quite wrong of the

British to take any steps to facilitate the partition of India’,91 reiterating his original plan

‘to turn the whole of India over either to the League or to Congress on the basis of

immediate Dominion Status and to remain as Governor General till June 1948, to see fair

play until then and then withdraw.’92 Jinnah was not only struggling for the partition of

India but with equal zest opposing the division of the Punjab and Bengal. To him the

partition of these two provinces would essentially destroy the spirit of Pakistan. He made

it clear that if Bengal was to be partitioned he would insist on the partition of Assam

too.93 The Governor of Bengal wanted his province to have the opportunity of ‘electing

for independence and thus remaining unified’, whereas the Governor of the Punjab was

not only against the holding of a referendum but was in general against the Viceroy’s

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plan for that province.94 Jenkins believed that a referendum in the Punjab could not be on

the simple issue of adherence to Pakistan or Hindustan, as in the Frontier, but would have

to be based on partition as such and for that purpose no question had been so formulated

that all communities could go for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in clear and concrete terms.95 Nehru and

the Congress had been ‘passionately attached to the idea of a United India’ but had

reluctantly conceded to partition, in the expressed hope of avoiding conflict.96 The Sikh

commitment to partition of the Punjab was deep rooted to the extent that it was ‘difficult,

and perhaps impossible for them to take a different line.’97 The partition of the Punjab

would divide the Sikhs ‘with two million of them in the East Punjab and one million

eight hundred in thousand in the West Punjab’, thereby ruining their dream of

‘Sikhistan’.98 They could not think of being deprived of their irrigational lands, their

sacred shrines and their historical sites, which was obvious to happen with the division of

the Punjab. The question of the lapse of paramountcy in case of the Indian states

presented another sensitive problem of enormous complexity and demanded careful

handling. In such an atmosphere of conflicting views, divergent interests and the Viceroy

decided upon meeting the Indian leaders, who in his opinion ‘have refused to agree to

anything other than partition, and even that with bad grace’.99 The purpose was to resolve

the political crisis and reach a conclusive settlement with regard to the planning of India’s

partition which was to be largely based on his draft Plan, incorporating the suggestions

and recommendations of His Majesty’s Government as recorded by Lord Ismay in

London.

97

All along, the one major problem that haunted the British officials, as they

prepared to give India freedom, was obtaining Jinnah’s consent to a truncated Pakistan.

Mountbatten was by no means certain of the reaction Jinnah would give to his Plan,

although he had strangely conveyed it on his own volition to Whitehall that he had the

acquiescence of all the leaders. The Viceroy feared that the Muslim leader in the hope of

‘getting more than the truncated Pakistan at present offered’ might reject the Plan, and

order ‘his followers not to attend the Legislative Assemblies in the Punjab and Bengal’

and also ‘refuse to nominate representatives to the Constituent Assemblies’, and he

doubted if Jinnah’s followers would refuse to obey his orders.100 In such an eventuality

the Plan would not be workable and Mountbatten knew the repercussions of this

possibility. With an alternate plan in mind he had been ready to impose, if necessary, a

new set of strategy without the approval of the Indian leaders.101 This was of course not

in keeping with the British claims of working out a solution in consultation with and in

consideration of the wishes of the Indian people. Jinnah was thought to be the stumbling

block in all the negotiations taking place at this stage because the priority was not to

annoy the Congress and its leaders. The assumed threat of his call for direct action and

civil disobedience in the NWFP in the wake of persecutions on the part of the

Government,102 and his non acceptance of the plan in general particularly relating to

partition of the Punjab and Bengal, were sufficient to make the British consider him the

biggest hurdle in the way of a solution. ‘Mountbatten’s magic’ did not work for Jinnah

and his followers who knew well where the Viceroy’s sympathies lay.103 Congress was

the obvious favourite and more so was its leader Nehru whose presence at Simla on 8th

May 1947 and its upshot became the legendary discriminatory act of the Viceroy.

98

A meeting of the Viceroy with the Indian leaders, as authorized by the India and

Burma Committee, was scheduled for 17th May, to begin discussions on the proposed

scheme and submit its conclusions to the Parliament. The Committee:-

‘Instructed the Secretary to prepare a revised draft of the proposed announcement

embodying the amendments which had been approved in the Committee’s

discussion.

Invited Lord Ismay to ascertain the views of the Viceroy, and of the Governors

concerned, on the statements to be included in the announcement regarding the

referendum in the North-West Frontier Province and the appointment of

Boundary Commission.

Agreed that the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Secretary of State for

India, should settle the final form of the draft announcement in the light of the

Viceroy’s replies on the points put to him about the position of Sylhet, the

options exercisable by the Indian States, the referendum in the North-West

Frontier Province and the appointment of Boundary Commissions.

Took note that the Prime Minister would submit the Committee’s

recommendations, together with the final draft of the proposed announcement, to

the Cabinet for consideration at their meeting on 13th May.’104

The plan with all its original features, the recommendations of the Committee and the

subsequent modifications, was to be put before the Indian leaders by the Viceroy on

which the Parliament was to make an announcement not later than 22nd May. The

proceedings so far were to remain secret and all the leaders were to be consulted

simultaneously for which purpose the meeting was mainly called. Mountbatten, however,

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showed the Plan to his guest Nehru in Simla on 8 May and thereby indulged in a flagrant

breach of trust and impartiality that his role demanded. Not only this, he also assigned

Vapal Pangunni Menon, his Reforms Commissioner and Constitutional adviser to ‘draft

something to which he [Nehru] will agree.’105 For all his immense efforts and ‘colossal

vanity’ he was unable to convey to his critics the image of an even handed Viceroy.106

‘Plan Balkan’ thus foundered in an improper act of ‘breach of security and impartiality’

which the Viceroy indulged in at a private meeting by allowing Nehru a glimpse of the

secret document.107

There was a frantic exchange of telegrams, between the Viceroy in Delhi and

Lord Ismay in London on the suggestions of Nehru, referred to by many as the

‘bombshell’ dropped on the plan in the last stages of its finalization. Nehru mainly feared

that the plan aimed at balkanization of India. At this late stage when he had all along been

a confidant of most of Viceroy’s deliberations and witness to much of the process of

planning, it was an after-thought that was hardly in keeping with his political acumen and

statesmanship. It was basically designed to wreck the League interests in the final round.

He had strong reservations to the wording of the Plan as he wanted more emphasis on the

‘Union of India’ and suggested referring to provinces adhering to the existing Constituent

Assembly as ‘constituting the Union of India’ and the provinces going with Jinnah as

‘contracting out of the Union of India’. He was also opposed to the holding of a

referendum in the N.W.F.P. that ‘would upset the delicately balanced equilibrium…

resulting in grave disorders’, objected to ‘the notoriously anti-Congress’ Caroe

continuing as Governor of the Frontier province and wanted a transfer of power ‘on

100

dominion basis as soon as possible.’108 Nehru claimed that the ‘whole background of the

draft announcement was very different from what he had imagined’, that ‘the draft which

Sir Eric Meiville had shown him had been rough; that it had dealt mainly with the

partition of Bengal and the Punjab; and that it had consisted of only one-and-a-half

pages.’ He further stated that at that time too he had objected to certain parts of the draft,

particularly in connection with NWFP and Baluchistan.109

Nehru’s plea for all these demands do sound odd, but keeping in view the fact

that he was reacting to the ‘pressure of Hindu opinion’ to which all the Congress leaders

were at this stage particularly sensitive,110 were not as outlandish as the Viceroy’s

approach to the whole issue appears to be. Apart from disclosing the matter to only a

chosen leader at very sensitive times, Mountbatten’s exchange of nine telegrams with his

emissaries in London on Nehru’s protest, in a short span of less than twenty four hours

was ample evidence of his policy and preferences, if not utter confusion in handling the

matters that the was confronted with. In all these there was hardly a mention of showing

the proposed amendments to Jinnah, Gandhi or Baldev Singh, though it was divulged to

Ismay that Patel’s concurrence would be obtained after further discussions with Nehru.111

The game was being played mainly in the Congress court with other communities mainly

consigned to the role of onlookers. The Viceroy had no intention of raising ‘the matter

with Jinnah until after the announcement of the Plan.’112 In such circumstances the

British intentions, to avoid communal violence and transfer power peacefully and

agreeably to the parties concerned, seem absurd, a mere farce and totally out of context

with ground realities. The making of the Plan had already created a lot of misgivings. Its

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final approval by the British Parliament and subsequent enforcement in India had also

been considerably jeopardized. What followed in the brutal and violent stages of the

implementation of Partition i.e. the violence, riots and bloodshed were hardly of Indian

making and could well have been avoided by steering clear of such uncalled for blunders.

Mountbatten was extremely pleased with himself for warding off a great error,

having consulted Nehru before it was too late113 and the Plan got a final shape by the

Cabinet. He thought it was a blissful ‘hunch’ to show the Plan to the Indian leader that

had saved him from a lot of embarrassment both in London and in Delhi. He was

particularly happy over Nehru and Patel ‘coming forward’ and indicating through

V.P.Menon that they wanted an early Dominion Status at least until a new Constitution

was fully framed which obviously was quite unlikely ‘for some considerable time after

June 1948.’114 It was to him ‘the greatest opportunity ever offered to the Empire’, one

that must not be ruined by administrative or other difficulties, as it would also ‘produce a

sporting chance of the main Union of India remaining indefinitely in the Commonwealth;

… and largely solve the problem of those Indian States which refuse to join a Constituent

Assembly.’115 For him an immediate Dominion Status would lead to a ‘terrific world

wide enhancement of British prestige… as well as conveniently bringing about the early

termination of present responsibilities especially in the field of law and order.’116 For

both British and the Congress an early transfer meant giving the League lesser time to set

up a whole new structure and a weak Pakistan suited their interests well. Patel was more

eloquent on the issue. His recipe for a peaceful transfer of power by an immediate hand

over to the Central Government with the British not interfering obviously meant a

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majority rule in which a strong centre would be capable of dealing with problems of

violence in particularly troubled areas such as the Punjab and the Frontier. The running of

India’s Interim Government as a dominion government was the only solution, whereas a

delay would only lead to civil war. They had ideally conspired to set up a ‘tent’ rather

than a solid structure and a ‘permanent building’.117

Once again the ‘speed factor’ came to the rescue of the administration; this time

to cover up not just the underperformance of a morally and physically dissipated Raj but

to hide a humiliation of not being able to gauge correctly the need of the times. Nehru’s

rejection of the proposed plan sent the Viceroy into yet another of his swing speed sprees

to rectify the mistake of not adhering to Congress wishes. What he failed to realize was

that he was depriving himself of a great opportunity to act as a capable and impartial

arbiter by abandoning all ‘pretence of dealing evenly between the Congress and the

League’.118 An official staff meeting held at the Viceregal Lodge on 9 May at Simla, the

usual staff of the Viceroy was enhanced to add Nehru, Patel and Rao Bahadur Menon,

keeping Jinnah away from the talks and the Plan fearing that he would wreck

negotiations.119 Much was happening behind the League’s back to make Jinnah cautious

and more watchful of the Viceroy’s handling of the situation and perhaps at this time the

only indication he got was a shift in the date of the meeting to 17th May.120 Surrendering

to Congress whims, in perhaps the most crucial matter of partition history, was a blunder

both of strategy and principle that Jinnah had overlooked at the moment. The entire

proceedings of planning for and implementation of division of India were gravely

affected by this decision and cast a deep shadow of doubt on the British intentions viz a

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viz their policies towards other communities. Had Mountbatten been able to grasp the

repercussions of his act, as it was to be recorded and reproduced by posterity, his vanity

might have suggested a more objective and balanced way out. Negotiating with only one

side of the two major groups was a ‘novel concept’ that he bequeathed upon Indian

political life.121

The Plan that eventually reached London for consideration was now drafted by

V.P.Menon whom Mountbatten knew to be a Patel loyalist and thus a Congress man. The

latter insisted on transferring power to the Central Government ‘as it now stands’ with the

‘Viceroy standing out’, to ensure ‘peace in the country within a week.’122 It was a

statement designed to put pressure on an already weak administration that was at this

stage looking for an exit route with Congress trying to make the best of it. In an

atmosphere charged with growing tension, an announcement to partition India was about

to come. The situation was explosive to the extent of a complete breakdown of authority.

India was in the grip of communal fury and the days of approaching freedom were

fraught with all kinds of rumours and tense anticipation. It was a phenomenon of

undeniable truth which the administrators were not at all unaware of though they would

have dearly wished to project and believe otherwise. Jenkins had warned Ismay of the

drastic consequences of making an announcement ‘on which there is no agreement’. He

believed that Muslims would not agree to a partition of the Punjab, Sikhs would hardly

accept a provisional boundary based on Muslim and non-Muslim majority districts, and

Hindus would follow the Sikhs.123 In the given scenario there was, no doubt, a very

strong element of panic in Mountbatten’s attempt to put together a second plan that

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would not be averse to Congress demands and preferences and would at the same time be

acceptable to the Cabinet in London.124 These matters were to be brought under

discussion and if possible acceptance of the ‘leaders of opinion’ in India at a round table

in Delhi on 17th May, scheduled by the Viceroy and to be attended by Nehru, Jinnah,

Liaquat Ali Khan, Patel and Baldev Singh. Invitations to the effect were sent on 10th May

and the States Negotiating Committee was also informed accordingly.

In the meantime the Cabinet was considering the Plan as revised and returned by

V.P.Menon. Under it the two proposed parts of India were to have Dominion status. It

also provided for a Consultative Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and

Communications that would have equal representation of the two parts of India and a

single Governor-General. The proposals were based upon the assumption that partition

had generally been agreed upon and from that premise also suggest it to take place

substantially earlier than June 1948.125 It was a Plan close to the Congress demands. The

Viceroy had now to prepare himself for meeting and rather dealing with Jinnah and his

reaction to the said Plan. What followed was nothing short of threatening the Muslim

leader into coercion to accept the Plan, the alternative being the demission of ‘power on

the basis of the existing Government of India Act 1935 with modifications as necessary,

i.e. to demit Provincial subjects to existing Provincial Governments and Central subjects

to the existing Central Government.’126 It was clear that Jinnah would be conveyed in no

ambiguous terms that the Plan was capable of being implemented even without his

approval and cooperation. To many this might be a British tactic in resolving the crisis

but it had a deeper connotation and far reaching implication associated to it. The British

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mind set was revealed and its priorities earmarked in so far as Muslim politics was

concerned. In face of such threats the Muslim League was in no position not to concede

to a truncated and mortally wounded Pakistan. The insistence of Congress on the division

of the Punjab was also in the hope that the League would not accept a mutilated Pakistan

and react favourably to some other alternating option other than Partition127 The plan that

Nehru came up with at this stage spoke of safeguards for Muslims and assistance for

‘those areas who did not want to stay in the Union of India’ and also an allowance for

Jinnah to form his Pakistan at a later stage.128 All this was to come if the Muslim League

did not accept the draft announcement of the Plan to be tabled in the forthcoming meeting

of the Viceroy with the Indian political leaders. Strangely enough it seemed as if

Mountbatten wanted Jinnah not to accept the Plan so that he would be in a position to

impose the alternative and thus accomplish the unachievable in one stroke by amicably

resolving the crisis and appeasing the Congress.129 Jinnah, however, was not a silent

spectator to all this. He was in command of the major Muslim political party and in no

mood to give up the demand for Pakistan on any bargaining counter, even if that would

imply a simple nod of the head and not an open acclamation of what the British were

asking of him. It was a last ditch effort to corner Jinnah by making him choose a

‘Pakistan with two bodies and no head nor centre of gravity, and chaos in the whole of

North India’.130 Jinnah’s choices were definitely limited but not to the extent that

Pakistan could be sacrificed as he knew well enough what was in store for the Muslims in

case of the Imperial retreat without Partition.

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Nehru seemed to be guiding the British policy in Delhi. His ideas, plans,

suggestions and advice mattered the most to the Viceroy who was frantically in search of

a peaceful solution to the Indian political dilemma. Congress was dictating its terms and

Nehru was making good use of his close and personal alliance with the Viceroy, the

‘real friends’ that they had become.131 At his suggestion the meeting with the Indian

leaders was also postponed from 17th May to 2nd June as the ‘present proposed timetable

was too much of a rush.’132 On the other hand Jinnah came to know of the draft

announcement when little could be done to influence the essential character of the Plan.

The division of Bengal and the Punjab and particularly the fate of Calcutta, the demand

for a corridor to link the two parts of Pakistan and the need for dividing the Indian army

were all attempts to fight a last battle for the case of Pakistan.133 It was the rejection of

the Congress demand for immediate Dominion Status and the handing over of power to

the interim government that was his most critical concern and which ultimately led to his

‘grudging acceptance’ of the Plan. He had no choice but to acquiesce in the planning as

the only solution offered was ‘either a moth-eaten Pakistan or a united India’.134

Nonetheless, registering strong disapproval he clearly stated ‘that the Muslim League will

never agree to any change in the position, functions or powers of the present Interim

Government either by Convention or otherwise, but that it must be dissolved as soon as

two Constituent Assemblies are formed; and all power should be transferred to them

immediately…’135 His final approval of the Plan came less as a settlement than a

compromise. There was no other way to wrench Muslim safeguards from a rule whose

deciding authority was the Congress.

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Jinnah’s insistence on the unity of the Punjab and Bengal was very logical and

based on a realistic and peaceful solution to the impasse. His demand of Pakistan

consisted of six units of Punjab, Sind, NWFP, Baluchistan, Assam and Bengal. Hindus,

he, believed would have their homeland of six large provinces that would mean three

fourth of British India. Such a settlement would avoid the probable dislocation, violence

and above all confusion rampant in the country. The clamour for partitioning the

provinces of the Punjab and Bengal was a ‘sinister’ move of Congress that would only

lead to similar developments in other provinces and create further disturbance. He

warned the British of this attempt at the fragmentation of India and of committing a grave

mistake by falling into the Congress trap.136 Evan Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab, had

also made it very clear that even if all the parties agreed to a partition of the provinces,

and the Partition resulted, it would mean a greater disaster for the Punjab.137 The

dislocation of communities would, in his opinion, entail a greater chaos than already at

hand and especially the belligerent mood of the Sikhs could unleash a violent spate of

fury and riots. The central administration, however, was in no mood to listen to any

proposal or suggestion that would not hold ground with the Congress. The most crucial

lapse on the part of the plan makers was the utter disregard of the possibility of massive

population transfer that was naturally attached with the partition of these two large

provinces. It was liable to intensify the communal split and became the most fatal error in

the long run.138 Millions of lives hung perilously on this logistical neglect that had its

roots in the British policy of Congress appeasement. In the days following the

announcement of the Plan, Mountbatten was heard completely overruling any prospect of

mass migrations, and hence no suitable or timely preparations for the job were

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undertaken.139 The Punjab was the scene of the most gruesome violence and but for the

stubbornness of Congress and the steadily diminishing authority of the Raj it could have

been largely avoided. Even the pre-partition massacres of Calcutta and Noakhali could be

traced to the rumours associated with the likely announcement of the partition of

Bengal.140 But the League’s cries for a more rational approach and Jinnah’s protestations

for a more complete Pakistan amounted to nothing in the face of the British-Congress

nexus that had been created in the months preceding the planning for independence and

partition.

Even the Viceroy did not seem comfortable with the situation despite all

pretensions to the contrary. In a fortnight he had returned from London armed with

parliamentary approval of his new Plan and now on June 2 the stage was set for a public

announcement that was to redraw the map of united India and give a new identity to its

inhabitants. The confusion and mismanagement at this stage of planning cannot be

overlooked. By May 31 it was still not clear if Bengal would be partitioned or left as a

unified province. The third option, that of even an independent status was also being

contemplated if all the major leaders of the principal Bengali parties agreed.141 However,

Nehru being the key decisive factor could not have allowed any such development and

the entire issue proved to be nothing more than an eyewash for all the other contenders.

The Cabinet Mission was by now dead and from its ashes the June 3 Plan was

born. Jinnah’s agreed acceptance was, however, still not available and the Viceroy but for

this hitch could have triumphantly gone forward with the announcement. A meeting of

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the leaders of all major Indian political parties was held on 2 June 1947 to make a formal

announcement for the Partition of India.142 The history of the subcontinent had gone

through its final chapter from late April to 23 June 1947 when Partition and its making

was announced. The Plan provided for a division of India and specifically worked out the

details of all those areas that were to form Pakistan; the Punjab, Bengal, NWFP, Sind,

Assam, British Baluchistan, the tribes of NWFP and the States. The need for speed was

duly highlighted in the Plan with the desire for the earliest possible transfer of power in

India.143 The Muslim League accepted to sit and agree only because if it rejected the

Plan, the Viceroy would have no alternative but to demit power to a united India on a

dominion status basis, with safeguards that would allow Jinnah to have his Pakistan

later.144 This alternative was the Congress dream aimed at driving the League to a

political suicide and dropping Pakistan into cold storage. Jinnah did not overlook the

stunt and striding clear of the trap gave a grudging nod to the Plan. The Viceroy held a

meeting of the principal Indian leaders on the morning of 3 June to receive their final

assent to the Plan. The major outline was discussed again and having reached at a ‘near

100%’ agreement of the representatives of Indian political opinion, the document was

sealed.145

On June 3 1947 the fate of India was decided. At 7:00 p.m. the broadcasts of the

Viceroy followed by Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh, felicitated and reassured their

anxiously excited followers who had at long last won freedom. It was by all standards a

historic moment, the beginning of an era for the new nations about to be created, also

heralding the close of a tired and in many respects incapacitated empire. However, in

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many respects it bluntly exposed the administrative inadequacies and negligence of the

British planners. The masses were overjoyed, their happiness at the long last achievement

of freedom was obviously beyond measure. But it was a stage when they were hoping to

reach their destinations in safety and with a sense of long forgotten security.146 That

destiny had not yet been planned. Superciliously imposed from above and largely out of

touch with the ground realities of the place, peoples and circumstances, the plan had laid

down the rules of the game which on the one hand gave India its long awaited and

cherished ideal of independence but on the other blatantly overlooked the basic

requirements of safety and protection of the masses. Issues like citizenship, minority

safeguards, princely states, military assets, decisive borderlines and migrations had been

left largely untouched. Mountbatten called it a less than perfect Plan and he was not very

far from truth, leaving the major work of bringing it about to the spirit of goodwill with it

would be carried out.147 That spirit was indeed to be displayed by the makers of the Plan

and by those who would be given the task of its implementation. It was again to be a

British initiative. In the long series of confused, contradictory and ambiguous statements

emanating from the British High Command it was a nonetheless new milestone yet

perhaps the most destructive in terms of the loss and disruption of lives that it entailed.

However, another, the Radcliffe Award, was in waiting which was to define and

demarcate in a practical way the boundaries of the two new nation states emerging out of

a United India.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 Rear Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, a cousin of King George VI, had been serving as Supreme Allied Commander of South East Asia before he was sent to India replacing Wavell as the last Governor-General of United India. 2 V.P.Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1957), 351. 3 Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British India (London: Cassell, 1963), 145-146. 4 Z.H.Zaidi, ed., Jinnah Papers: Prelude to Pakistan 20 Feb.-2 June 1947, Vol.1, Part.2 (Islamabad: National Archives, 1993), xxxix. 5 Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (London: Yale University Press, 2007), 55-60. 6 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 30 January 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 581-582. 7 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 3 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 595-596. 8 Wavell to Attlee, 17 January 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 511. 9 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 3 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol.9, 596. 10 Note by joint Planning Committee, 1 January 1947, T.O.P., Vol.9,.597-602. 11 Viceroy’s Staff Meeting, 10 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 176-177. 12 Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight: The Last years of The British Empire in India, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 141. 13 Note by joint Planning Committee, 1 January 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 601. 14 Wavell to Attlee, 5 February 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 624. Wavell’s dismay at being summarily dismissed without adequate notice that the position and dignity of the appointment demanded was the root cause of many administrative problems that the ‘scuttled replacement’ entailed. Attlee’s opinion that it was the result of a ‘wide divergence of policy’ was hardly a correct assessment of the situation. Wavell himself pointed out to him that six months earlier he had asked for such a change, but there was no indication of any desire that a move of this nature was being contemplated by London. His remark, that whether the ‘conduct of my office since then has deserved dismissal at a few weeks notice is for others to judge’ as he replied to Attlee’s letter, is a clear manifestation of his disgust with Whitehall’s policies, and testimony enough to the big game that had started off with connection to Indian affairs. 15 Ibid. 16 Mountbatten to Pethick-Lawrence, 17 April, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 294. Also see Mountbatten’s Personal Report No. 3, 301. 17 Record of Interview between Mountbatten and Nehru, 24 March 1947, Viceroy’s Interview No.3, T.O.P. Vol.10, 11. 18 Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight, 142. 19 Mountbatten’s Personal Report No.3, T.O.P., Vol.10, 301. 20 Minutes of Governors’ Conference, 15 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 242. 21 Mountbatten’s Personal Report No.3, T.O.P., Vol. 10, p.301. 22 Minutes of Governors’ Conference, 15 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 251. 23 Mountbatten’s Personal Report No.3, T.O.P., Vol.10, 301. 24 See Mountbatten Papers, Viceroy’s eleventh miscellaneous meeting, 10 May 1947, Doc.2, 268-272. 25 Viceroy’s staff Meetings, Uncirculated Record of Discussion No.5, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 176-177. 26 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 5, 1 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 533-534. 27 For details see Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province 1937-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 217-227. 28 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 5, I May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 534. 29 Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight, 143. 30 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 251. As the author writes Jinnah, hoped to delay the

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timetable, thereby keeping the British in charge until he worked out a strategy to avoid the partition of Punjab and Bengal and to force the Congress to make some concessions at the centre. 31 Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight, 177. 32Viceroy’s Staff Meeting, Uncirculated Record of Discussion No. 8, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 223. 33 Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight, 177. 34 These words were used with a cosmetic consistence in all the statements and speeches issued from the administrative quarters from the 20 February Statement down to the declaration of Independence. 35 Eric Mieville in his briefing to foreign correspondents, 10 May, 1947, quoted in Alan Campbell- Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (New York: Atheneum, 1985), 88. 36 Mountbatten’s interview with Liaqat Ali Khan, 24 March 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 14. 37 Minutes of First day of Governor’s Conference, 15 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol.10, 251. 38 Ibid., 254. 39 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 247. 40 Record of Interview between Mountbatten and Nehru, 24 March 1947, T.O.P. Vol.10, 11. 41 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 249. 42 Ibid., foot note no. xi, 250. 43 Dawn (1 May 1947). 44 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 3, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 299. Mountbatten, however, was adamant in his comparison of the two partitions and believed that the partition of India itself would be a ‘criminal act’ if carried out as such, and that Jinnah would have to accept partition on the principle of further divisions. 45 Record of meeting between Lord Ismay, Sir O.Caroe, Sir E.Mieville, Mr.Weightman, Mr.Abell and Captain Lascelles, 14 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol.10, 231-232. 46 D.N. Panigrahi, India’s Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat (New York: Routledge, 2004), 321. 47 Minutes of Viceroy’s Twenty Sixth Staff Meeting, May 5 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 618. 48 Jenkins to Mountbatten, 3 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 594. The Governor was quite clear in his analysis and advice to the British High Command. He firmly believed that it would be ‘futile to announce a partition of the Punjab which no community would accept. The announcement would be regarded as an award which all three communities would dare us to enforce, and I have no doubt that all three communities would begin instantly to fight among themselves.’ 49 Minutes of The First day of Governors’ Conference, 15 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 254. 50 Jinnah was vehemently opposed to the idea of dividing the Punjab as well as Bengal, but in the latter case he had serious reservations on account of Suharwardy emerging as the leader of a United Bengal. It did not, however, dissuade him from working tirelessly for keeping its unity intact for the sake of Pakistan. The fact, nevertheless, remains that Jinnah and Suharwardy had moved away from one another on this goal. For details see Leonard A. Gordon, ‘Divided Bengal: Problems of Nationalism and Identity in the 1947 Partition’, in Mushirul Hasan, India’s Partition: Process, Strategy, Mobilization (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001),310-316. Also see V.P.Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 355. 51 India and Burma Committee, Enclosure (iii) to Document 560, Nehru’s interview in News Chronicle, 27 May 1947, Selection of Cabled News and Press Reports from India and Burma, T.O.P. Vol. 10, 1040. 52 Krishna Menon to Cripps, Public Record Office, Enclosure to Document 551, Minute 2, 27 May 1947. 53 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 281. 54 Leonard A. Gordon, ‘Divided Bengal’, 316. 55 Minutes of the First Day of Governors’ Conference, 15 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 252-253 56 Ibid. 57 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 256-257. 58 Minutes of Second Day of First Governors’ Conference, 16 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 270. Mountbatten insisted that N.W.F.P. would be a trouble spot for the League not realizing the political and sentimental desires of the people of the province. In his desire to appease the Congress he overlooked not only the peoples’ inclinations but neglected the geographical dangers of the proposition that he was making. 59 Minutes of the Viceroy’s Fifth Miscellaneous Meeting, 21 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 356. 60 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism, 219. 61 Ibid. 62 Minutes of the Second Day of Governors’ Conference, 16 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 269.

