POLICY BRIEF ON POPULISM

IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS:WHAT, WHEN, WHO, AND SO WHAT?∗

June 2018

Contents

WHAT IS POPULISM? 2Multiple Definitions Are a Problem 2Populism is Defined in Terms of

Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Populism is Distinct from Other

Democratic Discourses . . . . 2Issue Positions Define Subtypes of

Populism . . . . . . . . . . . . 3What an Ideational Definition

Gets Us . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

WHY POPULISM MATTERS 3New Research Demonstrates that

Populist Ideas Have Consis-tent Effects on Democracy . . 3

Populism Can Contribute to Long-term Erosion of DemocraticNorms and Social Cohesion . 4

Populism Can Reveal Weaknessesin Liberal Democracy . . . . . 4

∗This brief was prepared at the request of IEUniversity’s Transatlantic Relations Initiative as acontribution to the Transatlantic Conference held inSegovia (Spain) July 06-08, 2018. This conferencebrings together senior practitioners and academicsfrom the Atlantic space. It is organized in partnershipbetween the IE School of International Relations andthe Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Sci-ence and International Affairs. Team Populism lead-ers met in a pre-conference workshop hosted by IEUniversity, June 25-26 in Segovia.

WHO IS POPULIST? 4Identifying Populist Citizens . . . . 4Identifying Populist Political Actors 5From Measurement to Analysis . . 6

WHERE DO POPULISTS RISE TO

PROMINENCE OR POWER? 7Populism Requires a Sense of

Grievance . . . . . . . . . . . 7Political Institutions Play a Role in

Constraining the Rise of Pop-ulist Forces . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Established Political Parties Playan Important Gatekeeping Role 7

The Media Play a Role in Ampli-fying Populist Messages andPolarizing Society . . . . . . . 8

WHO SUPPORTS POPULISTS AND

WHY? 8Demographics of Populists are

Dramatically Different fromRadical Right Supporters . . . 8

Ethnic Minorities Are Less Populist 8Psychological Profiles of Populist

Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Blame and Emotional Appeals

Trigger Populist Attitudes . . 9Countering Populism with Posi-

tive Discourse . . . . . . . . . 9

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HOW DO WE RESPOND TO POPULISTS

IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT? 9Constitutional Responses Empha-

sizing Engagement RatherThan Containment Are MostSuccessful . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Extra-constitutional ResponsesAre Risky and Often Backfire 11

FUTURE RESEARCH ON POPULIST

CONSEQUENCES AND THEIR

MITIGATION 11

FURTHER INFORMATION 12

TEAM POPULISM 12Team Populism Coordinator . . . . 13Team Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

WHAT IS POPULISM?Populist forces are on the rise in democra-cies everywhere. Many scholars and policy-makers are concerned about the potentiallynegative consequences populism may havefor democratic institutions and the post-war global liberal order. Given these highstakes, we want to know who is populist,what is causing this increase in populist pol-itics, what are the consequences for democ-racy, and what if anything should be done.

Multiple Definitions Are a Problem

The first obstacle to answering these ques-tions is the lack of agreement over whatpopulism is. Many commentators associateit with specific issue positions, such as op-position to immigration or support for re-distributive economic policies, or they useit as a laudatory or a pejorative label.

The problem with these approaches isthat they do not explain or understandpopulism itself. Issues associated withpopulist forces vary by region, with left-ist positions dominating in Latin Americaand Southern Europe, and rightist positionsholding sway in the rest of Europe andNorth America. Presumably, populism isdistinct from these issue positions or therewould be no need for a separate word to

capture it. If populism is going to be morethan a pejorative, we must identify the com-mon features of all parties and movementsthat we deem populist.

Populism is Defined in Terms of Ideas

The best solution to this definitional prob-lem is an ideational one. Scholars fromacross Europe and the Americas have iden-tified a core set of ideas at the heart ofevery populist force. They call some-thing populist if it expresses the belief thatpolitics embodies a struggle between theforces of good, understood as the willof the common people, and the forces ofevil, associated with a conspiring elite.Thus, populism is a polarizing (Manichean)discourse that is people-centric and anti-establishment.

