ownership structure financial structure and r&d investment evid
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Singapore Management UniversityInstitutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access) Dissertations and Theses
2010
Ownership Structure, Financial Structure andR&D Investment: Evidence from Korean FirmsYanghua ChenSingapore Management University, [email protected]
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Recommended CitationChen, Yanghua, "Ownership Structure, Financial Structure and R&D Investment: Evidence from Korean Firms" (2010). Dissertationsand Theses Collection (Open Access). Paper 69.
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
AND R&D INVESTMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM KOREAN
FIRMS
CHEN YANGHUA
SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY
2010
Ownership Structure, Financial Structure and R&D
Investments: Evidence from Korean Firms
by
Chen Yanghua
Submitted to Lee Kong Chian School of Business in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Management
Supervisor: Prof Young Rok CHOI
Singapore Management University
2010
Copyright (2010) Chen Yanghua
Ownership Structure, Financial Structure and R&D Investments:
Evidence from Korean Firms
Chen Yanghua
Abstract
Understanding factors that can enhance a firm‟s innovativeness is of critical
concern in management research. Prior studies in strategy and financial economics have
advanced our understanding of how resource allocation into innovation is shaped in a
firm, mainly from the perspectives of ownership and financial structures. However, the
extant literature is incomplete, because it treats ownership and financial structures as
separate determinants, even though theoretical arguments and empirical evidences
suggest that they are interdependent. This study investigates the determinants of firm‟s
R&D investments by bridging ownership and financial structures. Ownerships held by
inside and external owners are considered for ownership structure, while financial slack
and leverage ratio are considered for financial structures.
Exploiting simultaneous equation modeling technique and data sample of Korean
firms, I found the direct and indirect effects of different types of ownership on R&D
investments. Different from previous studies, this paper showed that financial factors
such as financial slack and leverage ratio that were used to be considered as determinants
of R&D investments are just mediators through which ownership structure affects firm‟s
strategic decision indirectly.
i
Contents
Acknowledgement ......................................................................................................... iii
Chapter 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2 Literature Review ............................................................................................ 5
2.1 R&D investments .................................................................................................. 5
2.1.1 The importance of R&D investments .............................................................. 6
2.1.2 The characteristics of R&D investments .......................................................... 7
2.1.3 R&D investments and firm value .................................................................... 7
2.1.4 The determinants of R&D investments ............................................................ 8
2.2 Ownership sructure ................................................................................................ 9
2.2.1 Controlling owner ......................................................................................... 10
2.2.2 Institutional investors .................................................................................... 13
2.2.3 Ownership structure and R&D investments ................................................... 14
2.2.4 Empirical evidence........................................................................................ 15
2.3 Financial structure ............................................................................................... 17
2.3.1 Financial slack and R&D investments ........................................................... 17
2.3.2 Capital structure and R&D investments ......................................................... 19
2.4 Ownership structure and financial structure ......................................................... 24
2.4.1 Ownership structure and financial slack ........................................................ 24
2.4.2 Ownership structure and capital structure ...................................................... 27
2.5 Summary ............................................................................................................. 29
Chapter 3 Theory and Hypotheses ................................................................................. 30
3.1 Ownership structure and R&D investments .......................................................... 30
3.1.1 Controlling ownership and R&D investments ............................................... 30
3.1.2 Institutional ownership and R&D investments ............................................... 32
3.2 The mediating effects of financial structures ........................................................ 34
3.2.1 Financial slack and R&D investments ........................................................... 34
3.2.2 Leverage ratio and R&D investments ............................................................ 35
ii
3.2.3 The mediating effects of financial slack ........................................................ 36
3.2.4 The mediating effects of leverage ratio .......................................................... 38
Chapter 4 Empirical Study............................................................................................. 42
4.1 Data and measurements ....................................................................................... 42
4.1.1 Sample .......................................................................................................... 42
4.1.2 Measurements ............................................................................................... 42
4.2 Summary statistics and model design ................................................................... 45
4.2.1 Summary statistics ........................................................................................ 45
4.2.2 Model ........................................................................................................... 49
4.3 Results ................................................................................................................. 50
4.4 Robustness test .................................................................................................... 53
Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusion ............................................................................ 58
5.1 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 58
5.2 Discussions .......................................................................................................... 58
5.3 Limitations .......................................................................................................... 62
5.4 Implications ......................................................................................................... 63
Appendix A ................................................................................................................... 64
Appendix B ................................................................................................................... 66
Appendix C ................................................................................................................... 68
Appendix D ................................................................................................................... 69
References ..................................................................................................................... 70
iii
Acknowledgement
I highly appreciate my supervisor Prof. Young Rok CHOI, who patiently
motivates me to conceive and finish the thesis. This thesis owes much to his thoughtful
and helpful comments. This paper would not have been possible without his guidance and
inspiration. I want to thank the Lee Kong Chian School of Business for giving me this
opportunity to study at Singapore and to do the research work.
Also, my gratitude is devoted to Prof. Kenneth HUANG Guang-Lih and Prof.
Burkhard SCHRAGE. Thanks for having reading a draft of this thesis and having made
their precious comments and suggestions. As for the left errors, the responsibility for the
text rests completely upon the author. My classmates from the Department of
Management support me in my research work. I want to thank them for all their help,
support and valuable hints. I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who directly
or indirectly offered his or her help to this thesis.
I cannot end without thanking my family, on whose constant encouragement and
love I have relied throughout my life. My deepest appreciation goes to them, namely my
parents and my two sisters.
1
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The importance of R&D investment has received increasing attentions from
policy-makers and researchers in the fields of economics and strategic management, since
a lot of empirical evidence have showed that investment in R&D has a significant
positive effect on economic growth. The proponents of new growth theory such as Romer
(1990), Lucas (1988) all realized the contribution of R&D activities in pushing economic
growth. In the OECD report written by Guellec and Van-Pottelsberghe (2001), they
found that one percent increase in R&D stock would contribute 0.13 percent increase in
the growth of multi-factor productivity. These studies emphasized the importance of
R&D investments in contributing to country‟s economic growth and enhancing
comprehensive national power from the macro level.
As the importance of R&D stock to a country, appropriate expenditure on R&D
investments is also essential for firm‟s survival and growth, especially for firms in R&D-
intensive industry. This paper tries to investigate the determinants of R&D investments
from micro level, namely from firm‟s specific characteristics. As Franko (1989) pointed
out, firms especially in technologically industries rely on R&D investments to guarantee
firm‟s viability and generate sustained competitive advantages. However, firms differ in
committing their resources to R&D investments even after controlling for the industry,
firm size and performance (Ettlie, 1998; Mosakowski, 1993). Rumelt et al. (1994)
claimed that the presence of heterogeneity in R&D expenditures on the firm-level is still
the fundamental research in the area of strategic management, because understanding the
differences in firm‟s R&D investments may help us explain the existence of
2
heterogeneity in other dimensions, for example, firm performance and absorptive
capability.
Reviewing the literature, we can find two research streams on the determinants of
R&D investments. The first stream concerns about the influence of ownership structure,
which is mainly based on agency theory. For example, Lee and O‟Neill (2003)
investigated the different effects of ownership concentration on firm‟s R&D intensity in
US and Japanese contexts. The second research line focuses on the role financial
structures such as financial slack and debt conditions. Researches done in this stream are
mainly based on behavioral search theory, pecking order theory, signaling, and agency
theory. For instance, Long and Ravenscraf (1993) studied the impact of leverage ratio on
R&D intensity for firms undergoing a leveraged buyout. However, most of previous
studies treated ownership and financial structures as separate determinants, even though
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest that they are interdependent.
Therefore, the extant literature ignores the potential interplay of ownership
structures and financial structures in decisions where R&D investments are determined. I
argue that this void may lead to a serious limitation in understanding firms‟ R&D
investments, because the current division of the literature may give incomplete
understanding of what are the relationships between the antecedents of R&D investments
(due to missing some relationship between ownership structures and financial structures
such as mediation relationships) and what are the consequences of the relationships
between those antecedents on R&D investments (such as over-investments etc.).
Therefore, identifying the direct and indirect effects of the salient factors of R&D
3
investments in a simultaneous model will help us to reveal new insights on the
relationship as well as avoid any false attribution of causality between those structure
factors and R&D investments.
The aim of this paper is to provide a systematic view on the determinants of R&D
investments on firm level, which has important implications in explaining firm‟s superior
performance and competitive advantages. Therefore, the main research questions of this
paper are: What are the determinants of R&D investments? What are the influences of
controlling owners and institutional owners in emerging markets? Are financial structures
such as financial slack and leverage ratio mediating factors in affecting R&D investments?
This paper contributes to the literature as follows: 1) it extends our understanding
of how ownership structure shapes strategic decisions such as R&D investments in
emerging markets. Since La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessons et al. (2000)‟s finding that
there is little separation between control and ownership in emerging markets all around
the world, many studies have been done to discern the role of controlling owners.
However, whether these controlling owners are long-term oriented and promote R&D
investments are still not clear. What‟s more, the drastic debate regarding the effect of
institutional investors on firms‟ R&D investments are most based on US governance
mechanism. I argue that different governance mechanisms and environment such as legal
protection may change their orientations. This paper enriches our understanding of their
roles in emerging markets. 2) It fills the literature void by bridging the relationships
between ownership structure and financial structure, which was neglected by previous
researchers. Kim et al. (2008) argued that ownership structure has moderating effect on
4
the relationship between financial slack and R&D investments. However, this paper
views financial structures such as financial slack and leverage ratio as mediating factors.
And my empirical study showed support for this perspective. 3) It verifies some
conventional wisdom such as the role of leverage ratio on R&D investments in Korean
context.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I reviewed the
literature regarding the roles of ownership structure such as controlling ownership and
institutional ownership and financial structures such as financial slack and leverage ratio
in determining firm‟s R&D investments, and reviewed the potential links between
ownership structure and financial structure. In Chapter 3, I proposed the main hypotheses
about the relationship between the antecedents of R&D investments and their influences
on R&D investments. In Chapter 4, I did the empirical test and presented the results.
Finally, I concluded with implications and pointed out the directions for future research.
5
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Since this paper aims to investigate the relationships between the antecedents of
R&D investments and their impacts on R&D investments, in the following parts I will
review the literature regarding these constructs such as R&D investments, ownership
structure and their relationships. First, some aspects of R&D investments such as its
importance, characteristics, determinants and its contribution to firm‟s value are
introduced in detail. According to the literature, there are two main determinants of R&D
investments that are wildly identified by previous scholars, namely ownership structure
and financial structure. Thus, previous studies about ownership structure and financial
structure are reviewed respectively. Finally, this paper provides a short summary of this
literature review part.
2.1 R&D investments
R&D is the abbreviation of research and development. R&D activity refers to
"creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of
knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of
knowledge to devise new applications" (OECD, 2008), includes fundamental research,
applied research and development test. The scale of R&D activities or R&D intensity
constitutes an important criterion to measure the scientific and technological strength or
core competency of a country. Similarly, the scale of R&D activities untaken by a firm
represents its value and competitiveness. Almost all famous international companies view
R&D activities as the blood of a firm and invest lots of resources in R&D activities. In
6
the following paragraphs, this paper will talk about the importance of R&D investments,
the characteristics of R&D investments, determinants and its contribution to firm‟s value.