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63 Record of Interview between Mountbatten and Sir Francis Mudie, 16 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 260. 64 Minutes of Second Day of Governors’ Conference, 16 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 274. 65 Ibid., 269. 66 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1973), 131. 67 Viceroy’s Personal Report No.3, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 299-300. 68 Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians (London: Widenfeld & Nicholson, 1994), 132. 69 Mountbatten to Pethick-Lawrence, quoting Liaquat Ali Khan’s letter to Mountbatten, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 295-296. The Viceroy replied to it by saying that his role did not allow him to take any steps that would weaken the Indian Army as the ultimate resource on which depended the country’s internal security and external defence, thereby subjecting the matter to the Defence Committee. 70 Kanji Dawarkadas, Ten years to Freedom (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1968), 221. 71 Jinnah’s Statement on Partition, Dawn (1 May 19470. 72 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 5, 1 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 542. 73 For details see Appendix I, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 550-553). 74 Mountbatten to Listowel, 3 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 583. 75 For details see Appendix II, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 525-527. 76 Minutes of Viceroy’s Twenty Sixth Staff Meeting, May 5 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 617. 77 Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight: the Last Years of the British Empire in India (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006),144. 78 Mountbatten to Ismay 3, May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 599-600. N.W.F.P. was a case in particular where Congress interests were a constant irritant for the British. Mountbatten cabled Ismay on 3 May 1947 asking for his suggestion on the issue of holding a referendum in the province saying that ‘it would be a far better way of finding out the will of the people and of removing weightage than under the system at present envisaged in the draft announcement whereby the decision is left in the hands of three persons’. Similarly the Viceroy was not very comfortable with Governor Caroe, and wanted an immediate replacement.. 79 Mountbatten to Listowel, 1 May1947, T.O.P., Vol.10, 532. Mountbatten wanted Ismay back as early as possible which meant not more than a week, with the authority of the Cabinet for a go ahead signal to launch his plans. He felt that each day counted if the communal conflict was to be prevented from spreading to ‘unmanageable proportions’. Also see Viceroy’s personal Report No. 5, 1 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 534. 80 Minutes of Viceroy’s Twenty Sixth Staff Meeting, 5 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol.10, 618. Jenkins’ fear was not baseless as Jinnah had strongly protested against the partition of the provinces and had demanded an immediate dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. Nehru was also not comfortable on the issue of the North West Frontier Province. Both objections were recorded by Mieville who had met both to show them the draft Plan and acquire their consent. For details see Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 5, 1 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 533. 81 Jenkins to Mountbatten, 4 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, p. 605. Also see Jenkins detailed appreciation of the Punjab situation in which he warned that a peaceful partition of the province ‘is most improbable. The Muslims want virtually the whole of the Punjab; the Sikhs want all districts from the Jumna to the Ravi, and possibly to the Chenab; the Hindus are likely to follow the Sikhs.’Also see Jenkins to Mountbatten, 1 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 528-530. 82 Viceroy’s Personal Report No.5, 1 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 534. 83 Mountbatten to Listowel, 1 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 530. 84 For details see Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism, 210-217. 85 Mountbatten to Listowel, 1 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 534. 86 See Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 268-270. 87 Draft of Broadcast Statement by H.E., Annex II to No.276, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 546. 88 Ibid., 547. 89 India and Burma Committee, 2Ist Meeting, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 626. 90 For details see Appendix III, T.O.P., Vol. 10, pp.626-628. 91 Viceroy’s Personal Report No.6, 8 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 681. 92 Mountbatten to Ismay, 4 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 615. 93 Minutes of Viceroy’s Ninth Miscellaneous Meeting, 1 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 507. 94 India and Burma Committee, I.B. (47) 21st Meeting, 5 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 625-626.

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95 Mountbatten to Ismay, 5 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 628. 96 Nehru to Mountbatten, 1 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 519. 97 Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 506. 98 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 6, 8 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol.10, 685. 99 Viceroy’s Personal Report No.5, 1 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 534. 100Mountbatten to Ismay, 8 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 676. 101Mountbatten to Ismay, 8 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 676. 102Jinnah’s Statement of 7 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 689 103 Lawrence James, The Making and Unmaking of British Empire (London: Abacus Book, 2007), 610-611. 104 India and Burma Committee, 8 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 692. 105 Mountbatten to Ismay, 8 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 697. 106 Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British Empire, London: Abacus Book, 1997, 609-611. 107 Lawrence James, 615-616. For the ‘crisis at Simla’ also see Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (New York: Atheneum, 1985), 83-90. 108 Mountbatten to Ismay, 8 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 696-697. 109 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fourteenth Miscellaneous Meeting, 11 May 1947, T.O.P., 10, 762-763. For further details of Nehru’s opposition to the draft plan and his alternate route to a more generally acceptable solution see Mountbatten Papers, Doc.2, 268-273. 110Viceroy’s twelfth miscellaneous meeting, 11 May 1947, Mountbatten Papers, Doc.2, 276. These views were expressed by the Punjab Governor Evan Jenkins immediately after Nehru’s objections to the draft announcement of the Plan. He blamed Nehru for working under the influence of Hindu ‘revolutionary agitators.’ 111 Mountbatten to Ismay, 8 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 699. 112 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirtieth Staff Meeting, 10 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 730. 113 See V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 365. 114 Mountbatten to Ismay, 8 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 699. 115 Ibid. 116 Mountbatten to Ismay, no. 54-SC, 11 May 1947, L/PO/427, O.I.O.C. 117 Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, 87. 118 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 270. 119 Minutes of Viceroy’s Twenty Ninth Staff Meeting, 9 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 702-705. 120 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 272. 121 Ibid. 271. 122 Patel’s interview to the Associated Press of America at New Delhi, 9 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 716. 123 Jenkins to Ismay, 9 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 715-716. 124 Lawrence James, The Making and Unmaking of British Empire, 616. 125 India and Burma Committee, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, 10 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 742. 126 India and Burma Committee. Paper I.B. (47) 63, India Office, 10 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 743. 127 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirteenth Miscellaneous Meeting, 11 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 760. 128 Ibid., 761) 129 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirteenth Miscellaneous Meeting, 11 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 761. His reaction to Nehru’s plan was that he ‘very much doubted that H.M.G. would allow him to impose it if Jinnah accepted the Plan in the draft announcement.’ 130 Jean Alphonse Bernard, From Raj to the Republic: A Political History of India 1935-2000 (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2001), 119. 131 Mountbatten to Lord Ismay, 11 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 776. 132 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirteenth Miscellaneous Meeting, 11 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 761-762. 133 See Jinnah’s remarks on Pakistan made in an interview with Reuters on 21 May, 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 929-930. 134 Mountbatten Papers, 12th Staff meeting, outlining a plan for India’s future with particular reference to Jinnah, 7 April 1947, Doc. 2, 182. 135 Jinnah to Mountbatten via Eric Mieville, 22 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol.10, 948.

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136 Statement by Jinnah issued on 30 April 1947, Mountbatten Papers, Viceroy’s ninth miscellaneous meeting, I May 1947, Doc.2, 259-260. 137Viceroy’s twelfth miscellaneous meeting, 11 May 1947, Mountbatten Papers, Do.2, 276. 138 Jenkins to Mountbatten, 31 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol.11, 26. 139 Times of India, (5 June, 1947). 140 Though for these disturbances other reasons, such as the economic disparity between the two major communities of Bengal, could also be held accountable, he announcement of the Plan, nevertheless, accentuated he danger of communal warfare in an already riot stricken area. 141 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Fourth Staff Meeting, May 31 1947, T.O.P., Vol.11, 2. The Viceroy had recorded in London two alternative versions of the broadcast announcement. One was to be used in case it appeared on the day that Bengal would be partitioned; and the other if it appeared probable that Bengal would remain united. 142 For details of the meeting see Mountbatten Papers, Doc.2, 373-387. 143 For details see Lionel Carter, Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty 22 March-15 August 1947 (Delhi: Manohar, 2003), 325-331. 144 Viceroy’s thirteenth miscellaneous meeting, 11 May 1947, Mountbatten Papers, Doc.2, 281. 145 Minutes of Viceroy’s Meeting with Indian Leaders, 3 June 1947, Mountbatten Papers, Doc.2,.38. 146 Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (Karachi: Oxford University Press,2008), 19. 147 See Lionel Careter, Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty, for the Viceroy’s broadcast on 3 June 1947, 332-334.

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Chapter 3

RADCLIFFE AWARD AND ITS DICTATES

The partition of India was finally decided upon as the only available alternative

and solution to the tricky political impasse confronting the subcontinent. Moreover, it

was also seen as the only solution to the communal problem facing India. Once the time

frame had been decided, the methods and mechanics came into full play, which were

‘likely to wield the greatest influence’.1 The stage had now arrived for materializing the

Plan and embarking upon the creation of two new and independent states. It was

something that the two major parties had come to agree upon, and although the Sikhs had

serious reservations and objections to the drafting of the Plan, their leader Baldev Singh

had given a reluctant acquiescence to it in his broadcast of 3 June 1947. What remained

to be done was to search for an impartial arbiter and a workable team to preside over

partition in the given time frame of a few weeks. The 3rd June Plan also popularly known

as the Mountbatten Plan carried a specific provision to this effect, i.e. the setting up of a

Boundary Commission to demarcate and draw the lines of two independent states

emerging out of a united India. Once again the hunt led to a divergence of opinion as

was, by now, the usual trend of British Indian politics. In the meeting held on 13 June

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1947, which included the Viceroy, the Congress, the Muslim League leaders and Baldev

Singh, the composition of the Boundary Commissions came under discussion.2 Two

suggestions were put forward, one that included the option of three UNO nominated

persons ‘plus three expert assessors from each side of each Partitioned Province’ and the

other that each Commission should have an independent Chairman with two

representatives each from the Congress and the Muslim League.3 Jinnah was in favour of

the former while Nehru contending it on the ground that it would unnecessarily delay the

matter and convey an impression of inability to solve our own problems, rather look

‘undignified and humiliating to have to ask anyone from outside India to come and take

on this task’,4 supported the latter suggestion, which ultimately prevailed. There was,

initially a general consensus among the parties that with an independent chairman

heading each Boundary Commission, there would be four other persons of high judicial

standing, two nominated by the Congress and two by the Muslim League, to carry out the

modalities of dividing India.5 However, two chairmen with their separate

recommendations could also have led to obvious complications. Therefore, in view of the

constraints of time,6 and on the condition of the acceptability of a single chairman by all

concerned parties, it was agreed upon that one nomination would be advisable and

practical. For once Jinnah’s advice that whoever was appointed as chairman of the

Arbitral Tribunal, might also take up the chairmanship of the Boundary Commissions,

carried weight with Congress and the Viceroy. However, to expedite matters Sir Patrick

Spens, a former Chief Justice of British India, was appointed the chairman of the Arbitral

Tribunal7 and the choice, as suggested by the Secretary of State, Earl of Listowel, fell on

Sir Cyril Radcliffe,8 a distinguished member of the Bar from England to chair the

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Boundary Commissions, a man generally considered to be ‘of high integrity, legal

reputation, and wide experience.’9

Before the announcement of the Boundary Commissions, a Partition Council was

created in a meeting held on the 27 June 1947, precisely seven weeks before partition,

consisting of two members nominated by each side.10 It was initially constituted as a

Committee or Tribunal11 that had started its sessions earlier and was now converted into a

Council with the explicit purpose of devising methods to reach an amicable division.

Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar,Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad

constituted the Partition Council, as per requirement that it should consist of the two top

ranking leaders of Congress and the Muslim League with the Viceroy being the

Chairman, though with no arbitral functions attached to his office, whatsoever.12 The first

meeting of the Committee that had taken place on 12 June, also decided upon a two man

membership ____ H.M. Patel and Muhammad Ali ____ of the Steering Committee which

was to supervise the working and management of all affairs pertaining to partition.13 The

Partition machinery had now started rolling, spelling out the details of a grand design,

with the aim and purpose of working in ‘a spirit of friendship and goodwill, and with the

desire to give a fair deal to both sides.’14 It was an ambitious ideal for which neither the

time nor the expertise was effectively sufficient.

The appointment of Sir Cyril Radcliffe as the joint Chairman, which had been

agreed upon earlier, of both the Commissions left much to be desired. His credentials

were undoubtedly of high judicial standing, his membership of the Bar was a merit in

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itself and his unanimous acceptability by the Indian leaders was also an achievement in

the given scenario of communal differences and misgivings. But was this appointment in

keeping with the required expertise of the job that it entailed, i.e. of actually cutting out

the boundaries of India and Pakistan, where the question, as Jinnah put it, was

‘experience of the broad principles whereby boundaries were demarcated’?15 A jurist of

‘unflinching integrity and repute’ who had been sent to dissect an ethnically and

communally mixed subcontinent in the wilting heat of Indian summer virtually had no

knowledge of the stupendous task ahead of him, when he arrived on July 8 1947, with

only an ‘unrealistic’ time schedule in hand. He had never been to India, a land that he

was supposed to have expert knowledge of as an arbiter of its geographical fate, had

never been associated with Indian administration, and not only this, he had no ‘prior

experience of adjudicating disputes of this sort.’16 He is reported to have confessed later

that he could have done a better job had he been given two years; Mountbatten gave him

forty days.17 Although with no prior links to the Viceroy or any of the Indian leaders that

could question his impartiality or establish his partisan leanings, the very fact that he had

been appointed to a mission for which he had neither the qualification, nor the

experience, sheds enough light on the possibilities of a dramatic finale. In the given

circumstances of communal uproar, administrative failure, vastness of area, technicality

of issues involved and limited available time, the choice was all the more contentious. It

was above all a job that definitely required more time than a mere forty days. The

division of the Subcontinent was a grave issue that could not be handled in such a

manner. The British knew that they were departing; the unwarranted haste would not

have been there, had it been a matter of a few decades or even a few years earlier when

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partition was nowhere on the cards. The British response and approach then would have

been entirely different.

The composition of the Boundary Commissions for Bengal and the Punjab was

based upon the recommendations of Nehru and Jinnah as required by the Viceroy to

timely facilitate the partition proceedings. Nehru’s suggestions for the Punjab

Commission were Mr. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan and Mr. Justice Teja Singh and for

the Bengal Commission he nominated Mr. Justice C.C. Biswas and Mr. Justice Bijan

Kumar Mukherji.18 Whereas Jinnah came up with the names of Mr. Justice Din

Muhammad and Mr. Justice Muhammad Munir for the Punjab and Mr. Justice Abu Saleh

Muhammad Akram and Mr. Justice S.A. Rehman for the Bengal Boundary Commissions

respectively.19 A ‘theoretically impartial Mountbatten’20 repeatedly insisted that he

would not be a part of the ‘decision-making process’,21 and stay away from the

deliberations, ‘as far as it is humanly possible’ for him and the British Government not to

interfere and dictate.22 He thus pledged utmost secrecy and though denying that he

wanted to be in the ‘driver’s seat’,23 he was making all the relevant moves; a dichotomy

the Indians had to face. To distance himself from the workings of the Commissions and

establish his judgments to be fair, unbiased and independent, Mountbatten created an

administrative team which would communicate with the commissioners. It was done also

to distance Mountbatten and the British Government from the boundary line and to avoid

much ‘anticipated controversy.’24 This staff included a secretary to the Chairman,

Christopher Beaumont who was from the Indian political service, five stenographers, one

clerk, five typists and eight other such officials along with an assistant secretary, Rao

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Sahib V.D.Ayer, a hindu.25 The inclusion of a hindu on the significant and sensitive post

of Assistant Secretary to the Commission even though involving purely clerical duties,

was not only a controversial choice but a ‘serious mistake’.26 It was, however, a job that

could have gone to any British official residing in India or even brought in from Britain.27

Nehru, Patel and V.P.Menon were the direct beneficiaries and recipients of information

whereby Congress was able to exert the right kind of pressure on the right quarters.

Intervention was also attempted at all levels even at the top, to bring the Award to their

behest.28 The most significant leak was, however made by yet another person, Rao

Bahadur Lala Adjudhia Khosla, the Chairman of the Central Waterways, Irrigation and

Navigation Committee who informed Nehru of Radcliffe’s intentions of handing over the

districts of Ferozepur and Zira, the former being a major irrigation and strategic point, to

Pakistan. Such acts, and there were many, cannot be overlooked as mere unintentional

blunders since their deliberate nature has over the years been proved, casting a doubtful

shadow on the intentions of the British to give India, partition of a lasting peace. A

flawed planning with the most unsuitable preferences in matters of time, choice of

persons and want of secure and safe administrative measures aggravated the ongoing

crisis. No matter what Mountbatten said, the evidence of influence on Radcliffe29 was

visible in many forms, and if he did not manipulate the fine print, the broad details did

not escape his tampering.30 He went so far as to advise the chairman to compensate each

party’s gains on one border with ‘losses on the other’.31 On the face of it this might sound

to be a very objective instruction coming from an impartial arbiter, as his position and

duties suggested, but what unfolded in the coming days was an altogether different story.

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Once the will to Partition had been sufficiently established the terms of reference

of the Commissions came in to play their role. They were mainly to demarcate the

boundaries in conformity with two principles; notional representation and geographical

contiguity. Geography and numbers were thus the two main factors to decide the future

contours of India and in this net the British would try to catch all that they could salvage

for their prestige. To appease the Congress was another of their passionate goals. The

latter remained as a ritual with all major policy decisions of the British. Time and again it

had been proved that it was mainly at the will of Congress that the government was

moving its machinery.32 From the choice of the Viceroy, through the making and re-

making of the 3 June Plan, from the need for ante-dating of Partition to the secret

manipulation of delay in the announcement of the partition formula, it was a policy

largely of appeasing and conciliating the Congress. The announcement and

implementation of the Award was also no exception. In broad principles, the Radcliffe

Award seemed to be the ‘Congress Scheme’.33 With this one drawback, and a major one

it was, the work started. It was definitely a matter of complexity to decide the issue of

four provinces, ‘Sind and three critically poised, namely Bengal the Punjab and the

North-West Frontier, to which were to be added Baluchistan and the predominantly

Muslim district of Sylhet in the predominantly non-Muslim Province of Assam.’34

For the Punjab and Bengal the principles laid down were the meeting of the two

Provincial Legislative Assemblies in two parts, representing Muslim majority districts

and the rest of the province, with 1941 census figures as the authority basis.35 In case of

these two partitions the dual principles of notional and geographical factors should also

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have accommodated a third one, related to economic viability which was neither laid

down in the 3 June Plan nor given much consideration in the final Award. The Punjab

was largely an area of five rivers, five divisions and seventeen districts with central

Punjab as the hub of canal development which constituted such a unit that any division

could not have failed to disrupt the irrigation system and inflict a major economic

damage.36 The claims of the Congress and the Sikhs were ‘essentially one’, to avoid a

partition of the province, the only difference being that the Sikhs were more vocal,

explicit and threatening in their approach and conduct,37 having been already sidelined by

the 3 June announcement in which ‘the word Sikh is nowhere to be found’.38 However,

Radcliffe seemed a little more sympathetic to the Sikh cause than the Viceroy himself for

despite realizing that they had a bare 25 percent majority in only four districts of

Ludhiana, Amritsar, Ferozepore and Jullndhur, he did carefully ‘reflect upon the problem

of preserving intact the Sikh heartland, Amritsar and the Manjha.’39 A more practical and

rational approach for the Sikhs could have been to throw in their lot with the Muslims

which might to some extent have preserved the unity of the Punjab and saved the

province from large scale massacre. The Muslim League was also of the view that

probably more Muslims would have to leave the eastern part than the Hindus and Sikhs

moving to the other side,40 thereby involving mass migrations and dislocations, a

possibility to which Jenkins had been consistently pointing at. The complication was not

the division of the communities alone but the decision to be taken about the canal

systems ‘so vital to the life of the Punjab’ and ‘developed only under the conception of a

single administration, and of systems of road and rail communication, which have been

planned in the same way.’41 The Radcliffe Award did not adhere to the notional principle

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of partition in western Punjab, by awarding three of the four tehsils of the Muslim

majority Gurdaspur district, Batala, Gurdaspur and Pathankot to eastern Punjab. The

fourth Muslim majority tehsil of Shakargarh was given to Pakistan as it was on the

western bank of River Ravi, unlike the others. Once again the Congress got what it

wanted; the Muslim majority tehsils of Ferozepore, Ajnala, Nakodar, Zira, Jullundhar and

parts of Kasur were handed over to eastern Punjab,42 despite Mountbatten’s assurance

that ‘there can be no question of coercing any large areas in which one community has a

majority to live against their will under a Government in which another community has

majority.’43 Ironically or perhaps strategically no non- Muslim majority tehsil was given

to Pakistan.44 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali recalls meeting Radcliffe years after partition, at

10 Downing Street when the ex-chairman of the Boundary Commissions asked him about

the place he came from and he replied, ‘From that unfortunate Muslim majority area in

the angle of the Beas and Sutlej Rivers which you “hesitated” before assigning it to India

without any valid reason.’45

The Award that came out for the Punjab was definitely the result of much

rigorous deliberations but cannot be defended as a meticulously conscientious one. It was

a breach of trust and faith on the part of the so-called impartial British rule and a glaring

example of how the administrative machinery was operating, making and then itself

nullifying the rules of the game. The finger of history points to a clear manipulation more

unfortunately so because Congress was all along a party to it. The episode has been

incorporated by many in the writings on the history of partition, but the blatant manner in

which the act was performed still leaves much to be looked into. The demarcating line of

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the Punjab boundary, drawn and finalized on a map, was sent to the Governor of the

Punjab Sir Evan Jenkins by Abbell on 8 August.46 There was little ambiguity about it.

The map clearly showed that the tehsils of Ferozpore and Zira had been awarded to

Pakistan47 but when the announcement became public, they were found to be in India’s

lap.48 Both were Muslim majority areas and should have automatically gone to Pakistan

but for the intervention of the ‘unholy’ other factors. What, where and how things were

manipulated is anybody’s guess but why was it done cannot be ignored or overlooked.49

Nehru’s influence was constant.50 Such ‘back stage maneuvers’ were only designed ‘to

deprive Pakistan of some strategic areas in the Punjab’ and led to uncalled for massacres

and unprecedented violence all over the province.51 Radcliffe Award was altered by

Mountbatten; Gurdaspur was handed over to India and thus was manipulated the

accession of Kashmir to India.52 Despite all protestations ‘to the effect that if it was

proved true that the Gurdaspur district in the north Punjab area or even a large part of it

had been given to East Punjab by the Boundary Commission , this would be regarded as a

most serious fact by Jinnah and the Pakistan Government’ amounting to ‘so grave a

breach of faith as to imperil the future friendly relations between Pakistan and the

British’, no attempt was made to redress the Muslim grievances.53

The case for Bengal was not much different, being handled by the same

authorities and with parallel motives. A similar leak occurred in case of the Bengal

Boundary Commission’s Report. On 20 June 1947 the provisionally partitioned Bengal

Legislative Assembly met to vote on partition and it turned out that the Hindu majority

districts voted for partition and the Muslim majority districts voted against it.54

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Conclusively the Commission set to work out the details of the boundaries. Here

Murshidabad, a Muslim majority district and significant as the site of the headwaters of

the river Hooghly,55 Nadia a two-thirds Muslim majority district and the whole of Malda

was awarded to India in utter violation of the notional principle of Partition. To this was

added another blow; ‘a corridor to Assam through West Bengal was provided through

Pakistan’, thus giving over 6,000 sq. miles of Muslim population of 3.5 million to India.56

Calcutta posed another serious problem as it was awarded to India under the

Commission’s deliberations. Notionally it was a correct decision, yet as in the case of

Punjab where Muslim majority areas had been accommodated to suit Congress interests,

this case could also be reviewed. No consideration was, however, given to the fact that it

was ‘indispensable for the economy of East Bengal which produced all the raw jute for

the mills in Calcutta’.57 India thus benefited not only by the inclusion of a thriving centre

of trade but also by the fertile lands of Jessore, Nadia, Mursidabad and Sylhet as a result

of which more than a million Muslims were left out of East Pakistan.58 Different

recommendations were presented to the Boundary Commission on Calcutta both from the

Muslim League and Congress sides suggesting equal division and even that of declaring

it as a free port but none prevailed and the Congress case outweighed the League’s

claims. Although with no ‘consistent criteria’, the Bengal Award, nevertheless led to

‘greater Muslim loss.’59 Bengal Award not much unlike the Punjab with all its ‘legal

monstrosities and curious reasoning’ came to be referred to as a ‘joke of jurists’

questioning the ‘neutrality’ and judicial talents of its chief architect.60 The issue of

Chittagong Hill Tracts61 also led to much controversial bickering. Here again the contents

of the Bengal Award trickled out to the Congress high command62 and the information

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that the Hill Tracts were going over to Pakistan led to a sharp protest from Sardar Patel to

the Viceroy,63 insinuating that the people of Bengal would be justified in using force and

the Indian Government would have no option but to support them morally and

militarily.64 Nehru also took personal reservation to the decision of the Commission

saying that Sir Cyril Radcliffe had ‘no business’ to touch the hill tracts.65 The pressure

thus exerted just before the Award was to be made public led to a change in the final draft

and once again the will and strategy of the Congress prevailed.

