our place in nature: material persons and theism

7/25/2019 Our Place in Nature: Material Persons and Theism

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Our Place in Nature: Material Persons and Theism

Lynne Rudder Baker

One of the deepest assumptions of Judaism and its

offspring, Christianity, is that there is an important

difference between human persons and everything else that

exists in Creation. We alone are made in Gods image. We

alone are the stewards of the earth. t is said in Genesis

that we have !dominion over the fish of the sea, and over

the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all theearth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the

earth." t is difficult to see how a traditional theist could

deny the significance of the difference between human

persons and the rest of Creation. We human persons are

morally and ontologically special.

On the other hand, we are undeniably part of nature.

n the Jewish, Christian and slamic traditions, God created

us#man and woman#along with everything else that exists

in nature. $oreover, all the sciences that in the past %&&

years have exploded with 'nowledge consider human

persons as part of nature. (cientific 'nowledge is genuine

'nowledge. t would be unthin'able to me to turn my bac',intellectually spea'ing, on the fact that the sciences have

met with astonishing success. )et, the sciences are

relentless in ta'ing human beings to be *ust another part of

nature+ a little more complex than chimpanees, but not

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essentially different#certainly not morally and ontologically

special. We are *ust one species among many.

(o, there is a tension+ On the one hand, theists ta'e

human persons to be significantly different from the rest of

nature but on othe other hand, intelligent inhabitants of the

scientific age ta'e human animals to be *ust one species

among many, not significantly different in nature from our

primate cousins. ndeed, even apart from religious

conviction, it seems clear to me that in some ways we are

li'e other living creatures, but in other ways we are

radically different. Only we have art, science, technology,

religion only we can fiddle with the course of evolution

only we can in/uire into what 'ind of beings we most

fundamentally are. n light of these uni/ue features, it

seems desirable that we have a conception of human nature

that allows that we are both part of nature and morally and

ontologically different from every other 'ind of thing in

nature. )ou might thin' of this as a story about how we

can be !in the world but not of the world."

What want to do here is to show how the Constitution

0iew of human persons deals with the tension between two

claims+ the biological claim that we are animals, continuous

with nonhuman animals, on the one hand, and the

philosophical claim that we are morally and ontologically

uni/ue, on the other.

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2irst, a note about labeling the second claim 3the

philosophical claim. 4lthough the claim that we are

morally and ontologically uni/ue is a theological as well as a

philosophical claim, label it 3philosophical because thin'

that it can be supported without any theological

assumptions, as ll try to show. Of course, the claim that

we are morally and ontologically uni/ue has theological

grounds as well, but wouldnt want atheists to suppose

that they could ignore the claim of our moral and

ontological uni/ueness *ust because they do not recognietheological considerations as legitimate. (o, ll defend the

claim of our uni/ueness on nontheological grounds.

The Constitution View

4ccording to the Constitution 0iew of human persons,

we human persons are animals, but notjustanimals.

5iology is one thing,and ontology is another. Ontologically

spea'ing, we are most fundamentally persons, where

something is a person in virtue of having what call a 3first6

person perspective. 4 first6person perspective is a very

peculiar ability that all and only persons have. $ature

language6users li'e us have robust first6person

perspectives. 4 robust first6person perspective is the ability

to thin' of oneself as oneself, without the use of any name,

description or demonstrative it is the ability to conceive of

oneself as oneself, from the inside, as it were.

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7inguistic evidence of a first6person perspective comes

from use of first6person pronouns embedded in sentences

with linguistic or psychological verbs#e.g., ! wonder how

will die," or ! promise that will stic' with you."- f

wonder how will die, or promise that ll stic' with you,

then am thin'ing of myself as myself am not thin'ing of

myself in any third6person way 8e.g., not as 75, nor as the

person who is thin'ing, nor as that woman, nor as the only

person in the room9 at all. :o wonder how ll die is not for

me to wonder how 75 will die, even though am 75 couldwonder how ll die even if had amnesia and didnt 'now

that was 75. 4 being with a robust first6person

perspective not only can have thoughts about herself as

herself, she can conceive of herself as the sub*ect of those

thoughts. not only wonder how ll die, but realie that

am having that thought. 4nything that can wonder how it

will die ipso facto has a robust first6person perspective and

thus is a person.

