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Centre-Province Relations in Pakistan Under President Zia: The Government's and theOpposition's ApproachesAuthor(s): C. G. P. RakisitsSource: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 78-97Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British ColumbiaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2758073 .Accessed: 23/08/2011 05:46

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Centre-Province Relations in Pakistan Under President Zia: The Government's and the Opposition's Approaches

C.G.P. Rakisits

W HILE PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ'S ISLAMIZATION program has been the focus of much scholastic attention, especially with regard to its

repercussions upon the political process of the countryl and its nefarious effects upon the condition of women in Pakistan,2 the consequences of the government's Islamization drive upon centre-province relations have yet to be analyzed in detail. It is as a result of President Zia's use of the Islamiza- tion program as a means to legitimize his government's drive to smother provincial dissent that the issue of centre-province relations has essentially become a clash between secularism and Islamic fundamentalism. More- over, this problem is further compounded by the widespread perception in the smaller provinces that the Islamization process is a crude and veiled attempt to impose Punjabi culture and values on the rest of the country. The view that the country is being "Punjabized" is given credibility by the fact that the two major state institutions, the armed forces and the bureaucracy, are overwhelmingly dominated by Punjabis. Therefore, it is this "Punjabization" of the three other provinces, coupled with the imposition of the government's highly centralized and Islamic approach to centre- province relations, which has had an adverse effect on the process of national integration.

Accordingly, it is the aim of this article to demonstrate that although President Zia's Islamization program has failed to arrest the centrifugal

* The views expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Depart- ment of the Parliamentary Library.

I See, for example, David Taylor, "The Politics of Islam and Islamization in Pakistan," in J.P. Piscatori, ed., Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 181-98; J. Henry Korson, "Islamization and Social Polity in Pakistan," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. vi, no. 2 (Winter 1982), pp. 71-90; and J.L. Esposito, "Islainization: Religion and Politics in Pakistan," The Muslim World, vol. lxxii, nos. 2-4 (July-Oct. 1982), pp. 197-223.

2 For an excellent article dealing with this issue, see Lucy Carroll, "Nizam-i-Islam: Pro- cesses and Conflicts in Pakistan's Programme of Islamization, with Special Reference to the Position of Women," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. xx, no. I (March 1982), pp. 57-95.

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tendencies in Sind, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), it nevertheless has had the beneficial result of having the extra- parliamentary opposition coalition, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD),3 adopt a political program that comes closest to the letter and spirit of the 1940 Lahore Resolution, the founding document of Pakistan. If implemented, it would certainly assist in the future resolution of centre-province relations by granting the provinces a large degree of autonomy.

Shortly after taking power, General Zia-ul-Haq, "as a true soldier of Islam,"4 argued that Islamizing Pakistan society would be the only way to bring about "genuine national integration" to the country.5 As he has so often repeated on various occasions, "I want only to emphasize the fact that the ideology of Pakistan is Islam and only Islam. There should be no misunderstanding on this score. We should in all sincerity accept Islam as Pakistan's basic ideology ... otherwise ... this country (will) be exposed to secular ideologies. 9 96

Clearly President Zia's view is that the reason Pakistan had yet to be fully integrated was because the people had failed to adhere to the tenets of Islam and had preferred to follow a secular path to development for the last thirty years. Accordingly, General Zia and his cabinet colleagues have maintained since 1977 that, since Pakistan was created on the basis of M.A. Jinnah's "Two-Nation Theory" which argued that as a distinct nation the Muslims of British India should be granted statehood so they could live according to their Islamic value system,7 it would only be through a total and all-embracing Islamization program that Pakistan would be able to proceed successfully with the task of national integration. Certainly Zia's argument that Islam is the common bond between all ethnic groups in Pakistan and all other loyalties could only be divisive and detrimental to the integration of the country is nothing new. Since independence, all governments, military and civilian, in their drive to smother ethnic identification and "protect" the Muslim-cum-Pakistan nation, have imposed a

3The MRD is composed of the following parties: the Pakistan People's Party, the Pakistan National Party, the Pakistan Democratic Party, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Fazlur Rehman group), the Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi, the Khaksar Tehrik, the Muslim League (Malik Qasim group), the Awami National Party and the Pakhtoonkhwa NAP.

I Interview with BBC Correspondent, Rawalpindi, 12 October 1982 (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), p. 13.

Revival of Islamic Values in Pakistan (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broad- casting, n.d.), pp. 8-9.

6 The President on Pakistan's Ideological Basis, Address by President General Zia-ul-Haq at the inauguration of Shariat Faculty at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 8 October 1979 (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), p. 2.

7 For the complete text of M.A. Jinnah's Presidential Address at the Twenty-Seventh Session of the All-India Muslim League held in Lahore on 22 March 1940 in which he elaborated on his "Two-Nation Theory," see Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., Foundations of Pakistan: A ll-India Muslim League Documents (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970), pp. 338-39.

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high degree of centralization on the polity; and, as the 1971 East Pakistan crisis clearly demonstrated, this approach has generally been unsuccessful. What is new, however, is Zia's use of an Islamic program to fulfil this goal which until then had been pursued in an ideological vacuum.

In the field of centre-province relations this has meant that Islam, which Zia consistently equates with Pakistan, must be the primary focus of one's affective loyalty; and all other affective values, especially ethnic identification, must become secondary. And one of the strategies used by the government to achieve the goal of downgrading local Pakistani culture in favour of identification with a greater Islamic culture has been to promote the importance of Arabic, a language foreign to Pakistanis except for the ulama (religious scholars) who use it in Qur'anic reading.8 There- fore, with the aim of inculcating "a greater sense of identity as a Pakis- tani,"9 President Zia has indicated that "all the languages (regional) will be developed in accordance with their importance. But at the same time the teaching of English is of vital importance and that of Arabic even more SO "10

However, while the government's emphasis on Arabic and Islamic culture has generally been ignored by the population at large, it is Presi- dent Zia's highly centralized approach to centre-province relations and his intolerance toward province-based opposition to his governmental policies which have increased the country's latent centrifugal tendencies and have thus adversely affected the process of national integration. Undoubt- edly, the most outstanding cases demonstrating the state of centre-province relations and the government's attitude toward this issue are the 1983 Sind unrest and the promulgation of the Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 1985.