To settle the extraordinary position of the North West Frontier Province, as the

province could not possibly stand by itself, a referendum was to be held there, ‘in view of

its geographical situation, and other considerations’ and also ‘in case Punjab should

decide on Partition.’66 It was a fact that could not be avoided and the Congress

considering the ‘growing demand for independence’ in the province and concerned about

its subsequent ‘relation with the rest of India’ wanted the referendum to provide for

necessary safeguards.67 The issue had become all the more complicated due to the

mounting criticism on the role of the Governor by the Congress Ministry with Nehru

advising the Viceroy that ‘there has been progressive deterioration in the relations

between the Provincial Government and the Governor and it is hardly possible to carry on

the administration with this continuous conflict going on.’68 Dr. Khan Sahib was also of

the same mind not only considering it ‘absolutely necessary’ for a change of the

Governor before the referendum took place but raising a demand for a third option i.e. for

an independent ‘Pathanistan’.69 To this the Viceroy explained that such an option was out

of question given the geographical location of the province with west Punjab in between

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NWFP and the rest of Hindustan and that Pandit Nehru had also agreed to it.70 This

option was, thus ‘not given to them by the departing British power’ and the Pashtoons felt

‘abandoned’ by the Congress which by accepting the 3 June Plan could not safeguard

their interests.71 In reality the Pashtoons felt that they had not been given any choice at

all. For geographical reasons they could not join ‘Congress India’ and for religious

reasons they could not join ‘Hindu India’; the verdict was a foregone conclusion.72 The

strange part, however, is not the demand but the Viceroy’s underlying tone of agreement

to it, overriding the wishes of a predominantly Muslim majority province. It was

geography that came to rescue and not a fair, impartial British approach.73

The fate of British Baluchistan was also to be decided by a referendum fixed for

the 29th of June and the electoral college was to be the Shahi Jirga, [excluding the

members who had been nominated by the Khan of Kalat and the non-official members of

the Quetta municipality set up in 1896]74 although considering its geographical position it

was initially also given an opportunity to consider its position and choose from one of the

alternatives offered to Bengal and the Punjab.75 To this there was hardly any resistance,

more so because there was no branch of Congress in Baluchistan and Nehru himself had

strongly rejected the idea of an independent Baluchistan.76 Moreover, after the decision

of the Sind Assembly with regard to its joining Pakistan, the question of Baluchistan

acceding to India was a closed chapter. Except for the question of the state of Kalat there

was no opposition to joining Pakistan. The real struggle was now between the Muslim

League and the State of Kalat,77 but that also did not last for long. The Khan of Kalat had

raised the issue of a ‘Greater Baluchistan’, invoking the treaty of 1876 by which Britain

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was committed to respect the ‘independence of Kalat’ and protect its territory against

‘external aggression’ with particular reference to restore its independence at the stroke of

British withdrawal.78 However, at the same time he wrote to Jinnah giving unequivocal

support to the demand for Pakistan which he believed echoed the demand of the ten

million Muslims of India.79 A land locked Baluchistan with most of its educated,

articulate and active elite perceiving the Khan as a symbol of reactionary Feudal System

were in no mood to support him. The other three states of Lasbela, Kharan and Makran

trusted Jinnah more than any other leader. Baluchistan gave its final verdict on 29 July

1947 to accede to Pakistan. Jinnah accepted the accession of Kalat on 31 March and

welcomed the Khan’s ‘sentiments of loyalty and service to Pakistan.’80

A plebiscite was also provided for Sylhet which resulted in a majority vote for

Pakistan.81 Radcliffe and his colleagues on the Sylhet Boundary Commission had

unanimously decided to take into account ‘other factors’82 in respect of Sylhet and the

adjoining districts of Assam, for the purpose of dividing them between East Bengal and

the Province of Assam on the basis of contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-

Muslims83. The practice of discharging his duties through a referendum appealed to the

Viceroy and doing that for the whole of the subcontinent was apparently his aspiration

too. It was in his opinion the ‘democratic way’, as it would have been a superb

opportunity to practically place the future squarely on Indian shoulders, a fact that the

Viceroy never made a farce to conceal, had it not been so utterly and ‘unfortunately

impracticable’.84 But it was again a hollow claim and not applied with a uniform will, for

when Jinnah asked for the need of a similar referendum in Bengal, the Viceroy ‘refused

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to be drawn.’85 It was, thus, a matter of Viceregal choice largely determined by the

Congress and not dictated by an impartial sense of duty to all the nations residing in the

subcontinent.86 In other words the people of India were to ‘take it upon themselves to

make up their own minds as to what they wanted to do for the future of their country,’ for

that was to him the only course open for a dignified retreat, knowing probably how

messed up it was all going to be in the end, given his speed paranoia.87 Without realizing

the accountability that the British owed in their administrative capacity to the Indian

nation, they moved on with their last chores of rapidly winding up. A smooth,

satisfactory and orderly transfer of power, was a task which by any definition of

governance was that of the departing authorities. But it was clear that it was farthest from

the Viceroy’s mind. What was in his mind, he denied, but said quite the same as well

that, ‘the one thing that would have been wrong to say was that we are going out and we

are going to leave you in this mess and we are not going to give you any help.’88 It ringed

a true bell but went perhaps unnoticed or ignored in a spirit of conciliatory but deliberate

oversight by all present and listening.

A third term of reference, briefly mentioned earlier and left strangely ambiguous

and largely undefined was to consider ‘other factors’ in chalking the boundary line, that

was to run through villages, over hills, along rivers and ultimately between homes and

hearts. Along with a practical reality it was a sentimental division of a combined past as

well, that needed a sensitive and careful handling, something its architects failed to

achieve or bequeath. It was an ‘elastic term’ used too often for convenience and

expediency, much to the detriment and disadvantage of Pakistan.89 Nehru and

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Mountbatten had their very definite though concealed role to play in using these factors

to accrue ‘maximum flexibility’ to change the proposed lines of demarcation in the

Punjab and Bengal at the very close of the proceedings.90 Even Radcliffe himself

admitted of the ‘controversy’ and ‘difference of opinion’ that the expression elicited and

which he said, ‘we were directed by our terms of reference to take into account, and as to

the weight and value to be attached to those [other] factors,’ which ‘made it impossible

to arrive at any agreed line.’91 Moreover, it was a strange phenomenon that the phrase

was consistently used in favour of India and against Pakistan.92 If the roots of an

insecure, truncated and unstable Pakistan are to be traced, Radcliffe Award stands out as

the most glaring point of reference for which there can never be an apology at any level.

This notion of ‘Other Factors’ has given rise to much suspicion and even to the growth of

misgivings over the years mainly with regard to the leverage or the possibility of

deviation that it granted to the British in manipulating the recommendations of the

Boundary Commissions and the ultimate announcement of their Award. Though to the

British mind it was meant to give the Commissions ‘considerable scope’ in the settling of

certain unwieldy and tangled issues.93 But the actual situation was far from it. A clear cut

statement of objectives, taking the major communities in confidence could have avoided

augumenting an atmosphere of mistrust and confusion that became the hall mark of

British planning for partition particularly in the last phase. It was the haste which was

bringing a bad name to all preparations and which the Viceroy was either too naïve to

understand, or too shrewd to make use of as a tool of exploitation. It also reveals how

unwise it is to assume that the political and administrative concerns that shaped the

acceptance of the demand for partition were the same that led to its fruition.94 The

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demand was accepted as the last workable option of securing and saving British grace but

its implementation was a speedy act of abandoning commitments and discarding

liabilities.

Among the ‘other factors’, the Sikh issue was one of the foremost. It was a matter

which was left out and ignored in the entire proceedings for the planning of partition, in

the sense that their demands were not met in the manner and method that they wanted.

June 3 Plan had made it considerably clear that any partition of the province would

inevitably lead to a splitting of this community to a ‘greater or lesser extent’. During the

making of the Plan the Congress President, Kripalani had informed the Viceroy about

the views of the Sikh community on the issue of partition, 95 but later when it was being

put into practice they were nowhere on the scene. The Viceroy also did not hesitate to

admit openly that this community would have to be divided into ‘almost equal parts’;

there was no alternative and that he was not a ‘miracle maker’ or a ‘magician’ and

therefore could not find a solution to this impasse.96 He stated clearly that the Sikhs

themselves had asked for partition and the Congress had framed the Resolution in the

form that they wanted and though the request had come to him ‘as shock’ he was ready to

do all in his power to help them out.97 This and the fact that time and again there had

been overtures of the safeguard of minorities from all parties concerned and involved, the

reassurances were not sufficient for the Sikhs. A major chunk of the Punjab population,

almost one eighth of the population of the Punjab, a proud and violently militant race of

resolute courage and valour, the Sikhs were in no mood to accept a division that would

divide their community, agricultural assets and the numerous sacred shrines scattered all

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over the region. In July 1947, they submitted a lengthy memorandum to the Boundary

Commission demanding large Muslim majority areas of Lahore, Lyallpur, Gujranwala

and Sialkot, claiming that these regions should be given to the Sikhs in consideration of

the land revenue paid by Sikh peasants and because of Sikh historical and religious sites

in those areas.98 They also made it clear, which unfortunately all other principal leaders

failed to take seriously at the time, that they not only anticipated but planned a population

exchange on both sides of the border, if need be, by violent means, to replace in the east

what they were to lose in the west.99 They knew that they were fighting a lost battle but

unwary of the consequences, were making a last effort to gain a position of some relative

strength. In the crucial days of planning it was also reported that out of the sixteen semi-

autonomous states of the Punjab, some ruled by Sikh Princes provided safe refuge and

arms to Sikh marauding bands100 massacring Muslim populations and forcing them to

flee to West Punjab/Pakistan, the names of Nabha, Patiala and Faridkot being the

prominent ones.101

The Sikh leaders had, to some extent, come to realize what actually lay in store

for them once the Award was finalized and announced. To come to terms with it was,

however, an altogether different matter. Initially they tried to convince the official

quarters of the strength of their argument and demand for a separate Sikh State,

Khalistan, insisting, convincing and at times threatening the authorities to take them

seriously and the ‘Sikh interests more fully into consideration’ while navigating the route

of the line of demarcation.102 A community that was not adequately understood by either

Jinnah or the Congress leaders and had no influence at the Mountbatten court or even in

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London,103 could not, therefore, hope for a happy start at freedom’s dawn. A split was

also known to have cropped up in their ranks in the final stages with Master Tara Singh

and Sardar Baldev Singh in one camp and Giani Kartar Singh, President, Shiromani

Akali Dal in the other.104 Nevertheless, once it was clear that they could not be

accommodated as per their wishes, the Sikh leaders pressed for two demands; ‘First that

they should have weightage in the Legislature of East Punjab, or alternatively, the Hindi-

speaking provinces of the East Punjab should be separated off and there should be a

province comprising the Punjabi-speaking areas.’105 They also wanted the drawing of the

boundary line more favourably and safeguards for the arrangement of their population

transfer, but except for the admittance that they had a ‘greater bargaining power’ owing

to their ‘military importance in the new Union of India’ the Viceroy was not able to offer

much.106 On a geographical plane too their demand could not be granted, scattered as

they were all over the Punjab. On the surface the Sikhs seemed to have accepted the Plan

but the calm was deceptive which misled many to believe in Baldev Singh’s calling it a

‘settlement’; underneath they were seething with anger and ‘working feverishly on a

scheme for bringing their community together and regaining their lost integrity.’107 A

faint hope, nonetheless, was there that they ‘would not be so foolish as to commit virtual

suicide’.108

The status of the 565 Indian States was yet another question that did not get its

due share of attention or planning. Under the British rule, India was divided into three

types of territories; first the ones that were under the sovereignty of the Crown, secondly

Tribal Areas with whom agreements had been concluded and thirdly the Princely

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States.109 Most of these States were very small, some even few acres, not more than mere

estates. For almost a century they had been protected in exchange for support, loyalty and

cooperation in a relationship of tutelage called Paramountcy. But for the most part they

were side-lined and neglected as problem areas, despite all the treaties they were bound

to with the Crown.110 It became all the more evident as partition drew close. Here again

chaos, confusion and manipulation laid down the rules of the game. To Mountbatten the

problem of the Princely States was a far greater one than partition or transfer of power

itself.111 According to the 3 June Plan the policy of British India regarding the Indian

States contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12 May would remain largely

unchanged.112 In simple terms withdrawal of the British would also mark the lapse of

paramountcy in so far as the fate of the Indian States was concerned.113 It was again

reiterated in the Indian Dominions Bill that ‘the functions of His Majesty in relation to

Indian States shall cease to be exercisable’ from the appointed day i.e. ‘when the

responsibility for peace and good government in any part of India’ would no more be the

responsibility of His Majesty’s Government or any of his representatives.114 The ‘void’

that would inevitably be created would have to be ‘filled either by a federal relationship

or by particular political arrangements with the successor government or governments’

creating indefinite and unjustified uncertainty.115 An era of conspiracies, plotting and

intrigues thus ensued with important and powerful Princely States maneuvering for a

better gain and some even nursing ambitions of independence, though not always keeping

their geographical limitations in view. Hyderabad was a case in point which remained

unresolved till 15 August 1947. But perhaps among the so many in a state of uproar and

mismanagement, the most glaring and the contentious , that has not been resolved to the

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present day, was that of Kashmir.116 It is the most trumpeted of all issues that becomes

painfully alive every now and then, and has led to major conflicts and even armed

combats between India and Pakistan in the last sixty years. Like other administrative gaps

that the British left behind for the new national entities, the issue of the Princely States

also suffered badly as a result of a sudden and irrevocable termination of all existing

treaty relations, notwithstanding any obligations or previous service to the Raj.117 The

Crown’s pledge of 1858 made to the States and their rightful masters that it ‘respects the

rights, dignity and honour of the native Princes as our own,’ was conveniently forgotten

when they were left to decide and determine their course without any guarantees of

supervision and safeguard.118 It was perhaps a blessing that the Radcliffe Award was not

supposed to enter the jurisdiction of the Princely States.

The Award was ready by 13 August 1947 but remained unknown and

unpublicized till the 17 of the fateful month. It was one of those ‘divine instincts’ of

Mountbatten which at a closer look always had a ‘mundane reason’, that delayed the

announcement of the Award. The Viceroy was advised from all possibly rational

quarters, especially the officials of the most sensitive areas of the Punjab, to declare and

announce the fate of millions before independence. The Supreme Commander of the

Armed Forces Auchinleck also warned him of the immediate need to announce the

Award as it was widely known that it was ready and any further delay was leading to ‘the

wildest rumours’ and ‘having the most disturbing and harmful effect.’119 No certain

evidence suggests any clue to Mountbatten’s post-dating the Award and suddenly

‘developing cold feet about publishing it’; it could be a fear of an ugly reaction with the

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British coming in for a lot of scathing criticism, knowing well how unpopular the

announcement could be, or that his intention all along was to delay the matter

substantially so that the celebrations of independence were not ruined and his personal

desire for ceremony, pomp and glamour remained unaffected.120 If this was the case it

was perhaps the first instance that he had relinquished his favourite ‘ride on speed’ theme

chosen for Indian partition. No matter what his reasons for the delay were, its impact was

momentous, keeping everyone guessing where the line would be drawn, with not enough

time to make the necessary administrative arrangements for security of life and property

and for mutual transfer of population.121 Some sources do believe and very strongly too

that the Report of the Boundary Commissions was ready and with Mountbatten by 7

August 1947, almost ten days before it was announced.122 If this is true it only seems how

the British administration was completely oblivious to the nature of the results and

repercussions of handing over an Award which was destined to shape the ‘very contours

of control and influence in the divided successor states’.123 A ‘sulking Punjab’, a

‘frustrated Bengal’124 and a ‘bleeding Kashmir’ was all that the British bequeathed as a

departing gesture of their hundred and forty years rule. For Pakistan it was a tragic and

unfortunate decision; in Bengal the East Pakistan debacle and in the Punjab the legacy of

a war-torn Kashmir still haunts the memory of a young nation.

Radcliffe did not prove to be impartial as was hoped. He finally did the job and

used his scalpel, knowing well that he had virtually disrupted the lives of 80 million

people in the Punjab and Bengal who would not spare him for the deed, he left India

saying ‘I do not want them to find me.’125 At the end of the day, however, the Award

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came out to be what Mountbatten wanted and many shared ‘the obstinate popular belief

that Radcliffe will award as H.E. dictates.’126 According to the Pakistan Times it was

nothing more than a ‘hoax perpetrated on the Muslims of India’, it was the sifting of a

jigsaw puzzle in which ‘tahsils, thanas and villages’ were the pawns played by a British

lawyer sitting in judgment.127 To describe the Award as a conspiracy would be an under-

statement. ‘An eminent English Counsel selected for his impartiality and aloofness from

political controversy’ had ‘shaved away three quarters of a Muslim majority district

already accepted as part of Pakistan under the so-called “notional” award of the Indian

independence Act.’128 It was one of those acts in the history of South Asia for which a

more intense and incisive term needs to be coined, for it imperiled the lives of millions

and bequeathed an inherent weakness in the structure of the new edifice, Pakistan. It was

indeed a ‘territorial murder’, ‘a bolt from the blue’ and ‘the folly of trusting the sense of

justice of one individual’, whose ruling did not possess the ‘essential characteristics of a

legal judgment.’129 India emerged as the successor state and Pakistan, an entity that had

seceded from the bigger, powerful whole responsible, for virtually all that the partition

violence and massacre entailed.130 Nehru’s harping of the secessionist theme that India

was inheriting the status, treaty and other obligations of her British predecessors,

continued to mar the proceedings till the very end. Although Jinnah, staunchly countered

a defiant Nehru, that what was happening in the name of partition was not ‘secession but

division’ and therefore the treatment meted out to both the dominions must be equitable

and impartial in matters of status and distribution of assets and liabilities, the Viceroy

‘accepted Nehru’s view that Hindustan will succeed to the position of India as an

international entity.’131 It was obvious that the architects of the Award were influenced by

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such thinking. The Award, in reality, became one of those so many ‘midnight follies’ that

Mountbatten referred to committing much ‘too frequently’ in the ‘late hours’ of the last

crucial days of planning.132 However, accepting the dictates of a ‘wrong, unjust and

perverse award’, that was more political and less judicial, as Jinnah stated, was still

‘binding upon us as ‘honourable people’ and ‘we must bear up this one more blow with

fortitude, courage and hope.’133

Radcliffe gave his verdict and left India, not to return, having confessed later of

being at threat from the Indians. A job accomplished, in the British definition, was all that

mattered. The task of implementing the decisions was not in his job description. His was

only the work of giving a frontier and a periphery in the capacity of an impartial, non-

partisan technocrat. The remainder of the performance was to be of another team and in

another setup. It would always remain a mystery of sorts and a riddle for historians as to

who actually made the Award. No written evidence to the effect that Mountbatten issued

instructions or tried to influence the Chairman have been found, despite the fact that at

the time of independence the general impression was that the Award was a command

performance.134 Both Indian and Pakistani public opinion apportion the blame at the

doorstep of the British authorities for the outcome of the decisions arrived at i.e. for all

the massacre and violence that followed especially in the Punjab. Administrative

problems of unimaginable magnitude cropped up instantly after the Award was finalized

and announced on 17th August, two days after the dawn of independence. Refugees,

Princely States, cross- border migrations, division of assets, issue of Armed Forces__

there were numerous problems waiting for the new governments that were already

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grappling with the shock of the Boundary Award. The delay had been disastrous though

not out of keeping with the Imperial imaging of glory and grandeur even in the last hours

of its existence and embodied so immaculately in the person of its last representative in

India. Radcliffe and his Award were just one of the so many trappings and trimmings of

the end of an Empire.

The road to Partition had almost been chartered. With the dawn of Independence

the task before the two new Governments was to tackle the enormously colossal

administrative issues that were left at its disposal along with the gift of freedom. The

conflict had now shifted to higher grounds, of the division of assets and liabilities, water

works and Armed Forces, refugees and rehabilitation, becoming more of a contest and

‘bitter divorce’ among former partners who fight over property, people and even

memories.135 This was a different battleground altogether and with the British more or

less gone, the new authorities in power across the border had to settle their affairs, in the

backdrop of massacres and violence the like of which India had never known before.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 Viceroy’s Thirteenth Staff Meeting, 11 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 191. 2 The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents, Vol. 1 (Lahore: National Documentation Centre, 1983),viii 3 The Partition of the Punjab, Vol. 1 (Lahore: NDC, 1983), viii. 4 Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel, 27 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 708. 5 The Partition of the Punjab, Vol. 1, viii-ix. 6 Time factor was most crucial, visible in almost all decisions made at this moment in India. One small instance was how the demand of Assam was turned down when its Governor wanted a separate Boundary Commission from that of Bengal, just because it would prolong matters. Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Seventh Staff Meeting, 25 June, 1947. T.O.P., Vol. 11, 634-635. 7 Meeting of the Partition Council, 5 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 909. 8 For details on Sir Cyril Radcliffe see Madhav Godbole, The Holocaust of Indian Partition: An Inquest (New Delhi: Rupa, 2007), 283-284. 9 Meeting of the Special Committee of the Indian Cabinet, 26 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 655. 10 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 10, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 683. 11 Both terms were used interchangeably but once it was converted into a Council, after decisions about the three provinces of Bengal , the Punjab and Sind had been taken, and all three had voted for partition, the latter expression came to be used singularly for referring to the body that looked over the functions of partition. For details see Minutes of Viceroy’s Seventeenth Miscellaneous Meeting, 7 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol.11, 184-189. 12 Ibid. 13 Meeting of the Special Committee of the Indian Cabinet, 12 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 284-286. The Committee was given responsibility for the making of recommendations in respect of terms of reference and membership of Expert Committees, including that of the Armed Forces Committee, the relationship of the last to the Partition Council and the Steering Committee to be exactly similar to that laid down for the other Expert Committees. Also see T.O.P., introduction to Vol. 11, xviii. 14 Meeting of the Special Committee of the Indian Cabinet, 16 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 427. 15 Record of Interview between Rear Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and Mr. Nishtar, 7 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 190. 16 Joya Chatterji, The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal’s Border Landscape, 1947-52’ (Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, Feb., 1999): 186. 17 Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians (London: Widenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), 91. 18 Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, 15 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 401. 19 Mr. Jinnah to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, 24 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 588-589. 20 Lawrence James, The Making and Unmaking of British Indi, (London: Abacus, 1977), 629. 21 Shereen Ilahi, ‘The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Fate of Kashmir’, Indian Review, Vol. 2, (January, 2003): 77. 22 Proceedings of Press Conference held in Council House, New Delhi, 4 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol.11, 112. 23 Ibid., 117. 24 Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, 93. 25 Edmund Heward, The Good and the Great: A Life of Lord Radcliffe (Chechester: Barry Rose, 1994), 40. 26 All over India ‘impeccable sound public servants’ were looking after the interests of their own countries and seeing to the future stability of their respective states. Ayer could definitely be no exception. For details see Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, 95. 27 The Daily Telegraph (25 February, 1992).

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28 Nehru tried to influence Mountbatten with regard to the Canal System in the Punjab asking the latter to intervene and send his note on the subject to Radcliffe. For details see Jinnah Papers, Vol. 5, Jawaharlal Nehru to Louis Mountbatten, IOR, R/3/1/157, 9 August 1947, 387. 29 The Daily Telegraph, (25 February 1992). Mr. Beaumont stated that Mr. John Christie, one of Mountbatten’ Assistant Private Secretaries noted in his diary for August 11, ‘H.E. is having to be strenuously dissuaded from trying to persuade Radcliffe to amend the Punjab line.’ 30Joya Chatterji, ‘The Fashioning of a Frontier’, 192. 31 H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1985), 355. 32 This had always been a norm but became a regular practice after Mountbatten’s arrival. Liaquat Ali Khan had raised an objection even at the swearing-in address of the new Viceroy on 24 March 1947, which he subtly suggested had been made at the behest of the Congress. It was obviously denied by the official quarters, but the fact of the matter is that this kind of a feeling existed right from the beginning and was not adding at all to clearing up the air of mutual disharmony. For details see Alex Von Tunzelmann, The Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire (London: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 169. 33 ‘…Mountbatten had not only allowed the Congress leadership to determine the structure and composition of the Boundary Commission but also to draft their terms of reference…’proof of which is now amply available. For details see Joya Chatterji, ‘The Making of a Borderline: The Radcliffe Award for Bengal’, in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh eds., Region and Partition: Punjab, Bengal and the Partition of the Subcontinent (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 192. 34 See introduction to T.O.P., Vol. 11, xiv. 35 Statement of 3 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 90. 36 O.H.K.Spate, ‘The partition of the Punjab and of Bengal’, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 110, No. 4/6 (Oct.-Dec., 1947): 202-203. 37 Ibid., 205. 38 Hugh Tinker, ‘Pressure, Persuasion, Decision: Factors in the Partition of the Punjab’, August 1947, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (August, 1977): 697. 39 Ibid., 698. 40 The Partition of the Punjab 1947, Vol. 1, 468-75. 41 The Partition of the Punjab, Vol. 3, 283. 42 Details to be seen in T.O.P., Vol. 12, 747-749. Also see ‘Award of Sir Cyril Radcliffe, Chairman, Punjab Boundary Commission’, Partition of the Punjab, Vol. 3, 281-288. 43 The Partition of the Punjab, 1947, Vol. 2, 253. 44 Ishtiaq Ahmad, ‘The 1947 Partition of Punjab: Arguments Put Forth Before the Punjab Boundary Commission by the Parties Involved’, in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, eds., Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 154. 45 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1973) ,219. 46 Radcliffe to Carter, 13 April 1948, IOR,L/P&J/10/119. 47 This has been corroborated in the letter of Evan Jenkins to Mountbatten in which the Punjab Governor reminds the Viceroy of the information that had been sent to him on 8 August and he had approved of it. The details of how he and Governor Mudie received the instruction of ELIMINATE SALIENT (referring to a sharp salient in the Ferozepore district) from the Viceroy’s House through a secraphone message, are now a matter of common knowledge. Warnings were thereupon sent to the Deputy Commissioners of Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Ferozepore with instructions to ‘burn the messages sent to them and, and to communicate the gist of them only to their respective superintendents of police.’ For details see Evan Jenkins to Louis Mountbatten, 7 April 1948, I0R, LP & J/10/119. 48 The Daily Telegraph (25 February, 1992). Mr. Christopher Beaumont said in a statement that ‘Radcliffe was persuaded to change his mind about Ferozepore and Zira at a lunch with Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India, from which Mr. Beaumont was deftly excluded.’ It was done mainly on pressure from Mountbatten who was obviously working under Nehru’s influence. But there was another factor to which Beaumont points and that was the Maharaja of Bikaner ‘whose states would have been adversely affected if the canal headworks in Ferozepore had gone to Pakistan and who is said to have told Mountbatten that unless Ferozepore was allotted to India he would have to accede to Pakistan.’