2.1.1 The importance of R&D investments
The importance of R&D has received increasing attentions from policy-makers
and researchers in the fields of economics and strategic management, since a lot of
empirical evidences have showed that investment in R&D has a significant positive effect
on economic growth (Bettina and Nigel, 2008). From the macro level, the proponents of
new growth theory such as Romer (1990), Lucas (1988) all realized the contribution of
R&D activities in pushing economic growth. In the OECD report written by Guellec and
Van-Pottelsberghe (2001), they found that one percent increase in R&D stock would
contribute 0.13 percent increase in the growth of multi-factor productivity. From the
micro level, firm faces more competitions as the economies globalized. The appropriate
expenditure spends on R&D activities is very important for firm‟s survival and growth,
especially for the technology intensive industry such as IT industry (Chan et al., 1990).
These R&D activities are mainly the sources of innovativeness and help firm generate
sustained competitive advantages (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Franko, 1989; Hall, 1998).
However, firms differ in committing their resources to R&D investments even after
controlling for the industry, firm size and performance (Ettlie, 1998; Mosakowski, 1993).
Since strategy literature shifted away from industry structure and towards firm
heterogeneity, theories such as resource-based view are developed to explain firm
heterogeneity. Rumelt et al. (1994) claimed that the presence of heterogeneity in R&D
expenditures on the firm-level is still the fundamental research in the area of strategic
7
management, because understanding the differences in firm‟s R&D investments may help
us explain the existence of heterogeneity in other dimensions, for example, firm
performance and core capability.
2.1.2 The characteristics of R&D investments
R&D investment is one kind of special investments that its result is usually
unknown. Mezghanni (2009) concluded that R&D investment has the following three
characteristics: high asset specificity, long investment horizon and high failure rate. High
asset specificity means that the outputs of R&D activities are specialized and can only be
fully deployed in its only firm (Williamson, 1988). If such kind of asset is transferred to
another firm, it will lose value to some extent. In order to get innovative technologies in
some area, firms need to input a lot of human and financial resources continuously, which
means long investment horizon. High failure rate refers to the high uncertainty of R&D
activities, means that the expenditure in R&D investments may not get any return or may
get some return only after many years. Because of these characteristics of R&D activities,
financing for them is different from other kind of investments (Bah and Dumontier, 2001;
Singh and Faircloth, 2005).
2.1.3 R&D investments and firm value
It is commonly shared by the literature that R&D investments are crucial to the
technology intensive firms and ensure their sustainability and competitiveness
(Mezghanni, 2009). Hence, it is expected that R&D investments should help improve
firm performance. Early empirical studies investigated the relationship between R&D
investments and firm value with two approaches. First approach studied the market
8
reaction about announcements of changes in R&D spending. For example, Jarrell et al.
(1985) reported a positive impact of announcements that firms were starting new R&D
projects; Woolridge (1988) studied the market response to the announcements of long-
term investments including R&D projects, and got the same conclusion with Jarrell et al.
(1985).
The other approach investigated the relationship between R&D investments and
firm value. Ben-Zion (1984) found that R&D intensity has a positive effect on firm‟s
market value. Using a panel of British manufacturing firms, Blundell et al. (1999)
reported a robust and positive relationship between the headcounts of innovation and
market value. Connolly and Hirschey (1984) found the positive effect of R&D
investments on Tobin‟s Q. Using a sample of Australian firms, Chan et al. (2007) found
that higher R&D intensity is associated with better firm value regardless of the
accounting methods used. Above abundant of empirical studies confirmed our
conventional wisdom that it is worth investing in R&D activities.
2.1.4 The determinants of R&D investments
According to the upper-echelons perspective, firms‟ actions are reflections of
their top management teams (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Therefore, decisions about the
magnitude and allocation of R&D investments are at the discretion of top management
team. Thus, the amount of expenditure on R&D activities depends on managers‟ risk
aversion and preferences. Exploiting the resource-based view, it is obvious that the
resources a firm possesses will determine the type of strategies it will take. What‟s more,
managers‟ decisions and behavior are monitored by various types of shareholders (Jensen
9
and Meckling, 1976). Hence, while shareholders may affect firms‟ R&D investment
decisions through monitoring managers, resources such as internal finance constraint
firms from investing more in R&D activities.
Based on above logic, we can divide literature about the determinants of R&D
investments into two streams. The first stream focuses on the role financial structures
such as financial slack and debt conditions. Researches done in this stream are mainly
based on behavioral search theory, pecking order theory, signaling, and agency theory.
The second stream concentrates on the influence of ownership structure. Because
different types of owners have different preferences, investment horizons and monitoring
power (Hoskisson et al., 2002), they may have different influences on firm‟s strategic
decisions such R&D investments. Researches that have been done in this stream mostly
draw on agency theory. This paper will review the determinants of R&D investments
according to these two streams.
2.2 Ownership structure
As Williamson (1963) suggested, ownership structure is the basis of corporate
governance. Abundant studies have been done on the effects of ownership structure on
firm performance, capital structure, innovation and diversification strategy and other
aspects. Thus, the research studying about the effects of ownership structure on R&D
investments becomes one main area. Since controlling ownership and institutional
ownership are of most significance in ownership structure, especially in emerging
markets, the following sections are going to review the literature on the roles of
institutional investors and controlling owners.
10
2.2.1 Controlling owner
Different from developed countries such as US and UK where shareholder
protection is good, publicly listed firms in most countries are usually characterized with
concentrated ownership structure and controlled by a single and large shareholder
(Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio et al., 2002). Previous studies name
this kind of shareholder as controlling owner or controlling shareholder. These
controlling owners are usually the founders of firms or their family members. According
to the data of Classens et al. (2000), more than two thirds of controlling shareholders in
Asian countries are family owners. In firms with controlling owners, there are little
separation between control and ownership. These controlling owners generally own more
control rights than cash flow rights through a pyramidal structure, cross-share holdings
and issuing multi-class shares (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Yeh, 2005). Reviewing the
literature on the role of controlling shareholder, we can find two opposite perspectives,
namely agency perspective and stewardship perspective.
Agency perspective
According to the early work of agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976)
argued that the interest conflicts between owners and managers are minimized in family
firms. However, they also noted that family owners have the incentive to expropriate
from minority shareholders. Later researchers developed this view as principle-principle
conflict perspective (PP). This expropriation can happen because controlling shareholder
can not only control how to run his firm, but also determine how to distribute firm‟s
profits (Classens and Fan, 2003). As long as they don‟t have 100% ownership, they may
11
consume lots of perquisites before distribute profits to other shareholders. La Porta et al.
(2000) emphasized that expropriation from minority shareholders are more likely to
happen in countries where there is limited investor protection. They also listed the forms
of expropriations such as asset stripping, resource transferring and ownership dilution.
Thus, while controlling shareholders largely reduce the agency cost of managers, whether
their presences are good for firms depends on their expropriation behaviors.
Based on PP perspective, researchers have done lots of studies hoping to find the
evidence of expropriation (Joh, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Wiwattanakantang,
2001; Yeh, 2005). Using data from Korean firms during 1993-1997, Joh (2003) found
that controlling shareholders‟ expropriation happens when their ownership is lower. His
study indicates the negative effect of control-ownership disparity. He also found “the
tunneling” behavior, which is one way of expropriation among affiliates of large business
groups. Exploiting the data from Taiwan listed firms, Yeh (2005) got the same
conclusion as Joh (2003) that the corporate value is lower when the gap between control
rights and cash flow rights is larger. Wiwattanakantang (2001) reported the positive
relationship between firm value and family ownership for Thailand firms where family
owners usually don‟t adopt pyramidal structures. Above empirical studies seem to
confirm the expropriation behavior of controlling owners.
Stewardship perspective
While agency theory assumes that man is self-interested, stewardship theory
argues that owners and managers are motivated by high order needs such as growth,
achievement and self-actualization, and they promote pro-organizational and
12
collectivistic behaviors (Davis et al., 1997). Since family owners‟ fortune and reputation
are closely tied to their businesses, they have deep emotional investment and
psychological attached to their firms (Bubolz, 2001). Burkart et al. (2003) and Casson
(1999) claimed that family owners generally want to pass their firms to next generations.
Anderson and Reeb (2003) identified that strategic investments in family firms are long-
term oriented. Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2006) and David and Laurie (2008)
suggested that family firms tend to have long-term orientation in other activities, say,
maintaining long run relationships with debt holders and suppliers. All these points seem
to support Miller and Le Breton-Miller‟s (2006) argument that stewardship attitude is
more likely to breed in family business.
Since most controlling shareholders are family owners, there are several studies
trying to discern whether controlling owners are stewards (Eddleston and Kellermanns,
2007; Miller et al., 2008; Zahra et al., 2008). Miller et al. (2008) reported totally support
for stewardship perspective. For instance, they found long-term orientation in strategic
investments, firm‟s reputation and relationships with employees and customers in family
firms. Using data from 248 family firms in food processing industry, Zahra et al. (2008)
found that stewardship-oriented organizational culture is conducive to strategic flexibility
and positively moderate the relationship between family commitment and strategic
flexibility. Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007) by utilizing stewardship theory argued that
altruism in family firm is conducive to breed a participative strategy process in which
firms are more likely to improve performance.
13
2.2.2 Institutional investors
Institutional investors are specialized financial institutions which consist of
pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds (Davis and Steil, 2001). They are
playing more and more important role in the global stock markets as their assets increases
(Hansen and Hill, 1991). These investors usually hold diversified portfolios and provide a
better trade-off of risk and return than individual investors. Previous scholars (see David
et al., 2001; Hoskisson et al., 2002) classified institutional investors into two categories:
short-term oriented and long-term oriented. Pension funds and insurance companies are
identified as long-term investors, since they are both instruments for long-term saving
and their goals are to get long-term returns (Fortune, 1993). Gilson and Kraakman (1991)
suggested that pension funds emphasize indexing and usually have an investment horizon
for about 10 years. However, mutual funds and other professional investment funds are
more interested in short-term return, since short-term return is the most important
indicator showing whether their management teams are competent. Individual investors
generally choose professional investment funds according to their short-term returns.
What‟s more, these professional investment fund managers have the incentive to compete
in the short-term return, since their compensation is market-based (Khorana, 1996).
As different types of institutional investors have different investment horizons and
focuses, there monitoring powers and influences on invested firms are different (Douma
et al, 2006). For pension funds, they are active in monitoring firms and care for firms‟
long-term developments (Fortune, 1993). While for mutual funds, they trade frequently
and vote by feet when firm‟s performance is poor (Froot et al., 1992). Based on their
14
different monitoring power and trading behavior, there have been a lot of studies done
regarding their influences on firm performance and strategic decisions.
2.2.3 Ownership structure and R&D investments
Previous studies mainly use agency theory to investigate the influences of
ownership structure on R&D investments. Agency problem happens because of interests‟
conflict and information asymmetry between owners and managers (Fama and Jensen,
1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, previous researchers link R&D investments with
ownership structure in terms of incentive misalignment and information asymmetry (Lee
and O‟Neill, 2003).
