APPENDIX

i

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A Denial of Motion for Stay of Judgment(December 10, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . App. 1

Appendix B Denial of Motion for Rehearing inSupreme Court of Louisiana(December 9, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 4

Appendix C Supreme Court of Louisiana Opinion(October 20, 2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 6

Appendix D District Court Transcript fromHearing on Motion to Quash (October 30, 2019). . . . . . . . . . . . App. 46

Appendix E Bill of Information(April 10, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 64

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APPENDIX A

Supreme CourtSTATE OF LOUISIANA

New Orleans

[SEAL]

[Dated December 10, 2020]

CHIEF JUSTICEBERNETTE J. JOHNSON Seventh District

JUSTICESWILLIAM J. CRAIN First DistrictSCOTT J. CRICHTON Second DistrictJAMES T. GENOVESE Third District JAY B. MCCALLUM Fourth District JEFFERSON D. HUGHES III Fifth District JOHN L. WEIMER Sixth District

JOHN TARLTON OLIVIERCLERK OF COURT

400 Royal St., Suite 4200NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130-8102

TELEPHONE (504) 310-2300HOME PAGE http://www.lasc.org

December 10, 2020

Jeffrey Martin Landry,LOUISIANA DEPT OF JUSTICEP O Box 94005Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005

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Shae Gary McPhee, Jr.,1000 Delaronde St New Orleans, LA 70114

Elizabeth Baker Murrill,1885 N 3rd StBaton Rouge, LA 70802

Re: STATE OF LOUISIANA V. TAZINARDELL HILL2020-KA-00323

Dear Counsel:

This is to advise that the Court took the followingaction on your Opposed Motion for Stay of JudgmentPending Disposition in the United States SupremeCourt filed in the above-entitled matter.

Stay denied.

Johnson, C.J., not signing. Crain, J., would grant.

With kindest regards, I remain,

Very truly yours,

Theresa McCarthySecond Deputy Clerk

TM: TMccs: Michael J. Gregory

Keith A. Stutes Roya Renee Sadreddini Lafayette

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15th Judicial District Court: 160634 - Div:KPatrick L. Michot, Sr.

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APPENDIX B

The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana

No.2020-KA-00323

[Filed December 09, 2020]______________________________STATE OF LOUISIANA )

)VS. )

)TAZIN ARDELL HILL )______________________________)

------IN RE: State of Louisiana - Appellant Plaintiff;Applying for Rehearing, Parish of Lafayatte 15thJudicial District Court Number(s) 160634;

------

December 09, 2020

Application for rehearing denied.

BJJJLWJDHSJCJTG

Crain, J., would grant application for rehearing.McCallum, J., would grant application for rehearing.

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Supreme Court of LouisianaDecember 09, 2020

/s/ Clerk of CourtFor the Court

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APPENDIX C

Supreme Court of Louisiana

[Filed: October 20, 2020]

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE

NEWS RELEASE #041

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OFLOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 20th day ofOctober, 2020 are as follows:

BY Genovese, J.:

2020-KA-00323 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. TAZINARDELL HILL (Parish of Lafayette)

The district court’s declaration thatthe statutes are unconstitutional andthe district court’s ruling grantingdefendant’s motion to quash areaffirmed. AFFIRMED.

Retired Judge James Boddie, Jr.,appointed Justice pro tempore, sittingfor the vacancy in Louisiana SupremeCourt District 4.

Weimer, J., concurs and assignsreasons.Crain, J., dissents and assignsreasons.

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10/20/20

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2020-KA-0323

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TAZIN ARDELL HILL

ON APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTHJUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, FOR THE

PARISH OF LAFAYETTE

GENOVESE, J.*

This case involves the constitutionality of astatutory requirement that persons convicted of sexoffenses carry an identification card branded with thewords “SEX OFFENDER.” This obligation is includedas part of a comprehensive set of registration andnotification requirements imposed on sex offenders inLouisiana. Other states (and the federal government)have enacted similar collections of laws. However, thespecific requirement to carry a branded identificationcard distinguishes Louisiana from the rest of thecountry. Forty-one other states do not require anydesignation on the identification cards of sex offenders.

For the reasons below, we find that thisrequirement constitutes compelled speech and does notsurvive a First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis.

*Retired Judge James Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice pro tempore,sitting for the vacancy in Louisiana Supreme Court District 4.

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Thus, we uphold the trial court’s ruling striking thisspecific requirement as unconstitutional and quashingthe prosecution of defendant for altering hisidentification card to conceal the “SEX OFFENDER”designation.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 10, 2017, the state filed a bill ofinformation charging defendant, Tazin Ardell Hill, withaltering an official identification card to conceal hisdesignation as a registered sex offender, in violation ofLa. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C). Defendant pleaded not guiltyand filed a motion to quash, contending that La. R.S.40:1321(J) and 15:542.1.4(C) are unconstitutional.

Defendant argued that La. R.S. 40:1321(J) and15:542.1.4(C) violate the First Amendment1 prohibition against compelled speech. In response, thestate argued that defendant failed to meet his burdenof proof in challenging the constitutionality of thestatute. Additionally, the state alleged he lackedstanding to challenge the requirement that he carry hisbranded identification card, as he was charged insteadwith altering it—not failing to carry it. Furthermore,the state asserted the alteration of his identificationcard lacked First Amendment protection for threereasons: (1) the statute regulates conduct, not speech;(2) regardless of the classification of the statute,defendant’s actions fell outside of First Amendment

1 Defendant averred that the branded identification cardrequirements violated both the Louisiana and Federalconstitutions’ prohibitions against compelled speech; however, itis the Federal jurisprudence that will be primarily cited herein.

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protection because they constituted speech integral tocriminal conduct; and, (3) defendant actedfraudulently, and fraud is not protected speech.Additionally, the state argued the First Amendmentdid not permit him to engage in “self-help” by illegallyaltering the card. Finally, the state averred that, evenif a strict scrutiny analysis was required, it wassatisfied.

On October 30, 2019, the district court provided ashort statement quashing the state’s bill of informationagainst defendant and holding that La. R.S. 40:1321(J)and La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C) are facially unconstitutional.Specifically, the court stated:

I found the statute to be unconstitutional. [T]herequirement that the offender have “sexoffender” written on his official stateidentification is not the least restrictive way tofurther the State’s legitimate interest ofnotifying law enforcement. It could beaccomplished in the same way that some otherstates utilize. Louisiana could use more discreetlabels in the form of codes that are known to lawenforcement.

The state appealed.

DISCUSSION

Before we reach the merits of this case, we mustaddress certain preliminary issues. Specifically, wemust determine that the case is properly before this

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court2 and that defendant properly raised theconstitutionality of the statute in the court below.

Defendant properly challenged the constitutionality ofthe statutes in the court below.

This court has held “that a constitutional challengemay not be considered by an appellate court unless itwas properly pleaded and raised in the trial courtbelow.” State v. Hatton, 07-2377, p. 13 (La. 7/1/08), 985So.2d 709, 718. In Hatton, this court described thechallenger’s burden as a three-step analysis. “First, aparty must raise the unconstitutionality in the trialcourt; second, the unconstitutionality of a statute mustbe specially pleaded; and third, the grounds outliningthe basis of unconstitutionality must beparticularized.” Id., 07-2377, p. 14, 985 So.2d at 719.Defendant has met this burden in this case.

The statute requiring defendant to obtain and carry abranded identification card and the statute setting

forth the penalties for altering that card are sointerrelated as to be non-severable, thus allowingdefendant to challenge the constitutionality of the

obtain-and-carry provision of the statute although heis charged with altering the identification.

Next, we must determine whether La. R.S.15:542.1.4(C), which sets forth the penalties foraltering a branded identification card, is severable from

2 Pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 5(D), this case is directlyappealable to this court. The facts of the offense are not before thiscourt, as the trial court’s declaration of the statutes’unconstitutionality was made before trial.

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the obtain-and-carry provision found in La. R.S.40:1321(J). The severability of La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C) isimportant because it determines whether defendanthas standing to challenge the underlying obtain-and-carry provision found in La. R.S. 40:1321(J).

The state argues that a ruling on theconstitutionality of the obtain-and-carry provision isnot essential, as the state did not charge defendantwith violating the provision requiring him to obtainand carry a branded identification card. Instead, itcharged him with altering an official identificationdocument to conceal the designation that he is aregistered sex offender, in violation of La. R.S.15:542.1.4(C). Defendant counters that the statutes areso interrelated as to be non-severable, which affordsdefendant the standing to challenge the underlyingrequirement to carry a branded identification card.

As mentioned at the outset, defendant was chargedwith altering an official identification card to concealthe designation that he was a registered sex offender involition of La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C), which provides asfollows:

(1) Any person who either fails to meet therequirements of R.S. 32:412(I) orR.S. 40:1321(J), who is in possession of anydocument required by R.S. 32:412(I) or R.S.40:1321(J) that has been altered with the intentto defraud, or who is in possession of acounterfeit of any document required by R.S.32:412(I) or R.S. 40:1321(J), shall, on a firstconviction, be fined not more than one thousanddollars and imprisoned at hard labor for not less

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than two years nor more than ten years withoutbenefit of parole, probation, or suspension ofsentence.

The obtain-and-carry provision, La. R.S. 40:1321(J),states in its entirety:

(1) Any person required to register as a sexoffender with the Louisiana Bureau of CriminalIdentification and Information, as required byR.S. 15:542 et seq., shall obtain a specialidentification card issued by the Department ofPublic Safety and Corrections which shallcontain a restriction code declaring that theholder is a sex offender. This specialidentification card shall include the words “sexoffender” in all capital letters which are orangein color and shall be valid for a period of oneyear from the date of issuance. This specialidentification card shall be carried on the personat all times by the individual required to registeras a sex offender.

(2) Each person required to carry a specialidentification card pursuant to this Subsectionshall personally appear, annually, at a fieldoffice of the office of motor vehicles to renew hisor her special identification card[,] but only afterhe or she has registered as an offender pursuantto R.S. 15:542 et seq. Reregistration shall includethe submission of current information to thedepartment and the verification of thisinformation, which shall include the streetaddress and telephone number of the registrant;the name, street address and telephone number

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of the registrant’s employer[;], and, anyregistration information that may need to beverified by the bureau. No special identificationcard shall be issued or renewed until the office ofmotor vehicles receives confirmation from thebureau, electronically or by other means, thatthe reregistration of the sex offender has beencompleted.

(3) The provisions of this Subsection shall applyto all sex offenders required to register pursuantto R.S. 15:542 et seq., regardless of the date ofconviction.

(4) Whoever violates this Subsection shall befined not less than one hundred dollars and notmore than five hundred dollars, or imprisonedfor not more than six months, or both.

“The test for severability is whether theunconstitutional portions of the statute are sointerrelated and connected with the constitutionalparts that they cannot be separated without destroyingthe intention manifested by the legislature in passingthe act.” State v. Baxley, 93-2159 (La. 2/28/94), 633So.2d 142, 144–45 (quoting State v. Azar, 539 So.2d1222, 1226 (La.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 823, 110 S.Ct.82, 107 L.Ed.2d 48 (1989)).

