Outline of ReportBook Review: Internalization Of The Bangsamoro Struggle Samuel K. Tan

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1: INERTIA OF HISTORY

I. Struggle for Political Powera. Pre-Sultanate period

i. Marked by the struggle of rajahships and datuships for the maintenance of their independence

b. Sultanate periodi. Concrete political system

ii. Datuships and rajaships as foundational leveliii. Blending of Islam and indigenous political culture

c. Against colonialism (Spain and US)i. Means: violence and diplomacy

ii. Succeeded in maintaining their political dominance by controlling the seasd. Introduction of steam gunboats

i. Led to the decline of Muslim political power ii. Erosion of the Sultanate foundations in Sulu and Maguindanao

e. Strengthened Spanish strongholdsi. Treaties:

a. Simuay Treaty in 1636b. Sulu Treaty of 1645c. Sulu and Captain General Jose Malcampo Treaty in 1876

ii. Further restricted the political range of Muslim activitiesiii. New Muslim response: Sabilallah

a. An institution of conflict that individualized the concept of Jihadb. Created most serious problem to Spanish security in Muslim areasc. Indication of Muslims’ unwillingness to give up political power even at

the cost of self-annihilation and the destruction of their homelandf. Treaty of Paris in 1898

i. Posed a more formidable challenge to the Muslim political struggleg. American campaigns in Muslimland

i. Destroyed the Muslim military capacity ii. Emasculated the datuship’s and Sultanate’s political power

h. Bates Treatyi. Recognized American supremacy and presence in Sulu

i. John Pershingi. Pressured the local datus into respecting American sovereignty by personally

presenting themselves to Camp Vicorsj. Muslim leadership had become divided

i. Anticolonial struggle a. Sajiduciman of Bayanb. Datus of Bayabao

ii. Compromising in a liberal democracyk. Moro Province of 1903

i. Accommodation and the integration of the Muslim leaders willing to participate in the American colonial system

l. Bud Bagsak in 1913i. Sultanate’s ultimate loss of any political power

a. Carpenter-Kiram Agreement i. Only retained for the Sultan his spiritual power over his subjects

m. Separation of church from state principlei. Deny the Muslim’s access to political power

n. Muslim Leadershipi. To explore the possibilities in the American liberal, democratic system

a. Rules more often than not clashed with the Islamic system of governanceo. Integration of the Christian Filipino leadership

i. Not only lost power to the Americans but also to the Christian Filipinos p. Frank W. Carpenter

i. First civil governorii. Definitely lost all political advantage

q. Participation in the democratic processesi. Rode to political power under American rule

ii. Ex: electioniii. Problems:a. Lacked adequate knowledge of Western civilization b. Especially the ability to read, write and communicate in Spanish and/or

Englishr. Frank C. Laubach

i. Brought literacy to the Muslim Souths. Few members of Muslim royalty that were able to study in American-established schools in

Manilai. Princess Tarhata Kiram

ii. Hadji Gulamu Rasul of Sulut. Petition to the US President in 1930

i. Not to include the Muslim South in an independent Philippines but to organize it as a territory of the US

u. Two Sultanates were establishedi. Sultan Ombra Amilbangsa

a. No historical linkages to the royal datuship b. Best way to reconcile the sultanate’s need to survivec. Local political system for purposes of integration but not for governmental

administrationv. Issue of proprietary rights over the Bornean territory of the Sultanate

i. “Deed of cession” a. Sovereinty would revert back to the Sultanate in case of the Philippine

government’s failure to pursue the Sultanate’s claims over SabahII. Struggle for economic progress

a. Lucrative economic systemi. Muslim South linked to the rest of the Philippines in both a beneficial

domestic trade and a kind of foreign tradei. Brought Southeast Asians and their goods into Sulu from as far

as Manila

b. Fall of Muslim Kingdom to Spanish forcesi. Under Miguel Lopez de Legazpi

ii. Led to the elimination of one of the most strategic and progressive Muslim entrepots of trade

c. Governor Francisco de Sandei. Expedition to Brunei due to the seizure o economic initiatives and control over

the Brunei-Manila tradeii. Constituted an alliance of economic interests seeking to profit from the

breakup of Muslim monopolyiii. Failed and neutralized the Muslim Mindanao

a. Destroying the vital role of Sulu and Maguindanao in the trade patternd. Muslims’ violent reaction to Spanish intrusion

i. Prevent disruption of a lucrative internal and external tradee. Muslim economic losses