Consider this quote from DonaldTrump’s (United States) inaugurationspeech from January 2017:

For too long, a small group in ournation’s Capital has reaped the re-wards of government while thepeople have borne the cost...Theestablishment protected itself, butnot the citizens of our country.1

Trump speaks about ordinary people asthe bearers of democratic virtue, the sourceof the one true way of running government.Just as important, he juxtaposes them withthe powerful elements of society who havebetrayed the people and conspired to servetheir selfish interests.

Populism is Distinct from OtherDemocratic Discourses

Populism contrasts with other ways of talk-ing about democratic politics. The mostcommon alternative is pluralism. Plural-ists see democracy as a more fluid process ofrepresenting multiple interests and avoidsdemonizing opponents, preferring insteadto refer to impersonal causes of problems.Another alternative is elitism, a view that

1https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/

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celebrates the virtues of experienced politi-cians, experts and power brokers.

Issue Positions Define Subtypes ofPopulism

Research shows that populist ideas areheld by parties with very different issuepositions. For example, two of the mostpopulist parties in Greece, SYRIZA andANEL (partners in government), have dif-ferent positions on social issues such as eth-nic minority rights. But this does not meanwe should ignore the issue positions of pop-ulist forces. Issue positions also deter-mine who voters support and what pop-ulist forces do in office. Because of this, itis helpful to refer to ideological subtypes ofpopulism, such as radical right populism.

What an Ideational Definition Gets Us

Not every scholar or policymaker will de-fine populism solely in terms of this set ofideas. Some scholars prefer to add addi-tional conditions, such as the presence ofcharismatic leadership. However, separat-ing issue positions from the ideas of pop-ulism allows us to carefully determine whycertain subtypes are more common in dif-ferent contexts – for example, why pop-ulists in Latin America and Southern Eu-rope often adopt redistributive policies. Italso allows us to explore the unique im-pact of populist ideas, independent of issuepositions, and to identify common causesof populism across regions or even acrosstime. As we show in this policy brief, theimpact of populist ideas on democracy issignificant, and there are common mech-anisms underlying the emergence of pop-ulism that provide useful lessons for miti-gating its effects.

WHY POPULISM MATTERS

The rise of populism worries many of usbecause of its potential impact on poli-cies and institutions. There is, for example,still a widespread sentiment that populism

harms the economy. An equally prevalentnotion is that it undermines democracy be-cause of its tendency to restrict civil libertiesand concentrate government powers in theexecutive branch. At the same time, someobservers affirm populism’s positive conse-quences, arguing that populism enhancesthe representation of voters who have beenignored by their politicians. Which of thesearguments are correct?

New Research Demonstrates that Pop-ulist Ideas Have Consistent Effects onDemocracy

Populism in power may have very differ-ent consequences from populism as a chal-lenger force. Most obviously, populist chal-lengers cannot directly determine govern-ment policy. Hence, most current researchfocuses on the potentially greater effects ofpopulism in government.

First, research shows that populism ingovernment, measured by the strength ofthe leader’s populist language, does nothave any clear effect on economic growth.Populism does not favor any one approachto economics, except the very general ideathat the economy should be at the serviceof the people and reflect their sensibilities.This means there can be very different eco-nomic policies and consequences under dif-ferent populist forces. For example, insome countries “the people” consists of im-poverished workers in the informal sector,who have much to gain from radically re-distributing wealth, in others it consists ofa middle class that enjoys property rightsand seeks to protect them through market-friendlier policies.

Second, populism has beneficial conse-quences for some forms of representationand political participation. Populists notonly dignify forgotten sectors of the pop-ulation, they also engage in concrete ef-forts to incorporate these citizens in politicsthrough voting and other forms of demo-cratic participation. Scholars think this ef-fect is more likely among left populists,because of their stronger inclusionary ap-peal to native populations of Latin Amer-ica, racial and sexual minorities, and the

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poor, but there are reasons to expect it fromall types of populism because of how theyreach out to disaffected voters.

Research shows that populism in govern-ment has a modest, positive effect on voterturnout. Indeed, because populists rely onelectoral legitimacy, a common strategy isa strong voter registration and get-out-the-vote drive for their supporters.