Here, La. R.S. 40:1321(J) is not so distinct from La.R.S. 15:542.1.4(C) as to be severable. The state mustfirst prove as an element of the crime that defendant isrequired by La. R.S. 40:1321(J) or La. R.S. 32:412(I) tocarry an identification card branded with the word “sexoffender.” Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:542.1.4(C)

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applies only to people who are required to obtain andcarry the branded identification card and criminalizesa person’s failure to comply with this requirement.Because La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C) depends on the obtain-and-carry requirement for an understanding of itsmeaning, severing them would destroy the intentionmanifested by the legislature.

Having found that defendant satisfied the initialhurdles presented by his case, we now address themerits.

The requirement to carry a branded identificationcard constitutes compelled speech and does not

survive a strict scrutiny analysis.

A threshold question in assessing theconstitutionality3 of the branded-identification cardrequirement is determining whether this obligationamounts to government speech or compelled speech. Ifcompelled speech, the branded identification card facesstrict scrutiny. If government speech, the brandedidentification card faces little to no scrutiny. Thisanalysis necessarily involves a review of FirstAmendment jurisprudence as it relates to governmentspeech and compelled speech.

3 As a general matter, statutes are presumed constitutional, andany doubt is to be resolved in the statute’s favor. State v. Fleury,01-0871, p. 5 (La. 10/16/01), 799 So.2d 468, 472. “Constitutionalscrutiny favors the statute. Statutes are presumed to be valid, andthe constitutionality of a statute should be upheld wheneverpossible. State v. Brenner, 486 So.2d 101 (La.1986); State v. Rones,223 La. 839, 67 So.2d 99 (1953).” State v. Griffin, 495 So. 2d 1306,1308 (La. 1986).

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The First Amendment provides that “Congress shallmake no law... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.Const. Amend. I. The First Amendment protectsagainst prohibitions of speech, and also against laws orregulations that compel speech. “[T]he right of freedomof thought protected by the First Amendment againststate action includes both the right to speak freely andthe right to refrain from speaking at all. See Board ofEducation v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–634, 63 S.Ct.1178, 1182–1183, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943)[.]” Wooley v.Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1435, 51L.Ed.2d 752 (1977).

In Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of ConfederateVeterans, Inc., infra, the United States Supreme Courtannounced a three-factor analysis to identifygovernment speech. This framework considers (1) amedium’s history of communicating governmentalmessages, (2) the level of the public’s associationbetween that medium of speech and the government,and (3) the extent of the government’s control over themessage conveyed. In terms of how the Free SpeechClause affects government speech, the Walker courtfound as follows:

When government speaks, it is not barred by theFree Speech Clause from determining thecontent of what it says. Pleasant Grove City v.Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–468, 129 S.Ct.1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). That freedom inpart reflects the fact that it is the democraticelectoral process that first and foremost providesa check on government speech. See Board ofRegents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth,

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529 U.S. 217, 235, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d193 (2000). Thus, government statements (andgovernment actions and programs that take theform of speech) do not normally trigger the FirstAmendment rules designed to protect themarketplace of ideas. See Johanns v. LivestockMarketing Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 559, 125 S.Ct.2055, 161 L.Ed.2d 896 (2005). Instead, the FreeSpeech Clause helps produce informed opinionsamong members of the public, who are then ableto influence the choices of a government that,through words and deeds, will reflect itselectoral mandate. See Stromberg v. California,283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117(1931) (observing that “our constitutionalsystem” seeks to maintain “the opportunity forfree political discussion to the end thatgovernment may be responsive to the will of thepeople”).

Walker, 576 U.S. 200, 207, 135 S.Ct. 2239, 2245–46,192 L.Ed.2d 274 (2015). Nevertheless, the ability of thegovernment to express itself is not without restriction,as other constitutional and statutory provisions maylimit government speech.

The Free Speech Clause itself may constraingovernment speech—for instance, in seeking to compelprivate persons to “convey the government’s speech.”Id., 576 U.S. at 208, 135 S.Ct. at 2246. “But, as ageneral matter, when the government speaks[,] it isentitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or totake a position. In doing so, it represents its citizensand it carries out its duties on their behalf.” Id.

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The state asserts the obtain-and-carry provisionamounts to permissible government speech notregulated by the First Amendment for three primaryreasons: (1) defendant is not required to publicallydisplay his state identification card “like a billboard;”(2) people viewing defendant’s state identification cardare unlikely to conclude that defendant endorses themessage “sex offender”; and, (3) requiring defendant toreport basic facts on his state identification (includingthat he is a sex offender) is necessary to conductessential operations of government. The state alsoargues that while people may be embarrassed aboutsome information on their license, like their age orweight, this court has explained that “an imposition ofrestrictive measures on sex offenders adjudged to bedangerous is ‘a legitimate nonpunitive governmentalobjective and has been historically so regarded.’” Statev. Trosclair, 11-2302, p. 13 (La. 5/8/12), 89 So.3d 340,349 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93, 123 S.Ct.1140, 1147, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003)).

We do not find the state’s arguments persuasive. InBarnette, supra, the United States Supreme Courtfound that the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses couldnot be compelled by the school board to salute the flagand to pledge allegiance at school without violating theFirst Amendment. About 30 years later, Barnette wascited in the analysis in Wooley v. Maynard, supra,wherein the United States Supreme Court found thata Jehovah’s Witness driver in New Hampshire couldnot be punished by the state for repeatedly obscuringthe state motto “Live Free or Die” on his license plate.Maynard was found guilty in state court of violating amisdemeanor statute on three separate charges. He

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refused to pay the mandated fines, which resulted in 15days in jail. Maynard and his wife then brought anaction to enjoin the state from arresting andprosecuting them in the future. Ultimately, the UnitedStates Supreme Court held that the state could not“constitutionally require an individual to participate inthe dissemination of an ideological message bydisplaying it on his private property in a manner andfor the express purpose that it be observed and read bythe public.” Id., 430 U.S. at 713, 97 S.Ct. at 1434–35.Furthermore “‘persons who observe’ designs on IDs‘routinely—and reasonably—interpret them asconveying some message on the [issuer’s] behalf.’”Walker, 576 U.S. at 212, 135 S.Ct. at 2249 (quotingSummum, 555 U.S. at 471, 129 S.Ct. at 1133). Whilethe Supreme Court did not identify its standard ofreview, it clearly applied strict scrutiny to find that thedriver could not be compelled by the government todisplay an ideological message with which hedisagreed.

However, compelled speech (or compelled silence)does not turn simply on whether an ideologicalmessage is at issue. In Riley v. National Federation ofthe Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 108S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988), the Supreme Courtleft the realm of the political and the religious andexpanded its compelled speech doctrine to the realm offacts. Specifically, the United States Supreme Courtnoted that Wooley, amongst other cases, could not bedistinguished simply because they involved compelledstatements of opinion, while Riley dealt with compelledstatements of fact: “[E]ither form of compulsionburdens protected speech.” Riley, 487 U.S. at 797–98,

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108 S.Ct. at 2678. While analyzing North Carolina’scontent-based regulation governing the solicitation ofcharitable contributions by professional fundraisers,the United States Supreme Court noted:

Thus, we would not immunize a law requiring aspeaker favoring a particular governmentproject to state at the outset of every address theaverage cost overruns in similar projects, or alaw requiring a speaker favoring an incumbentcandidate to state during every solicitation thatcandidate’s recent travel budget. Although theforegoing factual information might be relevantto the listener, and, in the latter case, couldencourage or discourage the listener frommaking a political donation, a law compelling itsdisclosure would clearly and substantiallyburden the protected speech.

Id., 487 U.S. at 798, 108 S.Ct. at 2678. It furtherobserved, “[m]andating speech that a speaker wouldnot otherwise make necessarily alters the content ofthe speech.” Id., 487 U.S. at 795, 108 S.Ct. at 2677.Thus, the court found that the North Carolina content-based regulation, wherein the state had adopted a“prophylactic rule of compelled speech, applicable to allprofessional solicitations[,]” was subject to exactingFirst Amendment scrutiny. Id., 487 U.S. at 798, 108S.Ct. at 2678. Ultimately, the court concluded thestate’s interest in the importance of “informing donorshow the money they contribute is spent to dispel thealleged misperception that the money they give toprofessional fundraisers goes in greater-than-actualproportion to benefit charity” was not as weighty as the

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state asserted. Id. Additionally, the chosen means toaccomplish it was unduly burdensome and notnarrowly tailored, as the state’s interest was notsufficiently related to a percentage-based test and notsufficiently tailored to such interests. Id. Governmentregulation of speech “must be measured in minimums,not maximums.” Id., 487 U.S. at 790, 108 S.Ct. at 2674.Therefore, the court found the regulation infringedupon freedom of speech.

In Walker, supra, the United States Supreme Courtobserved that “specialty license plates issued pursuantto Texas’s statutory scheme conveyed governmentspeech.” Walker, 576 U.S. at 208, 135 S.Ct. at 2246.Relying on its analysis from Summum, the court firstnoted that, “the history of license plates shows that,insofar as license plates have conveyed more than statenames and vehicle identification numbers, they longhave communicated messages from the States.” Walker,576 U.S. at 210–11, 135 S.Ct. at 2248. Furthermore,the “Texas license plates designs ‘are often closelyidentified in the public mind with the [State].’” Id., 576U.S. at 212, 135 S.Ct. at 2248 (quoting Summum, 555U.S. at 472, 129 S.Ct. at 1133). The plates serve thegovernmental purpose of vehicle registration andidentification, and the governmental nature is clearfrom their faces. Id. Further, Texas requires all vehicleowners to display license plates, Texas issues everylicense plate, and Texas owns the designs (includingthe patterns and designs proposed by organizationsand private individuals). Id. Texas even dictates theprocedure for disposing of them. Id. Thus, “Texaslicense plates are, essentially, government IDs. Andissuers of ID ‘typically do not permit’ the placement on

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their IDs of ‘message[s] with which they do not wish tobe associated.’” Id., 576 U.S. at 212, 135 S.Ct. at 2249(citing Summan, supra, at 471, 129 S.Ct. at 1133). Thecourt noted that Texas “maintains direct control overthe messages conveyed on its specialty plates[,]”allowing Texas to choose how to present itself and itsconstituency. Id., 576 U.S. at 213, 135 S.Ct. at 2249.The court also noted that there are other features onthe Texas specialty license plates that also indicatethat the message conveyed by those designs is conveyedon behalf of the government. Texas selects each design,and presents these designs on “government-mandated,government-controlled, and government-issued IDsthat have traditionally been used as a medium forgovernment speech.” Id., 576 U.S. at 214, 135 S.Ct. at2250. Furthermore, it also places the designs directlybelow the large letters identifying “Texas” as the issuerof the IDs. “The [designs] that are accepted, therefore,are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying agovernment message, and they thus constitutegovernment speech.” Id., 576 U.S. at 214, 135 S.Ct.at2250 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 472, 129 S.Ct. at1134).

