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A.M. No. 2361 February 9, 1989

LEONILA J. LICUANAN, complainant,vs.ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

An affidavit-complaint, dated November 11, 1981, was filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Cour

Administrator on 5 February 1982 against respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics, allegingthat respondent, who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, failed to remit to her the rentalscollected by respondent on different dates over a twelve-month period, much less did he report to her the receipt of saidamounts. It was only after approximately a year from actual receipt that respondent turned over his collections tocomplainant after the latter, through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment and had demanded the same.

In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted having received the payment of rentals from complainant's tenantAida Pineda, as alleged in the complaint, but explained that he kept this matter from the complainant for the purpose ofsurprising her with his success in collecting the rentals.

We forwarded the case to the Office of the Solicitor General, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings wereconducted and the parties presented their respective evidence.

After investigation, the Solicitor General submitted the following Findings and Recommendation:

Findings:

The issue to be resolved is whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of the respondent in accounting forthe funds collected by him for his former client, the complainant herein, for which unprofessional conductrespondent should be disciplined.

A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduchimself with all good fidelity to his clients. Under paragraph 11 of the Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated toreport promptly the money of client that has come to his possession and should not commingle it with his privateproperty or use it for his personal purpose without his client's consent viz:

Money of the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported promptly,and except with the client's know and consent should not be commingled with his private or be used by him.

And paragraph 32 of the Canons of Legal Ethics further requires a lawyer to maintain a reputation for honesty andfidelity to private trust:

... But above all, a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and topublic duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.

In the instant case, respondent failed to observe his oath of office. It is undisputed that the relation of attorney andclient existed between Licuanan and Melo at the time the incident in question took place. The records disclosethat on August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against AidaPineda whereby the latter was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals fromOctober, 1978 and succeeding months thereafter.

When several months had elapsed without them hearing a word from Pineda, respondent decided to send her aletter on February 4, 1980, demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will beconstrained to take the necessary legal action against her to protect the interest of his client (Exhibit "A", p. 8record). On February 11, 1980, Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to respondent's office and paidhim P3,060.00 for which respondent gave her a receipt for the said amount representing her rental payments forOctober, 1978 to February, 1980 at the rate of P180.00 per month (Exh. "B", p. 9, Ibid.) At the end of March31,1980, Pineda again went back to respondent and paid the rentals of her apartment for the months of Marchand April, 1980 in the sum of P360.00 (Exh. "C" p. 10, Ibid.). Not only that, respondent again received fromPineda on June 30, 1980 rental payments covering the months of May, June and July, 1980 in the total sum of

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P540.00 (Exh. "D" p. 11, Ibid.). And, on September 29, 1980, he received and issued Pineda a receipt forP540.00 covering rental payments for the months of August, September and October, 1980. (Exh. "E", Ibid.). Afterfour months had elapsed, or on January 23, 1981, he collected again from Pineda the total sum of P720.00covering the months of October, November, December, 1980 and January 1981 (Exh. "F", p. 12, Ibid.).

During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda, hedid not bother to inform or report to complainant about the said payments and instead unnecessarily retained themoney. He allowed the money to accumulate for a year and kept complainant in the dark as to the progress of thecase. He did not even attempt to tell her about the money that had come into his possession notwithstanding the

fact that complainant used to call him and inquire regarding the case (pp. 14-15, tsn., Sept. 10, 1985).

It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by complainant, wrote respondent a letteron May 4, 1981, advising him to surrender the money to complainant that he accounted for it (Exh. "H", p. 15,Ibid.). But this was rather late because as early as April 27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that respondent hadbeen receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted an administrative case against her (Aida Pineda) beforethe Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising from her alleged failureto pay the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 037276 and claiming thatshe has ignored and refused to pay her just obligation (Exh. "G", p. 14, Ibid.).

This led therefore Pineda to bring an action against her (Licuanan) for damages before the then Court of FirstInstance of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings andsocial humiliation arising from the unfounded administrative case Licuanan filed against her (Aida Pineda), since

as borne out by the records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of Licuanan, hereinrespondent (pp. 48-52, record). Clearly, this unfortunate incident would not have happened had respondent beenonly true to his oath as a lawyer, i.e., to be honest and candid towards his client.

Thus, we find it hard to believe respondent's defense that he kept the money of complainant for a year merelybecause he wanted to surprise her with his success in collecting the rental payments from Pineda. On thecontrary, it is very much discernible that he did not surrender immediately the money to complainant because hewas using it for his own benefit. Common sense dictates that by unnecessarily withholding the money ofcomplainant for such length of time, respondent deprived her of the use of the same. It is therefore too credulousto believe his explanation, which is flimsy and incredible Respondent's actuation casts doubt on his honesty andintegrity. He must know that the "highly fiduciary" and "confidential relation" of attorney and client requires that theattorney should promptly account for all funds and property received or held by him for the client's benefit, andfailure to do so constitutes professional misconduct, as succinctly held by the Honorable Supreme Court in the

case ofFermina Legaspi Daroy, et al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65SCRA 304, to wit:

A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduchimself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that hascome into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposeswithout his client's consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Pars. 11 and32, Canons of Legal Ethics).

Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must beimmediately turned over to them(Aya vs. Bigonia, 57 Phil. 8, 11).

xxx xxx xxx

A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or foany violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27).

The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting andconfidential in character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith(7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of thaspecial relationship, 'lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf oftheir clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees onmoney in his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for thefunds received. (Emphasis supplied).

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In fine, we are convinced that respondent is guilty of breach of trust reposed in him by his client. Not only has hedegraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession (In reParaiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15SCRA 131). By his deceitful conduct, he placed his client in jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suitthus, instead of being a help to his client, he became the cause of her misery. He, therefore, deserves a severepunishment for it. (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11; In re Bamberger, April 17, 1924, 49 Phil. 962; Daroy, et al., vsAtty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi, supra.)

Clearly, respondent is guilty of professional misconduct in the discharge of his duty as a lawyer.

RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, we respectfully recommend that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period ofnot less than one (1) year, and that he be strongly admonished to strictly and faithfully observe his duties to hisclients. (pp. 78-85, Rollo)

We find the foregoing findings well considered and adopt the same but differ with the recommendation.