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49 For details see Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churcillians, 93-94. He records Christopher Beaumont’s revelations forty-five years after partition. The latter served as Secretary to the Chairman Punjab Boundary Commission and was in knowledge of confidential information. 50 Nehru to Mountbatten, 9 August 1947, IOR R/3/1/157. 51 See Jinnah Papers, Appendix 1, Vol. 5, 378. 52 Ibid., 379. 53 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 17, 16 August 1947, IOR/L/P/6/123. 54 Joya Chatterji, ‘The Fashioning of a Frontier’, 188. 55 Joya Chatterji in Region and Partition, 188. 56 Jinnah Papers, Vol. 5, Appendix I, p. 379. 57 Ibid. 58 Ali Tayyeb, Pakistan: A Political Geography (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 91. 59 Ibid. 60 Dawn, 24 August, 1947. 61 Alex Von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire (London: Simon & Shuster, 2007), 235.The Chittagong Hill Tracts had a non-Muslim majority, most of the inhabitants being Buddhists or Animists. The Congress raised an issue over its award to Pakistan as ‘manifestly unjust’, though the fact cannot be denied that India on the whole had done ‘much better out of the partition of Bengal than had Pakistan’, even if the Hill Tracts were not taken into account. 62 The Daily Telegraph (25 February, 1992) Mr. Beaumont has revealed that in this particular case he had ‘little doubt’ that it was Rao Sahib V.D.Iyer who was keeping the Congress leaders informed, for on 12 August the day before he handed the Commission reports to the Viceregal Lodge, Nehru had complained about the award of Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bengal going over to Pakistan.’ 63 Vallabhbhai Patel to Louis Mountbatten, 13 August 1947, Jinnah Papers, Vol. 5, Appendix 1.11, 393-394. 64 Patel to Lord Mountbatten, Mountbatten Papers, 13 August 1947, Doc. 85. 65 Hugh Tinker, ‘Pressure, Persuasion, Decision’, 701. 66 Statement of June 3 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 91. 67 Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel, 3 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 105. 68 He had not only ‘begged’ for a change of Sir Olaf Caroe as the Governor but had even asked for a transfer of ‘some senior officers serving in the Tribal Areas’, whom he thought ‘were totally unsuited for their present positions.’ For details see Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, 4 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 122-123. 69 Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and Dr. Khan Sahib, 5 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 150. 70 Record of the Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and Dr. Khan Sahib, 5 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 150. 71 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North West Frontier Province 1937-47 (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1999), 191. 72 Sukeshi Kamra, Bearing Witness: partition, Independence, End of Raj, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002), 180. 73 For details see Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North West Frontier Province 1937-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 217-231. 74 For details see A.B.Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and political Processes (London: New Century Publishers, 1985), 175-187. 75 Statement of June 3 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 91. 76 L/P & S/13/1846, 22. 77 For details see Farooq Ahmad Dar, ‘Quaid-iAzam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the Governor General of Pakistan,’ Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Quaid-i-Azam University (Islamabad, 2008), 193-203. 78 For details of the official memorandum see Taj Mohammad Breseeg, Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), 228-239. 79 Khan of Kalat to M.A.Jinnah, 14 April 1947, Jinnah Papers, Vol. 1, Part 1, 549. 80 Farooq Ahmad Dar, ‘Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the Governor General of India’, 202.

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81 The 3 June Plan clearly provided for a referendum in Sylhet district in case partition of Bengal was decided, under the aegis of the Governor General and in consultation with the Assam Provincial Government. For details see Statement of 3 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 92. 82 ‘Other factors’ constituted a strange, ambiguous and flexible term used in the 3 June Plan by Mountbatten to address and handle situations as they would arise in the making of partition and its implementation. It became a serious matter when manipulated by Radcliffe and his associates in designating boundaries and allocating populations. 83 Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel, 13 August 1947, Appendix III, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 755. 84 Minutes of the Meeting of the Viceroy with Members of the States Negotiating Committee, 3 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 81. 85 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 8, 5 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 158. 86 The question as to ‘why did Radcliffe accept so much of the letter and spirit of Congress scheme’ would always remain a mystery. Joya Chatterji in ‘The Making of a Borderline: The Radcliffe Award for Bengal’ has tried to find a plausible answer and considers Mountbatten to be responsible for the working of Radcliffe’s mind. To her it was the Viceroy who ‘had allowed the Congress leadership not only to determine the structure and composition of the Boundary Commission but also to draft their terms of reference’ with the result that the Commission’s work ended up in Congress party’s favour. 192. 87 Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 154. To a question that should not the Constituent assemblies be responsible for the task of drawing up boundaries instead of a Commission, the Viceroy categorically stated, ‘The question is a good one but the Answer is speed.’ He did not seem to have much to say to any query or objection or even a suggestion except for the haste that he was imposing upon the Indians, and in its wake an obvious lot of chaos and confusion. Also see the Proceedings of a Press Conference held in the Council House, New Delhi, 4 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 116. 88 Proceedings of a Press Conference held in the Council House, New Delhi, 4 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 110. 89 For details of how the Radcliffe Award was used and in particular the term ‘Other Factors’ was ‘misused’ to injure and harm the interests of Pakistan, see S.M.Burke and Salim al Din Quraishi, The British Raj in India: An Historical Review (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 536-562. 90 Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight, 57. 91 Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel, 12 August 1947, Appendix 1 to No. 488, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 745. 92 See Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 213. 93 Sir F. Burrows to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, 26 June, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 672. In the present context it was the debate on the Chittagong Hill Tracts and their possible attachment with East Bengal and preference for federation with Tripura and Assam states on the basis of their commerce and administrative ties being with that district .Burrows believed that though the Muslim League would press for their inclusion in East Bengal as the hydro-electric project for electrification of Chittagong Areas depends on the dam at Barkal on Karnaphuli River in the interior of the tracts, great weight needed to be attached to the opinion of the three chiefs of the Tracts ‘who strongly deprecated being placed under the Muslim Province of East Bengal.’ Another instance was the unanimous decision of the Boundary Commission on Sylhet, for that area not to be awarded as a whole to East Bengal. Also see T.O.P., Vol. 12, 755. 94 Joya Chatterji, in Region and Partition, 193. 95 Report on Viceroy’s Plan, n.d., IOR,L/PO/6/120. 96 Proceedings of a Press Conference held in the Council House, New Delhi, 4 June, 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 112-117. 97 Ibid. 98 See ‘Sikh Memorandum to the Punjab Boundary Commission’, M.M.Sadullah, Sharif al Mujahid, Ashfaq Ahmad, Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents. Vol. 1 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1993), 347-397. 99 For details see Tan Tai Yong, ‘Prelude to Partition: Sikh Responses to the Demand for Pakistan, 1940-47,’ International Journal of Punjab Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (July-December 1994): 167-199.

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100 The Princes not only were providing support to the violent Sikhs bands but some of them such as the Maharaja of Patiala were also known to have recruited a large number of Sikh soldiers in their local armies. 101 Paul R. Brass, ‘The Partition of India and retributive genocide in the Punjab, 1946-47: Means, Methods, and Purposes’, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 5, Issue No. 1 (March 2003): 78. 102 Rear Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel, New Delhi, 3 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 105. 103 W.H.Morris Jones, ‘Thirty-Six Years Later: The Mixed Legacies of Mountbatten’s Transfer of Power’, International Affairs, Vo. 59, No. 4 (Autumn 1983): 625. 104 Mr. Thompson to Sir C. Corfield, 2 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 38. 105 Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh, 30 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 760-761. 106 Ibid. 107 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 158. 108 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 8, 5 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 163 109 Farooq Ahmad Dar, ‘Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the Governor General of Pakistan’, 176-177. 110 W.H.Morris Jones, ‘Thirty-Six Years Later’, 624. 111 The Pakistan Times, 1 July 1948. 112 See T.O.P., Vol. 7, 522-524 113 In other words ‘as soon as fully self-governing Governments are set up in British India, paramountcy will lapse, the Crown Representative will disappear and the machinery which he controls [Political Department, Residents and political Agents] will disappear with him.’ For details see Sir C. Corfield to Mr. I.D. Scott, 11 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 272-279. 114 India and Burma Committee, 13 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 354. 115 W.H. Morris Jones, ‘Thirty Six Years Later’, 624. 116 For details see Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 13-24, and Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 101-116. 117 Mr. Rajagoalachariar to Sir S. Cripps, 8 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 196-198. 118 Sukeshi Kamra, Bearing Witness, 182. 119 Note by Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck, 15 August, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 736. 120 Mountbatten’s Personal Report No. 17, 16 August 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, pp. 771-772. Also see Joya Chatterji, ‘The Fashioning of a Frontier’, 195. 121 Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia (London: Routledge, 2000), 98. 122 Sir George Cunnigham Diary, 1947,-48, MSS, EUR D. 670/41. 123 Joya Chatterji, in Region and Partition, 190. 124 Jean Alphonse Bernard, ‘Bengal and Punjab: Before and Beyond’, History Today, Vol. 47, Issue 9 (September 1997): 33. 125 Cited in Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition, 94. 126 J.M.Short to Sir Stafford Cripps, Jinnah Papers, Vol. 5, Appendix 1.1, 383. 127 Pakistan Times, 19 August, 1947. 128 Hugh Tinker, ‘Pressure, Persuasion, Decision’ 695. 129 Dawn, 21 August 1947. 130 Nehru had been very clear and vehement about it. To Jinnah’s plea that both states were equal and thereby successors to the British legacy in every way, the Congress leader did not fail to point out that ‘India was continuing in every way the same, and the fact that dissident Provinces… allowed to secede must not interrupt the work of the Government of India….’ Such discouraging tendencies only aggravated the already mounting tension and definitely aimed at challenging if not directly disrupting the foundations of Pakistan. It seemed as if independence and freedom had come only to India. For details see Viceroy’s Report No. 8, 5 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 164. 131 India and Burma Committee, 31st Meeting, 17 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 481. 132 Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel, 27 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 678. 133 Broadcast by M.A.Jinnah, 31 August 1947, Jinnah Papers, Vol. 5, 163.

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134 Mountbatten to Radcliffe, 22 July 1947, IOR,R/3/1/157. 135 Yunas Samad, ‘Reflections on Partition: Pakistan Perspective’, in Ian Talbot and Guruharpal Singh eds., Region and Partition, 375.

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Chapter 4

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

Planning for partition was accomplished, as the Radcliffe Award finalized the

broad details thereby giving to the state of Pakistan ‘40 odd days’ to ‘pack up and remove

to Karachi’ the machinery that it would need to set up the government and regulate its

functioning.1 The Boundary Award was ready by 13 August 1947 but to prevent the

British administration from the ‘inevitable odium’ of reaction’, its publication was

postponed till a later date.2 Mountbatten’s desire to mark the celebrations with his usual

passion for grandeur took the better of him as an administrator, relinquishing his duties of

a more serious nature to look over the safety and protection of the people under his rule.

It was an act that paid heavily in terms of the loss of life and property owing mainly to

the uncertainty of millions whose national identity and place of residence remained

obscure and ambiguous even on the day of independence and freedom. The

administrative consequences of this decision led to a number of problems which

compounded and complicated an already difficult situation. Mountbatten’s ‘historic

hunches’ always proved to be far from a realistic and practical approach and hardly in

conformity with general agreement. As the last days of the British Raj unfolded in India,

the impact of such decisions became plainly evident, worsening the communal situation

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that was shortly to turn into a national strain and haunt the new states for a very long time

to come. It would not be wrong to trace back the existing troublesome relations between

India and Pakistan to the seeds of discord that were planted at the time of partition by

unduly raising a few issues and not effectively curbing others.3 The list is very long, but

only a few of the most important shall be elaborated which contributed to the fragility of

administration bequeathed on the subcontinent, more so on the nascent state of Pakistan

which became the direct recipient of the Muslim League legacy of British conduct.

For the purpose of smooth transfer to two independent states a constitution was

required as a basis of government to which power was to be handed over. In the absence

of one, the Government of India Act 1935, was thought to be the only alternative ‘until

such time as the two respective Governments have made up their minds in regard to what

sort of constitution they want and what sort of amendments they will require in the Act.’4

A Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 4 July and passed on 15 July. The

next day it went through the House of Lords without any amendments. The British

Parliament thereby enacted the Indian independence Act which came into force on 18

July 1947, also having received Royal assent. The Act provided for setting up two

independent Dominions, to be respectively known as India and Pakistan,5 with His

Majesty’s Government in general and the Viceroy in particular having no responsibility,

power and authority over ‘undivided’ British India.6

As the two new Dominions could not be expected to frame a constitution in the

little time available before partition, it came as a relief to both the Congress and the

Muslim League that they could use the Act as a framework for constitutional matters in

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the early days of independence. Even the British did not want the new dominions to stay

for long without a constitution.7 It was obviously an advantage to both the states as it

gave them the much needed time but it suited the British esteem too as their Constitution

was to be promulgated in two states. Such a marriage of mutual convenience was hard to

get in those tumultuous and discordant times. Administrative continuity thus provided by

the Act was perhaps the ‘greatest single Legislative achievement of the British in India.’8

Eventually Mountbatten issued the two orders simultaneously on 14 August; the Indian

Provisional Constitutional Order and the Pakistan Provisional Constitutional Order under

section 9 (1) (c) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 with more or less identical orders.9

The Government of India Act 1935 became the Provisional Constitution of both India

and Pakistan. The omissions, adaptations and modifications were to be separately done

for each of the new dominions.10 It was one of those matters that came to be resolved

amicably in comparison to the numerous other issues that plagued the birth of India and

Pakistan and left in most cases permanent scars of injury and damage.

Commonwealth membership was also an issue of prestige for the Imperial

authorities who wanted to continue and maintain a link with India and Pakistan even

when the latter did not remain part of the Empire in large. The liquidation of an Empire in

a ‘panic-stricken and undignified shuffle’ could be compensated sufficiently by the

inclusion of India into the ‘new dynamic Commonwealth admirably adjusted to the

changed world.’11 It would be, as Mountbatten believed, also a good incentive for other

nations particularly Ceylon and Burma to join the Commonwealth in the coming years.12

Jinnah had as early as April 1947 agreed to Pakistan becoming a member of the

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Commonwealth,13 making it clear though, that the decision was to be for the transitional

period and the final verdict was to be of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.14 The pro-

Congress biases of Mountbatten were by now an open secret and it was clear that he was

not ready to accept Pakistan’s inclusion as a Dominion State until the Congress also

showed willingness to join the Commonwealth in the same capacity.15 He tried to justify

his line of argument by the contention that in case of a future conflict between the two

states, Britain would be unduly forced to take sides, and thereby get involved in a tricky

and difficult position.16 The whole episode was frighteningly reminiscent of the Cabinet

Mission days when the British had made the acceptance of the Plan by the Muslim

League conditional to Congress acquiescence, going back on their initial promise that

which ever party agreed to the Mission Plan would be invited to form the Government. It

was only when Congress agreed to it that the British showed willingness to make it work.

The Commonwealth issue was another similar situation, when Mountbatten waited for

Congress to accept joining it as a Dominion with a hunch that the Muslim League might

not. In that eventuality he was ready to give the Dominion Status only to Congress and

transfer power to an independent Government of Pakistan outside the Commonwealth.17

Jinnah by now acutely aware of Mountbatten’s preferences, called his rebuff by accepting

Dominion Status for Pakistan, raising the question whether the British Commonwealth

was in a position to expel Pakistan against its wish.18

Mountbatten wanted one Governor-General for the two dominions,19 at least in

the initial stages, though he wished his name not to be mentioned in this regard.20

However, he had suggested to Listowel for an amendment in the Indian Independence

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Bill to the effect that it should be made ‘lawful for one person to hold both appointments

of Governor-General for such period as may be determined by either Dominion after the

15th August.’21 That person could not obviously be Jinnah or Nehru. The hint was clear.

Even his personal staff considered it necessary for a smooth transfer of power and an

easy division of assets if both the countries would have a common Governor-General.22

Nehru jumped at the idea willingly accepting Mountbatten as the first Governor-General

of India and conveyed the acceptance on behalf of the Congress, hoping that it would also

be beneficial to sort out the problems of the Princely States.23 This definitely boosted

Mountbatten’s ego and confidence as the major political party of India had decided to

support his claim. However, it was something on which Jinnah was uncompromisingly

lucid from the beginning though he kept asking on for time to think over the matter, as he

was reluctant to offend the Viceroy and create unnecessary troubles for his nation.

Gradually he began to show his cards stating that his country should be better off with its

own independent Governor-General. He at the same time suggested that a Crown

Representative should be appointed for arbitration and that post could indeed be given to

Mountbatten,24 someone who would be above the two Governors-General. It was,

however, turned down by the British Government due to Mountbatten’s opposition who

did not want his role to be restricted to arbitral functions only.

Encouraged by Congress response Mountbatten stated that it would not be

possible for him to stay as the Governor-General of only one of the two Dominions.25 He

was confident of the fact that Jinnah could be persuaded around to accept him for

Pakistan’s supreme position as well, 26 bearing upon him the advantages of accepting a

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common Governor-General in his person.27 Ismay also tried to impress upon Liaquat Ali

Khan how difficult it would be to conduct a peaceful transfer of power unless this one

hurdle was removed.28 It was an obvious and clear indication of his desire to assume the

joint Governor-Generalship of both the states. Due to this divergent approach a simple

administrative matter became a huge controversy. Eventually Jinnah informed

Mountbatten of his decision on 2 July that he was willing not to share a common

Governor-General with India.29 It came as a big shock to the Viceroy and according to

Morris Jones, one of the Constitutional Advisors to Mountbatten, it was the only recorded

moment of fury in his entire tenure of Viceroyalty.30 He was unable to reconcile to this

‘tragedy’ as he would have to take sides when ‘hitherto he had managed to retain

complete impartiality,’31 He, however, in view of the ‘overpowering advice from

London’ accepted the Prime Minister’s request and agreed to assume the Governor-

Generalship of the Dominion of India, though putting on record for the last time that he

was doing so with great unhappiness and unease.32 It was in the first place surprising that

Mountbatten should have set his heart on the prospect of assuming joint Governor-

Generalship and that it should become a contest of will between the two.33 Independence

was truly synonymous only with a sense of complete sovereignty and freedom, even if

Mountbatten’s attitude came to assume a threatening tone when he acidly replied to

Jinnah’s refusal of accommodating him that ‘it may well cost you the whole of your

assets and the future of Pakistan.’34 This was the premise on which the distribution and

division of assets started.

Mountbatten’s approach of taking decisions for the independent dominions

seemed to be perpetuating a continued imperial hold rather than an acceptance of change.

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He suggested the design of flags for India and Pakistan with a Union Jack in the upper

Canton, extending to one-third of its depth.35 The idea was, however, rejected both by the

Congress and the Muslim League. It was indeed an interference and not acceptable to

either of the two parties. In fact before taking such a step Mountbatten should have

realized the changed nature of circumstances and the volatile state of public mind.

Instead of harping on the Imperial tune, he should have reconciled to the retreat of the

Empire gracefully. Such acts only added to the infamy of the British whose acceptance of

withdrawal became questionable again and again, not only at a level of leadership

concern but also in the realm of the interests of common masses. His decisions taken as

the last Viceroy had a direct imprint on the manner and mode of the life of millions, as

the two states were emerging out of a united imperial entity, so long ruled by the British.

The transfer of the Armed Forces was another complicated issue. The units were

to be combed so that Muslim soldiers could be sent to Pakistan and vice versa, but at the

same time distribution was to be done on voluntary basis giving each soldier the option of

serving the country of his own choice.36 These were the two stages in which the division

was to take place. It was indeed a complex job as until shortly after 1857, entire

regiments had been Hindu or Muslim after the war of independence, mixed in such a

manner as to balance the two religions so that ‘each might act as a restraint upon the

other.’37 The Indian Armed Forces were one of those rare concerns regarding partition on

which the British felt uniquely involved. The Indian Armed Forces was an institution that

they had nurtured and raised with great pride, devotion and commitment in particular by

Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Auchinleck. He was in no mood initially to divide

the forces and thereby let go of something that to him symbolized the honour and prestige

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of the Empire. To avoid ‘any breach in the continuity of the Indian Army’ and to

maintain ‘the organization of defence on an all India basis’ were the clear instructions to

the Viceroy from the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee.38 Viceroy’s own opinion was not

much different. Knowing well that both the Congress and the Muslim League leaders

wanted a reconstitution of their respective armies under separate operational

Commanders-in-Chief before or at least with the stroke of independence, he insisted that

the administration should remain under Auchinleck until an appropriate time.39 The

British were taking all the necessary steps to retain a stronghold even after their

departure;40 all they could not or would not do was to take precautionary measures for the

security and peace of the subcontinent.

There was no intention so far of cutting up the Indian Armed forces at least at the

time of partition, and if there was such a talk in certain quarters it was with reluctance

and a very heavy heart mainly as the last resort. The Act of 1935 that was to regulate the

administrative structure of partition, however, clearly provided for such ‘a division of the

Indian Armed Forces of His Majesty between the Indian Dominions and for the

governance of those forces’ as it said, ‘until the division is complete.’41 This was

obviously the requirement of the new and changed times as the option of an undivided

army was not only impracticable but also would not have been acceptable to the two new

nation-states involved. The reluctance to the said division on the part of the British,

nevertheless, remained a strange phenomenon, particularly once partition had been

accepted in principle. Obviously it included division of all assets no matter how much the

imperial authorities felt attached to it. Their plea was that in order to avoid chaos and

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confusion and to prevent affecting the morale and efficiency of the soldiers it was

necessary to keep the forces under central administration, also suggesting that the present

Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army should be entitled Supreme Commander for

both the countries till the job was complete,42 with a Joint Defence Council43 to supervise

and manage the relevant affairs, mainly those of supervising troops in transit.44 And the

job was meant to take a very long time, to be finished somewhere around 1 April 1948,45

as it included the transfer of units from one territory to another and ascertaining the

wishes of all personnel, Indian as well as European. This could have complicated matters

for both the states since without a standing army none of the new national entities could

have proceeded on an independent course of action. The argument is that the limited time

was definitely not enough to conduct such crucial matters in an amicable way. Needless

to say the hurried nature of things planned by the British gave both the states a hollow

and rickety start.

`The division of military assets came to be at a proportion of sixty four and thirty

six percent to India and Pakistan respectively. All the sixteen ordnance factories went to

India and the six hundred million rupees promised as compensation to start its own

ordnance factories and other necessary institutions, never reached Pakistan.46 Engineering

equipment, ordnance stores, armoured vehicles, arms and ammunition also suffered a

similar fate. Tanks, guns, transport paraphernalia and spare parts were also withheld, with

only unwanted and outdated items sent to Pakistan for the use of its soldiers.47 All

attempts were made to keep Pakistan’s defence on a weak footing. Auchinleck himself

told Attlee that ever since Independence all efforts were made by all relevant quarters to

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obstruct the division of Armed Forces mainly with the aim of preventing Pakistan from

receiving its just share.48 It was thus consequent that Liaquat Ali Khan’s insistence on

Pakistan having its own army on the day of independence had to take up an assertive tone

to establish his country’s claim on the issue. While negotiating for it he demanded an

immediate division of the Armed Forces, as a matter of ‘greatest urgency’ not later than

15 August under Pakistan’s own Commander-in-Chief, with 70% Muslims and 30%

Hindus.49 The irony of the whole matter was that the division and distribution was taking

place under British auspices but without an incumbent responsibility for maintaining law

and order.50

There was another side to the issue as well. The British did not want the Imperial

troops to be used in communal disturbances due to which there seemed to be an anxiety

on their part to remove the British troops as early from India as possible.51 It was a matter

of policy that the troops could be used only for saving British lives and not for any matter

of Indian concern. Lip service to the ideal of Indian defence and internal security,

however, continued to be paid but that too had motives; an India relapsing into general

chaos and disorder would be a blemish on the Imperial façade of prestige and honour and

could lead to India asking for help from outside. Moreover, by retaining troops in India

an influence could be preserved over neighbouring states notably Afghanistan and

contribute to a ‘steadying influence’, ensuring that ‘India did not pass into a foreign and

hostile orbit.’52 But it was unfortunate that an imperial power had been reduced to such

thinking. In the midst of chaos and violence many recorded the non-availability of the

British among the law enforcing authorities, most of whom were only thinking of going

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home. The security of India was left at the mercy of a paltry, ad-hoc force of 15,000 men

called the PBF (Punjab Boundary Force) announced on 22 July under Major General

Thomas Rees. A clichéd and much quoted statement about the PBF, that it allotted four

men to every three villages in the Punjab, has reduced it to a joke in the annals of

Military history. How the authorities thought of stopping a genocide by this force was

aptly proved by the carnage that encompassed the province in the ensuing days and

months, leaving behind a bitter memory of the Partition.

Division of other assets was equally a tough contest and the new states were again

looking up to the departing authorities to a proportionate if not an equitable distribution.

The assets ranged from railways to industries, from machinery to engineering services,

from water sources to agricultural produce and from simple office equipment to much

needed hard cash. It was a tedious job and once again suffered badly due to insufficient

time and improper handling. By 15 August the Partition Council and its auxiliary

committees had not been able to come to any formula with regard to unresolved issues.

Status quo prevailed for almost three months after which direct talks were resumed

between the governments of India and Pakistan. The relations between the members of

the Interim Government belonging both to the Congress and the Muslim League were in

certain cases not even of talking terms, which made the task of a ‘hasty and messy’

Partition all the more formidable.53 The biggest issue was the repayment of Pakistan’s

share of British India’s debt,54 a matter which should have been decided at the earliest

keeping in view the needs and requirements of the new state. On the date of transfer of

power the cash balance with the Government of India was four billion rupees and sterling

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balance of nine hundred and twenty five million. Pakistan received seven hundred and

fifty million rupees and sterling balances of hundred and sixty five million only.55

Pakistan’s demand that since it would be setting up an altogether new structure, it should

be given one billion rupees was turned down by the Indian authorities. Pakistan was also

denied its share of five hundred and fifty million rupees on the plea that it would use that

money for aggression against India.56 There was little hope that India would ever release

the money. The British seemed to have lost all interest; it was now a fight over which

they had conveniently lost hold, even though Mountbatten was around as Indian

Governor General and as always was in a position to influence Nehru and other Congress

leaders. Gandhi’s fast unto death for the release of Pakistan’s share, once again saved the

situation which otherwise would have meant a financial collapse for the new economy as

Pakistan had only two hundred million rupees in its treasury and the outstanding bills

amounted to around four hundred million rupees. Gandhi’s fast of seventy two days led

the Reserve Bank of India to transfer five hundred million rupees to Pakistan on 19

January, 1948.57 India still kept fifty million as adjustments of claims against Pakistan.