However, the United States Supreme Court alsoexplicitly noted that its “determination that Texas’sspecialty license plate designs are government speechdoes not mean that the designs do not also implicatethe free speech rights of private persons. We haveacknowledged that drivers who display a State’sselected license plate designs convey the messagescommunicated through those designs.” Id., 576 U.S. at219, 135 S.Ct. at 2252 (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717

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n.15, 97 S.Ct. at 1436). Furthermore, the courtrecognized the following:

[W]e have recognized that the First Amendmentstringently limits a State’s authority to compela private party to express a view with which theprivate party disagrees. But here, compelledprivate speech is not at issue. And just as Texascannot require SCV to convey ‘the State’sideological message,’ SCV cannot force Texas toinclude a Confederate battle flag on its specialtylicense plates.

Id., 576 U.S. at 219, 135 S.Ct. at 2253 (citationsomitted).

Thus, while license plate designs are governmentspeech, it is possible that government speech canimplicate private speech interests. Returning toWooley, the issue was whether the government’smessage is “readily associated” with the private personcompelled to propound it. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 n.15,97 S.Ct. at 1436. Even more so than a license plate ona car, an identification card is personalized to such anextent that it is readily associated with the bearer.4

4 Additionally, the Wooley court noted that currency differs insignificant respects from an automobile. Currency, while passedfrom hand to hand, is not as readily associated with its operator,like an automobile. Thus, while “[c]urrency is generally carried ina purse or pocket and need not be displayed to the public[,]” [and]“[t]he bearer of currency is thus not required to publicly advertisethe national motto,” it differs in significant respects from apersonal identification card as well. Id. Although not displayed as

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We find instructive a recent ruling by a federaldistrict court in Alabama, which determined that abranded-identification requirement unconstitutionallycompels speech. The ruling in Doe 1 v. Marshall, 367F.Supp.3d 1310 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 11, 2019), pertained tothe Alabama Sex Offender Registration andCommunity Notification Act (“ASORCNA” or “the Act”),which applied to adult offenders convicted of any of 33infractions designated as sex offenses under Alabamalaw. There, a sex offender must abide by certainregistration and notification requirements and mustcarry a branded identification card. Those registrant-specific identifications must bear the inscription“criminal sex offender” in bold, red letters, whichenable law enforcement to identify the licensee as a sexoffender.

In February 2019, the Alabama court grantedsummary judgment for the plaintiffs on the as-appliedcompelled speech challenge, declaring that the brandedidentification requirement under Alabama law wasunconstitutional under the First Amendment. Itspecifically found that the branded identificationrequirement unnecessarily compels speech, and it wasnot the least restrictive means of advancing acompelling state interest. Id. at 1324. The court, citingto Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 949–51 (10thCir. 2015), observed there was a four-part test todetermine whether the state has compelled speech.“There must be (1) speech; (2) to which the plaintiff

prominently as a billboard or a license plate, an identification cardis not as pervasive yet unnoticed as currency either, and oftenmust be displayed to handle every day, mundane duties.

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objects; (3) that is compelled; and[,] (4) that is readilyassociated with the plaintiff.” Id. The court found allfour elements were satisfied. Id.

First, comparing the words “criminal sex offender”to the “Live Free or Die” license plate in Wooley, supra,the court found there was speech. Id. The court furtherobserved that while the branded identification cardsinvolved government speech, that designation did notimmunize it from a compelled speech analysis. Whileno one can force the state to print a specific design ona license plate, like in Walker, supra, neither can thestate force someone to display a certain message ontheir license plate, like in Wooley. Id. at 1325.

Next, the Doe I court recognized that the plaintiffsstrongly objected to the message on their identificationcard, but they were compelled to display the message.Carrying and displaying identification is a virtualnecessity in contemporary society; and, thus, the courtfound the branded identification comparable to Wooley,where a license plate is both required by the state andrequired to be displayed to others. Id. Furthermore, themessage on the branded identification card isassociated with the plaintiffs, as the cards are “chock-full of Plaintiffs’ personal information[.]” Id. at 1326.Additionally, much like how Maynard in Wooley wasassociated with his vehicle, the plaintiffs here wereassociated with their drivers licenses. The court noted,“[t]he dirty looks that Plaintiffs get are not directed atthe State.” Id. The court also differentiated betweenidentification cards and currency, as a person is notidentified with their currency, which is not displayed,but rather exchanged. Identification cards are

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personalized and never meant to be given away, unlikecurrency. Id.

The Doe I court determined that the brandedidentification requirement compelled speech andimposed a content-based regulation on speech;therefore, the requirement must pass strict scrutiny.Id. While noting that the state has a compellinginterest in identifying a person as a sex offender, itfound that Alabama had not adopted the leastrestrictive means of doing so, such as using a singleletter that law enforcement would know but thegeneral public would not, and therefore it went beyondwhat was necessary to achieve that interest. Id. at1326–27. Thus, the court found the statute, as appliedby the state, unconstitutional. Id.

Also noteworthy is the case from the northerndistrict of California, which is helpful in our analysis.That case pertained to the International Megan’s Law(“IML”) codified in 34 U.S.C. § 21501 et seq., requiringthat passports issued to sex offenders convicted of a sexoffense against a minor display a unique identifierindicating the bearer’s conviction. Doe v. Kerry, No. 16-cv-0654-PJH, 2016 WL 5339804 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23,2016). The plaintiffs in that case challenged both the“passport identifier” and “notification” provisions, thelatter pertaining to international travel plans thatrequired individuals to report their future travel plans21 days in advance of international travel. Under theprocedures that existed at the time, a sex offendercould travel to one country, but then travel from thatdestination to another country without detection byU.S. authorities, and the “IML prevents such offenders

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‘from thwarting I[ML] notification procedures bycountry hopping to an alternative destination notpreviously disclosed,’ by directing the StateDepartment to ‘develop a passport identifier’ thatwould allow such individuals to be identified once theyarrive at their true destination.” See id. at 5 (citing 162Cong. Rec. H390 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2016) (statement ofRep. Smith)).

Once an individual was determined to be aconvicted sex offender, the Secretary of State would notissue a passport to them unless it included a “uniqueidentifier” and could revoke passports issued withoutsuch an identifier. In this case, however, the uniqueidentifier to be used had not been determined at thetime of the suit, and therefore the court found that theplaintiffs had failed to establish standing, as the casewas not ripe for consideration.

Nonetheless, the Kerry court did briefly address thecompelled speech claims and noted that a Federal Ruleof Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal would beappropriate, as the passport identifier would constitutegovernment speech, and not speech by the individualpassport holder. The court noted the governmentcontrols every aspect of its issuance and appearance,and that a passport is a government-issued document.The court even specifically noted that, “[t]he function ofa passport is to serve as a ‘letter of introduction inwhich the issuing sovereign vouches for the bearer andrequests other sovereigns to aid the bearer’ and as a‘travel control document’ representing ‘proof of identityand proof of allegiance to the U.S.’” Id. at 16 (quotingHaig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292–93 (1981)). Even while

App. 27

in the passport holder’s hands, a passport remainsgovernment property and must be surrendered upondemand. Furthermore, individuals have no editorialcontrol over the information in the passport, and onlythe U.S. government may amend passports. Criminalpenalties are imposed upon those who mutilate or alterthem. Id. at 17. Ultimately, the court found that thepassport identifier constituted government speech, andtherefore, the “unique identifier” requirement did notimplicate First Amendment interests, as the FreeSpeech Clause limits government regulation of speechthat is considered private, but does not regulategovernment speech. Id. at 18. Further, a passportcommunicates information on behalf of the issuinggovernment, not the passport holder. The court statedthat “[i]f federal law permitted individuals tocommunicate their own messages in their passports, orcontrol the information that passports contain, thosedocuments would cease to function as reliablegovernment-issued identification.” Id.

The Kerry court differentiated the Kerry case fromthe Wooley jurisprudence by stating that those“involved government speech containing an ‘ideologicalmessage’ or a political position which implicated theFirst Amendment because the government’s point ofview would be attributed to—or deemed to be endorsedby—the private party.” Id. The court found the yet-to-be-determined mark on the passport was a statementof fact to be placed by the government—who can speakfor itself—on the passport and did not communicateany ideological or political message. Id. The courtfurther noted that registered sex offenders had had theopportunity to challenge criminal charges, and that a

App. 28

person would not reasonably interpret the identifier toconvey agreement with the government’s opinion of sextrafficking. Id. Additionally, while the court noted thatin some cases, the compulsion of “factual” speech maybe unconstitutional, citing to Riley, supra, itdetermined that “those cases are distinguishablebecause the laws or regulations at issue required thespeaker to communicate the government’s messagerelating to controversial social or political issues, notmere facts relating to criminal convictions.” Id.Ultimately the court found that, “contrary to plaintiffs’arguments, the identifier is not a public communicationand will not even be displayed to the public. The U.S.passport itself is not speech, and the passport identifierdoes not suggest or imply that the passport holder hasadopted or is sponsoring an ideological or political pointof view.” Id.

Bringing the analysis back to the facts of this case,we are faced with the question of whether Louisiana’sidentification more like a license plate, which can be ahybrid of compelled and government speech, or morelike a passport, which at least one federal district courtruled is government speech that is immune to thereach of the First Amendment. Defendant clearlyobjects to showing others an identification that reads“SEX OFFENDER” in big orange letters because of thesocial consequences of that message rather than forreligious or political reasons. The federal districtcourt’s opinion in California with regard to passportsnotwithstanding, Walker, supra, suggests that if thegovernment compels private persons to regularlyconvey its chosen speech, the government forfeits the

App. 29

deference it is normally afforded under the governmentspeech doctrine.

Thus, we find the attempt by the Kerry court todistinguish the facts of that case from the Rileyjurisprudence unpersuasive, as Riley did notdifferentiate between statements of facts that relate tocontroversial or political facts, as opposed to simplyfacts. Like in Wooley where the government-issuedlicense plate read “Live Free or Die,” the identificationcard branded with “sex offender” is speech. The factthat a license plate was found to be government speechdid not immunize it from a compelled speech analysis.Thus, even though an identification card is governmentspeech, a compelled speech analysis may still berequired. While Wooley involved an ideologicalstatement, Riley observed that cases cannot be differentiated on whether they turn on compelledstatements of opinion or on compelled statements offact. Further, the First Amendment does not turn onwhether a person is speaking or being forced to speak,rather than remaining silent. While no one can forcethe state to print a certain design on its license plate,like in Walker, neither can the state force someone todisplay a particular message on his or her license plateeither, like in Wooley.

Notably, the state also argues that requiringdefendant to report basic facts on his stateidentification card is necessary to conduct essentialoperations of government. In other cases, the courtshave more explicitly addressed compelled speech whenit pertains to essential government operations. InUnited States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 1995), the

App. 30

federal Eighth Circuit rejected a claim that compelleddisclosure of information on an IRS form was unlawfulcompelled speech: “There is no right to refrain fromspeaking when ‘essential operations of governmentrequire it for the preservation of an orderly society—asin the case of compulsion to give evidence in court.’” Id.at 878 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1189, 87L.Ed. 1628 (1943)).

