385Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 356e390

President’s party and no representation from the opposi-tion. Consequently, the constitutional changes introducedwith the intention of advancing democracy in Kazakhstanare now of little value. With a compliant parliament dom-inated by his own party, President Nazarbayev has consol-idated his authority over all branches of the politicalsystem.

The election had little impact on the governmentformed, as most of the same ministers remained inpost. The opposition in any form is now completelymarginalised from the political process. It is likelythat all their attempts at contesting the results throughthe courts will amount to little, as judicial proceduresin Kazakhstan are sympathetic to the authorities.With no elections to contest until the 2011 local elec-tions, the opposition and the other political parties facea considerable time outside the political process. Possi-bly, in this intervening period, the parties e loyal op-position and outright opposition alike e may turntheir attention to working more closely with the peopleand strengthening their party organisations. Despitecriticising the electoral process, the OSCE designatedKazakhstan as Chair of the organisation for 2010 ata meeting held at the end of November 2007 in Ma-drid. Overall, however, the result could prove damag-ing to Kazakhstan’s international reputation.

Despite the apparent air of stability that the election re-sult gives President Nazarbayev, the long-term effectcould be de-stabilising. By again having a fraudulent elec-toral process that disenfranchises voters, the President has

� Tel.: þ44 (0)161 295 5614; fax: þ44 (0)161 295 2818.

E-mail address: a.aghrout@salford.ac.uk

failed to let out any steam in the system. Over time, pres-sure may grow, not just among opposition elites but alsoamong the electorate at large. Most authoritarian regimeseventually fall to political and popular pressure for greaterpluralism. President Nazarbayev is potentially storing upthis problem for a later date.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust whofunded the field research during the 2006e2007 aca-demic year which made it possible to be present in Ka-zakhstan during the election.

References

AK Zhol, 2007. Ty dostoin svoei mechty! (Pre-election programme.)

ANSDP, 2007. Za Novyi Kazakhstana! (Pre-election programme.)

Buluktaev, Y., et al., 1998. Politicheskie Partii kazakhstana: Spravochnik.

IPK, Almaty.

Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2002. About

Political Parties (with 2005, 2006, and 2007 amendments).

Nur Otan, 2007. Za protsvetanie Kazakhstana I blagopoluchie

Kazakhstantsev. (Pre-election programme.)

Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 2007. Novyi Kazakhstan v novom mire.

(Presidential Annual Address, February.) Available from:

www.akorda.kz.

OSCE/ODIHR, 2004. Election Observation Mission Report, Repub-

lic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections. 19 September, 3

October, and 15 December, Warsaw.

OSCE/ODIHR, 2007. Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Inter-

national Election Observer Mission, Parliamentary Election of

Kazakhstan. 18 August.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.12.001

Parliamentary and presidential elections in Mauritania,2006 and 2007

Ahmed Aghrout �

European Studies Research Institute, University of Salford, Salford, Manchester M5 4WT, UK

1. Background

In August 2005 a bloodless military coup ended the21 years of President Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya’s

386 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 356e390

authoritarian regime in Mauritania.1 With military coupshaving occurred in 1978, 1979, and 1984, the 2005 coupwas the most recent of a series marking the country’s post-independence history. Ould Taya had seized power in1984 and became head of the Comite Militaire de SalutNational (Military Committee for National Salvation).From 1991, Ould Taya initiated constitutional reforms le-galising multiparty politics in Mauritania, which pavedthe way for the country’s first multiparty elections.2 In re-ality, the reforms, called le tournant democratique de1991e1992, were intended merely to legitimise a dis-credited political regime (International Crisis Group,2006). Successive elections, presidential and legislative,enabled Ould Taya to tighten his grip on power and sawMauritania become, de facto, a one-party state. Thus,the 2005 coup signified both a rupture in the autocraticrule of Ould Taya and the Parti Republicain Democrati-que et Social (Democratic and Social Republican Party,PRDS) and renewed hope for democratic development.3