Incentive misalignment: Abundant of studies pointed out that top management
teams tend to be reluctant in investing in R&D (e.g., Froot et al., 1992; Stein, 1988;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which is named as “managerial myopic” behavior. One
thing to support this argument is that R&D investment involves high risk and high failure
rate. While outside shareholders can diversify risk by holding diversified portfolios,
managers cannot and bear high risk since their job safety and compensation are related to
firms‟ performance in their contract‟s periods (Hoskisson et al., 1993; Kor, 2006; Laverty,
1996). So managers tend to build empires and invest more in marketing and acquisition
activities to get firm‟s good short-term performance (Kor, 2006). The other thing is that
managers usually get pressures from stockholders who are interested in short-term
financial return (Froot et al., 1992). These stockholders may sell their stock when they
see the bad quarterly or annually reports (Froot et al., 1992; Lee and O‟Neill, 2003). If
many investors have the same opinion toward the announcement of these reports, namely
15
to sell the stocks, then the firms‟ value will decrease. What‟s more, as Laverty (1996)
argued that the professional investment institutions evaluate the value of a firm
emphasizing less on the intangible assets which are the results of R&D investments. Thus,
in order to get good pay and secure their jobs, managers wouldn‟t like to take the risk of
investing on the long-run. Therefore, because of the misaligned incentives, managerial
opportunism has been identified as one obstacle for R&D investments by many
researchers.
Information asymmetry: Information asymmetry between owners and managers
would lead to the inappropriate evaluation of R&D investments (Laverty, 1996; Lee and
O‟Neill, 2003), which is identified as another obstacle of R&D investments. One reason
for existence of information asymmetry is that outsider stockholders have costs to collect
information on firm‟s strategic actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For the other, the
nature of information on R&D investments put some obstacles for outsiders to get to
know them (Myers, 1984). The information publication on the R&D projects would put
the firm at a competitive disadvantage if this information provides crucial signal to its
competitors (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983). Thus, Lee and O‟Neill (2003) argued that
frequent communication between managers and investors can help alleviate the latter
ones‟ pressure.
2.2.4 Empirical evidence
Lots of empirical studies have been contributed to study the relationship between
ownership and R&D investments using above two explanations (i.e. managerial myopic
and information asymmetry). Most of these studies focus on the effect of institutional
16
ownership. In the 1980s, as the level of institutional ownership of public firms increases,
researchers began to worry about its effect on long-term investment such R&D projects
(Graves, 1988). Researchers such as Drucker (1986), Mitroff (1987) and Scherer (1984)
held the view that institutional investors are short-term oriented which lead to their
myopic investment strategy. However, the first empirical study done on this issue by
Jarrell and Lehn (1985) indicated the opposite.
The debate regarding the role of institutional investors didn‟t stop at their work,
but led to more empirical studies. For example, using firm data in the computer industry,
Graves (1988) found that increased institutional investor ownership decreases R&D
investments; Baysinger et al. (1991) reported the positive effect for 176 Fortune 500
firms; longitudinal study conducted by Hansen and Hill (1991) also indicate the positive
effect. For the above contrary conclusions, Hoskisson et al. (2002) provided one
persuasive argument that different types of institutional investors have different
investment horizons. Therefore, empirical studies using datasets composed by different
weights of types of institutional investors might lead to different conclusions.
Regarding the effect of controlling ownership on long-term investment, empirical
studies are sparse and most of them were done in recent years. Using panel data of U.S.
family and non-family firms and exploiting Bayesian approach, Block and Thams (2008)
didn‟t find evidence that family firms are more long-term oriented. However, Kim et al.
(2008) reported that controlling owners promote R&D investments for Korean firms.
Therefore, more empirical studies need to be done to discern the role of controlling
owners on R&D investments.
17
2.3 Financial structure
According to resource-based view, the resources a firm possesses decide its
strategy. Financial factors such as financial slack and debt condition have been
considered as important resources in determining firm‟s R&D investments. While
organizational researchers, such as Cyert, March and Bourgeois, emphasized the
important role of slack resources in promoting firm‟s experimentation and innovation
activities, financial researcher, such as Myers, Majluf and Williamson, argued that debt
condition has enormous effect on financing R&D projects. The literature on financial
slack, leverage ratio and their relationships with R&D investments is reviewed in
following paragraphs.
2.3.1 Financial slack and R&D investments
Slack resources
The concept “slack” has been the focus of organizational literature for a long time
since Cyert and March‟s (1963) work, and it was usually treated as independent variable
to explain organizational behavior (Bourgeois, 1981). Since different scholars captured
different aspects and functions of slack resources, there have been many definitions of
organizational slack (cf. Child, 1972; Cyert and March, 1963; Litschert and Bonham,
1978). Bourgeosi (1981) suggested a definition by paraphrasing March‟s work which was
adopted by most researchers as follows:
Organizational slack is that cushion of actual or potential resources which allows an organization
to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in
policy, as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external environment.
18
As he suggested, it is important to operationalize slack in terms of measurable
items to facilitate empirical study. Based on his work, Bourgeois and Singh (1983)
classified slack into three categories: available slack, recoverable and potential slack.
Sharfman et al. (1988) simplified their classification and identified slack resources from
high discretion (e.g. cash, marketable securities) to low discretion (e.g. inventory, labor
and low flexibility machine capacity). This paper is going to investigate the role of
financial slack, which is one kind of high-discretion slack, including cash and receivables
(Greve, 2003; George, 2005; Kim et al., 2008).
Regarding to the functions of slack, there have been two contrary views.
Proponents of slack such as Cyert and March (1963), Bourgeois (1981), Singh (1986)
argued that slack resources allow firms to engage in experimentation and innovation
activities. According to the economic equilibrium theory, there should be no slack in the
equilibrium point. Thus, opponents of slack viewed it as phenomenon of inefficiency and
argued that slack breeds the sense of complacency in organization and diminish
incentives to innovate (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). Agency theorists such as Jensen and
Meckling (1976), Triantis (2000) suggested that slack allows managers to pursue their
own interests and promotes undisciplined R&D projects.
Slack and innovation
According to the perspective from Cyert and March (1963) and their following
proponents, it is definitely the case that slack promotes R&D activities. Several empirical
studies have showed supports for it. Using the questionnaires data of 64 large U.S. and
19
Canadian firms and exploiting structure model equation, Singh (1986) reported that both
absorbed and unabsorbed slack have a positive relationship with risk taking projects.
Zajac et al. (1991) studied the factors that might enhance innovation in internal corporate
joint venture, and found that organizational slack is positively related to innovativeness.
However, organizational economists and agency theorists claim that slack is kind
of unnecessary cost and is not conducive to innovation. Thus, this view predicts negative
relationship between slack and R&D investments. Nohria and Gulati (1996) reconciled
above contradictive views by arguing that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship
between slack and innovation, which was also supported by their empirical test. Kim et al.
(2008) provided further evidence for Korean firms that the relationship between slack and
R&D investments is curvilinear. Therefore, these studies showed that certain amount of
slack resources is needed for innovation while too much slack indicates wastes of
resources.
2.3.2 Capital structure and R&D investments
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) advanced the classic proposition about the
capital structure „irrelevance‟, the theory of capital structure started. Various theories
such as pecking order theory, information asymmetry perspective, transaction cost theory
and agency theory were developed to investigate organizational factors‟ influences on
capital structure. On the other hand, capital structure is an important factor affecting the
whole organization, from performance to strategic decisions. While researchers in the
area of strategy mainly emphasized that the kind of strategy (innovation strategy or
diversification strategy) a firm pursues affects capital structure, most financial
20
researchers claimed that capital structure decides strategy. In the following paragraphs,
this paper first reviews the literature about the traditional explanations of capital structure,
then the causal relationship between capital structure and R&D investments, and finally
the empirical evidence.
Traditional explanation of capital structure
Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated: “in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs,
and asymmetric information, and in an efficient market, the value of a firm is unaffected
by how that firm is financed”, which means that a firm‟s financial structure is irrelevant
to its investment decision. This famous conclusion violated conventional wisdom at that
time and ignited interest in the study of capital structure. However, the real world is not
that frictionless. Several years later, Modigliani and Miller (1963) corrected their model
by relaxing the assumption of a tax-free world and got the conclusion that the value of a
firm is positively related to leverage ratio, which is because of the tax benefits of interest
payments.
While Modigliani and Miller (1963) showed the tax benefits of debt financing,
other researchers found the costs of it. We can find two kinds of costs of debt financing
from the literature. First, Jensen and Meckling (1976) pointed out that there‟re agency
costs of debt. In their model, owner-manager of a firm first issues debt, and then decides
what investments to take. In the modern corporation, owner-manager has limited liability,
thus moral hazard problem happens. The equity holders have incentives to pursue riskier
investment projects, since the downside risk of the investment decisions are borne by the
bondholders. Realizing this problem, the bondholders will probably demand protection
21
via monitoring and bonding mechanisms, or demand a premium, which increases the
costs of debt financing. Second, financial distress is another cost of debt financing. When
a firm cannot meet its debt obligations, it causes the firm to lose value going through
bankruptcy (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). Jensen (1986) corrected the conclusion that
there are agency costs associated with debt financing, and argued that it also has some
benefits. Realizing that managers are self-interested and may invest in unproductive
projects, he noted that debt financing increased the leverage ratio and deceased the
amount of free cash flow that managers have discretion over, thus reduce the total agency
costs within a firm.
Another different perspective on capital structure is Myers and Majluf‟s (1984)
pecking order theory. Their model showed that internal finance is most preferred because
of information asymmetry and capital market imperfection. When internal finance is not
sufficient, the firm will issue debt first and then equity.
The links between capital structure and R&D investments
After the classic work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), various theories were
developed to study the puzzle of capital structure. These theories include pecking order
theory, transaction cost theory, information asymmetry perspective. Although some of
them indicate the influences of characteristics of R&D investments on the choice of
financing, others study the effect of leverage ratio on R&D investments. However, these
theories seem to predict the same relationship between leverage ratio and R&D intensity.
Each of these theories is reviewed in the following paragraphs respectively:
22
Information asymmetries: As argued previously, regarding the investments on
R&D activities, while the information asymmetry problem exists between managers and
shareholders, it also exists between managers and debtholders because of the
confidentiality nature of R&D projects (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983). As Jensen and
Meckling (1976) pointed out, after R&D projects are financed, moral hazard problems
may happen. Because of the limited liability, shareholders have the incentive to invest in
riskier projects. Realizing this problem and the difficulty to monitor their behavior,
debtholders usually demand high premium on their finance. Bah and Dumontier (2001)
argued that his high premium makes equity financing more attractive than debt financing.
Thus, if firms pursing innovation strategy finance R&D projects using equity, the
leverage ratio should be maintained at a low level.
Transaction cost theory: Williamson (1988) suggested that debt financing is
preferred to equity when the transaction cost of negotiation is low. He argued that the
transaction cost is positively related to asset-specificity. For example, when a firm‟s
asset-specificity is lower, it can be easily redeployed and sold to other firm. Thus, it
transaction cost is lower when debtholders execute the option of asset sales and
liquidation. But when a firm‟s asset cannot be easily sold to another firm (high asset
specificity), the cost of transferring these assets are high (Long and Ravenscraft, 1993). It
is well known that R&D investments are highly specialized that have low redeployability.
Therefore, the implication from Williamson‟s theory is similar to the perspective of
information asymmetry.