In addition, in United States v. Arnold, 740 F.3d1032 (5th Cir. 2014), the federal Fifth Circuit found theregistration requirements of the Sex OffenderRegistration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) did notcompel speech in violation of the First Amendment.There, the court noted that in 2011, Arnold moved fromMarshall County, Mississippi, to Tennessee, but did notnotify Marshall County of his move, update hisregistration with Mississippi, or register as a sexoffender in Tennessee. While observing that Arnold hadnot urged that SORNA either requires him (a) to affirma religious, political, or ideological belief he disagreeswith, or (b) to be a moving billboard for a governmentalideological message, the court noted that it appearedCongress enacted SORNA as a means to protect thepublic from sex offenders by providing a uniformmechanism to identify those convicted of certaincrimes.

However, Sindel pertains to information providedsolely to the government, and Arnold concernedSORNA’s requirement that sex offenders register theirresidence. In Riley, the Supreme Court noted that thestate may itself publish the detailed financial

App. 31

disclosure forms it requires professional fundraisers tofile. This specific procedure “would communicate thedesired information to the public without burdening aspeaker with unwanted speech [.]” Riley, 487 U.S. at800, 108 S.Ct. at 2679. The court suggested the statecould “vigorously enforce” its antifraud laws, and thesemore narrowly tailored rules were “[i]n keeping withthe First Amendment directive that government notdictate the content of speech absent compellingnecessity, and then, only by means precisely tailored.”Id. 487 U.S. at 800, 108 S.Ct. at 2679–80.

Returning to Wooley, the Supreme Court analyzedwhether the state’s countervailing interest wassufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees todisplay the state motto on their license plates. There,the state argued that the display of the motto(1) facilitated the identification of passenger vehicles;and (2) promoted appreciation of history,individualism, and state pride. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716,97 S.Ct. at 1436. The court found that even if thegovernment’s purpose in requiring them to display theplate was “legitimate and substantial, that purposecannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can bemore narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislativeabridgment must be viewed in the light of less drasticmeans for achieving the same basic purpose.” Id., 430U.S.at 716–17, 97 S.Ct. at 1436 (quoting Shelton v.Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d231 (1960).

Here, defendant is not just required to register hisresidence, nor solely to provide information to the

App. 32

government. Defendant is instead also required todisplay the words “sex offender” on his identificationcard. In performing everyday tasks, he will have toshow that identification card to the public. Thatidentification card is branded with the words “sexoffender,” and, along with his name, picture, address,and other identifying characteristics, that brandedidentification card is “readily associated” with him.Wooley, supra. Further, a state identification card isnot like a passport or currency. Passports are notroutinely viewed by the public, and they serve as a“letter of introduction in which the issuing sovereignvouches for the bearer and requests other sovereigns toaid the bearer” and as a “travel control document.”Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292–93 (1981). Whilecurrency may have the words “In God We Trust”printed on it, that message is not personalized, as isthe case with an identification card. Furthermore,currency is simply exchanged, as the currency passesthrough many hands. Identification cards, on the otherhand, are proof of identity and are frequently displayedfor examination by a cashier, bank teller, grocery storeclerk, new employer, or for air travel, hotelregistration, and so forth.

The branded identification card is compelled speech,and it is a content-based regulation of speech thatconsequently must pass strict scrutiny. While the statecertainly has a compelling interest in protecting thepublic and enabling law enforcement to identify aperson as a sex offender, Louisiana has not adopted theleast restrictive means of doing so. A symbol, code, ora letter designation would inform law enforcement thatthey are dealing with a sex offender and thereby reduce

App. 33

the unnecessary disclosure to others during everydaytasks. The sex offender registry and notification isavailable to those who have a need to seek out thatinformation, while also not unnecessarily requiringdisclosing that information to others via a brandedidentification. As Louisiana has not used the leastrestrictive means of advancing its otherwise compellinginterest, the branded identification requirement isunconstitutional.

The state’s final argument is that defendant’salteration of his identification card is fraudulentconduct, which is not protected by the FirstAmendment. The state cites United States v. O’Brien,391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.672 (1968), insupport of this assertion; however, we do not find thestate’s argument persuasive.

In O’Brien, the Supreme Court addressed a 1965Amendment concerning Selective Service registrationcertificates, which “subject[ed] to criminal liability notonly one who ‘forges, alters, or in any mannerchanges[,]’ but also one who ‘knowingly destroys (or)knowingly mutilates’ a certificate.” Id., 391 U.S. at 375,88 S.Ct. at 1678. The Supreme Court stated thegovernment had a substantial interest in assuring thecontinuing availability of issued Selective Servicecertificates, the 1965 Amendment specifically protectedthat interest, and the court “perceive[d] no alternativemeans that would more precisely and narrowly assurethe continuing availability of issued Selective Servicecertificates than a law which prohibits their willfulmutilation or destruction.” Id., 391 U.S. at 381, 88S.Ct. at 1681. Specifically, the Supreme Court noted:

App. 34

The governmental interest and the scope of the1965 Amendment are limited to preventingharm to the smooth and efficient functioning ofthe Selective Service System. When O’Briendeliberately rendered unavailable hisregistration certificate, he willfully frustratedthis governmental interest. For thisnoncommunicative impact of his conduct, and fornothing else, he was convicted.

Id., 391 U.S. at 382, 88 S.Ct. at 1681–82. However, thecourt differentiated this case from ones “where thealleged governmental interest in regulating conductarises in some measure because the communicationallegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to beharmful.” Id. As an example, the court cited toStromberg, supra, noting, “this Court struck down astatutory phrase which punished people who expressedtheir ‘opposition to organized government’ bydisplaying ‘any flag, badge, banner, or device.’ Sincethe statute there was aimed at suppressing communication[,] it could not be sustained as aregulation of noncommunicative conduct.” O’Brien, 391U.S. at 382, 88 S.Ct. at 1682.

We find Wooley, supra, to be more applicable thanO’Brien, supra. In Wooley, Maynard repeatedly coveredthe motto “Live Free or Die” on his license plate, and,in response, was repeatedly charged with and convictedof a misdemeanor offense that prohibited obscuring theletters on a license plate. The court declared thestatute unconstitutional and enjoined New Hampshirefrom enforcing it on the grounds that forcing theirresidents to display the state motto violated their First

App. 35

Amendment rights. Similarly, we find that thedesignation on the identification card is compelledspeech, and a similar result must follow. This outcomeis in contrast with the O’Brien ruling, wherein theSupreme Court found the governmental interest andthe scope of the 1965 Amendment were limited topreventing harm to the Selective Service System. WhenO’Brien deliberately rendered his registrationcertificate unavailable, he willfully frustrated thisgovernmental interest. Additionally, “[f]or thisnoncommunicative impact of his conduct, and fornothing else, he was convicted.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at382, 88 S.Ct. at 1682. However, in the instant case,because it compels speech, the identificationrequirement is a content-based regulation of speech,which targets speech based on its communicativecontent.

Furthermore, this requirement cannot be severedfrom the rest of the statute. As discussed above, La.R.S. 40:1321(J) is not distinct from La. R.S.15:542.1.4(C). The statute which defendant wascharged under, La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C), specificallystates “[a]ny person who either fails to meet therequirements of La. R.S. 32:412(I) or La. R.S.40:1321(J), who is in possession of any documentrequired by La. R.S. 32:412(I) or La. R.S. 40:1321(J)that has been altered . . . .” Thus, in order to convictdefendant of violating La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C), the statemust first prove as an element of the crime that he isrequired by La. R.S. 40:1321(J) or La. R.S. 32:412(I) tocarry an identification card branded with the words,“sex offender.” Therefore, the statute still requiresunconstitutional compelled speech, and this

App. 36

requirement cannot be severed from the rest of thestatute. The statutes are intertwined so that we cannotsimply strike the provision requiring sex offenders tohave “sex offender” written on their identification card.Otherwise, the meaning of that statute is lost.However, the state has an alternative methoddiscussed herein for preventing fraud, through otherprovisions in the Louisiana Revised Statutes thatprohibit altering a government identification generally.See La. R.S. 14:70.7; 40:1131. Thus, the state still hasa content-neutral way to prevent fraudulently alteringidentification cards.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the district court did not err when itdeclared La. R.S. 40:1321(J) and La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C)unconstitutional. The statute that defendant wascharged under, La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C), cannot besevered from La. R.S. 40:1321(J), because in order toprosecute defendant under La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C), thestate must first prove as an element of the crime thathe is required by La. R.S. 40:1321(J) or La. R.S.32:412(I) to carry an identification card branded withthe word, “sex offender.” Furthermore, the brandedidentification card is compelled speech. As a content-based regulation of speech, it must pass strict scrutiny.While the state certainly has a compelling interest inprotecting the public and enabling law enforcement toidentify a person as a sex offender, Louisiana has notadopted the least restrictive means of doing so. AsLouisiana has not used the least restrictive means ofadvancing its otherwise compelling interest, thebranded identification card requirement is

App. 37

unconstitutional. Nor does the inclusion of fraud as anelement of La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C) salvage the statute,as the statute’s requirement that defendant carry thebranded identification card cannot be severed from theremainder of the statute. However, the state has acontent-neutral way to prevent fraudulently alteringidentification cards, through other provisions in theLouisiana Revised Statutes which prohibit altering agovernment identification generally. See La. R.S.14:70.7; 40:1131.

DECREE

The district court’s declaration that the statutes areunconstitutional and the district court’s ruling grantingdefendant’s motion to quash are affirmed.AFFIRMED.

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10/20/20

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2020-KA-0323

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TAZIN ARDELL HILL

On Appeal from the Fifteenth Judicial District Court,Parish of Lafayette

WEIMER, J., concurring.

I agree with the majority’s determination that thebranded identification card required by La. R.S.40:1321(J) and La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(C) is compelledspeech and, as content-based regulation of speech, willsurvive constitutional analysis only if it passes thestrict scrutiny test. I write separately to emphasize thefailure of the state, on the present record, to meet itsevidentiary burden under a strict scrutiny analysis.

As set forth in detail in In re Warner, 05-1303 (La.4/17/09), 21 So.3d 218, which is another decision of thiscourt addressing the constitutionality of a rule effectinga content-based regulation of speech, the strict scrutinyanalysis involves a two-part inquiry. “Under strictscrutiny the government bears the burden of provingthe constitutionality of the regulation by showing(1) that the regulation serves a compellinggovernmental interest, and (2) that the regulation isnarrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest.”Warner, 05-1303 at 37, 21 So.3d at 246. As we

App. 39

cautioned in Warner, “[a] law subject to strict scrutinybecause it regulates speech based on its content ispresumptively invalid, ‘and the Government bears theburden to rebut that presumption.’” Id., 15-1303 at 43,21 So.3d at 250 (quoting United States v. PlayboyEntertainment Group. Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817(2000)).

