participatory governance and professional radicalism – two ...genealogy is an approach that...
TRANSCRIPT
1
ECPR General Conference 2014, 3-6 September 2014, University of Glasgow Marko Nousiainen Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä [email protected]
Participatory governance and professional radicalism –
Two historical variations of community organising
Abstract
This paper explores the limits and possibilities of participatory politics with genealogical and historicist research. It presents two variations of “community organising” in which involvement of local communities is a central means of handling juvenile delinquency, poverty and other social problems. These interrelated but differing conceptions are Clifford Shaw’s sociological thought with its governmental application, the Chicago Area Project, started in the 1930s, and Saul Alinsky’s work in the 1940s and 1970s. The first case tells how community involvement was based on sociological knowledge on communities deployed as a means of social change. The second illustrates how community organising may be understood as a tool for emancipation and widening of democratic politics. This examination helps to understand how participation and citizen involvement in governance can be understood both as a consensual effort to solve social problems and as inherently conflictual and political action, a fight for a more equal society.
Keywords: Alinsky, Saul; Chicago school; genealogy; participation; Shaw, Clifford
2
Introduction
The involvement of communities and the empowerment of citizens in the realization of various
political goals is currently a very popular governmental strategy. Barbara Cruickshank (1999) has
examined such strategies from the Foucauldian perspective of governmentality and described them
as technologies of citizenship instead of enhanced freedom. With participation and empowerment
power seeks to create active citizens, people capable of independent and responsible conduct of
their conduct. Thus power works through the subjectivities of citizens rather than against it.
(Cruickshank, 1999: 68-9.) In a very similar vein, many other scholars approaching contemporary
modes of governing from a Foucauldian perspective attach participatory governance practices using
communities or other micro-moral domains for the responsibilisation of citizens to the neo- or
advanced liberal art of governing as governmentalised modes of communitarianism (see Delanty,
2003: 87-90; Rose, 1996; Miller and Rose, 2008). Nevertheless, the roots of such modes of
governing are neither in the age nor thought popularly seen as neoliberal, as the current paper
argues.
This article deplores the roots of such a participatory technology of citizenship that is non-judicial
and non-economic but social (see Procacci, 1989) and linked to a normative concept of community.
It seeks to offer new insight for the political interpretation of such governance trough a genealogical
and historicist examination of community organising in the USA. Through discussing the social
scientific origins of community organising and through depicting its two historical variations, the
current paper seeks to give us heuristic means to understand different aspects, problems and
possibilities of participatory governance. Especially it explains why it is possible to see
conservative well as radical democratic goals and values attached to policy participation; why it is
seen simultaneously as exercise of social control and community empowerment (Delanty, 2003:
88).
Genealogy is an approach that follows Michel Foucault’s Nietzsche-inspired historical method. It
examines historical processes but is not interested in history for its own sake only. Rather, it seeks
to find new and inventive ways to approach contemporary phenomena – and especially to challenge
such taken-for-granted ideas which govern the present. Genealogy is thus a critical use of history.
(Foucault, 2000: 369-91; Helén, 2005.) By studying the history of contemporary discourses and
practices, it is possible to show how these are dependent on certain historical contexts, struggles,
circumstances or rationalisations – i.e. contingent and political. A genealogical analysis disputes
3
any universal notion of truth, moral principles, human nature etc., and seeks to find out the
conditions that have made such ideas possible. (Helén, 2005.) As Mark Bevir (2010: 427) has
written, the genealogical (or radical historicist) notion of history has a strong emphasis of
nominalism, contingency and contestability. Alongside this critique-enabling function, genealogical
examinations may have practical value as they relativise objects previously considered natural and
enable us to see alternatives.
The work presented in this paper is a genealogical examination of certain governmental strategy
that seeks to deploy citizen participation and local community as a tool for solving social problems.
Thus, it is not a history of political mobilization in general nor a history of 20th century American
sociological thought. Instead I examine what kind of scientific knowledge community organising
was based on, and what kind of historical circumstances gave birth to it. Bevir (2010: 434) defines
“a tradition” such ideational background against which individuals come to adopt certain web of
beliefs and which influence the beliefs they are likely to adopt. Thus “a tradition” is similar to “a
discourse” as a concept. The main theme of this work is the development of the intellectual or
discursive tradition I call community integration/disintegration in the early Chicago school
sociology and the two participatory strategies of government1 it produced.
Firstly, I will discuss the sociological roots of community organising in Chicago, the scietific effort
to understand social problems and to solve them in partnerships with local communities by reading
certain classical works in Chicago school sociology. Especially Thomas’s and Znaniecki’s classical
work on Polish immigrants and Shaw’s studies on juvenile delinquency were important texts in this
history. After that, I will interpret Saul Alinsky’s work and his notion of radical community
organising for the political empowerment of the underprivileged. Lastly, I will discuss what kind of
value genealogical work could have for the examinations of contemporary community organising
projects.
The idea of community disintegration is sometimes seen as the intellectual basis of the Chicago
tradition of community action or organising, and thus the conservative and radical variations of
organising are lumped together (e.g. Cortes, 1997; Cazenave, 2007: 45). This article clarifies this
picture by examining how the concept of community came to be thought as a means of social
1 When speaking of “government” I use the term in a Foucauldian fashion: not as a synonym of state institutions but as any effort to conduct the citizens’ conduct in order to enhance their wellbeing, health or security.
4
intervention and how Alinsky can be seen as a critic of this intellectual tradition. It depicts, thus,
what are the alternative strategies any policy of community involvement is likely to face.
The sociological roots of community organising
An important root of community organising is the idea that social problems, especially crime, are
not problems of individual morals only but larger social phenomena in which the relations between
people are significant. Even if this kind of perspectives were already developed by the French 19th
century social thought, for example Durkheim (Snell 2010, 60; Procacci, 1989; Rabinow, 1989), the
Chicago school sociologists in the early 20th century made a significant contribution to how the
concept of community came to be thought as a means of social intervention. Apparently the city of
Chicago offered a fertile ground for the development of this kind of thinking. And the sociologist to
form these scientific examinations into a practical project of governance in the early 1930s was
Clifford Shaw, the researcher of juvenile delinquency working in the Illinois Institute of Juvenile
Research.