The actuations of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the amount of P5,220.00received by him on behalf of his client, the complainant herein, depriving her of its use, and withholding information on thesame despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore observance, and anevident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics particularly:

11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takesadvantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client of other trust property coming into the possession of thelawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstance becommingled with his own or be used by him. *

Indeed, by his professional misconduct, respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has shownhimself unfit for the confidence and trust which should characterize an attorney-client relationship and the practice of law

By reason thereof complainant was compelled to file a groundless suit against her tenant for non-payment of rentalsthereby exposing her to jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by said tenant against her By force ofcircumstances, complainant was further compelled to engage the services of another counsel in order to recover theamount rightfully due her but which respondent had unjustifiedly withheld from her.

Respondent's unprofessional actuations considered, we are constrained to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and grossmisconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delayany man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself unworthy of thetrust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the severest punishment.

WHEREFORE, consistent with the crying need to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession and topreserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo,from the practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all Courts of the country and spread on the personal record of respondentAtty. Manuel L. Melo.

SO ORDERED.

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[A.C. No. 4349. December 22, 1997]LOURDES R. BUSIOS, complainant, vs.ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT,respondent.R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint for disbarment dated 31 October 1994 but received by us on 21 November 1994, complainantLourdes R. Busios charged respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort, a practicing lawyer in Oas, Albay, with havingcommitted the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code by misappropriating the sum

of P32,000.00. Of this amount,P30,000.00 was entrusted to respondent for deposit in the bank account of complainantshusband, while P2,000.00 represented the amount respondent demanded from complainant supposedly for a bond in CivilCase No. 5814, when no such bond was required.

In the resolution of 18 January 1995, we required respondent to comment on the complaint. Despite his receipt of acopy of the resolution, respondent did not comply, compelling us in the resolution of 17 July 1995 to require him to showcause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.

Again respondent failed to comply. Hence in the resolution of 25 September 1996, we ordered him once more to filehis comment within ten (10) days from notice, and within the same period, to pay a fine of P1,000.00 or suffeimprisonment of ten (10) days should he fail to so pay. In a Compliance and Motion dated 24 October 196, respondentransmitted the fine of P1,000.00 by way of postal money order, but asked for five (5) days from date to file his commentAs respondent still failed to so file, we then declared, in the resolution of 2 December 1996, that respondent was deemedto have waived his right to file his comment, and referred the complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant for reception of

complainants evidence and submission of a report and recommendation thereon. On 16 October 1997, the Bar Confidant, Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa, submitted her Report and Recommendation,

material portions of which read as follows:

Respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort stands charged with having misappropriated the sum of P30,000.00 intended for hisclients as well as having deceived his clients into giving him the sum of P2,000.00 purportedly to be deposited as a bondin the case he was handling.

Complainant Lourdes R. Busios is one of the heirs of Pedro Rodrigo who are the defendants in Civil Case No. 1584,apparently a case involving the properties of the late Pedro Rodrigo, father of herein complainant. Respondent was thecounsel of record for the defendants in the said case. On July 10, 1994, complainant representing her co-heirs, executeda special power of attorney, appointing and constituting respondent and/or Pedro Rodrigo, Jr. to be her true and lawfuattorney-in-fact with the following powers:

1. To attend to and represent me, testify, or otherwise enter into compromise during the pre-trial stage or otherproceedings in Civil Case No. 1584, entitled Heirs of Rosario Rodrigo-Reantaso, vs. Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo Sr., et al.now pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Ligao, Albay;

2 To demand, collect and receipt for any and all sums of money that may now be deposited in said court by thedefendant Oas Standard High School or hereafter be deposited by said defendant, due and owing to me or said Heirs ofPedro Rodrigo Sr., representing the rentals of said defendants for the lease of the property involved in said case; and

3 To sign, authenticate, issue and deliver any and all deeds, instruments, papers and other records necessaryand pertinent to the above stated transactions.

On August 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Br. 12 issued an order, directing the Clerk of Court torelease any and all deposits of rentals made in connection with this case (Civil Case No. 1584) to the defendants Heirs ofPedro Rodrigo through Lourdes Rodrigo Businos who were receiving the rentals from Oas Standard High School prior tothe institution of this case.

In a letter dated August 10, 1994, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Ligao informed herein complainant that respondent hadalready received the rental deposit of P25,000.00 on eve date (see Annex C to the complaint). Respondent alsoreceived from Oas Standard High School on August 17, 1994 the sum of P5,000.00 as payment for rental of school sitefor the month of July 1994 (See Annex D to the complaint). The said sum was entrusted to respondent with an obligationon his part to deposit the same in the account of complainants husband at PNB, Ligao Branch. Instead, however, ofdepositing the money, respondent converted the money to his own personal use, and despite several demands, he failedto return the same to complainant. She was thus constrained to file a criminal case for estafa and an administrative case

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for disbarment against him. Thus, on November 21, 1994, complainant filed the instant administrative case againstrespondent.

Complainant further accuses respondent for demanding and receiving P2,000.00 from her which he said will be used forthe bond in Civil Case No. 1584, but said amount was never used as intended since no bond was required in the saidcase. Thus, respondent merely pocketed the said amount.

xxx xxxxxx

Complainant, upon questioning by the undersigned, testified that: She authorized respondent to withdraw the moneyamounting to P35,000.00 representing the rental fee paid by Oas Standard High School from the Clerk of Court, with theinstruction to deposit the same in her savings account at the PNB. After she was informed by the court that respondenthad already withdrawn the money, she expected in vain to receive the money a week later in Tarlac as respondent failedto effect the deposit of the said sum in her account. She demanded from him to give her the money, but he informed hethat he had already spent the same. He promised, though to pay her the said amount. (pp. 7-8, TSN, Reception ofEvidence, April 18, 1997). She clarified that respondent withdrew only the sum of P30,000.00 from the Clerk of Court,while the P5,000.00 was withdrawn by respondent from Oas Standard High School (TSN, p. 8). Despite several demandsboth from her and her lawyer, respondent failed to make good his promise to give her the money he withdrew from theClerk of Court and Oas Standard High School (TSN, pp. 11-13). She was then constrained to file a criminal case forestafa and an administrative case against respondent sometime in November of 1994 to recover the money in question(TSN, pp. 14-16).On their third hearing of the estafa case sometime in 1995, respondent came with the money and paid

complainant inside the courtroom (TSN, pp. 15, 19-20). Because of this development, she did not anymore pursue theestafa case against respondent (TSN, p. 17). She has no intention, however, of withdrawing the instant complaint (TSN,p. 18).