4 being may be conscious without having a robust

first6person perspective. ;onhuman primates and other

higher animals are conscious, and they have psychological

states li'e believing, fearing and desiring. :hey have pointsof view 8e.g., !danger in that direction"9, but they cannot

-A6-&&.

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conceive of themselves as the sub*ects of such thoughts.1

:hey can not conceiveofthemselves from the first6person.%

Personis an ontological 'ind whose defining

characteristic is a first6person perspective. :o say that

personis an ontological 'ind is to say that when a new

person comes into the world a new entity comes into the

world persons are persons essentially. 8Contrast wives+ a

new wife is an already6existing being who has ac/uired a

new property, but a new person is a new being.9

4 first6person perspective is the basis of all self6

consciousness. t ma'es possible an inner life, a life of

thoughts that one realies are her own. :he appearance of

first6person perspectives in a world ma'es an ontological

difference in that world+ 4 world populated with beings

1Gallups experiments with chimpanees suggest the possibility of a 'ind of

intermediate stage between dogs 8that have intentional states but no first6personperspectives9 and human persons 8that have first6person perspectives9. n myopinion#for details seePersons and Bodies, pp. @16D#Gallups chimpanees fallshort of full6blown first6person perspectives. (ee Gordon Gallup, Jr., !(elf6Eecognition in Frimates+ 4 Comparative 4pproach to 5idirectional Froperties ofConsciousness," American Psychologist%1 8-?BB9+ %1?6%>.

%:hey lac' robust first6person perspectives. ;onhuman primates and humaninfants have rudimentary first6person perspectives. 4lthough we language6usershave robustfirst6person perspectives, a human person comes into existence when ahuman organism develops to the point of being able to support a rudimentaryfirst6person perspective, which is defined by sentience, intentionality and a capacity toimitate. When a human organism gets to that point 8which re/uires a brain9, then itcomes to constitute a new entity, a person. 4 human infant is thus a person, who

has a first6person perspective 8rudimentary or robust9 necessarily. 4lthough ahigher nonhuman animal may have a rudimentary first6person perspective, it canonly have a first6person perspective contingently and, unli'e a human animal, itdoes not constitute any entity that can develop a robust first6person perspective.When a human organism comes to constitute a person, the organism has theproperty of being a person derivatively 8in virtue of constituting something that is aperson nonderivatively9 and the person has the property of being an organismderivatively 8in virtue of being constituted by something that is a bodynonderivatively9. develop thiese points in detail in The Metaphysics of Everyday

ife8Cambridge F, 1&&B9.

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with inner lives is ontologically richer than a world

populated with no beings with inner lives. 5ut what is

ontologically distinctive about being a person#namely,

essentially having a first6person perspective#does not have

to be secured by a nonmaterial substance li'e a soul.

f something is a person in virtue of having a first6

person perspective, how is a human person related to her

body, an organismH :he relation between human persons

and their bodies is constitution.

Constitution is a very general relation that we are all

familiar with 8though probably not under that label9. t is a

relation of real unity that falls short of identity. Ivery 'ind

of thing that we 'now about is constituted by something

else#ultimately by aggregates of physical particles. :he

basic idea of constitution is this+ When things of certain

basic 'inds 8say, an aggregate of a hydrogen atom and a

chlorine atom9 are in certain circumstances 8different ones

for different 'inds of things9, then new entities of different

'inds come into existence. :he circumstances in which an

aggregate of a hydrogen atom and a chlorine atom comes to

constitute a hydrogen chloride molecule are chemical

bonding. f the hydrogen and chlorine atoms were spatially

separated, the aggregate would still exist, but the hydrogen

chloride molecule would not. :he circumstances in which a

piece of paper comes to constitute a .(. dollar bill have to

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do with its being printed in a certain way under a certain

authority. n each case, new things of new 'inds#hydrogen

chloride molecules, dollar bills#with new 'inds of causal

powers, come into being.D

Constitution is the vehicle, so to spea', by which new

'inds of things come into existence in the natural world.

(o, it is obvious that constitution is not identity.

