Overview of the Impact of Benefit Sanctions

David Webster

Urban StudiesUniversity of Glasgow

UKAJI/CASE Joint SeminarLondon School of Economics – 16 March 2016

Outline

• Rise & fall of JSA & ESA sanctions, reasons• Hardship payments• Likelihood of sanction of particular groups• Negative impacts• Do financial sanctions work?• DWP misrepresentations

The JSA sanctions campaign• Doubling of JSA sanctions after 2010• Peak 1,037,000 2012/13; 414,000 (inc. UC) 2014/15• Fallen back but only to highest level pre-2010• 22% of all JSA claimants were sanctioned (after

challenges) over 5 years 2009/10 to 2013/14 (FoI) –one quarter before challenges

• 12.9% of all JSA claimants sanctioned (after challenges) in 2014/15; of these, one quarter sanctioned more than once (FoI) – but DWP doesn’t know actual lengths of repeat sanctions

• All the most frequently occurring JSA sanctions lengthened from 22 Oct 2012 – min. now 4 weeks, harsh penalties for repeats

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JSA sanctions per month as % of claimants, before and after challenge, last 12 months

JSA originally adverse decisions as % of claimants, last 12months

JSA adverse decisions after review/appeal as % ofclaimants, last 12 months

Coalition

John Hutton Sec of State

45G/24

JSA sanctions campaign (2)• Increase in the more aggressive JSA sanctions,

especially non-participation in Work Programme & ‘Not actively seeking work’

• State substitutes its view on job search for the citizen’s

• DWP’s own research shows that about half of JSA ‘claimant commitments’ have unsuitable, useless or unachievable actions

• Proportion of ‘not ASW’ referrals resulting in sanction risen to 96% (other referrals: 54%)

• Ministers have driven up sanctions through management action – not ‘targets’ but ‘expectations’

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Vol./Mis. Ref. empl. Tr&Empl sch. MWA & Wk Exp. JS Direction FTA interview ASW Availability Other

Changing reasons for JSA sanctions (no. of sanctions for each reason as % of total sanctions)

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2015 1st half

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JSA sanctions: Adverse as % of original decisions: 'Not actively seeking work' and all other

All excl. ASE: Adverse as % of original decisions

ASE: Adverse as % of original decisions57/01

John HuttonSec of State

Coalitiongovt

Cons govt

Start of 'claimant commitment'

ESA sanctions• Escalated ESA (WRAG) sanctions since 2011 –

2.9% of all claimants in 2014/15 • More repeat sanctions than for JSA• Peak 49,400 2013/14, 29,000 in 2014/15• ESA sanctions also much harsher from 3 Dec 2012

– now lose all of personal allowance £73.10 p.w. plus fixed penalty 1, 2 or 4 weeks (previously only WRAG component £29.05 p.w., half for first 4 weeks then all)

• 80% of ESA sanctions are now for non-participation in ‘work related activity’

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ESA sanctions per month as % of claimants, before and after challenge, last 12 months

ESA originally adverse decisions as % of WRAG, last 12 months

ESA adverse decisions after review/appeal as % of WRAG, last 12months

45G/07

Note: ESA sanctions started in Oct 2008, but the published data only permit this chart to be shown for the months since February 2011

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Reasons for ESA sanctions (thou.), monthly after challenges

FTA mandatory interview

FTP work related activity

Coalition

47E/01

Cons govt

Appeal system• Claimant’s payments stopped without

hearing and before any appeal• Only one fifth of JSA sanctions challenged,

16% overturned (>70% success rate)• Half of ESA sanctions are challenged, 26%

overturned (50% success rate)• Mandatory Reconsideration (Oct 2013) has

reduced JSA & ESA challenges & all but killed off Tribunals

• MR has reduced proportion of ESA sanctions overturned but left JSA unchanged

What happens if you lose benefit? -‘Hardship’ payments

• Discretionary with specific harsh test since 1988/1996 (Portillo, Lilley) – designed to clean the claimant & family out of resources, e.g. no payment if cash from a payday lender exceeds ‘applicable amount’

• ‘Hardship payments’ 60% of JSA (rarely, 80%); 60% of ESA• Prior to Oct 2012, only 1 in 10 of sanctioned JSA claimants

got hardship payments – now over 40% (ESA 20%)• Two-week wait to apply except for arbitrarily defined

‘vulnerable’ - officially acknowledged to damage health• Under Universal Credit payments become repayable, in

effect sanctions 3½ times as long (NB sanctions lengthened anyway by being made consecutive, not concurrent); must demonstrate ‘compliance’ for 7 days before application; must reapply each 4-week period; 80% rate abolished

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JSA sanctions (before challenges) and hardship payment awards, 2011-15

JSA sanctions beforechallenges (est.)JSA hardship paymentawards

57/03

Harsher regime

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ESA sanctions (before challenges) and hardship payment awards, 2011-15

ESA sanctions before challenges (est.)