The growth of the city of Chicago in the 19th and the early 20th century was very rapid. When in the
1840s Chicago was a small town of some 4500 inhabitants, in the year 1930 over 3.3 million people
lived there. As in other cities in the United States, this growth meant very large immigration. For
instance, in 1920 42.2 percent of the inhabitants of Chicago was born abroad, and an overwhelming
majority originated from families in which at least one of the parents was an immigrant. These first
or second generation immigrants formed 72 % of the city’s total population. Of those born outside
the USA, the largest group were the Poles (17 %), the second largest were the Russians (especially
the Russian jews) and Lithuanians (15%), and third were the Germans (13,9 %). (Shaw and McKay,
1931: 23–5.) Because immigration was so broad it, naturally, had consequences for the social
structure of the city. Especially it meant that social turmoil, for example crime and industrial
conflict, was frequent and that the immigrants formed peculiar groups within the city. Thus, it was
natural for the Chicago school sociologists to concentrate on social problems and to see society as a
mosaic of separate communities.
As for example in Durkheim’s view of social science, social organisation and order were the
scientific fields of inquiry in which the Chicago school sociologists directed their interest. Also
similarly, their aim was a positivist change in society. (Snell, 2010.) The school was heavily
5
influence by the American pragmatist philosophical tradition and also links to German idealism are
known (Engel, 2002; Cortese, 1995; Delanty, 2003: 52).
In 1918 William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki (1974a: 1, 36–7) criticised the earlier “practical
sociology” or “common sense social theory” in their classic work The Polish Peasant in Europe
and America, and wanted to develop a more scientific and systematic research of social phenomena.
Their explicit aim was to create such a science that could control society and enhance its wellbeing
in the same manner as natural sciences enhanced industrial production. The purpose of sociology as
a science should then be the unveiling of social laws and causal relations. Thomas & Znaniecki
(1974a: 38) acknowledged, nevertheless, that this task was much more difficult in the field of social
relations than in natural sciences. In addition to the discovery of social facts, all things that impact
the individuals’ subjective ways of thinking (e.g. personal experiences) would have to be taken into
account in order to explain their behaviour. And the need to understand the subjective ways of
thought led Thomas and Znaniecki to develop the life-history method which aimed in getting
information about the researched individuals’ values and attitudes as well as the cultural and
historical circumstances that form them. Thomas and Znaniecki (1974b: 1832–4) wrote that life-
records were the best material for social research as they were nuanced and concrete enough to
enable the accurate depiction of social institutions. A life-record material could be produced
through autobiographical accounts written by informants, or interpreting other written sources
concerning their “inner life”. (Zaretsky, 1996: x; Thomas & Znaniecki, 1974b: 1907.)
The concepts of social values and attitudes gave the theoretical and methodological foundation to
the new science of society. Thomas and Znaniecki (1974a: 21, 31-2) assumed that the values shared
by individuals and the respective attitudes and norms control their behaviour. The systems of values
constitute social institutions which in turn constitute social organisation and, ultimately, all social
groups:
”… The rules of behaviour, and the actions viewed as conforming or not conforming with
these rules, constitute with regard to their objective significance a certain number of more or
less connected and harmonious systems which can generally be called social institutions, and
the totality of institutions found in a concrete social group constitutes the social organization
of this group. And when studying the social organization as such we must subordinate
attitudes to values as we do in other special cultural sciences; that is, attitudes count for us
6
only as influencing and modifying rules of behaviour and social institutions.” (Thomas and
Znaniecki, 1974a: 32–3.)
Societies – as organised social groups – were for Thomas and Znaniecki in the last analysis based
on values and attitudes controlling behaviour. Therefore they saw communities with homogeneous
values very important. Ultimately only shared values made society possible and enabled everything
that comes with it. Thomas and Znaniecki (1974b: 1825) wrote that the social institutions
constituted by common values are the “only barrier which now stands between the mass of Polish
immigrants and complete wildness”. For the sake of consistency it must be concluded that this
should apply to all other social groups as well, in addition to Poles!
In other words, Thomas and Znaniecki saw the enactment of a social order that would control the
conduct of individuals autonomously of law or the state (as a coercive apparatus) as the objective
for the new science of sociology. Thus this aim was not very far from other early sociologic
thinkers across the Atlantic. In the early French sociology the governability of democracy was a
central theme and the great promise of sociology was enacting a social solidarity, a moral order that
would render modernity governable and end the instability marked by the problem of poverty and
consequently the threat of revolution. (Procacci, 1989; Rabinow, 1989.) For the Chicago school the
symbol of the problematic of modernity was, in addition to poverty, the figure of a delinquent.
Other difference was that the basis of social order was the notion of local community. In the context
of the American city, a mosaic forged by massive immigration, it was more difficult to picture a
uniform nation state as the reference point of social solidarity than in the French republican
tradition.
The Polish Peasant was probably the volume that made the greatest impact on the evolution of the
Chicago school. On top of the rigorous empirical examination of society connected to theoretical
insight, its central innovation was a properly sociologic want to examine the relation between the
individual and her social environment and to understand why individuals sometimes act in a
problematic way. (Zaretsky, 1996: xiii; Cortese, 1995.) In this book, the writers’ main thesis was
that the traditional culture of Polish peasants had a strong sense of community in which family and
village were very significant. In America on the contrary, the dominant culture was more
individualistic which challenged the traditional values. Modernisation, in general, and the manifold
and dynamic environment of the American city, in particular, led to the deterioration of the
traditional social institutions and morality and thus weakened social solidarity. For example, the
7
social control that was a central feature of life in a Polish rural village was not possible in a city
environment that enabled anonymous action. Simultaneously, the immigrant community offered
few possibilities for the development of new shared values and institutions. This kind of
disintegration of social institutions offered the explanation for antisocial behaviour for Thomas and
Znaniecki (1974b: 1825–7). Subsequently, nearly all social problems (e.g. crime, domestic
violence, poverty) could ultimately be seen as the consequences of a life isolated from community
support and control (Zaretsky, 1996: xiii). These ideas were largely accepted by the Chicago school
sociologists, and the idea of disintegration of communities, signifying the problematic of modernity,
became a sort of paradigmatic assumption, an accepted starting point for many later studies striving
to understand social problems (Zaretsky, 1996: ix, xiv). Another impact of The Polish Peasant was
that the Polish immigrant population became a central object of research and social policy
experiment in Chicago.