She further testified that respondent demanded from her the sum of P2,000.00 for the bond required in the civil case(TSN, p. 18). Respondent did not give her a receipt for the said amount. (TSN, p. 19). Respondent gave backthe P2,000.00 to complainant. He paid complainant a total of P60,000.00 representing the money he withdrew from theClerk of Court and Oas Standard High School, the P2,000.00 he got from complainant and attorneys fees, which heundertook to foot as a way of settlement. (TSN, p. 19).

Although complainant failed to submit the original or certified true copies of the documents in support of her complainagainst respondent, respondents repeated failure to comply with several resolutions of the Court requiring him tocomment on the complaint lends credence to the allegations of the complainant. It manifests his tacit admission thereto.

We have no other alternative, therefore, but to accept the said documents at their [sic] face value.

There is no doubt that respondent is guilty of having used the money of his clients without their consent. As theevidentiary value of the documents should be given more weight than the oral testimony of complainant, we place theamount illegally used by respondent at P30,000.00 and not P35,000.00 as claimed by complainant. Respondents illegause of his clients money is made more manifest [by] his letters to complainant, all promising the latter to make good hispromise to pay the money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas Standard High School (See Annex E to thecomplaint).

It bears emphasis that a lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound toconduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his client that has comeinto his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without hiscllients [sic] consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Daroy vs. Legaspi, 65

SCRA 304).

Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be immediatelyturned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8).

Respondent, by converting the money of his clients to his own personal use without their consent , and by deceiving thecomplainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used as a bond which was not required, isundoubtedly, guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. By so doing, he betrays the confidence reposed in himby his clients. Not only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of anhonorable profession.

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His belated payment of the amount he illegally used and fraudulently obtained do not relieve him from any liability if onlyto impress upon him that the relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a verydelicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring high degree of fidelity and good faith. In view of that speciarelationship, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients andfailure to do so constitutes professional misconduct (Daroy vs. Legaspi, supra).

Moreover, his repeated failure to comply with the resolutions of the Court, requiring him to comment on the complaintindicate the high degree of irresponsibility of respondent.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.Francisco Ricafort be SUSPENDED fromthe practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR.

While the findings are in order, the penalty recommended is not commensurate to respondents infractions.

Plainly, respondent breached Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.0116.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which read:

SEC. 25 Unlawful retention of clients funds; contempt.--When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his clientafter it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his officialtransactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

CANON 1- A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE

RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAYCOME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01-- A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02-- A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept byhim.

Rule 16.03-- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall havea lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursementsgiving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executionshe has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Respondents transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethicabehavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannotbe denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betraystheir trust and confidence.

This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members ofthe Bar. In Marcelo v. Javier(A.C. No. 3248, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 1, 12-13), reiterated in Fernandez v. Grecia(A.C. No. 3694, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 425, 434), this Court declared:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarilyreposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, thecourts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing .Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar,to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tendto lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.

Here, respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyers oath, he became a guardian of truth and the rule oflaw and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice -- a vital function of democracy afailure of which is disastrous to society.

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Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not betolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is specially so, as here, where respondent even deliberatelydefied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11 of theCode of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.

WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior in palpable disregard of Section 25 ofRule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof, and consistent with the urgent need tomaintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith inthe members of the Philippine Bar, the Court Resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the

practice law. His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.This resolution shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be

appended to respondents personal record; the National Office and the Albay Chapter of the Integrated bar of thePhilippines; the Philippines Judges Association; and all courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5162 March 20, 2003EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,complainant,vs.ATTY. MICHAEL DIONEDA,respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY to the cause of his client mindful always of the trust and confidence reposed in him.1Anattorney-at-law must serve his client with competence and diligence at all times, 2 and never neglect a legal matteentrusted to him,3 for it is his sworn duty to delay no man for money or malice and to conduct himself in a proper mannernot just to his client, but also to the court, the legal profession and society at large.

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by the EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERSASSOCIATION (ECTHA) against ATTY. MICHAEL DIONEDA.

On 29 September 1997 ECTHA and respondent Dioneda entered into a Retainers Agreementwherein respondent lawyeagreed to handle the case of the complainant against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Savings Bank by way offiling a Complaint-in-Interventionin the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, docketed as Civil Case No

4890-V-96, for P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and P1,000.00 as appearance fee per hearing.4

It was further agreed tharespondent lawyer would update the complaint and work on the development of the case. 5

In its Complaint ECTHA alleged that Atty. Dioneda, after receiving the amount of P20,000.00, did nothing for thedevelopment of the case and to update the complaint on the status of ECTHAs intendedComplaint-in-Intervention. Dueto the insistence of the members of the Association, Mr. Fernando Garcia, ECTHA President, was compelled to check therecords of the case in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 75, and secured a certification from the BranchClerk of Court dated 5 July 1999 that there was no motion for intervention filed in the case. 6

On behalf of ECTHA Mr. Garcia repeatedly made oral demands for respondent to return the amount of P20,000.00because he did not do anything to protect the rights and interests of the Association. Respondent Dioneda only made oralpromises to pay, and in August 1999 he could no longer be contacted and the personnel in his office simply madeexcuses to Mr. Garcia.7

Through Mr. Garcia ECTHA referred the matter to Atty. Antonio L. Umali, who contacted respondent by telephone. Still,no response was made by respondent. On 18 August 1999 a letter dated 17 August 1999 was sent to Dioneda, but againthere was no response.8

In his Commentfiled before this Court, respondent Dioneda admitted that he and ECTHA entered into a RetainersAgreement; however, he averred that the Agreementdid not cover only the Complaint-in-Interventionas adverted to bythe complainant. It also included the case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) that thecomplainant filed against the developer of Emiliano Court Townhouses who refused to release to the members of theECTHA their respective Deeds of Sale.

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At the time his legal services were engaged, Atty. Dioneda alleged that there was already a decision in favor of thecomplainant. Thereafter, respondent entered his appearance and filed a Motion for Executionwith the HLURB. Accordingto respondent Mr. Garcia would go with him and follow up the issuance of the Writ of Executionwith the HLURB NationaOffice. Respondent Dioneda further alleged that he wanted to pursue the Writ of Executionsince he would attach it tothe Complaint-in-Intervention, and that this was explained to the members of ECTHA. Respondent claimed that there wasdelay in the filing of the Complaint-in-Intervention because there was delay in the issuance by the HLURB of the Writ oExecution.

Respondent further averred that Mr. Garcia would call him at his residence and "spew invectives" at him. There would be

no day that Mr. Garcia would not call respondent and hurl expletives at him and his parents. Respondent denied theallegation that ECTHA had made several demands on him and that he promised to pay sometime August 1999.

