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Our common future/ The future of our commons Tine De Moor (UU)

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  • Our common future/The future of our commons

    Tine De Moor (UU)

  • Commons are everywhere!

  • What explains this revival of collective action?

    Collective action in particular in new media initiatives, eg. Wikipedia, Creative Commons

    Open access movement New initiatives that are based on collective action (see also e.g. Groupon)

    Failure of market and state? 2009-Nobel prize Economic Sciences for Elinor Ostrom

  • What are commons really?

    Where does the term come from? Long-term historical evolution, focus on Europe

    What do commons stand for? From local pastures to global commons

    What makes commons different from state or market?

    What can we learn from commons-research AND practice for policy?

  • Looking back to look forward

    Long-pre-history of term commons Long-term approach is also needed because:

    Effects of specific form of resource management often become apparent only after long period of time.

    Resilient institutions require time to be built & tested (trial-and-error)

    Long-term development can contribute to our institutional toolbox: methods and techniques to deal with change and crises.

  • Where does the term commons come from?

    From Late Middle ages-onwards (12th c.): rise of collective management of resources both in town and countryside

    Towns: guilds Countryside: commons, waterboards etc.

    E.g. Netherlands: Markegenootschappen and Meenten

    Historical common referred to land that was: 'used by several people or households during a certain period, in distinction to land that was used by only one person or household throughout the whole year

    Great variety of types but mainly two forms of commons

  • Features of commons and similar institutions for collective action

    Exclusive membership Initiative taken by local villagers Devised and adjusted their own rules In dialogue with local powers Group responsibility

  • Marke Raalterwoold (Overrijsel, Netherlands)

    (before) 1445 1859

    markenboek 1615 (incl. copies of earlier regulations) - 1859

  • Eskdale commons (Cumbria, England), Middle Ages - c. 1859

    Common rights:pasture, peat and turves, bracken

  • Gemene and Loweiden (Near Bruges, Belgium): 14th

    century-today

    Common rights: mainly pastureland

  • Selfgovernance and self-regulation:Monitoring and sanctioning

    Commoners set-up their own regulation and restricted their own behaviour:

    Right to vote in meetings (linked to household) Obligation to attend meetings Election of representatives Rotation of responsibilities

    Management tools Provision of monitors and systems of sanctions for malefactors

    often graduated fines: 3 strikes and youre out

    Enforcement of collective exploitation Increasing regulation of grazing on the commons

    Limiting of commercial activity Limits on the amount of each resource to be appropriated

  • Dealing with the market: Rules against over-use due to commercialisation

    1. Limitation of the number of cattle in relation to the capacity of resource: 1. Cattle had to be in possession of user during previous

    winter2. Grazing of cattle bought before grazing period was

    restricted3. Grazing cattle of non-entitled users was forbidden4. Linkage of the number of cattle to surface of arable in

    private property

    2. Selling products from the common was forbidden (outside the village)

    3. Use of common limited to own needs

  • Parallel to commons

    Development of other forms of co-operation Between craftsmen in towns: guilds

    Sharing of resources and services (e.g. communal guild house) Collective buying of working materials Collective insurance against risk for members and family

    Between users of waterboard services Fraternities, beguinages etc.

    19th century: co-operatives, labour unions, ..

  • Advantages of institutionalised collective action, as in the case of commons

    Economies of scale Search and information costs:

    internal agreement on the price of the goods according to set rules that are not changed unless there is an urgent need to do so

    if there is a change all members are aware of this via collective meetings with compulsory attendance

    Bargaining costs: Rights on the use of resources is made clear via clear access rules

    Policing and enforcement: prevention of freeriding via stimulating social control and graduated sanctioning

    Monitoring often shared and rotating task,

  • Why have we forgotten about the commons?

    From late 18th c. onwards: The individual becomes the central unit in society

    Enlightenment Nation State: organisation of society becomes centralised, including legal and economic basis

    The state decides upon on the economic framework The state decides upon the legally acceptable forms of institutions.

    -> gradual disappearance of the commons

    19th century: centralised dissolution of common land in the whole of Western Europe

  • From 19th century onwards

    Debate on commons is dominated by ideas that individual (homo economicus) seeks individual gain, not collective welfare

    that collective resources are bound to being overharvested

    See Malthus, Lloyd, Hardin (1968): The tragedy of the commons

  • Tragedy of the commons (1968)

    Main issue: how to deal with growing world population?

    Problematic about commons-metaphor: No communication No regulation/institutionalisation No boundaries, only open access

    Main solution: state or market Linkage of commons as local phenomenon to global

    issues

    > emergence of the term commons in global context (e.g. global commons)

    > blurred vision of what commons really were/are

  • Features of well-managed commonsOstroms design principles

    Governing the commons( (1990):

    Clearly defined boundaries (effective exclusion of external unentitled parties);

    Rules regarding the appropriation and provision of common resources are adapted to local conditions;

    Collective-choice arrangements allow most resource appropriators to participate in the decision-making process;

    Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the appropriators;

    There is a scale of graduated sanctions for resource appropriators who violate community rules;

    Mechanisms of conflict resolution are cheap and of easy access;

    The self-determination of the community is recognized by higher-level authorities.

    Elinor Ostrom

  • Important aspects of Ostroms view

    Importance of resilience: long-term survival of institutions (reduces costs)

    Stress on self-governance: bottom-up formation and management-> Recognition of capability of local communities to avoid tragedies and solve dilemmas in a cost-effective way

    Stress on diversity of common pool arrangements: local conditions should be taken into account in regulation

  • The role of technology

    Well-known example of Nepali irrigation systems (Ostrom 1990): technology/innovation can destroy

    cooperation-incentives

    Similar: new media allow to collaborate, but does this go together with the same incentive-structures?

    Trust without visibility? Reciprocity without community-context? -> what is the role of new media in resilient cooperation? Can it help to built resilient institutions?

  • Important aspects of Ostroms view

    Importance of resilience: long-term survival of institutions (reduces costs)

    Stress on self-governance: bottom-up formation and management-> Recognition of capability of local communities to avoid tragedies and solve dilemmas in a cost-effective way

    Stress on diversity of common pool arrangements: local conditions should be taken into account in regulation

    Identifying the potential of collective action and cooperation for a sustainable and resilient society and economy

    BUT: common management is no panacea:No size fits all!

  • Essential features of commons

    Trying to solve a social dilemma: the individual interest versus the common good

    Often in times of scarcity Via:

    Self-governance Regulation/institutionalisation Boundaries/exclusiveness

    Need for legal and political secure environment

  • Spectrum of institutional arrangements to govern resources

    State/public

    High administration costs

    Not always effective regulation

    Costly to persecute and punish defectors

    Collective action:

    Self-regulation and sanctioning is

    cheaper and often very effective

    Effects of individual behaviour on group are felt directly by group members

    Market/private:

    Externalisation of costs

    Sanctioning remains responsibility of

    state

  • Presentations Our common future/The future of our commons

    Commons as institutions for collective action in different settings, dealing with different types of resources:

    Western Europe and Developing Countries Tangible and non-tangible commons

    Well-delimited and self-governed institutions NOTE: We do not deal explicitly with global commons

    Wikipedia: Global commons is that which no one person or state may own or control and which is central to life. A Global Common contains an infinite potential with regard to the