In Autumn 1983 there developed a full-scale rural uprising in some parts of Sind. It was a major threat to the survival of President Zia's regime. The "precipitant" to the "internal war""1 was Zia's speech of 12 August 1983 in which he outlined the government's plan to proceed with non- party legislative elections. '2 However, more important to the analysis of the movement were the existing pre-conditions which gave the Sindhis objective reasons to rebel against the Martial Law government.

8 For example, in January 1984 the government-controlled television began broadcasting daily news in Arabic.

I Address at the Academy of Administrative Training, Lahore, 1 November 1981 (Islam- abad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), p. 9.

10 Inaugural Address, Fourth Session of the Federal Council, Islamabad, 9 October 1982 (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), p. 39.

11 Harry Eikstein has defined "precipitant" as an event which actually starts the war, and "internal war" as "any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rulers or policies." "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," History and Theory, vol. iv, no. 2, (1965), pp. 135, 140.

12 Political Plan Announced, Address by President Zia-ul-Haq to the Seventh Session of the Federal Council, Islamabad, 12 August 1983 (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting).

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The unrest, which was mainly restricted to specific areas in the interior of Sind, such as Dadu, Hala, Nawabshah, Khairpur and Larkana, home town of former Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, essentially involved unautho- rized mass demonstrations and the destruction of symbols of government authority; for example, police stations, post offices, railway lines and government buildings. Initially the central government left it to the provincial police to deal with the unrest; however, once the movement developed into a large-scale uprising, and threatened the economic prosperity of the Punjab,'3 Zia decided it was time to take sterner measures. Two crack army divisions disarmed the unreliable and ineffective Sindhi constables,'4 and quickly quashed the uprising. According to independent sources, the army followed typical anti-guerrilla warfare tactics; that is, surrounding a village or a town with troops and conducting house-to-house searches to flush out what the government referred to as "dacoits" and "miscreants."'5 Although the introduction of army personnel proved to be an effective means of ending the disturbances, the casualties were relatively high.'6 Nevertheless, by mid-November 1983 the government was sufficiently con- fident to declare that "the Sind situation was well under control."' 7

Widespread and deep-seated discontent among the Sindhis, especially in the rural areas, has been a fact of life virtually since the days of Partition. Therefore, the unrest which developed in Autumn 1983 should have come as no surprise to Zia; nevertheless, the intensity of the movement was quite unexpected. There were several reasons for the sudden upsurge of unrest in Sind. First, Sindhi representation in the bureaucracy and the military, already low under Bhutto, further deteriorated after his ouster. For example, rural Sindhis in the central administrative Secretariat are, according to the established quota, allowed to have 11.4 percent of the positions. How- ever, their actual representation is substantially lower, with 5.0 percent (grades 16-22) and 3.7 percent (grades 20-22). On the other hand, urban Sind, which essentially refers to muhajirs (Muslim migrants who migrated to Pakistan after Partition), is allowed 7.6 percent of the national quota; but their numbers in the Secretariant are grossly over-represented, with 23.2 percent (grades 16-22) and 21.8 percent (grades 20-22). Similarly, in government-controlled corporations, rural Sindhis have only 3.6 percent of

13 According to the sketchy newspaper reports on the unrest, the burning, looting and blockading of the national highway and railroad lanes connecting Karachi with the Punjab caused a 30 percent drop of goods being delivered to the Punjab. The Muslim, 3 October 1983.

14 The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 August 1983. 15 Interview [a journalist for Dawn, Lahore, December 1983]. 16 According to government sources, of the 61 people who died and 200 who were injured,

20-25 percent were law enforcement agents. The Muslim, 11 November 1983. According to unofficial sources, the actual number of people killed rose to 150. The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 October 1983. It is interesting to note that throughout this period of unrest there was never any mention of these disturbances on the government-controlled television and radio; the population listened to BBC reports to obtain news about the unrest.

17 The Pakistan Times, 14 November 1983.

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the positions, compared to urban Sind's 47 percent. 18 Moreover, these figures do not reflect the true extent of the discrimination against the rural Sindhis, since muhalfirs and Punjabis who live in rural Sind declare them- selves as Sindhis. Similarly, Sindhi representation in the armed forces, although impossible to determine precisely because of security reasons, is known to be well below their ratio in society.19

Secondly, the poor socio-economic conditions of rural Sindhis, of which, according to the latest statistics, 65 percent live below the poverty line, have created a deep sense of frustration, a fact which the former governor of Sind, Lieutenant-General SM. Abbasi, acknowledged to be the main reason for the unrest. 20 The economic deprivation started back in the late 1940s when the federal government decided to allocate approximately 40 percent of the evacuee property left behind by the out-going Hindu farmers to the in-coming muhalfirs. This resulted in a massive eviction of Sindhi tenants from land which they had been cultivating for generations. To compound this situation, the majority of the new land brought under cultivation with the construction of the new barrages was alloted to muhajirs, Punjabis, Pukhtuns and defence personnel, leaving only a small proportion for the Sindhi farmers to purchase.2' Moreover, of the four provinces, the general pattern of land tenure in Sind is the most skewed in favour of the large landlords who own 79 percent of the total arable land, making Sind the province with the lowest number of small farmers.22 Finally, as demonstrated in the following table, rural Sind's general economic development is clearly lagging behind, compared to the rest of the country.

TABLE I RANKING OF DISTRICTS OF PROVINCES

ACCORDING TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA

Punjab Sind NWFP Baluchistan

Most developed 12 -

Intermediate 9 1 5 -

Least developed - 12 2 9

Source: The Muslim, 30 October 1983.

18 Charles H. Kennedy, "Policies of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan," Asian Survey, vol. xxiv, no. 6 (June 1984), p. 698.

19 Interview [A Western military attache, Islamabad, November 1983]. I was told there were no Sindhis over the rank of colonel.

