owasp appsec research 2010 - the state of ssl in the world

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Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License. The OWASP Foundation OWASP http://www.owasp.org The State of SSL in the World Michael Boman Omegapoint

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OWASP AppSec Research 2010 - The State of SSL in the World

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Page 1: OWASP AppSec Research 2010 - The State of SSL in the World

Copyright © The OWASP FoundationPermission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License.

The OWASP Foundation

OWASP

http://www.owasp.org

The State of SSL in the World

Michael BomanOmegapoint

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Who am I?

Consultant at Omegapoint (Stockholm) Penetration Tester Incident Handler Course Instructor

Secure DevelopmentSecurity Testing

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Agenda

Background Data collection method Results from data analysis

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A little background

Lacked a good tool to perform OWASP-CM-001 tests (Testing for SSL-TLS, OWASP Testing Guide)Couldn’t find any that suited my requirements

Free, Runs locally, Works on Windows

Wrote SSLAudit in Perl (GPL)http://code.google.com/p/sslaudit/No longer maintained

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A little background (2)

Re-write SSLAudit or port SSLScan?http://sourceforge.net/projects/sslscan/

Ported SSLScan to Windows (GPL)http://code.google.com/p/sslscan-win/

Enhanced SSLScanRenegotiation testsEnhanced XML output formatRefactored output code

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SSLSCAN IN ACTION, SINGLE INSTANCE

Demo

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Why scan a lot of HTTPS servers?

I noticed that some organizations that you would think would have good security failed miserable on the HTTPS configuration

Was it a fluke? What differs organizations with good HTTPS settings with those with not-so-good or insecure settings?Money? Popularity? Industry?

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First large scan attempt

Single instance with a large collection of hosts

Took forever and was not that stableCould not easily resume failed scan process

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Second large scan attempt

Multiple instances with a handful of targets each

Much better performance, but still takes long time to complete the scan

Still could not easily resume failed scan processBut I didn’t need to start from beginning, just

the failed batch

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Third large scan attempt

Using Amazon AWSSQS to keep track of jobsS3 to store results

Multiple instances scanning one target each

Easy to resume failed jobs Still taking a long time to perform the

scan…

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Forth large scan attempt

Added Amazon EC2 to the mixNow I have theoretically unlimited servers to

scan from

Can scan the required dataset within a few days without problem

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Forth large scan design

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Forth large scan design

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SSLSCAN ON AMAZON EC2Demo

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The Question

What are the key factors for a good HTTPS configuration?Money?Popularity? Industry?

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THE NUMBERS…So what did I find?

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Data details

Alexa list from 18 Apr 2010 Fortune 500 (2010) Data aquired 26 Apr 2010

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HOW MANY OF THE TESTED SERVERS SUPPORTS SSL/TLS TO BEGIN WITH?

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Fortune 500

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Alexa 10k

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PROTOCOL SUPPORT

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Fortune 500

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Alexa 10k

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Fortune 500

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Alexa 10k

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Fortune 500

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Alexa 10k

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INSECURE KEY EXCHANGE

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Fortune 500

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Alexa 10k

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KEY LENGTHS

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NO ENCRYPTION(0 BIT KEY)

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Fortune 500

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Alexa 10k

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WEAK ENCRYPTION(1-127 BIT KEY)

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Fortune 500

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Alexa 10k

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MEDIUM ENCRYPTION(128-255 BIT KEY)

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Fortune 500

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Alexa 10k

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STRONG ENCRYPTION(>=256 BIT KEY)

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Fortune 500

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Alexa 10k

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SESSION RENEGOTIATION

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Fortune 500

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Alexa 10k

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FORTUNE 500 VS ALEXA 500

16 Organizations are on both lists

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Money vs. Popularity:HTTPS enabled?

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Money vs. Popularity:SSLv2 enabled? (= bad)

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Money vs. Popularity:0-bit keys being enabled?(=bad)

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Money vs. Popularity:Weak keys being enabled?(=bad)

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Money vs. Popularity:No auth kx being enabled?(=bad)

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Money vs. Popularity:Secure Session Renegotation?

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Fortune 500 Industries

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Fortune 500 Industries

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Fortune 500 Industries

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Fortune 500 Industries

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Fortune 500 Industries

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Bad

Worse

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Fortune 500 Industries

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Commercial Banks

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Conclusion

What the data told me is thatMoney (Fortune) seems to have something to

do with HTTPS being enabledPopularity (Alexa) seems to be they key to

enable HTTPS securelyThere is no obvious real trend in what kind of

industry a company is in and their HTTPS security settings, but it seems more likely the company is doing business over the webb the more likely they offer HTTPS on their website

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What’s next?

Deeper investigation into the Swedish market in co-operation with .SE (The Internet Infrastructure Foundation – the guys responsible for .SE TLD)

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Questions and Answers

Research website:http://sslresearch.michaelboman.org

Raw data, documentation, scripts and tools

Contact information:[email protected]

References: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_SSL-TLS_(OWASP-CM-001)