23
Leverage as bonding device: Similar to above transaction cost perspective, assets
generated by R&D investments are not only highly specialized, but also worth low value
when severs as collateral guarantee (Long and Malitz, 1985). Without sufficient collateral
guarantee, debt provides are unlikely to lend money to these firms. Thus, a firm invests
too much in R&D activities cannot support high leverage ratio. On the other hand, as
Mishra and McConaughy (1999) suggested, high leverage ratio indicating the high
default of risk increases difficulty in funding for R&D projects. Therefore, a firm with a
high leverage ratio is less likely to be financed. Above two points predict the negative
relationship between leverage ratio and R&D intensity.
Myopic cash flow generation: Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) suggested that
debtholders prefer firms to follow stable strategies that can generate cash flow in short-
term, rather than investing in risky R&D projects. When a firm‟s leverage is higher, they
will force managers focusing on generating cash flow to pay the interest of their debts.
Free cash flow is very important in …Thus, reduced free cash flow makes the firm‟s
current R&D projects uncontinuous or invests less for future projects. Whited (1992)
supported for this view by arguing that higher leveraged firms face greater financial
constraints. More financial constraint makes firm more difficult in getting finance for
R&D activities. Hence, higher leverage ratio prevents firm pursuing innovation strategy
and decreases the expenditure in R&D projects.
Empirical evidence
Most empirical studies have confirmed above prediction that leverage ratio is
negatively associated with R&D intensity. Using a sample of 971 COMPUSTAT firms,
24
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) found strong significant negative relationship between
the long-term leverage ratio and R&D intensity. Bhagat and Welch (1995) reported a
negative relation between debt levels and R&D expenses. By comparing a sample of
R&D intensive firms to a sample of non-R&D ones for firms in the UK, US, Japan and
Europe, Bah and Dumontier (2001) found the former ones exhibit significantly lower
leverage ratio and dividend payout ratio, but longer debt maturity and higher cash levels.
Using a sample of large US manufacturing corporations, Singh and Faircloth (2005)
found a strong negatively relationship between leverage ratio and the level of R&D
expenditure that firms undertake. Jordan et al. (1998) found that innovation-based
strategy is associated with the lowest level of debt, while cost-leadership based strategy
had the highest leverage ratio. O‟Brien (2003) got the same conclusion that innovation-
based strategy is associated with the lower level of debt.
However, above empirical studies were done based on the contexts of developed
countries. Empirical studies regarding the relationship between capital structure and
R&D investments in emerging markets are sparse. Different institutional background and
governance mechanisms in emerging markets may change above conclusion that is
derived from developed countries.
2.4 Ownership structure and financial structure
2.4.1 Ownership structure and financial slack
Investigating the influence of ownership structure on firm‟s strategic decisions,
performance and other aspects has been the main research area in the domain of corporate
25
governance. However, according to my literature review, rare research has been done on
the direct relationship between ownership structure and financial slack. Most studies have
contributed to study the relationships between ownership structure and financial policies
such as dividend policy using agency theory. Since retained earnings are the main source
of financial slack, we may find some implicit relationships between ownership structure
and financial slack in the financial economics and strategy literatures.
The link between ownership structure and financial policy is recognized in many
early works such as Williamson (1964) and Jensen (1986). Based on their recognition,
later scholars have done lots of studies on the relationship between managerial ownership
and dividend policy (for example, Rozeff, 1982; Jensen et al., 1992; Eckbo and Verma,
1994). Until 1990s, researchers began to realize the role of institutional investors in
affecting firm‟s financial policy (for example, Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; Bathala et
al., 1994). As the recent increasing interests in the domain of family business, researchers
in this area start to investigate the relationship between family ownership and dividend
policy (for example, Faccio et al, 2001; Hu et al. 2007).
In the eyes of agency theorists, ownership structure and dividend policy are all
governance mechanisms that can be used to align the interests between managers and
owners. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that increasing managerial
ownership can help mitigate the interest conflicts between managers and owners; Rozeff
(1982) and Easterbrook (1984) claimed that increasing dividends payout reduces the cash
at the discretion of managers and forces them to get additional funds from external capital
market, which in turn will monitor their behavior. Hence, managerial ownership and
26
dividends have the same function in reducing agency cost. Exploiting their substitution
effects, Crutchley and Hansen (1989) found the negative relationship between managerial
ownership and dividend payout ratio. Using simultaneous equation, Jensen et al. (1992)
got the same relationship.
Regarding the role of institutional investors on dividend policy, previous studies
are mainly based on tax-based theory and agency theory. From tax-based perspective, it
is well known that institutional investors have tax benefits. Thus, institutional investors
are likely to demand more dividend payout ratio. From agency perspective, Jensen (1986)
points out that managers tend to retain cash under their control and pay less dividends. In
order to reduce agency cost, institutional investors may force managers to pay more
dividends (Short et al., 2002). Therefore, above two perspectives all predict the positive
relationship between institutional ownership and dividend ratio. However, Grinstein and
Michaely (2005) claimed that there is selection procedure in which institutional investors
choose invested firms. Empirical researches on this line also produced mixed results.
Short et al. (2002) found the positive relationship between institutional ownership and
dividend policy using UK panel data; using data of public U.S. firms, Grinstein and
Michaely (2005) didn‟t find any relationship between them; Kouki and Guizani (2009)
found significant negative relationship for Tunisian firms. For above inconsistency, I
would think the context matters on one hand. On the other hand, as Hoskisson et al.
(2002) pointed out, institutional investors are heterogeneous and have different
investment horizons. Hence, long-term oriented institutional investors may not demand
too much dividends on the short run while short-oriented ones probably will do.
27
Controlling owners are criticized by researchers such as La Porta et al. (2000) and
Faccio et al. (2002) on their expropriation behavior from minority shareholders. They are
claimed to pay lower dividend ratio (Faccio et al., 2002). Hu et al. (2007) supported this
argument, and found that family firms pay lower dividend than nonfamily firms.
However, direct empirical evidence on the relationship between controlling ownership
and dividend ratio is really sparse.
2.4.2 Ownership structure and capital structure
Earlier studies on the relationship between ownership structure and capital
structure concern about the role of managerial ownership. Amihud and Lev (1981)
argued that professional managers have undiversified employment risk and tend to reduce
it by ensuring the viability of their firms. Since high leverage ratio increases the
probability of financial stress, Friend and Long (1988) claimed that decreasing the debt
holdings can reduce managers‟ employment risk. Thus, based on managers‟ self-interest
behavior, it might be the case that they hold the debt level below the optimal level
(Brailsford et al., 2002).
As managerial ownership helps align the interests between managers and
shareholders, its effect on capital structure has drawn amount of studies (see Brailsford et
al., 2002; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Jensen et al., 1992). Incentive alignment will
prompt manager to behave on the behalf of shareholders (Morck et al., 1988). Thus,
increasing managerial ownership will increase debt holding. However, as their ownership
increases to a point, McConnell and Servaes (1990) argued that entrench effect will
dominate and results in managerial opportunism. Therefore, above logic suggests an
28
inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and leverage ratio.
Brailsford et al. (2002) found support for this argument while most of earlier studies such
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) and Jensen et al. (1992) found a negative relationship.
From the agency perspective, most of governance mechanisms are designed to
constraint managerial opportunism. The role of institutional investors is identified as a
way to increasing shareholders‟ monitoring power (Friend and Lang, 1998). Thus, when
managers pursue a strategy that the debt level is below optimal, institutional investors
may have influence in countering their decision. Therefore, this perspective predicts the
positive relationship between leverage ratio and institutional ownership. Brailsford et al.
(2002) supported for this perspective. However, an alternative view leads the opposite
conclusion. Jensen‟s (1986) cash flow theory indicates that debt is a way to reduce
agency cost, since interest payment of debt reduces managers‟ control over firm‟s cash
flow. Thus, debt policy has been viewed as internal governance mechanism by agency
theorists in restricting managers‟ self-interest pursuing behavior where institutional
investors play the same function (Grossman and Hart, 1980). According this view, debt
policy and the role of institutional investors can be substituted by each other. Hence, a
negative relationship is expected between them, which is also supported by Bathala et al.
(1994)‟s empirical study.
As the resurgence in the area of family business, several studies have contributed
to investigate the capital structure in family firms (King and Santor, 2008; Mishra and
McConaughy, 1999). As similar to managers, controlling owners hold undiversified
stakes in their firms. Thus, they care for firm‟s viability and long-term development
29
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). On the
other hand, family owners fear losing control over their firm (Mishra and McConaughy,
1999). In addition, Burkart et al. (2003) argued that family owners suffer far more lose
than just their assets when going bankruptcy. Hence, family owners have much more
incentive than any types of shareholders in maintaining control and ensuring firms‟
survival (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999). Therefore, King and Santor (2008) and
Mishra and McConaughy (1999) argued that family firms tend to be more risk aversion
and maintain lower level of debt ratio than nonfamily firms. Their empirical studies
showed supports for this view.
2.5 Summary
By reviewing the literature, I found two main determinants of R&D investments,
namely ownership structure and financial structure. However, according to my
knowledge, the literature on the determinants of R&D investments is incomplete, since
these two research streams treat ownership structure and financial structures as separate
factors, even though there are some arguments and empirical evidences showing these
two are interdependent. For example, ownership structure affects firm‟s financial policy
and capital structure. Therefore, the extant literature ignores the potential interplay of
ownership structures and financial structures in decisions where R&D investments are
determined, which may lead to false attribution of causality between those factors and
R&D investments.
30
CHAPTER 3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
3.1 Ownership structure and R&D investments
3.1.1 Controlling ownership and R&D investments
Controlling owners in Korean firms are usually founders and founders‟ relatives,
they often present on the board of directors or top management teams (Kim et al., 2008).
As such, controlling owners often have great influence on their firms‟ strategic decisions.
While agency problems may be severe in professional manager-managed firms,
managerial opportunism is largely restricted in firms with controlling owners, since
managers are under effective monitoring or controlling owners may be managers
themselves. Therefore, according to the upper-echelons perspective, in Korean context,
we can conclude that firms‟ R&D investment decisions, to a large extent, depend on
controlling owners‟ intentions.
Reviewing the literature, I have found two conflicting voices about the role of
controlling owner, namely PP perspective and stewardship perspective. And most of
previous studies that done using above two perspectives generally tried to investigate the
relationship between controlling ownership and firm performance. It is obvious as Le
Breton-Miller and Miller (2006) suggested that expropriation behavior is detrimental to
firm performance while stewards can help improve firm performance. While these two
conflicting views may predict the opposites regarding the influences of controlling
ownership on performance, I argue that they don‟t have conflicts in predicting the
relationship between controlling ownership and R&D intensity.
31
Controlling owners can be psychologically tied to their firms (Le Breton-Miller
and Miller, 2006) and want to pass firms to their heirs (Burkart et al.,2003; Casson, 1999).
They can also be long-term oriented in making strategic decisions (Anderson and Reeb,
2003), and maintain long run relationships with employees and suppliers (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2006; David and Laurie, 2008). At the same time, they may pay little
dividend ratio and expropriate from minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Young
et al., 2008). But as long as controlling owners care for firm‟s viability and long-term
development (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and realize that
R&D investments can help firm generate competitive capabilities (Franko, 1989), they
would like to invest more in R&D activities.