This was not the end. Ordinary and basic furniture such as tables, chairs, desks

even clips, inkstands and paper pins were lacking in Pakistani offices. Records and files

loaded on trains never reached Pakistan; they were either burnt or destroyed on the way

as trains were attacked by mobs mercilessly. They were full of corpses and empty of

goods when they reached their respective destination in Pakistan. To relate one small

instance of a meeting of the Partition Committee held on 26 June would shed enough

light on the spirit prevalent in India for dividing assets at the time of partition. It was

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when Liaquat Ali Khan asked to move one of the six Government printing presses from

Delhi to Karachi as Pakistan had only one and that was insufficient to handle the

Government’s requirement, Patel flared up saying that none of the printing presses could

be spared, adding that ‘no one had asked Pakistan to secede’.58 A refusal in this tenor was

shocking and the British administration was unable to do much about it though it was still

very much in control of the subcontinent. Jinnah’s disappointment with the planning of

Partition was not uncalled for; India had a base to start from, despite which it was

allowed to keep away from Pakistan much of its rightful and needful share.59 The covert

bias of Mountbatten was visible to many of his own British officials, which even came to

include his very close associates including Lord Ismay60 and Commander-in-Chief

Auchinleck. The bare minimum that Pakistan received was not hidden from anybody, in

spite of an undertaking on the part of the Partition Council that all assets would be

divided on the ‘genuine requirements of the two new Governments’.61

Partition in retrospect will always remain a painful subject, until the issue of

Kashmir is resolved. It was a wound inflicted on Pakistan in the earliest hours of its birth

and remains to the present day a bleeding and raw lesion. Mountbatten himself admitted

that the States issue was a thorny question and that he had been unable to grasp it fully.62

Kashmir was even more complicated and suffered from his direct interference more than

any other state. That he was sympathetic to the Congress cause was not a hidden fact in

the political circles of India.63 There are few themes in world history that have invited so

much debate and academic discourse than the Kashmir issue and most researches have

traced the origins of this dispute to the making of the Partition, in the manner and method

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that it was conceived and implemented.64 It is needless to go into the details of this

State’s history except for highlighting the importance of its configuration which made it a

prized and welcome gain for any of the two countries.65 The other significant feature was

that its Maharaja was a Hindu whereas it enjoyed an overwhelming Muslim majority,

particularly in the valley. The two principles of notional representation and geographical

contiguity, as laid down by the Boundary Commissions to be their major terms of

reference, made its obvious accession to Pakistan a granted fact. This, however was not

to be. In the present study the emphasis is neither on the Congress and its stance nor on

the Muslim League approach and reaction. The concern was and still is with the role of

those authorities which were responsible for laying down the principles and then for one

reason or another flouting them. The result is that the peace of the region remains

endangered, and the two countries went to open war three times with each other in the

last sixty two years, singularly on this issue, the first one in under five months of

Partition.66

The ‘ascertaining of the will of the people’ either by referendum, elections,

plebiscites or even by representative public meetings, was one of the options that

Mountbatten had himself floated,67 mainly in order to decide extraordinary situations

where the Boundary Commissions terms of reference were not workable. But when it was

Kashmir in question his own ‘principled instructions’ took a flight. What he was

suggesting in case of Hyderabad68 i.e. a plebiscite under impartial auspices with British

supervisory officers became an anathema to him in Kashmir. The Nizam of Hyderabad

relying on the small ruling Muslim elite, abhorred the idea of joining India and with his

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natural dislike of Congress asked the British Government for a Dominion Status. It was

obviously rejected as it had been clearly stated in the Draft Independence Bill that the

policy towards states should in no way encourage any and in particular Hyderabad and

Travancore to consider an independent status69. Mountbatten advised the Nizam, that

‘placed as Hyderabad is, its interests are inextricably bound up with those of India,’ and it

would be effectively feasible for the State to join the Dominion of India.70 By this time

Mountbatten was India’s Governor General, and Congress was reaping the benefits of his

weight on their side. Eventually the instrument of accession came under the Nizam’s

signatures In September 1948 Indian troops were able to ‘restore order’ in Hyderabad.

Congress had a major role to play in instigating the population and even launching a civil

disobedience movement in Hyderabad. But ultimately it was the British influence as the

deciding factor that brought about the accession. Junagadh was another state that was a

mirror image of the situation in Kashmir and Hyderabad with a Muslim Maharaja and a

Hindu majority population and bordered on all sides with States that had opted to accede

to India.71 He had decided to join Pakistan despite more than eighty percent Hindu

population and the League tactics had worked suitably on him. Indian infiltration,

however, altered the scene and Junagadh was forced to join India, with Mountbatten

stating that the Indian takeover was the right action.72 To most of the independent

observers it was the closest to a Nazi technique of overpowering a weak neighbour73. The

New York Times regarded the action as ‘extremely unwise’74 and Manchester Guardian

considered the Indian intervention to be totally in ‘contradiction with what Gandhi and

Nehru were preaching’.75 A similar situation in Kashmir was not allowed to take a

parallel turn. The events unfolded in more or less the same fashion; Pakistani troops

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entered Kashmir, there was a tribal incursion when it came to be known that the

population was not willing to join India, the Maharaja was pressurized and ultimately the

accession went over to India on 24th October 1947 with Indian troops of occupation

taking forcible charge of the State.76

The handling of the Kashmir issue can be taken as the single most reflective

episode on the British intent in the entire proceedings of partition that does not find a

parallel. To go into the motives would lead the discussion once again to Congress as it

was Nehru, being a Kashmiri Pandit himself, whose passionate association with the State

and whose ‘great mental distress if the mission were to remain unfulfilled’77 led

Mountbatten to take all possible measures to help Kashmir cede to India. The bitter

‘emotional state’ that Nehru was in at that time and the type of personal, ‘private

business’ that he had made the Kashmir issue was becoming extremely difficult to handle

even for Mountbatten.78 Geographically it had all links with Pakistan as the major

waterways and roads led to it. Culturally and historically its situation made it closer to

Pakistan as compared to India. And politically it had been granted a right to accede to

Pakistan by the very British terms of Radcliffe Award. But commercially, economically

and strategically it was a State India would not have allowed Pakistan to acquire. The

British/ Congress axis resulted in making a simple matter of partition, one of the most

prolonged and painful disputes in the history of South Asia. Forgotten were the cases of

Hyderabad and Junagadh. The Maharaja, as mentioned earlier, was eventually persuaded

to sign the instrument of accession. It was, however, not till the end of October 1947 that

the state acceded to India, a time spent in maneuverings and manipulations, all aimed to

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deny Pakistan of its rightful hold over the state and also causing the first major conflict

between the two new states. The manner in which the line was drawn in favour of India

has made it a war-torn and desperate land ever since, its people still waiting for a UN

promised plebiscite and paying the ‘price for Mountbatten’s___ and by extension,

Radcliffe’s___ alleged malfeasance.’79

Nothing, however will ever match the massacres and violent out lash of physical

and emotional anger that raged the subcontinent in the summer of 1947. The dislocation

of people has been estimated to twelve million, deaths to more than one million and the

destruction of homes and hearths beyond the grasp of statistics. It was at an early stage,

even before the partition plan was announced, that the authorities in power, particularly

in the Punjab knew that there was no hope of organizing mass population transfer.80 It

had to happen on its own, left to its own situational needs, thus with every possibility of

getting out of control and turning ugly. It was also in the knowledge of the British

administration that the situation was quite out of their control particularly in the Punjab

ever since June, though there had been sporadic instances of violence in March, in

Amritsar, Multan, Jullundhar, Lahore and Rawalpindi but that had been suppressed. The

warnings were loud and clear; all three communities i.e. Hindus, Muslims and the Sikhs

were involved and the casualties were increasing by the day. There was an increase in the

number of incidents of stabbing, burning and as Jenkins put it ‘cloak and dagger’

outrages.81 The Commissioner of Lahore had also reported ominous lull in hostilities in

early June describing the Hindus as ‘sullen and uncooperative’ and the Muslims ‘numbed

and hopeless’; he had also demanded reinforcements in view of large scale attacks, with

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the Sikhs ready to fight till the very end.82 Nehru was bitter and openly reprimanded the

administration for a complete failure in maintaining order even under section 93 and

demanded the sacking of each and every official from the Governor downwards.83 The

Muslim League was perturbed and so was Jinnah, demanding of the administration to

take stern action against the culprits.

Mountbatten’s characteristic urgency had now been replaced by a slow, even at

times non-existent response to repeated appeals of the provincial officials to control the

volcanic rupture of riots and killings in the Punjab. Jenkins as the main governing

authority in the Punjab had been consistently sending signals, asking for help and

asserting how difficult it would be to ‘partition within six weeks a county of thirty

million people which had been governed as a unit for 93 years even if all concerned were

friendly and anxious to make progress.’84 No major response in the shape of large scale

preparations, however, reached the province in time. There was much that could have

been done but for a flimsy acceptance of failure to suppress the outrage. The entire

administrative machinery was still in the British hands along with the army, which could

have effectively provided safety measures. If the government sitting in Whitehall could

be ‘legally and constitutionally responsible’85 to Indians for a smooth transfer of power,

its representative in Delhi could be equally responsible for all law and order situations

created as a result of that transfer. But there seemed to be a major gap in words uttered

earlier and deeds performed later on the actual moment. An Empire had surrendered

before a province, probably not because there was any lack of equipment, resources or

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manpower but because its will to govern had succumbed to an untimely demise, realizing

that it had not much time and no more stakes in India.

It was not only one province that was burning. Bengal was turbulent but it had

seen its share of rioting the previous year in 1946 when Calcutta and Noakhali had been

ravaged by violence.86 It had also been essentially of a communal character and of a

highly organized nature having direct links with institutional politics, its leadership

coming from political parties; the Muslim League for the Muslims and the Hindu

Mahasaba and sections within the Congress for the Hindus.87 The fratricidal riots of 1946

which were unprecedented in Bengal’s history definitely bore ominous signs of further

sequels particularly as partition drew closer. The memories of the ‘Great Calcutta

Killings’ haunted many in the province which could not afford to be thrown into such an

agony again. The announcement of the Boundary Commissions Award for Bengal was

anticipated to create serious trouble,88 but Gandhi’s presence in the riot-stricken areas of

the province considerably calmed the region.89 Again it were not the British who came to

safeguard the populace from another spate of fury. Wavell had already acknowledged the

undermined strength of British administration and the lack of cooperation and support

that it enjoyed from the provincial officials as compared to the past.90 No difference was

recorded when the new Viceroy came and the situation remained volatile and turbulent.

The administration at the top could hardly be relied upon even in the changed

circumstances mainly because the imperial policy was the same, something the local

populace and their leaders were not ignorant of or oblivious to. 91

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As mentioned earlier the slaughter in Punjab that came in the wake of partition

and independence has become a much debated subject of academic and scholarly

discourses. So great was its impact and so deep rooted its effects that it has for long been

a cathartic source of literary outpourings on both sides of the border. Women were a

particular victim who lost homes, loved ones and in many cases even their identities.

Recent studies have concentrated on this tragic aspect, regarding them as the ‘main

victims’; first of ‘abduction’, then of ‘recovery’ against their will in most cases, and third

of ‘rejection’ by their own children ‘born after their abduction but before recovery by

their original families.’92 The savagery was similar to all three communities despite the

differences of religion and a phenomenon particular to partition chaos which had not

been witnessed in earlier communal situations.93 To discuss the human aspect would be a

digression in the present study but the story of partition can never be related in its true

sense if the human factor is overlooked or ignored. In all it is believed 5.5 million Hindus

and Sikhs went over to India and 5.8 million Muslims came to Pakistan in the winter of

1947-48, with the number of dead and displaced ‘impossible to calculate.’94 It was the

Punjab that suffered the most. The third community residing there, that of the Sikhs criss-

crossed the province in a manner that any division of the province was to inevitably

divide them., their irrigation systems and above all their sacred shrines. Being aware of

that, their leaders planned a Muslim Diaspora from East Punjab. The result was violence

and a complete breakdown of authority as rivals went on a rampage of bloodshed and

massacres. Jenkins reported to Mountbatten on 31 May, 1947 that his administration had

been ‘defeated by incendiarism’. He seems to be convinced that Tara Singh and his

associates were directly engaged in instigating and encouraging acts of violence.95 Cases

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of rape, arson, stabbing, looting, burning and killings became a routine in the districts of

Gurgaon, Jullundhar, Gurdaspur and Hoshiarpur. In one case 1500 villages were

destroyed. Whole villages were torched and entire populations eliminated. Lahore and

Amritsar were the worst affected targets of communal frenzy, whose plight Jenkins

compared to ‘London during the fire blitz.’96 It was a ‘living-dying’ moment that

combined the euphoria of independence with the grim and immense sorrow of turbulent

and mass dislocation.

The myth that all this was unexpected or that the intensity of the massacres, loss

of lives, looting and plundering was unanticipated sheds a poor light on the imperial

administration, its ability to determine the gravity of the situation and also its intentions.

Even before the publication of the Boundary Awards the Partition Council seemed to be

anxious and perturbed over the likely possibility of large-scale violence in both the major

affected provinces of the Punjab and Bengal. Arrangements for law and order came up

under discussion at length.97 Jenkins the Governor of Punjab had clearly predicted a

‘considerable muddle’ on 15 August.98 Mountbatten is on record to have received

information about statements made by various instigators of disturbances to the effect of

producing bombs, targeting water headworks and attacking trains of goods from Delhi to

Karachi.99 The name of Master Tara Singh came as one of the masterminds of all this

plotting,100 yet no arrests were made on the pretext that it would further worsen the

situation. Jinnah also blamed Mountbatten that the trouble could have been ‘nipped in the

bud’ if the Sikh leaders had been arrested at the right time, had the Viceroy ‘acted firmly

and put the consensual decision into effect’.101 Mountbatten he believed was working

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mainly under Congress influence.102 That no effective steps were taken when the actual

moment came is an altogether different matter, but the likely arrival of that moment was

very much in mind. Mountbatten does not seem to be oblivious of the administrative

weakness of the situation. Not only this, he had also assured all parties concerned that

there was no chance of any bloodshed or riot and that as a soldier he would put down any

violence by calling out the Army and by using tanks and aircraft if necessary.103

Interestingly, he was talking of an army that had been prohibited of playing its role with

explicit instructions not to be a part of communal upsurge. The British administration was

all along aware of the repercussions of their deeds but preferred to pretend ignorant. It

was convenient to rule, to plan, to take decisions, to grant a time frame, to provide for a

provisional constitution, to divide and to proudly own and celebrate the grant of freedom

to South-Asian states but to be available to draw a line for the violence to end was where

very expediently its jurisdiction ended.

NWFP and Sind were also in danger of chaos and disturbance, especially if the

Muslims started avenging themselves on the migrating Hindus which in case of the latter

province was no small number. In NWFP termed by Mountbatten as ‘the greatest danger

spot in India and the bone of contention’ between Congress and the League,104 the

communal tension had been aggravating ever since the end of 1946. Calcutta rioting had

also aroused the people’s sensitivities. Being a predominantly Muslim Province the

administration had to be cautious of its handling of Hindu population which was accused

of making mischief, particularly in creating food shortage and thus antagonizing the local

populace.105 The Referendum results, however, made public on 20 July 1947 made it

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clear that the Province had opted for Pakistan106, with Congress boycotting its

participation. Once the decision was arrived at and Pashtoon support established for

Pakistan,107 the situation came under a greater degree of control. The dismissal of the

Congress Ministry by the Governor George Cunningham108 and the consequent

disillusionment of the leading party Khudai Khidmatgars with the Congress was very

much visible in the province when the flags of the latter party came to be replaced by

Zalmai Pakhtun flags.109 Despite the anticipation of trouble, and non-acceptance of the

referendum results by a large segment the situation remained largely peaceful with few

scattered incidents of violence reported. Sind was relatively calm and ‘retained its head

while all others around her lost theirs’.110 There were a few miscreants in this area and

riots were also reported but the scale and intensity was not considerable especially if

compared with the Punjab or even the 1946 Bengali turbulence. The minorities, however,

presented a sensitive issue and needed a careful handling as it could lead to trouble,

particularly in view of Congress propaganda in the province.111 Jinnah’s reiteration of the

safeguard of the rights of minorities was a definite step in restoring confidence and

promoting harmony as it was able to allay considerably serious fears and suspicions.112

But partition time went much smoother in these parts as compared to East and

West Punjab which became scenes of ruin and death in all conceivable shapes of human

misery. A long war of succession was what the province was in store for.113 Hindus,

Sikhs and Muslims all became perpetrators of arson, rape, loot, murder and destruction of

private and public holdings. Mosques, Mandirs and Gurduwaras all came equally under

attack. It was a sad and tragic time, more so because it came at an hour which had been

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waited and struggled and sacrificed for decades. The sheer happiness and fulfilling joy of

freedom had been spoiled beyond retrieval by an imperial authority that unfortunately

conducted itself over and above the administrative demands of duty and accountability to

a people it was so ‘graciously awarding independence.’ Reveling in their achievement of

creating two new Dominions as John Smith the Private Secretary to the Governor of

Bengal wrote, they were happy to be able to divide the ‘largest and most troublesome

Provinces in India ___ Bengal and the Punjab.’114 The cost was not theirs to worry about.

Radcliffe’s words that the ‘Viceregal establishment lived in another world apart’ were

just a small echo of the mismanagement and ill-planning that partition became a victim of

in August 1947.115

The debate on the rationale of a flawed partition cannot end here. Though it is a

modest attempt to search for the root cause of the problem it will probably never find a

satisfying answer, agreeable and understood by all parties involved in the historic deed.

In movements of freedom, which are obviously not easy times, especially if there is

partition to take place as well, division of resources and distribution of land and people

has always been the liability of the authorities in power. If they can rule with pride in

peace times, they are also called upon to dispense justice and maintain law and order in

chaotic situations. This latter obligation was missing in the case of Britain’s last hour in

India as the Empire faded and independence dawned for India and Pakistan. As the final

transfer of power was taking shape virtually the ‘whole of North India and much of the

rest of the country was aflame’.116 There were, however, many from among the British

ranks who regretted the manner things had been handled. As Mosley writes that those

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who had worked and lived in India and had come to love that country, would realize in

the years to come how the final days of the British Raj were smeared with so much

unnecessary blood.117 Mountbatten, his advisors and the British Government seemed at a

loss to understand what they had actually been called upon to do. It was by no means a

contest where decisions could be taken off the cuff, but was a real life complex

situation;118 a subcontinent was being divided and the future of millions was uncertain

and perilously hanging on their choices.

Withdrawal of imperial troops was the high watermark of the episode. In the

opinion of many including even the Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck it would have

made a difference had there been an impartial force to regulate, guide and control

affairs.119 A mobilization of troops to guard sensitive areas could have been an effective

deterrent to subversion. Mountbatten’s decision of 9 August that took away the

responsibility of controlling grave disorders from the British Armed Forces, something

they had borne for a century, and putting it on inexperienced shoulders of divided armies,

was a vital mistake.120 The delay in the announcement of the Boundary Commissions

Awards was another blunder that could have saved the fate of Punjab. It was a decision

that cost millions a terrible price given the uncertainty and ambiguity of national

identities. Again Mountbatten seemed overtly engrossed in throwing state banquets,121

sending invitations for exhibitions,122 attending ceremonies and celebrating independence

in all vibrancy, overwhelmed by the unprecedented reception accorded to him by crowds

in Karachi and Delhi,123 rather than worrying about contingency plans to check and

secure the province against much anticipated violence. An avoidable delay of the fateful

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two days led to massacres of unprecedented extremity only because the merriment of the

rulers could go on without interruption and disturbance. Ironically, for the multitudes of

common people, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs of the subcontinent whose freedom it

actually was, independence was planned and implemented in altogether different hues.

Finally it was the confused and contradictory policy on the States that caused permanent

damage to the relations of the two independent states. Mountbatten’s ‘Machiavellian’

tactics and pressures including the use of force124 to bring around the States’ decision was

in itself a rude reminder of the Raj’s devices to control and deliver. He knew that exerting

pressure by causing them to hurry at a soft moment of indecision would lead many to side

with India, admitting that ‘if I can bring in a basket full of States before 15 August,

Congress will pay whatever price I insist on for the Basket.’125 His handling of the States

policy was causing much concern and worry to many quarters including his close British

associates,126 as not only were the people at a disadvantage and the Princes were losing

the game, but the international reputation of the Empire was also at stake.

If Mountbatten’s first impression of Indian situation on his arrival in March 1947

was that of ‘unrelieved gloom’ with no hope of a communal settlement, and no common

ground on which the two political parties could agree,127 speeding up matters was hardly

the answer or the solution to inject optimism. That Partition was brought back from June

1948 to August 1947 has already been talked about in detail but the debate cannot

satisfactorily reach fruition as the British clearly failed to understand the need of a patient

and steady approach to such a complex problem. The violence or carnage and the misery

brought to innumerable souls that could have been avoided or at least minimized by a

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more sustained policy is now in the realm of the ‘ifs and buts’ of historical scrutiny,

though not pardonable by any means. In committing a noble deed, Mountbatten forced

the pace too much128 not realizing the consequences and not accepting the onus. What is

most regrettable is the callous attitude of not taking into consideration the human factor

by taking such hasty decisions and considering that the period to 15 August is fortunately

enough so short that the ‘unbearable strain’ would be over soon, after which there would

be a ‘relaxation of tension.’129 Indeed the let up was to be for the British since post 15

August period was made into one of the most nightmarish times in the history of the

subcontinent. A hurried planning that failed to appreciate the significance of the solemn

task and mismanaged implementation that made a farce of administrative wisdom was

perhaps the method and manner of an Imperial authority to relieve itself of the agonizing

stress. The physical impact was gruesome, but momentary lasting a few months or at the

most a couple of years. The political repercussions, and the emotional and psychological

ramifications, however, have carried their brunt even to the present day. Nations rejoice

when freedom is achieved but in the case of India it came without the natural enthusiasm

with migrants unhappy and reluctant to leave their homes,130 refugees distraught and the

general populace dismayed at the enormity of destruction and death toll, caught in an

atmosphere of fear and suspicion.131 This was the independence of India for which the

nations of the subcontinent had struggled and sacrificed so much in the last century. The

imperial bondage was discarded but not without a huge cost, not only to individual

nations but to the peace of the region in general.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 Meeting of the Partition Council, 27 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 676. 2 Louis Mountbatten to the Earl of Listowel, Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 17, L/ PO /6/ 123, 16 August 1947. 3 Mishandling of Princely States, inappropriate partitions of the Punjab and Bengal, uncomfortable rather thorny controversy of joint Governor-Generalship, inequitable division of assets, mismanaged and ineffective machinery for controlling widespread violence, massacres and administrative weakness and inadequacy in channelizing large scale cross-border migrations thus compounding the miseries of refugees, were a few instances that triggered off a bad start, from which the Imperial authorities cannot by any means be exonerated. 4 Proceedings of a Press Conference held in the Council House, New Delhi, 4 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 113. 5 Indian Independence Act, IOR, L/PO/6/121. 6 H.M. Seervai, Partition of India: Legend and Reality (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 149. 7 E.W.R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954), 166. 8 Lionel Carter, ed., Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty, 22 March- 15 August 1947 (Delhi: Manohar, 2003), 287 9 Report to the Secretary of State on Conditions in India and Pakistan and for the period August 27 to September 20, 1947, IOR/L/I/1/42. 10 Indian Independence Act, Section 8, Clause 1, Basic Constitutional Documents, Islamabad: National Assembly Secretariat , 1979, Vol. 1, 130-131. 11 Sukeshi Kamra, Bearing Witness: Partition, Independence, End of the Raj (Calgary: Calgary University Press, 2002), 171-172. 12 Mountbatten Papers, Doc. 4, 27 June 1947. 13 Record of Interview between Mountbatten and Jinnah, 26 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 451-454. 14 Sharif al Mujahid, Founder of Pakistan: Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah 1876-1948 (Karachi: National Committee for Birth Centenary Celebrations of Quaid-i Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 1976), 143. 15 Viceroy’s Personal Report, 17 April 1947, IOR, L/PO/6/123. 16 Minutes of Viceroy’s Staff Meeting, 28 March 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 35-38. 17 Interview between Mountbatten and Mr. Churchill, 22 May 1947. T.O.P., Vol. 10, 944-946. 18 Interview between Mountbatten and Jinnah, 26 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 451-454. 19 There had been such a provision in the 1935 Act, that ‘unless and until another appointment is made, the person who, immediately before the appointed day, is Governor General of India within the meaning of the Government of India Act, 1935, shall, as from the appointed day, become the Governor-General of each of the Indian Dominions.’ For details see Draft Indian Dominions Bill, L/P&J/10/123. 20 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fortieth Staff Meeting, 9 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 199. 21 Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel, 26 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 674-675. 22 Ismay, Memoirs of Lord Ismay (London: Heinemann, 1960), 429. 23 V.P. Menon suggested that Mountbatten’s appointment would help India on a number of scores, more particularly the Princely States which carried, as he shrewdly gauged, every potential of becoming a major bone of contention. To have Mountbatten in the top most seat would be incredibly helpful. Cited in R.J.Moore, Escape from Empire: Attlee Government and the Indian Problem (London: Oxford University Press, 1983), 319. 24 I.B (47) 41 Meeting, Minute 1, 7 July 1947, PRO, PREM 8/549. 25 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fortieth Staff Meeting, 9 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 199. 26 Mountbatten to Attlee, 4 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 901. 27 Interview between Mountbatten and Jinnah, 23 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 58-583. 28 Ismay to Mountbatten, 20 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 532-535.