As Warner explains, in connection with the firstprong of a strict scrutiny analysis–the statement of acompelling governmental interest which is served bythe regulation in question–“[t]he state’s role is to assertan interest served by the regulation at issue and tosubmit evidence to establish the compelling nature ofthat interest.” Warner, 15-1303 at 44, 21 So.3d at 250.In this endeavor, mere speculation of harm will notsuffice; rather, the state must effectively demonstrate“that the harms it recites are real and that itsrestriction [of speech] will in fact alleviate them to amaterial degree.” Id. (quoting PlayboyEntertainment Group, 529 U.S. at 817).

If the state meets this burden and succeeds insetting forth an interest which qualifies as“compelling,” then we must analyze “whether the lawin question is precisely drawn or narrowly tailored toserve that compelling interest.” Warner, 15-1303 at 47,21 So.3d at 253. “The purpose of this analysis ‘is toensure that speech is restricted no further thannecessary to achieve the [state’s] goal ....’” Id., 15-1303at 48, 21 So.3d at 253 (quoting Ashcroft v. AmericanCivil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). Tothis end, the court must consider: (1) whether the ruleactually advances the interest asserted; (2) whether it

App. 40

is reasonably necessary to serve the state interest;(3) whether the rule is underinclusive; i.e., whether itleaves appreciable damage to the supposedly vital stateinterest unprohibited; (4) whether the rule isoverinclusive; i.e., whether it suppresses more speechthan is necessary to accomplish the compelling goal;and (5) whether there are less speech restrictivealternatives available that would serve the compellingstate interest as well. Warner, 15-1303 at 48-49, 21So.3d at 253-54.

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the burdenthat falls on the state in a case such as this one,requiring a strict scrutiny analysis, is a substantialone, which will not be satisfied simply by argumentand speculation. However, that is essentially all thatthe record below offers.

Before this court, the state asserts that theLouisiana Legislature’s findings and purpose withregard to the state’s sex offender registrationrequirements, codified in La. R.S. 15:540(A), aresufficient to prove a “compelling governmentalinterest.” Pretermitting the question of whether broadstatements of legislative purpose involving the sexoffender registration requirements as a whole (and inabsence of empirical evidence of the type outlined inWarner) are sufficient to establish a compellinggovernmental interest, what is at issue in this case isnot the entire registration scheme, but a specificprovision thereof, and the state has offered no evidenceproving that the branded identification card effectivelyalleviates any harm that might be inflicted on the

App. 41

public, or that it is the least restrictive means offurthering its stated interest.

On the present record, the state has clearly failed tomeet its evidentiary burden under the strict scrutinytest. Therefore, I respectfully concur.

App. 42

10/20/20

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2020-KA-0323

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TAZIN ARDELL HILL

ON APPEAL FROM THE FIFTHEENTHJUDICAL DISTRICT COURT,

PARISH OF LAFAYETTE

CRAIN, J., dissenting.

The majority finds it unconstitutional to require aconvicted sex offender to be identified as such on agovernment-issued identification card. LouisianaRevised Statutes 40:1321J requires a registered sexoffender to procure a special identification card thatincludes the words “sex offender” in all capital, orangeletters. That phrase is the speech at issue. It is notFirst Amendment protected speech. The speaker is thegovernment: the words are stamped by a governmentalagency on a government-issued identification card inaccordance with a government-enacted statute. This isthe embodiment of government speech.

The only issue is whether this government speech ispresented so as to lead an observer to incorrectlyconclude the speaker is the cardholder. If so, thegovernment speech crosses the line into “compelledspeech,” which is subject to strict constitutional

App. 43

scrutiny. The First Amendment stringently limits astate’s authority to compel a private party to express aview with which the private party disagrees. Walker v.Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S.200, 219; 135 S.Ct. 2239, 2253; 192 L.Ed.2d 274 (2015).However, “the Government is not uniformly barredfrom passing laws that might call on private parties toliterally carry an item containing Government speech.”New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of United States, 891 F.3d578, 593 (6th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original). As explained by the Supreme Court, the test is whetherthe private parties “are closely linked with theexpression in a way that makes them appear to endorsethe government message.” Johanns v. Livestock Mktg.Association, 544 U.S. 550, 565 n.8, 125 S.Ct. 2055, n.8,161 L.Ed.2d 896 (2005) (internal quotation marksomitted); New Doe Child, 891 F. 3d at 593. Under this“attribution analysis,” the question is whetherobservers would attribute, or actually have attributed,the speech to the individual rather than to thegovernment. See New Doe Child, 891 F.3d at 593-94.

Here, nothing about the placement or content of thesubject speech remotely suggests it is made or endorsedby the defendant. It declares the defendant is a sexoffender. It appears on a state-issued identificationcard. “[P]ersons who observe designs on IDsroutinely—and reasonably—interpret them asconveying some message on the issuer’s behalf.”Walker, 576 U.S. at 212; 135 S.Ct. at 2249 (internalpunctuation omitted; emphasis added). That isparticularly true in this case given the pejorativenature of the speech. No reasonable observer, whenlooking at the identification card, will conclude the

App. 44

defendant chose to promote his status as a convictedsex offender by voluntarily procuring and personalizinga state-issued identification card to declare thatinformation for the world. “In this context, there islittle chance that observers will fail to appreciate theidentity of the speaker.” Pleasant Grove City, Utah v.Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471; 129 S.Ct. 1125, 1133; 172L.Ed.2d 853 (2009).

The majority uses a truncated standard that asksonly if the speech is “associated with,” rather than“endorsed [by],” the defendant.1 The majority determines the defendant’s identification card is“associated with” the defendant, an unavoidableconclusion given the whole purpose of an identificationcard is to identify the defendant. It is certainly his ID;however, that fact alone does not attribute the speechon the ID to the defendant instead of the government.

1 The “associated with” phrase appears in Wooley where theSupreme Court was “faced with the question of whether the Statemay constitutionally require an individual to participate in thedissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on hisprivate property.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713; 97 S.Ct.1428, 1434; 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (emphasis added). The Courtdistinguished such messages on currency, which is “passed fromhand to hand,” from a message appearing on the license plate of anautomobile “which is readily associated with its operator.” Wooley,430 U.S. at 717 n.15; 97 S.Ct. at 1436 n.15. We are not confrontedwith speech conveying an ideological message, nor are weaddressing compelled verbal communication, which is inherentlyidentified with the speaker, as in Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blindof N. Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781; 108 S.Ct. 2667; 101 L.Ed.2d 669(1988). The Supreme Court’s more recent and refined approach toidentifying permissible government speech appears in Walker,Pleasant Grove City, and Johanns, as set forth herein.

App. 45

Absent attribution to the defendant, the speakerremains the government. Under the majority’sapproach, any and all information appearing ingovernment-issued documents that are “associatedwith” a person--a driver’s license, passport, socialsecurity card, birth certificate, etc.--is compelled speechsubject to strict constitutional scrutiny. A driver’sweight, age, height, and address are all compelledspeech that, if challenged on constitutional Free Speechgrounds, requires the state to prove the inclusion of theinformation is the least restrictive means of achievinga compelling state interest.

This case turns on a single determinative question:who is the speaker? Any reasonable observer of thedefendant’s state-issued identification card wouldreadily ascertain the speaker is the government, notthe defendant. I respectfully dissent from the majority’sholding declaring Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1321Jand 15:542.1.4C unconstitutional.

App. 46

APPENDIX D

IN THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURTOF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF LAFAYETTE

STATE OF LOUISIANA

[Filed February 14, 2020]

*************************************************STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS DOCKET NUMBER: 160634

TAZIN ARDELL HILL

**************************************************

The above-entitled case came before the HonorablePatrick L. Michot, Judge of the above-styled court,Lafayette Parish Courthouse, Lafayette, Louisiana, onOctober 30, 2019, pursuant to notice.

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA: MS. ROYA S. BOUSTANY ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY LAFAYETTE PARISH COURTHOUSELAFAYETTE, LOUISIANA 70501

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE:MR. SHAE McPHEEATTORNEY GENERAL

App. 47

POST OFFICE BOX 94005 BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA 70804-9095

APPEARANCES, CONTINUED

FOR THE DEFENDANT:MR. MICHAEL GREGORYINDIGENT DEFENDER BOARD POST OFFICE BOX 3622 LAFAYETTE, LOUISIANA 70502

App. 48

OPEN COURT

HONORABLE PATRICK L. MICHOT, JUDGEPRESIDING

OCTOBER 30, 2019

MOTION

* * *

MR . GREGORY: So, Your Honor, I filed a --

MS. BOUSTANY: Can I make an appearance first,Michael?

MR. GREGORY: Go ahead.

MS. BOUSTANY: Roya Boustany on behalf of theState of Louisiana, Your Honor.

MR. McPHEE: And I’m Shae McPhee on behalf ofthe Attorney General.

THE COURT: I’m sorry. Your name again, please?

MR. McPHEE: Mr. McPhee, Shae McPhee.

MR. GREGORY: And then Michael Gregory onbehalf of Tazin Hill.

THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed?

MR. GREGORY: Yes. So, Your Honor, I filed amotion to quash on this case. Mr. Hill is charged withfailure to register under 15:542.1.4 (C) and, specifically,he’s charged with altering his identification document.So the law requires Mr. Hill to carry an identificationthat has the word “sex offender” written on it. He is

App. 49

charged with scratching off the word “sex offender.”And I want to specifically state the -- or read the actualpart of the statute that he’s charged with. It says that,“Any person who either fails to meet the requirementsof RS 32:412(I) or RS 40:132.1 --” which those are theones that require that someone who has to register asa sex offender have the word “sex offender” written onhis ID, “-- who is in possession of any documentrequired by RS 32:412(I) or RS 40:1321(J) that hasbeen altered with the intent to defraud.” And that’s --that’s essentially what they are charging him. They’resaying that he altered the document that was requiredby law with the intent to defraud.

And the basis for my motion to quash is that thatrequirement is unconstitutional.

And while there was a recent federal district courtopinion in Alabama --

THE COURT: Do you have a copy of the motion?

MR. GREGORY: I filed it. I actually don’t think Ihave a copy on me.

MADAME CLERK: I can print one for you, Judge.

THE COURT: The clerk’s going to get me one.

MS. BOUSTANY: Your Honor, you want my copy?

THE COURT: She’s going to print it. I mean, youprobably need yours.

We’ll go forward now.

MR. GREGORY: There was a federal district courtin Alabama that recently ruled that Alabama’s similar

App. 50

requirement that it’s a criminal sex offender onsomeone’s license is unconstitutional, and that’s one ofthe things I mentioned in my motion. But, essentially,my motion actually --

THE COURT: Now, that was a district court?

MR. GREGORY: Yeah, a federal district court.

THE COURT: A federal district court, okay.

MR. GREGORY: My motion actually really is basedon a case called Wooley v. Maynard. And I’ll just givea basic description of that case. That was a UnitedStates Supreme Court case back in the 1970s. So theState of New Hampshire, the State motto is “Live Freeor Die.” And they require that the license plate of everycar say “Live Free or Die.”