Constitution is contingent identity is necessary.

Constitution is relentlessly anti6reductive. f pieces of cloth

constitute flags, then an inventory of what exists that

included pieces of cloth but not flags would be incomplete.

4 flag cannot be reduced to a piece of cloth nor can a

person be reduced to a body.A

:o sum up+ 4 person@is essentially a person#an entity

with a first6person perspective+ continue to exist as long as

something has my first6person perspective if something has

my first6person perspective, then that being is a person and

that person is me. 5ut a person is not essentially a human

animal. (he could be constituted by a human body at one

time but constituted by a nonhuman body 8a bionic body, a

resurrection body9 at another time.


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necessarily embodied+ they cannot exist without some body

or other capable of supporting a first6person perspective.

5ut they do not necessarily have the particular bodies that

they have. (o, on the Constitution 0iew, am a wholly

material being, constituted by, but not identical to, my body

8by this body, this human organism, now9. 4lthough not

identity, constitution is a relation of real unity#not *ust two

things that happen to be in the same place at the same

time.B

How The Constitution View Resolves the Tension

:he Constitution 0iew ma'es sense of both the

biological claim that we are animals continuous with

nonhuman animals, and the philosophical claim that we are

ontologically and morally uni/ue. :he Constitution 0iew

accommodates both these claims by holding that we are

animals in the sense that we are wholly constituted by

animals, and yet we are ontologically uni/ue in virtue of

having first6person perspectives. 4 human person#a being

with a first6person perspective constituted by a human body

#is ontologically distinct from any animal, human or

nonhuman. :his is the position that want to defend.

shall defend it by arguing that a first6person perspective

really does ma'e an ontological difference.

B(ome philosophers have held that the idea of unity without identity isincoherent. nPersons and Bodies* A +onstitution #ie!8Cambridge+ Cambridgeniversity Fress, 1&&&9, give a completely general definition of 3constitution thatis coherent, and improve it in The Metaphysics of Everyday ife.

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4t the outset, let me emphasie exactly what will

argue for. :he coming into existence of a human person is

the coming into existence of a brand6new entity, not *ust the

ac/uisition of a contingent property of an already6existing

individual. :he brand6new entity, a person with a

rudimentary first6person perspective, typically develops a

robust first6person perspective. 4 first6person perspective#

robust, or if the constituter is an organism, at first

rudimentary#ma'es an ontological difference in the world.

t does not matter whether the first6person perspective is aproduct of evolution. $y position concerns the status of the

first6person perspective, not its origin.


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am happy to leave biology to the biologists.


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case that self6consciousness is nothing more than a

contingent property of human animals.

(o, let us turn to the uni/ueness of self6consciousness.

5y saying that self6consciousness is uni/ue, mean that self6

consciousness#ultimately, having an inner life#is not an

extension of, addition to, or modification of any other

property we 'now of. 4 first6person perspective is

irreducible to third6person properties.? $anifold

manifestations of self6consciousness attest to its

uni/ueness+

2irst, self6conscious beings are bearers of normativity

in ways that nothing else is+ (elf6consciousness is re/uired

for rational and moral agency. 4 rational agent must be

able to evaluate her goals. n order to evaluate her goals,

she must be able to as' /uestions li'e !s this a goal that

should really haveH" 4s'ing such /uestions is an exercise in

self6consciousness, re/uiring that one can thin' of herself as

herself, in the first person. Only persons, who can 'now

that they have goals and sub*ect them to scrutiny, can be

called rationally into account. $oreover, only persons, who

can appreciate that they#they themselves#have done

things, can be called morally into account. 4 moral agent

must be able to appreciate the fact that she 8herself9 does

things and has done things in the past. n order for me to

own up to something that have done, must be able to

?(eePersons and Bodies, Ch. %.

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conceive of myself in the first6person as the one who did it.

(uch appreciation re/uires that one have a concept of

herself as herself. Only persons can be rational agents and

moral agents. :he appearance of persons in the natural

world is the appearance of a genuinely new 'ind of being.