ESA hardship payment awards

Note: ESA figures include hardship awards to disqualified claimants.

Harsher regime

Impact on particular groups• All the qualitative research indicates that vulnerable/disadvantaged

claimants are more likely to be sanctioned• But limited quantitative information – last study was Peters & Joyce 2006

which failed to contact one third of its sampleJSA• Young people 18-24 twice as likely to be sanctioned• Homeless twice as likely to be sanctioned (Sheffield Hallam 2015)• Men sanctioned more than women• Hutton & Duncan Smith sanctions drives have particularly affected ethnic

minorities• DWP does no disability monitoring but self-described disabled claimants

more likely to be sanctioned repeatedly• One child affected for every 6 JSA sanctions• Some of the worst affected are older single white men without relativesESA• ESA claimants with mental health conditions more likely to be sanctioned• Sanctioned ESA claimants more likely than JSA to get repeat sanctions

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Monthly JSA sanctions after challenges as % of claimants: young people and others

Aged 16-24

Aged 25+

05A/01

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Monthly JSA sanctions after challenges as % of claimants by ethnic group

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Black or Black British

Chinese or Other ethnicgroup

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Hutton

Duncan Smith

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% of (self-defined) disabled & non-disabled JSA claimants with each no. of sanctions after challenges Apr 2000 - Sep 2015

Disabled %

Not disabled %

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ESA WRAG claimants: Ratio of monthly rate of sanction of those with mental & behavioural

conditions to rate for those with other conditions

Start of Work Programme

64/07

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No. of sanctions

JSA and ESA: Percentage of sanctioned claimants receiving each no. of sanctions 2014/15 (1 July - 30 June)

JSA %

ESA %

62/01

Negative impacts of sanctions – on the claimant & family

• Damage to physical & mental health up to and including death

• Hunger & resort to Food Banks (Loopstra et al. 2015)

• Family and friends suffer hardship • Damage to family relationships• Debt• Homelessness• Increased crime (incl. ‘survival theft’ )• Longer term loss of resilience• All these illustrated in recent Sheffield Hallam &

Quarriers reports on sanctions & homelessness

Negative impacts of sanctions – on the jobfinding process

• Claimants’ & employers’ time wasted through pointless job applications

• Interference with people’s own strategies• Employment services worse & people alienated• Claimants fear to complain re bad treatment• Many people drop out of benefit & employment

services altogether (only half of unemployed young people claim JSA)

• Diversion of Jobcentre Plus & contractor resources • Huge administrative waste (e.g. ‘cancelled’ referrals,

duplication of ASW disentitlement & sanction)• Diversion of voluntary & other public sector resources

Do financial sanctions work?• Overseas academic studies show some evidence of small

effects (of different regimes!) on employment• But DWP does not record destinations of sanctioned

claimants who stop claiming (cf. Wk & Pensions Commrecs) – off-flow is sole management target

• No evidence to support longer sanctions• No evidence to support escalation of repeat sanctions• No evidence to support financial sanctions as opposed to

other means of influence (e.g. simple job search monitoring – McVicar 2010)

• Conversely, much evidence that sanctions make getting a job more difficult for many claimants

• And that sanctions push people into worse, less well paid and less stable jobs (Arni et al. 2012)

• UK’s ‘jobs miracle’ has meant dire productivity and low wage growth

Five DWP misrepresentations• ‘72% of claimants said awareness of sanctions

made them more likely to follow rules’ – same research shows no more likely to get a job

• ‘Sanctions are a last resort’ – no they aren’t -there are no procedures to make them so

• ‘There are no targets for sanctions’ – but there are ‘expectations’

• ‘Only a tiny minority are sanctioned’ – misuse of post-challenge per month figures, 5% v. 25%

• ‘Oakley Review found that benefit sanctions provide a vital backstop’ – no it didn’t , this is just the personal view Oakley started with

More information• My Child Poverty Action Group webpage http://www.cpag.org.uk/david-

webster

• My Sanctions project webpage http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/socialpolitical/research/urbanstudies/projects/ukbenefitdisallowances/

• Blogs:• Socialist Health Association http://www.sochealth.co.uk/2014/10/09/dwps-benefit-

sanctions/• ERSA (Employment Related Services Association) http://ersa.org.uk/media/blog/dr-

david-webster-argues-its-time-abolish-benefit-sanctions• Centre for Crime and Justice Studies

http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/resources/benefit-sanctions-britains-secret-penal-system

• Poverty Alliance – Challenge Poverty Week https://challengepoverty.wordpress.com/2015/10/19/poverty-punishment-overkill-the-deliberate-creation-of-destitution-through-benefit-sanctions/

• LSE British Politics and Policy https://challengepoverty.wordpress.com/2015/10/19/poverty-punishment-overkill-the-deliberate-creation-of-destitution-through-benefit-sanctions/

• Email me at: david.webster@glasgow.ac.uk – ask to be put on my mailing list