part ii constitutional law of corrections. chapter 17 – probation and parole, community...
TRANSCRIPT
Part II
Constitutional Law of Corrections
Chapter 17 – Probation and Parole, Community Corrections, Fines
Introduction: This chapter examines the constitutional decisions that affect the work of probation and parole officers and some of the other legal implications of their work Fines and other types of community
corrections also are examined
Chapter Outline How Probation and Parole Work Jones v. Cunningham Morrissey v. Brewer Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay Griffin v. Wisconsin; United States v. Knights;
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott
Martinez v. California Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of
Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard
Chapter Outline: cont’d United States v. Addonizio; California
Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis
Jago v. Van Curen Moody v. Daggett Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of
Public Safety v. Doe Community Corrections Use of Fines Williams v. Illinois; Tate v. Short Bearden v. Georgia
How Probation and Parole Work
Similarities – probation and parole Both part of the sentencing phase Both occur in the community Both have offenders under
supervision by trained officers Both have offenders legally placed
under conditions or restrictions on their release status
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
Differences – probation and parole Probation - a judicial function; parole -
an administrative function Probation – occurs instead of
confinement; parole – follows a period of confinement
Revocation status – for probation done by court; for parole – done by paroling authority
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
Probation – imposed by a court May impose a sentence of jail
time or prison, then suspend that sentence, with person being placed on probation – called suspended execution of sentence
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
May also suspend imposition of sentence and place person on probation
There is no set term of imprisonment – referred to as suspended imposition
If person violates probation, court may impose any sentence that might originally have been imposed
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
Both types of probation have specified durations
Probationer typically has a supervising officer
Required to regularly report to this person
Degree of supervision can vary – from minimal to intense
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
Parole – release to the community after serving time in prison Paroling authority determines release Ordinarily, person has hearing before
authority The hearing occurs at the prison before
either members of the parole authority or its hearing examiners (or parole officers)
When done by hearing examiners, report is prepared and forwarded to the paroling authority for decision
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
Parole eligibility is determined By sentencing statutes where the
court imposes a sentence within a range specified by the legislature, such as one to five years, with the one year being the eligibility date (the earliest the defendant can be released on parole)
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
When courts only impose the full term date of the sentence (such as five years)
Parole eligibility is then established by some formula (such as one-third of sentence) set by the parole law
May be indeterminate, where court imposes a single term (such as five years) and the inmate is immediately eligible for parole
Release is at the discretion of the parole authority
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
For a life sentence, parole eligibility may be set by state statute or may be specified as part of the sentence imposed by the court (for example, 15 years to life)
Legislature may make some offenses nonparolable, or may eliminate parole completely
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d 16 states had abolished discretionary
parole for all inmates by the end of 2000 Four other states had abolished it for
certain violent offenses or other crimes against a person
The federal government also has abolished parole
Abolishment does not mean the end of parole authorities, as parole continues for those sentenced prior to the abolition of parole
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
Good conduct allowances – subtracted from the full date of the sentence and, in some instances, from the parole eligibility date If the inmate is not released on
parole, release occurs when that good time date is reached
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
Supervision is the essence of either probation or parole release To enforce supervision, there is the
power of revocation of release status Occurs when supervising officer
makes a negative report, which may recommend revocation
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
For probation, court reviews the report and decides whether probationer’s actions are serious enough to terminate probation
If yes, the court may impose original sentence or any part of it that was imposed and suspended
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
Or if the court suspended imposition of any prison term at the original sentencing, and placed the offender on probation, then, upon revocation, the court may impose any length of sentence to prison that could have originally been imposed
If probation is revoked, probationer goes to prison to serve the court specified term