The detailed case-study became the hallmark of the Chicago school (Janowitz, 1967: vii), and its
central premise was the Thomas theorem: If men define situations as real, they are real in their
consequences (Deegan, 1988: 122; Shaw, 1966: 3). The school borrowed form pragmatist
philosophy a critical attitude towards the notion of rationally calculating cognition and argued that
reality is socially constructed and individuals constantly create and recreate their roles (Cortese,
1995). Knowledge and human understanding were seen as ultimately tentative and hypothetical, as
socially constructed concepts emerging with a communal examination (Engel, 2002: 52). Perhaps it
is the pragmatist philosophy and its notions of a socially or symbolically constructed self, faith in
the underlying benevolence of people, as well as the assumed need for greater democracy and
participation (see Delanty, 2003: 52; Deegan, 1988: 106, 249) what ultimately enabled the study of
cultural values and meanings to be transformed into a practical project of government.
The notion of community defined as a basic building block of social order was not confined to
Thomas and Znaniecki’s work but it was central to many later Chicago sociologists, as well. For
example Robert Park (1967c: 114–8) and Ernest Burgess (1967b: 143–7), the most famous scholars
of the Chicago school, discussed the meaning of community in their writings. To them, community
meant, firstly, the inhabitants of certain geographical area. Secondly, community was seen as a form
of social organisation. This kind of organisation was, on one hand, ecological: a system of
geographically defined characteristics and functions. On the other hand, community meant an
organisation of economic action. Thirdly, community was a unit of cultural and political
organisation that contained the customs and norms which control individual impulses. For example
8
art, religion, and politics were factors of cultural communality through which individuals take part
in social life. Community was thus understood a shared consciousness on which collective action
was founded.
Community also meant the “instinctive understanding” of a spontaneously grown social order
among people who live near to each other (see Park, 1967: 7). It was not seen as an object of
empirical study but as a necessary condition of social reality. Thus, a community with uniform
values was understood as a normative description of the social environment people should naturally
live in. The homogeneity of values and norms was an ideal that many scholars accepted as the
starting point of their explanation concerning social ills. For example, the researchers of juvenile
delinquency Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay cited Thomas’s and Znaniecki’s notion of vital
community in their report on the causes of crime.
”The community is vital when social opinion concerns itself with all matters, outside
happenings or individual acts, which possess a public interest, when its attitude toward these
matters are consistent and able to reach approximate unanimity, and when any common action
considered necessary to solve the situation is defined by social opinion it is carried on in
harmonious cooperation.” (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1974b: 1171; op. cit. Shaw and McKay,
1931: 99.)
Such a normative idea of unanimous communities enabling collective action can be seen as a
marker of the discursive tradition of community integration/disintegration. The Chicago school
community discourse also shared the pessimism typical to other early sociological community
theorizing (Delanty, 2003: 15): the invaluable foundations of moral order were endangered by
modernization.
Even if it was not an object of research itself, the ideal notion of a harmonious community could be
compared to the empirical findings gathered in the city – for example statistical knowledge on the
distribution of juvenile delinquency, child mortality, tuberculosis, truancy, use of welfare services,
etc. (Burgess, 1967a: 50–1; Shaw and McKay, 1931: 26, 385; Shaw and McKay, 1969). And
because the distribution of social ills showed a clear spatial pattern, the concept of community
seemed empirically relevant, too.
9
The geographical (or ecologic) examinations showing that problems were consistently concentrated
in certain neighbourhoods, enabled social ills to be seen as community problems. Especially
problematic communities were found in the inner city. These “zones in transition” were located
near commercial and industrial centres. (Burgess, 1967a: 50–1.) In Chicago this kind of slum areas
were located near the actual business centre, but as well near the southern steel industry area (the
Bush) and the meat packing district (Back-of-the-Yards) on the southern bank of Chicago River
(e.g. Pacyga, 1989). The inhabitants of the slums were mostly immigrants who chose their place of
residence near their countrymen and thus formed culturally and ethnically relatively homogenous
populations that differed form the rest of the American society (e.g. Park, 1967a: 9–10). Above all
the tradition of community integration/disintegration explains why, despite the relative ethnic and
cultural homogeneousness of the immigrant community, the assumed lack of homogeneity was
found as the reason for social problems.
For the history of participatory strategies of government the most influential work was Shaw and
McKay’s studies on juvenile delinquency and how they revised the Thomas & Znaniecki’s idea on
social disintegration. Especially Shaw and McKay took as their starting point the earlier observation
on how modern environment changed the relations between parents and children. When the
community in Polish rural villages supported parents’ authority over their children, in the USA this
social control collapsed. As well, children were able to reach economic autonomy younger than in
the old country, and parents lacking language skills had turn to their children for help in managing
their every-day affairs which, according to Thomas & Znaniecki, could lead the children to assume
“a real or imagined” superiority compared to their parents. (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1974b: 1650–1,
1974a: 709–11; Shaw and McKay, 1931: 104.) Inevitably, modern environment made the control of
children more difficult.
