organized labour in the 2014 indonesian presidential
TRANSCRIPT
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ORGANIZED LABOUR IN THE 2014 INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION
Charlotte Corbyn
Australian Consortium for In-Country Indonesian Studies (ACICIS)
Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik
Universitas Katolik Parahyangan
Bandung
December 2014
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ORGANIZED LABOUR IN THE 2014 INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION
Charlotte Corbyn
Australian Consortium for In-Country Indonesian Studies (ACICIS)
Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik
Universitas Katolik Parahyangan
Bandung
December 2014
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HALAMAN PENGESAHAN
Nama : CHARLOTTE CORBYN
NIM :
Judul : Ms
Penulis
Charlotte Corbyn
Telah diuji dalam Ujian Sidang Skripsi Program West Java Field Study Research dari
The Australian Consortium for ‘In-Country Indonesian Studies (ACICIS) di
Universitas Katolik Parahyangan Bandung pada Selasa, 16 Desember 2014, dan
dinyatakan LULUS
Tim Penguji
Dr. Mangadar Situmorang Ph.D.
Ketua sidang merangkap anggota
Dr. I Nyoman Sudira Elisabeth Adyiningtyas Satya Dewi, Ph.D.
Anggota Penguji 1 Anggota Penguji 2
________________________________
Elena Williams
Resident Director ACICIS
Mengesahkan,
________________________________
Dr. Mangadar Situmorang Ph.D.
Dekan Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik
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ABSTRACT
Trade unions in Indonesia have been increasingly active since the fall of the New
Order. The 2014 election is particularly indicative of advances that trade unions have
made in their engagement with formal politics, with labour organizations increasingly
politicized. This thesis will be examining the methods through which trade unions
have engaged with the 2014 presidential election, including mobilization and
negotiations with and support for different candidates. This increasing politicization
has occurred within the context of an oligarchic political system, the influence and
presence of which is the subject of ongoing debate. This thesis will assert that labour
organizations, like civil society and politics more generally, are currently contested
between oligarchic and reformist forces. In the 2014 election the labour movement
divided, showing it is in part influenced and drawn into oligarchic politics, but also in
part genuinely concerned with the development of Indonesia’s democracy and
advancement of workers.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are many people who have assisted me in completion of this skripsi, and it is a
pleasure to be able to acknowledge them.
Thank you to Mas Mangadar Situmorang, my supervisor at Universitas Katolik
Parahyangan, for wonderful advice and assistance while I was in Indonesia.
Thank you to my supervisor from Murdoch University, Ian Wilson, not only for your
advice and support on this skripsi, but also for first sparking my interest in Indonesian
politics.
Thank you to the ACICIS staff, for making my visit to Indonesia possible, and for
making it such a pleasure. An interest in Indonesia will always stay with me as a
result of the wonderful program you run. Thank you, particularly, to Ellie Williams
for your excellent advice on this skripsi.
Thank you so very much to Om Bambang Dahana for assisting me with interviews,
for being so welcoming and kind, for always looking out for me and for speaking to
me for hours about labour here in Indonesia.
Thank you to the friends I have made while studying in Bandung for your
encouragement and relief from study. Thanks, in particular, to my friend and
housemate, Grace Dong. Grace, I’ll always remember and be grateful for your support
and kindness. Thank you to Tennille Bernard for your thoughtfulness and always
checking in on me. You’ve both made this year for me.