How Probation and Parole Work: cont’d
For parole, the negative report goes to the paroling authority, which has the revocation authority
If a decision is made to revoke, person is returned to prison to serve out the balance of the sentence, computed in accordance with the laws of the state
Jones v. Cunningham (1963) Virginia parolee raised the question of
whether he could go into federal court and challenge his sentence under the federal habeas corpus statute
The inmate was paroled before his case was decided in the court of appeals Inmate tried to substitute the parole
members as respondents, instead of the penitentiary superintendent
Jones v. Cunningham: cont’d
The lower court refused, saying the inmate was no longer in custody, but rather was “at large”
Supreme Court agreed to decide whether a parolee is “in custody” within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus statute and the Constitution
Jones v. Cunningham: cont’d
Court held this could occur Parole conditions significantly restrain
the inmate’s liberty to do those things which free men are entitled to do
The conditions significantly confine & restrain his freedoms
This is enough to keep him in custody of the Parole Board within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute
Morrissey v. Brewer (1972)
Iowa inmate’s parole was revoked by the parole board, following its review of the parole officer’s report The board of parole ordered Morrissey to
be returned to prison Inmate challenged the revocation of
his parole, using habeas corpus, on the grounds that he was given no hearing
Morrissey v. Brewer: cont’d
Supreme Court looked at whether inmate is entitled to due process – that is, some type of hearing – before being returned to prison by revocation of his parole status
Morrissey v. Brewer: cont’d
Court held there was a liberty interest, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
Court held that the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty
Its loss inflicts a “grievous loss” on the parolee and often on others
Morrissey v. Brewer: cont’d Court set forth the minimal
requirements needed for parole revocation – first is a preliminary hearing
To determine whether probable cause or reasonable ground exists to believe person’s acts would constitute a violation of parole conditions
Hearing done by impartial party Advance notice to the parolee of the
hearing and the alleged violations
Morrissey v. Brewer: cont’d
Parolee must be allowed to appear and speak in own behalf
Opportunity to bring letters, documents, or individuals who can provide the hearing officer with relevant information
At the parolee’s request, the opportunity for questioning of a person who has given adverse information on which the revocation may be based
Morrissey v. Brewer: cont’d
Hearing officer must make a summary or digest of hearing
Hearing officer should determine whether there is probable cause to hold parolee for a final decision
Hearing officer should state the reasons for his determination and the relied-upon evidence
Morrissey v. Brewer: cont’d After the preliminary hearing, and
within a reasonable time, there must be a final hearing
The final hearing determines whether the facts warrant revocation
Parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or
If he did, that mitigating circumstances suggest that the violation doesn’t warrant revocation
Morrissey v. Brewer: cont’d
Minimum requirements at the final hearing
Written notice of the claimed parole violation(s)
Disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him
Opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence
Morrissey v. Brewer: cont’d
The right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (absent a hearing officer finding of good cause not to)
A neutral and detached hearing body such as a paroling authority, and
A written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole
Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973); Mempa v. Rhay (1967)
Scarpelli pled guilty to armed robbery in Wisconsin Received 15 year prison term; this was
suspended, and he was placed on probation for seven years
He was allowed to go to Illinois to reside Later arrested in that state for house
burglary His probation was revoked by Wisconsin
without any hearing Sent to a Wisconsin prison to serve the
15-year term that had originally been imposed
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay: cont’d
He challenged the revocation of his probation by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus
He was paroled prior to the case being decided, but the court held his petition was not moot because he was still under the restraints of his parole
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay: cont’d
Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli addressed the question of due process at parole revocation proceedings - the Court relied on two earlier decisions:
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay: cont’d The first was Mempa v. Rhay (1967)
Mempa had been placed on probation for two years, on condition he spend 30 days in county jail; imposition of further sentence was deferred
Mempa had appointed counsel assisting him
Four months later, Mempa was back into court on charges of burglary
He was not represented by counsel, nor was he asked if he wanted counsel
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay: cont’d
His probation was revoked; he received a 10-year sentence
The court made a recommendation to the parole board that Mempa be paroled after one year
Six years later, Mempa filed for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming a due process violation in the denial of counsel at his sentencing and parole revocation proceeding