After receiving the demand letter of ECTHA respondent immediately called up the residence of Mr. Garcia and informedhim that he could get the money and the records of the case at his office. However, respondent informed ECTHA that aportion of the amount to be returned would be deducted as a reasonable fee for the efforts exerted by him. According torespondent, no representative of the complainant showed up at his law office.

Respondent Dioneda denied the charge that he never attended to the case of the complainant and that he did nothing toprotect the interest of its members. He asserted that there was no intention on his part to defraud them.

The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation. Hearings were set on at least five (5)separate dates. Despite due notice, respondent never attended the IBP administrative hearings. Thus the IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline allowed the presentation of complainants evidence ex-parteagainst respondent on the 14December 2001 hearing.9

On 13 February 2002 the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), through thedesignated Commissioner, recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating the Code of ProfessionaResponsibility, specifically Canons 17 and 18.10 The IBP held that the act of receiving professional fees and thereafterfailing to render the corresponding legal service is a violation of the Canons. The penalty of three (3) months suspensionfrom the practice of law and an order for Dioneda to return the amount of P20,000.00 to his client in the interest of justicewere recommended. On 29 June 2002, Resolution No. XV-2002-252 was passed by the IBP Board of Governors adoptingand approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

The sole issue in this case is whether Atty. Dioneda violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of ProfessionaResponsibility. Admittedly respondent received the amount of P20,000.00 as acceptance fee for handling a case to be

filed in behalf of ECTHA. Despite receipt of the aforementioned fee, respondent allegedly failed to render thecorresponding legal services to the complainant.

We agree with the Report of IBP Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes as approved and adopted by the IBP Board ofGovernors.

The Complaint-in-Interventionwas never filed and despite the pronouncement of respondent that he would return theattorneys fees to complainant, he never did. The issuance of the Writ of Executionin the HLURB should never have beena requirement imposed by respondent before a Complaint-in-Intervention could be filed.

Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent Dioneda did not attend a single hearing to defend himself.Despite due notice, he did not attend the hearings scheduled on 19 March, 9 May, 20 June, 8 August and 14 December2001. The parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers in the Order of 9 May 2001 of the CBD-IBPRespondent never complied with the Order.

Respondents lamentable attitude towards his clients case is clearly evident from his apparent disinterest in his own casefor disbarment. Dioneda never bothered to present evidence in his defense. He disregarded all notices sent to him by theIBP Commission on Bar Discipline, which were personally served at his office address. He never appeared before theCommission despite several opportunities to do so and explain his side.

It is reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondent committed an infringement of ethicastandards. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the case of complainant ECTHAagainst LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Bank and subsequently failing to render such service is a clear violation ofCanons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Not only that. The acts of inexcusable negligence in lega

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matters entrusted to him and disloyalty to his client constitute major breaches of respondents oath as a lawyer.11 These

acts that are inimical to his clients interests render respondent liable.

A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenanceand defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. 12 Public interest demands that an attorneyexert his best efforts and ability to preserve his clients cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewis eserves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties not only tothe client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyers inability to properly discharge his duty to his cl ienmay also mean a violation of his correlative obligations to the court, to his profession and to the general public.

The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his clients interests commences from his retainer until his effective discharge from thecase or the final disposition of the entire subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a client establishes anattorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. The canons of the legal professionrequire that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotionIndeed, respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to file the Complaint-in-Interventionhe undertook tohandle, thus making him liable under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18.

In Santos v. Lazarothis Court recognized Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibilityas a basic postulate inlegal ethics stating that when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence inprotecting his rights.13 The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a familymakes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client butalso to the legal profession, the courts and society.14

However, the recommended penalty by the IBP is not commensurate to the acts complained of. Jurisprudence shows thatheavier sanctions have been imposed for ethical violations of this nature, taking into consideration the gravity of theoffense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal profession.

Following the latest rulings of this Court on disciplinary proceedings against erring attorneys, those found guilty of thesame or similar acts were suspended for not less than six (6) months from the practice of law.

The facts ofSencio v. Calvadoresbear a striking similarity to the present case.15 The respondent lawyer in Senciodid noreturn the money to the complainant after a demand therefor was made following his failure to file the case. This Courttook to task the respondents attitude of not answering the complaint and in deliberately disregarding the orders andnotices of the IBP on many occasions, holding that this attitude showed a character or disposition which stains the nobilityof the legal profession as he chose not to appear at the scheduled hearings despite due notice and warnings given. 16 The

IBP-appointed Commissioner had no other recourse but to receive the evidence of the complainant ex-parte.17

Accordingly, the respondent in Senciowas found guilty of violation of the lawyers oath, malpractice and grossmisconduct, suspended for six (6) months, and ordered to return to his client the amount of P12,000.00 with interest at12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of the resolution until the return of the amount. 18

This Court in Garcia v. Manuelsuspended the respondent lawyer from the practice of law for six (6) months and orderedhim to render an accounting of all monies he received from the complainant. 19 The counselor-at-law was found guilty ofgross misconduct, especially for ineffectively handling the case of his client and failing to return the money given by thatsame client.

In Rabanal v. Tugade20 and Galen v. Paguirigan,21 the respondent lawyers who failed to file a brief to the detriment of theirespective clients were suspended by this Court for six (6) months on the first offense.

The respondent attorney in Aromin v. Boncavilwas found to have violated Canons 15, 17 and 18 of the Code oProfessional Responsibility.22 He was suspended for six (6) months and warned that a repetition of a similar offense wouldbe dealt with more severely.

As to the amount of Atty. Dionedas compensation for his legal services, the general rule as to the conclusiveness of avalid written contract fixing attorneys fees cannot find application in the case at bar. This is due largely to thecomplainants request for a full refund of the attorneys fees given, and the respondents counter-proposal that a portion othe amount be deducted as a reasonable fee for the efforts exerted by him. In a situation where both parties are deemedto have impliedly disregarded the contract and placed themselves in the position as though there was no expressstipulation as to the attorneys fees, the lawyers compensation shall be determined on the basis ofquantum meruit.23

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Despite this settled principle of law on the compensation of an attorney for legal services, we rule against respondentlawyer in the present case.