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29 Mountbatten to Attlee, 3 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 863. 30 Morris Jones, ‘Transfer of Power 1947’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 16 (June 1982): 29. 31 Viceroy’s personal Report No. 10, 11 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 97. 32 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty Fifth Staff Meeting, 9 July, 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 35. 33 H.M.Seervai, Partition of India: Legend and Reality (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 131. 34 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 11, 4 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 899-900. 35 Lionel Carter, ed., Mountbatten’s Report on the last Viceroyalty, 270-271. 36 Mountbatten Papers, Copy of a note by the Viceroy on the partition of the Armed Forces, Doc.2, 27 June 1947. 37 Sukeshi Kamra, Bearing Witness, 178. 38 Mountbatten Papers, Doc. 3, 24 March 1947. 39 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 10, 27 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 691. 40 Some recent studies have pointed to the fact that the British were insisting upon it to thwart the Russian designs and advances in the region. 41 Draft Indian Dominions Bill, L/P&J/10/123. 42 Mountbatten Papers, Doc.2, 21 June 1947. 43 The Defence Council was to consist of the Governor General or Governors General, the two Defence Ministers and the Commander-in-Chief or alternatively by the partition Council with which would be associated the Defence Members of the two Dominions. Meeting of the Special Committee of the Indian Cabinet, 26 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 654. 44 Linoel Carter, ed., Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty , 270. 45 Sukeshi Kamra, Bearing Witness, 179. 46 Dawn, 13 December, 1947. 47 Report on Ghulam Muhammad’s Press Conference in London, 5 July 1948, IOR, L/P&J/10/119. 48 Report by Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, 8 October 1947, PRO, PREM 8/587. 49 Liaquat Ali Khan even went to the extent of saying that he and Mr. Jinnah will not take over the reins of Government in Pakistan ‘unless they had an army on the spot, and under their control, of the kind that he had mentioned.’ Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, 20 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 534. 50 Mountbatten Papers, Doc.2, 21 June 1947. 51 Jinnah had wished that ‘the withdrawal should not be conducted too quickly as he considered that troubles might possibly rise.’ Strong exception was taken to this remark of Jinnah by Auchinleck who made it clear with a capital NOT that British troops cannot and would not be used or available for any such duty. For details see Field Marshal Auchinleck to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, 26 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 660-661.V 52 Reports by Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of Defence, 26 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 665-668. 53 For details see Farooq Ahmad Dar, ‘Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the Governor General of Pakistan’, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 144-151. 54 Patel to Jinnah, 12 August 1947, NAP, F.48-GG/7-8. 55 The Eastern Times, December 14, 1947. 56 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 344. 57 Minutes of the Meeting of the Cabinet on 18 January 1948, NDC, F. 64/CF/13-4. 58 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 10, 27 June, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 682. 59 Jinnah conveyed his dejection over the unfair handling of partition affairs for which Pakistan had to start from almost a scratch. Jinnah to Attlee, 1 October 1947, NAP, 1523-GG/47. 60 Ismay wrote to his wife that he was ‘furious with Dickie… Does he really forget the millions that are destitute, homeless and without hope? Or does he fail to understand it!’ Quoted in Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, 109. 61 Minutes of Viceroy’s Twenty Fourth Miscellaneous Meeting, 30 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 418. 62 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 10, 11 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 99. 63 Farooq Ahmad Dar, ‘Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the Governor General of Pakistan,’ 228. 64 For details of the history and origins of the Kashmir dispute see Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 43-53. 65 It was one of the most coveted of all the Princely States for its strategic location and trade earnings being a lucrative tourist resort. ‘Kashmir bordered Tibet to the east, China to the north-east, Afghanistan to the

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north-west and the province of Punjab to the south.’ Shereen Ilahi, ‘The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Fate of Kashmir’, India Review, Vol. 2, no 1, (January, 2003): 79. 66 Alex Von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire (London: Simon and Schuster, 2007),304. 67 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Emergence of Pakistan, 286. 68 Hyderabad was another state that had a problematic start. It was a Hindu majority state with a Muslim Nizam and was all sided landlocked by Indian territory. The similarity between the two situations was stark but the British policy almost totally different in both matters. 69 Mountbatten Papers, Doc. 4, 20 June 1947. 70 Sukeshi Kamra, Bearing Witness, 199. 71 Ibid., 194-195. 72 Farooq A Dar, ‘Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the Governor General of Pakistan’, 212. 73 Ibid. 74 New York Times, 11 October, 1947. 75 Manchester Guardian, 21 October, 1947. 76 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993),139-140. 77 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 15, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 450. 78 Ibid., 449. 79 Shereen Ilahi, ‘The Radcliffe Boundary Commission’, 79-80. 80 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirteenth Miscellaneous meeting, 11 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 10, 760. Mountbatten asked Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab about such a possibility but the latter did not consider the prospect of an easy or organized transfer. He rather asked for moving a Division less of a Brigade from Poona to affected areas of the Punjab, in order to control untoward situations created by announcement of partition. 81 Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, 25 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 623. 82 Sir E. Jenkins to Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, 7 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 194-195. 83 Viceroy’s personal Report No. 10. 27 June 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11. 680. Patel, Baldev Singh and the League leaders were equally vehement saying if the situation continued as it was there would hardly be any city to inherit. A ‘shoot at sight’ cry was raised to curb the violence in the province.. 84 Sir E. Jenkins to Rear Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, 30 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 428. 85 Proceedings of a Press Conference in the Council House, 4 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 114. 86 Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal 1905-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 172-192. 87 Ibid., 176. 88 Meeting of the Partition Council, 17 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 207. 89 Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 205. 90 Note by Field Marshal Viscount Wavell of Interview with Muslim League Members of Cabinet, 21 November 1946, T.O.P., Vol. 9, 128. 91 Not everyone was as naïve as Mountbatten. Most of the top ranking officials knew how messed up the entire situation had become. Auchinleck told Savory in September that ‘the sooner we go the better.’ Ismay is also reported to have said to his wife that all seems to be lost, and the British would ‘have to return home with all our work destroyed and leaving behind anarchy, and misery and measureless slaughter.’ Quoted in Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, 109. 92 Ritu Menon, Kamla Bhasin and Urvashi Butalia in their works Borders and Boundaries and The Other Side of Silence respectively have made these issues subjects of their very interesting and thorough research. Quoted in Paul R. Brass, ‘The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab 1946-47, Means, Methods and Purposes’, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 5, no.1 (March 2000): 94. 93 Ibid., 95. 94 Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British Indi,(London: Abacus, 1997), 635-636. 95 Paul R. Brass, ‘The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab,’ 86-87. 96 Jenkins to Mountbatten, 31 May 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 11, 23-27. 97 Meeting of the Partition Council, 17 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 206-208. 98 Sir E. Evan Jenkins to Rear admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, 30 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 425-431.The situation in the Punjab had been discussed at length on many administrative forums and this

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particular note was very lucid about the conditions prevalent in the province with reference to all the communities being charged with rage and employing all means to harm the others. 99 Lionel Carter, Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty, 279. 100 Evan Jenkins had appointed an officer of Punjab Criminal Investigation Department, Mr. savage to coordinate and investigate Intelligence Reports and the name of the Sikh leader Tara Singh came up involved in the planning of most of the subversive activities in the Punjab. 101 Note by Ismay, 5 October 1947, Jinnah Papers, Vol. 5, x. 102 UKHC Convention with Jinnah, 9 December 1947, PRO, FO, 371/69728. 103 H.M.Seervai, Partition of India : Legend and Reality (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 168. 104 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province 1937-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 213. 105 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, North-West Frontier Province: History and Politics (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 2007), 141-142. 106 Ibid., 143. 107 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism, 226. 108 George Cunningham to M.A. Jinnah, 23 August 1947, Jinnah Papers, Vol. 5, 93. 109 Intelligence Report, 22 August 1947, Jinnah Papers, Vol.5, 82-83. 110 Address by the Mayor of Karachi, H.M. Ahson, 25 August 1947, Jinnah Papers, Vol. 5, 109. 111 Syed Hashim Raza, Secretary to the Governor of Sind had invited Jinnah on behalf of the Sind Minorities Association which he believed was appositive sign and if he accepted , it would not only be encouraging but also help greatly in countering the Congress propaganda. For details see S.H.Raza to F. Amin, 22 August 1947, Jinnah Papers, Vol. 5, 90-91. 112 Address by the Mayor of Karachi, H.M.Ahson, 25 August 1947, Jinnah Papers, Vol. 5, 107. 113 Jenkins to Mountbatten, 9 August 1947, T.O.P., Vol 12, 636-637. Mountbatten was also aware of it and accepted the grave communal situation in the province. See Viceroy’s Personal Report16 August 1947, IOR, L/P/6/123. 114 Quoted in Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 206. 115 Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, 113. 116 Jim Masselos, Indian Nationalism (Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1993), 222. Most authors on Partition have agreed that it was the ‘unrealistic’ time schedule that led to the massacre and violence from which no part of the subcontinent could save itself. It was a storm where warring bands went on a rampage of looting and killing in certain case targeted and in others indiscriminate. 117 Leonard Mosley, The last Days of the British Raj (London: Widenfeld & Nicholson, 1964), 286. 118 Sukeshi Kamra, Bearing Witness, 172-173 119 Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, 118. 120 Seervai, Partition of India, 171. 121 Lionel Carter, ed., Mountbatten’s Report on the last Viceroyalty, 278-279. On the night of 13 August he threw a banquet of sixty people before leaving for Karachi, the next day to preside over Pakistan’s official ceremonies for independence. His preoccupation with theses aspects was remarkable when Northern India was on a visible brink of catastrophe. 122 Louis Mountbatten to M.A. Jinnah, 22 August 1947, Jinnah Papers, Vol. 5, 92-93. 123 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 17, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 773-774. 124 The Pakistan Times, 22 June, 1948. 125 Viceroy’s Personal Report, 25 July 1947, IOR, L/PO/6/123. 126 Letter of W.T. Monckton to Lord Ismay on the situation in Hyderabad. He felt particularly sore for the Nizam who in his opinion was not deserving of the kind of treatment being meted out to him only because he had no ‘nuisance value’ any more, whereas the Congress was being unduly accommodated. See Mountbatten Papers, Doc. 10, 9 June, 1947. 127 Mountbatten Papers, Doc. 6, 1 April 1947. 128 Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (London: Abacus, 1997), 638. 129 Mountbatten Papers, Doc. 4, 18 July 1947. 130 Sir E. Jenkins to Rear Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, 30 July 1947, T.O.P., Vol. 12, 427-428. 131 Ibid., 428.

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CONCLUSION

The history of Partition is still an alive and active subject, a work in progress with

many projects undergoing archival research and enquiry. The present study engages with

the flaws of a plan that attempted to rescue nations from the imperial Raj but failed to

create stable state entities, particularly in case of Pakistan. ‘Historians of Partition’, in the

words of Joya Chatterji, ‘all of whom have been interested in the political rather than the

administrative issues involved, have tended to end their stories with the 3 June Plan.’1 It

is true that the struggle for independence had a long past and the acceptance of freedom

and partition by the British seem to be a culmination of the historic effort of centuries.

Yet the recognition of the demand was only a milestone; the journey onward to attaining

an actual sovereign status was an equally stupendous task. In fact it was only the

beginning and the scenario that comes to surface is a complex and intricate account of

one of the most sensitive chapters in the entire history of the world. Moreover, the

intense ideological overtones of imperial historiography of Partition, that was suggestive

of an altogether different and largely unsympathetic imperial mindset, needs to be

reviewed and reconstructed. It was basically an attempt on the part of British ideologues

to rationalize and justify the mistakes of the elite. For a fresh understanding of the history

of Partition, a critically evaluated and objective approach is needed, based more upon

nationalistic aspirations than imperialistic explanations. The latter approach only

distorted the conceptual framework of Partition historiography, making Mountbatten’s

assertion, that once partition was complete, ‘the Indian leaders would regret the decision

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they had taken.’ This theme as a supporting base could only lead to creating an erroneous

historical edifice. And that is what it did.

Lord Mountbatten’s role was of a defining nature. At the cross roads of Indian

destiny he assumed the decisive position of an arbiter and an administrator. Crucial but in

no way one of the best times to be in the job, he managed a degree of optimism and hope.

What was required of him was to guarantee the same to the Indians as well. He arrived in

India in March 1947 as the Governor General, abruptly and prematurely ending Lord

Wavell’s term, with not only unprecedented powers but a timetable for Indian

independence. Later that came to be associated with partition as well. But his leanings

towards the Congress and in particular his friendly terms with Nehru, the most

authoritative, influential and vocal Hindu leader, upset the role of an impartial arbiter that

he was sent to play as the last Viceroy. He failed to strike a balance in his dealings with

the other political parties, especially Jinnah the leader of the Muslim League, with whom

he was never able to develop any rapport and the final connection, if there was any,

snapped when the issue of a common Governor-General arose. Ismay believed that he

lacked the quintessential Viceregal quality___impartiality. The high moral standards set

by earlier Viceroys were by no means matched by Mountbatten; they were mainly

architects and he was a ‘demolition engineer’, the nature of whose work called for an

altogether different approach. The tilted policy of the last Viceroy did much harm to the

planning for Partition which could have run smoothly otherwise. It seems not a far

fetched idea that had Mountbatten followed the advice of Gandhi, Jinnah or Suharwardy,

instead of listening only to Nehru and to some extent Patel, Punjab and Bengal might

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have been spared their deadly horrors, and a united Bangladesh, with its developed

capital in Calcutta, would have emerged instead of the impoverished Bangladesh born

from its eastern half a quarter century later.

The British liaison with Congress was something that had assumed new

dimensions during the preparations for partition. The Muslim League was not unmindful

of it. Jinnah in particular knew how to safeguard the Muslim interest. It was not

‘bargain’, instead a compromise that he made by accepting an amputated and truncated

Pakistan. The other option was a Hindu Raj, unacceptable at any cost. Jinnah was clear

that to save his community from Hindu domination was definitely worth the miseries of

Partition. The Indian leaders, neither Nehru nor Gandhi could ever fully comprehend the

depth of Muslim misgivings about a Hindu Raj, or could ever understand the nature of

Jinnah’s passion for Pakistan that ultimately became the voice of millions. It was a hard

task to convince the British upon the partition of India but more so in the case of the

Congress with Gandhi as its most vocal and staunch supporter on the issue. Once the

acceptance became available the Congress began to insist upon the partition of Punjab in

the hope that if the Muslim League realized that the grant of Pakistan was dependent

upon a partition of the Punjab, they would react against Pakistan. This was not to be as

the Muslims had by now come to realize what their fate would be in an un-partitioned

United India. The League had learnt its lesson fighting on many fronts with a score of

enemies, all bent upon turning Pakistan into a catastrophe and a disaster. Pakistan was,

nonetheless created. The casualty was the peace of the region as the seeds were sown,

first by ‘divide and rule’ and then ‘demolish and run’ policy of the Imperial rulers.

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Partition had come to be accepted, even though reluctantly, by the British as well

as the Congress, which it did as late as April 1947. Its preparations started with the arrival

of Mountbatten when it came to be realized that the Cabinet Mission Plan was dead and

not acceptable to the parties either as a solution or an alternative. The 3rd June Plan came

as the situational remedy of the political crisis and began to be worked upon with fervent

activity. Time was the biggest constraint. An ‘off the cuff’ remark by Mountbatten had

decided the time that was to be given to the planning for India’s Partition_____seventy

two days in all____a fateful error indeed. The antedating of partition from June 1948 to

August 1947 led to a hurried and largely mismanaged scuttle, that would not stop even

with the entire subcontinent being set ablaze with all kinds of conceivable violence,

bringing about a total breakdown of administrative machinery. Mountbatten was of the

opinion that the two sides were completely irreconcilable, and the possibility of their

coming together on one platform in any type of executive government was so remote that

unless something was done at once and with speed, there would be a complete

breakdown followed by civil disorders, and ultimately no authority to rule with or

delegate to. However, as things turned out, nothing could have been as bad as what

ultimately happened. If Mountbatten thought that ‘the need for speed had arisen from the

deplorable deterioration in the situation over the last eight months, the British might as

well have got back to London in 1895.’2 Leaving much to the goodwill of the executors,

which was fundamentally paramount, the Viceroy had tried to play the good

administrator by acknowledging in the earlier stages of its drafting that it was hardly the

perfect plan and depended much upon the support from all sections of the Indian political

life. But giving sufficient time to them was equally imperative. Although it was not a bad

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start, its approval from London and execution in Delhi was all that mattered in the final

analysis, on which depended the political and strategic contours of the subcontinent. This

by any definition was a British responsibility.

The ‘Partitioner’s Axe’ as the Radcliffe Award has come to be properly

remembered, implemented the plan with equal speed and even lesser expertise. The

Boundary Commissions set up for the partition of the Punjab and Bengal had a difficult

and strenuous task, but also one that demanded independent and undisclosed functioning.

The latter was not accomplished in the strict meaning of the term. Despite the

pronouncements of both Radcliffe and Mountbatten to the contrary, the Award, its timing

and announcement were tampered with and influenced by political imperatives of the

statesmen sitting both in Delhi and London. The result was dissection of the Indian

subcontinent, a country of 400 million, in a manner that led to the worst massacres for

which researchers have started using the laden terminology of a ‘South Asian holocaust’.3

Two nations were born and their boundaries split in seven weeks in a manner that the

three affected communities___ Hindus, Muslims and the Sikhs___ had no idea of their

national identification or national borders, with little sense of the place in which they

were located, on the wrong sides of the border, so to speak. The upheaval and the havoc

thus played upon innocent populace has become an ugly smear upon the administrative

acumen of the British policy makers. Instead of accepting the responsibility even in a

minor degree, Mountbatten placed the onus on the Indians even of the findings and

implications of the Radcliffe Award. To him it were the Indian leaders who selected the

personnel of the Boundary Commissions including the Chairman, who drew up the terms

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of reference and who should therefore shoulder the responsibility for implementing the

award. It was indeed a strange logic when the imperial authority was very much there and

still effectively working.

The turbulent legacy of Kashmir dispute was the major bequest of the Radcliffe

Award and a sad imprint of the flawed planning, that gave to India and Pakistan their

freedom. A States problem gone sour, its implications were not properly understood by

those who tried to manipulate it to their interest. Few in position of authority realize that

the ‘unhappy Kashmir saga will continue to the benefit of none and the detriment of all.’

Nehru’s claim that India being a secular state where the rights of the minorities were

adequately safeguarded, was therefore, perfectly justified to demand and retain Kashmir’s

accession. It was only an excuse not to undo the take over. He obviously and

conveniently did not remember the manipulation that went into making Kashmir a part of

India, and in which he had an aggressive part to play. Mass migration was another

problem that hardly seemed to have been considered at the time of planning. Needless to

say it created a greater problem for the two states than many others, left largely to be

grappled by the new governments. It was a fatal mistake that was the outcome of

confused thinking and ill planning at a very critical moment in history. However, the

hurriedly improvised, flawed plan was made workable as the last available option. The

plan to partition India and the efforts to implement it evolved in an atmosphere of

confusion, complexity and mistrust which the British authorities were unable to dispel or

dismiss. No attempt was made to decrease the impact either. On the contrary they

themselves fell a victim to the intrigue and prejudice which was so much a part of the

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communal life of the last days of united India. Gandhi had warned them ‘not to be a party

in any way whatsoever to the division of India’ which would in his opinion be a blunder

of the first magnitude. In fact, they added to it a reluctance that was unworthy of an

empire, one that was already in retreat. An easy, well-meaning acceptance of Partition on

the part of the British, could have averted much chaos, anarchy and disorder.

Attlee’s announcement of 20 February for British withdrawal was the proposal, 3

June Plan was the roadmap, Boundary Commissions the work place and Radcliffe Award

the outcome of the Partition work. A combination of these gave enough control and

maneuverability to the British for organizing and planning a concise, effective and

workable solution. But the opportunity was not taken in a spirit of sympathetic

understanding. As the plan to divide and quit was being finalized, the Viceroy remained

unshaken in his belief and desire that a unified India was by far the best solution of the

problem, and that the Cabinet Mission Plan provided ‘the best arrangement that can be

devised to meet the interests of all the communities of India’, that have amicably welded

together into an entity and enjoyed the great advantages and integrated blessings of

unified existence. If the planning was being conceived with such disinclination to divide,

as the Viceroy remained ‘violently opposed to partition’ the implementation was likely to

be mismanaged and flawed. A final point must relate to the retaining of the British

Armed Forces in India during the stormy days of Partition. If these forces could be used

for law and order situations created so many times in the last century, strict instructions

not to involve them in ‘matters of internal peace and security’ were quite

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incomprehensible. The apathy these orders reflect, failed to create an imperial image that

Mountbatten had so wanted in the last days and weeks of British Empire in India.

Partition of India is behind us but we are still caught in its narrative, as it stands

very much to be a current reality, now and then ‘socially remembered and rhetorically

invoked’. The question, that could the tragedy of colossal human loss of lives, the

misgivings created in the hearts and souls of the Indian populace, the upsurge of violent

revenge time and again and the almost permanent clouds of strained relationship between

India and Pakistan, could be averted, has been answered by most, at least to date, in the

negative. But what actually happened and who was responsible for the ‘migrations, and

the horrendous and atrocious violence’ that accompanied partition has to find a body

responsible and accountable ‘for not preventing, or failing to control’ the slaughter. The

wholesale transfer of populations, that was largely responsible for the tragic outcome,

was not in the interest of any national community residing in India, either Muslims, Sikhs

or Hindus, and their leaders felt helpless at how events overtook them, dictated the course

of their policy and influenced their decisions, generating fears and uncertainties. They

had been reduced to mere spectators overtaken and overwhelmed by the tumultuous

shape of events, surrendering their ‘wits as it were to Lord Mountbatten.’ Their response

to situations was significantly different from each other but was nonetheless reflective of

common sufferings and sacrifices. A dream had come true but with it, had shattered so

many others on an individual level, the memory of which has become a legendary tale of

sacrifice and also of unspoken sadness. It were the imperial executors of power that did

not prove worthy of a role that destiny had handed them down. An Empire had ended but

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in making the retreat, it was unable to effectively negotiate the twists and turns of an

arduous journey, much to the impairment of the land it had ruled for so long.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

.

1 Joya Chatterji, ‘The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal’s Border Landscape, 1947-52’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, Feb., 1999, 187. 2 It was evident that neither Mountbatten nor the members of the Cabinet Mission were conscious of the gradual but steady deterioration in the political and communal situation. It was definitely not of the making of the last few months. Had the British realized it, the end could have been different. For details see Minutes of Viceroy’s Twenty Fourth Staff Meeting, 1 May 1947, T.OP., Vol. 10, 523. 3 Many authors of South Asian and in particular of Partition history have used the term holocaust for the carnage and bloodshed that resulted as a consequence of Britain’s winding up of the Indian Empire in 1947. Most recently a study by Madhav Godbole, is titiled as The Holocaust of Indian Partition: An Inquest, New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2007.

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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES

a) UNPUBLISHED India Office Record, London (IOR)

Biographical Records (O) Information Department Record (L/I) Parliamentary Branch Record (L/PARL) Political and Secret Department Records (L/P&S) Private Office Papers (L/PO) Public and Judicial Department Record (L/P&J) Record Department Papers (L/R)

Private Papers, London (MSS)

Attlee Collection, (MSS EUR. 212) Corfield Collection, (EUR. D. 844) Cunningham Collection, (MUR EUR. D. 670) Jenkins Papers, (EUR D. 807) Mountbatten Papers, (EUR F. 200) Mudie Collection, (EUR F. 164) Wavell Collection, (MSS EUR. D. 9771/1-18) Zetland Collection, (MSS EUR. F. 77)

212

Public Record Office (PRO)

Record of the Cabinet Office (CAB) Record of the Prime Ministers Office (PREM

National Archives, Islamabad (NAP)

Freedom Movement Archives (FMA) Quaid-i-Azam Papers (QAP)

National Documentation Centre, Islamabad (NDC)

Cabinet Files (CF) Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence (PPAI)

213

b) PUBLISHED A History of the Freedom Movement. Vols. I-IV, Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1970. Allana, G. ed., Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents. Karachi; University of Karachi, 1967. Carter, Lionel. Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty 22 March-15 August 1947.New Delhi: Mnohar, 2003. Chopra, P.N. ed. Towards Freedom 1937-47. New Delhi: India Council of Historical Research, 1985. Disturbances in the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents. Vols. I-IV, Islamabad: National Documentation Centre, 1995. Gwyer, Maurice and A. Appadorai. eds., Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921- 1947. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches. Vol. 1. Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1983. Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947-48. With an introduction by S.M. Burke. Oxford University Press, 2000. Mansergh, Nicholas, and Penderel Moon. eds. Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-47. Vol. 1. The Cripps Mission, January-April 1942. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1970. _____________.eds. Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-47. Vol. 2. Quit India, 30 April-21 September 1942. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1971. _____________.eds. Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-47. Vol. 3. Reassertion of Authority: Gandhi’s

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____________.eds. Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: Transfer of Power 1942-47. Vol. 12. The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Princes, Partition and Independence, 8 July-15 August 1947, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1983. The Partition of the Punjab. Vols. I-IV. Lahore: National Documentation Centre, 1983. Moon, Penderel. ed. Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1974. Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin. ed., Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents, 1906-1947. Vols. I-II, Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970. Settar, S., and Indira B. Gupta. eds., Pangs of Partition, Vol. I, The Parting of Ways, and vol. II, The Human Dimension. Delhi: Manohar and the Indian Council of Historical Research, 2002. Sherwani, Latif Ahmad. Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan (A Selection of Documents Presenting the case for Pakistan). Karachi: National Publishing House, 1969. Singh, Kirpal. ed., Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab 1947: India and Pakistan. New Delhi: National Bookshop, 1991. The Collected Works of Mahatama Gandhi, Vol. LXXXVIII. New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1983. The Collected Works of MahatamaGandhi, Vol. LXXXIX. New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1983. The Collected Works of Mahatama Gandhi, Vol. XC. New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1984.

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Zaidi, Z.H. ed. Jinnah Papers. Vol. I, Prelude to Partition, 20 February- 2 June 1947. Part 1. Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, 1993. ________. ed. Jinnah Papers. Vol. 1. Prelude to Partition, 20 February-2 June 1947, Part II, Islamabad, Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, 1993. ________. ed. Jinnah Papers. Vol. II. Pakistan in the Making, 3 June-30 July 1947. Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, 1994. ________ .ed. Jinnah Papers. Vol. III. On the Threshold of Pakistan, 1 July-25 July 1947. Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, 1996. ________.ed. Jinnah Papers. Vol. IV. Pakistan at Last, 26 July- 14 August 1947. Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, 1999. ________.ed. Jinnah Papers. Vol. V. Pakistan: Pangs of Birth, 15 August-30 September 1947. Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, 2000.

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SECONDARY SOURCES a) BOOKS Ahmad, Aziz. Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967. Ahmad, Jamil-ud-Din. Final Phase of Struggle for Pakistan. Karachi: International Press, 1965. Ahmad, Jamil-ud-Din. Creation of Pakistan. Lahore: Publishers United, 1976. Ahmad, N. Muslim Separatism in British India: A Retrospective Study. Lahore: Ferozesons, 1991. Allana, G. Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: The Story of a Nation. Lahore: Ferozesons Ltd., 1967. Ali, Chaudhri. Muhammad. Emergence of Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Ambedkar, B.R. Pakistan or the Partition of India. Lahore: Book Traders, 1967. Awan, A.B. Baluchistan: Historical and Political Processes. London: New Century Publishers, 1985. Azad, Abul Kalam. India Wins Freedom. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1960. Aziz, K.K. The Making of Pakistan. London: Chattoo & Windus, 1967.