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay: cont’d
Supreme Court in Mempa held that the “deferred sentencing” procedure in the state of Washington was so important as to require the presence of counsel
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay: cont’d
In Mempa, the Court said there is a constitutional right to counsel in felony cases “at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected”
At his sentencing, although deferred, Mempa was entitled to the appointment of counsel because his rights (his liberty interest) were so substantially affected
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay: cont’d
The second decision heavily relied on by the Court in Gagnon was Morrissey v. Brewer where the Court held that the loss of liberty is a serious deprivation requiring due process
Using these decisions, the Court in Gagnon held that a probationer, like a parolee is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay: cont’d
The Court in Gagnon held that at the preliminary hearing for probation revocation, there must be
Advance notice of the alleged violations
An opportunity to appear and present evidence
A conditional right to confront adverse witnesses
An independent decision maker, and A written report of the hearing
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay: cont’d
Minimum requirements at a final hearing are very similar
The one additional requirement, besides those for the preliminary hearing, is that the person be advised of what evidence there is against him
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay: cont’d
Gagnon Court then decided issue of the right to counsel (retained or, for indigents, appointed) at revocation hearings
The Court held there was a right to counsel in limited circumstances
When the charges are contested or There are substantial mitigating
reasons for his violative conduct and those reasons are complex or difficult to present
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; Mempa v. Rhay: cont’d
Court did not see right to counsel when person is convicted of another crime, or admitted to crime
Probationer or parolee may want to provide mitigating reasons why revocation is not appropriate; these reasons, said the Court, ordinarily are not so complex as to require counsel
In practice, as a matter of reasonable precaution, courts at most probation revocation proceedings, and parole boards at most parole revocation proceedings typically allow counsel to appear
Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987); United States v. Knights (2001); Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott (1998)
Probationers’ and parolees’ constitutional rights are limited
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, probation officers searched Griffin’s apartment without a warrant Search followed police advising that
Griffin may have guns at that location A gun was found Griffin was convicted of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon
Griffin v. Wisconsin; United States v. Knights; Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott: cont’d
Griffin sued and the Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of the probationer’s home did not violate the probationer’s constitutional rights
Probationer’s situation as a person under close supervision by his probation officer overrides the offender’s personal protections
Griffin v. Wisconsin; United States v. Knights; Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott: cont’d
Probation agency “must be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene (by conducting a search) before a probationer does damage to himself or society”
In Griffin, the right to search was granted to probation officers by state regulation – could do a search when there were “reasonable grounds” to believe something illegal or impermissible was in the home
Griffin v. Wisconsin; United States v. Knights; Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott: cont’d
In United States v. Knights, probationer Knights was suspected of being involved in criminal activity As a condition of his probation, a California’s
court order provided that Knights’ person, property, vehicle,
residence, and personal effects would be subject to search at anytime
With or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause
By any probation officer or law enforcement officer
Griffin v. Wisconsin; United States v. Knights; Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott: cont’d
Knights signed the order Based on the previously mentioned
suspicion, police searched Knights’ apartment, finding a detonation cord, ammunition, and liquid chemicals
Knights was indicted, and moved to suppress the evidence
Lower courts held that the search was impermissible, that the search condition in the probation order was limited to probation searches, and not for investigation purposes
Griffin v. Wisconsin; United States v. Knights; Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott: cont’d
The Supreme Court reversed, holding for the government
Fourth Amendment didn’t limit searches pursuant to this probation condition to those with a probationary purpose
When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the person’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable
Griffin v. Wisconsin; United States v. Knights; Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott: cont’d
Griffin and Knights concerned probationers, but similar rules apply to persons released on parole and generally to the authority of supervising parole officers Parolees also are clearly under the