Third, populism’s privileging of major-ity rule harms central institutions of lib-eral democracy, including civil rights, elec-toral quality, and the separation of powers.Liberal democracy protects individual free-doms and minority rights from the poten-tial threat of electoral majorities. Populistideas encourage politicians and their con-stituents to see their opponents in diabolicalterms that justify curtailing their rights, asa way of protecting the people from a con-spiring, parasitical class. These ideas alsomake politicians and voters value electionsfor their ability to express the will of thepeople, rather than adjudicate competinginterests – hence, rules can be bent. And,to the degree that populists come to powerunder charismatic leaders embodying thepopular will, they are willing to concentratepower in the chief executive.

Research demonstrates a noteworthy de-cline of about 10% in press freedom andthe separation of powers for highly populistleaders. Importantly, this negative effect ex-ists for populist leaders on the left and right.

Populism Can Contribute to Long-term Erosion of Democratic Normsand Social Cohesion

The deliberate polarizing strategy of pop-ulists may also have long-lasting impacton social cohesion. In particular, the iden-tification of some groups of citizens as“good” and others as “evil” transforms po-litical sympathies into social identities. Inthis form of “political tribalism,” societiesdivide into camps of “Us” and “Them”that favor and trust their in-group of like-minded persons, and distrust and dispar-age the out-group.

In the extreme, these polarizing dynam-ics lead the populist and the anti-populist

camps to each view their opponents as athreat to the nation and their way of life.The populist supporters may justify the ero-sion of democratic norms in order to stayin power. Populism’s challengers may seepopulists as such a threat that they justifyextra-constitutional actions to remove themfrom power, or prevent them from access-ing power in the first place.

Populism Can Reveal Weaknesses inLiberal Democracy

All of these findings suggest that populistideas themselves, and not just the issue po-sitions they attach to, are a significant con-cern.

Focusing on populist ideas also helpsus see the potential weaknesses in liberaldemocracy, especially the failures of rep-resentation that create populist grievances.Politicians responding to populism needto examine their own parties for ways toaddress these needs, not merely look forways to condemn populism’s illiberal ex-cesses.

WHO IS POPULIST?Populism combines people-centric and anti-elite ideas with a polarizing worldview.Populist forces are not only political leaders.Parties, politicians at all levels of govern-ment, social movements, and individualcitizens can subscribe to and express theseideas to varying degrees. Understand-ing populism’s causes and consequences re-quires identifying who (and what) is pop-ulist. Hence we must measure the levelsof populism across citizens and political ac-tors.

Identifying Populist Citizens

Populist individuals exhibit populist atti-tudes. We can identify populists by theiranswers to three sets of questions, typicallyincluded in public opinion surveys.

Asking individuals whether politiciansshould...

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• ...always listen closely to the people.

• ...spend time with the people.

• ...prioritize the will of the people.

indicates their level of people-centrism.Asking individuals whether politicians...

• ... sell out to special interests.

• ... look out only for themselves.

• ... are crooked.

indicates their level of anti-elitism.Asking individuals whether they see

their political opponents as...

• ... bad.

• ... evil.

• ... misinformed.

indicates their level of polarizing outlookon politics.

Populist individuals express high lev-els of people-centrism, anti-elitism, and apolarizing outlook. These attitudes canbe summed into an index for comparisonacross individuals and countries.

Research with this scale and otherslike it suggest populist attitudes arewidespread and that average levels dif-fer little across countries. This is true re-gardless of levels of development, region,and whether populist leaders and/or par-ties have succeeded electorally.

Identifying Populist Political Actors

Three main tools have been developed tomeasure populist ideas among political ac-tors: surveys of populist attitudes amongelected representatives, content analysis ofparty manifestos and leader speeches, andexpert surveys on political messaging.

Surveying politicians. We can uncoverpopulist attitudes among elected represen-tatives by asking them a set of survey ques-tions similar to the ones asked in publicopinion surveys.

Greece is one of the few countries wherethis approach has been used. As Figure 1

Figure 1: Populism Index by PoliticalParty – Greece 2015.

shows above, both left-wing SYRIZA andright-wing ANEL (Independent Greeks)score highly on an index of populist attitudequestions. Members of parliament from tra-ditional parties (PASOK and New Democ-racy/ND) score much lower.