(econd, any reflection on ones life re/uires self6

consciousness. 4ny thought about ones desires or other

attitudes#!What do really wantH"#re/uires a first6person

perspective. 5eing anxious about the future, wondering

how one is going to die, hoping that one is ma'ing the right

decision about going into a certain profession, and on and

on#depend directly on self6consciousness. :hings that

matter deeply to us#our values, our futures, our ultimate

destinies#could matter only to beings with first6person

perspectives.

:hird, cultural achievements are further conse/uences

of self6consciousness. :he ability to wonder what sort of

thing we are, to consider our place in the universe#these

are specifically first6person abilities that motivate much of

science, art and architecture, philosophy and religion.

2ourth, in contrast to other primates that areconscious without being self6conscious in the sense

described, we have control over nature, at least in a limited

way. We are not only the products of evolution, but also we

are the discoverers of evolution and interveners in

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evolutionary processes, for good or ill. We clone mammals,

protect endangered species, devise medical treatments,

stop epidemics, produce medications, use birth6control,

engage in genetic engineering and so on. Eeproduction is

the great biological imperative, which we can and do flout.

4nimals that do not constitute persons can attempt to

survive and reproduce, but#being unable to conceive of

themselves in the uni/uely first6personal way#they cannot

try to change their natural behavior.

2ifth, there is a sense in which self6consciousness itself

brings into existence new reality#the !inner world" that

Lescartes explored so vividly in the first part of the

Meditations. 4lthough do not accept Lescartes reified

conception of the realm of his thoughts nor its

independence from the !external" world, do agree that

there are facts of the matter#e.g., that Lescartes was

thin'ing that he existed#and that the existence of these

facts would be logically impossible in the absence of self6

conscious beings. Lescartes certainty was that he 8himself9

existed, not that Lescartes existed.


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is seems to be more than *ust another contingent property

of animals.

Contrast the difference that self6consciousness ma'es

with the difference that, say, wings on birds ma'e. :he

appearance of wings ma'es possible new facts about flying.

5ut there is a big difference between facts about flying and

facts about self6consciousness. $any different species 8e.g.,

of birds and insects9 fly, and facts about flying are on a

continuum with other 'inds of facts#say, about swimming,

running, and slithering on the ground. :he appearance of

self6consciousness also ma'es possible new facts. 5ut the

facts that self6consciousness ma'es possible 8e.g., deciding

to change ones life9 are not on a continuum with other

'inds of facts. ;or do we find self6consciousness among

different species. (elf6consciousness is novel in a way that

wings are not.

$ere consciousness, too#it may be argued#is also

novel. agree, but self6consciousness is novel in a uni/ue

way. (imple consciousness is found in many species and

seems to be sub*ect to gradation. Consciousness seems to

dawn gradually 8from simpler organisms 8li'e earthwormsH9

and it seems to become more fine6grained as it runs

throughout the animal 'ingdom. n contrast, we do not find

self6consciousness or robust first6person perspectives in

different species. :he empirical studies that purport to

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show that nonhuman animals are self6conscious in the sense

of conceiving of themselves as sub*ects seem to me to be

open to alternative interpretations they do not seem to me

at all persuasive. (uch studies would be more satisfying if

the evidence were available in the wild, and if chimpanees,

for example, passed along what researchers ta'e to be

evidence of self6consciousness to their offspring.

n sum+ 2irst, there is a much clearer line between self6

conscious beings and their nearest nonself6conscious

biological neighbors than between merely conscious beings

8whichever ones they are9 and their nearest biological

neighbors. (econd, the difference in abilities and

achievements between self6conscious and nonself6conscious

beings is overwhelming, and overwhelming in a more

significant way than any other single difference that we

'now of. :he abilities of self6conscious, brooding and

introspective beings#from (t. 4ugustine in the +onfessions

to analysands in psychoanalysis to former .(. Fresidents

writing their memoirs#are of a different order from those

of tool6using, mate6see'ing, dominance6establishing

nonhuman primates, even though our use of tools, see'ing

of mates and establishing dominance have their origins inour nonhuman ancestors. With respect to the range of what

we can do 8from planning our futures to wondering how we

got ourselves into such a mess, from assessing our goals to

confessing our sins9, self6conscious beings are obviously

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uni/ue. :he uni/ueness of self6consciousness counts in

favor of ta'ing it to have ontological significance.