sanction of a sentence
Griffin v. Wisconsin; United States v. Knights; Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott: cont’d
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, Scott, as part of his release conditions, agreed not to own or possess any firearms or other weapons His parole agreement, which he signed,
allowed state probation and parole authorities to search his person, property, and residence without warrant
And to seize and use as evidence in revocation proceedings any violative items found
Griffin v. Wisconsin; United States v. Knights; Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott: cont’d
Five months into his parole, and pursuant to an arrest warrant, Scott was arrested by three parole officers
Prior to his transfer to a prison, Scott gave the officers the keys to his residence
The officers’ search, without warrant, discovered firearms and other weapons
The discovery was a contributory factor, along with alcohol consumption charges, to Scott’s parole revocation and return to prison
Griffin v. Wisconsin; United States v. Knights; Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott: cont’d
Scott argued the search of his residence was unreasonable
Supreme Court held the search was permissible and the revocation action taken was proper
Court noted that parolees are more likely to commit future criminal offenses than are average citizens – “Indeed,” the Court said, “this is the very premise behind the system of close parole supervision”
Griffin v. Wisconsin; United States v. Knights; Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott: cont’d
Because parole revocation deprives the parolee not of absolute liberty, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions, States have wide latitude under the Constitution to structure parole revocation proceedings
Martinez v. California (1980) Thomas was convicted of attempted
rape and sentenced to 20 years with a no-parole recommendation
After five years he was paroled Done in spite of Thomas’ record and
warning in his record that he was likely to commit another violent crime
Five months later he tortured and killed a 15-year-old girl
Martinez v. California: cont’d
Her family sued the state and its parole authority, claiming the girl’s life had been taken without due process of law and
That the paroling authorities were liable for the wrong decision in releasing Thomas
Martinez v. California: cont’d
State statute, however, provided that government officials were not liable for any injury resulting from a decision to release a prisoner on parole, or from determining the conditions of his parole, or whether to revoke his parole Held to be a complete defense, giving
absolute immunity from a suit for damages
Martinez v. California: cont’d
Supreme Court upheld the legality of the immunity statute – holding that it furthers a policy that reasonable lawmakers may favor The statutory defense allows the
parole board to take greater risks in this decision-making than they otherwise would have done
Martinez v. California: cont’d
The victim’s family also filed an action under 42 USC § 1983, claiming a constitutional violation of the victim’s rights in depriving her of her life without due process of law
Martinez v. California: cont’d
Court held that the action of Thomas five months after his release cannot be fairly characterized as state action
Her life was taken by the parolee, in no sense was he an agent of the parole board
Victim’s death is too remote a consequence of the parole officers’ action to hold them responsible under the federal civil rights law
Martinez v. California: cont’d
As a general comment, action by a court placing a defendant on probation is even more clearly immunized from suits for damages Judges have absolute immunity
from lawsuits arising from their judicial decisions
Martinez v. California: cont’d
In Forrester v. White (1988), the Court held absolute immunity applies only to the court’s adjudicative, not administrative, functions In Forrester, Judge White fired a probation
officer Supreme Court held in doing this firing, the
judge was acting in an administrative, not judicial capacity; and was not entitled to absolute immunity; the Court did note that qualified immunity would be available to judges in their employment decisions
Greenholtz v. Inmates (1979); Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat (1981); Board of Pardons v. Allen (1987); Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard (1998)
Examines the initial decision to place the offender on probation or parole
As to probation, the law is clear
Greenholtz v. Inmates (1979); Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat (1981); Board of Pardons v. Allen (1987); Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard (1998)
Placing defendant on probation is imposition of sentence; due process protections of a criminal trial apply
Defendant has the opportunity to be present
To present evidence for mitigation of sentence
To be heard himself
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
Supreme Court has recognized individualization of sentencing as an important sentencing objective
Person has right to counsel at every significant stage of the proceeding, including sentencing
Strong movement recently to afford more rights to victims and their families at sentencing
Some courts allow a “victim impact statement” Supreme Court approved (Payne v. Tennessee
(1991))
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
The more contentious question – Is due process required at the time of decision regarding parole?