There was a guy who was a Jehovah’s Witness inNew Hampshire and he said, “I hate that phrase. Idon’t believe in what it stands for. I don’t like Live Freeor Die. I think there are many other options.” So hescratched it off of his license plate and was chargedwith a misdemeanor, spent time in jail, and then fileda federal suit to enjoin the New Hampshire police fromenforcing this law, saying that law wasunconstitutional. The United States Supreme Courtagreed.

The United States Supreme Court believed that thisis what was called “compelled speech.” And socompelled speech is when the government forcessomeone to say an ideological message that they do notagree with.

App. 51

THE COURT: So, wait. You may get to this, butwould this apply to newspaper ads to -- to send outnotice that you’re a sex offender as well?

MR. GREGORY: Possibly, but that’s not at issue --

THE COURT: Today?

MR. GREGORY: -- today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREGORY: Yeah, there are lots of possiblerepercussions that certainly aren’t at issue today. Butthe test for compelled -- so what the United StatesSupreme Court has found and what jurisprudence hassaid since is that compelled speech is presumptivelyunconstitutional. And the only way that compelledspeech can pass constitutional muster is by undergoingstrict scrutiny analysis. And what that means is theremust be a compelling state interest that is furthered,and the means of furthering it must be narrowlytailored. They must be the least restrictive means offurthering that interest. If they are not the absoluteleast restrictive means, then the court is required tofind that this requirement is unconstitutional.

What the federal district court in Alabama ruled isunder this analysis they applied that to the sexoffender card and they found that it was not the leastrestrictive means because there are states that do notmake you write the word “sex offender,” for instance,Delaware, Florida. Instead, they just have a symboland that allows law enforcement to know. So whenyou’re -- when you‘re dealing with law enforcementthat allows them to know that someone may be -- you

App. 52

know, have to register as a sex offender, but it preventssomeone from just the routine humiliation andembarrassment of having to -- you know, you go opena bank account and you have to let everyone in thebank know that you have to register as a sex offender.That’s embarrassing. It’s humiliating, and that’s whatMr. Hill has been having to deal with for the past 22years. That’s essentially my argument.

The State -- the state filed a reply brief. I’m going tolet the State reply as long as I get an opportunity forrebuttal, but there is one thing I do want to addressbecause I think it will clear up a lot of the contentionbetween the State’s position and mine.

The elements of this crime that Mr. Hill is chargedwith is, one, any person; two, who is in possession of adocument required by RS 32:412(I) and RS -- or RS40:1321(J) that has been altered with the intent todefraud.

THE COURT: Hang on just a second. We need quietback here. We cannot hear with -- I don’t know who thegentlemen in the orange, turn around, please. Be quiet.Thank you.

Okay.

MR. GREGORY: Many of the State’s arguments saythat Mr. Hill doesn’t have standing or the ability tochallenge this. I would disagree because theirargument is he doesn’t have standing to challenge theconstitutionality of the requirement -- the sex offenderrequirement, which is 32:412(I), which if you have adriver’s license, and 40:1321(J) which is if you don’thave a driver’s license. Both of them require an ID

App. 53

card. They’re saying that Mr. Hill doesn’t have theability to challenge standing, however, these laws are,in fact, an element of the crime. The requirements ofthese laws are an element of the crime that Mr. Hill ischarged with, which I think rebuts any sort of standingargument or that he can’t collaterally attack it.

MR. McPHEE: Thanks, Your Honor, I’d just like torespond to that.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. McPHEE: So once, again, Mr. Hill ischallenging two different provisions, two statutes; theone that requires him to obtain and carry the sexoffender ID, and the other is -- forbids him fromaltering or prescribing it -- or altering it with intent todefraud. And here we’re only charging him withaltering it with intent to defraud.

But going to my friend’s arguments, the SupremeCourt of Louisiana has explained that there is anavoidance doctrine. This court should try as hard as itpossibly can to avoid ever ruling on theconstitutionality of a statute. And in a case called Statev. Mercadel it said that you have to look for the reliefrequested in order to determine whether or not thecourt should rule on the question. And Mr. Hill isasking you to quash the motion -- or to quash the bill ofinformation. We’re only charging him with altering hisID card. And Mr. Hill, he says that the differentelements that he’s being charged with, that they’re notseverable, but that’s incorrect. You actually canseverable -- can sever here the obtaining requirement --the obtain and carry requirement from the altering

App. 54

requirement and he’s trying to say that they’re all onething. And so if you charge him with one, then youhave to bring in the other, but that’s not right.

And I think that the clearest way to see that is thatif the court agrees -- even if the court agrees that thoseprovisions that carry and obtain requirements areunconstitutional, it still wouldn’t help the defendantbecause he altered his ID. He -- and so we could hit himwith charging him with intent to defraud no matterwhat. And so I think the clearest way of showing thatis that there’s a process for challenging state statuteswe’ve listed in our brief. You know, you have to makea motion. You can’t resort to self-help. You can’t justsay, you know what, I don’t like this idea, I’m going togo ahead and change it. And the reason for that isbecause everybody in the state knows that ifsomebody’s been charged with a sex offense then yourID will say “sex offender.”

And so if I’m deciding who I want to be mybabysitter and I know that I don’t want a sex offenderto babysit my children, I say, “Okay. I’d like to see yourID before I allow you to babysit my children.” And, “Oh,it says sex offender, I’m not going to hire you.”

Now, if somebody just goes ahead and resorts toself-help and just takes it off but I expect that I canjust look at somebody’s ID, if he’s taken it off byhimself because he just thinks it’s unconstitutional,well, that’s no good. And so what that means is that wecan charge him with altering the license with intent todefraud, even if -- and so the obtain and the carryrequirements just aren’t at issue here at all. They areseverable.

App. 55

THE COURT: So you’re arguing that if he doesexercise self-help that that eliminates him arguing thatit’s unconstitutional?

MR. McPHEE: Yeah. I’m saying that he doesn’thave -- the court --

THE COURT: Because he has dirty hands, so tospeak, in your argument?

MR. McPHEE: Right. Right. He has dirty hands andthe court just shouldn’t rule on something even if --even if it granted him relief if it wouldn’t actually helphim. So if the court ruled those statutes areunconstitutional, if that wouldn’t help him, then thecourt shouldn’t rule the statutes are unconstitutional.It’s the Avoidance Doctrine.

And the reason why you can apply the AvoidanceDoctrine here is because the provisions are severable.Because even -- because you don’t need the obtain andcarry requirements to necessarily get at the defacingrequirement. And we’re only charging him with thedefacing requirement. So the court just shouldn’t touchthe questions over here of whether or not he has tocarry and obtain the ID card.

THE COURT: What about if -- well, if they woulduse a symbol, like he -- he -- defense counsel hasargued that other states use?

MR. McPHEE: Right.

THE COURT: What would be the harm to the State,the prejudice to the State in that situation if that werethe law?

App. 56

MR. McPHEE: Right. So in the Alabama case thatmy friend referenced, it’s -- there the court was veryspecific that the compelling interest of the state atissue was informing law enforcement about the status,the sex offender status. And in our brief we cite -- weactually quote, a big block quote, the Louisianaprovision that lists Louisiana’s interests and theinterests are more powerful. It’s not just, “Oh, we wantto let law enforcement know.” It’s also we want to letthe public know. We want the public -- we want theperson looking for the babysitter to be able to have aquick means of identifying the sex offender status, andso our -- our compelling interests that we’ve stated inour statutes are much stronger than the ones that theAlabama court was dealing with. And so just a letter onthe ID isn’t going to help -- isn’t going to notifymembers of the general public that he’s a sex offender.You actually need something that says “sex offender” sothat everyone can see it and know. And so that’s animportant distinguishing point between our case andbetween that Alabama case.

But I really don’t think that the court even needs toget to the issue of whether or not this is compelledspeech because, once again, the court shouldn’t addressthose provisions. And if we only look at the provisionthat he’s been charged with, that is the altering anddefacing, well, the first amendment just doesn’t protectthat kind of conduct. The First Amendment, as ageneral matter, protects speech and expressiveconduct.

I think a good example of this is the SupremeCourt’s opinion in O’Brien -- famously, Mr. O’Brien got

App. 57

up on the courthouse steps. He was angry that he hadto register for the draft. He lights his draft card on firein front of a big crowd and he gets arrested and theSupreme Court looks at that and says, “You know, hewas sending a message. There was expressive conductthere that the First Amendment maybe can offer someprotections.” Ultimately, Mr. O’Brien lost.

But here the First Amendment just doesn’t evenreach the conduct at issue because the conduct that Mr.Hill did was clandestinely altered his ID, you know, notin front of anybody or not in a crowd -- not on thecourthouse steps, not in front of a crowd. He wasn’ttrying to send a message so the First Amendment justdoesn’t protect that. So the court just shouldn’t addressthe two provisions, the obtain and carry requirement,and the First Amendment doesn’t protect the conductthat he did, which was altering his license. But even ifthe court wants to get into the issues of whether or notthis should have -- be a constitutionality of the obtainand carry requirements, our compelling interests aremuch higher, our stated ones, as you can see in thestatute, and I actually think that the district court inAlabama made a mistake.

There isn’t -- the court doesn’t have to -- excuse me.There’s a difference between government speech andprivate speech. An ID card is government speech. Now,that’s also true of a license plate, the “Live Free orDie,” right. “Live Free or Die” is government speechthat’s on a license plate.

Also, similarly, that’s true of an ID car. But theSupreme Court in Wooley v. Maynard explained thatideological messages were -- that the government

App. 58

couldn’t force people to share its ideological messages. It couldn’t make people walking billboards. That’s whatthe Supreme Court said it couldn’t do.

Here, though, whether or not somebody’s a sexoffender is just a basic fact. It’s not an ideologicalmessage. Now, the Supreme Court did explain in adifferent case that the government couldn’t compelprivate persons to share private -- or to share basicfacts. But the government in government speechabsolutely can share basic facts, otherwise, it would bewrong -- otherwise, the government would have tosurvive strict scrutiny to put that I need to wear light --glasses on my driver’s license. There’s no way that thathas to survive strict scrutiny. And the reason for thatis because it’s a basic fact and it’s government speech.Same with the sex offender ID, it’s a basic fact. Itpurports simply that he’s been convicted previously ofa sex offense and it’s government speech. It’s agovernment ID.

So even if the court is inclined to get into the issue,our interests are more compelling and it’s just notprotected speech, and that’s the end of my argument.

MR. GREGORY: Yeah, responses to those. As forthe idea of self-help, it’s a pretty basic tenant ofconstitutional law that the law’s unconstitutionality isa defense. And the State seems to suggest that, youknow, well even if the requirement’s unconstitutional,he can’t just, you know, violate it. Well, that’s actually-- that’s how most of these constitutional cases cameabout. That’s how Wooley v. Maynard came about.There was a law. He resorted to self-help in taking“Live Free or Die” off his license plate. Similarly, the

App. 59

State spends a lot of time citing United States v.Alvarez. There someone was charged with violating theStolen Valor Act and pretending that they were in themilitary. And the federal court there said that law is unconstitutional. You know, the conviction was notupheld there. And so, yes, defacing governmentproperty is a crime, but charge him with amisdemeanor, simple criminal damage to property. Itis an element of this crime, RS 32:412(I) or 40:1321(J)is as an element of this crime. They cannot convict himof this crime if those laws are unconstitutional.