i. Destruction of farms and villages in Jolo Islandii. Destruction of trading vessels and the looting of valuable merchandise and

itemsf. Encomiendas

i. Motivated Spanish expeditionsii. Captain Figueroa

a. Led expedition to Pulangi in Mindanaob. Conditions:

i. Be appointed as Governor of Mindanao for lifeii. Lands acquired by conquest and pacification be distributed as

encomiendasiii. Wiped out series of ancestral lands

g. Role of the Jesuits and the Recollectsi. Strengthening Spanish rule

ii. Alienation of territories from ancestral lands of hill tribes and Muslim groupsh. 19th century

i. rise of towns in Davao, Cotabato, Misamis, Zamboanga, Surigao and Suluii. breaking up the economic patterns of internal trade

iii. marked the final loss of economic advantage they have enjoyed for so many centuries

i. Gen. Tasker H. Blissi. Governor of the Moro Province

a. Reorient the natives toward the American free enterprise economic system

b. Draw American agricultural and business interests to the development of American plantations and business in Southern Philippines

j. Muslims merely supplied the raw materialsk. Sultans and datus loss their status and importance in the colonial society

III. Struggle for social destinctiona. Decline of social importance

i. Loss of political and economic powerb. Colonial system

i. Deprived the Muslim and other cultural communities of the capacity to achieve the level of equality in social status

c. People regarded the Christian Filipinos as socially higher than the Muslims and pagansd. Muslim middle class

i. Educated and professionalse. Employment of royalties

i. Royal class to ordinary government employeesii. Landholder to cultivator

f. Quezon’s agrarian policyi. Settlement of Christians in Mindanao and Sulu as a way of finally integrating

Muslim Mindanao into the ‘national mainstream’g. Modern western influences

i. Not only in societies but also in value systemsIV. Struggle for cultural identity

a. Philippine independence in 1946i. Muslim fears that whatever political, economic, social and cultural

possessions they had preserved under the American liberal democratic system might finally be lost to the Christian Filipinos who had become virtual heirs to the American colonial government

b. Government could not be fully trustedi. Kamlon Uprising in Sulu

a. Suspected the government to be supporting their local enemiesc. Moro National Front (MNLF)

i. Nur Misuariii. March 18 – memorial day

a. To commemorate the massacre of Tausug-sama trainees on Corrgidor Island

d. March 18 – Bangsamoro daye. Muslim perception

i. Filipinism is limited and relevant only to the aspirations of the Christian majority in the country

CHAPTER 2: THE MORO IN HISTORY

CHAPTER 3: OPTIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

3 periods: 1946- 1968: 22years domination of integrationist view of problem1968- 1987: 19years characterized by secessionist option1987- up to present: emergence of separatist alternative

First Period: The Integrationist Approach

- After the Pacific War and the following declaration of Philippine Independence in July 4 1946, the government was confident that whatever Filipino-Muslim issues remaining can be resolved by the fast integration of Muslims in the Filipino Republic. However not a few Muslim leaders thought of the same thing based on their participation with national development as Filipino citizens.

Political Families in Muslim South:

Lanao- Alonto, Lucman, Dimaporo, Tamano, Pangandaman, MorohomsarCotabato, Maguindanao- Sinsuat, Mangelen, Pendatun, Piang, Matalam, MasturaSulu- Kiram, Abubakar, Taluwi, Rasul, Sangkuli, Anni, Tan, Loong

-The quality of integration can be seen by the success of involvement of both catholic and non-catholic in the electoral process

Maranaos elected Tomas Cabili in congress Tausug and Sama elected Leon Fernandez as governor of Sulu Siasi elected Felix Bello and Vicente Santos as mayors Chinese families such as the Tans, Lims, Kongs, Teos and Hos were elected in predominantly

Muslim areas.-This pattern continued until 1968 when new element in Muslim attitude resulted to Jabidah Massacre.-Although Muslim political families maintained the integrationist pattern, the “new element” pushed for a secessionist option that aimed for withdrawal from a political body which is in context, the “break-up” of Muslim South from the Philippine territory subjected to Philippine sovereginity.

Second Period: The Secessionist Option

Bangsamoro Liberation Organization-lead by Datu Rashid Lucman- leader of the secessionist movement-umbrella organization for Muslim groups seeking independence from the state although with little unity to speak of.-divided by ethnic and other local factors -composed of three largest Muslim groups in the archipelago: Maranaos, Maguindanaos, Tausugs(including Sama) -sent 90 or so Muslim youths who trained in Malaysia for military combat and training from the three major groups

Three from each group were chosen to emerge as rallying personalities on what we now know a Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MNLF:

Dimasangkay Pundato- MaranaoHashim Salamat- MaguindanaoNur Misuari- Tausug-Sama

In the late sixties, the Muslim struggle was ideologically anchored on a semi- conservative view that the Muslims were Filipinos and thus constituted to a part of the Philippine state.