To deserve compensation for his legal services based on quantum meruit, respondent Dioneda must prove by substantiaevidence that he is entitled to a reasonable fee for his efforts in pursuing the complainants case with the Court taking intoaccount certain factors in fixing the amount of his fees.24 However, due to respondents conspicuous absence at theadministrative hearings for his disbarment set by the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline on at least five (5) differentoccasions, and the apparent lack of findings of fact to support the position of respondent, evidence required to establishattorneys fees was never adduced. For having missed several opportunities to present evidence in his favor without any

satisfactory explanation as to his non-appearance, we are constrained to deny him compensation for his legal services onthe basis ofquantum meruitdue to the lack of any factual basis to determine the value of his work as complainantscounsel.

Finally, Rivera v. Corral25 reiterates the purpose of administrative cases against lawyers in this manner -

The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erringindividual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public fromthe misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of theirlawyer's oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. Alawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, whichshows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as anofficer of the court.

It must be stressed that the power to discipline advocates of the law should be exercised with extreme care, primarily onthe notion of preserving the nobility of the law as a profession rather than on the incidental purpose of vindicating therights of private parties against erring lawyers. The indispensable duty of this Court as the guardian of the bench and barremains that of maintaining the peoples respect for the rule of law and the efficient administration of justice, while at th esame time restoring the communitys faith in the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Michael Dioneda is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months, which shaltake effect from the date of notice of receipt of the finality of this Decision, with a WARNING that repetition of the same osimilar acts will merit a more severe penalty, and is ORDERED to RETURN to complainant Emiliano Court TownhousesHomeowners Association the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with interest of twelve percent (12%) perannum from the date of promulgation of this Decision until the full amount as directed, is returned.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the BarConfidant, and entered into respondents personal records as an attorney and as a member of the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3294 February 17, 1993MARIO S. MARIVELES,complainant,vs.ATTY. ODILON C. MALLARI,respondent.

Rodolfo B. Ta-asan for complainant.

PER CURIAM:

On January 11, 1989, Mario S. Mariveles of Davao City filed an administrative complaint against his former counsel,Attorney Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal services he had engaged in 1984 to handle his defense in Criminal Case No. 6608of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City where he was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as theBouncing Checks Law.

After an adverse decision was rendered on December 26, 1986, Mariveles instructed Attorney Mallari to appeal the triacourt's decision to the Court of Appeals, which the respondent did.

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However, in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous extensions of time, totalling 245 days, which he obtained from theCourt, Attorney Mallari failed to file the appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.

Complainant discovered his lawyer's desertion only when he was subpoenaed by the trial court to appear before it for theexecution of the decision which had become final.

Through new counsel, complainant filed a Petition for Reinstatement of Appeal, Cancellation of Entry of Judgment andAdmission of Appellant's Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, but it was denied by the appellate court.

He sought relief in this court (G.R. No. 85964, "Mario S. Mariveles vs. Court of Appeal, et al.") which, on March 13, 1989,granted his petition, ordered the Court of Appeals to cancel the entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, reinstate theappeal, and admit the appellant's brief filed by his new counsel. The Court said:

It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the appellant which led to the dismissaof the appeal does not necessarily warrant the reinstatement thereof. However, wherethe negligence of counsel is so great that the rights of accused are prejudiced and he isprevented from presenting his defense, especially where the appellant raises issueswhich place in serious doubt the correctness of the trial court's judgment of convictionthe aforesaid rule must not be rigidly applied to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Theseteachings of jurisprudence are present in the case at bar.

On the first aspect, the failure of petitioner's former counsel to file the brief, for reasons

unknown and without any cause imputable to petitioner, amounted to deliberateabandonment of his client's interest and justifies reinstatement with consequent dueconsideration of petitioner's appeal through a new counsel. (pp. 106-107, Rollo).

On February 15, 1989, the administrative complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) forinvestigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP's Committee on Bar Discipline investigated the complaint and held hearings. On March 3, 1992, it submitted tothis Court a report/resolution finding:

In sum, what was committed by the respondent is a blatant violation of our Code of ProfessionaResponsibility.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering anexplanation for his failure to do so.

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and hisnegligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in the course of that practice,he will eventually wreck and destroy the future and reputation of his client and thus disgrace the lawprofession. The last thing that his peers in the law profession and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

would do is to disrobe a member of the profession, for he has worked for the attainment of his careerburning the midnight oil throughout school and passing the bar. The undersigned, however, could not findany mitigating circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty. Disbarment is the only recourse to removea rotten apple if only to instill and maintain the respect and confidence of all and sundry to the nobleprofession. (pp. 249-250, Rollo)

The Court concurs with the above observations. The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack ofresponsibility to the courts and his client but also a shameless disregard for his duties as a lawyer. He is unfit formembership in this noble profession.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Attorney Odilon C. Mallari guilty of abandonment and dereliction of duty towardhis client and hereby orders him DISBARRED from the legal profession and to immediately cease and desist from the

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practice of law. Let the Office of the Court Administrator and the Executive Judges of the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh andTwelfth Judicial Regions, be furnished with copies of this resolution for dissemination to all the courts in those regions.

SO ORDERED.

ELSIE B. AROMIN, FE B. YABUT, TIBURCIO B. BALLESTEROS, JR., and JULIAN B. BALLESTEROS,complainants, vs.ATTY.VALENTIN O. BONCAVIL,respondent.D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint[1]filed by Elsie B. Aromin, Fe B. Yabut, Tiburcio B. Ballesteros, Jr., and Julian B. Ballesterosagainst Atty. Valentin O. Boncavil for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainants allege that their late father, Tiburcio Ballesteros, engaged the services of respondent as counsel in twocadastral cases then pending in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City, to wit: Cadastral Case No. N-14LRC CAD RMC No. N-475, Lot No. 6576, Pls-119, entitled The Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. Faustina CaliboClaimant, v. Tiburcio Ballesteros, Claimant, and Cadastral Case No. N-14, LRC CAD. REG. No. N-475, Lot No. 7098Pls-119, entitled The Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. Belinda Tagailo-Bariuan, Claimant, v. Tiburcio BallesterosClaimant; that despite receipt of the adverse decision in the two cases on August 8, 1991, respondent did not informherein complainants of the same nor file either a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal to prevent the decisionfrom becoming final; that respondent did not file either a writ ten offer of evidence despite the trial courts directive for himto do so; and that it took respondent four years from the time complainants father died before he filed a motion tosubstitute herein complainants in the trial court. The foregoing acts and omissions of respondent are alleged to be inviolation of the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS ANDTRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THETRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall

render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time tothe clients request for information.

Complainants pray that such disciplinary sanctions as may be appropriate be imposed against Atty. Valentin Boncavil.