When there was a clear discrepancy between the values of the old country – to which the parents
were accustomed – and the values of the new country – to which the children were accustomed –
conflicts in families were obvious. This led to domestic violence and the disintegration of solidarity
in families which, in turn, was seen to drive especially the boys away from home and to peer groups
where they were completely without adult control. And it was easy to adopt criminal values and
skills in the peer group. (Shaw and McKay, 1931: 5–8, 111–5.) This kind of explanation for
delinquency was presented also in Shaw’s ([1930] 1966) classic work, The Jack-Roller, that told the
life-history of a Polish immigrant boy Stanley and his gradual orientation toward a criminal career
in the slum Back-of-the-Yards.
10
Shaw added empirical evidence on the social origins of juvenile delinquency to the tradition of
community integration/disintegration. He – alone and together with McKay – showed how
delinquency was a culturally transmitted mode of action that had its roots in the slum environment.
Shaw and McKay provided a lot of evidence to support this view. Firstly, most of the young
offenders brought to justice were caught in the company of others (Shaw and McKay, 1931: 194–
5). Secondly, the delinquents shared certain traditions, common norms and codes of conduct (Shaw
and McKay, 1931: 241). Thirdly, there was a visible pattern in the evolution of the typical criminal
career: it started with shoplifting and other petty crimes and advanced towards a more demanding
crime. Crime was a learned mode of action in which the older would advise the younger (Shaw and
McKay, 1931: 202-14). On basis of the records on youngsters arrested together, it was in fact
possible to depict “a chain of masters and apprentices” that continued unending as far in history as
the records had been kept (Shaw and McKay, 1969: 175).
Chicago Area Project
It is easy to imagine how promising prospects these studies offered for an intervention aimed to
tackle the delinquency problem: If crime is a social phenomenon also its preventions should strike
at the social forces causing it. If the main reason for the problem is disintegration and the resulting
deficiency in the ability to organise and act collectively, the logical solution is community
organising geared to building new institutions. In the early 1930s Shaw started the Chicago Area
Project (CAP), an endeavour to experiment with the sociologic knowledge in order to reduce
delinquency (Short, 1969). The application of sociology to control society was not Shaw’s original
idea, but many writers before him had called for action. (e.g. Park, 1967: 109–10; Thomas and
Znaniecki, 1974b: 1825–6). Especially Burgess (1967b: 142) criticized the earlier social work, e.g.
settlements, for insufficient scientific basis: Instead of helping the underprivileged, neighbourhood
work should understand and manipulate the social forces underlying modernity. Nevertheless, it
was Burgess’s student, Shaw, who forged these ideas into a coherent governmental strategy built on
imaginable solution to the problems of modernity that the new sociologic knowledge made
possible.
Shaw and others wrote in 1937 that the objective of CAP is the “fullest possible neighbourhood
participation” and “making the neighbourhood conscious of the problem of juvenile delinquency
and collectively interested in the welfare of its children and active in promoting programs for such
11
improvements of the community environment as will develop in the children interests and habits of
a constructive and socially desirable character” (op. cit. Schlossmann and Sedlak, 1983: iii). CAP
sought to cure social ills by promoting common values and standards of behaviour as well as by
enhancing collective solidarity and developing a sense potency and confidence (Schlossmann and
Sedlak, 1983: 43, 55). In other words, it tried to produce certain kind of subjectivity that would
encourage self-help measures in the development of the communities. This kind of “will to govern”
didn’t concern only the children living in the slums but adults as well.
When an important premise in the project was the assumed slum dwellers’ lack of ability to
organise and to act collectively for common good, neighbourhood participation was an
understandable tactical choice. Organising people to act collectively hits at the very core of the
problem. In addition, it was thought that since “natural” social environment directs people’s
behaviour, also the intervention should be seen as a part of it (Kobrin, 1959: 22–3). That is why the
project had to be targeted at adults as well. Furthermore, it was thought that people will only
participate to the kind of collective action which they have possession of and which they find
meaningful in their own terms. Therefore it was seen important that the organisations CAP wanted
to found should be autonomous and controlled by the inhabitants themselves. The role of the expert
was only to advice and support the participants on their road to social change. In order to be
effective, the project should make the inhabitants want the change and to act in order to carry out
the actual work. (Kobrin, 1959: 22–3; Schlossmann and Sedlak, 1983: iv.) Even if the participants
held the power in the founded organisations, they were also targets of indirect influence. CAP
wanted to change the values and attitudes of the participants, and the means used were negotiation
and persuasion.
CAP managed to found a dozen community committees with slightly differing programmes. A
central strategy in community organising was to arouse interest among local leaders.2 In addition,
the project wanted to train and hire local inhabitants as employees; the knowledge on local culture
and customs was seen important. The autonomy of the participants was respected, as well, and the
decisions they had made were accepted even if the sociologists leading the project had a different
opinion3. The committees organised recreational activities for children and youth, carried out self-
2 This was not Shaw’s original innovation since Burgess (1967b: 153) had suggested it already in 1925. 3 According to Kobrin (1959: 25) this was not common since the leaders of CAP were highly respected by locals and thus could influence their decisions.
12
help projects in order to develop the neighbourhoods, and mediated between the law enforcement
and the young. (Kobrin, 1959: 24–6; Short, 1969: xlix–l; Schlossmann and Sedlak, 1983: 33.)
Dominic Pacyga’s (1989) account on the Russell Square Community Committee (RSCC) in a South
Chicago’ steel industry area, the Bush, gives us an example of what kind of pragmatic action
community organising in CAP was. The first difficulty was to get the local Polish catholic parish
interested in co-operation. The priest of the parish had a great influence in the neighbourhood but he
was at first sceptical towards the project. After the priest and the sociologists reached an agreement,
the parish became an important supporter to the RSCC (Pacyga, 1989: 165–6). RSCC organised
voluntary work and gathered funds, started a Boys’ Club, formed links to the local youth, built a
summer camp centre, ran a library, employed young gang members, and helped community
members freed from prison. Since it was able to raise funds and voluntary work for the benefit of
children, even in the middle of the great depression, RSCC may be considered the most successful
of the CAP’s committees. (Pacyga, 1989: 171–6, 179.)