Their long neglect pushed them to seek independence from the Philippines.-attributed to the leaderships of traditional leaders that wielded influence such as

*Rashid Lucman and Domacao Alonto of Lanao*Udtog Matalam of Cotabato*Maas Bawang of Sulu

However, the ties between traditional leadership and the central government in Manila downplayed the radical elements that had permeated the Moro consciousness-because of compromises with government as they were responsible for paving the way for the return to the “fold of the law” of a good number of rebels.

1976 Tripoli Agreement between MNLF under Nur Misuari and the government represented by Carmelo Barbero with representatives of OIC as witnesses

-conducted more peace talks following the 1974 outbreak of MNLF hostilities in Jolo.-rift in leadership of MNLF

The traditional leaders found the difficulty of winning over the Moro Struggle

Third Period: The Separatist Alternative

Nur Misuari declared the ideology of MNLF based on his own idea and not recognizing the view of the whole group. There was no other doctrine of ideology other than his. The other MNLF leaders thought of this as Misuari’s ideology. -resulted to acceptance of Misuari’s dominance

Idea: concoction of Islamic, Socialist, and Marxis-Leninist sources-factor for recruiting youths in joining the group-established the fact that the “Moro Nation” was established long before the Spanish colonization and NEVER PART OF FILIPINO STATE OR NATION and in fact developing separately from Filipino or Christian community.-MNLF is reestablishes the assertion of the separateness of the Moro nation THEREFORE, SECESSIONISM COULD NOT BE CORRECT BECAUSE IT IMPLIES BEING PART OF THE FILIPINO NATION -the idea of separation appealed more to the Moro nation since it claims the fact that they were never part of a nation that was previously conquered

The Moro people asked for more concrete components of the MNLF ideology. Misuari declared a speech in Maimbung following their official paper, Mahadlika.

Mahadlika concepts:1. gaosbaugbug2. kaadilan

These concepts were attractive to the Tausug-Sama elements but unclear to non-Tausug-Sama elements. This factor reinforced the perception that the ideology is made to suit the interest of the said ethnic group. Although the gaosbaugbug and kaadilan did not really conflict with the non-Tausug-Sama concepts, the ideology’s ethnic character was clearly shown. It greatly affected the stability of MNLF leadership and struggle.

Crack in the movement’s solidarity:

Lucman wrote a confidential note- asking for the Tripartite Committee of the OIC to resolve the issues of the Moros.

- implying that Misuari’s ideology had crossed the Marxist-radical line that is not in the best interest of the Muslims in the Philippines

-breakaway of Salamat and Pundato from MNLF sserved to isolate the Maranao and Maguindanao from the movement*reduced the MNLF to Nur Misuari to a Tausug-Sama based separatist struggle

Pundato and Salamat created a new group named Moro Islamic Liberation Front-Misuari denied the idea that MILF was formed to repudiate the MNLF ideology-conformed that the break was because of personal interests-blamed external influences such as the Philippine government that is exploiting the internal issues of MNLF leadership

Misuari recognized the seriousness of the MILF.He deliverd a message in Tausug reminding them of the three motivating concepts powered by the Moro struggle:1. hula- Tausug for homeland; suggest the idea of territoriality2. agama- -religious tradition; suggest the idea of identity3. bangsa- race; suggest beyond identity of proud origin based on biological and historical beginnings

- by the time of Aquino administration, the demands of the group redused to Tausg –Sama

Pundato:-accepted the dictatorship of the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA)-being the head of the MNLF Reformist, he followed the traditional approach by going for integrationSalamat:-Maguindanao was the object of government proposals-also accepted the integrationist solution

Because of this decisions made by the other two leaders, the OIC concluded their full support for Nur Misuari’s MNLF by 1989.-made the Muslims opt for the separatist movement

Government Responses to the Moro Issue

The government opts for integration based on old colonial ideas Difference:Colonizers- wanted to promulgate ChristianizationGovernment- guided by constitutional guarantee of religious freedom

However, the Filipino-Muslims continued to suffer neglect from the government*limited opportunities in government service*mostly in secondary levels of bureaucracy