In his answer,[2]respondent alleges that the day before the cadastral court rendered its decision, he met by chanceherein complainant Julian Ballesteros, who, after inquiring as to the status of the cadastral cases and learning that thesame had already been submitted for resolution, told him You are too busy to attend to our case, it would be better ifsomebody else would take over, to which, according to respondent, he replied, It is all right with me, it is your privilege;that as a self-respecting legal practitioner, he did not want to continue rendering unwanted legal services to a client whohas lost faith in his counsel; that he thus considered himself discharged as counsel in the two cadastral cases and

relieved of the obligation either to move for a reconsideration of the decision or to file a notice of appeal and to notifyherein complainants of the decision against them; that, contrary to complainants assertion, he did make an offer ofevidence, although he reserved the right to submit authenticated copies of the documentary evidence from the Bureau ofLands in Manila; that the delay in the substitution of Tiburcio Ballesteros with his heirs was because neither the heirs northe administrator of the intestate estate of Tiburcio Ballesteros informed him of the latters death despite the heirsknowledge that he was the counsel in the two cadastral cases.

On June 8, 1994, complainants moved for a judgment on the pleadings, alleging that the facts are not in dispute andthe respondents answer admits the material allegations of the complaint.

[3]

On June 13, 1994, IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose required respondent to comment on the foregoing motionwithin five (5) days from notice.[4]On October 12, 1995, he set the case for hearing on November 17, 1995.[5]

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On November 17, 1995, however, only complainants Tiburcio Ballesteros, Jr. and Fe Yabut and their counseappeared. This fact, together with respondents failure to comment on complainants motion submitting the case forresolution on the basis ofthe pleadings, prompted Commissioner Jose to grant complainants motion.[6]

On June 21, 1996, Commissioner Jose submitted his report recommending that respondent be suspended from thepractice of law for six months with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-97-16 approving Commissioner Josesreport and recommendation.

After due consideration of the records of this case, the Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to be well taken.

The facts clearly show that respondent violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which providesthat a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. By abandoning complainants cases, respondentviolated Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that a lawyer not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and hisnegligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. As stated inSantiago v. Fojas:[7]

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of thetrust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latterscause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the clientwarm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to theend that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that hisclient is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he mayexpect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the

entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar,and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; healso serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legaprofession.

Nor can we sustain respondents claim that he did not file either a motion for reconsideration or a notice of a ppeafrom the decision in the two cases because he was under the impression from the remark of Julian Ballesteros thatcomplainants no longer wanted to retain his services. As a member of the bar, he ought to know that the only way to berelieved as counsel in a case is to have either the written conformity of his client or an order from the court relieving himas counsel. Thus, Rule 138, 26 of the Rules of Court provides:

An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed incourt. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the

court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case osubstitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the formerone, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.

As a matter of fact, Julian Ballesteros, who allegedly made the remarks which became the basis for respondentsinaction, denied ever having made those statements, much less having discharged respondent as counsel. [8]MoreoverJulian Ballesteros is only one of the heirs of Tiburcio Ballesteros, and it has not been shown that he was speaking onbehalf of the other heirs when he allegedly relieved respondent of his services. In any case, if respondent had really beendischarged as counsel, although not in accordance with the Rules of Court, he should have informed the trial court andasked that he be allowed to withdraw from the cases.[9]Until his dismissal or withdrawal is made of record, any judicianotice sent to him was binding upon his clients even though as between them the professional relationship may havebeen terminated.[10]He cannot validly claim that, in any case, the decision has not yet become final for want of service onthe Solicitor General, for the period within which complainants can file a motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal is

counted from receipt of the decision by their counsel of record.Nor is this the first time that respondent is remiss in his professional obligation toward complainants. In his answer

he practically admits that he was late in moving for the substitution of Tiburcio Ballesteros by herein complainantheirs. Respondents excuse that he was not immediately informed by complainants of their fathers death is withoutmerit. Four years after the death of complainants father is simply too long a period for him not to have known of hisclients death, especially as it appears that he and complainants live in close proximity with each other. During those fouyears, surely occasions would have arisen where respondent had to confer with Tiburcio Ballesteros regarding the cases.

Respondent also, in effect, admits that he failed to file a written offer of evidence as required by the court in its order,dated June 21, 1983. What he actually filed was only a provisional written offer of evidence because the documentsoffered were not certified true copies. What the Court makes of respondents garbled explanation [11]for this lapse is thahe could not bother to go to the Bureau of Lands in Manila to get certified true copies because a check with the Bureau of

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Lands in Pagadian City showed the same documentary evidence to be substantially the same true copies. If that werethe case, respondent did not explain why he did not then go to the Pagadian City branch of the Bureau of Lands to get thecertified true copies of his documentary evidence.

The recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months for respondents gross negligence inthe handling of the two cadastral cases is in accordance with our decisions.[12]

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to suspend respondent Atty. Valentin O. Boncavil from the practice of law forsix (6) months from notice with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Let a copyof this decision be attached to Atty. Boncavils personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished

to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and to all the courts in the land.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120592 March 14, 1997TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ,respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz, head of the E.N.A.Cruz and Associates law firm, entered into a retainer agreement on February 26, 1987 whereby the former obligated itself

to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3,000.00 in consideration of the law firm's undertaking to render the servicesenumerated in their contract. 1Parenthetically, said retainer agreement was terminated by the union on April 4, 1990. 2

During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to private respondent the claims of its members forholiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB). After the appropriatecomplaint was filed by private respondent, the case was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National LaborRelations Commission (NLRC) on March 24, 1987 and docketed as NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466. 3

On September 2, 1988, the NLRC rendered a decision in the foregoing case in favor of the employees, awarding themholiday pay differential, mid-year bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential. 4The NLRC, acting on a motion forthe issuance of a writ of execution filed by private respondent as counsel for petitioner union, raffled the case to LaborArbiter Oswald Lorenzo. 5

However, pending the hearing of the application for the writ of execution, TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC beforethe Supreme Court. The Court, in its decision promulgated on August 30, 1990, 6modified the decision of the NLRC bydeleting the award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential. 7

The bank voluntarily complied with such final judgment and determined the holiday pay differential to be in the amount ofP175,794.32. Petitioner never contested the amount thus found by TRB. 8The latter duly paid its concerned employeestheir respective entitlement in said sum through their payroll. 9

After private respondent received the above decision of the Supreme Court on September 18, 1990, 10he notified thepetitioner union, the TRB management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney's lien over theaward of holiday pay differential through a letter dated October 8, 1990. 11

Thereafter, on July 2, 1991, private respondent filed a motion before Labor Arbiter Lorenzo for the determination of hisattorney's fees, praying that ten percent (10%) of the total award for holiday pay differential computed by TRB aP175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be declared as his attorney's fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to payand remit said amount to him. 12

The TRB management manifested before the labor arbiter that they did not wish to oppose or comment on privaterespondent's motion as the claim was directed against the union, 13while petitioner union filed a comment and oppositionto said motion on July 15, 1991. 14After considering the position of the parties, the labor arbiter issued an order15onNovember 26, 1991 granting the motion of private respondent, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that the TRADERS ROYAL BANKEMPLOYEES UNION with offices at Kanlaon Towers, Roxas Boulevard is hereby ordered (sic) to paywithout delay the attorney's fees due the movant law firm, E.N.A. CRUZ and ASSOCIATES the amount of

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P17,574.43 or ten (10%) per cent of the P175,794.32 awarded by the Supreme Court to the members ofthe former.