Analyzing what political actors say. Par-ties and their candidates may employ pop-ulist language in efforts to win votes. Thusparty manifestos and leader speeches maycontain populist elements. Human codingand artificial intelligence methods can de-tect and quantify the degree of populist con-tent in both.

Measuring the degree of populism in po-litical actors’ public statements allows us toobserve how populism relates to ideology.Figure 2 arrays party manifestos and partyleader and candidate speeches from West-ern Europe along a left-right issue dimen-sion, then measures the strength of populistideas expressed by these parties and lead-ers. Strong populists are labeled with theiracronym. As can be seen, there are promi-nent cases of populism on both sides.

Surveying experts. Academic experts havespecialized knowledge about party politicsin a given country. They can reliably scoreparties and leaders on populism as well astheir stances on their left-right ideologicalposition.

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Figure 2: Parties’ and Leaders’ levelof populism along Left-Right IdeologicalSpectrum in Western Europe, 2010–2015.

Abbreviations: SYRIZA = Coalition of the Radi-cal Left (Greece); Linke = Die Linke (Germany);IU-UP = Izquierda Unida-Unidad Popular (Spain);NPD = Nationaldemokratische Partei Deustchlands(Germany); PVV = Partij voor de Vrijheid (Nether-lands); ANEL = Independent Greeks (Greece); SVP= Schweitzerische Volkspartei (Switzerland); Frei-heitliche Partei Ostereichs (Austria).

Figure 3 orders presidents in Latin Amer-ica from Left (bottom) to Right (top) andcontrasts this with their level of populism.Expert assessment shows an overlap be-tween populism and ideological leftismamong presidents in the region. Promi-nent examples include Nicolas Maduro(Venezuela), Evo Morales (Bolivia), andRafael Correa (Ecuador).

However, the experts place some LatinAmerican populist forces (parties and pres-idents) on the ideological right. So whilein some regions populists are more suc-cessful on one side of the ideological spec-trum, this does not rule out their successacross the spectrum.

From Measurement to Analysis

Identifying how strongly citizens and polit-ical actors espouse populist ideas is a criti-cal first step toward a global understandingof populism. Each method described here

Figure 3: Expert Scores of Latin AmericanPresidents on Populism and Left-RightIdeology, 2015

contributes a piece of the larger puzzle ofpopulism.

Public opinion surveys illuminate the in-fluence of populist attitudes on decisions tovote for populist forces. Expert surveys per-mit us to assess how populist forces com-bine their rhetoric and issue stances to at-tract populist voters. Party manifestos andleader speeches indicate the range of pop-ulist options for voters. And surveyingelected representatives reflects the successof populist parties. Below we build on thesemeasures to take up these questions.

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WHERE DO POPULISTS RISE TO

PROMINENCE OR POWER?Populism is a global phenomenon thatcan be witnessed in both newer and long-established democratic political systems,from Hungary and Venezuela to Switzer-land and Austria. The election of DonaldTrump in the United States is just the latestand most visible example of a populist gain-ing access to executive power in the West.

Research indicates that the rise of pop-ulism in national politics follows a com-mon pattern across time and space.

Populism Requires a Sense ofGrievance

Commentators often focus on economic orother policy failures as the source of sup-port for populism. However, this is notenough. Populist forces rise to power whencitizens perceive that policy failures resultfrom the intentional acts or indifferenceof their representatives. This creates asense of grievance. Common grievances to-day include the sense that representativesare technocratic and deaf to voters’ con-cerns about social and economic inequality(prevalent in Latin America) or immigra-tion and government regulation (prevalentin Europe). Corruption scandals reinforcethese concerns.

Although necessary, a context ofgrievance is still insufficient for pop-ulism – populist political actors play anessential role in highlighting neglected is-sues and framing them in a populist way.For example, while populist parties tookadvantage of the economic crisis in Greeceto mobilize voters, populist messages werenot pushed on the agenda in Ireland orPortugal in a similar context.