Thank you to my mum, Pam Corbyn, my sister, Sarah Corbyn, my boyfriend Luke
Carbon and my dear friends in Australia for your kind (and sometimes strict) words
when I was feeling stressed and a little lost.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT 4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 8
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 11
THE OLIGARCHIC ARGUMENT 11
PATRIMONIALISM 12
CIVIL SOCIETY 13
NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE OLIGARCHY 14
THE FALL OF SUHARTO 15
POST SUHARTO AND DECENTRALIZATION 15
THE PROSPECT OF CHANGE 17
POWER RESOURCE THEORY 18
COUNTER OLIGARCHIC 20
NON-MATERIAL FACTORS 21
LABOUR 22
POLICY CHANGE 23
AGENCY OVER STRUCTURE 24
INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCESS CHANGE 24
CONCLUSION 25
CHAPTER 3: ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER OF LABOUR 27
THE BIRTH OF TRADE UNIONISM 28
TRADE UNIONISM AND THE NEW ORDER 29
LABOUR NGOS 32
LABOUR ORGANIZATION POST SUHARTO 34
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NEO-LIBERALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 35
LEGACY OF THE NEW ORDER 36
CHAPTER 4: LABOUR IN THE 2014 ELECTION 39
MOBILIZATION 39
PROVEN ABILITY TO MOBILISE 41
KSPI AND MOBILIZATION 44
MOBILIZATION IN THE 2014 ELECTION 45
FORMAL POLITICS 47
PRABOWO SUBIANTO 48
LABOUR SUPPORT FOR PRABOWO 53
JOKO WIDODO 57
LABOUR SUPPORT FOR JOKOWI 60
CONCLUSION 64
BIBLIOGRAPHY 67
APPENDIX 81
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Under Suharto trade unions in Indonesia were severely limited, in their organization
but also in their engagement with ‘formal’ politics. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998,
trade unions have been increasingly well organized, and increasingly engaged with
the formal electoral system. The 2014 general election marks another milestone in
the development of labour organization in Indonesia. For the first time trade unions
have been highly visible and active, engaging in the formal political process. For the
first time, a union entered into a political contract with a candidate. Contextualizing
this, however, is ongoing academic and public debate on the nature of Indonesian
democracy, and the extent to which it is dominated by oligarchic interests (Halim and
Aritonang 2014, Ford and Pepinsky 2013). The dominant academic story arc on
Indonesia argues that New Order era elites and oligarchs have persisted since the fall
of Suharto, dominating democratic institutions and electoral processes (Aspinall
2013).
In addition their existence within an oligarchic framework, trade unions must contend
with a history of limitations on their political engagement, organisation and activism.
Under New Order era industrial relations policy, independent unions were suppressed,
with only one, strictly controlled, state-sanctioned union permitted to function, the
SPSI. While democratisation also ushered in an explosion of trade unionism, the
legacy of the New Order has been a strong and lasting one, with unions taking some
time to develop good organisational skills, as well as depart from the apolitical nature
of unionism under Suharto. Understanding the role of labour today has potential to
shed light on how labour has contended with challenges arising from its authoritarian
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past and on its experience ‘coming of age’ in a late developing, late democratising
nation.
In the context of these challenges, this thesis will be examining ways in which trade
unions have shown increasing politicisation in this election, by negotiating with
candidates and through mass mobilisation before and during the election. Through
this analysis this thesis will show that, while much of the labour movement are
engaged in continuing reformasi and assisting the cause of lower class interests and
left wing political development, elements have been co-opted by oligarchic and elite
power, to the detriment of Indonesia’s ongoing democratic development and
development of the labour movement. Further, it will show that labour in Indonesia,
while it has ‘come of age’ in respect to it’s a greater level of political engagement, it
continues t o show a pattern of fragmentation and division. The 2014 election
reflected this, with oligarchic power, as well as fragmented activism, evident in major
unions engagement with formal politics.
Chapter 2 is a literature review of literature on Indonesian democracy and power since
the fall of Suharto, with particular focus on the contrast between oligarchic and
counter oligarchic approaches to understanding Indonesian democracy. This chapter
lays the theoretical framework for understanding trade unions in Indonesia, and where
they fit into a system characterized by oligarchic and elite power, as well as contested
and fragmented reformist forces.
Chapter 3 examines the history and development of trade unionism more specifically,
particularly their development under the New Order and since the collapse of Suharto,
with the intention of contributing to understanding of the form and features of labour
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organization in Indonesia today. Of particular importance are the attitudes to
politicization, and the development of political unionism from a
Chapter 4 examines the role of labour in the 2014 election in detail, more specifically
the different ways in which unions have engaged with the political system, including
mass mobilization and direct engagement with formal politics. Mobilization power
refers to the ability to mobilize large number of people in street protests. It will assess
trade union industrial action and demonstrations leading up to the 2014 elections, the
assessment of labour leaders on the importance of these mass mobilizations and the
role of street mobilization in the 2014 election. Engagement with formal politics
refers to the negotiations that occurred (or did not occur) between trade unions and
presidential candidates, as well as as the factors that contributed to trade unions
supporting either Jokowi or Prabowo. Motivations and engagement with formal
politics have been assessed through a combination of public reports on the
engagement of trade unions with candidates, as well as qualitative interviews with
trade union leaders and party officials.