Previous studies investigated the influences of ownership structure on R&D
investments mainly using perspectives derived from agency theory, namely managerial
myopic and information asymmetry. Exploiting these perspectives also suggests a positive
relationship between controlling ownership and R&D intensity. For the managerial
myopic problem, no matter the firm is owner-managed or not, managers pursuing self-
interest behavior should be largely restricted as controlling ownership increases, because
the benefits of monitoring increase. According to Lee and O‟Neill (2003), increased
ownership would increase owners‟ incentive to collect information about R&D projects,
which leads to their appropriation valuation on these projects. What‟s more, controlling
owners usually grow with their firms and are very familiar with the businesses and
projects. Thus, they will evaluate R&D activities appropriately. Therefore, in the firms
with controlling owners, the problems of managerial myopic and information asymmetry
which impede managers from investing in R&D projects don‟t exist anymore.
32
Therefore, both stewardship theory and agency theory predict the positive
relationship between controlling ownership and R&D intensity.
H1: Controlling ownership is positively associated with R&D intensity.
3.1.2 Institutional ownership and R&D investments
Foreign institutional ownership in emerging markets is mostly owned by
institutional investors from U.S. and European countries (Choe et al., 1999). As the
economies globalized and liberalized, these investors hold more and more diversified
percentages of stock portfolios in emerging markets to reduce systematic risk. According
to the statistics published in Business Week (2006), foreign ownership has increased to 42%
of public Korean firms in terms of capitalization in year 2006. Although the aggregate
ownership is large, their ownerships are usually dispersed as long as their goals are to
diversify risk. Korean laws also don‟t allow foreign investor to hold a large proportion of
shares in one company (Jung and Kwon, 2002). Another characteristic of foreign
institutional investors is that they trade frequently (David et al., 2006), since most of
foreign investors are professional investment companies who tend to have short-term
horizons and need to shuffle their portfolios. These characteristics and their orientation
make them behave like Korean domestic financial institutional investors (Choe et al.,
1999; Kim et al., 2008). Thus, in the following paragraphs, I will use the term
“institutional investors” refer to foreign institutional investors and domestic financial
institutional investors.
For the role of institutional investors, most prior studies have showed the positive
relationship between institutional ownership and R&D investments (Hansen and Hill,
33
1991; Hill and Snell, 1988). For these studies, their argument is that increased ownership
reduce information asymmetry problem, which lead to their appropriate evaluation on
firms‟ innovation activities. Hoskisson et al. (2002) provided more detailed analysis of
institutional investors. They argued that different types of institutional investors have
different strategy orientation. Since these studies are all done in U.S. context, the focus is
on the conflicting preferences between institutional investors and managers concerning
about R&D projects, where there is an agent context according to Lee and O‟Neill (2003)
and the latter ones are supposed to prefer short-term investments.
However, the case is different in Korea where the conflicting preferences are
between institutional investors and controlling owners. While the latter ones are usually
strategic investors who prefer R&D investments, I argue that some conditions make
institutional investors more likely to be short-term oriented compare to the U.S. context.
First, weak laws on shareholder protection don‟t guarantee investors‟ return (La Porta et
al., 2000). Second, most of foreign investors are investment companies and less of them
are pension funds. In addition, according to Hoskisson et al. (2002), foreign institutional
investors tend not to be interested in R&D investments.
While prior studies that support the positive relationship between institutional
ownership and R&D investments assuming that institutional investors have pressures on
managers in U.S., I argue they may not have influence on controlling owners in Korea.
David et al. (2001) found that ownership alone is not sufficient to firms‟ R&D
investments decisions. And they argue that only engaging in activism such as initiation of
shareholder proposals, negotiations with managers and the launching of proxy contests
34
can have effect on managers‟ decision. However, in Korean, institutional investors are
not allowed to exercise voting rights based on the “shadow voting” rule before the 1997
financial crisis (Hong and Lee, 1998). Although this restriction was removed after the
crisis and other corporate governance reforms implemented in Korea, the power and
influence of institutional investors is still not as strong as theirs in US (Solomon et al.,
2002). Therefore, I get the following hypothesis:
H2: Institutional ownership is not associated with R&D intensity.
3.2 The mediating effects of financial structures
3.2.1 Financial slack and R&D investments
Although existing literature indicated two contrary views on the role of financial
slack on innovation, namely promoting innovation and wastes of resources, I would think
they have the same implication on the relationship between financial slack and R&D
investments. First, proponents of slack all agreed that more slack resources allow firms to
take more experimentation and engage in more R&D activities (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert
and March, 1963). Second, opponents of slack emphasized that too much slack resources
are the indicator of inefficiency and allow managers to pursue their own interests, for
example, engaging in excessive diversification and investing more in unproductive R&D
projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, opponents of slack resources acknowledge
that more resources will lead to more R&D activities but may not lead to more innovation.
Innovation is the result of R&D investments, but not all R&D investments would lead to
35
innovation. As Holmstrom (1989) pointed out, innovation requires both strong
managerial incentives and careful monitoring.
As long as this paper concerns about the determinants of R&D investments, these
above two views all support the argument that more financial slack would lead to more
R&D investments where the opponent view claimed that these R&D investments may not
be transformed to innovation.
3.2.2 Leverage ratio and R&D investments
According to pecking order theory, because of information asymmetry problem,
internal finance is first preferred, then debt and equity is ranked at the bottom among this
three. However, the characteristics of R&D activities make information asymmetry
problem severer and debt financing more inappropriate than equity (Bah and Dumontier,
2001). So firms who want to invest in R&D projects have to finance internally or through
equity. Hence, firms pursuing innovativeness should exhibit lower leverage ratio.
Transaction cost theory tells us that transaction cost is positively related to asset-
specificity (Williamson, 1988). R&D investment is considered to be highly specialized
and the results of it such as patents are not easily deployed by other firms, which makes
R&D assets as poor collateral. Thus, R&D investments cannot support a high level of
debt (Long and Malitz, 1995).
Above theories all investigate the effects of R&D investments on capital structure.
However, capital structure also influences R&D investments in turn. Higher debt ratio
increases the probability of bankruptcy and the difficulty in financing for R&D projects
(Mishra and McConaughy, 1999). Whited (1992) supported this view by arguing that
36
higher leveraged firms face greater financial constraints. Therefore, increased leverage
ratio is associated with less R&D investments. No matter how R&D investments affects
capital structure and how leverage ratio influences R&D investments, above perspectives
all predict the negative relationship between the two.
3.2.3 The mediating effects of financial slack
Controlling owner
Controlling owners are identified by previous researchers as long-term oriented
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; David and Laurie, 2008), it is unlikely that these firms would
pay large amount of dividends (Jensen et al., 1992; Hu et al., 2007), since more retained
earnings can help firm get out of financial distress and grasp growth opportunities
(Mishra and McConaughy, 1999). What‟s more, according to the tax policy, as
controlling owners are generally individuals, they will pay higher dividend tax ratio than
institutional investors. Thus, controlling owners probably would prefer lower dividend
ratio to avoid high tax rate. Hu et al. (2007) provided evidence for above argument that
family firms tend to have lower dividend payout ratio than nonfamily firms. Lower
dividends payout ratio increases firm‟s financial slack indirectly.
Controlling owners are identified as psychologically tied to their firms and even
take them as “children” (Bubolz, 2001). Thus, they have strong incentive to maintain and
ensure control over their firms (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999). As issuing equity will
dilute their control, study of De Angelo and De Angelo (1985) indicates that controlling
owners usually issue non-voting stocks. As the market imperfection and information
asymmetry problems make external finance such as equity and debt more expensive
37
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984), controlling owners are more
likely to rely on internal finance. Internal finance generally comes from firm‟s retained
earnings, which are important part of financial slack. Hence, I predict that controlling
owners tend to maintain high level of financial slack.
Institutional investors
From the agency perspective, institutional owners tend to demand more dividends
in order to reduce agency costs. However, there is no consistent empirical conclusion
about it (see Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Kouki and Guizani, 2009; Short et al., 2002).
Based on the implication from Hoskisson et al. (2002) that institutional investors are
heterogeneous, I argue that the relationship between dividend payout ratio and
institutional ownership depends on the types of top management teams and institutional
investors. In the context of Korea, it is clear that the top management teams are usually
controlled by family owners to a large extent. As suggested by La Porta et al. (2000),
they may behave like entrenched managers who will expropriate from minority investors.
Thus, their expropriation incentives and poor shareholder protection will force
institutional investors demand more dividends. In addition, institutional investors in
emerging markets are usually mutual funds and other types of professional investors who
are short-term oriented. So these institutional investors focus on the short-term return
rather than long-term return. Hence, for the certain environment in Korea, it is likely that
institutional ownership is positively related to dividend payout ratio.
The problem is whether institutional investors can affect controlling owners‟
financial policies or not. Controlling owners may need the presences of institutional
38
investors on their firms‟ shareholders list to signal outsider investors that their firms are
well run. So they may pay more dividend ratio to please these institutional investors.
What if controlling owners don‟t take this action? I argue that institutional investors can
still adjust their portfolios and choose the companies that pay high dividend ratio, since
they short-term oriented. Higher dividend ratio decreased financial slack, since more
dividends reduce retained earnings. Therefore, this paper predicts that institutional
ownership is negatively associated with financial slack.
3.2.4 The mediating effects of leverage ratio
Controlling owner
Existing literature on ownership and capital structure indicates that the level of
financial leverage depends on “manager‟s risk aversion, the costs of monitoring and
bankruptcy, the threat of takeovers, and the growth opportunities of the firm” (King and
Santor, 2008: 2425). However, these views are developed in developed markets. In the
Korean context, the threats of takeover are very seldom. As there is little separation
between ownership and management, agency cost of managers is largely restricted. So
firm leverage ratio mainly depends on controlling owners‟ risk aversion, the cost of
bankruptcy and growth opportunity.
For their undiversified and large stakes in firms, controlling owners are identified
to be more risk averse than professional managers, since they will lose more than just
their assets (Burkard et al., 2003). As emphasized by Mishra and McConaughy (1999)
that family owners have strong desire to maintain control over their firms and care for
firm‟s survival, the cost of losing control and bankruptcy is extremely large. Although
39
high leverage ratio increases the probability of financial distress, financing through equity
causes other problems. First, underdeveloped equity market in Korea makes the cost of
equity financing much more expensive. It is wildly recognized that Korea corporate
governance is bank-oriented, which makes financing through debt much cheaper. Second,
financing through equity diluted controlling owners‟ control over their firms. It is the
case what controlling owners fear most. Therefore, in order to grow their firms and get
finance for strategic investments, but not to weaken their controls, they are more likely to
finance through debt rather than equity. According to this argument, it is expected that
controlling ownership is positively associated with leverage ratio.
Institutional investors
Agency theorists view both outsider ownership concentration and debt financing
as monitoring devices. Because of substitution effects between these two, increased
institutional ownership makes debt financing less necessary. According to the signaling
model, the presence of institutional investor gives minority shareholders confidence and
signals that the firm is committed (Wiwattanakantang, 1999). Hence, these two theories
predict the negative relationship between leverage ratio and institutional ownership.