Political Institutions Play a Role inConstraining the Rise of PopulistForces

Populist forces almost always rise to powerwithin democratic structures. Democraticpolitical institutions in a country determinehow easy it is for populist forces to enter the

legislative and executive branches of gov-ernment. Two institutional structures areespecially important. For one, a country’selectoral rules determine how open a po-litical system is to newcomers (both pop-ulist and non-populist).

The type of executive is another cru-cial institutional factor. It determines ifvoters elect their government directly (i.e.presidential systems) or if the governmentis responsible to a parliamentary major-ity, and hence, voted into office indirectly(i.e. parliamentary systems). More specif-ically, presidential systems offer two dis-tinct electoral routes to power – the leg-islative and the executive branch. Unlikein parliamentary systems, the direct elec-tion of the executive offers populist con-tenders a chance to gain executive powereven without a majority in the legislature,as Rafael Correa did in Ecuador in 2007 orHugo Chavez did in Venezuela in 1999.

In parliamentary systems, however, pop-ulist parties may enter governing coalitionswith established political parties, like theFreedom Party in Austria (FPO), the Partyfor Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands orthe Danish People’s Party (DF). In othercases, populist parties have gained majoritycontrol of the parliament on their own, likethe Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Polandand Fidesz in Hungary.

Established Political Parties Play anImportant Gatekeeping Role

Through their nominating rules, parties candetermine whether or not populist candi-dates easily rise from within their ranks. Atthe same time, these same rules determinehow readily parties can adapt their electoralappeal and address populist grievances. Ifestablished parties fail in their role as gate-keepers, populist forces may sometimesemerge from within them. This can hap-pen when the leader of an established party,such as Fidesz in Hungary, transforms theparty, or when an outsider captivates andtransforms an established party, like Trumpand the Republican Party in the UnitedStates.

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The Media Play a Role in AmplifyingPopulist Messages and Polarizing So-ciety

Like other politicians, populists rely on themedia to transmit their messages to citizens.Media have traditionally played a gate-keeping role in politics by informing citi-zens and interpreting political events andpolitical messages. However, three featuresof modern media have transformed thatrole and amplified the ability of populists tocommunicate their message. The first is tra-ditional media’s willingness to engage insensationalism to win market share. If thecountry’s media is concerned with viewer-ship, they may try to exploit the attentionthat populist forces generate by amplifyingpopulist message dissemination.

Second, social media provides a tool fordirect communication that allows populiststo work around gatekeepers in traditionalmedia. Finally, the multiplication of me-dia sources allows citizens to choose newssources that confirm their prior beliefs, afactor that facilitates social polarization andmakes it difficult for traditional politiciansto reach out to populist voters.

WHO SUPPORTS POPULISTS

AND WHY?

As noted above, populist attitudes arewidespread among citizens and indepen-dent of the presence of populist forces ina country. There is, however, little to norelationship between the potential demandfor populism among the masses and theamount of populist supply offered by politi-cians, parties and movements.

At the same time, within countries withrelevant populist forces, we find that peo-ple with populist attitudes support andvote for populist politicians and engagewith populist parties and movements.Hence it is important to understand whosupports populist forces and why.

Demographics of Populists are Dra-matically Different from Radical RightSupporters

Unlike radical right sentiments, populistattitudes are equally strong in men andwomen, and are unrelated to age, incomeor education. Populism is only associ-ated with authoritarian personality, andanti-immigrant or xenophobic sentiments,when attached to the radical right, makingthese topics prevalent issues of the politicaldiscourse. These are not essential populistissues and are only associated to the radicalright character of some, but definitely notall, populists.

Ethnic Minorities Are Less Populist

The majority ethnic group in a countryis not necessarily more populist, due tothe diversity of opinions within this group.However, ethnic minorities are less likelyto identify with the people-centric compo-nent of the populist message, and are lesslikely to be populists. The main exceptionis those who harbor secessionist goals (e.g.Scotland, Catalonia, or Quebec) where anti-elitist messages against the national govern-ment resonate.

Psychological Profiles of Populist Vot-ers

Populist attitudes are also strongly associ-ated with:

• Lower personal life satisfaction;

• Conspiratorial thinking;

• Dissatisfaction with how democracyis working (a perceived democraticdeficit);

• Feelings of being treated unfairly bythe state and society (relative depriva-tion);

• Other grievances which vary across so-cial and national contexts.