Chapter 5 will conclude, focusing on how labour has engaged with formal politics in
the 2014 presidential election, managing to have some success and influence on
candidates, but also showing co-option by oligarchic and elite powers. The sum is an
image of labour, which is highly fragmented, characterized by contestation between
reformist and oligarchic influences.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
To explore the role of trade unions in Indonesia today, it is necessary to place them in
their context in Indonesian politics and society. That is, it is necessary to understand
the current power configurations and forces at play in Indonesia to understand how
trade unions might fit into and influence this picture. Currently two main approaches
can be identified within the literature exploring this topic. The first, ‘oligarchic’
approach, focuses analysis on the role that material wealth and oligarchic forces play
in shaping Indonesian politics and society. This approach gives a relatively minor
level of attention to forces external to the oligarchy having any great influence on
politics and society. Further, it holds that the effect of democratisation has not made
this oligarchic class redundant, merely made them adapt to a new manner of
organization and wealth defense. This approach, led by Jeffrey Winters, Vedi Hadiz
and Richard Robison, contains internal differences, although is clearly distinguishable
from the second, ‘counter oligarchic’ approach, which I will give further attention to
shortly.
THE OLIGARCHIC ARGUMENT
Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison describe oligarchy as “a system of power relations
that enables the concentration of wealth and authority and its collective defense”
(Hadiz and Robison 2013, 37). Oligarchy, in their analysis, refers to the development,
interaction and finally the fusion of capital with public authority. This fused politico-
business elite employs its resources in the continual and collective defense of their
status and wealth. Hadiz and Robison’s analysis can be contextualized within their
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structural political economy, neo-Marxist theoretical approach. Their work attempts
to understand how market capitalism influences different structural forces within
society, and subsequently shapes and influences power configurations. They see the
development of oligarchy as a result of the growth of market capitalism, and in
particularly a condition of late-developing capitalist nations (Hadiz and Robison
2013, 38-39). This approach and context lends itself to their analysis of the
development of the oligarchy under the New Order and to their analysis of why the
oligarchy has been able to persist through institutional change and democratisation.
PATRIMONIALISM
Hadiz and Robison argue that the power and reach of the oligarchy today has three
significant antecedents, the development of patrimonial networks, the suppression of
civil society and the advent of neo-liberalist policies. Like most other scholars
writing on Indonesian democracy they recognize the impact of the oligarchic and
patrimonial networks developed during the New Order as particularly significant to
today’s oligarchy. The New Order began as a state capitalist regime, with state
ownership or monopolies on most industries, for example minerals, transport,
telecommunications and banking (Hadiz and Robison 2005, 222, 2013, 38). While the
ousting of Sukarno meant that some of these industries were sold off, by and large the
state still had a great deal of control over resources and industry, including in the form
of permits and licenses. This served as a resource in the development of a pervasive
and complex patrimonial system, with the military, Suharto and his family, Chinese
business owners and lower level ‘renters and fixers’ extracting the most from it
(Hadiz and Robison 2013, 47). This network served two purposes. Firstly, the
distribution of public power and wealth and secondly, the means by which social
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order was maintained without the need for coercive force. It was only through these
networks of patronage that people were able to advance in careers and business
(Hadiz and Robison 2013, 46). As a result, while the higher echelons of government
benefited the most, they also stretched down to the local level and to society more
generally.
CIVIL SOCIETY
The second significant influence on oligarchic power today is the fragmentation and
disruption of independent civil society and opposition groups under the New Order,
characterized by Hadiz as a “highly state-centered authoritarian corporatist” regime
(Hadiz 2003, 598). There were several methods utilized by the New Order to
suppress potential opposition and civil society. One such method was coercive power,
administered by the state’s powerful security apparatus. The military, along with state
sponsored gangsters, used fear, intimidation and violence to prevent the organization
of opposition groups and civil society. This, coupled with the power of the
patrimonial system, was used to co-opt potential opposition groups and individuals
into organizations and networks that supported the regime (Hadiz and Robison 2013,
46).