20 Dawn, 31 December 1983. 21 Viewpoint, 27 December 1984, p. 25. 22 The Pakistan Times, 15 September 1983. For a detailed study of land tenure in Pakistan,

see Pakistan: Census of Agriculture, 1980 (Agricultural Census Organization, Statistics Div- ision, Government of Pakistan, Lahore, n.d.).

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Thirdly, because of the rapid expansion of educational institutions during the Bhutto period, there has been a dramatic increase in graduates seeking employment. However, unlike the non-Sindhis who have had better job opportunities in the urban centres, where most of the productive assets are located, the rural Sindhis have had great difficulties finding employment in their area of residence. Moreover, the few industries that do exist in the interior of the province, and which are generally owned by non-Sindhis, prefer to employ members of their own ethnic group.23 Ironi- cally, while there has been an increase in unemployed graduates as a result of the educational expansion of the 1970s, there has been, according to the latest census, a decrease in the literacy rate in rural Sind from 17.5 percent in 1972 down to 15.57 percent in 1981, and an increase from 47.43 percent up to 50.77 percent in urban Sind.24 While these figures may be damaging to the President's image and reinforce the negative perception the Sindhis have of his policies, the fact that there was no census during Bhutto's regime (1972 being too soon after Yahya's departure to have any meaning) makes it impossible to determine whether the downward trend began only under Zia or whether it was already beginning under Bhutto.

Although there was a specific "precipitant" to the unrest, and most of the grievances already existed under previous governments, there was one important factor which brought an added dimension to the 1983 movement: not only was Bhutto, the only Sindhi prime minister the country had ever had, no longer in power, but he had been sentenced and executed by Punjabis and muhajirs. So even though Bhutto did not significantly improve the lot of the Sindhis, and was accused of being a Punjabi puppet, he did raise the hopes for a better future for the majority of the people at the bottom echelon of the socio-economic hierarchy. At least he appeared to care about the condition of the peasants and workers. But in 1983, with the Punjabis and muhajirs in control of a non-elected government, the Sind- his' only means left to air their frustrations was open revolt, regardless of the cost.

The political awakening of Sind was fully exploited by the Maoist- oriented Sind Awami Tehrik (SAT) which in those days was not a member of the MRD. Although SAT, which spearheaded the 1983 unrest, was demanding greater provincial autonomy, a more equitable share of power at the centre,25 and an increase in resources allocated for rural Sindhis, it

23 Viewpoint, 12 September 1985, p. 30. 24 1981 Census Report of Sind Province (Population Census Organization, Statistics

Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, December 1984), p. 14. 25 At the time of the uprising there were only two Sindhis included in the federal cabinet:

Mir Ali Ahmad Talpur (Defence) and Elahi Bakhsh Soomro (Industry). During an interview I had with Talpur it quickly became obvious that the interviewee was only nominally in control of his department, and that his inclusion in the cabinet was only meant to placate Sindhi discontent. He was subsequently defeated at the non-party-based elections of February 1985.

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was not secessionist in character, even if some elements made appeals to symbolic Indian intervention. This political platform made it possible for virtually all members of the Sind community to participate in the unrest. The movement had such a Sindhi fervour that even the all-powerful waderas (large landlords), generally supporters of the government in power, were forced to join the bandwagon for fear that if they did not their political position would seriously be threatened in the future, especially if President Zia were to be toppled by this unrest.26 The movement also received a major psychological and political boost with the participation of influential pirs (guardians of religious shrines) who, as leaders of "popular" Islam, have always represented a credible political force in the rural areas of Pakistan.27 The pirs supported the movement for two different reasons. First, generally being large landlords, they believed, as did the other waderas, that it was in their best interest to join the movement. Second, they resented the government's Islamization program; for not only did this clash with the fundamental belief system of the pirs "who had preached that there was no single uniform way to divine grace," 28 but, more importantly, it threatened their power base in rural Sind. The participation of these two important socio-economic groups could be a strong indication that the traditional social structure of rural Sind is progressively breaking down and could well lead to a realignment of political forces in rural Sind.

However, not all residents of Sind were supporters of the movement. The most important group which almost to the very end refused to join the movement was the muhajir community. Not only was this because they were urban-based and had little empathy for the rural Sindhi's grievances, but also because they had no valid reason to oppose the government. They were in influential positions in the civilian and military bureaucracies, they had important portfolios in the central cabinet, and they were prosper- ing under Zia's free market economy. However, as was the case with the waderas, the muhajirs felt that their long-term interest warranted that they at least give token support to the movement lest the Sindhis turn their frustration against them. Accordingly, a New Sindhi National Front was formed, emphasizing the solidarity between old and new Sinhis, viz, muhajirs.29

Meanwhile, the MRD felt this was the perfect occasion to demand the lifting of Martial Law and the restoration of democracy. It believed, and

26 Interview [A former PPP minister, Islamabad, October 1983]. 27 For an interesting discussion on the political role of the pirs, see Riaz Hassan, "Pirs and

Politics," Paper presented at the Fifth Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Austra- lia, Adelaide, 13-19 May 1984.

28 K.B. Sayeed, "Impact of Islam: Domestic and Foreign Policies of Muslim States," Third World Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 2 (April 1985), p. 432.

29 Dawn, 8 November 1983.

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correctly so, that if it could get the movement to spill into the other provinces, especially the Punjab, it would finally be able to topple Zia's military government. However, this is where the leadership of the MRD made a grave tactical mistake in that it did not objectively assess the political situation in the rest of the country, believing that the three other provinces would automatically come to the support of an issue which was generally perceived as provincial in character.