Essentially, psychological characteristicsand social identity seem more importantin explaining populist attitudes than demo-graphics.

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Blame and Emotional Appeals TriggerPopulist Attitudes

Since populist attitudes are present in so-cieties independent of economic develop-ment, region, and the presence of populistforces, researchers explore the less obviouscauses of how and when populist attitudesexpress themselves.

Political elites trigger populist attitudesin the masses using communication tech-niques. For example, blaming problemson the actions of specific groups or indi-viduals rather than on impersonal eventsor circumstances, leads people to expressmore populist attitudes and support pop-ulist candidates. Emotional triggers thatcapitalize on anger, fear and resentmentalso resonate. Packaging political messageswith these cues makes populist individu-als more likely to support both populistforces and their proposed policy solutions.

Countering Populism with PositiveDiscourse

Can anything counterbalance populist at-titudes? Ongoing research hones in ontwo possible counterweights: positive emo-tional frames (care, gratitude and happi-ness) and mutual recognition of the oth-ers’ views and their legitimacy or affirma-tion. While we are optimistic that these fac-tors may partially mitigate the expressionof populist attitudes, psychological researchsuggests they will not fully outweigh nega-tive triggers.

HOW DO WE RESPOND TO

POPULISTS IN AND OUT OF

GOVERNMENT?Traditional political parties, social move-ments, civil society actors and internationalorganizations have responded to the pop-ulist challenge with a variety of strategies,both constitutional and extra-constitutional.In assessing these strategies, we need toconsider contexts when a populist leaderor party has been elected to executive of-

fice (Incumbents) versus when they are anemerging or growing party with some rep-resentation but not yet holding executive of-fice (Challengers).

Constitutional Responses Emphasiz-ing Engagement Rather Than Contain-ment Are Most Successful

Engagement to respond to voter complaints.The first message is that engagement withvoters is the most successful strategy tocounter populism, whether the populistsare in or out of power. Non-populistsshould proactively mobilize voters by ac-knowledging voter grievances and con-structing their positive alternative, with-out succumbing to the temptation to copythe divisive appeal employed by populistforces. A tit-for-tat strategy of vilifying anddividing simply deepens the polarization.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt (UnitedStates) exemplifies the engagementstrategy. While using a less-polarizingdiscourse, he proposed massive socialprograms to address citizen concerns inthe Great Depression in order to co-opt theradical populist appeals of politicians likeLouisiana’s Governor Huey Long.

Coalition-building to mobilize voters. Oncein power, populist forces have demon-strated that they represent at least a plu-rality, if not a majority, of voters, and theypersistently appeal to that mandate to en-act their policies and reforms. A counter-mobilization of voters therefore often re-quires a broad coalition of parties bothto challenge populist forces at the ballotbox, and to challenge any behavior thatrestricts civil liberties and minority rights.The Venezuelan opposition coalition Demo-cratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) success-fully challenged the Chavista’s legislativedominance when they united to use thevery electoral formulas enacted by Chavezto favor the majority party: in 2015 theywon a two-thirds legislative majority. Incontrast, fragmented oppositions in Hun-gary, Nicaragua, and Venezuela in 2016-18 election cycles failed to present crediblechallenges to populist governments.

Containment through legal limits on pop-

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Political Responses to Populists In and Out of Government.

Populist Incumbent Populist Challenger

ConstitutionalActions

Mobilize voters Engagement: address voters’grievances with non-divisivemessages

Build a broad coalition Cordon sanitaire: domestic con-tainment

Legal accountability: Impeach-ment or indictment

Third-party action: internationalcontainment

Third-party action: Mediation,Incentives, Sanctions

Extra-constitutionalActions

Electoral Boycott Electoral coup: disqualifyingparties or candidates

Ousting the incumbent: Militaryor societal coup

Ousting the incumbent: Ques-tionable impeachment

ulist parties or candidates. In contrast toan engagement approach which proactivelymobilizes voters, a containment approachuses constitutional methods to limit theelectoral or legal viability of the populistparty or politician. For example, judicialor legislative actions to indict or impeacha populist incumbent for cause can elim-inate, at least temporarily, his/her viabil-ity. Brazilian President Fernando Collor deMelo was impeached in 1992 for corruption,and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconiwas disqualified from running for office af-ter indictment for tax fraud in 2013. Thisstrategy, however, may not be long-lasting.We also note it is a favorite strategy ofsome populist incumbents, although oftenon dubious constitutional grounds, such asMaduro’s diqualification of opposition can-didates in Venezuela.