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Barnes, John, and David Nicholsaon. eds. The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amrey Diaries. London: Hutchinson, 1988. Bernard, Jean Alphonse. From Raj to Republic: A Political History of India 1935-2000. New Delhi: HarAnand Publications, 2001. Beverley, Nicholas. Verdict on India. Bombay: Thacker & Co., 1946. Bhattarcharjea, Ajit. Countdown to Partition: The Final Days. New Delhi: Harper Collins, 1998. Bourke-White, M. Halfway to Freedom. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1950. Brecher, Michael. Nehru: A Political Biography. London: Oxford University Press, 1959. Bresseg, Taj Muhammad. Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004. Butalia, Urvashi. The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000. Chand, Tara. History of the Freedom Movement in India. Lahore: Book Traders, 1972. Chakrabarty, Bidyut. The Partition of Assam and Bengal: Contour of Freedom. London: Routledge, 2004. Chatterjee, Joya. Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Chopra, Pran. Uncertain India: A Political Profile of Two Decades of Freedom. London: The MIT Press, 1968. Collins, Larry, and Dominique Lapierre. Freedom at Midnight. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975.

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Collins, Larry, and Dominique Lapierre. Mountbatten and the Partition of India. New Delhi: Vikas, 1982. Clarke, Peter. The Cripps Version. London: Allen Lane, 2002. Das, Suranjan. Communal Riots in Bengal 1905-1947. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993. Dawarkada, Kanji. Ten Years to Freedom. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1968. Edwardes, Michael. The Last Years of British India. London: Cassell, 1963. French, Patrick. Liberty or Freedom: India’s Journey to Independence and Division. London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997. Gilmartin, David. Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. Godbole, Madhav. The Holocaust of Indian Partition: An Inquest. New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2007. Golant, William. The Long Afternoon: British India 1601-1947. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1975. Hameed, Abdul. Muslim Separatism in India: A Brief Survey 1858-1947. Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1971. Hamid, Shahid. Disastrous Twilight: A Personal Record of the Partition of India. London: Leo Cooper, 1986. Hansen, Anders Bjorn. Partition and Genocide: Manifestations of Violence in Punjab, 1937-1947. Delhi: India Research Press, 2002. Hardy, P. The Muslims of British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

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Hasan, Mushirul. ed., India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993. _____________. ed. Inventing Boundaries: Gender, Politics and the Partition of India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000. Heward, Edmund. The Good and the Great: A Life of Lord Radcliffe. Chechester: Barry Rose, 1994. Hodson, H.V. The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan. London: Huthchinson, 1969. Ikram, S.M. Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1965. Ismay. The Memoirs of Lord Ismay. London: Heinemann, 1960. Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. James, Lawrence. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India, London: Abacus, 1997. Johnson, Alan Campbell. Mission with Mountbatten. New York: Dutton and Co., 1953. Kamra, Sukeshi. Bearing Witness: Partition, Independence, End of the Raj. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002. Karaka, D.F. Betrayal in India. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1950. Kaul, Suvir. ed. The Partitions of Memory: The Afterlife of the Divisions of India. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. Khaliquzzaman, Choudhary. Pathway to Pakistan. Lahore: Longmans, 1961. Khan, Yasmin. The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan, London: Yale University Press, 2007.

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Kholsa, G.D. Stern Reckoning: The Survey of the Events Leading up to and following the Partition of India. New Delhi: Bhawani and Sons, 1952. Lamb, Alastair. Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994. _____________. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993. Lohia, Ram Manohar. Guilty Men of India’s Partition. Allahbad: Navahind: 1960. Low, D.A. and Howard Brasted. eds. Freedom, Trauma, Continuities: Northern India and Independence. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998. Lumby, E.W.R. The Transfer of Power in India 1945-47. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954. Mahajan, Sucheta. Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India. Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000. Majumdar, R.C. History of the Freedom Movement in India. Lahore: Book Traders, 1963. Mansergh, Nicholas. Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs. London: Oxford University Press, 1958. Masselos, Jim. Indian Nationalism. Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1993. Mehrotra, S.R. Toward’s India’s Freedom and Partition. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979. Menon, Ritu, and Kamla Bhasin. Borders and Boundaries: Women in India’s Partition. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998. Menon, V.P. The Transfer of Power in India. Bombay: Orient Longman, 1957.

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Metcalfe, Barbara and Thomas. A Concise History of Modern India. New Delhi, Cambridge University Press, 2008. Michel, A.A. The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Moon, Penderel. Divide and Quit. London: Chattoo & Windus, 1946. Moore, R.J. Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963. __________. Churchill, Cripps and India: 1939-45. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. Mosley, Leonard. The Last Days of the British Raj. London: Widenfeld & Nicholson, 1964. Mujtaba, Syed Ali. The Demand for Partition of India and the British Policy. Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2002. Mujahid, Sharif al. Founder of Pakistan: Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah 1876-1948. Karachi: National Committee for Birth Centenary Celebrations of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 1976. Muller, Edmund, and Arun Bhattacharjee. India Wins Independence ( A Connected Historical Narration of India’s Freedom struggle). New Delhi: Asish Publishing House, 1988. Munawwar, Muhammad. Dimensions of Pakistan Movement. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1987. Nanda, B.R. The Making of a Nation: India’s Road to Independence. New Delhi: Harper Collins, 1998. Nanda, J. Punjab Uprooted. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1948. Pandey, B.N. The Break-up of British India. London: Macmillan, 1969.

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Pandey, Gyanendra. Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism, and History in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Panigrahi, D.N. India’s Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat. London: Routledge, 2004. Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin. Evolution of Pakistan. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House , 1987. Prasad, Rajendra. India Divided. New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1986. Qureshi, I.H. The Struggle for Pakistan. Karachi: University of Karachi, 1965. Rai, Satya. Partition of the Punjab. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965. Roberts, Andrew. Eminent Churcillians. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1994. Sayeed, Khalid bin. Pakistan: The Formative Phase. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1978. Schechtman, J.B. Population Transfer in Asia. New York: Hallsby, 1949. Schofield, Field. Wavell: Soldier and Statesman. London: John Murray, 2006. Seervai, H.M. Partition of India: Legend and Reality. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003. Sen, Sachin. Birth of Pakistan. Calcutta: General Printers and Publishers, 1955. Shah, Sayed Wiqar Ali. Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim politics in the North-West Frontier Province 1937-47. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999. _________________ North-West Frontier Province: History and Politics. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 2007.

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Sharma, Jagdish. India’s Struggle for Freedom. New Delhi: S. Chand and Co. Ltd., 1987. Sherwani, Latif Ahmad. The Partition of India and Mountbatten. Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1986. Singh, Amarjit. Punjab Divided: Politics of the Muslim League and Partition, 1935-1947. Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 2001. Singh, Amrik. ed., The Partition in Retrospect. (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers and Distributors, 2000. Singh, Anita Inder. The Origins of the Partition of India 1936-47. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987. Sondhi, K. Uprooted. New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 1977. Spate, O.H.K. On the Margins of History: From the Punjab to Fiji. Canberra: Australia National University, 1991. Spear, Percival. India: A Modern History. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1961. Stephens, Ian. Horned Moon. London: Chattoo & Windus, 1954. __________. Pakistan. London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1967. Symonds, Richard. The Making of Pakistan. London: Faber & Faber, 1950. _______________ In the Margins of Independence: A Relief Worker in India and Pakistan 1942-1949. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001. Talbot, Ian. Freedom’s Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in North-West India. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996. __________ Khizr Tiwana: The Unionist Party and the Partition of India. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002.

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Talbot, Ian, and Guruharpal Singh. eds., Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Tan, Tai Yang, and Gyanesh Kudaisya. The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia. London: Routledge, 2000. Tayyeb, Ali. Pakistan: A Political Geography. London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Tinker, Hugh R. Experiment with Freedom: India and Pakistan 1947. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Tirmazi, S.A.I. The Paradoxes of Partition, 1937-1947. Delhi: Centre for Federal Studies, Hamdard University, 1998. Tucker, Francis. While Memory Serves. London: Cassell, 1950. Tunzelmann, Alex Von. Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire. London: Simon & Schuster, 2007. Wainwright, Mary Doreen, and C.H. Philips. eds., The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives 1937-47. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970. Wheeler-Bennett, John W. King George VI. London: Reprint Society, 1959. Wofford, Clare and Harris. India Afire. New York: The John Day Company, 1951. Wolpert, Stanley. A New History of India. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. _____________. Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006. Zamindar, Vazira- Fazila Yaqoobali. The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008.

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Ziring, Lawrence, Ralph Braibanti, and W. Howard Wriggins. eds., Pakistan: The Long View. Durham: Centre for Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, 1977. b) ARTICLES IN JOURNALS Brass, Paul R. “The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab 1946-47: Means, Methods and Purposes.” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no.1 (March 2003):71-101. Brown, Judith. “Gandhi and Nehru. Frustrated Visionaries?” History Today 47, no. 9 ( September 1997):22-27. Campbell-Johnson, Alan. “Mountbatten and the Transfer of Power.” History Today 47, no. 9 (September 1997):34-40. Chatterji, Joya. “The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal’s Border Landscape 1947-52.” Modern Asian Studies 33, no. 1 (February 1999):185-242. Davis, Kingsley. “India and Pakistan: The Demography of Partition.” Pacific Affairs 22, no. 3 (September 1949):254-264). Gilmartin, David. “Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative.” The Journal of Asian Studies. 57, no. 4 (November 1998):1068-1095.

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Gorrie, R.Maclagan. “Countering Desiccation in the Punjab.” Geographical Review 38, no. 1 (January 1948):30-40. Hewitt, Vernon. “Kashmir: The Unanswered Question.” History Today 47, no. 9 (September 1997):60-64. Jalal, Ayesha. “Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship Issue.” Modern Asian Studies 19, no. 1 (1985):29-53. Jeffrey, Robin. “The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problem of Order, August 1947.” Modern Asian Studies 8, no. 4 (1947):491-520. Johnson, Gordon. “Indian Independence.” Asian Affairs 16, no.3 (October 1985):254-264. Kaufman, Chaim D. “When All Else Fails: Ethnic population Transfers and partitions in the Twentieth Century.” International Security 23, no. 2 (Autumn 1998):120-156. Kumar, Radha. “The Troubled History of Partition.” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (January 1997):22-34. Morris-Jones. W.H. “Thirty-Six Years Later: The Mixed Leagacies of Mountbatten’s Transfer of Power.” International Affairs 59, no. 4 (Autumn 1983):621-628. Mushirul Hasan. “Partition: The Human Cost.” History Today 47, no. 9(September 1997):47-53. Philips, Cyril. “Was the partition of India Inevitable?” Asian Affairs 17, no. 3 (October 1986):243-251. Robinson, Francis. “The Muslims and Partition.” History Today 47, no. 9 (September 1997):40-46. Shreen, Illahi. “The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Fate of Kashmir.” India Review 2, no. 1(January 2003):77-102.

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Spate, O.H.K. “The Partition of the Punjab and of Bengal.” The Geographical Journal 110, no. 4/6 (October- December 1947):201-218. ___________. “Geographical Aspects of the Pakistan Scheme.” The Geographical Journal 102, no. 3 (September 1943):125-136. __________. “The Partition of India and the Prospects of Pakistan.” Geographical Review 38, no. 1 (January 1948):5-29. Spear, Percival. “Britain’s Transfer of Power in India.” Pacific Affairs 31, no. 2 (June 1958):173-180. Symonds, Richard. “State Making in Pakistan.” Far Eastern Survey 19, no. 5 (March 1950):45-50. Talbot, Ian. “Mountbatten and the Partition of India: A Rejoinder” History 69, no. 225 (1984):29-35. Tinker, Hugh. “Pressure, Persuasion, Decision: Factors in the partition of the Punjab August 1947.” The Journal of Asian Studies 36, no. 4 ( August 1977): 695-704. __________. “Jawaharlal Nehru at Simla, May 1947. A Moment of Truth.” Modern Asian Studies 4, no. 4 (1970):349-358.

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c) RESEARCH JOURNALS * Asian Affairs. London. * Asian Profile. Hong Kong. * Asian Survey. California. * Indian Quarterly. New Delhi. * Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. Madras. * Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. Villanova. * Modern Asian Studies. Cambridge. * The Muslim World. Hartford. * Pakistan Horizon. Karachi. * Pakistan Journal of History and Culture. Islamabad. * Pakistan Quarterly. Karachi. * South Asian Studies. Lahore. * Third World Quarterly. London. * World Affairs. Washington. * World Politics. Princeton. * Economic and Political Weekly. Mumbai. * Journal of South Asian Literature. Michigan.

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* Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. London. * Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History. London * Journal of Asian Studies. London. * Indian Economic and Social History Review. London. * Subaltern Studies. Delhi. * International Security. Boston. * History Today. London. * International Affairs. London. * History. Exeter. * Pacific Affairs. British Columbia. * Geographical Review. New York. * Far Eastern Survey. New York. * India Review. Philadelphia. * Journal of Genocide Research. London. * Journal of Contemporary History. California. d) NEWSPAPERS * Civil and Military Gazette. Lahore. * Comrade. Delhi. * Dawn. Delhi. Karachi. * Daily Gazette. Karachi. * The Hindu. Madras. * Hindustan Standard. Calcutta. * Imroze. Lahore. * Inqilab. Lahore. * Manchester Guardian. Manchester. * The Leader. Allahbad. * Morning News. Calcutta. * Nawa-i-Waqt. Lahore. * Paisa Akhbar. Lahore. * The Pakistan Times. Lahore. * The Patriot. Lahore. * Star of India. Calcutta. * The Statesman. Delhi.

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* Daily Telegraph. London. * The Times. London. * Tribune. Ambala. * Zamindar. Lahore. * The Hindustan Times. New Delhi. e) UNPUBLISHED Ph.D. DISSERTATIONS Chawala, Muhammad Iqbal, “Lord Wavell and Muslim Politics in India.” Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. 2007. Dar, Farooq Ahmad, “Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the Governor General of Pakistan”. Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2008. Syed, Javed Haider, “The Political Development in Baluchistan in the Last Decade of the British Raj.” National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2005.

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX I

Indian Policy, Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s Statement of 20 February, 1947

1. It has long been the policy of successive British Government to work towards the realization of self-government in India. In pursuance of this policy an increasing measure of responsibility has been devolved on Indians and to-day the civil administration and the Indian Armed Forces rely to a very large extent on Indian civilians and officers. In the constitutional field the Acts of 1919 and 1935 passed by the British Parliament each represented a substantial transfer of political power. In 1940 the Coalition Government recognised the principle that Indians should themselves frame a new constitution for a fully autonomous India, and in the offer of 1942 they invited them to set up a Constituent Assembly for this purpose as soon as the war was over. 2. His Majesty’s Government believe this policy to have been right and in accordance with sound democratic principles. Since they came into office, they have done their utmost to carry it forward to its fulfillment. The declaration of the Prime Minister of 15th March last which met with general approval in Parliament and the country, made it clear that it was for the Indian people themselves to choose their future status and constitution and that in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government the time had come for responsibility for the Government of India to pass into Indian hands. 3. The Cabinet Mission which was sent to India last year spent over three months in consultation with Indian leaders in order to help them to agree upon a method for determining the future constitution of India, so that the transfer of power might be smoothly and rapidly effected. It was only when it seemed clear that without some initiative from the Cabinet Mission agreement was unlikely to be reached that they put forward proposals themselves. 4. These proposals, made public in May last, envisaged that the future constitution of India should be settled by a Constituent Assembly composed, in the manner suggested therein, of representatives of all communities and interests in British India and of the Indian States. 5. Since the return of the Mission an Interim Government has been set up at the Centre composed of the political leaders of the major communities exercising wide powers within the

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existing constitution. In all the Provinces Indian Governments responsible to Legislatures are in office. 6. It is with great regret that His Majesty’s Government find that there are still differences among Indian Parties which are preventing the Constituent Assembly from functioning as it was intended that it should. It is of the essence of the plan that the Assembly should be fully representative. 7. His Majesty’s Government desire to hand over their responsibility to authorities established by a constitution approved by all parties in India in accordance with the Cabinet Mission’s plan, but unfortunately there is at presence no clear prospect that such a constitution and such authorities will emerge. The present state of uncertainty is fraught with danger and cannot be indefinitely prolonged. His Majesty’s Government wish to make it clear that it is their definite intention to take the necessary steps to effect the transference of power into responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948. 8. This great sub-continent now containing over 400 million people has for that last century enjoyed peace and security as a part of the British Common wealth and Empire. Continued peace and security are more than ever necessary to-day if the full possibilities of economic development are to be realized and a higher standard of life attained by the Indian people. 9. His Majesty’s Government are anxious to hand over their responsibilities to a Government which, resting on the sure foundation of the support of the people, is capable of maintaining peace and administering India with Justice and efficiency. It is therefore essential that all parties should sink their differences in order that they may be ready to shoulder the great responsibilities which will come upon them next year. 10. After months of hard work by the Cabinet Mission a great measure of agreement was obtained as to the method by which a constitution should be worked out. This was embodied in their statements of May last. His Majesty’s Government there agreed to recommend to Parliament a constitution worked out, in accordance with the proposals made therein, by a fully representative Constituent Assembly. But if it should appear that such a constitution will not have been worked out by a fully representative Assembly before the time mentioned in paragraph 7, His Majesty’s Government will have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over, on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of central Government for British India or in some areas to the existing Provincial Governments, or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people.

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11. Although the final transfer of authority may not take place until June 1948, preparatory measures must be put in hand in advance. It is important that the efficiency of the civil administration should be fully provided for. But inevitably, as the process of transfer proceeds, it will become progressively more difficult to carry out to the letter all the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. Legislation will be introduced in due course to give effect to the final transfer of power. 12. In regard to the Indian States, as was explicitly stated by the Cabinet Mission, His Majesty’s Government do not intend to hand over their powers and obligations under paramountcy to any Government of British India. It is not intended to bring paramountcy, as a system to a conclusion earlier than the date of the final transfer of power, but it is contemplated that for the intervening period the relations of the Crown with individual States may be adjusted by agreement. 13. His Majesty’s Government will negotiate agreements in regard to matters arising out of the transfer of power with the representatives of those to whom they propose to transfer power. 14. His Majesty’s Government believe that British commercial and industrial interests in India can look forward to a fair field for their enterprise under the new conditions. The commercial connection between India and the United Kingdom has been long and friendly, and will continue to be to their mutual advantage. 15. His Majesty’s Government cannot conclude this statement without expressing on behalf of the people of this country their goodwill and good wishes towards the people of India as they go forward to this final stage in their achievement of self-government. It will be the wish of everyone in these islands that, notwithstanding constitutional changes, the association of the British and Indian peoples should not be brought to an end; and they will wish to continue to do all that is in their power to further the well-being of India. Source: Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, eds., Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India, Transfer of Power 1942-47, Vol. 9, The Fixing of a Time limit, 4 November 1946-22 March 1947 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1980), 773-775.

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APPENDIX II

THE 3RD JUNE PLAN

Statement by His Majesty’s Government 3rd June 1947 INTRODUCTION 1. On 20th February, 1947, His Majesty’s Government announced their intention of transferring Power in British India to Indian hands by June 1948. His Majesty’s Government had hoped that it would be possible for the major parties to co-operate in the working –out of the Cabinet Mission’s Plan of 16th May, 1946, and evolve for India a constitution acceptable to all concerned . This hope has not been fulfilled. 2. The majority of the representatives of the Provinces of Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, Orissa and the North-West Frontier Provinces, and the representatives of Delhi, Ajmer-Merwara and Coorge have already made progress in the task of evolving a new Constitution. On the other hand, the Muslim League Party, including in it a majority of the representatives of Bengal, the Punjab and sind, as also the representative of British Baluchistan, has decided not to participate in the Constituent Assembly. 3. It has always been the desire of His Majesty’s Government that power should be transferred in accordance with the wishes of the Indian people themselves. This task would have been greatly facilitated if there had been agreement among the Indian political parties. In the absence of such an agreement, the task of devising a method by which the wishes of the Indian people can be ascertained has devolved on His Majesty’s Government. After full consultation with political leaders in India, His majesty’s Government have decided to adopt for his purpose the plan set out below. His Majesty’s Government wish to make it clear that they have no intention of attempting to frame any ultimate Constitution for India; this is matter for the Indians themselves. Nor is there anything in this plan to preclude negotiations between communities for an united India.

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THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 4. It is not the intention of His Majesty’s Government to interrupt the work of the existing Constituent Assembly. Now that provision is made for certain Provinces specified below, His Majesty’s Government trust that, as a consequence of this announcement, the Muslim League representatives of those Provinces, a majority of whose representatives are already participating in it, will now take their due share in its labours. At the same time, it is clear that any Constitution framed by this Assembly cannot apply to those parts of the country which are unwilling to accept it. His Majesty’s Government are satisfied that the procedure outlined below embodies that best practical method of ascertaining the wishes of the people of such areas on the issue whether their Constitution is to be framed (a) in the existing Constituent Assembly; or (b) in a new and separate Constituent Assembly consisting of the representatives of those areas which decide not to participate in the existing Constituent Assembly. When this has been done, it will be possible to determine the authority or authorities to whom power should be transferred. BENGAL AND THE PUNJAB 5. The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and Punjab (excluding the European members) will therefore each be asked to meet un two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the Province. For the purpose if determining the population of districts, the 1941 census figures will be taken as authoritative. The Muslim majority districts in these to n Provinces are set out in the Appendix to this Announcement. 6. The members of the two parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the Provinces should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favour of partition; division will take place and arrangements will be made accordingly. 7. Before the question as to the partition is decided, it is desirable that the representatives of each part should know in advance which Constituent Assembly the Provinces as a whole would join in the even of the two parts subsequently deciding to remain united. Therefore, if any member of either Legislative Assembly so demands, there shall be held a meeting of all members of the Legislative Assembly (other than Europeans) at which a decision will be taken on the issue

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as to which issue as to which Constituent Assembly the Province as a whole would join if it were decided by the two parts to remain united. 8. In the event of partition being decided upon, each part of the Legislative Assembly will, on behalf of the areas they represent, decide which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to adopt. 9. For the immediate purpose of deciding on the issue of partition, the members of the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab will sit in two parts according to Muslim majority districts (as laid down in the Appendix ) and non-Muslim majority districts. This is only a preliminary step of a purely temporary nature as it is evident that for the purposes of final partition of these Provinces a detailed investigation of boundary questions will be needed; and , as soon as a decision involving partition has been taken for either Province, a Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor-General, the membership and terms of reference of which will be settled in consultation with those concerned. It will be instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. It will also be instructed to take into account other factors. Similar instructions will be given to the Bengal Boundary Commission. Until the report of a Boundary Commission has been put into effect, the provincial boundaries indicated in the Appendix will be used. SIND 10. The Legislative Assembly of Sind (excluding the European members) will at a special meeting also take its own decision on the alternatives in paragraph 4 above. NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE. 11. The position of the North-West Frontier Province is exceptional. Two of the three representatives of his Province are already participating in the existing Constituent Assembly. But it is clear, in view of its geographical situation, and other considerations, that, if the whole or any part of the Punjab decides not to join the existing Constituent Assembly, it will be necessary to give the North-West Frontier Province an opportunity to reconsider its position. Accordingly, in such an event, a referendum will be made to the electors of the present Legislative Assembly in the North-West Frontier Province to choose which of the alternatives mentioned in paragraph 4 above they wish to adopt. The referendum will be held under the aegis of the Governor-General and in consultation with the Provincial Government.

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BRITISH BALUCHISTAN 12. British Baluchistan has elected a member but he has taken his seat in the existing Constituent Assembly. In view of its geographical situation, this Province will also be given an opportunity to reconsider its position and to choose which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to adopt. His Excellency the Governor-General is examining how this can most appropriately be done. ASSAM 13. Though Assam is predominantly a non-Muslim Province, the district of Sylhet which is contiguous to Bengal is predominately Muslim. There has been a demand that, in the event of the partition of Bengal, Sylhet should be amalgamated with the Muslim part of Bengal. Accordingly, if it is decided that Bengal should be partitioned, a referendum will be held in Sylhet district, under the aegis of the Governor-General and in consultation with the Assam Provincial Government, to decide whether the district of Sylhet should continue to form part of the Assam Province or should be amalgamated with the new Province of Eastern Bengal, if that Province agrees. If the referendum results in favour of amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, a Boundary Commission with terms of reference similar to those for the Punjab and Bengal will be set up to demarcate the Muslim Majority areas of Sylhet district and contiguous Muslim majority areas of adjoining districts, which will then be transferred to Eastern Bengal. The rest of the Assam Province will in any case continue to participate in the proceedings of the existing Constituent Assembly. REPRESENTATION IN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. 14. If it is decided that Bengal and the Punjab should be partitioned, it will be necessary to hold fresh elections to choose their representatives on the scale of one for every million of population according to the principle contained in the Cabinet Mission’s plan of 16th May, 1946. Similar elections will also have to be held for Sylhet in the event of is being decided that this district should from part of East Bengal. The number of representatives to which each area would be entitled is a follows:- Province General Muslim Sikhs Total Sylhet District 1 2 Nil 3 West Bengal 15 4 Nil 19 East Bengal 12 29 Nil 41 West Punjab 3 12 2 17 East Punjab 6 4 2 12

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15. In accordance with the mandates given to them, the representatives of the various areas will wither join the existing Constituent Assembly or form the new Constituent Assembly. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS 16. Negotiations will have to be initiated as soon as possible on administrative consequences of any partition that may have been decided upon:-

(a) Between the representatives of the respective successor authorities about all subjects now dealt with by the Central Government, including Defence, Finance and Communications.

(b) Between different successor authorities and His Majesty’s Government for treaties in regard to matters arising out of the transfer of power. (c) In the case of Provinces that may be partitioned as to administration of all provincial subjects such as the division of assets and liabilities, the police and other service, the High Courts, provincial institutions, &c. THE TRIBES OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER 17. Agreement with tribes of the North-West Frontier of India will have to be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority. THE STATES 18. His Majesty’s Government wish to make it clear that the decisions announced above relate only to British India and that their Policy towards Indian States contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May 1946 remains unchanged. NECESSITY FOR SPEED 19. In order that the successor authorities may have time to prepare themselves to take over power, it is important that all the above processes should be completed as quickly as possible. To avoid delay, the different Provinces or parts of Provinces will proceed independently as far as practicable within the conditions of this Plan, the existing Constituent Assembly and the new Constituent Assembly (if formed) will proceed to frame Constitutions for their respective territories: they will of course be free to frame their own rules.