:he second consideration in favor of saying that self6

consciousness really does ma'e an ontological difference

concerns the continuity found in the animal 'ingdom+ there

is no gap between human animals and other higher

primates. Larwinism offers a great unifying thesis that

!there is one grand pattern of similarity lin'ing all life."-&

Considered in terms of genetic or morphological properties

or of biological functioning, there is no discontinuity

between chimpanees and human animals. n fact, human

animals are biologically more closely related to certain

species of chimpanees than the chimpanees are related to

gorillas and orangutans.-- (o, theres no significant

discontinuity between human animals and higher nonhuman

animals. 5ut there is a huge discontinuity between us

persons, constituted by human animals, and higher

nonhuman animals. 4nd this discontinuity arises from the

fact that we, and no other part of the animal 'ingdom, are

self6conscious. :his discontinuity distinguishes us persons

ontologically from the rest of the animal 'ingdom. :his is to

say that the first6person perspective#and thus personhood#is an ontologically significant property.

-&;iles Ildredge, The Triumph of Evolution8;ew )or'+ W.


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:hese two considerations#the uni/ueness of self6

consciousness and the seamlessness of the animal 'ingdom

#may now be seen as two data+

849 (elf6consciousness is absolutely uni/ue in the

universe. We are self6conscious beings#beings

with vastly different abilities from nonself6

conscious beings. ;o other part of the animal

'ingdom is self6conscious in the way that we are.

859 We are, in some sense, animals#biological beings.:he animal 'ingdom is a seamless whole,

revealing no important biological 8morphological,

genetic, etc.9 discontinuities between human and

nonhuman animals.

;ow compare the Constitution 0iew to 4nimalism+

4ccording to 4nimalism, what am most fundamentally is

an animal exist only so far as a certain animal exists.

:here is nothing ontologically significant about self6

consciousness or about being a person. 5eing a person is

on a par with being a fancier of fast cars#*ust a contingent

property that some animals have during some parts of their

existence. 4ccording to the Constitution 0iew, as we haveseen, self6consciousness has ontological significance+ it is

an essential property of the things that have it.-1

-1$ore precisely, self6consciousness is an essential property of things thathave it nonderivatively.

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:he two considerations 849 and 859 support the

following argument against 4nimalism+

8-9 (elf6consciousness is absolutely uni/ue.

MConsideration 849N

819 f self6consciousness is absolutely uni/ue, then+ if

self6consciousness is nothing but a contingent

property of certain animals, then self6

consciousness ma'es a gap in the animal

'ingdom. M$eaning of 3uni/ueN

8%9 f self6consciousness is nothing but a contingent

property of certain animals, then self6

consciousness ma'es a gap in the animal

'ingdom.. M2rom 8-96819, modus ponensN

8D9 :here is no gap in the animal 'ingdom.

MConsideration 859N

8A9 t is false that self6consciousness is nothing but a

contingent property of certain animals. M8%968D9,

modus tollensN

(o, conclude that any view 8such as 4nimalism9 that

holds that we are essentially animals to which self6

consciousness ma'es no ontological difference, is false

because it is inade/uate to the data. On the other hand,

the Constitution 0iew explains both these considerations.

:he Constitution 0iew explains the first consideration

#the uni/ueness of self6consciousness#by ta'ing self6

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consciousness to be what ma'es us ontologically distinctive.

:he property of having an inner life#not *ust sentience#is

so extraordinary, so utterly unli'e any other property in the

world, that beings with this property are a different 'ind of

thing from beings without it. Only self6conscious beings can

dread old age or examine their consciences or try not to be

so impatient. (ince first6person perspectives are essential

to us, it is no mystery that we human persons are self6

conscious.