This constrained petitioner to file an appeal with the NLRC on December 27, 1991, seeking a reversal of thatorder. 16

On October 19, 1994, the First Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution affirming the order of the laborarbiter. 17The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the NLRC in a resolution dated May 23,1995, 18hence the petition at bar.

Petitioner maintains that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding theaward of attorney's fees in the amount of P17,574.43, or ten percent (10%) of the P175,794.32 granted as holiday paydifferential to its members, in violation of the retainer agreement; and that the challenged resolution of the NLRC is nuland void, 19for the reasons hereunder stated.

Although petitioner union concedes that the NLRC has jurisdiction to decide claims for attorney's fees, it contends that theaward for attorney's fees should have been incorporated in the main case and not after the Supreme Court had alreadyreviewed and passed upon the decision of the NLRC. Since the claim for attorney's fees by private respondent wasneither taken up nor approved by the Supreme Court, no attorney's fees should have been allowed by the NLRC.

Thus, petitioner posits that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award of attorney's fees, as said actconstituted a modification of a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court which did not award attorney's fees. It

then cited decisions of the Court declaring that a decision which has become final and executory can no longer be alteredor modified even by the court which rendered the same.

On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his motion to determine attorney's fees was just an incident of themain case where petitioner was awarded its money claims. The grant of attorney's fees was the consequence of hisexercise of his attorney's lien. Such lien resulted from and corresponds to the services he rendered in the action whereinthe favorable judgment was obtained. To include the award of the attorney's fees in the main case presupposes that thefees will be paid by TRB to the adverse party. All that the non-inclusion of attorney's fees in the award means is that theSupreme Court did not order TRB to pay the opposing party attorney's fees in the concept of damages. He is not thereforeprecluded from filing his motion to have his own professional fees adjudicated.

In view of the substance of the arguments submitted by petitioner and private respondent on this score, it appearsnecessary to explain and consequently clarify the nature of the attorney's fees subject of this petition, in order to dissipatethe apparent confusion between and the conflicting views of the parties.

There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. 20In its ordinaryconcept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he hasrendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.

In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losingparty in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as thoseauthorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that theaward shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.

It is the first type of attorney's fees which private respondent demanded before the labor arbiter. Also, the presen

controversy stems from petitioner's apparent misperception that the NLRC has jurisdiction over claims for attorney's feesonly before its judgment is reviewed and ruled upon by the Supreme Court, and that thereafter the former may no longeentertain claims for attorney's fees.

It will be noted that no claim for attorney's fees was filed by private respondent before the NLRC when it acted on themoney claims of petitioner, nor before the Supreme Court when it reviewed the decision of the NLRC. It was only after theHigh Tribunal modified the judgment of the NLRC awarding the differentials that private respondent filed his claim beforethe NLRC for a percentage thereof as attorney's fees.

It would obviously have been impossible, if not improper, for the NLRC in the first instance and for the Supreme Courtthereafter to make an award for attorney's fees when no claim therefor was pending before them. Courts generally ruleonly on issues and claims presented to them for adjudication. Accordingly, when the labor arbiter ordered the payment ofattorney's fees, he did not in any way modify the judgment of the Supreme Court.

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As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466private respondent's present claim for attorney's fees may be filed before the NLRC even though or, better statedespecially after its earlier decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorney'sfees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separateaction. 21

With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may beavailed of only when something is due to the client. 22Attorney's fees cannot be determined until after the main litigationhas been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fees only

arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.

23

While a claim for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of thefees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer's claim forattorney's fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will bepremature. 24Of course, a petition for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied othe proceeds thereof delivered to the client. 25

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees.Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment forholiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award's complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file aclaim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of hisaforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.

Assailing the rulings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, petitioner union insists that it is not guilty of unjust enrichmenbecause all attorney's fees due to private respondent were covered by the retainer fee of P3,000.00 which it has beenregularly paying to private respondent under their retainer agreement. To be entitled to the additional attorney's fees asprovided in Part D (Special Billings) of the agreement, it avers that there must be a separate mutual agreement betweenthe union and the law firm prior to the performance of the additional services by the latter. Since there was no agreemenas to the payment of the additional attorney's fees, then it is considered waived.

En contra, private respondent contends that a retainer fee is not the attorney's fees contemplated for and commensurateto the services he rendered to petitioner. He asserts that although there was no express agreement as to the amount ofhis fees for services rendered in the case for recovery of differential pay, Article 111 of the Labor Code supplants thisomission by providing for an award of ten percent (10%) of a money judgment in a labor case as attorney's fees.

It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for servicesperformed at the special instance and request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying torepresent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. 26It will thusbe appropriate, at this juncture, to determine if private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration under theretainer agreement 27entered into by him and petitioner.

The parties subscribed therein to the following stipulations:

xxx xxx xxx

The Law Firm shall handle cases and extend legal services under the parameters of the following terms and conditions:

A. GENERAL SERVICES

1. Assurance that an Associate of the Law Firm shall be designated and be available on a day-to-daybasis depending on the Union's needs;

2. Legal consultation, advice and render opinion on any actual and/or anticipatory situation confrontingany matter within the client's normal course of business;

3. Proper documentation and notarization of any or all transactions entered into by the Union in its day-to-day course of business;

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4. Review all contracts, deeds, agreements or any other legal document to which the union is a partysignatory thereto but prepared or caused to be prepared by any other third party;

5. Represent the Union in any case wherein the Union is a party litigant in any court of law or quasi-judicial body subject to certain fees as qualified hereinafter;

6. Lia(i)se with and/or follow-up any pending application or any papers with any government agencyand/or any private institution which is directly related to any legal matter referred to the Law Firm.