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
In Greenholtz v. Inmates, the Supreme Court noted that “parole release and parole revocation are quite different” Parole revocation - depriving a person of
a liberty one has Parole release - denying a conditional
liberty one desires Court held no liberty interest inherent in
the parole-release process, and no constitutional right to due process inherent in that process
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
Court, however, also examined the language of the state statute to see if this provided a liberty interest
Nebraska statute provided for the inmate’s release unless it found the existence of one of four conditions
Court found this created expectation of release entitling an inmate to some due process
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
Court held the amount of due process required was:
an opportunity to appear and to be heard and
if parole is denied, to be informed of the reasons
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
In Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, the Court dealt with a challenge to the State Board of Pardons’ actions
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
Dumschat, serving a life sentence, applied for a commutation
A commutation is a reduction in sentence, or changing some aspect of the sentence
Pardons are full-fledged wiping out of the conviction and sentence
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
In Connecticut, a board was established to consider pardon and commutation action
The board denied Dumschat’s application
He claimed he should have been given a hearing by the Parole Board
Connecticut law gave the board total discretion
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
Dumschat claimed he had some expectation of receiving a commutation because 85-90% of life sentences in the state were commuted
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
Supreme Court denied his contention, holding inmate’s expectation was simply a unilateral hope
Ground for a constitutional claim, if any, must be found in statutes or other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged with exercising clemency
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
In Board of Pardons v. Allen, inmates brought a § 1983 action, claiming denial of due process rights in parole release procedures
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
Montana statute stated
“the Board shall release on parole . . .when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community”
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
Supreme Court held this language created a liberty interest in parole release under the due process clause
Because mandatory language – “shall” – created a presumption that parole would occur when the designated findings were made
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Sandin v. Conner (1995) has called the mandatory language standard into question
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard relied on both Greenholtz and Dumschat Ohio constitution gave governor the
power to grant clemency Legislature may regulate the application
and investigation process, but can’t curtail the governor’s discretionary authority
Woodard sentenced to death for aggravated murder done in the course of a carjacking
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
As his date for execution approached, the Parole Authority, as required, notified Woodard he could have a clemency interview, if he wanted one, on 9/9/94, with his clemency hearing 9/16/94
Woodard objected to the short notice and requested counsel be allowed to take part
Ohio did not allow counsel at the interview
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
Supreme Court held the Ohio procedures had no due process violations
Governor retains total discretionary authority to grant or deny clemency
Governor’s executive discretion need not be fettered by the procedural protections sought by Woodard
Offender has no substantive expectation of clemency
Greenholtz v. Inmates; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat; Board of Pardons v. Allen; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: cont’d
Court further noted that denial of clemency merely means inmate must serve the sentence originally imposed
Court also saw no violation of Woodard’s right under the Fifth Amendment to be free from self-incrimination
Court said it was hard to see how a voluntary interview could “compel” Woodard to speak
United States v. Addonizio (1979); California Department of Corrections v. Morales (1995); Garner v. Jones (2000); Lynce v. Mathis (1997)
Cases look at whether parole rules may be changed after a defendant has been sentenced
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
In United States v. Addonizio, inmate claimed that the U.S. Parole Commission’s (USPC) change of rules resulted in his being sentenced longer than intended by the sentencing judge Addonizio had been sentenced to 10
years, with the judge indicating an expectation that the inmate, with good behavior, would be released after serving one-third of his sentence
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
New rules adopted by USPC three years after Addonizio was sentenced gave more weight to the seriousness of the offense
Resulted in the inmate’s consideration for parole being postponed
Inmate applied to the sentencing court, which found its sentencing expectations frustrated and ordered the inmate’s release, reducing his sentence to “time served”
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
