palparan digests

7/31/2019 Palparan Digests

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Hannah Cris A. Echavez AdDU LAW

the gorgeous one gorgeous hannah Political LawCONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. vs. HRET

G.R. No. 189506 February 11, 2010

Facts: Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the

House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruzand Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition forquowarrantowith the HRET against Aangat

Tayo and its nominee Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House

of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Lucaban furtherpointed out that Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did no

belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district

representative.Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for

the members of the H of R. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan,

Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups. Shortly after the elections, Lesaca filed

with HRET a petition for quowarranto against Bantay and its nominee Palparan. Lesaca and the others alleged that

Palparan was ineligible to sit in the H of R as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces

Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed

gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay,not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee.

Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question

must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET. HRET issued an order dismissing the petition

against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the

jurisdiction of the COMELEC. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of Palparans qualificationsPalparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it hence, the recourse to this Court.

Issue: WON WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has the authority to pass upon the

eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.

Held: Yes

Ratio: Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization

that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Under Section 5, Article VI of theConstitution, the members of the House are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from legislativedistricts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,

and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list

representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected

however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by lawestablished where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list

representatives belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like mannerThey have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that

will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three

years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as"members of the House of Representatives," thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of

representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional andsectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which willenable Filipino citizens belonging to the

marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political

constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that willbenefit the nation as a whole, tobecome members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State

shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible

representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to


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the gorgeous one gorgeous hannah Political Lawcompete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

InBantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, a party-list representative is

in every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-

list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in

appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for

disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the

Philippines for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to

read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least 90

days preceding the day of the election, and is at least 25 years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age

on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of 30 during his term

shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and

Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that theyought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of

the party or organization which he seeks to represent."It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him

or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that

characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and themarginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list

nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine

the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs

to the party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that the party

or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-lis

representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the

resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe

when it resolved the challenge to Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approvethe registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here

and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET

shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members ofthe House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of

the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction tohear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the

party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath

and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over

election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions

forquo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the questionof the qualifications of Abayon and Palparan.


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the gorgeous one gorgeous hannah Political LawPHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General

GEORGE FGBF GEORGE DULDULAO v COMELEC

G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010

Facts: PGBI was removed from the list of party-lists. Section 6(8) ofRA 7941, otherwise known as theParty-List System Act, provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC

may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel,after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

x x x x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections orfails to obtain at

least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)

preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 the Rules andRegulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System

which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered

national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations

affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 andit did

not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any

national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or

through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.

Issue: Whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.

Held:

Ratio: TheMinero RulingOurMinero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain

PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or

coalitions under the party-list system.

First,the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any

interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional

or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a)fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding

elections; or(b)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system

in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[6] The word or is a

disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things

enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctiveword. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons

for delisting.

Second,Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent ofSection 6(8) of RA 7941, as

PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non

participation of a party-list organization in an election as similarto a failure to garner the 2% threshold

party-list vote. WhatMinero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in

an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused

interpretation of the law, given the laws clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/190529.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/190529.htm#_ftn6


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the gorgeous one gorgeous hannah Political Law

the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate

grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it is aninterpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive

interpretation of the law.

What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for

Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC(Banat) where wepartly invalidated the 2%

party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:

We rule that, in computing the allocation ofadditional seats, the continuedoperation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in

the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds

that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum

number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds

50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the

additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the membersof the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should

therefore be understood in light of theBanatruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering lessthan 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.

We need not extensively discussBanats significance, except to state that a party-list

group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be

delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words

the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list

votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives

a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now

necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the

two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delistingthese grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to

garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of

theBanatruling, to meanfailure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the

constituency in which it has registered.This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be

understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, and as an exception to the

application of the principle ofstare decisis.

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; itwas

clearly an erroneous application of the law an application that the principle of stability or predictability

of decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent

of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced bythe continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandonMinero and strike it out from our

ruling case law.

We are aware that PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a

prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that

is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law

and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over which ful

discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the principle of

separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this concern to the

legislatures notice.


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Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELECG.R. No. 179271 21April2009

Facts:

Issue:

Held:Ratio: We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly

stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number ofallparty-list congressmen

shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, includingthose elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two

percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in theHouse of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it

actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two

additional seats;Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled

to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two

hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative

districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance

with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered

national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of

representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the

ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall befilled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous

cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the

religious sector.

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall

constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House ofRepresentatives including those under the party-list.

x x x

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall be composed ofnot more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives

shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature

to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.


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the gorgeous one gorgeous hannah Political LawSection 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to

the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from

the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats available

to legislative districts

x .20 =

Number of seats available to

party-list representatives

.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list

representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14 th Congress of the Philippines has 220district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

220 x .20 = 55

.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number orepresentatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representativesto the wisdom of the legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold

and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List

System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-

percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. 7941 on

the allocation ofadditional seats under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule, andJustice Vicente V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formulaas an alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-lis

representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of whichprovide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,[22] the following procedure shall

be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest

based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total

votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That thosegarnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in


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the gorgeous one gorgeous hannah Political Lawproportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, orcoalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. TheCOMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide

basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives

proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, orcoalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list

representative seats.The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with

Section 12 of R.A. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members ofthe House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5,

Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847

dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall

be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%)

of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more thanthree (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups underthe immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding

to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups

which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordancewith Section 12 of RA 7941.