Despite political policies and programs which later on became political slogans and propaganda, the Muslim alienation intensified together with the increase of national population. -the minorities were down the list of priorities-political bias

*Christian majority enjoyed abundance of natural resources*monopoly of power in nation even in Muslim areas

The government correctly believed that by compromising with the Muslim leaders which were basically the elite, the Muslim threat to the national security can be neutralized. -the government gave resources to the elite, and not considering the needy Muslim masses-subsequent share of Muslim leadership in the economic resources through trade, commerce, agriculture, and other revenue generating schemes

1957 Commission on National Integration, 1968 Mindanao State University-only gave the Muslim leaders the feeling of importance-venue to project their political and intellectual profiles in Philippine society-participated only by intellectuals and academicsThis factor strengthened the option for secessionism or separatist struggle by the masses. They agitated because of their worsening situation.-the traditional leaders soon opened for the radical option

Decleration of Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) by Governor Udtog Matalam in Pagaluan Cotabato in may 1968.-President Marcos arranged a meeting to neutralize the radical threat of the MuslimsResult: it was unstoppable because the Muslims have became so united at this point although Matalam gave the government the opportunity to prove its dedication to Muslim progress -outbreak of war in Sulu in 1974 (bloodiest and costliest conflict) between the government and the newly formed MNLF seeking independence

Jolo up to Tawi-Tawi- setting of the war hundreds of government troopers and mujaheedeens were killed poverty since lots of properties were lost and robbed

Clashes in Lanao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, Basilan were reported Tripoli Agreement in December 1976

- Nur Misuari and Carmelo Barbero of the government- Witnessed by the OIC representatives- Agreed to pursue a peaceful solution towards Muslim autonomy without any prejudice- The MNLF did coldly accepted the national plebiscite and autonomous structures for the

Muslim South- Accused the government of insincerity and duplicity

Post-Tripoli Agreement- intensified propaganda against each other- calculated armed attacks

After Marcos was ousted, the Muslims saw hope in Aquino but did not do anything to mandate the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement other than one visit in Jolo.Private and public talks followed to amend the rift between the gov and the Muslims.

Missions to the Middle East- dialogue with Misuari and OIC in ME

Jeddah Accord in 1987 composed of Sens- Aqulino Pimentel and Agapito Aquino gave ideas to search for solutions- Uncertainties in Aquino admin gave the Muslim the idea of insincerity and infact, increased

efforts to divide the Muslim people

Late 1989- the OIC gave an impending admission of the MNLF as a full member of the organization- showed the serious implications of the Moro issue- might give MNLF the leverage in fighting the OIC

Through the Department of Foreign Affairs, the government attacked the MNLF in the person of Secretary Raul Manglapus

- expressed that the government is ready for peace talks if the group is composed of its complete leaders Misuari, Pundato and Salamat

- made the OIC doubt the unified front of the MNLF- Pundato already accepted the directorship of Office of Muslim Affairs- Salamat’s MILF was offered juicy political positions and economic opportunities, including access

to financial resources

The government encroached MNLF’s grounds- based on the results of the February 1991 plebiscite- inauguration of the regional gov’t by Gov. Zacaria Candao showed OIC it’s sincerity in honoring the Tripoli Accord

Final blow that brought to an end OIC’s support for the MNLF:- Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait which polarized the Muslim and Arab world- MNLF was not taking any side (neutral) which disappointed the OIC; they expected to seek

unification against Iraq’s aggression

MNLF profile was undermined- inability to stage credible attacks even to areas under MNLF influence unlike they did back in

1974 is Sulu- government succeeded in neutralizing the MNLF by using politicians and traditional leaders that

were underrated by Misurai

1976 Tripoli Agreement asked an explanation for the lack of MNLF armed response for suspected MNLF terrorists. The leadership was forced to disown groups who kidnapped civilians and engaged gov’t troops. - Psy-war to dissimulate MNLF’s lack of control over it’s field commanders

RECAPITULATION When we look back at the efforts of both groups, it’s clearly seen that integration were almost all attributed to the gov’t, with the Muslim leadership taking a “don’t know don’t care” attitude. If we look at the progress’ period, the pre-1978 resolution was one sidedly initiated by the gov’t from Roxas to Marcos.