With CAP, Shaw forged the strategy of community organising as a participatory mode of curing
social ills through re-enacting social order and solidarity destroyed by modernity. Thus it can be
seen as a sociologically founded technology of citizenship, a way of deploying community as a
means of producing active and socially minded agents that would help and control their neighbours.
This strategy differed from earlier social work as it was based on sociological ideas on the origin of
social problems. It did not provide social services for the poor, but wanted help the poor to help
themselves in an autonomous organisation. It also bears an interesting resemblance with the
technology of social insurance that, according to Ewald (1991: 209), was adopted as the foremost
mode of governing social ills in the late 19th century Europe. First of all, community organising is a
technology of solidarity aiming to help those who have fallen in distress. In place of judicial mode
of action, it seeks to enhance the citizens’ feelings of solidarity. Yet, unlike social insurance, it
contains the minimum (or no) elements of inter-community redistribution. In addition, it is a moral
technology growing out of the normative notion of community as a moral order. Like social
insurance, community organising is, thus, also a political technology as it seeks to create new
groupings of interest based on assumed interdependence. But is not based on contractual order or
right as social insurance is, but it was made possible by a sociological imagination on an organically
grown social order in geographical proximity. (cf. Ewald, 1991: 206-207.) Despite the local control
and bottom-up character of the strategy, it nevertheless reflects the pragmatic faith in scientific
expertise and education: the aim of an organiser is to use knowledge in order to change the values
13
and attitudes of the community members and make them act for the common good. Thus the
participant is simultaneously an active agent and an object of government.
The most apparent flaw in this strategy – and one for which Shaw was criticized already in the
1930s (Schlossman & Sedlak, 1983: 17) – is that it concentrates on local level and turns a blind eye
to the larger structural inequalities evident in a capitalist society. As this variation of community
organising strives for harmonious cooperation, it implicitly hides political aspects of social
problems from sight. The underlying tradition of community integration/disintegration blames the
poor – or their assumed lack of shared values and norms – for their condition, but without blaming
anybody individually. Also the tradition is inherently conservative: it considers any change in the
traditional values as potentially dangerous as this change disintegrates social institutions, the very
foundation of organised society.
Community organising as radicalism
Another strategy of organising communities to solve social problems was presented in Saul
Alinsky’s work. He was an American civic activist and a self-proclaimed professional radical who
developed the tactics and theories of community action and organising in Chicago together with
Shaw and others. This variation can be seen to address the most obvious deficiency in Shaw’s
notion of community organising: the lack of political insight concerning social ills. The variation
Alinsky presented illustrates, first and foremost, why community organising is often attached to
radical democratic ideas.
Alinsky was a second generation immigrant of Russian Jewish background, and he studied
sociology in the University of Chicago under Park and Burgess (Engel, 2002). Alinsky’s thinking is
crystallised in his two books, Reveille for Radicals published originally in 1946 and Rules for
Radicals published in 1971. Both volumes are practical guides to radical community organising that
build on Alinsky’s personal experience on actual work with communities. Even if Alinsky probably
considered himself rather an activist than a theoretical thinker, his work, nevertheless, illustrates a
certain kind a view on communities. He has been labelled “a reluctant community theorist” by
posterity (Reitzes and Reitzes, 1982).
In the 1930s Alinsky worked as Clifford Shaw’s assistant in CAP. He had a project that sought to
introduce youngsters from the Bush to the academic opportunities the University of Chicago
14
provided. In 1938 Shaw assigned him to organise the Back-of-the-Yards slum, the meatpacking
district made infamous by Upton Sinclair’s classic muckraking work The Jungle. The area was
mostly populated by Polish immigrants and it had a very bad reputation. The experiences with the
Back-of-the-Yards Organizing Council (BYOC) led Alinsky to forge a new variation of the
participatory strategy of governing and also to a break with Shaw. BYOC united the church and
organised labour to battle against meatpacking industry. Even if the endeavour was successful, it
was contrary to the consensual strategy Shaw was experimenting with. Back-of the-Yards was had
more difficult problems than the other slums in Chicago, and to mach the challenge Alinsky’s
strategy had to be more radical. (Engel, 2002: 52; Pacyga, 1989: 162, 179; Schlossmann and
Sedlak, 1983: 73-4, 101.) Especially the emphasis of conflictual and political mode of action
distinguishes Alinsky’s notion of community organising from the other early developers of
governmental use of participation. He criticised the earlier strategy for concentrating solely on the
theme of social disorganisation and for the lack of comprehensive understanding on the political
and economic forces affecting the lives of slum-dwellers (Alinsky, 1941).
In Reveille for Radicals Alinsky criticised what he called a segmented understanding of social
problems inherent to the previous efforts to enhance community welfare through community
councils. Alinsky (1969: 57) stated that such programmes problematically treat social problems as
independent of all other problems. In developing this criticism, he departed from the standard
sociological tradition of community integration:
“From a functional point of view the problem of youth (or any problem) cannot be viewed as
an isolated phenomenon. Similarly neither can any specific problem of youth be understood or
studied as a problem apart and unto itself. A conspicuous example of this sort of segmental
thinking is to be found in our usual studies of delinquency and crime. Crime can properly be
viewed only as one facet of a problem of social disorganization. The opening of the door on
the study of crime confronts one with a broad vista of social disorganization. Such aspects of
this dreary scene as unemployment, undernourishment, disease, deterioration, demoralization,
and many other including crime itself, are simple parts of the whole picture. … A sound
approach to the field of crime would therefore involve an approach to all of these other
problems which are part and parcel of the etiology of crime”. (Alinsky, 1969: 57.)