Ultimately the Punjabis failed to respond to the MRD's call for a popular uprising against the government. There were several reasons for this. First, the level of political consciousness among the population of the Punjab is relatively low compared to the Sindhis'. Consequently, Punjabis tend to become mobilized only over emotional issues, and the MRD's political slogans had very little appeal to the average Punjabi. Secondly, compounding the Punjabis' general apathy toward the MRD's call was the absence of well organized grassroot political infrastructures like the ones existing in Sind. This lack of developed political organizations in the Punjab was mainly the result of the PPP's (Pakistan People's Party) failure, after gaining power in 1971, to systematically mobilize and channel the Punjabi electorate into an organized political force.30 Thirdly, as opposed to the poor economic conditions of the rural Sindhis, the Punjabis have fared well for the last decade. Apart from the fact that there are better employment opportunities for Punjabis either in the private or public sectors, the single most important factor which has contributed to the improvement of their living standards is the remittances that migrants to the Middle East have sent back to their families. Since the beginning of the movement of migrant workers to the Middle East in the mid-1970s, the Punjabis have been by far the most dominant ethnic group to take advan- tage of this economic "bonanza.' '31 Therefore, considering the favourable economic conditions the Punjabis had been enjoying under Zia's government, it is not surprising that they were not responsive to the MRD's drive to topple the government;32 for not only were the political slogans coming from Sind increasingly loaded with secessionist overtones, thus weakening the MRD's credibility as a force wishing to restore democracy, but the Punjabis were certainly not interested in losing thousands of rupees worth of Middle East employment in exchange for imprisonment, fines and floggings.33

30 Interview [Mazhar Ali Khan, editor of Viewpoint, Lahore, 11 November 1983]. 31 For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see Ijaz Gilani, M. Fahim Khan and Munawar

Iqbal, "Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Middle-East and its Impact on the Domestic Economy," Research Report Series, no. 126, June 1981 (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics), p. 10.

32 It is for these same reasons that the Punjab failed to respond on a wide scale to the MRD's call for "peaceful opposition" to President Zia's government in August-September 1986 with the aim of forcing him to call mid-term elections.

33 K.B. Sayeed, "Pakistan in 1983: Internal Stresses more Serious than External Problems," Asian Survey, vol. xxiv, no. 2 (February 1984), p. 223.

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As with the Punjab, NWFP was at best lukewarm in its endorsement of the MRD movement. Similar factors which had inhibited the Punjabis from joining the unrest were present in NWFP: an ineffective PPP organization in the province; favourable economic conditions as a result of the large influx of remittances from the Middle East,34 the booming heroin trade, and the profitable commerce in smuggled goods; a monopoly in the national transportation industry which has had a beneficial effect in the Pukhtuns' integration in the national economy; large business interests in Karachi, where approximately one million Pukhtuns reside, which the large NWFP trading houses did not wish to jeopardize; influential positions in the civilian and military bureaucracies; and a satisfactory modus vivendi with the Punjabi elite who generally allowed them to have control over their own provincial affairs.35

Similarly, the Baluch, who generally sympathized with the Sindhi's plight, were also reluctant to join the movement against the government; however, this was not so much because they were ambivalent toward the government as they were suspicious of the MRD, and especially the PPP leadership. The Baluch had not forgotten that it was the previous PPP administration which had dismissed their elected provincial government and had sent the army into their province to crush the rebellious tribesmen. Although Bizenjo's Pakistan National Party had joined the MRD after Zia's August speech, what guarantee could the Baluch be given that if and when the PPP formed the next government the provinces would be granted provincial autonomy? Regardless of the type of government at the centre, the Punjabis would always be the dominant national force. Finally, the massive increase in development capital being spent in Baluchistan to improve the economic standards of the Baluch was an important inhibit- ing factor to the Baluch joining the 1983 unrest.

Therefore, as a consequence of the MRD's failure to muster the support of the other provinces, especially the Punjab's, for the overthrow of the government, the MRD-led movement was bound to collapse; for, histori- cally, it has been demonstrated that unless Lahore, the largest city of the Punjab, joins an anti-government uprising, as it did when Ayub and Bhutto were toppled, all opposition movements will falter and fail to achieve their objective. Moreover, on the military side, unlike the case of East Pakistan, it was relatively easy for the army to contain the Sind uprising because the geographical position of the province was such that the military logistics of the "operations" could easily be met without fear of external disruption.

34 In 1984 there were over three hundred thousand Pukhtuns in the Middle East. View- point, 27 December 1984, p. 25.

35 This was often repeated during interviews I had with Pukhtuns. Interview [Mian Mohammad Iqbal, President of the Frontier Province Muslim League (Pagara group), Peshawar, December 1983].

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Complementing the military approach to the termination of the Sind crisis, President Zia also pursued political and economic means for the resolution of the unrest. On the political front, Zia, who repeatedly stressed the need to find a political solution to the problem, decided to hold talks with the leaders of the banned political parties. However, Zia was very selective of the individuals with whom he was ready to negotiate a settle- ment of the crisis, since he emphasized his willingness to find a solution to the Sind situation in cooperation with only the "patriotic" elements. All other politicians, according to him, "were neither political nor patriotic, and subversion is their business."36 This meant that the government had discussions with only the fundamentalist Jama'at-i-Islami, the Muslim League and other political parties which had very little appeal in rural Sind. All other elements directly involved in the unrest, such as the PPP and SAT, were not consulted. Although a high-level committee of enquiry was established to investigate the reasons for the unrest, the consequence of the government's selective approach to negotiations was to further radical- ize the Sind movement, and to reinforce the Sindhis' feelings of having no institutional lines of communication open to them to let the government know their needs and wants.

Even though the government may have been willing to have direct discussions with the Sindhi politicians, it was well aware of the economic plight of rural Sindhis. Accordingly, it decided to significantly increase development funds to be allocated to the interior of the province. During the height of the unrest, the federal minister for Planning and Develop- ment declared that with the development funds Sind had been receiving since 1977 there was no validity in the Sindhis' accusations that their province was being neglected, for they were receiving more than their fair share, as calculated according to their ratio of the national population.37 He stated that in 1982 the government had opened 2,500 primary schools, which was significantly more than what had been done in the last thirty years. He also added that Rs 5.5 billion had been spent in the Sind provincial budget during the last five years which was twice as much as in the previous Five-Year Plan.38 Moreover, in the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-88) over Rs 15 billion, of which two-thirds would be directed to the rural areas, would be allocated to the development of Sind, which was six times as much as the pre-1977 level.39 Finally, the government decided to authorize the disbursement of Rs 270 million worth of loans for the farmers of the Larkana region, the heartland of Bhutto support in Sind.40

Although the government increased development funds for the interior

36 The Muslim, 7 October 1983. 37 The Pakistan Times, 14 November 1983. 38 Ibid. 39 The Muslim, 28 December 1983. 40 Dawn, 22 December 1983.