- no meaningful Muslim input into their integration process which was left to the leadership in Manila

- due to lack of clear vision of what integration meant or lon history of government’s lack of implementation

CHAPTER 4: INTERNATIONALIZATION FROM WITHIN

** Events that lead for urgent need for foreign support Deployment of more military troops in the Southern Phil. Pressured to diplomatic options

MUSLIM VIEW OF FOREIGN SUPPORT

**Reasons why Muslims handed foreign support to MNLF separatist aims As Muslims, they should help their Muslim brothers everywhere MNLF was fighting for the cause of Islam Governmental effort to convert Muslims to Christianity To improve the standard of living in Muslims areas

VIOCE FROM THE FIELD

** MNLF’s rank-and-file and broad supporters Came from the provinces of Region 9 (Western Mindanao) Represent the reactions of the Sama, Tausug and Yakan ethnic groups

THE BANGSAMORO MEETINGS AND CONGRESS

**Methods used by MNLF to draw int’l attention Organized congress Mass gatherings

** Misuari was the central figure

** Conference of 1986 proved that: The MNLF was a force to reckon with It is working for the freedom of the Bangsamoro people

** 17th OIC Annual Resolution of March 1988 Acknowledged the MNLF’s show of force Declared unequivocal support for the MNLF as representative of the Bangsamoro

** Bangsamoro National Congress Crafted strongly-worded resolutions These resolutions were passed and included in the OIC’s annual meeting on March 13-16

Reasons for joining MNLFMansur sakili The threat of to islam, the treatment of

muslims as second-class citizens, and neglect of muslim areas by the govt.

Sylvia jahil To provide much needed medical service to her people.

Saidali abdula Rampant graft and corruption among govt. officials.

Ibnu Hassan The calling of Muslim youths to get involved in the struggle against govt. injustice.

Panglima Abdullah sansawi He believed that as a progressive landowner his interest could be protected from any future political changes

Hadji hatab yusop He was thoroughly convinced by the MNLF propaganda.

Datu amiril maindan SympathizerIbnu unaid Only as recruits who do not fuly

understand the MNLF stand.Sawadjaan atiulla Belived in the struggle of bangsamoro

people.Eliasin jainal Influenced by his relatives.Hasinon tingkaban Discrimination from islam to chrisytianity.Cesar utam Believed that martial law was not good for

muslims.Sali ilaji Disenchantment with marcos

administration.Apalal julkanain He was against the government specialy

when two of his brothrs died within marcos’s presidency.

Samad abdurahim To fight for muslim independence.Matlib usman Marcos’s oppression of muslims and govt’s

oppression of islam.Mudjabirin arasain To fight fro the bangsamoro freedom, for

the cause of islam, chack govt. military abuses against muslim women and religion.

Malinsa hasim He feared of loosing his religion.Kurasiya husin Belief that the govt. was carrying out the

plans to convert Muslims to Christianity.Mudjabirin sarani Defense of bangsamoro homeland seeking

for independence, defense of muslims who was harrased by the military, defense of islam which wsa threatened by marcos.

Hadji albasi bin mutalib To fight for freedom amg digity of the muslims and to be part of muslim struggle for independence.

Hadji bawang estino Rampant abuses commited by the military against many innocent muslims.

Morofred sarangkula Govt’s “perennial neglect”.Hadji alln salabiddin It was duty of all muslims to help attain the

freedom in mindanao.Prof. amirul abajul NMLF has historical basis for fighting

against the autonomous govt.Amil jawari Defense of islam.Muksan taguilid Anti-muslim attitude.Habib harun aldam Defense of islam.Habib nabo hasim Discontented with the govt. Yusop alam Disenchantmant with the govt. Hadji malik alsad Believes in freedom and independence of

bangsamoro people.Gerry salapuddin Discrimination.

RESOLUTION NO. 1------- Appealing to the OIC to grant membership to the MNLF

RESOLUTION NO. 2------- Calling for the resumption of peace talks between the MNLF and the Philippine gov’t

RESOLUTION NO. 3------- Rejecting the Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao

RESOLUTION NO. 4------- Urging the Philippine gov’t to implement the 1976 Tripoli Agreement

RESOLUTION NO. 5------- Reiterating the congress’s recognition of Nur Misuari’s leadership

RESOLUTION NO. 6------- Calling for the solidarity of Muslims, Christians and the highlanders who support the independence of the Bangsamoro homeland

RESOLUTION NO. 7------- Calling for the demilitarization of Mindanao and other islands

RESOLUTION NO. 8------- Desisting the continued exploitation of the Bangsamoro homeland by multinationals and their local counterparts

RESOLUTION NO. 9------- Urging the just indemnification of all the victims of human rights violations

RESOLUTION NO. 10------ Recognizing the sovereignty of the Palestinian state and the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle

RESOLUTION NO. 11------ Condemning Salman Rushdie and his novel, Satanic Verses

RESOLUTION NO. 12------ Calling for the establishment of the Bangsamoro media

**18th meeting of the OIC’s Foreign Ministers (March 13-16, 1991)

Draft Resolution No. 18-P

Reaffirmed the “unflinching adherence” of the OIC to Tripoli Agreement OIC’s support for the full implementation of its purposes

OIC urged its member states to extend material, financial and humanitarian assistance to MNLF

CHAPTER 5: INTERNALIZATION FROM WITHOUT

Muslim Independence Movement in 1968- to internationalize the Moro struggle were directed toward foreign diplomacy.- strengthening of the domestic front.- purely Muslim independence movement in a broader and comprehensive struggle in

southern Philippines.- members consisted of Muslims, Christians, and Lumads who shared common vision of

free, independent and prosperous Mindanao. The Moro struggle had become the struggle of a regional population not bound by a common

religion, but by a common aspiration, a goal anchored on the conviction that the progress of the region lies in independence.

The Lucman Initiatives Haraun Al-Rasid Lucman

- prominent Maranao leader from Lanao Del Sur - he first to take steps toward the internationalization of the Moro struggle.- Established contacts with Malaysian leaders especially Tun Mustapah of Sabah for the training of Moro youth and leaders in a movement towards Moro liberation.-Established ties with Arab countries.

The MNLF was organized with a central committee headed by Nur Misuari. The visits in the Middle East in 1971: Libyan connection Muslim obligation to assist oppressed Muslim, Lucman utilized the likelihood of Zionist

influenced behind the Philippine government’s treatment of the Moro people as an argument to get the unequivocal and passionate support of Libyan president Muammar Ghadafi for the MNLF.

In June 1972, Libya’s formal support for the MNLF was declared by President Ghadafi who pledge substantial military and other assistance to the Moro cause.

As a result, the Bangsa Moro Army was organized and equipped with modern military weapons and hardware.

The Libyan aid was substantial, that the Libyan gave the MNLF “all kinds of support”. - Misuari meant included Libya’s strategic and vital role in the MNLF’s diplomatic efforts,

especially in the OIC where all the heads of the state of 46 Muslim countries were members.

The attention to the Moro issue was no small thing. It was historic and elating because the most powerful Muslim body in the world had given formal recognition to the Moro issue and deemed worthy of support by the OIC.

The MNLF in the face of the Marcos government which was exhausting all means thwart the Moro struggle. The resolution called upon the Marcos government to guarantee the rights and security of the Moro people.

The OIC become the formidable force behind the Moro struggle, as shown by the subsequent development.

The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)

Moro struggle becoming an OIC concern, the gradual growth of Misuari’s importance here and abroad was inevitable.

In 1973, 4th conference in Bengazi, Libya.- The OIC resolution No.4, expressed concern over the genocidal campaigns of the

Philippine government against the Moro population. - The formation of an OIC delegation to visit the Philippines and to report its findings.

In 1974, 5th conference in Kuala Lumpur- Resolution No.18, reiterated the previous OIC commitment and support, while also

noting the Philippine government’s effort to address the problem and to improve on prospects for peace.

- Urged the Philippine government to negotiate a political solution with the MNLF.- Created Filipino Muslim Welfare and Relief Agency - - a plus factor in the MNLF

struggle, since the agency would deal the critical needs of the Moro people not effectively served by the Philippine government.

In 1975, 6th conference in Jeddah- Resolution No.10, the MNLF demands were presented and approved for the adaptation.- The demands were:

o Self- government for Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Palawan.o An internal security forced composed of MNLF and other minority groups.o Dismantling of all the government armed forces in the Moro homeland.o A system of Shariah courts.o Control of elementary and secondary education by the local government.o Control of all Muslim institutions by the Moro government.o Moro control of all economic affairs of the region.o Full and free participation of the Moro people in the central government.

In 1976, 7th conference in Istanbul- Putting real pressure on the Philippine government to grant meaningful autonomy to

the Moro people.- The conclusion of the historic the basis for the ultimate solution to the Moro problem

without sacrificing Philippine sovereignty. From 1977 to 1980

- Carry out the ambiguously general provision of the Tripoli agreement resulted in fundamental differences in interpretation.

- Charges and countercharges between the parties to the agreement led to a frosty conclusion when formal talks between the MNLF and the government ceased together.