After the coup, leaders of the 17-member ConseilMilitaire pour la Justice et la Democratie (MilitaryCouncil for Justice and Democracy, CMJD) pledgedthey would remain in power for no more than twoyears, during which they would ‘‘create favourableconditions for an open and transparent democraticgame in which civil society and political actors canfreely take part’’ (Agence Mauritanienne d’Informa-tion, 3 August 2005; translation). A number of impor-tant measures were taken by the CMJD during thistransitional military phase (August 2005eMarch2007) prior to the holding of elections (Keesing’s Re-cord of World Events, 2005). In September 2005, a gen-eral amnesty for political prisoners, particularly coupplotters and alleged Islamic extremists,4 and theCMJD organised ‘national consultation’ days in Octo-ber to discuss ways for a speedy return to constitutionalrule.5 Setting up the Commission Electorale NationaleIndependante (National Independent Electoral Com-mission, CENI) and an election timetable were thekey issues discussed during this national consultation(Ordonnance, 2005). Another milestone was the June

1 The coup was initially condemned by the United Nations, the

African Union, and the European Commission.2 A new constitution, replacing the 1964 constitution, was adopted

in a referendum in July 1991.3 See Pazzanita (1996) for further details.4 Amongst those released was Colonel Salah Ould Henena, a lead-

ing figure in the failed coup attempt against President Ould Taya in

June 2003.5 The CMJD adopted a decree confirming the ineligibility of mem-

bers of the Council and the transitional government to take part in the

scheduled elections.

2006 referendum that approved major constitutionalchanges (Middle East Online, 2006), which includedlimiting the presidential term to five years for a maxi-mum of two consecutive terms and a clause making thetwo-term restriction unalterable (Keesing’s Record ofWorld Events, 2006).6

It was against this backdrop that Mauritania returnedto democratic practices. The elections were intended toreturn the country to civilian rule and constitutionalnormality (Le Monde, 2007), the final stage of a politicaltransition under military rule. The parliamentary elec-tions were held on 19 November and 3 December 2006for the National Assembly (al-Jamiya al-Wataniya) andon 21 January and 4 February for the Senate (Majlisal-Shuyukh). These were followed by the presidentialelection on 11 and 25 March 2007.

2. Electoral system

The three elections were conducted under differentelectoral rules. The 95 members of the National As-sembly were elected by universal suffrage to servea 5-year term.7 Deputies were elected using a mixedvoting system: 64 members were elected from a mixof 20 single-member and 22 two-member constituen-cies using a two-round majority system to represent42 of the country’s 45 constituencies (Moughatas);17 deputies are elected from the three large cities(Nouakchott 11, Nouadhibou 3, and Selibaby 3) inmulti-seat constituencies with party-list proportionalrepresentation; and 14 deputies were elected by pro-portional representation on a nationwide basis.

The 56-member Senate is indirectly elected and sen-ators serve 6-year terms; one-third of Senate seats are re-newed every two years. Municipal councillors elect 53senators by simple majority in single-member constitu-encies and three senators are chosen by the elected sen-ators to represent the Mauritanian community livingabroad. The president is elected by direct universal suf-frage using a two-round system to ensure an absolutemajority; the president serves a 5-year term.8

3. Parties and presidential candidates

Mauritania has undergone notable political changesince the overthrow of Ould Taya. The legalisation of

6 Under the 1991 constitution, the president served six-year terms

for an indefinite number of terms.7 The previous assembly (2001e2005) consisted of 81 members.8 From 2007, the presidential mandate is renewable only once

(Ordonnance, 2007).

11 The candidates were Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, Ibrahima Moc-

387Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 356e390

multipartism in the 1990s benefited mainly the PRDSwhich dominated Mauritanian politics until the 2005military coup, and renamed as the Parti Republicainpour la Democratie et le Renouveau (Republican Partyfor Democracy and Renewal, PRDR) afterwards. Ofthe 35 officially registered political parties, 28 con-tested the parliamentary electiondthe largest numbereverdalong with several independent candidates. Inall, independents represented 30% of all candidates;various major political forces, especially the formeropposition, criticised the ruling junta for being behindthe proliferation of independent candidates.