Institutional investors‟ frequently trading behaviors which increase the stock
liquidity can help reduce information asymmetry (Brennan and Tamarowshi, 2000),
which further reduce the cost of capital. What‟s more, the presence of institutional
investors on shareholder list gives debtors more confidence that that firm is well-
managed and has low risk of default. Thus, institutional investors may influence
controlling owners‟ finance decisions (David et al., 2006). It is well known that Korean
40
firms are highly leveraged even after 1997 financial crisis. From the lesson of that crisis,
institutional investors may force firms to reduce debt ratio or may tend to choose the
firms that present low level of debt to protect their held stake (Grinstein and Michaely,
2005). Therefore, this paper predicts the negative relationship between institutional
ownership and leverage ratio.
Based on the above arguments, I get the following relationships between
ownership structure, financial structure and R&D investments (refer to Figure 1 and
Figure 2):
H3a: Financial slack mediates the relationship between controlling ownership and R&D
intensity, such that financial slack increases the positive effect of controlling ownership
on R&D intensity;
H3b: Financial slack mediates the relationship between institutional ownership and
R&D intensity, such that institutional ownership indirectly negatively affects R&D
intensity;
H4a: Leverage ratio mediates the relationship between controlling ownership and R&D
intensity, such that leverage ratio decreases the positive effect of controlling ownership
on R&D intensity;
H4b: Leverage ratio mediates the relationship between institutional ownership and R&D
intensity, such that institutional ownership indirectly positively affects R&D intensity.
41
Figure 1. Proposed model of relationships between controlling ownership,
leverage ratio, financial slack and R&D investments.
Figure 2. Proposed model of relationships between institutional ownership,
leverage ratio, financial slack and R&D investments.
Controlling
Ownership
Financial slack R&D
Investments
+
Leverage
ratio
+
- +
Institutional
Ownership
Financial slack
R&D
Investments
- +
Leverage ratio - -
+
42
CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL STUDY
4.1 Data and measurements
4.1.1 Sample
To test these hypotheses, I used a database developed by the Korea Investor
Service, which contains information about company‟s profiles, ownership structure and
financial structure for all Korean publicly listed firms. The data structure is similar to
those found in COMPUSTST, and has been used by many previous scholars (see Chang
and Hong, 2002; Kim et al., 2008). Since R&D investment is relatively more important
for manufacturing industry, I selected companies in this industry during the 1995-2007
periods. After eliminating observations with incomplete information, there were 999
firms and 10518 firm-years left for analysis.
4.1.2 Measurements
Dependent and independent variables
Dependent variable: R&D intensity (rdint), was measured by the ratio of
expenditure to total sales. This measure has been widely used by previous studies (e.g.,
Greve, 2003; Lee and O’Neill, 2003; Kim et al., 2008).
Independent variables: (1) Financial slack (fs), was measured by the ratio of
operation cash flow to total sales. According to Singh (1986), financial slack can be
measure by the ratio of quick assets (such as cash and receivables) to total assets or total
sales. Operation cash flow consists of these quick assets.
43
(2) Leverage ratio (da), was measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets.
(3) Controlling ownership (owner_p), was measured by the percentage of equity
shares owned by the person who actually controls the firm and his/her family members
and relatives.
(4) Institutional ownership (inst_p), was measured by the adding foreign
institutional ownership and domestic institutional ownership. Domestic institutional
ownership is the total percentage of equity ownership held by domestic institutional
investors composed of insurance companies, securities firms, and merchant banks, while
foreign institutional ownership is the total percentage of equity ownership held by foreign
financial institutions. These variables and their corresponding abbreviations are listed in
table 1.
Control variables
(1) ROA (roa): net income divided by total assets. ROA indicates the profitability
of a firm which would influence firm‟s strategic decisions directly. Many empirical
studies, e.g., Lotta Vänänen‟s (2003), showed support for it. The profitability of a firm is
also likely to affect its dividend payout ratio and capital structure (Jensen et al., 1992).
(2) Firm size (emp): the total number of employees. Firm size is considered to be
a main factor to explain firm-specific heterogeneity. Choi et al. (2008) showed the
necessity to control it for Korean firms.
(3) Industry R&D intensity (inddrint): average of R&D intensity in the each
detailed industry. It is reasonable to account for industry effect, since the importance of
44
R&D investments to the industry of food products and beverages is different to its
importance to the industry of rubber and plastics products.
(4) Total assets (logta): take the natural log value of total asset. Crutchley and
Hansen (1989)‟s empirical study showed its influence on dividend payout ratio and
capital structure.
(5) Affiliated (bgmember): dummy variable, to control for the affiliated effect.
Affiliated to a business group is very common in Korean firms. This affiliation would
have effect on firm‟s corporate governance mechanisms and possessed resources
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).
(6) Export ratio (exportr): the ratio of total export to total sales. Choi et al. (2008)
showed the necessity to control it, because it may be the case that internationally oriented
firms tend to invest more in R&D activities, which would enhance their competitiveness
in international market.
(7) Growth opportunity (go): the increased ratio of total sale. Early studies (e.g.,
David et al., 2006; Wright et al., 1996) talked about the efficiency of R&D investments
by investigating whether these R&D investments are made consistent with growth
opportunity. Thus, it can be expected that when growth opportunity appears, firm is more
likely to investment in R&D activities. What‟s more, previous studies (e.g. Jensen et al.,
1992; Eckbo and Verma, 1994) have showed that growth opportunity affects firm‟s
capital structure and financial slack.
45
(8) Dividend ratio (divr): the percentage of cash dividend amount divided by total
assets. Agency theorists view dividend policy as a tool to reduce agency cost, which is
similar to the function of debt financing. So dividend ratio might have substitute effect on
leverage ratio. As a source of financial slack, dividend ratio is supposed to affect
financial slack. All control variables and their corresponding abbreviations are listed in
table 1.
Table 1. All variables and their corresponding abbreviations
Variables Corresponding
abbreviations
R&D intensity rdint
Financial slack fs
Debt ratio da
Controlling ownership owner_p
Institutional ownership inst_p
ROA roa
Firm size emp
Industry R&D intensity inddrint
Total assets logta
Affiliated bgmember
Export ratio exportr
Growth opportunity go
Dividend ratio divr
4.2 Summary statistics and model design
4.2.1 Summary statistics
Table 2 gives out the sample distribution among each year. From this table, we
can see that the data sample is an unbalance panel. As more and more firms went public,
the number of sample increased in the later years. In the year 1995, the size of Korean
stock market is 566, and it increased to 980 in the year 2007.
46
Table 2. Sample distribution among each year
Year Freq. Percent Cum.
1995 566 5.38 5.38
1996 614 5.84 11.22 1997 645 6.13 17.35
1998 670 6.37 23.72
1999 711 6.76 30.48
2000 763 7.25 37.74 2001 836 7.95 45.68
2002 897 8.53 54.21
2003 938 8.92 63.13 2004 951 9.04 72.17
2005 966 9.18 81.36
2006 981 9.33 90.68 2007 980 9.32 100.00
Total 10,518 100.00
Figure 3. Firms’ R&D intensity on average in the period of 1995-2007
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
R&
D inte
nsity
1995 2000 2005 2010Year
47
Figure 4. Firms’ ROA on average in the period of 1995-2007
Figure 3 and Figure 4 give out the trends of firm‟s R&D intensity and ROA on
average in the period of 1995-2007. From Figure 3, we can see that R&D intensity firms
increased in first several years and decreased after the year 2001. The trend for ROA is
much more complicated than the trend for R&D intensity. From Figure 4, we can see
that there is a deep decrease in the year 1998, and then a sharp increase in the following
two years, and the main tread of the remaining years is decreasing. We may explain the
first decrease by 1997‟s financial crisis, after which Korean firms cut down budget to
invest in R&D activities. However, we still don‟t know what caused the complicated
change in Korean firms‟ R&D intensity after the year 2000.
-.02
0
.02
.04
.06
RO
A
1995 2000 2005 2010Year
48
Table 3. Summary statistics for all variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
rdint 10518 .0246 .0468 0 .4880
fs 10518 .0424 .1947 -5.438 1.490
da 10518 .4944 .2081 .0110 .9992
owner_p 10518 .2591 .2236 0 1
inst_p 10518 .0563 .1254 0 1
divr 10518 .0076 .0123 0 .2807
roa 10518 .0321 .1461 -.9888 .9731
emp 10518 697.43 3368.7 1 85813
indrdint 10518 .0684 .1496 0 .8863
logta 10518 10.95 1.492 5.198 17.993
bgmember 7765 .1030 .3040 0 1
go 9677 .1266 .3886 -5.337 5.613
exportr 10518 .2885 .3105 0 1
Table 3 is the summary statistics for all variables. From this table, we can see that
the numbers of observations for variables bgmember and go are less that others‟. For the
former one, it is because there‟re some missing values in my data; while for the latter one,
the value of go is missing in the beginning year for a firm, since I take the first year as a
base year. The mean value for R&D intensity (rdint) is 0.0246 and the maximum value is
0.0468, which indicates the large variance of R&D intensity of Korean firms. It is same
case indicated by Lee and O‟Neill (2003)‟s study. The variance for financial slack (fs) is
even larger, since the minimum value is -5.438, the maximum is 1.490 while the mean is
0.0424. While many scholars have attributed the causes of 1997‟s financial crisis to the
high leverage ratio of Korean Chaebols, the leverage ratio reduced a lot after Korean
government‟s reform. The mean value of leverage ratio (da) is 0.4944. But there are still
some firms with high leverage ratio, since the maximum value is 0.9992. The mean value
of controlling ownership (owner_p) and institutional ownership (inst_p) are 0.2591 and
0 .0563.
49
4.2.2 Model
In order to indentify the direct and indirect effects of ownership structure on R&D
investments, this paper builds a simultaneous equation model as follows:
rdint = f (fs, da, exportr, emp, roa, go, bgmember, indrint, owner_p, inst_p) (1)
fs= g (owner_p, inst_p, divr, logta, roa, go) (2)
da= h (owner_p, inst_p, divr, logta, roa, go) (3)
It is usually the case that top management team makes the budget plans and
strategic decision at the beginning fiscal year, so the factors this year are likely to
influence next year‟s R&D investments. Thus, the variables in the right side of equation
(1) were all lagged by one year except the affiliation indicator, bgmember. In equation (2)
and equation (3) only ownership variables were lagged by one year, since the ownership
effect maybe hysteretic. From above simultaneous equations, we can see that equation (2)
and equation (3) are independent from equation (1) while equation (1) depends on the
other two. Hence, I estimate equation (2) and equation (3) independently and use two-
stage estimation for equation (1). For the estimation of equation (2) and equation (3), I
exploit the most common method, namely Fixed Effect model. To test whether Fixed
Effect model is appropriate, the F statistics and Hausman statistics are reported in the
result.