:he Constitution 0iew also explains the second

consideration#that the animal 'ingdom is seamless#by

holding that we are constituted by human animals that are

on a continuum with nonhuman animals and then explaining

what constitution is. :he continuity of the animal 'ingdom

is undisturbed. Well, almost+ human animals that constitute

persons do differ from other animals, but not in any

essential way. Ferson6constituting human animals have

first6person6perspective properties that non6person6

constituting human animals lac' but the animals that have

these properties only have them derivatively#wholly in

virtue of their constituting persons.-% (o, the Constitution

0iew honors the continuity of the biological world andconstrues us as being part of that world in virtue of being

constituted by human animals. nsurprisingly, conclude

-%:o put it more accurately, human animals have first6person6perspectiveproperties wholly in virtue of constituting persons that have first6person6perspectiveproperties independently of their constitution6relations.

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that the Constitution 0iew gives a better account of human

persons than does the 4nimalist 0iew.

can almost hear the /uestion+ Why not be more

4ristotelian and and ta'e the !genus and species"

approachH 4n 4ristotelian may say that we are animals who

differ from other animals in being self6conscious. :hen

as'+ n virtue of what do have my persistence conditionsH

:he answer cannot be that have my persistence conditions

in virtue bothof being a human animal and of being self6

conscious. (ince the animal that is supposed to be identical

to me existed before it was self6conscious 8when it was an

embryo, say9, cannot be both essentially an animal and

essentially self6conscious. :o say that persons are

essentially animals, and not essentially self6conscious, is to

ma'e properties li'e considering ho! one should live

irrelevant to what we most fundamentally are, and

properties li'e having a circulatory systemcentral to what

we fundamentally are. thin' that what we most

fundamentally are is a matter of what is distinctive about us

and not of what we share with nonhuman animals.

(o, what is our place in natureH We are part of the

animal 'ingdom in that we are wholly constituted by human

animals, on a continuum with other species. 5ut our first6

person perspectives allow us to be, among other things,

rational and moral agents#not *ust to have goals, but to

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assess and change our goals. 4mong all the creatures, it is

given only to us to decide how we ought to, or want to, live,

to decide what sort of persons we want to become.

4lthough a part of nature, we can in many ways control

nature. ;ot all wholesale changes come either from laws of

nature 8such as the formation of continents9, or from

outside of nature 8such as miracles9. We human persons

have already changed the face of the earth 8from

s'yscrapers to highways to strip mines9, and we are on our

way to changing the course of evolution. We humanpersons occupy a uni/ue position#part of nature, and yet,

to some extent, controlling the nature that we are part of.

Methodoloical Morals

:his discussion raises some important methodological

issues, two of which want to discuss. 2irst, as we have

already seen, the Constitution 0iew implies that ontology

need not trac' biology. (econd, the Constitution 0iew

implies that the fundamental nature of something may be

determined by what its abilities rather than by what it is

made of.

With respect to the first issue#that ontology need nottrac' biology#my position is to ta'e biologists as

authoritative over the animal 'ingdom and agree that the

animal 'ingdom is a seamless whole that includes human

animals there are no significant biological differences

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between human and higher nonhuman animals. 5ut from

the fact that there are no significant biologicaldifferences

between human and higher nonhuman animals, it does not

follow that there are no significant differences, all things

considered, between us persons and all members#human

and nonhuman#of the biological 'ingdom. :his is so,

because we are constituted by animals without being

identical to the animals that constitute us. 2or example, the

evolutionary psychologist (teven Fin'er writes, !4

Larwinian would say that ultimately organisms have onlytwo MgoalsN+ to survive and to reproduce."-D 5ut he also

points out that he himself is !voluntarily childless," and

comments, ! am happy to be that way, and if my genes

dont li'e it, they can go *ump in the la'e."-A was startled

by this remar', a remar' that indicates that Fin'er has a

first6person perspective on himself as something more than

his animal nature as revealed by Larwinians. :he

Constitution 0iew leaves it open to say that although

biology fully reveals our animal nature, our animal nature

does not exhaust our complete nature all things considered.

:hus, we have a distinction between ourselves

regarded from a biological point of view, and ourselvesregarded from an all6things6considered point of view. We

'now more about ourselves all6things6considered than

-D(teven Fin'er,-o! the Mind .or/s8;ew )or'+ W.W. ;orton and Company,-?BB9+ AD-.

-A-o! the Mind .or/s, A1.