Prior to the parliamentary election, two major coali-tions were formed between several different politicalparties. These coalitions included the 11-party Coalitiondes Forces du Changement Democratique (Coalition ofForces for Democratic Change, CFCD) established inMay 2006 (Agence Mauritanienne d’Information,2006). The CFCD brought together former major oppo-sition parties, such as the Rassemblement des ForcesDemocratiques (Rally of Democratic Forces, RFD),Union des Forces du Progres (Union of Forces of Prog-ress, UFP), Alliance Populaire Progressiste (People’sProgressive Alliance, APP), and Parti Mauritanien pourl’Unite et le Changement (Mauritanian Party for Unityand Change, PMUC).9 The other major coalition, al-Mithaq (Convention), was formed in January 2007 andconsisted of independents and parties formerly associ-ated with Ould Taya’s regime (Agence Mauritanienned’Information, 2007). Among other parties, al-Mithaqincluded the PRDR, the former ruling party; Unionpour la Democratie et le Progres (Union for Democ-racy and Progress, UDP); Rassemblement pour laDemocratie et l’Unite (Rally for Democracy and Unity,RDU); Union du Centre Democratique (Union of theDemocratic Centre, UCD); El-Badil (Alternative); andindependent moderate Islamists.10

There were 20 contenders in the presidential elec-tion, 8 from political parties and 12 independents.The principal contestants were the long-time opposi-tion figure and RFD leader, Ahmed Ould Daddah, for-merly governor of Mauritania’s central bank; ZeineOuld Zeidane, a technocrat who had served as chiefof Mauritania’s central bank during the CMJD’s gov-ernment; Saleh Ould Hanena, leader of the failed2003 coup attempt against Ould Taya; and Sidi Mo-hamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, an economist who

9 The CFCD also included six other small parties; three of these

subsequently left the CFCD coalition to set up El-Watan, a new

coalition.10 Al-Mithaq included 12 other small political parties.

had served several times as a minister. Abdallahibenefited from the support of the al-Mithaq coalitionand many viewed him as the candidate representingthe ruling junta. Note, too, that three black candidates(descendants of freed black slaves) took part in thepresidential contest.11 This indicates significant prog-ress for the black community in a society divided alongethnic and regional lines and long dominated by thewhite Moors group.

4. Electoral campaigns

By and large, the campaigns for parliamentary andpresidential elections were conducted in a peaceful en-vironment with no serious incidents reported (Missiond’observation electorale de l’Union europeenne (MOE/UE), 2007). The campaigns were marked by a ‘‘greatdeal of folklore and a few programmes’’ (Arab ElectionWatch, 2006; Nouakchott Info, 2006). Tents wereerected in almost all electoral districts and in Nouak-chott, the capital. These attracted large crowds ofpeople, where they ‘‘spent pleasant nights in the tents,drinking peppermint-flavoured tea with poets recitingpoetry praising the candidates and singers singing forthis or that candidate’’ (Arab Election Watch, 2006).

The campaigns proved the poorer for the lack ofreal political debate. The commitments of the partiesand the independents about economic, social, and po-litical reforms were fairly vague. Even so, the promiseto break off relations with Israel was received with sat-isfaction by a large proportion of voters (Arab ElectionWatch, 2006).12 In many instances, the information forvoters gave more emphasis to explaining how to ticka ballot paper than presenting clear political pro-grammes (Mission d’observation electorale de l’Unioneuropeenne (MOE/UE), 2007).

Throughout the presidential campaign, candidatesheld public meetings in various cities in their efforts toattract votes. Three presidential candidatesdAbdallahi,Ould Daddah, and Ould Zeidanedhad more resourcesthan the other contenders.13 From early on in the cam-paign, the state-controlled electronic and print mediashowed bias in favour of these three candidates; even,in certain instances, in favour of Abdallahi, viewed asthe regime’s favoured candidate. During the second

tar Sarr, and Ba Mamadou Alassane; between them, they won some

18% of the vote in the first round.12 Mauritania established full diplomatic relations with Israel in

October 1999, the third Arab state after Egypt and Jordan.13 Their resources came from private sources; institutional support

was mainly confined to media access.