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of the province, most Sindhis still felt that their grievance had fallen on deaf ears, for the 1983 unrest had not only been a matter of economics, but also of political representation at the centre. This feeling of not having a voice in Islamabad was further compounded by the heavy presence of non-Sindhis not only in the urban areas but also in the interior. This fact of life, however, could not be corrected, regardless of the government in power, for it would mean having to evict non-Sindhi agriculturalists for the sake of assuaging Sindhi feelings, a political price no federal government could be expected to pay. It is an essential ingredient of the process of national integration that in any modernizing political system the demand for the sharing of power at the centre must be accompanied by a willingness to allow "foreigners" to share power at the local and provincial level. So, while Zia was able to contain the potentially explosive situation and survive the crisis with only minor consequences, such as the boycott of the local elections,4' the basic causes of the unrest were not, and still have not been, corrected, as the subsequent August-September 1986 disturbances, mainly restricted to Sind, clearly demonstrated.42

The government's most important institutional contribution has been the promulgation of the Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 1985 (RCO) which substantially altered the original 1973 Constitution. Although in the context of the role of Islam in the administration of the country and the increased powers of the president the RCO instituted major changes, in the field of centre-province relations it merely reinforced two political trends which have existed since independence: a further

TABLE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE MAJLIS-I-SHOORA

National Assembly Senate Total Punjab 128 19 147 Sind 50 19 69 NWFP 28 19 47 Baluchistan 13 19 32 F.A.T.A.* 8 8 16 Islamabad - 3 3 Minorities 10 - 10

237 87 324

* Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

41 The Economist, 8 October 1983, p. 41. 42 The Guardian Weekly, 24 August 1986. Although for different reasons, between October

1986 and February 1987, there were also widespread ethnic riots in Karachi which caused over 120 dead and 300 injured. This led to the government imposing intermittent and selective curfews in Karachi. These disturbances erupted following police raids on drug operations controlled by Pukhtuns and Afghan refugees. This led to the latter attacking Muhajirs, a community perceived as being closely allied with the Punjabi-dominated central government. Viewpoint, 26 February 1987, pp. 11-12.

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restriction on the province's autonomy and a continuation of the Punjab's domination at the centre.

The above table demonstrates what a dominant position the Punjab has in the parliament. In the National Assembly alone, it has an absolute majority. As for its numbers in the Majlis-i-Shoora, only relevant in a joint sitting of both houses, it would need only sixteen non-Punjabi votes to be able to defeat a bill if the Punjabi parliamentarians managed to vote en masse. Therefore, regardless of the type of bill presented, the Punjab will ultimately determine whether it will be passed, amended, or defeated. Bills relating to the Federal Legislative List, such as defense, external affairs, currency, federal public service, customs, national planning, and the Con- current Legislative List (which includes, among other things, criminal law, contracts, law and order, and population planning), may originate in either house. Once the bill is passed by the house in which it originated, it is sent to the other house, and if it is passed without amendment by the second house it will be presented to the president for assent. However, if the second house rejects or passes the bill with amendments, then the bill will be considered at a joint sitting (Arts. 70 & 71). On the other hand, all money bills may originate only in the National Assembly, and need not be sent to the Senate before being presented to the president for his assent (Art. 73). This legislative procedure, which undoubtedly favours the Punjab, already existed in the unaltered version of the 1973 Constitution.

Apart from federal legislative procedures, there are other important sections in the RCO which directly affect the provinces. First, after the end of President Zia's term of office in 1990, the president is to be elected by members of an electoral college consisting of the members of the Majlis-i- Shoora and the members of the provincial assemblies (Art. 41[3]); and the fact that the Punjab has such great numbers of parliamentarians will mean that it will have a dominant position in the selection of the chief executive.43 Secondly, as with the above case, the selection of the prime minister, a procedure which will come into force in March 1990, will essentially be determined by the Punjabi parliamentarians even if they decided not to vote en masse, since he will be elected by the majority of the National Assembly (Art. 91[3]). However, this procedure already existed prior to the amendment of the constitution. Thirdly, the governor of each province is to be appointed by the president in consultation with his prime minister (Art. 101[1]). This is significantly different from the method of appoint- ment which existed in the original 1973 Constitution; for previously it was the president who selected the governors, but "in accordance with the advice of the prime minister and such advice shall be binding on him" (Art.

43 The number of seats in the four provincial legislatures are: Punjab: 240; Sind: 100; NWFP: 80; Baluchistan: 40. Also, each assembly has 5 seats reserved for women and seats reserved for minorities, i.e., Punjab: 8; Sind: 9; NWFP: 3; Baluchistan: 3.

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48). Nevertheless, in both cases it is the centre which determines the selection of the governors. Fourthly, the governor will, subject to the president's approval, appoint the chief minister, dismiss the provincial cabinet which has lost the confidence of the provincial assembly, and dissolve the provincial assembly when an appeal to the electorate is necessary (Art. 105[1] [a] [b] [c]). This is probably the most important change in centre-province relations which the RCO introduced; since in the original 1973 Constitu- tion the chief minister was elected by a majority of the provincial assembly (Art. 131 [3]), could not be dismissed by the governor (Art. 134), and advised the governor as to when to dissolve the provincial assembly (Art. 112). However, following the passage of the Eighth Constitution (Amendment) Bill in October 1985, the chief minister will once again be elected by the members of the provincial assembly as of 1988. Finally, if there is disagree- ment over a matter which is enunciated in the Concurrent Legislative List, the federal parliament's authority will supersede provincial legislation (Art. 143), a procedure which already existed in the unaltered version of the 1973 Constitution.