One characteristic of R&D investment is long investment horizon. While one
R&D project is ratified and starts to implement, various resources are needed
continuously. So it is more likely the case that the expenditure of R&D investments this
50
year is related to it in the last year. Thus, I add lagged dependent variables as independent
variables. For such model setting, it may cause biased estimation while using Ordinary
Least Square (OLS). Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation,
Arellano and Bond (1991) have shown that the lagged dependent and explanatory
variables are valid instruments, under the assumption that the error terms are not serially
correlated. The GMM estimator in such a situation achieves asymptotic efficiency. The
dynamic panel GMM estimation method has advantageous capacities to deal with
unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity, endogeneity problems, and the presence of the
unknown heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in panel data (Arellano 2003). Therefore,
I used the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation and dynamic panel data
model – Arellano-Bond regression for equation (1) in the second stage. However, the
validity of the GMM estimation relies on the validity of the assumption that the error
terms are not serially correlated. If the assumption is valid, there should be evidence of
significant negative first-order serial correlation in difference residuals and no evidence
of second-order serial correlation in the difference residuals (Baltagi 2005). Thus, I test
this assumption with an Arellano-Bond test of second-order serial correlation.
4.3 Results
Table 4 is the correlation matrix for all the variables. From this table, we can see
that the correlation coefficients between these variables are all not very high, which
reduces the probability of multicollinearity problem.
The estimation results of equation (2) and equation (3) are illustrated in Table 5.
From the two Hausman statistics and F statistics, we can see that Fixed effect (F.E.)
51
models are appropriate. From the results in Table 5, we can conclude that both
controlling ownership and institutional ownership influence financial slack and leverage
ratio significantly. Hypothesis 3a predicts that controlling ownership positively affects
financial slack. The regression coefficient of controlling ownership (owner_p) in
equation (1) is 0.0306 and is statistically significant, which is consistent with my
prediction. Hypothesis 3b predicts that institutional ownership negatively affects financial
slack. The regression coefficient of institutional ownership (inst_p) in equation (1) is
negative and statistically significant, which indicates my prediction is correct.
My predictions about the influence of ownership structure on capital structure are
that controlling ownership positively affects leverage ratio while institutional ownership
negatively affects leverage ratio. However, the estimation results in equation (2) don‟t
show support for the effect of controlling ownership on leverage ratio but support for the
effect of institutional ownership, since the regress coefficients of controlling ownership
(owner_p) and institutional ownership (inst_p) in equation (2) are -0.0308 and -0.0491,
and both them are statistically significant.
To dismantle the direct and indirect effects of ownership structure on R&D
investments, I used two-stage estimation method. First, to estimate the direct effect of
controlling ownership on R&D investments, I regressed controlling ownership (owner_p)
on financial slack (fs), leverage ratio (da) and other variables and got the predicted value
of owner_p, which is uncorrelated with fs, da. Then, I substituted the owner_p with the
predicted value of owner_p in equation (1). Repeat the same procedures for institutional
ownership (inst_p). Finally, I did the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation for
52
equation (1). Hence, in the regression results of Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data
estimation, the coefficient for controlling ownership (owner_p) is the direct effect of
controlling ownership on R&D investments, while the coefficient for institutional
ownership (inst_p) is the direct effect of institutional ownership on R&D investments.
The two-stage estimation results for the direct and indirect effects of controlling
ownership and institutional ownership on R&D investments are presented in Table 6.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that controlling ownership is positively associated with
R&D intensity. From Table 6, we can see that the coefficient of controlling ownership
(owner_p) is 0.1008 and statistically significant, which means that controlling ownership
has direct positive effect on R&D investments. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that institutional ownership has no impact on R&D intensity. The
coefficient of institutional ownership (inst_p) is -0.0525 but not statistically significant,
which means that institutional ownership has no direct negative effect on R&D
investments. So hypothesis 2 is also supported.
Hypotheses H3a, H3b, H4a, H4b argue that financial slack and leverage ratio are
mediators through which controlling owners and institutional investors influence R&D
investments. From Table 6, we can see that the coefficients signs for leverage ratio (da)
and financial slack (fs) are negative and positive, and both of them are significant, which
are consistent with my predictions that more financial slack will lead to more R&D
investments while higher leverage ratio is associated with less R&D investments.
Combined with the results presented in Table 5, namely controlling ownership is
positively associated with financial slack and negatively associated with leverage ratio
53
while institutional ownership is negatively associated with both financial slack and
leverage ratio, we can conclude: (1) financial slack positively mediates the relationship
between controlling ownership and R&D intensity; (2) financial slack negatively
mediates the relationship between institutional ownership and R&D intensity; (3)
leverage ratio positively mediates the relationship between controlling ownership and
R&D intensity; (4) leverage ratio positively mediates the relationship between
institutional ownership and R&D intensity. Therefore, Hypotheses H3a, H3b, H4b are
supported, but hypothesis H4a is not supported.
4.4 Robustness test
To check the robustness of above empirical results, I did the following tests:
(1) Delete observations where R&D intensity is above its mean three standard
deviations. After this deletion, repeat the analysis model in Table 5 and Table 6, I found
that both controlling ownership and institutional ownership influences financial structures,
namely financial slack and leverage ratio, significantly with the same impacts as I got in
above empirical studies. I also found that controlling ownership affects R&D intensity
directly while institutional ownership has no direct impact on it. Compared to earlier
study, the only difference after this deletion is that the prediction “financial slack
positively affects R&D intensity” is not supported. Detailed result is presented in Table 7
and Table 8 in Appendix A.
(2) After the 1997‟s financial crisis, Korean government has initiated some
corporate governance reforms. To control for the effects of these institutional change, I
54
choose the sample after year 1997. Consistent with earlier study, I got the same
relationships between ownership structure, financial structure and R&D investments.
Detailed result is presented in Table 9 and Table 10 in Appendix B.
(3) Use the natural logarithm of total assets to measure firm size. In the primary
analysis, I used the number of employees to measure firm size. However, the natural
logarithm total assets is an alternative measure of firm size that is wildly used in the areas
of finance of strategy. Substitute Ln(totoal assets) for the number of employees and
repeat the analysis model in Table 6, I found that no differences compared to the results
in Table 6. Detailed result of this change is presented in Appendix C.
(4) Delete some insignificant control variables. From Table 6, we can see that the
control variables such as firm size (emp), ROA and affiliated (bgmember) don‟t have
significant influence on R&D intensity. Dropping these control variables, the results
found in earlier study still don‟t change. Detailed result is presented in Appendix D.
From above model changes and tests, we can see that the results found in my
primary study are not changed, indicating the robustness of these results.
55
Table 4. Correlation Matrix
rdint exportr indrdint emp roa da fs owner_p inst_p go logta bgmember divr
rdint 1.000
exportr 0.005 1.000
indrdint 0.167 0.098 1.000
emp 0.013 0.136 -0.006 1.000
roa -0.111 0.011 -0.011 0.030 1.000
da -0.178 0.028 -0.049 0.070 -0.248 1.000
fs -0.094 0.064 -0.017 0.067 0.445 -0.149 1.000
owner_p -0.092 -0.032 -0.064 -0.077 0.187 -0.114 0.133 1.000
inst_p -0.042 0.052 0.085 0.183 0.095 0.107 0.093 -0.054 1.000
go -0.073 0.003 0.023 0.010 0.301 -0.004 0.201 0.046 0.033 1.000
logta -0.156 0.196 -0.106 0.491 0.092 0.194 0.142 -0.038 0.298 0.012 1.000
bgmember -0.078 0.138 -0.067 0.376 0.029 0.159 0.074 0.024 0.186 0.010 0.622 1.000
divr -0.046 0.004 -0.016 0.002 0.314 -0.381 0.232 0.153 0.021 0.132 -0.005 -0.026 1.000
56
Table 5. Panel Regression Results for equation (2) and equation (3)
Dependent variable: Financial slack (fs)
Dependent variable: Leverage ratio (da)
Independent variables Coef. Coef. Controlling ownership
(owner_pt-1) .0306
**
(.0107) -.0308
***
(.0078) Institutional ownership
(inst_pt-1) -.0428
*
(.0183) -.0491
*** (.0134)
Dividend ratio (divrt-1)
.0860 (.1982)
-1.551***
(.1451) Ln(total assets)
(logtat-1) .0121
**
(.0043) .0017
(.0031) ROA
(roat-1) .3093
***
(.0163) -.1446
***
(.0119) Growth Opportunity
(got-1) .0222
***
(.0052) .0189
*** (.0038)
_cons -.1029*
(.0460) .6566
***
(.0336) Obs. 8486 8486 Firm 991 991
F Stat. 2.86***
12.21***
Hausman Stat. 254.83***
171.63***
Model F.E. F.E. R-square 0.0823 0.3124
1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients；
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%;
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table.
57
Table 6. Two-Stage estimation and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Dependent variable: R&D intensity (rdint)
Independent variables Coef.
R&D intensity (rdintt-1)
.4098***
(.0254) R&D intensity
(rdintt-2) -.0473
** (.0152)
Leverage ratio (dat-1)
-.0233***
(.0048) Financial slack
(fst-1) .0068
*
(.0035) Export ratio (exportrt-1)
-.0061+
(.0034) Firm size (empt-1)
-5.27e-07 (7.10e-07)
ROA (roat-1)
.0008 (.0043)
Growth Opportunity (got-1)
.0120***
(.0013)
Affilated (bgmember)
.0021 (.0065)
Industry R&D intensity
(indrdintt-1) -.0072
**
(.0028) Controlling ownership
(owner_pt-1) .1008
**
(.0390) Institutional ownership
(inst_pt-1) -.0525 (.0726)
_cons .0233***
(.0064)
Obs. 5740 Firm 901
Wald stat. 436.08***
Sargan Stat. 491.22***
AR(1) -5.45***
AR(2) .977 1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients；
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%.
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table.
58
CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
5.1 Conclusions
Realizing the importance of R&D investments to firm‟s survival and growth, this
paper investigated the determinants of R&D investments in Korean context. Exploiting
simultaneous equation modeling technique, this paper obtained the following conclusions:
(1) Controlling owners have direct impact on firms‟ strategic decisions, and they
promote R&D investments. Apart from this direct effect, controlling owners
tend to maintain high level of financial slack and low level of leverage ratio,
with both financial factors increase R&D investments;
(2) Institutional investors have no direct impact on R&D investment because of
the corporate governance environment where their monitoring power is
limited. However, they have influences on financial slack and leverage ratio.
Contrary to the effect of controlling ownership, institutional ownership is
negatively associated with financial slack and leverage ratio.
5.2 Discussions
While previous studies mainly draw agency theory to investigate the direct
relationships between different types of ownership and R&D investments, this paper tried
to find the different mechanisms about how different types of ownership influence R&D
investments. Mainly based on agency theory, stewardship theory and financial theories
such as pecking order theory, this paper predicted that different types of ownership may
59
not only affect R&D investments directly, but also influence it indirectly through
financial structures such as leverage ratio and financial slack.
Exploiting simultaneous equation modeling, my empirical study has showed that
controlling ownership has direct positive effect on R&D intensity while institutional
ownership has no influence. For the mediation effects, my empirical work showed:
financial slack positively mediates the relationship between controlling ownership and
R&D intensity but negatively mediates the relationship between institutional ownership
and R&D intensity; while leverage ratio both positively mediates the relationship
between controlling ownership and R&D intensity and the relationship between
institutional ownership and R&D intensity. The whole effects of ownership structure on
R&D investments are concluded in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Consistent with previous studies, this paper found that controlling owners have
impact on firms‟ strategic decisions. As La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessons et al. (2000)
found, there is little separation between control and ownership among firms with
controlling owners in developing countries all around the world. Since controlling owners
both dominate the boards of directors and top management teams, it is reasonable that
they have impact on firm‟s strategic decisions such as R&D investments. Drawing on
agency theory and stewardship theory, this paper predicted that controlling ownership
positively affect R&D intensity, which is also supported by the empirical study.