The logical consequence of such a broad understanding of social problems is that “any intelligent
attack” on a problem must consider other “facets of social disorganisation” as well. Alinsky
15
criticises the conventional community councils for the lack of this kind of inclusive approach and
for offering “supervised recreation, handicraft classes and character building” instead of tangible
solutions to the intertwined social problems. What a feasible intervention should offer is “jobs,
higher wages, economic security, and health among other things”. These things are important to
everybody but they, nevertheless, are controversial in nature. Alinsky stated that they lead us into
“the most merciless arenas of struggle of capital and labor”. That is why the action to enhance
social conditions in the slum must be courageous and militant. Helping the people in the slum,
which Alinsky defined as a “dirty, miserable, and diseased human junkyard full of frustration and
despair”, must be aimed to organising “the people to rebel and fight their way out of the muck”.
Other kinds charities, based on less comprehensive explanations of social problems, are only
superficial and trivial ameliorations. (Alinsky, 1969: 57-9.) With this kind of intertwined
understanding social problems can be seen as deficiencies of democracy: a central cause of social
problems is that the underprivileged have less means of defending their interest. Even if Alinsky
sometimes used the vocabulary typical to the tradition of community integration, he did not
circumscribe the causes of social problems to the crumbling of shared values.
In his later work, Alinsky adopted even a more critical stance towards the causes of social issues
presented by the early Chicago school. He wrote that communities are never disorganised, but also
passive people suffering from deprivation and discrimination have a community pattern: they are
organised to apathy and non-participation (Alinsky, 1971: 115–6). This view was enabled by
William Foote Whyte’s (1981) study on Italian slums (originally published in 1943) which was one
of the first sociological studies that did not take social disintegration as its starting point.
Nevertheless, Alinsky’s notion of community is quite similar to his contemporary community
organisers: it is the immigrant neighbourhood of the1930s and 1940s American city. Community
meant for Alinsky, as it did for Chicago school sociologists, a basic building block of social order, a
uniform entity which has shared customs, interests and ethnic identification. These are understood
as social forces that support or prevent political action and as available means for the activation
effort. (Alinsky, 1941: 798; Alinsky, 1969: 78, 80.) Alinsky’s strategy – as Shaw’s before him –
was ultimately based on the assumed community characteristics and thus he saw it important to
understand local culture. He has been criticized for neglecting the changes that happened in the
social structure in the cities in the latter half of the 20th century (Reitzes and Reitzes, 1982: 266).
Another trait that links Alinsky to the strategy based on the tradition of community
integration/disintegration is his urge to find and use local leaders. Alinsky (1969: 64-6) wrote, that
16
local communities are organised around local or natural leaders. These may be local businessmen,
priests, or even gangsters, but nevertheless they represent the community and its people. These are
the leaders whom the locals trust and who they have elected or selected as their representatives in
one way or another. The important thing to any community organising project is to get these
representatives to participate and support the effort, since only the people’s own leaders can
actually build a real “People’s Organisation”.
Like a true pragmatist, Alinsky thought that the experienced deficiencies in community unity can be
worked through different tactics. He presented a variety of means for this: persuasion, pressure, or
even what he calls the manipulation of social situations – indirect pressure targeted at the leader’s
friends or family (Alinsky, 1969: 110). Even if some community groups or leaders can be hostile to
each other, Alinsky thought that face-to-face interaction in a common organisation will sooner or
later lead them to find common interests and strategies (ibid.: 86-88). This conviction means that
political conflicts within communities are, in the last analysis, irrelevant since communities as
homogenous groups have a common rational interest to fight against larger oppressive forces. It
follows consistently the notion of community dependent on the context of the early 20th century
American city. Alinsky (1969: 88) even wrote that conservative people whose ideologies might at
first sight seem contrary to the equalising and democratizing mission of community organisation are
to be mobilised as well. When they are involved in a progressive endeavour their ideas are going to
change. In the end, a rational conflict of interests among the members of a community seems
impossible.
Since social problems were seen ultimately of a political origin, Alinsky defined the enhancement
of democracy, equality and human dignity as his foremost objectives. To him, democracy meant
progress, political and economic equality and mass participation in decision-making. Nevertheless,
democracy was not an absolute value, but rather he saw it as the best means for the achievement of
certain important principles which were also the basis of Judaeo-Christian civilization: equality,
justice, freedom, peace, and respect for human life. Anomie and political passivity, on the other
hand, meant the death of democracy. (Alinsky, 1969: 25–6, 192–3, 1971: 12, 47.) Alinsky’s
assessment concerning the state of democracy in America of his time was very pessimistic. The
central message of his book Reveille for Radicals was that saving democracy necessitates the quick
activation of all radically minded actors. Even if many of Alinsky’s ideas can be seen as more or
less socialistic he also differentiated himself of Marxism and especially the dogmatic notion of
dialectical materialism (Alinsky, 1969: xii-xiii; Alinsky, 1971: xiii).
17
Unlike Shaw’s notion of community organising, Alinsky’s aim was to organise the poor as a
political force in the struggle over power. A strong dualism depicts his thinking. On one hand there
are the poor, or “Have-Nots”, who are oppressed and subjugated by the political and economic
elites. On the other hand, the elites are called with many names: the political machine, the City Hall,
the system, the tycoons, or the establishment. The clash between these two poles constitutes
political action in Alinsky’s thinking and politics can be reduced to the relations of struggle
between “the Haves” and “the Have-Nots”.4
Alinsky’s thought follows a certain populist mode of reasoning that operates with the notion of
uniform “People” and builds it an antagonist relation to the establishment. The People is an entity
with the common interest of resisting the oppression of the elites. The task for the organiser is to
establish a “People’s Organization” with a programme produced by the community and serving its
needs. With this organization the People can be mobilized as a political force and may be able
defend their interests effectively. The main content of Alinsky’s two volumes is in the practical
advice on how the People’s Organization may be started and how it should act in order to be an
effective pressure group against the selfish interest of the elites.
The mission of the People’s Organisation is to change the status quo. Therefore, Alinsky’s strategy
strikes at the most obvious shortcoming of Shaw’s consensual strategy: its lack of political vision.
