panel 5 - mateus · panel 5 - mateus.pptx author: damien gerard created date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 pm
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Ins$tu$ons, Norms and Economics: Compe$$on and Development
Compe&&on Policy at the Intersec&on of Equity and Efficiency
A Conference honoring Eleanor Fox
Abel M. Mateus Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels
June, 8th, 2016 1
![Page 2: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Compe$$on and Development
• The limitaGons of compeGGon policy in economies with non-‐inclusive insGtuGons • Economic dynamics • PoliGcal structure and vested interests
• PoliGcal economy of developing countries: the case of Middle East and North Africa: the Arab Spring • Why Egypt blocked the development while Turkey was successful aQer her financial crisis • Towards a model of the poliGcal economy of development, cronyism and compeGGon
2
![Page 3: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Poli$cal Economy of Compe$$on (I)
• Acemoglu, Robinson and others describe extensively exploitaGve economies, where the economic surplus is appropriated by a small elite; country in stagnaGon or degradaGon • Rent seeking and “Crony socieGes”: can we have compeGGon policy in an authoritarian regime? Can we have anGtrust against major economic groups that may control the state? • “policy choices are endogenous to poliGcal interests” • “policies are used to create advantages for incumbent elites, rents are generated for business and poliGcal elites and special interests are insulated from compeGGve pressures of domesGc and foreign markets”
• InsGtuGonal weaknesses in developing countries, but on the other hand • “The effecGveness of state -‐ in market intervenGons or insulaGon from private interests -‐ hinges on state capacity”
3
![Page 4: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Poli$cal economy of the 2011 Arab Spring
• This was a failure of the Arab development model, especially its inability to support an independent and compeGGve private sector.
• Based on a distorted legacy of intervenGon and distribuGon, this development model is structurally incapable of reconciling aspiraGons with economic opportuniGes.
• The contradicGons associated with this development model are parGcularly apparent in the region’s labour-‐abundant economies, where a shrinking resource envelope has led to an erosion of the social contract, resulGng in a scaling back of public employment and welfare services. Worryingly, the space vacated by a shrinking state has not been filled by a vibrant private sector.
• Why there was an under-‐developed private sector? In much of the Arab world the private sector acts as an appendage of the state. Businesses tend to survive either when they are too close to the state, such as crony capitalists, or too far, which is the case with informal firms.
• TradiGonal policy reform will not work. Relieving greater compeGGve space for the private sector requires a poli%cal concession that grants autonomy to independent businesses and relaxes barriers to trade.
• Adeel Malik, PoliGcal Economy of Arab Uprisings, New Palgrave DicGonary of Economics, 2015
4
![Page 5: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
5
![Page 6: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Poli$cally Connected (CF) versus Non-‐Connected Firms (NCF) • CF are disproporGonally present in sectors that are closed to FDI and which require licensing, they are usually dominant firms and exclusionary mechanisms increase once they entered the sector • CF may not have higher returns than NCF, due to larger inefficiencies that compensate for higher barriers to entry • Egypt and Turkey are both Arab States, where the military sector is an important part of the economy (esGmates between 10 and 30% of GDP), and where large conglomerates belong to a dozen of families that are connected with the poliGcal power
6
![Page 7: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
7
EGYPT: 2011
From: Chekir and Diwan, Crony Capitalism in Egypt
![Page 8: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
8
Cases in Egypt
From Chekir and Diwan
![Page 9: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
9
Egypt: How cuts in tariff rates was counter-‐balanced by increases in non-‐tariff barriers: no import liberalizaGon
Decomposing by sector shows That Connected Firms/Sectors Were the main beneficiaries
Illusory increase in compeGGon
![Page 10: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
10
Note: Russia and Ukraine worst Korea good, because chaebols are in tradables
![Page 11: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Why Turkey was a more successful economy?
• The liberalizaGon and macroeconomic stabilizaGon that took place in the 1990s led to a substanGal and effecGve opening of the economy • Did not threaten the large family conglomerates. In fact, the strong recovery expanded substanGally their markets and opportuniGes • More diversified economy, with a larger resource and human basis • A larger role in exploiGng the geopoliGcal posiGon in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia: construcGon and consumer goods
11
![Page 12: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
12
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
GDP per capita in PPP (USD)
Egypt
Turkey
Egypt has a crony index 3 Gmes higher than Turkey
The percentage of employment in the informal sector Non-‐agriculture is about 25% in Turkey and 37% in Egypt
![Page 13: Panel 5 - Mateus · Panel 5 - Mateus.pptx Author: Damien Gerard Created Date: 6/7/2016 9:28:56 PM](https://reader034.vdocuments.mx/reader034/viewer/2022050214/5f6046d4ebc31667e93bfe45/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Further research: An economic model of Poli$cal Economy of crony-‐capitalism • Good entrepreneurial and management resources are extremely scarce • Development requires conGnuous investment in physical and human capital as well as innovaGon and technological progress in tradables and non-‐tradables • But only through compeGGve and efficient markets that process will work • Suppose you have a non-‐tradables sector with regulaGons and/or entry barriers that reserve those sectors to incumbents (CF) • And tradables with high protecGon from foreign compeGGon (CF) • No new entry (no contestability). Where investment is going to occur? Only in protected sectors, but limited by the market (inequaliGes further restrict it) and with no pressure to improve producGvity • Besides credit is majority allocated to these sectors because of risk • The rest of the populaGon is squeezed out to the informal sector, or survives in small firms in non-‐protected formal sectors
13