Despite their understanding of this decimation of civil society as important, Hadiz
argues that a vibrant civil society is not, alone, indicative of democratisation, and
criticizes transition literature that asserts as much. Offering a more nuanced
discussion of civil society, Hadiz argues that it is not only the presence of an active
civil society, but also the constellation of power within that civil society which is
important (Hadiz 2003, 594). It may be favorable to democratisation, or may not,
depending on what the persuasion of the most active and powerful of interest groups
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within it are. In the case of post–Suharto Indonesia, the most powerful civil society
groups are those that were nurtured by the predatory and capitalist New Order regime,
and therefore groups that are not necessarily favorable to democracy, for example
gangsters or low-level New Order apparatchiks. Those that continue to suffer from
poor organization as a result of their suppression are those that sat outside the New
Order’s capitalist, predatory framework, for example the “liberal intelligentsia,
professional groups…and politically marginalized working class”(Hadiz 2003, 594).
At the same time, pro-New Order, predatory groups were encouraged and nurtured,
and thus are better organized in post-Suharto Indonesia.
NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE OLIGARCHY
Hadiz and Robison’s neo-Marxist positioning is most obvious in the third factor they
argue as significant in the development of the oligarchy. That is, the influence that
neo-liberal, ‘neo-institutionalist’ policies have had on allowing an oligarchic class to
flourish. With the rise of Suharto, and ousting of Sukarno, national state-capitalist
policies began to be wound back, partly at the encouragement of Western
governments and Western trained technocrats. Nevertheless, the state continued to
control a great deal of industry, allowing the previously mentioned patrimonial
networks to flourish. Further, technocratic neo-liberal policy advocated for rational,
technocratic decision-making, and was thus used as a justification for the exclusion of
popular interests and input in decision making processes (Hadiz and Robison 2005,
223).
The collapse of oil prices in the 1980’s caused upheaval. Technocrats were able to
push through a number of significant neo-liberal reforms, aimed at reducing state
monopolies on certain industries and trade permits. Instead of marking the beginning
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of an era of free markets and reduced state power, the state and business elite
continued to work in concert, with the state channeling resources and contracts to
oligarchs (Hadiz and Robison 2005, 224). Internationally, the economic growth and
deregulation of financial markets meant that Western investment was flooding into
Indonesia, propping up this oligarchic class. It is within this context that patrimonial
networks, expropriating and exploiting the free market and neo-liberal reforms, began
to consolidate into an oligarchic class (Hadiz and Robison 2005, 225).
THE FALL OF SUHARTO
The approach scholars take to the collapse of Suharto is indicative of their approach
to understanding Indonesia’s democracy today, particularly the emphasis they place
on elite, as opposed to popular action. Hadiz and Robison argue that the bourgeoisie
in Indonesia gradually developed, from a “bonapartist form…to an oligarchic form in
the later New Order period”. Power was increasingly shared among families drawn
from the political and business elite, including many high-ranking positions reserved
for Suharto’s extended family. This laid the groundwork for rifts to develop among
the political elite. With the upheaval of 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis and
subsequent reforms demanded by the IMF, tensions and fractures began to develop
within the regime, particularly between family members in Suharto’s inner circle and
those left out of it. In the face of popular unrest and opposition, elites previously
supportive of Suharto quietly abandoned him (check and cite this). With Suharto
vacating the presidency, the reformasi movement was still poorly organised, and
unable to halt the ascendance of a well-organised, wealthy, New Order affiliated
political class.