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IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF POWER 20. The major political parties have repeatedly emphasized their desire that there should be the earliest possible transfer of power in India. With this desire His Majesty’s Government are in full sympathy, and they are willing to anticipate the date of June 1948, for the handing over of power by the setting up of an independent Indian Government or Government at an even earlier date. Accordingly, as the most expeditious, and indeed the only practicable, way of meeting this desire His Majesty’s Government propose to introduce legislation during the current session for the transfer of power this year on a Dominion status basis to one or two successor authorities according to the decisions taken as a result of this announcement. This will be without prejudice to the right of Indian Constituent Assemblies to decide in due course whether or not the part of India in respect of which they have authority will remain within the British Commonwealth. FURTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS BY GOVERNOR-GENERAL 21. His Excellency the Governor-General will from time to time make such further announcement as may be necessary in regard to procedure or any other matters for carrying out the above arrangements.

APPENDIX

The Muslim majority districts of the Punjab and Bengal according to 1941 census. 1.THE PUNJAB Lahore Division- Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Sialkot. Rawalpindi Division- Attock, Gujrat, Jhelum, Mianwali, Rawalpindi, Shahpur. Multan Division – Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan, Muzaffargarh. 2. BENGAL Chittagong Division – Chittagong, Noakhali, Tippera. Dacca Division – Bakarganj, Dacca, Faridpur, Mymensingh. Presidency Division – Jessore, Murshidabad, Nadia. Rajshahi Division – Bogra, Dinajpur, Malda, Pabna, Rajshahi, Rangpur 3rd June 1947 THE VICROY’S HOUSE,

NEW DELHI. Source: Lionel Carter, ed., Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty 22 March-15 August 1947 (Delhi: Manohar, 2003), 325-331.

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APPENDIX III

RADCLIFFE AWARD

NEW DELHI, 12 August 1947

PUNJAB BOUNDARY AWARD REPORT

To:- His Excellency the Governor-General. 1. I have the honour to present the decision and award of the Punjab Boundary Commission which, by virtue of section 4 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, is represent by my decision as Chairman of that Commission. 2. The Punjab Boundary Commission was constituted by the announcement of the Governor-General dated the 30th of June 1947, Reference No.D50/7/47R. The members of the Commission thereby appointed were Mr. Justice Din Muhammad, Mr. Justice Muhammad Munir, Mr. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, and Mr. Justice Teja Singh I was subsequently appointed Chairman of this Commission. 3. The terms of reference of the Commission, as set out in the announcement, were as follows:- “The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into account other factors.” We were desired to arrive at a decision as soon as possible before the 15th of August.

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4. After preliminary meetings, the Commission invited the submission of memoranda and representations by interested parties. Numbers memoranda and representations were received. 5. The public sittings of the Commission took place at Lahore, and extended from Monday the 21st of July 1947, to Thursday the 31st of July 1947, inclusive, with the exception of Sunday, the 27th of July. The main arguments were conducted by counsel on behalf of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and the Sikh members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly: but a number of other interested parties appeared and argued before the Commission. In view of the fact that I was acting also as Chairman of the Bengal Boundary Commission, whose proceedings were taking place simultaneously with the proceedings of the Punjab Boundary Commission, I did not attend the public sittings in person, but made arrangements to study daily the record of the proceedings and of all material submitted for our consideration. 6. After the close of the public sittings, the Commission adjourned to Simla where I joined my colleagues, and we entered upon discussions in the hope of being able to present an agreed decision as to the demarcation of the boundaries. I am greatly indebted to my colleagues for indispensable assistance in the clarification of the issues and the marshalling of the arguments for different views, but it became evident in the course of our discussions that the divergence of opinion between my colleagues was so wide that an agreed solution of the boundary problem was not to be obtained. I do not intend to convey by this that there were not large areas of the Punjab on the west and on the east respectively which provoked no controversy as to which State they should be assigned to; but when it came to the extensive but disputed areas in which the boundary must be drawn, differences of opinion as to the significance of the term “other factors”, which we were directed by our terms of reference to take into account, and as to the weight and value to be attached to those factors, made it impossible to arrive at any agreed line. In those circumstances my colleagues, at the close of our discussions, assented to the conclusion that I must proceed to give my own decision. 7. This I now proceed to do. The demarcation of the boundary line is described in detail in the schedule which forms Annexure A to this award, and in the map attached thereto, Annexure B. The map is annexed for purposes of illustration, and if there should be any divergence between the boundary as described in Annexure A and as delineated on the map in Annexure B, the description in Annexure A is to prevail. 8. Certain representations were addressed to the Commission on behalf of the States of Bikaner and Bahawalpur, both of which States were interested in canals whose head works were situate in the Punjab Province. I have taken the view that an interest of this sort can not weight directly in the question before us as to the division of the Punjab between the Indian Union and Pakistan since the territorial division of the provinces does not affect rights of private property, and I think that I am entitled to assume with confidence that any agreements that either of those

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State has made with the Provincial Government as to the sharing of water from these canals or otherwise will be respected by whatever Government hereafter assumes jurisdiction over the headworks concerned. I wish also to make it plain that no decision that is made by this Commission is intended to affect whatever territorial claim the State Bahawalpur may have in respect of a number of villages lying between Sulemanke Weir and Gurka Ferry. 9. The task of delimiting a boundary in the Punjab is a difficult one. The claims of the respective parties ranged over a wide field of territory, but in my judgment the truly debatable ground in the end proved to lie in and around the area between the Beas and Sutlej rivers on the one hand, and the river Ravi on the other. The fixing of a boundary in this area was further complicated by the existence of canal systems, so vital to the life of the Punjab but developed only under the conception of a single administration, and of systems of road and rail communication, which have been planned in the same way. There was also the stubborn geographical fact of the respective situations of Lahore and Amritsar, and the claims to each or both of those cities which each side vigorously maintained. After weighing to the best of my ability such other factors as appeared to be relevant as affecting the fundamental basis of contiguous majority areas, I have come to the decision set out in the Schedule which thus becomes the award of the Commission. I am conscious that there are legitimate criticisms to be mad of it: as there are, I think, of any other line that might be chosen. 10. I have hesitated long over those not inconsiderable areas east of the Sutlej River and in the angle of the Beas and Sutlej Rivers in which Muslim majorities are found. But on the whole I have come to the conclusion that it would be in the true interests of neither State to extend the territories of the West Punjab to a strip on the far side of the Sutlej and that there are factors such as the disruption of railway communications and water systems that ought in this instance to displace the primary claims of contiguous majorities. But I must call attention to the fact that the Dipalpur Canal, which serves areas in the West Punjab, takes off from the Ferozepore headworks and I find it difficult to envisage a satisfactory demarcation of boundary at this point that is not accompanied by some arrangement fro joint control of the intake of the different canals dependent on these headworks. 11. I have not found it possible to preserve undivided the irrigation system of the Upper Bari Doab Canal, which extends from Madhopur in the Pathankot Tahsil to the western border of the district of Lahore, although I have made small adjustments of the Lahore-Amritsar district boundary to mitigate some of the consequences of this severance; nor can I see any means of preserving under one territorial jurisdiction the Mandi Hydro-electric Scheme which supplies power in the districts of Kangra, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozepore, Sheikhupura, and Lyallpur. I think it only right to express the hope that, where the drawing of a boundary line cannot avoid disrupting such unitary services as canal irrigation, railways and

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electric power transmission, a solution may be found by agreement between the two States for some joint control of what has hitherto been a valuable common service. 12. I am conscious too that the award cannot go far towards satisfying sentiments and aspirations deeply held on either side but directly in conflict as to their bearing on the placing of the boundary. If means are to be found to gratify to the full those sentiments and aspirations, I think that they must be found in political arrangements with which I am not concerned, and not in the decision of a boundary line drawn under the terms of reference of this Commission. CYRIL RADCLIFFE

Annexure A to Appendix 1

1. The boundary between the East and West Punjab shall commence on the north at the point where the west branch of the Ujh river enters the Punjab Province from the State of Kashmir. The boundary shall follow the line of that river down the western boundary of the Pathankot Tahsil to the point where the Pathankot, Shakargah and Gurdaspur tahsils meet. The tahsil boundary and not the actual course of the Ujh river shall constitute the boundary between the East and West Punjab. 2. From the point of meeting of the three tahsils above mentioned , the boundary between the East and West Punjab shall follow the line of the Ujh river to its junction with the river Ravi and thereafter the line of the river Ravi along the boundary between the tahsils of Gurdaspur and Shakargarh, the boundary between the tahsils of Batala and Shakargarh, the boundary between the tashsils of Batala and Narowal, the boundary between the tahsils of Ajnala and Narowal, and the boundary between the tahsils of Ajnala and Shadara, to the point on the river Ravi where the district of Amritsar is divided from the district of Lahore. The tahsil boundaries referred to, and not the actual course of the river Ujh or the river Ravi, shall constitute the boundary between the East and West Punjab. 3. From the point on the river Ravi where the district of Amritsar is divided from the district of Lahore, the boundary between the East and West Punjab shall turn southwards following the boundary between the tahsils of Ajnala and Lahore and then the tahsils of Tarn Taran and Lahore, to the point where the tahsils of Kasur, Lahore and Taran Taran meet. The line will then turn south-westward along the boundary between the tahsils of Lahore and Kasur to the point where that boundary meets the north-east corner of village Theh Jharolian. It will then run along the eastern boundary of that village to its junction with village Chathianwala, turn along the northern boundary of that village, and then run down its eastern boundary to is junction with village Waigal. It will then run along the eastern boundary to is junction with village Kalia and

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then along the southern boundary of village Waigal to its junction with village Panhuwan. The line will then run down the eastern boundary of village Panhuwan to its junction with village Gaddoke. The line will then run down the eastern border of village Gaddoke to its junction with village Nurwala. It will then turn along the southern boundary of village Gaddoke to is junction with village Katluni Kalan. The line will then run down the eastern boundary of village Katluni Kalan to its junction with villages Kals and Mastgarh. It will then run along the southern boundary of village Katluni Kalan to the north-west corner of village Kals. It will then run along the western boundary of village Kals to its junction with village Khem Karan. The line will then run along the western and southern boundaries of village Khem Karan to its junction with village Maewala. It will then run down the western and southern boundaries of village Maewala, proceeding eastward along the boundaries between village Mahaidepur on the north and villages Sheikhupura Kuhna, Kamalpuran, Fatehwala and Mahewala. The line will the turn northward along the western boundary of village Sahjra to its junction with villages Mahaidepur and Machhike. It will then turn north-eastward along the boundaries between villages Machhike and Sahjra and then proceed along the boundary between villages Rattoke and Sahjra to the junction of village Rattoke. Mabbuke, and Gajjal. From that point the line will run along the boundary between villages Mabbuke and Gajjal, and then turn south along the eastern boundary of village Mabbuke to its junction with village Nagar Aimanpur. It will then turn along the north-eastern boundary of village Nagar Aimanpur, and run along its eastern boundary to its junction with village Masteke. From there it will run along the eastern boundary of village Masteke to where it meets the boundary between the tahsuks if Kasur and Ferozepore. For the purpose of indentifying the villages referred to in this paragraph, I attach a map21 of the Kasur tahsil authorized be the then Settlement Officer, Lahore District, which was supplied to the Commission by the Provincial Government. 4. The line will then run in a south-westerly direction down the Sutlej River on the boundary between the District of Lahore and Ferozepore to the point where the districts of Ferozepore , Lahore and Montgomery meet. It will continue along the boundary between the districts of Ferozepore and Montgomery to the point where this boundary meets the border of Bahawalpur State. The district boundaries, and not the actual course of the Sutlej River, shall in each case constitute the boundary between the East and West Punjab. 5. It is my intention that this boundary line should ensure that the canal headworks at Sulemanke will fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the West Punjab. If the existing delimitation of the boundaries of Montgomery District does not ensure this, I award to the West Punjab so much of the territory concerned as covers the headworks, and the boundary shall be adjusted accordingly.

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6. So much of the Punjab Provinces as lies to the west of the line demarcated in the preceding paragraphs shall be the territory of the West Punjab. So much of the territory of the Punjab Provinces as lies to the east of that line shall be the territory of the East Punjab.

NEW DELHI, 12 August 1947

BENGAL BOUNDARY AWARD REPORT

To:- His Excellency the Governor-General. 1. I have the honour to present the decision and award of the Bengal Boundary Commission, which, by virtue of section 3 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, is represented by my decision as Chairman of that Commission. This award relates to the division of the Province of Bengal, and the Commission’s award in respect of the District of Sylhet and areas adjoining thereto will be recorded in a separate report. 2. The Bengal Boundary Commission was constituted by the announcement of the Governor-General dated the 30th of June, 1947, Reference No. D50/7/47R. The members of the Commission thereby appointed were Mr. Justice Bijan Kuman Mukherjea, Mr. Justice C.C Biswas, Mr. Justice Abu Saleh Mohamed Akram, and Mr. Justice S.A Rahman. I was subsequently appointed Chairman of this Commission. 3. The terms of reference of the Commission, as set out in the announcement, were as follows:- “The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous (majority) areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will take into account other factors.”

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We were desired to arrive at a decision as soon as possible before the 15th of August. 4. After preliminary meetings, the Commission invited the submission of memoranda and representations by interested parties. A very large number of memoranda and representations was received. 5. The public sitting of the Commission took place at Calcutta, and extended from Wednesday the 16th of July 1947, to Thursday the 24th of July 1947, inclusive, with the exception of Sunday, the 20th of July. Arguments were presented to the Commission by numerous parties on both sides, but the main cases were presented by counsel on behalf of the Indian National Congress, the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha and the New Bengal Association on the one hand, and on behalf of the Muslim League on the other. In view of the fact that I was acting also as Chairman of the Punjab Boundary Commission, whose proceedings were taking place simultaneously with the proceedings of the Bengal Boundary Commission, I did not attend the public sittings in person, but made arrangements to study daily the record of the proceedings and all material submitted for our consideration. 6. After the close of the public sittings, the remainder of the time of the Commission was devoted to clarification and discussion f the issues involved. Our Commissions took place at Calcutta. 7. The question of drawing a satisfactory boundary line under our terms of reference between East and West Bengal was one to which the parties concerned propounded the most diverse solutions. The province offers few, if any satisfactory natural boundaries, and its development has been on lines that do not well accord with a division by contiguous majority areas of Muslim and non-Muslim majorities. 8. In my view, the demarcation of a boundary line between East and West Bengal depended on the answers to be given to certain basic questions which may be stated as follows:- (1) To which State was the City of Calcutta to be assigned, or was it possible to adopt any method of dividing the City between the two States? (2) If the City of Calcutta must be assigned as a whole to one or other of the States, what were its indispensable claims to the control of territory, such as all or part of the Nadia River system or the Kulti rivers, upon which the life of Calcutta as a city and port depended? (3) Could the attractions of the Gages-Padma-Madhumati river line displace the strong claims of the heavy concentration of Muslim majorities in the districts of Jessore and Nadia without doing too great a violence to the principle of our terms of reference?

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(4) Could the district of Khulna usefully be held by a State different from that which held the district of Jessore? (5) Was it right to assign to Eastern Bengal the considerable block of non-Muslim majorities in the districts of Malda and Dinajpur? (6) Which State’s claim ought to prevail in respect of the Districts of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, in which the Muslim population amounted to 2.42 per cent of the whole in the case of Darjeeling, and to 23.08 per cent of the whole in the case of Jalpaiguri, but which constituted an area not in any natural sense contiguous to another non-Muslim area of Bengal? (7) To which State should the Chittagong Hill Tracts be assigned, an area in which the Muslim population was only 3 per cent of the whole, but which it was difficult to assign to a State different from that which controlled the district of Chittagong itself? (9) After much discussion, my colleagues found that they were unable to arrive at an agreed view on any of these major issues. There were of course considerable areas of the Province in the south-west and north-east and east, which provoked no controversy on either side: but, in the absence of any reconciliation on all main questions affecting the drawing of the boundary itself, my colleagues to the view at the close of our discussions that I had no alternative but to proceed to give my own decision. 10. This I now proceed to do; but I should like at the same time to express my gratitude to my colleagues for their indispensable assistance in clarifying and discussing the difficult questions involved. The demarcation of the boundary line is described in detail in the schedule which forms Annexure A to this award, and in the map attached thereto, Annexure B. The map is annexed for purposes of illustration, and if there should be any divergence between the boundary as described in Annexure A and as delineated on the map in Annexure B, the description in Annexure A is to prevail. 11. I have done what I can in drawing the line to eliminate any avoidable cutting of railway communications and of river systems, which are of importance to the life of the province: but it is quite impossible to draw a boundary under our terms of reference without causing some interruption of this sort, and I can only express the hope that arrangements can be made and maintained between the two States that will minimize the consequences of this interruption as far as possible.

CYRIL RADCLIFFE

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Annexure A to Appendix-II

1. A line shall be drawn along the boundary between the Thana of Phassidewa in the District of Darjeeling and the Thana Tetulia in the District of Jalpaiguri from the point where that boundary meets the Province of Bihar and then along the boundary between the Thanas of Tetulia and Rajganj; the Thanas of Pachagar and Rajganj, and the Thanas of Pachagar and Jalpaiguri, and shall then continue along the northern corner of the Thana Debiganj to the boundary of the State of Cooch-Behar. The District of Darjeeling and so much of the District of Jalpaiguri as lies north of this line shall belong to West Bengal, but the Thana of Patgram and any other portion if Jalpaiguri District which lies to the east or south shall belong to East Bengal. 2. A line shall then be drawn from the point where the boundary between the Thanas of Haripur and Raiganj in the District of Dinalpur meets the border of Province of Bihar to the point where the boundary between the District of 24 Paraganas and Khulna meets the Bay of Bengal. This line shall follow the course indicated in the following paragraphs. So much of the Province of Bengal as lies to the west of it shall belong to West Bengal. Subject to what has been provided in paragraph I above with regard to the District of Darjeeling and Lalpaiguri, the remainder of the Province of Bengal shall belong to East Bengal. 3. The line shall run along the boundary between the following thanas: Haripur and Raiganj; Haripure and Hemtabad; Ranisankail and Hemtabad; Pirganj and Hemtabad; Pirganj and Kaliganj; Bochaganj and Kaliganj; Biral and Kaliganj; Biral and Kushmundi; Biral and Gangarmpur; Dinajpur and Gangarampur; Dinajpur and Kumarganj; Chirirbandar and Mumarganj; Phulbari and Kumarganjl Phulbari and Balurghat. It shll terminate at the point where the boundary between Phulbari and Balurghat meets the north-south line of the Bengal-Assam Railway in the eastern corner of the Thana of Balurghat. The line shall turn down the western edge of the railway lands belonging to hat railway lands belonging to that railway and follow that edge until it meets the boundary between the Thanas of Balurghat and Panchbibi. 4. From that point the line shall run along the boundary between the following Thanas; Balurghat and Panchbibi; Balurght and Joypurhat; Tapan and Porsha; Bamangola and porsha; Habibpur and porsha; Habibpur and Gomastapur;Habibpur and Bholahat; Malda and Bholahat; English Bazar and Bholahat; English Bazar and Shibganj; Kakuachak and Shubganj; to the point where the boundary between the two last mentioned thanas meets the boundary between the districts of Malda and Murshidabad on the river Ganges. 5. The line shall then turn south-east down the River Ganges along the boundary between the Districts of Malda and Murshidabad; Rajshahi and Murshidabad; Rajshahi and Nadia; to the point in the north-western corner of the District of Nadia where the channel of the River

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Mathabanga takes off from the River Ganges. The district boundaries and not the actual course of the River Ganges, shall constitute the boundary between Eat and West Bengal. 6. From the point on the River Ganges where the channel of the River Mathabanga takes off, the line shall run along that channel to the northern most point where it meets the boundary between the Thanas of Daulatpure and Karimpur. The middle line of the main channel shall constitute the actual boundary. 7. From this point the boundary between East and West Bengal shall run along the boundaries between the Thanas of Daulatpur and Karimpur; Gangani and Karimpur; Meherpur and Karimpur; Meherpur and Tehatta; Meherpur and Chapra; Damurhuda and Chapra; Damurhuda and Krishnaganj; Chuadanga and Krishnagani; Jibannagar and Krishnagang; Jibannagar and Hanskhali; Maheshpur and Hanskhali; Maheshpur and Ranaght; Maheshpur and Bongaon; Sarsa and Bongaon; Sarsa and Gaighata; Gaighata and Kalaroa; to the point where the boundary between those thanas meets the boundary between the districts of Khulna and 24 Parganas. 8. The line shall then run southwards along the boundary between the Districts of Khulna and 24 Parganas, to the point where that boundary meets.

NEW DELHI, 13 August 1947

SYLHET AND ASSAM

REPORT

To:- His Excellence the Governor General. 1. I have the honour to present the report of the Bengal Boundary Commission relating to Sylhet District and the adjoining districts of Assam. By virtue of Section 3 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the decision contained in this report become the decision and award of the Commission.

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2. The Bengal Boundary Commission was constituted as stated in my report dated the 12th of August 1947 with regard to the division of the Province of Bengal into East and West Bengal. Our terms of reference were as follows:- “The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslim and non – Muslims, in doing so, it will also take into account other factors, In the event of the referendum I the District of Sylhet resulting in favour of amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, the Boundary Commission will also demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet District and the contiguous Muslim majority areas of the adjoining districts of Assam.” 3. After the conclusion of the proceeding relating to Bengal, the Commission invited the submission of memoranda and representations by parties interested in the Sylhet question. A number of such memoranda and representations was received. 4. The Commission held open sitting at Calcutta on the 4th, 5th and 6th days of August 1947, for the purpose of hearing arguments. The main arguments were conducted on the one side by counsel on behalf of the Government of East Bengal and the Provincial and District Muslim Leagues; and on the other side, by counsel on behalf of the Government of the Province of Assam and the Assam Provincial Congress Committee and the Assam Provincial Hindu Mahasabha. I was not present in person at the open sittings as I was at the time engaged in the proceedings of the Punjab Boundary Commission which were taking place simultaneously, but I was supplied with the daily record of the Sylhet Proceedings and with all material submitted for the Commission S consideration. At the close of the open sittings, the members of the Commission entered into discussions with me as to the issues involved and the decisions to be come to, These discussions took place at New Delhi. 5 there was an initial difference of opinion as to the scope of the reference entrusted to the Commission .24 Two of my colleagues took the view that the Commission had been given authority to detach form Assam and to attach to East Bengal any Muslim majority areas of any part of Assam that could be described as contiguous to East Bengal, since they construed the words ,,the adjoining districts of Assam,, as meaning any districts of Assam that adjoined East Bengal, the other two of my colleagues took the view that the Commission s power of detaching areas form Assam and transferring them to East Bengal was limited to the district of Sylhet and contiguous Muslim majority areas (if any) of other district of Assam that adjoined Sylhet, The difference of opinion was referred to me for my casting vote, and I took the view that the more limited construction of our term of reference was the correct one and that the ,, adjoining districts of Assam ,, did not extend to other districts of Assam than those that adjoined Sylhet. The Commission accordingly proceeded with is work on this basis. 6 It was argued before the Commission of behalf of the Government of East Bengal that on the true construction of our terms of reference and section 3 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the whole of the District of Sylhet at least must be transferred to East Bengal and the

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Commission had no option but to act upon this assumption, All my colleagues agreed in rejecting this argument, and I concur in their view. 7 We found some difficulty in making up our minds whether ,under our terms of reference, we were to approach the Sylhet question in the same way as the question of partitioning Bengal, since there were some differences in the language employed, But all my colleagues came to the conclusion that we were intended to divide the Sylhet and adjoining districts of Assam between East Bengal and the Province of Assam on the basis of contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, but taking into account other factors. I am glad to adopt this view. 8. The members of the Commission were however unable to arrive at an agreed view as to how the boundary lines should be drawn, and after discussion of their differences, they invited me to give my decision. This I now proceed to do. 9. In my view, the question is limited to the districts of Sylhet and Cachar, since of the other districts of Assam that can be said to adjoin Sylhet neither the Garo Hills nor the Khasi and Jaintia Hills nor the Lushai Hills have anything approaching a Muslim majority of population in respect of which a claim could be made. 10. Out of 35 thanas in Sylhet, 8 have non-Muslim majorities; but of these eight, two- Sulla and Ajmirgana (which is in any even divided almost evenly between Muslims and non-Muslims), are entirely surrounded by preponderating Muslim areas and must therefore go with them to East Bengal. The other six thanas comprising a population of over 530,000 people stretch in a continuous line along part of the southern border of Syleht District. They are divided between two sub-divisions, of which one, South Sylhet, comprising a population of over 515,000 people, has in fact a non-Muslim majority of some 40,000; while the other, Karimganj, with a population of over 568,000 people, has a Muslim majority that is a little larger. 11. With regard to the District of Cachar, one thana, Hailakandi, has a Muslim majority and is contiguous to the Muslim thanas of Badarpur and Karimganj in the District of Sylhet. This thana forms, with the thana of Katlichara immediately to its south, the sub-division of Hailakandi, and in the Sub-division as a whole Muslims enjy a very small majority being 51% of the total population. I think that the dependence of Katlichara on Hailakandi, and in the Sub-division as a whole Muslims enjoy a very small majority being 51% of the total population. I think that the dependence of Katlichara on Hailakandi for normal communications makes it important that the area should be under one jurisdiction, and that the Musltims would have at any rate a strong presumptive claim for the transfer of the Sub-division of Hailakandi, comprising a population of 166,536 from the Province of Assam to the Province of East Bengal. 12. But study of the map shows, in my judgment, that a division on these lines would present problems of administration that might gravely affect the future welfare and happiness of the whole District. Not only would the six non-Muslim thanas of Sylhet be completely divorced from the rest of Assam if the Muslim claim to Hailakandi were recognized, but they from a strip running east and west whereas the natural division of the land is north and south and they effect an awkward severance of the railway line through Sylhet, so that, for instance, the junction for the town of Sylhet itself, the capital of the district, would lie in Assam, not in East Bengal.

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13. In those circumstanced I think that some exchange of territories must be effected if a workable division is to result. Some of the non-Muslim thanas must go to East Bengal and some Muslim territory and Hailakandi must be retained by Assam. Accordingly I decide and award as follows; A line shall be drawn form the point where the boundary between the Thanas of Paatharkandi and Kulaura meets the frontier to Tripura State and shall run north along the boundary between those Thanas, then along the boundary between the Thanas of Karimganj and Beani Bazar to the point where that boundary meets the River Kusiyara. The line shall then turn to the east taking the River Kusiyara as the boundary and run to the point where that river meets the boundary between the Districts of Sylhet and Cachar. The centre line of the main stream or channel shall constitute the boundary. So much of the District of Sylhet as lies to the west and north f this line shall be detached from the Province of Assam and transferred to the Province of East Bengal. No other part of the Province of Assam shall be transferred. 14. For purposes of illustration a map marked A is attached on which the line is delineated. In the even of any divergence between the line as delineated on the map and as described in paragraph 13 the written description is to prevail.

CYRIL RADCLIFFE

Source: Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, eds., Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India, The Transfer of Power 1942-47, Vol. 12, Princes, Partition and Independence, 8 July-15 August 1947 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 1983), 744-757.