Participation as Viewed through the Lensof the Political Socialization Project

M. Kent JenningsUniversity of California, Santa Barbara

Prepared for a Conference on "Political Participation: Building a Research Agenda," Center forthe Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton University

October 12-14, 2000

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Participation as Viewed through the Lensof the Political Socialization Project

At the outset of the political socialization project in 1965 the topic of political

participation assumed a relatively minor role. After all, the primary respondents were high

school seniors, most of whom had engaged in little concrete, purposive political action. Even the

18-year old vote was several years away. Consequently, with respect to participation, the

interview schedule only contained questions about participative orientations, political skills and

resources, and what were judged to be other adolescent precursors of adult participation. Of

course we had gathered indicators of participation from the parent sample, but they were seen as

being mainly useful for how they conditioned parent to child transmission of other political traits.

As the project expanded over time, participation came to occupy a more prominent role in study

design, instrument content, and analysis. Indeed, in many respects we are just beginning to

realize fully the fruits of the design with respect to participation as the class of '65 reaches the

fullness of middle age. The project remains very much a "work in progress."

In this brief essay I will highlight some results that have emerged from the project and

make some suggestions about future research.1 In particular I will emphasize results that either

reveal insights and raise questions not available with less complex designs or that provide a

much firmer foundation for work coming out of such designs. It may be helpful to consult Table

1, which shows the main components of the design.2 Three points are especially important.

First, the design includes multiple generations, now expanded to three based on having surveyed

1I have appended a list of the relevant published and unpublished work associated with the project, but I wish toidentify and thank four colleagues who have been intimately associated with this project over the years as co-workersand co-authors: Richard Niemi, Paul Beck, Gregory Markus, and Laura Stoker.

2Not included here are several other sets of data obtained in 1965, including basic school characteristics and mass-administered data from all members of the senior class in most of the schools.

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the offspring of the class of '65 (G3) in the 1997 wave. Second the design is longitudinal, with

four waves of the class of '65 (G2) and three of their parents (G1). Third, the resultant data sets

consist of embedded familial ties, not just those of parent and child, for which we now have two

sets, but also multiple sets of husband-wife pairs.

Although it distorts the reality of the actual processes involved, I will proceed in rough

chronological order, beginning with the pre-adult years, moving on to young adulthood, and

concluding with young adulthood and beyond. As will become apparent, I do not focus

exclusively on political participation as a dependent variable which--aside from the dimension of

representation--constitutes the thrust of most studies of participation. Rather, because of its

multi-generation, multi-wave character the project also lends itself to treating participation as a

mediating and independent variable. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to political

participation are based on multi-item indexes that reflect respondents' reports of concrete,

purposive activities over the several years preceding the survey date.

Pre-Adulthood

Most of our attention at this level has been directed toward the family and the school, the

degree to which and the manner is which they influence subsequent participation on the part of

their charges. With respect to the family we have focused on parental social class and on

parental levels of political participation. The first provides a general indicator of the resources

and environment that surrounded the developing child while the second provides a more specific

indicator of the participation cues and reinforcement that were being offered. I concentrate on

parental levels of participation here, but suffice it to say that family social class does in fact

behave as it should with respect to later political activity on the part of both G2 and G3.

3

Somewhat to our surprise, the correspondence between parents and their children on

participation indexes--while highly significant statistically--turned out to be moderate in

magnitude. Considerable variation exists around that moderate figure, but compared with the

congruence on attitudes about highly salient political objects and on measures of political

awareness, the overall pair similarity seemed low. Interestingly enough, these levels of

congruence varied only slight according to whether contemporaneous or lagged relationships

were being considered in the case of the G1-G2 pairs, though they always ran a bit higher in the

former case. Children do not become more like their parents as they age, contrary to what a

sleeper or latent effects model would predict. Nevertheless, the residues of preadult socialization

with respect to participation remained quite visible even as the class of '65 hit middle age.