As far as government speech vers us private speech,this is -- yes, the government makes the license, butagain, it’s the same thing in Wooley v. Maynard, thegovernment made that license plate that said “LiveFree or Die.” Also, it’s not purely sort of private orclandestine, the whole problem is that he then goes andhas to show his ID to people. That’s the speech at issuehere.

And so he -- I would also disagree that this is abasic fact. In the time between when Mr. Hill wasconvicted in 1997 and 2019, the Louisiana legislatureactually changed registration laws. This is somethingthat is totally at the discretion of the government. Thisis an ideological message that the government ismaking someone say. This is something that Mr. Hillobjects to.

Mr. Hill, who again, was convicted 22 years agodisagrees that he should have to continue to labelhimself this way in this humiliating, degrading fashion.And as for the idea that this is the least restrictivemeans of furthering compelling state interest, I mean,

App. 60

the State brings up babysitting. Someone who’s ababysitter can just go on the internet and look at theregister. Everyone in the State of Louisiana who’s beenconvicted of a sex offense has to register. They can dothat.

Mr. Hill going to cash a check, what does that haveto do with anything, what he’s been convicted of? Goingto vote, what does that have to do with anything? Andhe is able to vote at this time.

Perhaps, maybe making, you know, large creditcard purchases or sometimes if you were to go rent ahotel room, things like that, there are opportunities -- there are times when you have to show your ID. If hewants to get on a plane, what do they need to know?That’s what makes it so overbroad, is that if there wasjust a registry, then people that wanted to know thesethings could go look it up. But people who are justgoing about -- toiling about in their job at the bankdon’t need to know, you know, this about Mr. Hill inorder for him to cash a check.

THE COURT: Motion’s granted.

MR. GREGORY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You’re welcome.

MR. McPHEE: Just to clarify what exactly isgranted.

THE COURT: On both statutes, Title 40 and Title15 as prayed for.

App. 61

MS. BOUSTANY: So Your Honor, you found -- I’mtrying to get some clarification. You found thesestatutes unconstitutional?

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. McPHEE: You’re striking them down?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BOUSTANY: Okay. Your Honor, we’re goingto --

MR. McPHEE: Yeah, we’ll definitely be appealingthis, I think directly to the Supreme Court, YourHonor.

MR. GREGORY: I was anticipating that.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else ready to proceedat this time?

I’ll be in chambers, ladies and gentlemen. I’ll beback when everything is ready to proceed.

(RECESS)

THE COURT: So let’s take up the Hill matter first.

MR. McPHEE: Yes, Your Honor, in light of theextraordinary circumstances --

THE COURT: State versus Hill, Tazin Hill.

MR. McPHEE: Your Honor, in light of theextraordinary circumstances, the court has now struckdown two Louisiana State Statutes requiring sexoffenders to have an ID that says “sex offender” on it,the Court -- which -- and we haven’t even charged him

App. 62

with violating one of those statutes, the State moves forwritten reasons to that effect.

MR. GREGORY: Sure.

THE COURT: All right. There’s no requirementunder the Criminal Code for written reasons, but I cangive a short explanation of the reason why I ruled theway I did.

MR. McPHEE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I found the statute to beunconstitutional -- statutes to be unconstitutional inthat the requirement that the offender have “sexoffender” written on his official state identification isnot the least restrictive way to further the State’slegitimate interest of notifying law enforcement. Itcould be accomplished in the same way that some otherstates utilize. Louisiana could use more discreet labelsin the form of codes that are known to law enforcement.So that’s it.

MR. McPHEE: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. GREGORY: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. BOUSTANY: Thank you, Judge.

(CONCLUSION)

App. 63

CERTIFICATE

PARISH OF LAFAYETTE

STATE OF LOUISIANA

I, Beth R. Liles, Official or Deputy Official CourtReporter in and for the State of Louisiana, employed asan official or deputy official court reporter by theFifteenth Judicial District Court for the Parishes ofAcadia, Vermilion and Lafayette, State of Louisiana, asthe officer before whom this testimony was taken, dohereby certify that this testimony was reported by mein the stenotype reporting method, was prepared andtranscribed by me or under my direction andsupervision, and is a true and correct transcript to thebest of my ability and understanding; that thetranscript has been prepared in compliance with thetranscript format guidelines required by statute or byrules of the board or by the Supreme Court ofLouisiana, and that I am not related to counsel or tothe parties herein nor am I otherwise interested in theoutcome of this matter.

Lafayette, Louisiana, this 14th day of February,2020.

/s/ Beth R. LilesBETH R. LILES OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERCERTIFICATE #91135

FILED THIS 14DAY OF FEB. 2020/s/ Deputy Clerk of Court

App. 64

APPENDIX E

BILL OF INFORMATION

[FILED APRIL 10, 2017]

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS No. CR160634

TAZIN HILL

IN THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTCOURT FOR THE PARISH OF LAFAYETTE

STATE OF LOUISIANA

KEITH A. STUTES, District Attorney in and for theFifteenth Judicial District Court, through theundersigned Assistant District Attorney, and byauthority of the Laws of the STATE OF LOUISIANAcharges that on or about December 5, 2016, at and inthe Parish, District and State aforesaid

TAZIN HILL 104 LUTHER ST

NEW ROADS, LA 70760 DOB 07/08/1977 DL# -LA BLACK/MALE

ARREST DATE: 12/05/2016 SSN #####6605 SID 001643362

did willfully, unlawfully and intentionally and/orpossessed and/or altered an official identification

App. 65

document, to-wit: State of Louisiana IdentificationCard, that had been altered to conceal the designationthat he was a registered sex offender, in violation of theprovisions of R.S. 15 :542. l.4(C).

CONTRARY TO THE LAWS OF THE STATE OFLOUISIANA and against the Peace and Dignity of thesame.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ RSB ROYA S. BOUSTANY

Assistant District AttorneyFILED: 4/10/17

/s/ DEPUTY CLERK

App. 66

[01/__/2017]

LA0280000 Signal Rep Area Item #6 16-0391864

Report Type Date TimeOFFENSE/INCIDENT 05-DEC-2016 1245

Day of Wk. Begin Date Begin TimeMON 05-DEC-2016 1045

End Date End Time05-DEC-2016 1224

Location of Offense316 W MAIN STREET LAFAYETTE 70501

Reporting Officer Responding DetectiveALICIA TENNEY ALICIA TENNEY

PR: 11209 BP: 723 PR: 11209 BP: 723

Arrived: 051045 Notified: 051045

Completed: 051224 Arrived: 051045

Supervisor

PR: BP:

Notified:

Arrived:

App. 67

REPORTING PERSON

Name: ALICIA TENNEY Race: WHITE

Sex: FEMALE

DOB: 30-AUG-1975 Age: 41

Address: 316 W MAIN STREET

City/St/Zip: LAFAYETTE, LA 70501

Social Security # Drivers Lic# D.L. State

Identify Suspect? Voluntary Statement?

Employer/School: LAFAYETTE PARISH SHERIFF

Address: 316 W MAIN STREET

City/St/Zip: LAFAYETTE, LA 70501

Home Phone:

Work Phone: (337)-236-3944

Cell Phone:

VICTIM

Victim Sequence Number: 1

Type: GOVERNMENT

For Insurance Purposes?

Name: STATE OF LOUISIANA

Address:

App. 68

City/St/Zip:

Social Security # Drivers Lic # D.L. StateLA

Home Phone:

Work Phone:

Cell Phone:

OFFENSE

Offense Sequence Number: 1

Victim: 1 Suspect: 1

R.S. Number: 15:542.14C(1)

Title: ALTERED SEX OFFENDER ID

Attempted/Completed: ATTEMPTED

Location Type: OTHER / UNKNOWN

Number of Premises:

Criminal Activity 1: POSSESSING/CONCEALING

Weapon/Force Type 1: NONE

SUSPECT

Suspect Sequence Number: 1

Name: TAZIN HILL Race: Black Sex: MALE

DOB: 18-JUL-1977 Age From: 39 To:

Ethnicity: NON-HISPANIC Resident? YES

App. 69

Height From: 510 To: Weight From: 165 To:

Eye Color: BROWN Hair Color: BLACK

Hair Length:

Address: 104 LUTHER STR

City/St/Zip: NEW ROADS, LA 70760

Alcohol Consumed? Computer Used?

Drugs Used? Gaming Motive? Gang Related:

Armed: Hate/Bias: NONE

Can be Identified by Witness:

Identifiable Features:

Location:

Arrest Type: NONE Voluntary Statement?

Local Check? State Check? NCIC Check?

Suspect Injury Codes: NONE

Social Security # Drivers Lic # D.L. State439336605

Home Phone:

Work Phone:

Cell Phone: (225)-2402029

ADDITIONAL WITNESS

None

App. 70

PROPERTY

Property Owner or Property recvd from:

SUSPECT 0

Desc. Code: 77 - OTHER

Loss Type: 5 - RECOVEREDQuantity: 1 Value:$0 Insured:

Owner-applied Number: Make:

Model: Serial Number:

Description: ALTERED SEX OFFENDERIDENTIFICATION CARD

Date Recovered: 05-DEC-2016

Recovery Address: 316 MAIN STREET

City/St/Zip: LAFAYETTE, LA 70501

Recovery Condition: GOOD

Recovery Disposition: SUBMITTED TO LPSOEVIDENCE

VEHICLE

None

CRIME SCENE

None

App. 71

INVESTIGATION

Type of Force Used: FORCE NOT SPECIFIED

Security Device Installed?

Point of Entry: Security Device Activated?

Safe Job? Gambling Devices on Premises?

Alcoholic Beverage Outlet?

Prior History of Domestic Violence?

Prior History Documented?

Number of Prior Cases:

Modus Operandi (MO): CONVICTED SEXOFFENDER HILL WAS IN POSSESSION OF ANALTERED SEX OFFENDER IDENTIFICATIONCARD.

INSURANCE

None

APPROVAL

Sergeant Viewed

User ID: LIGHTFOOT_JC

Date/Time: 29-DEC-2016 13:32

Lieutenant Viewed

Dist. Cmdr. Viewed

App. 72

FINAL APPROVAL User ID: LIGHTFOOT-JC

Date/Time: 29-DEC-2016 13:32

Crime Prevention Officer Required?

Issued Compliant Slip?

911 Notified?

Warrant?

Parade Related? Crime Scene Required?

Report Status: COMPLETED

Exceptional Clearance: NOT APPLICABLE

Date:

District Follow Up?

Bureau Follow Up?