In sum, in the field of centre-province relations the RCO further streng- thened the position of the Punjab vis-a-vis the other provinces, and increased the centre's powers to intervene in provincial affairs. These are certainly the most important criticisms which the smaller provinces have of the RCO; for, while the subsequent Eighth Constitution (Amendment) Bill slightly reduced the powers of the president in favour of the prime minister, they feel the RCO is merely another step in reinforcing the defacto unitary system of government Pakistan has had since 1947.

As a result of the government's ability to contain the opposition through economic, political and coercive means, the extra-parliamentary political parties have become divided, confused and ineffective in their opposition to Zia's government. A vivid proof of their ineffectiveness was exemplified in the failed 1983 uprising, in the population's rejection of the MRD's call for a massive boycott of the non-party-based legislative elections of 1985, in the willingness of middle and lower-ranking PPP members to participate in the 1985 elections, and in the MRD's inability to force the government to call mid-term elections by Autumn 1986. As well as co-opting ex-PPP politicians to its side,44 the government applied punitive actions against politicians who refused to abide by its directives. These included: the imprisonment and flogging of political leaders, restrictions on politicians' inter-provincial movements, and the "voluntary" exile of

44 Some of the most important of these PPP members included in the cabinets were: All Ahmad Talpur, Minister for Defence (23 August 1978-26 February 1985); Al-Haj Abbas Khan Abbasi, Minister for Religious and Minority Affairs (9 March 1981-15 March 1984); Raja Tridev Roy, Adviser for Minority Affairs (9 March 1981-26 February 1985); Malik Noor Hayat Khan Noon, Minister for Health, Special Education and Social Welfare (10 April 1985-28 January 1986); and Nasim Ahmad Aheer, Minister for Education (28 January 1986-present).

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the most troublesome opponents. And after the lifting of Martial Law it imprisoned politicians, including Benazir Bhutto, the co-chairperson of the PPP, who wished "to embarrass the present government.' 45 While these governmental tactics have had the effect of dividing the opposition regarding the strategy that would most effectively force the government to call mid-term elections before 1990, the MRD has nevertheless managed to present a common policy with regard to future centre-province relations under an elected civilian government. However, this major development came about only after the MRD leadership realized that the increasingly regional focus of the political parties threatened to erode further the coalition's rapidly diminishing effectiveness against the present government of President Zia.

Until August 1986, when the MRD adopted the Declaration on Provin- cial Autonomy, the majority of opposition parties, including the PPP, wanted to see a restoration of the 1973 Constitution as it stood before President Zia altered it by passing the RCO. The PPP leadership, especially Benazir Bhutto, whose father was the main architect of this constitution, believed that the 1973 Constitution adequately guaranteed provincial rights. In other words, it believed in a strong centre and a system of government which is for all intents and purposes unitary. It was this unyielding attitude regarding possible modification of the constitution in the field of provincial autonomy, coupled with the former PPP government's poor record in the realm of centre-province relations, which caused some members of the PPP and the MRD to question whether the original 1973 Constitution was still an appropriate document for the effective and equitable management of the country's ethnic problems. A brief examina- tion of the political parties' views about the ideal approach to centre- province relations will demonstrate the extent of the divisions within the MRD on this issue.

The range of constitutional proposals emanating from the opposition has virtually been as varied as the number of political parties. Air Marshal (Ret.) Asghar Khan, leader of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI), until recently the second largest party of the MRD,46 has stated that full and complete provincial autonomy must be granted, otherwise the country would continue to be plagued by centrifugal forces.47 This demand, which before the adoption of the MRD's Declaration was a departure from mainstream PPP ideology, seriously strained relations between Asghar Khan and the PPP leadership, a relationship which has always been at best tenuous considering the TI was one of the parties of the Pakistan National Alliance coali-

45 The Guardian Weekly, 7 September 1986. 46 The TI decided to leave the MRD in October 1986 on the premise that Benazir Bhutto

was reviving "Bhuttoism," an ideology which the TI believed was authoritarian and overwhelmingly rejected by the people. Viewpoint, 17 October 1986, p. 16.

47 The Muslim, 13 July 1985.

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tion which spearheaded the political uprising that toppled Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto in July 1977. On the other hand, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the Baluch leader of the Pakistan National Party (PNP), has gone a step further, and has been promoting the idea of a "loose" federation.48 His political arguments for demanding a loose federation are based on his belief that there is no such thing as a Pakistan nation, but instead there exist four nationalities. It is because of the presence of these four nationality groups that only a loose federation would be a viable solution, for, as Bizenjo stated, "you can occupy, suppress, but not create a nationality."49 This structural framework would, according to him, come closest to the spirit of the 1940 Lahore Resolution, the pact upon which the four provinces (and former East Pakistan) agreed to join the Muslim League's struggle on the understanding that they would be given full autonomy in the future state of Pakistan. Moreover, it is because Bizenjo squarely puts the blame for the deteriorating situation in the country on the Punjabis, and does not expect them to make any concessions regarding provincial autonomy, that he feels that only a loose federation can prevent the break- up of the country.50 Finally, along with the PNP, the Maoist-oriented National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Mazdoor Kisan Party,5' also members of the MRD, have announced that they no longer consider the restoration of the 1973 Constitution a political objective they should strive to attain; for they believe the constitution has "ceased to exist and now there should be fresh polls to elect a new constituent assembly."52

However, another serious development which the MRD, and especially the PPP, has been confronted with is the formation of the London-based Sindhi-Baluch-Pashtun-Front (SBPF), which was launched on 18 April 1985. The four most important leaders, Mumtaz Bhutto, a cousin of the late Z.A. Bhutto and a former PPP governor and chief minister of Sind; Hafiz Pirzada, a former cabinet minister in the PPP government; Ataullah Men- gal, former National Awami Party Chief Minister of Baluchistan; and the late Afzal Bangash,53 leader of the Marxist-oriented Mazdoor Kisan (Worker-Peasant) Party based in NWFP, are politicians from the three smaller provinces who are ostensibly disaffected with President Zia's approach to centre-province relations as well as with the PPP's "anti- national" outlook. They feel the PPP leadership has an identical "hostile disposition" toward the question of nationalities as do the military author-

48 S.S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), pp. 55-56.

49 The Muslim, 25 April 1984. 50 Harrison, op. cit., p. 56. 51 These two parties, along with the Awami Tehrik, merged in July 1986 to form the

Awami National Party. 52 The Muslim, 4 August 1985; Viewpoint, 19 June 1986, p. 17. 53 Afzal Bangash died on 29 October 1986.