Table 1

Results of the National Assembly election, 19 November and 3

December 2006

Party/Coalition 1st Round

(seats)

2nd Round

(seats)

Total

seats

Independents 10 31 41

Rally of Democratic

Forces (RFD)

12 3 15

Union of Forces of

Progress (UFP)

3 5 8

Republican Party for

Democracy and

Renewal (PRDR)

4 3 7

Popular Progressive

Alliance (APP)

4 1 5

Union for Democracy

and Progress (UDP)

1 2 3

Rally for Democracy

and Unity (RDU)

2 1 3

Mauritanian Party

for Union and

Change (PMUC)

2 0 2

PMUCeAPP 0 2 2

RFDeUFP 0 2 2

Democratic

Renewal (RD)

2 0 2

Union of the Democratic

Centre (UCD)

0 1 1

Alternative 0 1 1

Popular Front (FP) 1 0 1

Social Democratic

Unionist Party (PUDS)

1 0 1

National Rally for

Liberty, Democracy and

Equality (RNLDE)

1 0 1

Total 43 52 95

First round: registered electors 1,073,287; total votes 788,029; invalid

votes 122,716. Turnout 73.4%. Second round: registered voters

632,956; total votes 439,835; invalid votes 27,289. Turnout 69.5%.

The second round electorate consists of registered electors for the 33

constituencies where a second round took place.

Source: Agence Mauritanienne d’Information: first round: http://

www.ami.mr/fr/articles/2006/novembre/22/17.html; second round:

http://www.ami.mr/fr/articles/2006/decembre/4/18.html.

388 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 356e390

week of the campaign, however, the media attempted torectify this imbalance by reducing the coverage of theleading candidates (Reporters sans Frontieres, 2007).

5. Election results

The parliamentary and presidential elections weremonitored by foreign observers. The European Union, inparticular, deployed an election observation mission(EOM) and contributed V6 million to the organisationand supervision of the elections.14 Even though theEOM underlined in its final report a number of deficienciesin the electoral process, it raised no major concerns aboutthem and expressed its satisfaction for their ‘‘orderly andtransparent conduct’’ (Mission d’observation electoralede l’Union europeenne (MOE/UE), 2007, pp. 5e7).

With something more than a million registered elec-tors, turnout for the National Assembly election was72.4% in the first round and 69.5% in the second. Therelatively high participation rate underscored voters’ en-thusiasm for an elected civilian government and theirhigh expectations of the post-Ould Taya’s era.15

The published results for the parliamentary electiondo not give the distribution of the vote for each partybut only seat distributions by parties, blocs, and indepen-dent candidates. These are reported in Table 1. TheCFCDdthe former oppositiondwon a remarkable 38seats in the National Assembly. The RFD, the main partyin the coalition, won 15 seats; the UFP won 8 seats andAPP won 5. The former governing party (PRDR) wononly 7 seats.16 Overall, the al-Mithaq bloc, which in-cluded independent candidates, managed to secure 57seats in the new National Assembly. The other majorwinners in the election were the independent candidateswith 41 seats, many of whom are regarded as Islamists.17

The al-Mithaq bloc also gained 38 seats in the Sen-ate. Although the CFCD did not do as well as hopedfor, winning only 15 seats, the result should give theCFCD much greater influence and involvement in thelaw-making process than its marginal representationin previous legislatures (Africa Research Bulletin,2006). Again, the independents performed well, secur-ing 34 seats, so constituting two-thirds of Senate seats.

14 There were also observers from the Arab League, the Organisa-

tion of the Islamic Conference, and the African Union.15 Turnout was 55% in the 2001 parliamentary election.16 The PRDR (standing as the PRDS) had won 70 out of 79 seats in

1996 and 67 seats out of 79 in 1992. In the 2001 election, it won 64

out of 81 seats.17 Islamic parties were banned, so their candidates could only stand

as independent candidates or under the banner of other political

parties.