It might be argued that this cohort had unique experiences as they came of age and that

preceding and succeeding cohorts would resemble their own parents to a greater extent. That

seems unlikely based on the second set of parent-child pairs, the class of '65 and their offspring

(G2-G3). The correspondence involving this second set of pairs matches almost exactly that for

the preceding set, a result that parallels, by the way, those found for highly salient attitude

objects. These cross-generational similarities in the face of enormous changes in family

structures, to say nothing of the social and political environments, speak to the unique place of

the family in shaping the political character of rising generations.

Parental participation also operates in a more indirect way by conditioning the

transmission process. G2 individuals with more participative and engaged parents tended to be

more like them with respect to political preferences than were those with less participative

parents. The ripple effects of this process are significant. Offspring more influenced by their

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parents at an early age possessed more stable predispositions over time, thus helping perpetuate

the parental attitudinal legacy.

Analysis of the subset of mother-father-offspring triads revealed another way in which

parental participation impinges on the transmission process. When parents held divergent

opinions (with respect to partisanship at least) children more often wound up in the camp of the

more participative parent. And when parents held the same views, those views were more

frequently reproduced when the parents had higher rates of political participation. Inferentially,

modeling processes based on more frequent cue-giving and reinforcement lead to these kinds of

outcomes. In this respect most of our findings about parental effects are understated to the extent

that they rely on data from a single parent rather than both.

The other aspect of the pre-adult years to which we have paid most attention is that of

schooling effects. As concern mounts about signs of declining civic engagement, attention has

turned increasingly to the role of pre-adult civic education, especially at the junior high and

secondary school levels. The formal curriculum, non-traditional learning, and extracurricular

activities have come under close scrutiny. Calls for innovation abound.

Our own work suggests rather trivial effects from civics courses per se. By contrast,

being involved in student body activities and the school�s associational life has substantial long-

term effects on later participation. This remains true even after taking into account a number of

other factors, including parental socio-economic status and political participation levels.

Thus the practice and skill acquisition associated with these �pre-political� endeavors

subsequently play out in the real world, much as civic educators have long preached. There are

important implications here regarding school size and opportunity structures. Larger schools

have a richer associational life in some respects, with more absolute opportunities. On the other

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hand, smaller schools provide a richer per capita opportunity structure for leadership and office-

holding simply because there are a limited number of certain positions regardless of school size

(only one class president for example). In this respect smaller is indeed better.

The socialization project was initiated long before the current rage for service learning

and other types of non-traditional civic programs emerged. Whether they will yield the same

positive results as those for student activities is problematic.3 My own speculation is that �pre-

political� training and skill acquisition within a setting of one�s own age peers has more long-run

payoff.

Young Adulthood

Although a number of salient events bearing on participation mark young adulthood, we

have devoted most attention to education and to political engagement itself. Education has been

treated as an independent variable, in the usual fashion, but political engagement has been treated

as a independent and mediating variable as well as a dependent variable, as will become clearer

as I proceed.

I begin with education, which is somewhat less interesting simply because of the pre-

existing wealth of information about the effects of education on participation. Our work with

educational attainment showed the customary strong connections to participation, even though

the G2 sample was truncated by the exclusion of dropouts. However, the design permitted us to

go beyond that to draw three other conclusions. One was to show the consistent impact of

relative position in the educational stratification system. Despite vast differences in the absolute

amount of education, the relationship between education and participation differed scarcely at all

3The literature, much of it based on inadequate designs and measurement, is burgeoning. For a symposium onservice learning see PS 33 (September 2000), 615-48.

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between G1 and G2.4 Second, the effects of educational stratification kick in very quickly. The

less well educated were always playing catch-up whereas the habit of participation had become

well-ingrained early on among the better educated.

Third, and relatedly, the harbingers of the education/participation link were already

sturdily in place before eventual educational attainments. As high school seniors the members of

G2 could be easily distinguished in terms of spectator participation, subjective interest, political

knowledge, and other corollaries of concrete participation according to their ultimate education

levels. That being the case, it raises anew the issue as to how much credit can be assigned to

higher education and just what it is that makes education such a reliable predictor of

participation. Cross section studies showing strong associations between education and

participation are clearly catching influences at work well in advance of educational destinations.