- The Marcos government went ahead with what it considered as the faithful carrying out of the Tripoli accord, including the establishment of two Muslim autonomous regions in Mindanao – Region9 (Western Mindanao) and Region10 (Central Mindanao).

- The MNLF position was strengthened internationally when it acquired from the OIC an observer’s status in 1977. This allowed the MNLF chairman access to the OIC leadership.

In 1981, 12th conference in Baghdad- Misuari lambasted the Philippine government for its genocidal campaigns in Pata island

and called upon the OIC to take drastic and urgent measures.- Giving the MNLF full membership status, the OIC went on reiterating support for the

MNLF as the sole official representative of the Moro people and rejecting measures taken by the Philippine government as not in keeping with the Tripoli Agreement.

In 1985- The Philippines had turned increasingly against the Marcos government and the MNLF

expressed support for the opposition forces seeking Marco’s overthrow.- The prospect of getting a better deal for the fulfillment of the Tripoli Accord, having

obtained from chief oppositionist, former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. the promised to carry out the agreement in the event that Marcos would be unseated.

In effect, the position and status of the MNLF in the OIC has remained the most important leverage of the Moro struggle for self- determination or, at least, a meaningful autonomy.

Psychologically, the OIC has given moral and political strength that military forces could not.

Tripoli Agreement as the only basis of any settlement. It has internationalized the MNLF struggle’s international character. It has given Misuari

a semblance of sovereignty as MNLF chairman. The Agreement is so unique that the OIC and its member states are bound collectively

and individually to uphold the MNLF cause. OIC commitment is a sacred responsibility. The MNLF is bound to the agreement and

therefore cannot exceed the limits set by the accord. It cannot ask for more than a truly meaningful autonomy for the Moro homeland

because the agreement honors Philippine sovereignty. Provisions has kept the OIC from granting the MNLF full membership status which the

movement has been seeking since 1977. To grant the MNLF full membership would be to negate the Tripoli Agreement. By consistently denying the MNLF fell membership, the OIC has given the Philippine the

guarantee of sovereignty and thus remain the only hope of the Philippine government resolve the Moro issue without waging a costly decisive war against the MNLF.

The Aquino government did not give this point serious attention, insisting instead on treating the issue as an internal problem that can be adequately dealt with by the Philippine constitution.

As long as the Philippine government keeps ignoring the agreement, the delays buys time for MNLF campaign for full membership in OIC.

The abandonment of the Agreement works in favor of Moro secessionism or separatism, the MNLF’s original goal, which has been effectively checked by the OIC.

Other Diplomatic Offensives The MNLF established an office in Pakistan, and its presence had also been made visible

through representatives in Sabah, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and Darrasalam. No doubt that Misuari was establishing or strengthening ties with other revolutionary

movement in the world to give the MNLF the international dimension. He vehemently attacked the Philippine government using Tausug expletives to

denounce not only the Filipino colonialism but also the government’s irreconcilable position.

8th OIC conference in Tripoli on May 20, 1977 where Misuari accused the Philippine government of violating the Tripoli Agreement and continuing its genocidal against the Moro people.

The more effective tools in internationalization process were Misuari’s lecture circuit and talks heads of state.

On January 27-28, 1987 Misuari addressed the plenary session of the 5th Islamic Summit of Muslim heads of states of Kuwait, wherein he again underscored the failure of the Philippine government to carry out the Tripoli agreement.

Misuari stressed his “quest for peace in Bangsamoro Homeland” and Somalia’s support for the MNLF full membership in the OIC as “the key to peace”.

He projected the confidence of a head of state and impressed his host with his knowledge and skill, especially with the use of titles of MNLF leaders.

“Jihad in the Bangsamoro Homeland, its roots, ordeal, and future” wherein Misuari dramatized the Moro people’s long and sanguinary struggle and the price they had to pay for their liberation.

During the second plenary session of the 8th Islamic conference of foreign minister on February 18, 1989 wherein he revealed the probable secret collusion between the Aquino government and the Zionist Club International to train young Christian Sabahans in the Hacienda Luisita with the blessings of Jaime Cardinal Sin. He suspected the scheme to be part of the government’s anti-Moro design.

The Psychology of state violence and peaceful Bangsamoro Demonstrations Since 1968, one of the effective means employed by the MNLF propaganda arm to

attain the internationalization of the Moro struggle was the graphic and emotional portrayal of massacres, killings, rapes, and as such human rights violation in Muslim areas.

“The unbroken thread of Genocide in the Bangsamoro Homeland”. It attacks the failure of the Aquino government to follow up the prospects of peace presented in the “Jolo Peace Dialogue”.