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ities.54 The Front has only one objective: the establishment of a confederation. Its members believe that because of changed circumstances the 1973 Constitution is no longer appropriate for fulfilling the needs of the four nationalities that exist in Pakistan; instead, they advocate a totally decen- tralized system of government in which each nationality, i.e., the Sindhis, Baluch, Pukhtuns and Punjabis, would be equally represented at the centre. As outlined in the SBPF's "Constitutional Arrangement in a Con- federal Structure for Pakistan,"55 the centre, or the Republic as they call it, would have authority only over defense, foreign affairs, communications, currency, and arbitration powers in disputes between the states. However, the states would still be allowed to raise civilian militias and other law enforcing agencies. Moreover, the centre's authority over foreign affairs would "not entitle it to negotiate any foreign loans for the benefit of a state without prior concurrence of the state." Also, "foreign trade shall be conducted by the states within the framework of the foreign policy of the Republic" and "the accounts of foreign exchange earned by each state shall be separately maintained and utilised." There would be a president "elected by rotation from the states in alphabetical order for four years," but executive authority would be vested in the Council of Common Inter- ests (Cabinet) which would have equal representation from the states, as would be the case with the Senate and the judicial institutions. Finally, the composition, command, strength and operation of the armed forces would be subject to the strictest discipline, and during peacetime expenditure on defence would be limited to no more than 3 percent of GDP.

The leaders of the SBPF decided to strive for a confederation, which would be structured along the lines of the United Arab Emirates,56 because they felt that within the existing framework not only would the Punjab continue to dominate the country, but, since the Punjabis had failed to ensure the fair treatment of the smaller provinces, the minority provinces must struggle to achieve an equitable system as was originally promised in the 1940 Lahore Resolution.57 And, since the PPP until recently did not wish to change its position regarding provincial autonomy and still does not recognize the principle of nationalities, the PPP members of the SBPF have decided that because of this ideological conflict they would rather resign from the PPP than abandon the confederal idea.58 Finally, they have argued that in any case Z.A. Bhutto would have agreed with their stance, for his opposition to Ayub Khan's One-Unit Plan was "no different from the demand for confederation."59

54 The Muslim, 2 October 1985. 55 Viewpoint, 8 August 1985, pp. 15-16. 56 The Muslim, 13 April 1985. 57 The Muslim, 19 April 1985. 58 The Muslim, 2 October 1985; Viewpoint, 26 September 1985, p. 14, and 3 October 1985,

p. 16. 59 The Muslim, 30 September 1985.

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As was to be expected, the PPP's reaction to the formation of the Front was one of disbelief and shock; for these SBPF's "rebels" had played into the hands of General Zia's strategy of divide and rule, and had brought into the open the deep-seated divisions within the PPP. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Central Executive Committee of the PPP decided to expel them from the party. There were two reasons for evicting them from the PPP: first, the PPP constitution does not allow a member to also belong to another political party and, second, the SBPF's confederal scheme is contrary to PPP policy. The PPP members of the Front replied that if the PPP considered the SBPF a political organization, which Mumtaz Bhutto and Pirzada insisted it was not, then the whole of the PPP should stand dissolved for belonging to the MRD.60

These were the ostensible reasons for their dismissal from the party; the more plausible reasons were the personal and political rivalries which existed between, on the one hand, Mumtaz Bhutto and Pirzada, and, on the other hand, Benazir Bhutto and her associates. Mumtaz Bhutto, who belongs to a rival section of the Bhutto clan, and Pirzada never forgave Z.A. Bhutto's unilateral decision to nominate his wife and his daughter as the chairpersons of the PPP. Moreover, Mumtaz Bhutto and Pirzada were both eventually overshadowed by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi,6' a former chief minister of Sind, and Mustafa Khar, former governor and chief minister of the Punjab. This nepotism within the PPP was publicly denounced by Pirzada when he stated that "this central committee-a nominated body-is forcing a division."62

While Benazir Bhutto staunchly believes the "nationality" question in Pakistan will be permanently resolved only "once the vested interest groups are crushed" and "a truly democratic and socialist commonwealth" is established,63 objectives which she feels can be attained within the framework of the unaltered 1973 Constitution, she has nevertheless agreed to support the MRD's August 1986 Declaration on Provincial Autonomy. This does not mean that the PPP no longer believes in the effectiveness of the 1973 Constitution for the resolution of centre-province relations, however; rather, it should be viewed as a bold attempt to arrest the increasing inter- and intra-party divisions within the opposition coalition on this issue. The PPP leadership is only too well aware that ethnic nationalism

60 Viewpoint, 19 September 1985, p. 16. 61 Ironically, G.M. Jatoi has, since the formation of the Front, also split away from the PPP

to form the National People's Party on the grounds that Benazir Bhutto was an autocratic leader.

62 The Muslim, 30 September 1985. 63 Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan: The Gathering Storm (Dhaka: University Press, 1983), p. 82. It

is interesting to note that in this small book, in which she outlines the PPP's future political program if and when it comes to power, there is only one non-committal statement regarding the "nationality question," and no mention of Z.A. Bhutto's military response to Baluchis- tan's and NWFP's demands for greater provincial autonomy.

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directed against the Punjab is a threat not only to the government but also to the PPP whose ultimate heartland of support is the Punjab. Conse- quently, the PPP must demonstrate its trustworthiness on this issue of provincial autonomy, and dispel all fears of real or perceived Punjab domination under a future PPP government. Accordingly, it felt that it was certainly in its best self-interest to agree to commit itself to the Declaration which represented a major departure from the 1973 Constitution.