Results based on political engagement proved more novel. The timing of the first wave

was fortuitous in a number of respects, coming as it did in the midst of the civil rights movement

and on the eve of the student protest movement and a number of other system shocks that would

transpire over the ensuing decade. One consequence of this timing was the emergence of a group

of protesters in the sample who could be followed over time and who could be genuinely labeled

as a generation unit in the Mannheimian sense. Most studies of protesters from that era have

been handicapped by either being single shot observations or confined to super-activists in

circumscribed locales. We picked up enough protesters in the 1973 wave to justify comparisons

between them and their equally well-educated, non-protesting fellows as they marched through

time.

4This finding anticipated that made by Norman H. Nie, Jane Judd, and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry, Education andDemocratic Citizenship in America (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996), though we did not derive the samepolitical implication.

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Becoming involved in the protest movement produced (or, to be more cautious, was

associated with) two rather profound effects, one on participation and the other on political

attitudes. With respect to participation, the nascent protesters as high school seniors did appear

to be somewhat more predisposed to later participation than were eventual non-protesters. But

the gulf in participation that appeared by 1973 could hardly have been anticipated. Among other

things, this gulf falsified the "riff-raff" version of student protesters because they exceeded the

non-protesters in all conventional modes of participation as well. More crucially, the

participation gap persisted over time, being nearly as wide in 1997 as it had been in 1973. Even

though much of the initial activity had been directed against establishment institutions and

personnel, the protesters went on to "work within the system" (a la Tom Hayden).

An important consequence of this ongoing difference in participation is that the two

groups came to differ dramatically in terms of political preferences. As high school seniors the

eventual protesters were just a shade more liberal than non-protesters. By 1973 these minor

differences had exploded into sharp contrasts on issues and partisanship. Subsequent soundings

in 1982 and 1997 revealed lasting, though sometimes muted divisions on old as well as newer

issues. In fact, the partisan divide was as massively wide in 1997 as in 1973, a vivid illustration

of how two generation units can become wedded to two different parties at a formative life stage.

Whether one wants to characterize this protest involvement as a transformative event (which is

my inclination) or as a phenomena that reflects how different members of the same birth cohort

worked over the same historical materials at hand, the result was the appearance and perpetuation

of generational units conceived during the protest era.

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Early participation history also affected other political orientations through its impact on

attitudinal stability. It turns out that people who became more generally politically active in early

adulthood also exhibited more attitudinal instability during that time frame. As time passed,

however, they became more stable than those off to a slow start in participation. At first glance

these findings seemed counterintuitive to us. Why shouldn't those who were more engaged, and

hence more likely to have greater familiarity with ongoing issues, parties, and the like, be more

rather than less stable early on? Paradoxically, greater fresh contact with what was transpiring as

they aged from 18-26 (1965-1973) is precisely why the more engaged were more unstable, for

this was a turbulent period when challenge and protest occupied center stage. Those more caught

up in what was going on were more subject to the pushes and pulls of the era. Then, having

undergone more intensive involvement during a formative period, they scored very sizeable gains

in attitudinal continuities in the ensuing panel periods and, for the most part, exceeded the

stability of their initially less participative classmates.

Not all ostensibly important political experiences in young adulthood carry equal weight,

however. One-half of the males in the sample experienced military service during the Vietnam

War. For a variety of reasons, including selection effects and the different stages of the war and

ages of the men during which military service occurred, the impact of military service on

political participation and political attitudes was much more limited than was that for protest

behavior. It would clearly be misleading to characterize those who served as constituting a

generation unit, though a fine-grained analysis based on a large number of cases might uncover

such a group. In any event, the important point is that the consequences of experiences in young

adulthood can produce variable impacts; having before and after measures provides a powerful

tool for making these distinctions and for helping account for them.

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Young Adulthood and (Way) Beyond

Having multiple generations and an extended time frame enabled us to address some

long-standing questions about the dynamics of participation as well as how intimate and more

remote contexts affect these dynamics. One such topic is that of participation rates over the life

cycle.

