GOVERNMENT

Panel wants Japan to loosen hold on technology A new report calls on the U.S. govern­ment to pressure Japan to direct more of its science and technology efforts to the future military and nonmilitary needs of both countries. The report, mandated by the previous Democratic Congress and funded by the Depart­ment of Defense, is the first attempt in years to redefine the scientific and tech­nological relationship between the U.S. and Japan.

Prepared by a National Research Council panel headed by former Penta­gon technology official Gerald P. Din-neen, the report, "Maximizing U.S. In­terests in Science and Technology Re­lations with Japan," is likely to be unpopular in economically troubled Japan. The Japanese already are irri­tated with persistent U.S. hard-bar­gaining over trade issues, incidents of industrial espionage involving U.S. intelligence agencies, the rape of a young Okinawan girl by GIs based there, and the expulsion of Daiwa Bank from the U.S. for systematically con­cealing losses.

"Because of changes in the interna­tional environment," Dinneen said, "the security rationale that justified a pattern of primarily one-way transfers of defense technology during the Cold War no longer applies and is un­likely to be revived." Elaborating, he said the old Soviet threat to stability in eastern Asia no longer forms the ba­sis for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The big­gest future threat could come from China, with North Korea also potential­ly volatile.

The chemically related technologies in the security alliance between the two countries are not classical commodity formulations. Rather they combine the creativity of chemists, physicists, and electrical and optical engineers. Re­searchers in those fields commonly work together on such developments as ceramics and resins for the packag­ing of integrated circuits, new forms of semiconductor materials, innovative plastic materials for lighter optical ca­bles, carbon fiber materials, flat-panel display screens for a number of infor­mation uses, and various sensor mate­rials and instrumentation systems.

The rationale for a richer and less re­strained exchange of science and tech­nology seems logical enough. But in re­

ality it is extremely complex when viewed against what has been a subtle and delicate relationship between the two countries. The very idea of export­ing security-related Japanese technolo­gy goes against the grain of the domi­nant official sentiment there. After its World War II defeat, Japan resolved it would never again become an aggres­sive military power. The policy for U.S.-Japan relations in military mat­ters was codified in the U.S.-Japan Mu­tual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954.

The model that evolved for carrying out the agreement was that the U.S. would provide Japan a Cold War mili­tary umbrella. In turn, Japan would fi­nance most of its own defense needs under the alliance. Major defense tech­nologies and weapons systems would flow in one direction only, from the U.S. to Japan. Incremental develop­ments made in Japan would be negoti­ated for transfer to the U.S.

The U.S.-to-Japan flow took two main forms—direct sales and agree­ments for the coproduction of various weapons systems such as fighter planes and destroyers. The Japanese in addition would make improvements in

the imported American technology. The upshot was that Japan learned a lot from its purchased American technolo­gy but wouldn't share those improve­ments—or indeed new developments made on its own—with the U.S.

Now, the NRC panel says, more than a bit of reciprocity is long overdue. Much military technology is of the so-called dual-use variety. Japan should start contributing directly and creative­ly to the U.S/s needs in technologies that apply to both military and com­mercial applications.

It adds that "recent trends toward lower defense budgets, greater utiliza­tion of commercial technologies, and Japan's greater relative strength in these areas would provide a favorable environment for expanded reciprocal U.S.-Japan cooperation. But this has not materialized and will likely prove diffi­cult to bring about."

Dinneen says the difficulties are probably best illustrated by the contro­versy surrounding joint development of the FS-X fighter plane. The program was a compromise between Japan's desire to develop an indigenous fight­er and the U.S. preference that Japan buy or produce a U.S. aircraft under license from the U.S. to Japan. Ameri­can contractors haggled with Japanese counterparts over sharing informa-

U.S., Japanese defense spending show different profiles

$ Billions 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

U.S. Total defense budget Defense spending

(as % of GDP) Defense R&D budget Defense R&D (as % of

defense budget) Defense R&D (as % of total

government R&D spending)

Japan Total defense budget Defense spending

(as % of GNP) Defense R&D budget3

Defense R&D (as % of defense budget)

Defense R&D (as % of total government R&D spending)

$299.5 5.9%

$ 37.5 12.5%

66.4%

$ 35.6 1.01%

$ 0.75 2.1%

4.2%

$303.3 5.5%

$ 36.4 12.0%

64.3%

$ 37.8 0.99%

$ 0.84 2.2%

4.4%

Note: All figures reflect government outlays; conversions at $1.0(

$288.9 4.8%

$ 36.2 12.5%

60.0%

$ 39.8 0.95%

$ 0.93 2.3%

4.5%

) = 100 yen. a traditionally funded a larger portion of early-stage defense R&D than have U.S. firms reflected in these figures, na = not available. GDP

$282.1 5.0%

$ 36.6 12.9%

58.9%

$ 41.3 0.94%

$ 1.04 2.5%

4.7%

$267.1 4.6%

$ 37.7 14.1%

59.0%

$ 42.1 0.94%

$ 1.12 2.7%

na

Japanese companies have This corporate funding is not

= gross domestic product. GNP = gross national product. Sources: Office of Management & Budget, "Budget of the United States Government—Historical Tables, 1995"; Japan Science & Technology Agency, "Indicators of Science & Technology, 1994 '; Michael Chinworth, "Inside Japan's Defense," 1992; Japan Defense Agency, "1993 Defense White Paper"; National Science Board, "Science and Engineering Indicators, 1993"

26 NOVEMBER 13,1995 C&EN

tion, Congress was concerned over loss of American technology to Japan, and the Japanese repeatedly were frus­trated by the apparent unwillingness of their American counterparts to share important information. Agree­ments, however, were ultimately worked out by corporate contractors and pro­duction is expected to begin this year. Still, bitterness between the two coun­tries remains.

There is complexity after complexity in this unique bilateral relationship. For example, Japan currently is reori­enting its broad geopolitical thinking. Its postwar policy has been to take non-military approaches to pursuing its in­terests in world affairs without giving preference to any region. But recently, it has focused most of its attention to­ward Asia, a development American experts see as potentially disruptive to the alliance.

The study makes five major recom­mendations that it believes should lead to a better dual-use technology policy between the two countries:

• Reciprocity in technology transfer should be pursued as a major goal by the Defense Department.

• The U.S. government should try harder to persuade Japan to allow ex­port of commercial technologies that undergo minor modifications for de­fense needs—something the Japanese, with a few exceptions, have opposed doing. The U.S. government addition­ally should allow U.S. companies to pay royalties to Japanese firms whose technologies find their way into de­fense applications.

• The Defense Department should develop new mechanisms to ease coun­try-to-country industry collaborations on common defense needs. Also rec­ommended is a program to fund joint research on specific basic technologies. The arrangement would be funded and managed by the two governments and the costs would be shared by joint in­dustrial teams.

• A major security dialogue between the two countries should take place re­viewing all aspects of the relationship.

• The Defense Department should develop a better, more coordinated ap­proach for pursuing collaborative de­fense programs with Japan. In addi­tion, conflicts within the U.S. defense, security, technological, and diplomatic establishments should be resolved.

Wil Lepkowski

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NOVEMBER 13,1995 C&EN 27