Alinsky (1969) wrote that:
”The building of a People’s Organization is the building of a new power group. The creation
of any new power group automatically becomes an intrusion and a threat to the existing power
arrangements. It carries with it the menacing implication of displacement and disorganization
of the status quo.” (Alinsky, 1969: 132.)
In other words, the People’s Organisation strives for the fulfilment of certain political goals by
organising communities as a political force. The organisation fights social ills especially by
applying many kinds of non-violent means of pressure, even if it may also adopt self-help measures.
Alinsky (e.g. 1971: 139, 143) talks of organising strikes, demonstrations, picket lines, boycotts, and
campaigns, as well as more unconventional means of pressure. Conflict does not belong to the
4 Of course Alinsky acknowledges that there is a third group in between, “the Have-a-Little, Want-Mores”, but this is to him a relatively meaningless group from the perspective of political action and democracy.
18
relations between the members of the People’s Organisation, except when the organiser fails to
project the frustration of the people to an external enemy- to “rub raw the sores of resentment”.
Alinsky’s organisation is a tool for political struggle, not its arena.
Nevertheless it is interesting that the emphasis of conflict apparent in Alinsky’s texts does not only
mean a fight against oppressive forces, a step towards some harmonious existence in the future. In
his later work, Alinsky (1971: 59) wrote that “[a] free and open society is an on-going conflict,
interrupted periodically by compromises – which then become the start for the continuation of
conflict, compromise, and on ad infinitum.” Understanding conflict as an important condition of
democracy legitimizes Alinsky’s own conflict strategy. If conflict is the ordinary state in a free
society, then the poor surely have as good grounds as every other societal group to take part in
political struggle for their interests. Asking somebody to give up the defence of her interests for
some collective motivation is basically an undemocratic demand. On the other hand, this
understanding of conflict – more that any other trait in Alinsky’s work – highlights the progressive
line of his thought. In comparison, Shaw’s notion of society was inherently conservative: it saw
conflicts only as potentially dangerous phenomena disintegrating the very foundation of social
order. Therefore, any kind of change in values or norms, and eventually relations between societal
groups, could be seen as dangerous. Alinsky’s view, in contrast, leads to a dynamic society in which
political action and demands are legitimate and an ordinary trait of democracy.
Despite of this emphasis of conflict, Alinsky’s idea of community organising has aspects which can
be interpreted as a governmentalised use of communities and which reflect the pragmatist
philosophical roots of the Chicago school. In addition to political struggle, the People’s
Organisation seeks to educate the slum dwellers. Alinsky defines the education of people as a
central trait of democratic society and the fulfilment of the people’s democratic potential requires
enlightening them. This education does not, however, mean only increasing the skills and
knowledge of the poor, but rather it is a process in which their attitudes are forged more democratic.
As well, hostilities between different groups with in the community need to be altered through
increasing face-to-face interaction. When groups representing different experiences and interest are
gathered to act together in common organisation, mutual understanding will increase. This, in turn,
will lead to new definition of social questions and to the increase of their political significance. And
by changing the attitudes of the natural leaders, the attitudes of the whole community are altered.
(Alinsky, 1969: 155-8.) Alinsky does not seem to think, thus, that the organiser will find the People
ready for the fight for equality and democracy. On the contrary, he writes, that community members
19
may have quite undemocratic – e.g. racist – attitudes (Alinsky, 1969: 170). Also self-interest may
often be the original motivation for taking part in the People’s Organisation. The task for a
community organiser is to create situations in which undemocratic attitudes can be changed. The
goal of education in the community organisation is to educate democratic citizens who are capable
of co-operation and who esteem solidarity.
Alinsky’s variation of the strategy of community organising emphasised indigenous interests,
political action and a more comprehensive understanding on the forces that create social problems
(Engel, 2002: 61;Alinsky, 1941). Despite the differences, this variation continued the same
pragmatist tradition emphasising social construction that informed the Chicago school (Engel, 2002:
63). The American city and its immigrant community can be seen as an important historical
condition for the feasibility of both of the variations. Along the tracks Alinsky laid down,
community organising today is often attached to radical democratic ideas (e.g. Ledwith, 2011: 91-
5). This separates most strikingly Alinsky from his less famous predecessors. Unlike Shaw and his
fellow sociologists, Alinsky himself was a member of the problematic group of second generation
immigrants. He was not a Pole, but belonged to the second biggest group of immigrants in Chicago.
This may have made him more sensitive to the economic and political conditions (i.e. segregation,
racism, exploitation) of the immigrant community than what the middle-class sociologists were.
Conclusions
The participatory technology of citizenship developed by Shaw did not remain an individual
experiment but was the basis for many later projects of government. As a national scale tool of
public administration it was reintroduced in the 1960s anti-poverty programme War on Poverty
(Janowitz, 1967; Cruikshank, 1999). In a somewhat similar manner, also the EEC poverty
programmes were already in the 1970s and 80s aimed in enacting a social order through the concept
of social exclusion and participatory projects (see Silver, 1994). Today, such governmentalised
communitarian strategies may be more common than ever before: For example Putnam’s (2000)
notion of social capital, and the concern over its disintegration, became the basis for many kinds of
political endeavours in the turn of the millennium. And recently many projects varying form rural
development (Nousiainen & Pylkkänen 2013) to the British policy schemes of Third Way (Rose,
2000) and Big Society (Hancock et al., 2012) are trying to deploy communities for the enactment of
an autonomous moral order producing responsible citizens. Perhaps the idea of endangered social
20
bonds, norms and values still provides us convenient ways to explain (and strategies to act upon)
such behaviour we find hard to understand.