The start up time needed for participation in young adulthood has been frequently

observed, although G2 started in the fast lane in that regard and may have been an exception that

proves the rule. What happens in the advanced stages of life is less clear, partly because of

compositional differences in successive cohorts and partly because the answer depends on what

kind of participation is being considered. The G1 sample provided an ideal vehicle for testing

the effects of age because composition was essentially held constant as that cohort aged. The

oldest one-third of this cohort was well into "young" old age (65-74) by the time of the last G1

wave in 1982. We concluded that the rates of more strenuous, demanding activities do decline as

old age approaches (taking into account period effects), but that more passive and "easier" modes

remain relatively unchanged. Moreover, involvement in politically relevant age-graded activities

and organizations takes up some of the participation slack.

Repeated soundings of G1 and G2 also enabled us to address the question of the

patterning of individual-level stability in participation over the life course. Continuities in

participation follow the same routes as those found for political preferences and cognition. The

impressionable, formative years model works here as well. As members of G2 went from young

adulthood into middle age their stability levels climbed and then more or less leveled off at a

reasonably high level (circa r=.60). Of course this rate still leaves ample room for individual

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variation over time.5 Importantly, though, participation habits appear to solidify or crystallize in

much the same fashion as do core political values and attitudes. Nor is the class of '65 plateauing

at a different level of stability than its biological predecessor, for G2�s continuity coefficients

over the last panel period closely approximate those for G1 over its last panel period. Patterns of

learning and crystallization are remarkably consistent across generations.

Marital transitions represent some of the most important events of adult life. The

common finding that married people participate more than do the unmarried obscures a much

more complex picture. The panel data contain marital histories as well as data on the spouses of

the primary respondents. As a result it becomes possible to assess the impact of marital

transitions on political participation. We reached a number of conclusions about the effects of

marital transitions, using husband-wife pairs from both G1 and G2. Marital partners adjust their

activity levels to become more like each other after marriage; marital transitions of any type,

especially marriage among younger people, tend to depress participation in the short run; the

overall effect of marriage is powerfully mediated by the participation level of the partner; and

these mediation effects are greatest for political activities that require joint efforts or that draw

upon the couple's joint resources.

The presence of marital partners also facilitated an examination of the gender gap in

participation within a familial setting in a fashion that cannot be as fully or reliably achieved by

relying on the reports of a single partner. Husbands had the overall edge in G1, which was not

surprising given the socialization of that generation, extant cultural expectations, and the

differential distribution of resources by sex. Two crucial caveats qualify this statement. First,

5 A few people are chronic slackers. Around 5% of G2 scored 0 on a cumulative 0-27 point index (where each pointrepresents an activity) that spanned the thirty-two years represented by the panel. Not surprisingly, no one scored27, although one super athlete registered a 25, surely worthy of a gold medal.

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wives exceeded husbands with respect to school affairs, a pattern found in more general

populations as well, and one in accord with traditional gender role expectations. Second, wives

could overcome their general disadvantage under certain, well-specified conditions that invested

them with resources superior to those of their husbands. Illustratively, when wives were better

educated and more personally efficacious than their husbands they held the advantage in

participation. Similarly, working class wives with more education or in the labor market

outperformed their husbands. These special circumstances are quite meaty in theoretical sense,

but for G1 they constituted a modest fraction of all cases.

Gender roles die hard, however. An analysis of marital pairs from G2 reveals a continued

gender gap in the husband's favor. Recall that G2 came of age as the second women's movement

was getting underway and as gender roles were being redefined. Recall also that all members of

G2 have at least a high school education and well over a third have a college degree. Yet when

participation inequalities exist within the crucible of the family, husbands still hold the edge. We

have not yet determined the circumstances under which this edge can be reversed for G2, but its

very existence testifies to the tenacity of the nexus involving gender roles and political

participation.