Equally noteworthy in a conservative society werethe gains made by women in these elections, particularlysignificant given their traditionally low level of partici-pation. In line with the 20% gender quota set up by thetransitional authorities for the first time in Mauritania’shistory, women won 18 seats in the National Assemblyand 9 seats in the Senate. This led Mauritania to have‘‘the second-highest proportion of women representa-tives in the entire Middle East and North Africa region’’(National Democratic Institute, 2007).

The presidential election was the last stage in theprocess of handing over power to democratic

Table 2

Results of the presidential election in Mauritania, 11 and 25 March

2007

Candidate (Party) 1st Round 2nd Round

Votes Votes

(%)

Votes Votes

(%)

Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh

Abdallahi

183,743 24.8 373,519 52.9

Ahmed Ould Daddah (RFD) 153,242 20.7 333,184 47.1

Zeine Ould Zeidane 113,194 15.3 e e

Messaoud Ould Boulkheir (APP) 72,611 9.8 e e

Ibrahima Moctar Sarr 58,818 7.9 e eSaleh Ould Hanena (PMUC) 56,718 7.7 e e

Mohamed Ould Maouloud (UFP) 30,265 4.1 e e

Dahane Ould Ahmed Mahmoud 15,316 2.1 e eMohamed Ould Cheikhna 14,265 1.9 e e

Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla 12,807 1.7 e e

Ethmane Ould Cheikh Ebi El Maali 10,874 1.5 e e

Ba Mamadou Alassane (PLEJ) 4078 0.6 e eMohamed Ahmed Ould Baba

Ahmed Ould Salihi

2789 0.4 e e

Moulaye El Hacen Ould Jeid

(PMRC)

2536 0.3 e e

Chbih Ould Cheikh Malainine 2117 0.3 e e

Rajel dit Rachid Moustapha (PMR) 1976 0.3 e e

Sidi Ould Isselmou Ould

Mohamed Ahid

1804 0.2 e e

Isselmou Ould El Moustapha (PCD) 1790 0.2 e e

Mohamed Ould Mohamed

El Moctar Ould Tomi

1470 0.2 e e

Mohamed Ould Ghoulam

Ould Sidaty

653 0.1

First round: registered voters 1,134,774; total votes 795,083; invalid

votes 54,017. Turnout 70.1%. Second round: registered voters

1,132,176; total votes 764,045; invalid votes 57,342. Turnout 67.5%.

Source: Agence Mauritanienne d’Information: first round: http://

www.ami.mr/fr/articles/2007/mars/12/78.html; second round: http://

www.ami.mr/fr/articles/2007/mars/26/50.html.

389Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 356e390

institutions. Turnout in the first round was 70.1%. Nocandidate won an overall majority but Abdallahi andOuld Daddah emerged as the top two candidates, soentered the second round. Both advocated rather simi-lar policies, especially on issues related to social in-equality, slavery, national unity, and the like. The keyto the outcome in the second round, however, hadmuch more to do with the new alliances concluded inthe interim than the candidates’ respective platforms(Makrane Ait Ouarabi, 2007). Abdallahi enjoyed notonly the backing of the al-Mithaq alliance (and pre-sumably the military junta) but also the support of sev-eral candidates from the first round, such as OuldZeidane (14.3%) and Ould Boulkheir (9.8%).18

Although Ould Daddah, the veteran oppositionleader of the CFCD, had the backing of other candi-dates, he managed to win only in Nouakchott, and inthe Inchiri and Trarza regions. Abdallahi triumphedin Mauritania’s remaining 11 regions. Certainly, the de-sertion of Ould Boulkheirda member of the CFCDwith whom Ould Daddah shared a long history of fight-ing against nepotism and political tyrannydworkedagainst Ould Daddah’s bid for the presidency (AfricanPress Agency, 2007). Ultimately, Abdallahi was pro-claimed the winner of the presidential contest aftergarnering some 53% of the vote to Ould Daddah’s47%. See Table 2.