Various contemporary strategies of government that operate through communities or other micro-
moral domains for the responsibilisation of citizens have been described as neo- or advanced liberal
modes of governing (Rose, 1996; Miller and Rose, 2008). As the present examination has shown,
such strategies are not new and could as well be called sociological as liberal. These strategies do
not strive only to the enhancement of rational and calculating subjectivities but also see man as a
social creature that acts in a social environment. On top of individual interest, also feelings of
solidarity are fostered – even if through schemes that contain the minimum elements of
redistribution. However, these strategies have indeed become more advanced and diverse since the
days of the Chicago school as Miller and Rose (2008: 210–215) have shown. Probably the long
history of experimenting with this kind of a social mode of governing, and bitter disappointments
related to its radical and conservative variations, have revealed many needs for improvements (e.g.
see Moynihan, 1969).
Yet, it is important for the contemporary students of participatory governance to notice that such
technologies of active citizenship are not politically uniform. In addition to enacting social order
that controls individual impulses and thus pacifies social relations, also radical democratic ideas are
often attached to it. Ironically, Alinsky turned the anti-revolutionary aims of the early sociological
thought upside down and transformed the community organising strategy as a (non-violent) means
of shaking up the status quo. Especially the two differing variations have in different combinations
been present in many later project of community organising which enables community organising
to be simultaneously regarded as a conservative and a radical technology. Perhaps it is just this
variability that explains the strategy’s popularity over the last century.
References
Alinsky SD (1941) Community Analysis and Organization. American Journal of Sociology 46(6):
797–808.
Alinsky SD (1969) Reveille for Radicals. New York: Vintage Books.
Alinsky SD (1971) Rules for Radicals. New York: Vintage Books.
21
Bevir M (2010) Rethinking governmentality: Towards genealogies of governance. European
Journal of Social Theory 13(4): 423–441.
Burgess E (1967a) The Growth of the City. An Introduction to a Research Project. In: Park R,
Burgess E and McKenzie R The City. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. pp. 47–62.
Burgess E (1967b) Can Neighborhood Work Have a Scientific Basis. In: Park R, Burgess E and
McKenzie R The City. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. pp. 142–155.
Burgess E (1966) Discussion. In: Shaw C The Jack-Roller. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press. pp. 184–197.
Cazenave N (2007) Impossible Democracy. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Cortes E (1997) Reweaving the Social Fabric. Families in Society 78(2): 196–200.
Cortese, AJ (1995) The rise, hegemony, and decline of the Chicago School of Sociology, 1892-
1945. Social Science Journal 32(3): 235–255.
Deegan, MJ (1988) Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School, 1892-1918. New Brunswick:
Transaction Books.
Delanty G (2003) Community. Abington: Routledge.
Engel, LJ (2002) Saul Alinsky and the Chicago School. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy
16(1): 50–66.
Ewald F (1991) Insurance and Risk. In: Burchell G, Gordon C and Miller P (eds) The Foucault
Effect. Studies in Governmentality. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. pp.197–210.
Foucault M (2000) Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984. Method and epistemology / Vol. 2.
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
22
Hancock L, Mooney G and Neal S (2012) Crisis social policy and the resilience of the concept of
community. Critical Social Policy 32(3): 343–364.
Helén I (2005) Genealogia kritiikkinä. Sosiologia 42(2): 93–109.
Janowitz M (1967) Introduction. In: Park R, Burgess E and McKenzie R The City. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press. pp. vii – x.
Moynihan DP (1969) Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding. New York: The Free Press.
Kobrin S (1959) The Chicago Area Project – A 25-Year Assessment. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 322(1): 19–29.
Ledwith M (2011) Community development. A critical approach. Bristol: The Policy Press.
Miller P and Rose N (2008) Governing the Present. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Nousiainen M and Pylkkänen P (2013) Responsible local communities – A neoliberal regime of
solidarity in Finnish rural policy. Geoforum 48(August): 73–82.
Pacyga D (1989) The Russell Square Community Committee. An Ethnic Response to Urban
Problems. Journal of Urban History 15(1): 159–184.
Park R (1967a) The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behaviour in the Urban
Environment. In: Park R, Burgess E and McKenzie R The City. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press. pp. 1–46.
Park R (1967b) Community Organization and Juvenile Delinquency. In: Park R, Burgess E and
McKenzie R The City. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. pp. 99–112.
Park R (1967c). Community Organization and the Romantic Temper. In: Park R, Burgess E and
McKenzie R The City. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. pp. 113–122.
Procacci, G (1989) Sociology and Its Poor. Politics & Society 17(2). pp.163–187.
23
Putnam R (2000) Bowling Alone. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Rabinow P (1989) The French Modern. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Reitzes D and Reitzes D (1982) Alinsky Reconsidered: A Reluctant Community Theorist. Social
Science Quarterly 63(2): 265–279.
Rose N (1996) The Death of the social? Re-figuring the territory of government. Economy and
Society 25(3): 327–356.
Rose, N (2000) Community, Citizenship, and the Third Way. American Behavioral Scientist 43(9).
pp. 1395–1411.
Schlossmann S and Sedlak M (1983). The Chicago Area Project Revisited. Santa Monica: The
Rand Corporation.
Shaw C (1966) The Jack-Roller. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Shaw C and McKay H (1931) Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency. Washington: National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.
Shaw C and McKay H (1969) Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Revised Edition. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Short J (1969) Introduction to the Revised Edition. In: Shaw C and McKay H Juvenile Delinquency
and Urban Areas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. xxv–liv.
Silver H (1994) Social exclusion and social solidarity: Three paradigms. International Labour
Review 133(5-6). pp. 531–578.
Snell P (2010) From Durkheim to the Chicago School: Against the ‘variables sociology’ paradigm.
Journal of Classical Sociology 10(1). pp. 51–67.
24
Thomas WI and Znaniecki F (1974a) The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. Volume One.
New York: Octagon Books.
Thomas WI and Znaniecki F (1974b) The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. Volume Two.
New York: Octagon Books.
Whyte, WF (1981) Street Corner Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Zaretsky E (1996) Introduction. In: Zaretsky E (ed) Thomas, William & Znaniecki, Florian: The
Polish Peasant in Europe and America. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. pp. vii–xvii.