POST SUHARTO AND DECENTRALIZATION
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Key to understanding Hadiz and Robison’s argument, is understanding the influence
that decentralization and institutional change has had on Indonesia’s democratisation
and oligarchic power (Hadiz and Robison 2013, 39). Hadiz and Robison critique
decentralization policy, as well as technocratic “good governance” policy and neo-
liberalist ideology they argue has underpinned it
(Hadiz 2004, Hadiz 2007, Hadiz and Robison 2005, 2013). Decentralization occurred
in Indonesia following the demise of the New Order, as a result of ‘good governance’
policy that was prevalent in academic and institutional literature at the time. The logic
supporting the push rested on an argument that decentralization would bring
government closer to local communities, increase electoral participation, allow
individual cultural and political autonomy and allow intergovernmental checks and
balances (Hadiz 2007, 877). Further, Hadiz and Robison argue it can be understood a
result of neo-liberal trend towards smaller government, less centralized power and
freer markets.
Hadiz and Robison hold that institutional change and decentralization in Indonesia
has not been inherently beneficial to democratisation. Instead, they argue that the
reality of power configurations on the ground is of the greatest importance in
assessing democratisation, misunderstood by technocrats based in Jakarta or at
international organizations. In the case of Indonesia the decentralization of power
paved the way for local elites of New Order era pedigree to use their access to capital
and political violence, as well as democratic rhetoric, to gain positions of public
power and further their own interests (Hadiz 2007, 879). Instead of increased electoral
participation and accountability, decentralization had the effect of allowing networks
of New Order era patronage to flourish under the guise of democracy, appropriating
government power and resources for their own ends (Hadiz 2003, 699). Hadiz argues
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that decentralization, coupled with a disregard for the reality power networks on the
ground, has resulted in government becoming the domain of conflicts between
coalitions of predatory elites, rather than site of democratic conflict between different
elements of society (Hadiz 2007, 878). The importance of this lies in Hadiz and
Robison’s analysis and explanation of how the oligarchy has been affected by
democratic and institutional change. Instead of oligarchic power being reduced and
constrained, it has successfully mutated to take advantage of the new ‘game’ in town
– democracy.
THE PROSPECT OF CHANGE
The usefulness the oligarchic argument is limited without additional attention given to
the avenues and potential for change within Indonesia. Hadiz and Robison propose
that there will be limited, genuine reform as long as New Order era officials remain in
positions of power, and are unwilling or unmotivated to instigate reform. From this
starting point, the question is then, what could instigate such a monumental shift?
Hadiz and Robison propose that liberal politics and labour, given its fragmentation
compared to oligarchic might, will only be able to accomplish piecemeal and gradual
change. Similarly, their critique of institutional and electoral change suggests that a
fix from these quarters is unlikely. Instead, they propose that wholesale change will
be more likely to occur from within the oligarchic elite. There are two possible ways
in which this may happen. The first, is a situation in which capital begins to favor a
system that is more predictable to operate in, although this is by no mean assured by
the example of other late developing nations. The second is through fracture of elites,
as a result of a system of money politics that may struggle to totally absorb conflict
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and competition between different coalitions of oligarchs. The resulting outlook by
Hadiz and Robison is bleak, describing a system of all-encompassing oligarchic
power, against which weak and fragmented popular movements and interests have
little ability to oppose.
POWER RESOURCE THEORY
Support for the oligarchic thesis is also given by Jeffrey Winters, in his work on
oligarchy through the ages, as well as his work specifically on Indonesia (Winters
2011, Winters 2013). There are several differences between his work and that of
Hadiz and Robison, however. Theoretically, Winters approaches Indonesia’s
democracy from the perspective of ‘power resource theory’, studying power
according to the ‘power resources’ held, rather than the power actually exercised.
Possible sources of power include “formal political rights, official positions (both
inside and outside government), coercive power, mobilizational power, and material
power”, all of which are important to Winters in shaping Indonesia’s politics (Winters
2013, 13). Material power, the domain of oligarchs, is particularly significant for its
ability to be converted into other forms of power. Thus, the power of the oligarchy,
however it is expressed and in whatever type of regime, can always be traced back to
wealth inequality. The challenge in situations of great wealth inequality and oligarchy
is understanding the interaction of these different types of power, and in particular the
conditions under which mobilizational power and democratic participation become an
influential and important force in the face of oligarchic power (Winters 2013, 16). His
focus on material inequality generally contrasts to Hadiz and Robison’s specific focus
on oligarchy as an outcome of capitalist development (Winters 2013).