44 party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared

unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;

(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes

obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for

the party-list system.BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the

votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes

of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats. Thirty-four(34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs second interpretation.In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6

formula and theVeterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They

claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. BayanMuna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the

qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of

all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the totaparty-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using

the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the

qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or


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the gorgeous one gorgeous hannah Political Lawremainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of thisranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up.

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to thelowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number

of votes garnered during the elections.

Rank PartyVotes

GarneredRank Party

Votes

Garnered

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48KALAHI 88,868

2 BAYAN

MUNA

979,039 49APOI 79,386

3 CIBAC 755,686 50BP 78,541

4 GABRIELA 621,171 51AHONBAYAN 78,424

5 APEC 619,657 52BIGKIS 77,327

6 A TEACHER 490,379 53PMAP 75,200

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54AKAPIN 74,686

8 ALAGAD 423,149 55PBA 71,544

9 COOP-

NATCCO

409,883 56GRECON 62,220

10 BUTIL 409,160 57BTM 60,993

11 BATAS 385,810 58A SMILE 58,717

12 ARC 374,288 59NELFFI 57,872

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60AKSA 57,012

14 ABONO 339,990 61BAGO 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62BANDILA 54,751

16 AGAP 328,724 63AHON 54,522

17 AN WARAY 321,503 64ASAHAN MO 51,722

18 YACAP 310,889 65AGBIAG! 50,837


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19 FPJPM 300,923 66SPI 50,478

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67BAHANDI 46,612

21 ABS 235,086 68ADD 45,624

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69AMANG 43,062

23 KABATAAN 228,637 70ABAY PARAK 42,282

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71BABAE KA 36,512

25 ALIF 217,822 72SB 34,835

26 SENIOR

CITIZENS

213,058 73ASAP 34,098

27 AT 197,872 74PEP 33,938

28 VFP 196,266 75ABA ILONGGO 33,903

29 ANAD 188,521 76VENDORS 33,691

30 BANAT 177,028 77ADD-TRIBAL 32,896

31 ANG

KASANGGA

170,531 78ALMANA 32,255

32 BANTAY 169,801 79AANGAT KA

PILIPINO

29,130

33 ABAKADA 166,747 80AAPS 26,271

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81HAPI 25,781

35 TUCP 162,647 82AAWAS 22,946

36 COCOFED 155,920 83SM 20,744

37 AGHAM 146,032 84AG 16,916

38 ANAK 141,817 85AGING PINOY 16,729

39 ABANSE!

PINAY

130,356 86APO 16,421

40 PM 119,054 87BIYAYANG

BUKID

16,241


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41 AVE 110,769 88ATS 14,161

42 SUARA 110,732 89UMDJ 9,445

43 ASSALAM 110,440 90BUKLOD

FILIPINA

8,915

44 DIWA 107,021 91LYPAD 8,471

45 ANC 99,636 92AA-KASOSYO 8,406

46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93KASAPI 6,221

47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.7941 states that parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at

least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. Thisclause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for

illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes

garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over

the total votes for the party-list.[28]

Rank PartyVotes

Garnered

Votes Garnered

over Total Votes

for Party-List, in%

Guaranteed

Seat

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1


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11 BATAS[29] 385,810 2.42% 1

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1

Total 17

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total numberof votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-

list candidates that are entitled to one seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we

distributed 17 guaranteed seats.The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. 7941 provides that those garnering more than two percen

(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. This iswhere petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause inproportion to their total number of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation

is contrary to the express language of R.A. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation ofadditional seats, the continued operation of the two percent

threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No7941 is unconstitutional . This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to

achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds

50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates theattainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of

party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a

guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a sea

despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeatitself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100

million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always

impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is

present.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats

as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted


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the gorgeous one gorgeous hannah Political Lawobstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment ofthe broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. 7941, the

following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the

number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for

the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled

to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have

already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocationas additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed

seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding offof fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in

Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at

by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-listcandidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the

remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-

List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentageand of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we

assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. Wedistributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seacap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats


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1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 . .N A

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 . .N A

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 . .N A

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 . .N A

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 . .N A

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 . .N A

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 . .N A

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 . .N A

9[31] -COOP

NATCCO

409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 . .N A

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 . .N A

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 . .N A

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 . .N A

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 . .N A

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 . .N A

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 . .N A

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 . .N A

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 . .N A

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 . .N A

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 . .N A

20 -UNI MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 . .N A

21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 . .N A

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 . .N A

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 . .N A


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24 -ABA AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 . .N A

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 . .N A

26 SENIOR

CITIZENS

213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 . .N A

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 . .N A

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 . .N A

29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 . .N A

30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 . .N A

31 ANG

KASANGGA

170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 . .N A

32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 . .N A

33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 . .N A

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 . .N A

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 . .N A

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 . .N A

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-lis

representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The

additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed atotal of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties toparticipate in the party-list elections. R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the

Constitutional Commission.Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the

party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the partylist system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to

participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutiona

Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the partylist system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political


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the gorgeous one gorgeous hannah Political Lawparty or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in theparty-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the

Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio

political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections inpatent violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major

political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or politicapurposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election

through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties

can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can

establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolknominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in

poverty, destitution and infirmity as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that thenominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the

senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-listrepresentatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the

determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House ofRepresentatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by

law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives canno

be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued

existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-listrepresentatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-

list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-

list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used inTable 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major politicaparties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continuedisallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his

separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with

thisponencia.


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