The Declaration on Provincial Autonomy which was adopted by the MRD's Action Committee stated that only four subjects, i.e., foreign policy, currency, communication and defense, would be the prerogative of the centre, and all other responsibilities would go to the provinces.64 Moreover, part and parcel of the Declaration is a commitment that when the alliance or any single party comes to power it will amend the constitution in order to fulfil the letter and spirit of the MRD's new policy on this issue. The most interesting aspect of the Declaration was the restriction placed upon the federal government for intervening in strictly provincial matters. Only in the event of an extraordinary situation developing in a province would the federal authorities be allowed to intervene, but if the Senate failed to endorse this intervention within thirty days it would cease to have legal effect. Similarly, a state of emergency in a province would be valid for only three months, unless the Senate approved its extension for another three months. After six months there were three possible scenarios: a return to the status quo ante, fresh elections, or a referendum in case the president wished to extend the state of emergency. During the state of emergency, legislative authority for the province would be the responsibility of a committee of senators from that province. These restrictions on the central government's right to interfere in provincial affairs were clearly intended to assuage Baluch's and Pukhtun's mistrust of the PPP; these two ethnic groups have not forgotten the way Z.A. Bhutto dismissed their elected provincial governments and sent the army into Baluchistan to quash a guerrilla insurgency.65

Also, of far-reaching consequence, if ever implemented, is the MRD's commitment "to have the armed forces restructured to reflect a truly federal structure,"66 In concrete terms, this would mean a drastic reduction of the Punjab's representation in the military in favour of Sind and Baluchistan, the NWFP already being equitably represented in the armed forces.67

64 For a discussion of the Declaration, see Viewpoint, 7 August 1986, p. 12. 65 For a perceptive article dealing with this issue, see Nader Entessar, "Baluch National-

ism," Asian Affairs, vol. 7, no. 2 (November-December 1979), pp. 95-104. 66 Viewpoint, 7 August 1986, p. 12. 67 While there are no official figures as to ethnic representation in the Pakistan armed

forces, the general consensus is that approximately 75 percent of recruits come from the Punjab, 20 percent from NWFP, and the rest from Baluchistan and Sind. For a discussion of this issue, see S.P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 40ff.

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Undoubtedly, this would be strongly resisted by the Punjabi military officers; for the military link has been a major factor that has permitted the Punjab to maintain a dominant position in the country since 1947. Moreover, not only would law and order and internal security matters be solely provincial responsibilities, but the provinces would be allowed to raise civil armed forces for that purpose. This development would certainly be opposed by the military as well, since this would threaten the armed forces' monopoly on the means of violence, a major element in its ability to suppress province-based ethnic dissent.

Although, according to Wilcox, "ideological commitment is a positive factor in national development, both politically and economically, because it maximises commitment to national goals,"68 the fact that President Zia has felt it necessary "to shove it down the throats of everybody,"69 has inevitably caused the population to react against it. And the main casualty of this Islamization program is the process of national integration; for Zia's policy of maintaining a tight control over provincial matters and institu- tionalizing this approach with the promulgation of the RCO increased the smaller provinces' demands for autonomy. However, the major factor that has intensified the centrifugal tendencies of the smaller provinces is the nature of the central government. Zia's government, although "civilian- ized" through the February 1985 non-party legislative elections, is still essentially a military-supported regime, and therefore its centralizing policies are even less acceptable to the smaller provinces. Moreover, the smaller provinces do not appreciate President Zia's blatant use of Islamic slogans to legitimize his policy of smothering ethnic dissent. They perceive the Islam- ization program as amounting to the "Punjabization" of Pakistan society. And this perception is virtually inevitable because of the Punjab's demo- graphic size and its dominant economic and political position in the country. Consequently, by failing to respond to the demands from the non-Punjabi ethnic groups, who erroneously see the Punjab as being monolithic, and increasing the centre's powers, the present administration has caused an increase in the centrifugal pull of the smaller provinces and has reinforced the ethnic polarization between, on the one hand, the Baluch, Sindhis and Pukhtuns, and, on the other, the Punjabis and muhajirs. As a result of this Islamization-cum-Punjabization process of Pakistan society, ethnic identification has increasingly replaced the Pakistan "nation" as a symbol of emotional loyalty.

It is in light of these circumstances, and with the objective of presenting the smaller provinces with an alternative approach that would assuage their feelings of alienation vis-a-vis the centre and the Punjab, that the

68 W.A. Wilcox, "Ideological Dilemma in Pakistan's Political Culture," in D.E. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 351.

69 "An Interview with General Zia-ul-Haq," The Muslim, 5 March 1985.

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extra-parliamentary opposition, and most significantly the PPP, decided to adopt a policy that represents a major departure from their traditional centralist approach to centre-province relations and which comes closest to the spirit and letter of the 1940 Lahore Resolution. However, just as essential to the PPP's change of mind on this issue was the feeling among the PPP leaders that unless they offered a radically different approach to centre-province relations, as was being offered by President Zia or the original 1973 Constitution, the PPP would lose its appeal in the smaller provinces. They were also determined to improve their poor image in the field of provincial autonomy; no one had forgotten the PPP government's heavy-handed approach to centre-province relations. Therefore, in a drive to downplay the changes introduced with the October 1985 Eighth Consti- tution (Amendment) Bill (which did partially trim the centre's powers but certainly did not herald fundamental changes in centre-province relations) and gain maximum political mileage out of the ethnic discontent, the PPP agreed to support the MRD's Declaration on Provincial Autonomy. Never- theless, notwithstanding the "political" motives for presenting this alternative approach, if in the future the parties of the MRD coalition are voted into power and honestly adhere to their newly-stated policy as outlined in the Declaration and manage to implement the promised constitutional changes, then the problem of centre-province relations will have come a step closer to being satisfactorily resolved.

Parliamentary Library, Canberra, February 1988

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