Supreme Court held the sentencing court’s action invalid
Court said actual parole decision is not for the court to make, either at the time of sentencing or later, if the court’s expectations are not met
Congress has determined USPC is in the best position to determine when release is appropriate
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
In California Department of Corrections v. Morales, the inmate was serving a 15 years to life sentence Became parole eligible in 1990,
with his first hearing in 1989, with parole denied
Under rules in effect at the time, subsequent hearings could occur each year
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
Law, however, was amended to allow Board of Prison terms to defer suitability for up to three years if inmate convicted of more than one offense involving the taking of life – Morales had two such convictions
Pursuant to the law change, the board rescheduled Morales for a hearing in three years, in 1992 rather than 1990
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
Morales filed a habeas corpus petition, claiming the amendment was an ex post facto law in violation of the constitution
Ex post facto (Article 1 Section 10) means laws may not be enacted that alter the definition of a crime after it has been done, or increase the penalty for criminal acts after their commission
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
Supreme Court held that the law change did not increase Morales punishment for his crime
The only change was procedural It affected only a few inmates for
whom the likelihood of release on parole was fairly remote
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
In Garner v. Jones, Jones was serving a life sentence in Georgia for murder. He escaped after five years, during which
time he did a second murder, receiving a second life term
Under Georgia law, parole consideration occurred after seven years for inmates serving life sentences
At the time of Jones conviction for the second murder, the board’s rules required reconsideration every three years
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
In 1985, after Jones began serving his second life sentence, the board changed its rules to provide reconsideration hearings for life sentence inmates at least every eight years
At his 1989 hearing, Jones received a rehearing date of 1997
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
A 1991 Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, in a separate case, held the retroactive application of the eight year rule violated ex post facto
Parole Board returned to its three year rule
Jones appeared before the Board in 1992 and 1995, being denied on both occasions
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
Following the Morales ruling, the board returned to eight-year reconsiderations, with the option to make shorter
Chose not to do so for Jones due to his multiple offenses and the circumstances and nature of the second offense
Jones sued, alleging violation of the ex post facto clause
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
Court saw the Georgia law as reasonable, allowing a better use of its resources
Court found it could not conclude, based on the record in the case, that the change lengthened Jones’ period of actual confinement
Court noted that Georgia law allowed for earlier consideration when warranted
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
Court’s holding, in its practical effect, gives deference to correction professionals to manage the parole process for the benefit of all
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
Lynce v. Mathis is a case holding there was an ex post facto violation In 1986, Lynce received 22 year
sentence (8,030 days) for attempted murder
Released in 1992 after the Corrections Department determined he had earned over 5,600 days of early release credits
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
A portion of those days (over 1,800) awarded as a result of the state’s plan to reduce prison overcrowding
Shortly after Lynce’s release, the state Attorney General issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroactively cancelled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder or attempted murder
Lynce was returned to custody, and given a new release date in 1998
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
Lynce filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming an ex post facto violation
Supreme Court agreed Held operation of the 1992 statute,
canceling overcrowding credits and requiring Lynce’s reconfinement, was clearly retroactive
Further, Lynce was unquestionably disadvantaged because it resulted in his rearrest and prolonged his imprisonment
United States v. Addonizio; California Department of Corrections v. Morales; Garner v. Jones; Lynce v. Mathis: cont’d
The Court distinguished Lynce from Morales
Morales didn’t affect the length of punishment being served
Lynce did, by canceling provisional credits previously earned and pulling some people, such as Lynce, back into prison
Jago v. Van Curen (1981) Van Curen was sentenced to 6 to 100
years, with parole eligibility in 1976 Ohio passed a “shock parole” statute,
allowing earlier parole of first offenders who had served at least six months in prison for nonviolent crimes
Van Curen was approved by the Ohio Adult Parole authority for early release in 1974
Jago v. Van Curen: cont’d Shortly after his parole interview, the
Parole Authority learned inmate had not been truthful in the interview or parole plan he had submitted He said he had embezzled one million
dollars, when it was actually six million dollars