NARRATIVE

Time Stamp: 12/5/2016 13:13 Written By: ALICIATENNEY

INITIAL REPORT:

REPORT NUMBER: 16-391864

DATE & TIME OCCURRED: 12/5/16, 1046 HOURS

TYPE OF CRIME: ALTERED SEX OFFENDER ID

LOCATION OF INCIDENT: 316 W MAIN ST,LAFAYETTE, LA 70501

App. 73

SUSPECT INFORMATION: TAZIN HILL

DRUG EVIDENCE: N/A

OTHER EVIDENCE: ALTERED SEX OFFENDERID

DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE: SUBMITTED TOLPSO EVIDENCE

VEHICLE INFORMATION: N/A

VEHICLE DISPOSITION: N/A

ITEM SEIZED AS EVIDENCE: ALTERED SEXOFFENDER ID

CASE DISPOSITION: CONVICTED SEXOFFENDER WAS IN POSSESSION OF ANALTERED SEX OFFENDER IDENTIFICATIONCARD.

INJURY SUSTAINED: N/A

INVESTIGATIVE NARRATIVE:ON DECEMBER 5, 2016 AT APPROXIMATELY1045 HOURS, CONVICTED SEX OFFENDERTAZIN HILL REPORTED TO THE LAFAYETTEPARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE IN ORDER TOUPDATE HIS ADDRESS INFORMATION. ATTHIS TIME, DETECTIVE MIKE THOMAS ASKEDHILL TO PROVIDE HIS SEX OFFENDERIDENTIFICATION CARD WHILE DETECTIVEALICIA TENNEY PROVIDED HILL WITHPAPERWORK TO COMPLETE. DETECTIVESTENNEY AND THOMAS OBSERVED HILL’S SEXOFFENDER ID CARD ALTERED IN WHICH IT

App. 74

APPEARED THE LAMINATION HAD BEENLIFTED AND THE WORDS “SEX OFFENDER”HAD BEEN REMOVED. UPON QUESTIONINGHILL ABOUT THE ALTERED SEX OFFENDERID CARD, HILL ADVISED, “I JUST WASHED ITWITH MY CLOTHES AND IT CAME OFF.” ITSHOULD BE NOTED THAT A SMALLRECTANGULAR INDENTION COULD BE FELTON THE ID WHERE THE WORDS “SEXOFFENDER” HAD BEEN REMOVED (CUT OUT)FROM THE ID AND VISIBLE TRANSPARENTTAPE HAD BEEN PLACED OVER IT. AT THISTIME HILL WAS MIRANDIZED AND PLACEDUNDER ARREST BY DETECTIVES. HILL WASBOOKED INTO THE LAFAYETTE PARISHCORRECTIONAL CENTER FOR ONE COUNTR.S. 15:542.1.4.C(1): ALTERED SEX OFFENDERID.

App. 75

FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISIRICT COURT

PARISH OF LAFAYETTE STATE OF LOUISIANA

AFFIDAVIT FOR WARRANT OF ARREST

Enter data legibly in black ink

Arrestee Information

Arrest # 16-12685 Case # 16-391864

Last Name Hill First Name Tazin Middle Gender: Male : Female 9 D/O/B 07/18/1977

Age: 39

Race: White 9 Black : Indian 9 Asian 9 Other 9

Arrest Location 316 W Main St, Lafayette

Arrest Date/Time 12/5/16/ 10:46

Statute/Charges: 15:542.1.4.C(1): Altered SexOffender ID

Transporting Officer Detective Mike Thomas

Arresting Officer Detective Alicia TenneyLAFAYETTE SHERIFFDEPUTY

Did prisoner cooperate during the arrest process?Yes : No 9

Were restraining devices other than handcuffs used?Yes 9 No :

If yes, list devices:

App. 76

Does the arrestee have a valid ID? Yes 9 No :

Did your agency seize of retain any of the arrestee’sproperty? Yes : No 9

If yes, list items: Altered sex offender ID card

Continued Detention is required because:

The arrestee is likely to cause injury to himself,another or property. Yes 9 No 9

The inmate has prior criminal convictions. Yes 9 No 9

The arrestee is unlikely to appear on a issuedsummons. Yes 9 No 9

The affiant states that the accused committed theabove offense based on the following information:

On December 5, 2016 at approximately 10:45 am,convicted sex offender Tazin Hill reported to theLafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office sex offender registryoffice. At this time, Detective Tenney asked Tazin Hillto provide his sex offender identification card. DetectiveTenney observed Hill’s ID to be altered in which thewords “sex offender” had been removed from Hill’s ID.

App. 77

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 05 day ofDecember 2016

Alicia Tenney Affiant (Print)

/s/ 147984Notary /s/ Alicia Tenney

Ex-Officio Notary Public Affiant (Signed)Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office

Check here if additional sheets attached 9

App. 78

FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DIS1RICT COURT

PARISH OF LAFAYETTE STATE OF LOUISIANA

AFFIDAVIT FOR WARRANT OF ARREST

[RECEIVED DEC 06 2016LAFAYETTE PARISH

DISTRICT ATTORNEY]

Enter data legibly in black ink Commbond

Arrestee Information 12/26 12/06

Arrest # 16-12685 Case # 16-361864

Last Name Hill First Name Tazin Middle Gender: Male : Female 9 D/O/B 07/18/1977

Age: 39

Race: White 9 Black : Indian 9 Asian 9 Other 9

Arrest Location 316 W Main St Lafayette

Arrest Date/Time 12/5/16/ 10:46

Statute/Charges: 15:542.1.4.C(1): Altered SexOffender ID

Transporting Officer Detective Mike Thomas

Arresting Officer Detective Alicia TenneyLAFAYETTE SHERIFFDEPUTY

Did prisoner cooperate during the arrest process?Yes : No 9

Were restraining devices other than handcuffs used?

App. 79

Yes 9 No :

If yes, list devices:

Does the arresstee have a valid ID? Yes 9 No :

Did your agency seize of retain any of the arrestee’sproperty? Yes : No 9

If yes, list items: Altered sex offender ID card

Continued Detention is required because:

The arrestee is likely to cause injury to himself,another or property. Yes 9 No 9

The inmate has prior criminal convictions. Yes 9 No 9

The arrestee is unlikely to appear on a issuedsummons. Yes 9 No 9

The affiant states that the accused committed theabove offense based on the following information:

On December 5, 2016 at approximately 10:45 am,convicted sex offender Tazin Hill reported to theLafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office sex offender registryoffice. At this time, Detective Tenney asked Tazin Hillto provide his sex offender identification card. DetectiveTenney observed Hill’s ID to be altered in which thewords “sex offender” had been removed from Hill’s ID.

App. 80

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 05 day ofDecember 2016

Alicia Tenney Affiant (Print)

/s/ 147984Notary /s/ Alicia Tenney

Ex-Officio Notary Public Affiant (Signed)Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office

Check here if additional sheets attached 9

App. 81

LAFAYETTE PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE

Arrest Register

ATN 280011612685

[December 5, 2016]

ArresteeTAZIN HILL

ARRESTEE DATA

Last Name First Middle Race SexHILL TAZIN B M

DOB ETHNICITY07/18/1977 NHIS

Arrestee Address104 LUTHER STR NEW ROADS, LA 70760

Hair EyesBLK BRO

SSN License SID CCN439336605 001643362 1411043

Height Weight5 ft. 10 in.165

ALIAS Name (last,first,middle,suffix), ALIAS Sex,Race, DOB

Birth State NationalityLA US

ARREST DATA

Location of Arrest316 W MAIN STR LAFAYETTE LA

App. 82

Arrest Date & Time12/05/2016 10:46

Cross Street Grid

Arresting Officer’s Name 1 Officer’s PR # UnitLPSO/ A. TENNEY

Arresting Officer’s Name 2 Officer’s PR #

Credit07

Transporting Officer’s Name Trans. Officer’s PR #LPSO/ A. TENNEY

Credit DescriptionLAFAYETTE PARISH SHERIFF

CHARGES

Item Number S/A/W Type Charge Code16-0361864 FE 154:542.1.4C(1)

Charge Title Instant ChargeALTER SEX OFFENDER ID Y

Court15 15TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

REMARKSCONVICTED SEX OFFENDER

App. 83

Prisoner Card

[December 5, 2016]

Race Sex DOBREPORT OF HILL TAZIN B M 07/18/1977

CCN 1411043 Incarcerated: H

HOLDING, INTAKE-LPCC

Height - 510 Weight - 165 Hair - BLK

Eyes - BRO

Ethn - NHIS Residency - R

Date Entered 12/05/2016

IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS

Type Description Number StateLODIS No

WARRANTS

Date issued Docket Number Item Number

Type Disposition Date Served Court ID

Issuing Officer

DETAINERS

Agency Commments Date Entered

PROBATION/PAROLE

Start date End date Type State Charge

Date Entered

App. 84

ADDRESSES

Address City State104 LUTHER STR NEW ROADS LA

Zip Code Date Entered Last Updated70760 12/05/2016

PHONE NUMBERS

Area Code Phone Number Extension Phone Type

Date Entered Last Updated

ALIASES

Type Last Name First Middle

Suffix Race Sex DOB Hair Eyes

Height Weight Enter Date

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTORS

Record Type Date EnteredBEARD 12/05/2016

Location/Description Scar Type Tattoo Type

Tattoo Literal RemarksGOATEE

Record Type Date EnteredBUILD 12/05/2016

Location/Description Scar Type Tattoo Type

Tattoo Literal RemarksLIGHT

Record Type Date EnteredCOMPLEXION 12/05/2016

App. 85

Location/Description Scar Type Tattoo Type

Tattoo Literal RemarksDRK

Record Type Date EnteredHAIR LENGTH 12/05/2016

Location/Description Scar Type Tattoo Type

Tattoo Literal RemarksABOVE EAR

Record Type Date EnteredMUSTACHE 12/05/2016

Location/Description Scar Type Tattoo Type

Tattoo Literal RemarksMEDIUM

Record Type Date EnteredTATTOO 12/05/2016

Location/Description Scar Type Tattoo TypeWORD

Tattoo Literal RemarksNECK

Record Type Date EnteredTATTOO 12/05/2016

Location/Description Scar Type Tattoo TypeLEFT ARM PICTURE

Tattoo Literal Remarks

ARREST

Booking Date and Time 12/052016 11:05

App. 86

Arrest Date and Time: 12/05/2016 10:46

Arrest Location: 316 W MAIN STR

ATN: 280011612685

Officer1: LPSO/A.TENNEY

Officer 2:

Arresting Agency: LA0280000

Comments: CONVICTED SEX OFFENDER

Charges:

Type Item Number Seq No StatuteFE 16-0361864 001 15:542.1.4C(1)

Description ALTER SEX OFFENDER ID

Amended To Description

Bond Amount: $0

* * * * END OF REPORT * * * *

App. 87

ARREST SUMMARY REPORT

SID: 001643362

ATN: 2800316070005

LBN 11612685

NAME: HILL TAZIN DOB 07/18/1977

RACE: B SEX: M SSN 439-33-6605

ATN CHG NO AGENCY ARREST DATE 1 LA0280000 12/05/2016

STATUTE CODE & MODIFIER DEG CNT[Illegible]15:542.1.4C(1) . .ALTER SEX OFFENDER ID