Containment through exclusion – a riskystrategy. When populist forces are emergingas viable contenders, some countries takea cordon sanitaire approach to containment,

treating populist forces as a pariah. An ex-ample is how Austria’s main parties treatedthe right populist Freedom Party (FPO) be-fore 2000. The risk of such ostracizingstrategies is that they play into the pop-ulist message of an establishment politi-cal elite excluding a significant sector of thepopulation, and thus may increase the elec-toral appeal of the excluded party. Indeed,the FPO grew in size until it was includedas junior partner with the conservative Aus-trian People’s Party in a new moderation-through-inclusion strategy in the 2000 gov-ernment coalition. The subsequent implo-sion of the FPO should not be taken asa sign of successful moderation-through-inclusion, however. Instead, the partyfractured and the more radical wing thatopposed moderation regained strength toagain join the government as junior coali-tion partner in 2017.

Third-party international roles as support-ing actors. Some longer-governing pop-ulists have expanded executive authority

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and weakened accountability mechanisms.In these cases, it is a daunting task fordomestic actors alone to challenge them.Third-parties are then called on to help me-diate improved electoral conditions or toprovide incentives and disincentives to dis-suade the incumbent’s abuse of power.

However, international attempts at con-tainment also contain risks. Again in Aus-tria, the European Union acting as third-party attempted to contain the FPO by acoordinated diplomatic sanctions strategythat pressured the dominant party to mod-erate the populist FPO. But foreign condem-nation also caused a rally-around-the-flageffect within Austria.

The lesson for third party action is thatit should play a supporting, rather thandominant, role to domestic actors, and thatits effectiveness depends on the leverageenjoyed by the third party. A demoral-ized Venezuelan opposition, for example,counted on international leverage throughsanctions and mediation to force PresidentNicolas Maduro to negotiate fair electionconditions in 2018. When that failed, theydivided over whether to participate in theunfair electoral process, and Maduro con-firmed another six years in power. Onthe other hand, the coordination of theEU’s leverage and the opposition strategyin Macedonia forced Gruevsky to improveelectoral conditions and step down in 2016.

Extra-constitutional Responses AreRisky and Often Backfire

Extra-constitutional responses betraydemocratic principles and play into thehands of populists by confirming theirfears about nefarious politicians conspir-ing against the people. Questionableimpeachment processes by Congress orjoint civil-military action to remove anunpopular incumbent can backfire in termsof public confidence in democratic insti-tutions. The Honduran Supreme Court’ssecret order to the military to removePresident Manuel Zelaya from power in2009 resulted in a protracted constitutionalconflict and eventually to internationalcriticism and mass protests against Juan Or-

lando Hernandez’s controversial re-electionin 2017.

Electoral boycott is also a risky strategy. Inunusual circumstances of sufficiently or-ganized domestic opposition and interna-tional leverage, they may succeed in forc-ing an incumbent to improve electoral con-ditions, as when the Macedonian opposi-tion threatened a boycott and the EU me-diated new conditions for the 2016 election.But in general it is better to participate evenin flawed elections and to force the govern-ment to compete than to allow it to win withno effort. Organized vote monitoring thatunmasks fraud, in turn, can provide lever-age to demand a change in the larger politi-cal rules of the game.

Failed opposition boycotts are exempli-fied in Venezuela. In the 2005 legislativeelections, the opposition boycotted despitemediation by the Organization of Ameri-can States (OAS) and EU to improve elec-toral conditions, thus paving the way forChavez’s complete control for the nextdecade.

Extra-constitutional responses may alsothreaten democracy itself. Repeated massmobilizations by the “yellow-shirt” urban,middle-class protests in Thailand againstThaksin and Shinawatra eventually endedin 2014 with a coup that installed the mili-tary in power and that continues to blockdemocratic elections today.