He said he planned to live with his half brother when released, when he really planned to live with his homosexual lover
Jago v. Van Curen: cont’d
Parole Board rescinded its earlier actions and continued the case to a later date The inmate had no hearing with
regard to the parole rescission action
Jago v. Van Curen: cont’d Supreme Court held no entitlement to
a hearing Doesn’t doubt that Van Curen suffered
“grievous loss” from the parole rescission
But rejected view that any grievous loss visited upon person by the state is sufficient to invoke the protections of the due process clause
Cited Greenholtz and Dumschat, and said that the Ohio law provided no protected liberty interest
Moody v. Daggett (1976) Moody was on parole from a federal
rape conviction and was sentenced to new ten-year terms for manslaughter and second degree murder
While serving these terms, U.S. Board of Parole issued a warrant charging him with a violation of parole release terms
The warrant was lodged as a detainer
Moody v. Daggett: cont’d Moody asked that the warrant be
executed to allow for parole violation time to run concurrently with his homicide sentences
Parole board denied the request Moody filed a habeas corpus
petition, claiming denial of a prompt parole revocation hearing
Moody v. Daggett: cont’d In Moody v. Daggett, the
Supreme Court held there was no illegal loss of liberty, that Moody was not entitled to an immediate parole revocation hearing Court held there were good reasons
for the board to defer its decision and consider Moody for release or revocation of parole when he finished his current sentence
Moody v. Daggett: cont’d Court said it allows the authorities to
make a more informed judgment on whether or not to revoke the probation or parole status of the inmate
Court also noted – the loss of liberty as a parole violator doesn’t occur until the parolee is taken into custody under the warrant
Smith v. Doe (2003); Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe (2003)
Cases look at the issue of continuing government “oversight,” even after the time the criminal has paid his debt to society
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
Smith v. Doe (2003) concerned the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act Act required every sex offender or child
kidnapper confined within the state to register with the department of corrections within 30 days prior to release from custody; if not confined, registration was to be with local law enforcement agencies, within a working day of the conviction or the offender’s entrance into the state
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
Periodic verification of the submitted information was required
Nonconfidential information about the offender – such as name, address, photograph, place of employment, and nature of conviction – would be available to the public, with the state choosing the means for this
The Act’s registration and notification requirements were to be retroactive
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
The Doe respondents in Smith were convicted sex offenders Had been released from prison
and completed sex offender treatment programs
Their convictions were before the Act’s passage
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
Suit was brought under § 1983, asking that the Act be declared not applicable to them Under the ex post facto clause
(Article I of the Constitution) And the due process clause (of
the Fourteenth Amendment)
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
Supreme Court saw the main question as Whether the legislature meant to
establish civil proceedings If yes, the question becomes whether
the statutory scheme was so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate the state’s intent
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
Court held for the government Intent of state legislature was
protection of public The Act mandated no specific
procedures, leaving this to the Department of Public Safety
The Department was responsible for enforcing both criminal and civil regulatory laws
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
The Act’s statutory scheme was not seen as punitive
It has a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public safety
This is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
Nor was the broadness of the Act – its application to all convicted sex offenders without regard to their future dangerousness, the duration of the reporting requirements, and the wide dissemination of the information – sufficient to make it punitive
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
Court held its role was not to determine whether the legislature made the best choice to address the problem it wants to remedy
But whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective
The Court held the regulatory means chosen were reasonable
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe involved a due process claim Doe filed on behalf of himself and other
similarly situated sex offenders Claiming he was not a dangerous sex
offender And that his being listed without a
hearing deprived him of a liberty interest – his reputation combined with the alteration of his status under state law
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
The Court relied on Connecticut’s legislative intent in passing the act The state intent was to facilitate
access to publicly available information about persons convicted of sex offenses
There was no assessment of the specific risk of reoffense or current dangerousness
Smith v. Doe; Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe: cont’d