B. SPECIAL LEGAL SERVICES

1. Documentation of any contract and other legal instrument/documents arising and/or required by yourUnion which do not fall under the category of its ordinary course of business activity but requires aspecial, exhaustive or detailed study and preparation;

2. Conduct or undertake researches and/or studies on special projects of the Union;

3. Render active and actual participation or assistance in conference table negotiations with TRBmanagement or any other third person(s), juridical or natural, wherein the presence of counsel is not formere consultation except CBA negotiations which shall be subject to a specific agreement (pursuant toPD 1391 and in relation to BP 130 & 227);

4. Preparation of Position Paper(s), Memoranda or any other pleading for and in behalf of the Union;

5. Prosecution or defense of any case instituted by or against the Union; and,

6. Represent any member of the Union in any proceeding provided that the particular member must givehis/her assent and that prior consent be granted by the principal officers. Further, the member musconform to the rules and policies of the Law Firm.

C. FEE STRUCTURE

In consideration of our commitment to render the services enumerated above when required ornecessary, your Union shall pay a monthly retainer fee of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 3,000.00)

payable in advance on or before the fifth day of every month.

An Appearance Fee which shall be negotiable on a case-to-case basis.

Any and all Attorney's Fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigation shalbelong exclusively to the Law Firm.

It is further understood that the foregoing shall be without prejudice to our claim for reimbursement of allout-of-pocket expenses covering filing fees, transportation, publication costs, expenses coveringreproduction or authentication of documents related to any matter referred to the Law Firm or that whichredound to the benefit of the Union.

D. SPECIAL BILLINGS

In the event that the Union avails of the services duly enumerated in Title B, the Union shall pay the LawFirm an amount mutually agreed upon PRIOR to the performance of such services. The sum agreedupon shall be based on actual time and effort spent by the counsel in relation to the importance andmagnitude of the matter referred to by the Union. However, charges may be WAIVEDby the Law Firm if ifinds that time and efforts expended on the particular services are inconsequential but such right ofwaiver is duly reserved for the Law Firm.

xxx xxx xxx

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The provisions of the above contract are clear and need no further interpretation; all that is required to be done in theinstant controversy is its application. The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not coverthe services the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in PartC of the agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law firm'scommitment to rendertheservices enumerated in Part A (General Services) and Part B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.

The difference between a compensation for a commitment to render legal services and a remuneration for legal servicesactually rendered can better be appreciated with a discussion of the two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyerThese are a general retainer, or a retaining fee, and a specia

retainer.

28

A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for anyordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The futureservices of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixedretainer fee which could be monthly or otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The fees are paid whether or notthere are cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity ofrendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.

A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client mayhave several cases demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and independentcontract for attorney's fees, each fee is considered a special retainer.

As to the first kind of fee, the Court has had the occasion to expound on its concept in Hilado vs. David29

in this wise:

There is in legal practice what is called a "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from the realizationthat the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professionaladvice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf ofthe latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rulethat a separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. "Aretaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future servicesand induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by beingretained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him,and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither madenor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of theclient to pay his attorney for the services for which he has retained him to perform." (Emphasis supplied).

Evidently, the P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union and the law firm refers to ageneral retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers only the law firm's pledge, or as expressly stated therein,its "commitment to render the legal services enumerated." The fee is not payment for private respondent's execution orperformance of the services listed in the contract, subject to some particular qualifications or permutations stated there.

Generally speaking, where the employment of an attorney is under an express valid contract fixing the compensation forthe attorney, such contract is conclusive as to the amount of compensation. 30We cannot, however, apply the foregoingrule in the instant petition and treat the fixed fee of P3,000.00 as full and sufficient consideration for private respondent'sservices, as petitioner would have it.

We have already shown that the P3,000.00 is independent and different from the compensation which private respondentshould receive in payment for his services. While petitioner and private respondent were able to fix a fee for the latter's

promise to extend services, they were not able to come into agreement as to the law firm's actual performance of servicesin favor of the union. Hence, the retainer agreement cannot control the measure of remuneration for private respondent'sservices.

We, therefore, cannot favorably consider the suggestion of petitioner that private respondent had already waived his righto charge additional fees because of their failure to come to an agreement as to its payment.

Firstly, there is no showing that private respondent unequivocally opted to waive the additional charges in consonancewith Part D of the agreement. Secondly, the prompt actions taken by private respondent, i.e., serving notice of charginglien and filing of motion to determine attorney's fees, belie any intention on his part to renounce his right to compensationfor prosecuting the labor case instituted by the union. And, lastly, to adopt such theory of petitioner may frustrate privaterespondent's right to attorney's fees, as the former may simply and unreasonably refuse to enter into any specia

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agreement with the latter and conveniently claim later that the law firm had relinquished its right because of the absenceof the same.

The fact that petitioner and private respondent failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment ofprofessional fees for special services will not absolve the former of civil liability for the corresponding remunerationtherefor in favor of the latter.

Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. 31One of the sources of extra-contractual obligations found in our CiviCode is the quasi-contract premised on the Roman maxim that nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari protest. As

embodied in our law,32

certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to theend that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.

A quasi-contract between the parties in the case at bar arose from private respondent's lawful, voluntary and unilateraprosecution of petitioner's cause without awaiting the latter's consent and approval. Petitioner cannot deny that it didbenefit from private respondent's efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award of holiday pay differential in favor ofthe union. It cannot even hide behind the cloak of the monthly retainer of P3,000.00 paid to private respondent because,as demonstrated earlier, private respondent's actual rendition of legal services is not compensable merely by saidamount.

Private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration for pursuing legal action in the interest of petitioner before thelabor arbiter and the NLRC, on top of the P3,000.00 retainer fee he received monthly from petitioner. The law firm'sservices are decidedly worth more than such basic fee in the retainer agreement. Thus, in Part C thereof on "Fee

Structure," it is even provided that all attorney's fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigationshall belong exclusively to private respondent, aside from petitioner's liability for appearance fees and reimbursement ofthe items of costs and expenses enumerated therein.

A quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor dictated by equity and by the principles of absolutejustice. Some of these principles are: (1) It is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit him; (2) Nobodywants to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another; and (3) We must do unto others what we want them to do untous under the same circumstances. 33

As early as 1903, we allowed the payment of reasonable professional fees to an interpreter, notwithstanding the lack ofunderstanding with his client as to his remuneration, on the basis of quasi-contract. 34Hence, it is not necessary that theparties agree on a defi