FUTURE RESEARCH ON POP-ULIST CONSEQUENCES AND

THEIR MITIGATION

Several current research projects are assess-ing additional consequences of populistattitudes and governments. These include,but are not limited to, political polarizationand tribalism, radicalization, citizen sup-port for the erosion of core democratic in-stitutions and for centralization of power inthe hands of a populist executive.

The role of social movements and civilsociety organizations is also understudied,whether they may serve as gatekeepers or

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are newly created as parallel sets of orga-nizations in the polarized context of pop-ulism.

We need to better understand the inter-action of economic and cultural forces increating the anxieties that feed populism,including economic inequalities and declin-ing mobility, or fears of diffusion of culturalvalues or group status in a society.

We also hope to find institutional ar-rangements, interventions, communica-tion and discursive strategies that mitigateeither populist attitudes or, more impor-tantly, the expression of these populist atti-tudes in individuals who are susceptible topopulist messages.

While unexplored to date, once the effectsof populism set in and society polarizesgreatly, reconciliation strategies used inethnic conflict, civil war or human rightsatrocities could be used to regain social co-hesion in such contexts.

Finally, populist foreign policy coor-dination (such as the ALBA countriesorganized by Venezuela, or the Polish-Hungarian coordination in the EU) andtheir role in international relations are beingstudied.

FURTHER INFORMATION

Kirk A. Hawkins, Ryan E. Carlin, Lev-ente Littvay, and Cristobal RoviraKaltwasser (eds). Forthcoming. TheIdeational Approach to Populism: Concept,Theory, and Analysis. Extremism andDemocracy Series. Abingdon: Routledge.https://tinyurl.com/teampopulismbook

Jennifer McCoy and Murat Somer, GuestEditors. 2018. Special Issue on Polarizationand Democracy: A Janus-faced Relation-ship with Pernicious Consequences. Ameri-can Behavioral Scientist 62(1).

Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kalt-wasser. 2017. Populism: A Very ShortIntroduction. Oxford University Press.https://tinyurl.com/shortintroduction

TEAM POPULISM

Team Populism brings together renownedscholars from Europe and the Americasto study the causes and consequences ofpopulism. We seek to answer why somepopulist parties, leaders or movements aremore successful than others.

Our general argument is that populismis best understood as a combination of in-dividual and contextual issues (“demandside”) and the availability of successfulleaders (“supply side”).

We expand on this broad framework bystudying multiple levels of analysis, and wedraw on different methodological tools, in-cluding experiments, surveys, and compar-ative analysis. To facilitate this work, in-dividual teams are organized around func-tional tasks.

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Team Populism Coordinator

Kirk A. HawkinsBrigham Young Universitykirk hawkins@byu.edu

Team Leaders

Ryan E. Carlin (Experiments)Georgia State Universityrcarlin@gsu.edu

Bruno Castanho Silva (Text Analysis)University of Colognebcsilva@wiso.uni-koeln.de

Levente Littvay (Mass Surveys)Central European Universitylittvayl@ceu.edu

Jennifer L. McCoy (Policy and Outreach)Georgia State Universityjmccoy@gsu.edu

Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser (Theory andCase Studies)Diego Portales Universitycristobal.rovira@mail.udp.cl

Saskia P. Ruth and Ioannis Andreadis (EliteSurveys)GIGA German Institute of Global and AreaStudies; Aristotle University Thessalonikisaskia.ruth@giga-hamburg.dejohn@auth.gr

Steven M. Van Hauwaert (Elite Interviews)University of Mainzvanhauwaert@politik.uni-mainz.de

Nina Wiesehomeier (Expert Surveys)IE Universitynwiesehomeier@faculty.ie.edu

Duration: Since September 2014.

Budget: 235,386 EUR.

Who Funded Us: Brigham Young Univer-sity; Center for the Study of Ethnicity, Cit-izenship, and Migration; Central EuropeanUniversity; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; GIGAHamburg; GSU Center for Human Rightsand Democracy; Hans Seidel Stiftung; IEUniversity; International Society of Politi-cal Psychology; University of Connecticut;University of Zurich.Project website:http://www.teampopulism.com