Persons were listed because of their conviction record and state law
Main purpose of placing this information on the Internet was to make it more easily available, not to warn about any specific person (dangerousness)
Court held state’s legislative scheme would govern
Community Corrections
A broad concept, encompassing all types of sanctions and sentencing arrangements that allow offenders to remain primarily in the community
Community Corrections: cont’d The concept includes
Probation and parole Prerelease centers and halfway
houses Community service and fines Restitution Furloughs Work and study release and Electronic monitoring
Use of Fines
One of the oldest kinds of sentencing
Also one of the most common sanctions for minor offenses
For serious offenses, particularly those involving financial gain, fines may be imposed in combination with other sanctions
Williams v. Illinois (1970); Tate v. Short (1971)
In Williams v. Illinois, Williams sentenced to one year in jail and a $500 fine for petty theft He was not able to pay the fine Under Illinois law, he was to be kept in jail until
he “worked off” the fine at the rate of $5 per day Meant he would be in jail 100 days longer than
he would have been had he been able to pay the fine
This extended sentence also was 100 days longer than the maximum jail sentence authorized for the crime
Williams v. Illinois; Tate v. Short: cont’d
Supreme Court held it violated the equal protection clause to require an indigent defendant to serve longer than the most that could be required for a nonindigent defendant
Williams v. Illinois; Tate v. Short: cont’d
In Tate v. Short, the Court extended its protection of indigents in fine cases Defendant was convicted of several
traffic offenses None of these authorized confinement He was given a fine, which he was unable
to pay He was ordered to the prison farm to
“work off” his fine at the rate of $5 per day
Williams v. Illinois; Tate v. Short: cont’d
The Court held this was impermissible discrimination against an indigent defendant in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Here, confinement was ordered solely due to the person’s indigency; this was an equal protection violation
Williams v. Illinois; Tate v. Short: cont’d
These rulings abolished the old practices of “working off” fines Sentences such as “$100 or ten
days” are no longer allowed
Bearden v. Georgia (1983)
In Bearden v. Georgia, Bearden was placed on probation With a condition that he pay a
fine of $500, and $250 in restitution
He paid $200 toward his fine, but lost his job and could not pay more
Bearden v. Georgia: cont’d When the balance came due, Bearden
told his probation office he was going to be late with his payments because he could not find a job He went before the court for a revocation
hearing His probation was revoked He was ordered to serve the balance of
his probationary term (about three years) in prison
Bearden v. Georgia: cont’d
The Court, upon getting the case, forged a new rule, one intended to take the competing interests into account An indigent inmate should not be excused
from punishment, including imprisonment, if he willfully refused to pay the fine (or restitution)
But if the person had made good efforts to pay the fine and could not do so…
Bearden v. Georgia: cont’d
It is “fundamentally unfair” to automatically revoke probation without considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available
Only if alternative measures are not adequate to meet the state’s interests in punishment and deterrence, may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay
Bearden v. Georgia: cont’d
The case was sent back to the trial court to consider the new rule, taking into account the indigency of the probationer
Bearden v. Georgia: cont’d Other sentences that avoid
confinement: Orders for community service and other
“creative orders” These require certain activities or
contributions by the defendant in lieu of imprisonment
Electronic monitoring – used in conjunction with probation or parole, as well as by itself
Such monitoring keeps track of the offender’s location
Bearden v. Georgia: cont’d Drug testing – may be a condition
of probation, or could be an independent kind of sentencing, run by an entity, to monitor the drug-free status of the defendant, when that is specifically ordered by the sentencing court
Bearden v. Georgia: cont’d Programs that release the person
from prison to go into the community with special conditions, and with the prison constraint still hanging over him:
Parole Furloughs Work Release Study Release
Bearden v. Georgia: cont’d Legal questions raised by such
community corrections activities are small, compared to those of prisoners’ rights No Supreme Court rulings or significant
constitutional rulings on such programs, except the earlier discussed probation and parole cases
What does exist comes from those denied participation, or terminated from participation because of some failure on their part
Bearden v. Georgia: cont’d
The significant concern in community correctional activities would seem to be to ensure such programs are available to all offenders, without regard to race, gender, or other unjustifiable distinctions
Placing inmates into work or study release, on furlough, or on parole is a discretionary function
Bearden v. Georgia: cont’d Placement consideration should be
tied to the criminal history and past behavior of the offenders, along with their prospects for successful community involvement
Apart from the impermissible factors of discrimination, program decisions should be based on eligibility and risk criteria, along with correctional judgment