Previous studies that have been done in the context of US showed the positive
relationship between institutional ownership and R&D intensity. However, this paper
didn‟t find the direct impact of institutional ownership. The different conclusions in
60
Figure 5. The model indicated by empirical study on the direct and indirect
effects of controlling ownership on R&D investments.
Figure 6. The model indicated by empirical study on the direct and indirect
effects of institutional ownership on R&D investments.
-0.0308*** Leverage
ratio
Controlling
Ownership
+0.0306** + 0.1008**
-0.0233***
R&D
Investments +0.0068*
Financial slack
-0.0491***
Leverage
ratio
Institutional
Ownership
-0.0525
-0.0233***
-.0428*
R&D
Investments +0.0068*
Financial slack
61
different contexts can be explained by different corporate governance mechanisms and
law environments. While shareholder protection laws in US and UK require public firms
to publish more information and give shareholders more ways to monitor professional
managers in these firms, shareholders‟ rights are limited in emerging markets. For
example, in Korea, institutional investors were not allowed to exercise voting rights
based on the “shadow voting” before 1997. Although there‟re some improvements after
Korean government reform, Solomon et al. (2002) argued that the culturally embedded
governance system is no easy to change, and doubted that institutional investors still may
not play an active role in monitoring. What‟s more, unlike professional managers,
controlling owners don‟t have job concerns and may not be enslaved to institutional
investors. Thus, institutional investors don‟t have direct influence on R&D investments.
Apart from different owners‟ direct impact on R&D investments, this paper
argued that financial structures such as financial slack and leverage ratio might mediate
the relationship between different types of ownership and R&D intensity. For example,
since controlling owners have large influence on firms‟ behavior, it is straightforward
that they affect firms‟ capital structure and financial slack; while institutional investors
don‟t influence R&D investments directly, they may affect firms‟ dividend policy and
capital structure. While controlling owners tend to maintain firms‟ control and care for
long-term development, institutional investors only care for short-term return. Consistent
with these perspectives, this paper showed that controlling ownership is positively
associated with financial slack and but negatively associated with leverage ratio while
institutional ownership is negatively associated with these financial factors.
62
There have been many empirical studies regarding the influences of these
financial factors on R&D investments. Consistent with these studies, this paper found that
financial slack positively affects R&D intensity while leverage ratio negatively affects it.
Therefore, above findings indicate that financial factors such as financial slack and
leverage ratio that were used to be considered as determinants of R&D investments are
just mediators through which ownership structure affects firm‟s strategic decision
indirectly.
5.3 Limitations
Above conclusions are reached based on an emerging economy, Korea. So these
findings may not be generalized to other contexts. For example, whereas institutional
investors are long-term oriented and promote R&D investments in United States (Hansen
and Hill, 1991), I found that foreign and domestic institutional investors have no impact
in Korea. One explanation for this difference is that controlling owners may not be
enslaved to institutional investor‟ pressures in Korea but professional managers in US
will do.
My sample data only covers manufacturing industry, so above conclusions might
also not be generalized to other industries. For instance, controlling owners are willing to
invest in R&D activities may be only when these R&D activities are essential to their
firms‟ survival and growth. R&D investments is especially important for manufacturing
industry, but not for many other industries. So the different characteristics of different
industries may influence different types of owners‟ orientations and preferences.
63
5.4 Implications
Whereas prior studies treated financial factors such as financial slack and leverage
ratio as important determinants of firm‟s R&D investments, this paper found that they are
only some mediators through which ownership structure affects firm‟s strategy.
Consistent with Williamson (1963)‟s view that ownership structure is the basis of
corporate governance, ownership structure is the ultimate and most important factor that
causes firm heterogeneity within an industry.
In Korean context where legal protection of outsider investors is weak and rights
of them are limited, to large extent firm‟s strategic decisions reflect its controlling owners‟
orientation and preferences. The specific governance environment in Korea endows
controlling owners with strong power in determining firms‟ decisions. This governance
setting might have some bad consequences. For example, controlling owners usually
initiate projects that are good for themselves, no matter whether these activities would be
detrimental to other shareholders; my study showed that they promote R&D investments
but whether they overinvest in R&D activities is still not clear. Therefore, this study
emphasizes the importance of improving the corporate governance mechanisms and
environment in emerging markets, including improving legal protection of outside
shareholders and debt holders, developing capital market and takeover market and so on.
Only when corporate governance mechanisms and environment give balance the powers
among all the stakeholders (i.e. controlling owners, institutional investors, minority
shareholders, managers, debtholders) can impel controlling owners make appropriate
strategic decisions.
64
APPENDIX A
Delete observations where R&D intensity is above its mean three standard deviations
Table 7. Panel Regression Results for equation (2) and equation (3)
Dependent variable: Financial slack (fs)
Dependent variable: Leverage ratio (da)
Independent variables Coef. Coef. Controlling ownership
(owner_pt-1) .0208
*
(.0092) -.0310
***
(.0077) Institutional ownership
(inst_pt-1) -.0311
+
(.0168) -.0474
*** (.0133)
Dividend ratio (divrt-1)
.5638***
(.1714)
-1.4668***
(.1445) Ln(total assets)
(logtat-1) .0140
***
(.0019) .0069
*
(.0033) ROA
(roat-1) .3849
***
(.0152) -.1477
***
(.0122) Growth Opportunity
(got-1) .0216
***
(.0051) .0235
*** (.0040)
_cons -.1315***
(.0216)
.6013***
(.0348)
Obs. 8237 8237 Firm 982 982
F Stat. 2.60***
12.33 ***
Hausman Stat. 228.98***
173.91***
Model F.E. F.E. R-square 0.0803 0.3220
1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients；
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%;
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table.
65
Table 8. Two-Stage estimation and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Dependent variable: R&D intensity (rdint)
Independent variables Coef.
R&D intensity (rdintt-1)
.1308 (.0878)
R&D intensity (rdintt-2)
.0002 (.0017)
Leverage ratio (dat-1)
-.0091***
(.0032) Financial slack
(fst-1) -.0007 (.0027)
Export ratio (exportrt-1)
.0008 (.0020)
Firm size (empt-1)
-2.60e-07 (5.20e-07)
ROA (roat-1)
.0006 (.0036)
Growth Opportunity (got-1)
.0015 (.0012)
Affilated (bgmember)
.0012 (.0015)
Industry R&D intensity
(indrdintt-1) .0002
(.0017) Controlling ownership
(owner_pt-1) .0450
*
(.0178) Institutional ownership
(inst_pt-1) -.0523 (.0367)
_cons .0175***
(.0043)
Obs. 5523 Firm 878
Wald stat. 83.97***
Sargan Stat. 463.01***
AR(1) -3.81***
AR(2) .287 1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients；
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%.
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table.
66
APPENDIX B
Control for the effect of institutional change
Table 9. Panel Regression Results for equation (2) and equation (3)
Dependent variable: Financial slack (fs)
Dependent variable: Leverage ratio (da)
Independent variables Coef. Coef. Controlling ownership
(owner_pt-1) .0429
***
(.0122) -.0283
***
(.0085) Institutional ownership
(inst_pt-1) -.0572
**
(.0210) -.0268
+ (.0146)
Dividend ratio (divrt-1)
-.0202 (.2156)
-1.168***
(.1503) Ln(total assets)
(logtat-1) .0159
**
(.0051) .0052
(.0036) ROA
(roat-1) .2938
***
(.0172) -.1263
***
(.0120) Growth Opportunity
(got-1) .0226
***
(.0055) .0176
*** (.0038)
_cons -.1038+
(.0541) .4912
***
(.0377) Obs. 7539 7539 Firm 991 991
F Stat. 2.60***
12.50***
Hausman Stat. 47.96***
173.91***
Model F.E. F.E. R-square 0.0824 0.1155
1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients；
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%;
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table.
67
Table 10. Two-Stage estimation and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Dependent variable: R&D intensity (rdint)
Independent variables Coef.
R&D intensity (rdintt-1)
.4928***
(.0301) R&D intensity
(rdintt-2) -.0327
+ (.0173)
Leverage ratio (dat-1)
-.0270***
(.0055) Financial slack
(fst-1) .0080
*
(.0048) Export ratio (exportrt-1)
-.0039 (.0042)
Firm size (empt-1)
-1.26e-06 (9.50e-07)
ROA (roat-1)
-.00002 (.0050)
Growth Opportunity (got-1)
.0135***
(.0016)
Affilated (bgmember)
.0035 (.0091)
Industry R&D intensity
(indrdintt-1) -.0134
***
(.0037) Controlling ownership
(owner_pt-1) .1553
*
(.0659) Institutional ownership
(inst_pt-1) -.1628 (.1344)
_cons .0088 (.0068)
Obs. 4659 Firm 900
Wald stat. 385.87***
Sargan Stat. 247.36***
AR(1) -5.16***
AR(2) 1.14 1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients；
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%.
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table.
68
APPENDIX C
Different measure of firm size
Table 11. Two-Stage estimation and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Dependent variable: R&D intensity (rdint)
Independent variables Coef.
R&D intensity (rdintt-1)
.4124***
(.0254)
R&D intensity (rdintt-2)
-.0458**
(.0153)
Leverage ratio (dat-1)
-.0198**
(.0067) Financial slack
(fst-1) .0059
+
(.0037) Export ratio (exportrt-1)
-.0060+
(.0034) Firm size (logtat-1)
-.0068 (.0052)
ROA (roat-1)
.0062 (.0068)
Growth Opportunity (got-1)
.0120***
(.0013)
Affilated (bgmember)
.0022 (.0065)
Industry R&D intensity
(indrdintt-1) -.0075
**
(.0028) Controlling ownership
(owner_pt-1) .1268
**
(.0451) Institutional ownership
(inst_pt-1) .0561
(.1013) _cons .0807
+
(.0436) Obs. 5740 Firm 901
Wald stat. 438.52***
Sargan Stat. 487.13***
AR(1) -5.457***
AR(2) 1.00 1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients；
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%.
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table.
69
APPENDIX D
Drop insignificant control variables
Table 12. Two-Stage estimation and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Dependent variable: R&D intensity (rdint)
Independent variables Coef.
R&D intensity (rdintt-1)
.3963***
(.0199) R&D intensity
(rdintt-2) -.0182 (.0125)
Leverage ratio (dat-1)
-.0267***
(.0038) Financial slack
(fst-1) .0064
*
(.0031) Export ratio (exportrt-1)
-.0062*
(.0028) Growth Opportunity
(got-1) .0100
***
(.0011) Industry R&D intensity
(indrdintt-1) -.0072
**
(.0025) Controlling ownership
(owner_pt-1) .0616
*
(.0296) Institutional ownership
(inst_pt-1) -.0101 (.0581)
_cons .0279 (.0048)
Obs. 7072 Firm 960
Wald stat. 566.19***
Sargan Stat. 458.20***
AR(1) -6.38***
AR(2) .854 1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients；
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%.
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table.
70
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