Notwithstanding this perpetuation, it should be noted that American couples tend to be

much more egalitarian on the political front than do couples in many other western countries

One shining, perhaps now dated, example of this appeared in the analysis of data from the eight-

nation Political Action study conducted in the mid 1970s. According to responses from youths

16-20 years of age, the United States was the only country in which fathers did not hold an edge

over mothers as a talking partner about politics. (Mothers trounced fathers in all countries on

other topics!) Moreover, while the fathers of these youths had the higher scores on a

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participation index in all countries, the margin was quite slim in the U.S. compared with other

countries.

As a further corollary, a rank ordering of sex differences in participation among adult

populations in these eight nations correlated very strongly with the rank ordering of the �talking

partner� variable, suggesting that the latter was both a reflection of and a cause of the former. It

would be surprising if socialization processes within the home did not mirror extant sex

inequalities in participation in the adult world. At the same time, extant practices valued by the

polity are sustained by the corresponding socialization of upcoming cohorts. Political

socialization becomes both cause and effect.

In addition to capitalizing on changes in personal circumstances, such as marital

transitions, the socialization project also affords the potential for exposing the consequences of

secular events and developments in the adult years. These developments include technological

innovations, none of more recent significance and discussion than the Internet. Virtually all

studies treating the political impact of the Internet on mass publics rest on cross-sectional designs

or, in the better instances, replicated cross-sectional designs. Inferences can be made about the

effects of Internet use on standard measures of participation, but without the "before" measures

such inferences remain problematic.6

The 1982 and 1997 waves provide very convenient bookends for assessing Internet

effects on G2, about half of whom had access by 1997. Contrary to some pessimistic

speculations, neither general nor political use of the Internet (relative to non-use) depressed

levels of participation. Indeed, taking into account "before" measures and controlling for other

relevant variables Net users became somewhat more active and involved. Significantly, that

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advantage included the standard measure of "working with others to solve some community

problem" and a measure of volunteerism, two prime indicators of civic engagement.

(Contemporaneous associations between Internet use and participation were similar for G2 and

G3.) Nor did Net use result in lower interpersonal trust, a frequently-cited ingredient of social

capital.

Although we have focused on individual characteristics and primary networks in looking

at the determinants and corollaries of participation, the influence of larger contextual effects can

also be observed. The protest movements of the 1960s provide one obvious example. Without

the opportunity structure presented by these movements, we would not have had such a sizeable

group of protesters in the class of '65. Their parents and their own offspring have virtually zero

entries on the protest side. Context makes a difference and, in this instance, a difference with

lasting consequences. In quite a different venue, the varying contexts offered up by presidential

election contests generated different levels of involvement over time in G1 and served to

distinguish them most sharply from G2 in the divisive campaign of 1972.

An unusual demonstration of contextual effects comes from the 1965 G1 survey and takes

advantage of information about the social composition of the 97 schools in the sample. A

passing comment here is that political scientists who study the politics of education continue to

be a lonely crowd, notwithstanding the fact that school politics typically command high citizen

interest and are often quite contentious. In the survey, parents were asked whether they had been

upset about anything that had transpired at their child's school and, if so, whether they had taken

action to address the grievance. A striking feature about the probability of seeking grievance

resolution via school authorities consisted of the interaction between individual and contextual

6The literature on Internet use and politics is rapidly expanding. For one account see Kevin A. Hill and John E.

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properties. In particular, being in a minority social category relative to the school's social

composition depressed grievance reduction attempts. For example, as the proportion of non-

Catholics in public schools increased, the probability that a Catholic parent would intervene

decreased. Similarly, as the social class of the school increased, the likelihood that a working

class parent would confront school authorities declined. In essence, being in a minority acted to

intimidate and constrain action.

Hughes, Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet ( Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 1998).

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Suggestions for the Future

I want to make three pitches in terms of survey approaches to the study of participation.

The first concerns study design. Not surprisingly, I am a big fan of medium to long-term panel

studies, difficult though they may be to execute. To state the obvious, patterns of individual-

level continuity and change in participation are best captured in panel studies. As I have tried to

demonstrate in the foregoing, panel studies provide a powerful tool for assessing the enduring

impact of earlier experiences and milieus, the consequences of changes in personal

circumstances, and the effects of events transpiring in the larger environment. Because we

cannot, as scholars, program these various occurrences and processes, the next best solution is to

be prepared to take advantage of them.