It enumerates and describes several of the incidents to prove the government’s genocidal campaigns:

1.) Manili Massacre- In 1970, In North Cotabato- Men, women, children, young and old- were shot and killed, including Muslim pupil in a

near by school.2.) Malindong Massacre- September 25, 1976, 9 navel boats landed on Malindong beach- Rounded up the Muslim residents in a barbed-wire and were ordered to dig their own

grave and were massacred.3.) Motong Massacre- in 1976 in Zamboanga del Norte- 15 pregnant women, 14 children, and old people were executed.

4.) Naga Massacre - In Zamboanga del Sur- Hundreds of Muslims were surprised by Ilaga-PC troopers and killed. - Those who escaped to the sea were rescued by a Japanese or South Korean boat.5.) Bassilan Massacre- Merciless killings in Tubutan, Sangbay, and Dasala islands by government troops.6.) Merciless killing of an imam in Palawan, whose body was hanged and left to rot in front

of his mosque.7.) Pata Massacre- in 1981

- Children and orphans were thrown to the sea for the sharks, and women were raped for weeks before they were killed and thrown to the sharks.

Photos of Moro children killed and Moro women preparing themselves for jihad carry an emotional message to the Muslim world.

CHAPTER 6: MORO SECESSIONISM COMPARED

CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Difficulties in the research of secessionism:- gathering of related or significant data- gaps of information because of the lack of primary sources - a lot of information only comes from one side of the conflict (govt/state)- too little info from the protagonist (rebel)- as long as there is a part of the Filipinos who are committed to the cause separate identity, our

vision of ideal might be lost forever4 historical motivations of secessionism

1. political power2. economy 3. social importance4. cultural distinction

Approaches to Moro struggle1. integration (join together)2. secession (separation)3. separatism

Issues concerning today- Do the Muslims consider themselves as Filipinos?

o Yes: because Sulu is part of the Philippineso No: because of the neglect and treatment as second class citizens (there is doubt if they

are part of the nation)o despite all, there is still hope that autonomy (freedom) might work o there remained a desire for peace, for freedom from the horrors of war

- Whether the involvement of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is welcomed by the Muslims

o Nobody regards the OIC involvement as an “interference”o Muslim view is opposite that of the government

- What is happening in the Muslim South is outside the process of the Tripoli Accord and therefore unacceptable

o This is the Muslims’ core of sentiments

Conclusion:Generalizations

- Muslim’s perception of Filipinism is vague- Awareness is territorial and geographic in nature - Whatever thrust was given to nationalist education had been insufficient to reverse the factional

tendencies in our national society o implies that we are facing a serious ideological problem in our effort to unify the nation

- unity based on dominant exercise of power by the central government cannot last in a pluralistic society such as ours

o should serve as an eye opener to deal with national minorities as important complements to national unity and growth

- internationalization of Moro secessionist movement - there is still a large number of Muslims and Christians who adhere to autonomy and not

independence as the most ideal setup for the Muslim South - peace and independence in the Muslim south is inseparable because they are the basic

components of human progress

The Imperative of Peace Five aspects of human radicalism

1. state and radicalisma. interest of elite and the masses

2. state and secessionism 3. society and tribalism 4. society and criminalism 5. various elements and factions- State policies implementing mechanisms and programs to thwart the secessionist movement

are anchored on religious premises which categorize secessionism as purely Islamic phenomenon

Conflicts:- tension and violent clashes between factions in both the radical and secessionist movements

The Imperative of Development - development refers to progressive growth of political, economic, social and cultural conditions

of society brought about by the action of individualThe following realities are found in Mindanao:

a. colonialism was marked by freedom and interdependence of various ethnic groups b. political power had been concentrated in an alien groupc. American imperialism accelerated the further alienation of the native societies from

their identities and traditions except for the Muslims d. The failure of the United States to decentralize political power to the local or sectoral

level proved detrimental to the liberal democratic system established in the region

Priority Areas of Development

- approach to Mindanao problem is to give priority to the elimination of the of the psychological problems that have confused the issue of autonomy and self-determination

- first, eliminate the perception that Muslims and non-Christians are discriminated against in the upper echelons of power and decision making.

o There should be non-Christian, most especially Muslim paraticipation in the highest level of national decision making

o If this is supplemented in national government agencies, the psychological barrier will eventually be eroded

- before peace and development can be obtained in Mindanao, psychological gap between national leadership and regional relations has to be bridged