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biology can tell us. 2or example, the /uotidian

considerations that mustered to show the uni/ueness and

importance of self6consciousness are not learned from

biology+ that we are rational and moral agents that we

care about certain things such as our own futures that we

have manifold cultural achievements that we can interfere

with the mechanisms of evolution that we en*oy inner lives.

:hese are everyday truths that are constantly being

confirmed by anyone who cares to loo', without need of any

theory. :hese truths are as firmly established as any in

biology. (o, they are available for our philosophical

reflection#understood, as Wilfrid (ellars put it, as !how

things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang

together in the broadest sense of the term."-@ With this

synthetic ideal, it is clear that we cannot *ust read ontology

off any of the sciences. Iverything we 'now#whether from

science or everyday life#should go into identifying the

*oints at which we are pleased to thin' that we carve

nature.

:his 'ind of methodological consideration underlies my

holding that there is an ontological division that is not

mirrored by a biological division. 4s (tephen Fin'er and

others point out, small biological differences can have big

effects.-B agree. (mall biological differences can even

-@!Fhilosophy and the (cientific mage of $an," in "cience' Perception andReality87ondon+ Eoutledge and egan Faul, -?@%9+ -6D&. 8uote, p. -9

-B(teven Fin'er,-o! the Mind .or/s'D&6-.

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have ontological conse/uences. 5iologically similar beings

may be ontologically different. ndeed, that is my view.

;ow turn to the second methodological issue+ $y

position is that what something most fundamentally is#its

nature#is more nearly determined by what it can do than

by what it is made of. :his is obvious in the case of

artifacts+ What ma'es something a cloc' has to do with its

telling time, no matter what it is made of and no matter how

its parts are arranged. (imilarly, according to the

Constitution 0iew, what ma'es something a person has to

do with its first6person perspective, no matter what it is

made of.-> (elf6consciousness ma'es an ontological

difference because what self6conscious beings can do is

vastly different from what nonself6conscious beings can do.

We persons are ourselves originators of many new 'inds of

reality#from cathedrals to catheters, from bullets to bell6

bottoms, from cell6phones to supercomputers. One reason

that ta'e this methodological stance is that it allows that

the nature of something is tied to what is significant about

the thing. What is significant about us#as even some

4nimalists agree-?#are our characters, memories, mental

->

thus re*ect


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lives and not the respiration, circulation and metabolism

that we share with nonhuman animals. :o understand our

nature is to understand what is significant and distinctive

about us, and what is significant and distinctive about us is,

have argued, our self6consciousness. 4 person is an

ontologically significant thing.


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the !neo6Larwinian synthesis" in biology.1& :he traditional

preoccupation concerns our inwardness#our abilities not

*ust to thin', but to thin' about our thoughts to see

ourselves and each other as sub*ects to have rich inner

lives. :he modern synthesis in biology has made it clear

that we are also biological beings, continuous with the rest

of the animal 'ingdom. :he Constitution 0iew of human

persons shows how we are part of the world of organisms

even as it recognies our uni/ueness.

thin' that the Constitution 0iew should be congenial

to traditional theists. On the one hand, it depicts us human

persons as ontologically different from the rest of Creation

on the other hand, it does not dispute widely accepted

scientific claims. 4 proponent of the Constitution 0iew need

not postulate any gap in the animal 'ingdom between

human and nonhuman animals that is invisible to biologists.

;or need the Constitutionalist deny natural selection. (he

may insist that theists can and should give science its due.

Circling the wagons against the onslaught of modern

science is hopeless it *ust breeds a 'ind of defiant

brittleness and alienates theists from the world that they

cannot avoid living in. :he Constitution 0iew bothrecognies the claims of the sciences and is compatible with

1&0ariations on this term are widely used. 2or example, see Irnst $ayr,To!ard a (e! Philosophy of Biology* 1bservations of an Evolutionist8Cambridge,$4+ :he 5el'nap Fress of >9 Fhilip itcher,Abusing"cience* The +ase Against +reationism8Cambridge $4+ :he $: Fress, -?>19Laniel C. Lennett,)ar!in2s )angerous 0dea* Evolution and the Meanings of ife8;ew )or'+ (imon and (chuster, -??A9.

1@


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our place in nature: material persons and theism

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