One possibility would be a (substantial) variant of the long-running Panel Study of

Income Dynamics. That study demonstrates that it is possible to keep an adult household (and

splitoffs) sample intact over a long period of time. Panel studies need not be confined, of course,

to general populations or strata within those populations (as in the political socialization project).

Surveys beginning with a core of activists or activist organizations and networks could address

such key topics as ingress and egress, motivations, and cross-issue mobility. If my stress on the

importance of young adulthood is correct, tailor-made designs that follow individuals into middle

age should illuminate the varied roles of participation as a dependent, independent, and

mediating variable. At a more applied level, systematic evaluations of innovations in civics

training should include extended observations.

Second, I would encourage more attention to contextual effects. Here I use the term in a

very broad sense to take in more or less immediate environments (including primary and

secondary ties) as well as larger, more encompassing ones. Just as studies of political attitudes

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profit by the inclusion of context, so too do participation studies. While larger environments can

be factored into the analysis of national studies, the same proves more difficult for more

immediate environments, especially with respect to survey studies. Ascertaining relevant

contextual features at the more immediate level (as, e.g., in the school context cited earlier),

probably means more by way of local studies or more highly clustered national samples

organized around institutions or policy areas.

Finally, I favor more intensive studies of political activists. Thanks especially to NES,

students of participation have a longitudinal map of electoral participation; and thanks to the

citizen participation studies by Verba and his associates, they also have a highly-nuanced

accounting of participation more generally. Absent from this national (and local for the most

part) picture are sizeable studies of domain-specific issue activists. As everyone recognizes,

samples of general populations only rarely produce enough specific issue activists for analytical

purposes. The authors of Voice and Equality struck it lucky by being in the field when the

abortion issue was at high tide. As a result they had enough activists in a specific issue domain

to merit detailed analysis. In the socialization project we lucked out by having enough student

protesters to merit detailed analysis. But these are among the few exceptions in the political

science literature.

This seems a rather strange state of affairs. Should we not be more strategic in seeking

out those individuals and groups more intimately involved in issues? As Brady observes, "Most

people get involved in politics because they care about some issue, but most models of

participation give short shrift to issues."7 One of the best ways to remedy that state of affairs is

7Henry E. Brady, "Political Participation," in Measures of Political Attitudes, ed. John P. Robinson, Philip R.Shaver, and Lawrence W. Wrightsman (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999).

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to study activists in specific issue arenas. Pinpointed, but substantively limited surveys capturing

citizen contacting, for example, can provide information reflecting mobilization efforts on

specific issues and some general information about contactors and non-contactors.8 Online

surveys of advocacy group members are another way of tapping into specific domains.

These kinds of surveys, many of which will probably involve the Internet in one way or

another, will be extremely valuable. But they are unlikely to generate detailed information about

activists to match the breadth, depth , and quality of that found in studies of more general

populations such as Voice and Equality. Rather, specific populations need to be targeted and

investigated more intensively. One modest step in that direction involved a national study of

AIDS activists. This investigation yielded insights into such topics as precipitating factors,

motivations, strategies, and issue overlap that are ordinarily impossible to achieve in surveys of

general populations.9 It will always be necessary to compare the more active with the less active,

but since the activists drive the political dynamics--especially in an era of issue advocacy--it

strikes me that we should devote more attention to them.

Similarly, political scientists have largely ceded the study of social movements to other

disciplines. Virtually all of these movements have evolved into if indeed did not spring from

political movements and organizations. The study of rank and file activists in particular, and the

relationship between them and movement leaders, would seem to be natural targets for political

science. I am undoubtedly overlooking some stellar work in this area, though having combed

8See Kenneth M. Goldstein, Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.Press, 1999), chs. 5-6.