6. Implications

Conducted in a reasonably free and fair way, theparliamentary and presidential elections in Mauritaniamark the conclusion of the political transition undermilitary rule and the restoration of democratically elec-ted institutions. The return to civilian government mayherald hopes of a new era of pro-democracy reforms inthe country. The process will take time to bear fruit.Meanwhile, the new leadership is faced with immedi-ate challenges which, if not addressed, might erodethe prospects for democratisation.

The elections reported here will not have anymarked effect on the balance of power, traditionallytilted towards the executive. This means that the pres-idency will have the upper hand over the parliament ininitiating reforms. Thus, critical to the success of thepresidency is the ability to keep the military out of pol-itics and to deal with the most pressing social problemssuch as racial tensions, vestiges of slavery, the return of

18 Ould Zeidane and Ould Boulkheir were well rewarded for their

support: the former was appointed prime minister, and the second

elected president of the National Assembly.

refugees, and the living standards of the population. Inparticular, the recent exploitation of oil could give theauthorities more resources to improve social conditionsin a country where about one person out of two lives inpoverty. The recently adopted law criminalising slav-ery for the first time is a positive sign, but Mauritaniahas a long way to go to achieve national unity amongpeople of multi-ethnic groups and establish genuinedemocratic government.

References

African Press Agency, 2007. How Sidi Ould Abdallahi won the

Mauritanian presidential election. 27 March. At: http://apanews.

net/spip.php?page¼show_article&;id_article¼24342.

Africa Research Bulletin, 2006. Mauritania: Opposition Leads. 1e31

December.

Agence Mauritanienne d’Information, 2005. Le Conseil Militaire pour

la Justice et la Democratie publie un communique. 3 August.

390 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 356e390

Agence Mauritanienne d’Information, 2006. Un groupe de partis

politiques annonce la creation d’une coalition des forces du

changement. 26 May.

Agence Mauritanienne d’Information, 2007. Declaration annoncant le

regroupement au sein d’une charte de 18 partis politiques. 8 January.

Arab Election Watch, 2006. Legislative elections in Mauritania. 13

December. At: http://www.intekhabat.org.

International Crisis Group, 2006. La transition politique en Maurita-

nie: Bilan et perspectives. Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afrique du

Nord 53, pp. 2e6.

Keesing’s Record of World Events, 2006. April, p. 47189.

Keesing’s Record of World Events, 2005. September, p. 46812.

Le Monde, 2007. 26 March. At: http://www.lemonde.fr/.

Middle East Online, 2006. Mauritania’s constitution gets 96.96% yes

vote. 28 June. At: http://www.middle-east-online.com.

Mission d’observation electorale de l’Union europeenne (MOE/UE),

2007. Rapport Final. Mission d’observation electorale de l’Union

europeenne en Mauritanie. March.

Mokrane Ait Ouarabi, 2007. Election presidentielle en MauritaniedLa

course pour le second tour a commence. El-Watan, 14 March, p. 15.

National Democratic Institute, 2007. Women are transforming

Mauritanian politics. At: http://winwithwomen.ndi.org.

Nouakchott Info, 2006. Campagne electoraledSilence, on dance. 13

November. At: http://www.akhbarnouakchott.com/imagesprg/zeit_

411_1.pdf.

Ordonnance, 2005. Creation de la Commission Electorale Nationale

Independante. 14 November.

Ordonnance, 2007. Modifiant et completant certaines dispositions de

l’ordonnance du 7 octobre 1991 portant loi organique relative a

l’election du president de la republique. 3 January.

Pazzanita, A., 1996. The origins and evolution of Mauritania’s sec-

ond republic. The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (4),

575e596.

Reporters sans Frontieres, 2007. Public media rise to challenge of

providing balanced, neutral coverage of historic election. 27

March. At: http://www.rsf.org.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.12.006