9 M. Kent Jennings and Ellen Andersen, "Support for Confrontational Tactics among AIDS Activists," AmericanJournal of Political Science, 40 (May, 1996), 311-34; Jennings and Andersen, "Activism among the Activists: theCase of AIDS," unpublished paper, 2000; and Andersen and Jennings, "Participation in Movement: The Dynamicsof Multi-Dimensional Activism,� paper presented at the meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association,Chicago, April 2000.

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much of the relevant literature in connection with the AIDS activists project I was struck by the

sparse attention devoted to movement activists by political scientists. Studying issue and

movement activists through survey research requires great ingenuity, especially with respect to

access and sampling, but the rewards should be ample.

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Abbreviated Research Design for National Study of Political Socialization______________________________________________________________________

Primary Sample of High School Seniors--G2Survey Year 1965 1973 1982 1997(Age) (18) (26) (35) (50)(N) (1669) (1348) (1135) (935)

Class of '65 X X X XAnd Their:

Parents--G1 X X X

Parent Spouses X X X

Own Spouses X X X

Own Children--G3 X______________________________________________________________________________

Three Analytic Approaches to the Data Sets(G2=class of '65; G1=Parents of G2; Sp=Spouse; G3=Children of G2)

Generational Analysis (Aggregate)

A. Single generation over time--G1'65, '73 '82, '97; G2 '65, '73, '82.

B. Contemporaneous cross-generation comparisons--G1'65 with G2'65; G1'73 withG2'73; G1'82 with G2'82; G2'97 with G3'97.

C. Lagged cross-generation comparisons--e.g. G2'65 with G3'97; G2'73 withG3'97; G2'73 with G1'82 with G3'97.

Panel Analysis (Individual)

A. Adjacent and non-adjacent waves for G2--i.e., the six pairings built upfrom 1965, '73, '82, and '97.

B. Same for G1, except limited to 1965, '73, and '82.

Pairs and Triples Analysis (Family Units)

A. Contemporaneous pair relationships--e.g., G1'65 - G2'65; G1'73 - G2'73;G2'97 - G3'97; G1'65 - G1Sp'65; G2'73 - G2Sp'73; G2'97 - G2Sp'97.

B. Lagged pair relationships--e.g., G1'65 - G2'73, '82, '97; G1'73 - G2'82,'97.

C. Contemporaneous triple relationships--e.g., G2'65 & G1'65 & G1Sp'65; G1'82& G1Sp'82 & G2'82; G2'97 & G2Sp'97 & G3'97.

______________________________________________________________________________

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Reports from the Political Socialization andRelated Projects Dealing with Participation

Beck, Paul Allen, and M. Kent Jennings. "Political Periods and Political Participation,"American Political Science Review, 73 (September, 1979), 737-750.

________. "Pathways to Participation" (with Paul Allen Beck), American Political ScienceReview, 76 (March, 1982), 94-108.

________. "Family Traditions, Political Periods, and the Development of Partisan Orientations,"Journal of Politics, 53 (August, 1991), 742-63.

Jennings, M. Kent. "Parental Grievances and School Politics," Public Opinion Quarterly, 32(Fall, 1968), 363-378.

________. "Gender Roles and Inequalities in Political Participation: Results from an Eight-Nation Study," Western Political Quarterly, 36 (September, 1983), 364-84.

________. "Another Look at the Life Cycle and Political Participation," American Journal ofPolitical Science, 23 (November, 1979), 755-771.

________. "Residues of a Movement: the Aging of the American Protest Generation," AmericanPolitical Science Review, 81 (June, 1987), 367-82.

________. "The Dynamics of Student Protest Behavior: An Intra-and Intergenerational Analysis.Paper presented at the meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Seattle, WA,July 2000.

________, and Richard G. Niemi. The Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence ofFamilies and Schools. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.

________. "The Division of Political Labor Between Mothers and Fathers" American PoliticalScience Review, 65 (March, 1971), 69-82.

________. Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents.Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

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________, and Jake Bowers. "Politics across Generations: Family Transmission Reexamined."Paper presented at the meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia,September 1999.

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