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Winters’ analysis of the Suharto regime is similar to Hadiz and Robisons’s. He argues
that under Suharto ‘s regime oligarchic power developed and became the norm,
subservient only to Suharto, and not to the rule of law. Towards the end of Suharto’s
rule, a previously predictable system of oligarchy was becoming unhinged by the
growing power and favoritism shown to Suharto’s children. Rather than being linked
to wealth defense of the oligarchy, Suharto’s closest circle were increasingly linked to
predatory and unpredictable behavior that threatened them. Growing dissatisfaction
with Suharto and his cronies meant that when the Asian Financial Crisis and oil shock
hit, triggering widespread popular protest, those that had previously supported
Suharto quietly abandoned him (Winters 2013, 18-19). Following Suharto’s
departure, surprisingly few of his supporters and the oligarchic elite were dismissed
with him and, given their great level of material power, they were able to persist into
the new, democratic system.
Despite the departure of Suharto, elites within and outside of the formal party system
continued the deep relationship that had developed over the course of the New Order,
now without the controlling influence of Suharto. In analyzing this relationship,
Winters gives a greater focus to national level politics, as opposed to Hadiz and
Robison’s focus on decentralization and politics at the local level (Ford and Pepinsky
2013, 6). In Winter’s post New Order Indonesia, oligarchic wealth and power has
become a necessary prerequisite to any person gaining a party nomination or running
a political campaign. Political power, when gained, generally owes something to its
oligarchic backing, and as a result becomes complicit in wealth defense of this
oligarchic class. This is only further complicated by a weak and corrupt legal system,
with legal action against the corrupt methods of oligarchs always a possibility, and
therefore used as extortion to gain further financial support and or backing by those in
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public office. Democratic change may have changed ‘the game’ somewhat, with
financial or political success now dependent on the deployment of wealth and
successful use of the law, elections, extortion and public office (Winters 2013, 29)
Potential for change within the Winter’s thesis rests on his understanding of power
resource theory. Great material wealth can be expressed through “formal political
rights, official positions (both inside and outside government), coercive power and
mobilizational power”. The only way that the oligarchic elite can be challenged, is
through the expression of power across each of these categories, sufficient to threaten
the material power and wealth defense of the oligarchy. Like Hadiz and Robison,
Winters argues that the fragmentation and weakness of civil society has limited the
potential for mobilizational change within Indonesia. Labour is not a significant
feature to be considered for Winters, and he instead looks at the mobilizational
potential of society more broadly.
COUNTER OLIGARCHIC
The counter-oligarchic approach is far more disparate than the oligarchic argument,
with a greater range of scholars taking a greater range of approaches to understanding
democracy in Indonesia. Broadly, the counter-oligarchic approach gives attention to a
broader range of factors, outside of a powerful and wealthy elite. For example
individual agency, popular mobilization, the organization of opposition or reformist
forces, and electoral processes are all important in counter-oligarchic work (Caraway
and Ford 2014, 2). These scholars also identify a number of shortcomings in the
oligarchic thesis, including a lack of attention given to non-material factors, policy
change, the role of agency over structure and the influence of institutional and process
change. In sum, after giving greater credit to a greater range of factors at play in
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Indonesia, the counter-oligarchic thesis takes a more optimistic view of Indonesia’s
democratisation. This thesis will be utilizing the work of Edward Aspinall, Michele
Ford, Teri Caraway, William Liddle and Thomas Pepinsky, among others, to identify
these weaknesses and shortcomings in the oligarchic thesis (CITE ALL COUNTER-
OLIGARCHIC).
NON-MATERIAL FACTORS
The oligarchic thesis gives extensive focus to the role of capital in shaping power
structures and struggles in Indonesia. Winters, in his analysis of Indonesia today,
gives non-material factors some consideration in his use of a “power resource theory”
framework, however still emphasizes the role of material-power for how it influences
and is the source for other types of power. Hadiz and Robison assert that they do
indeed account for non-material factors, particularly notions of “nationalism,
populism and corporatism” and their role in wealth defense against liberal and social
democratic critics (51). However this apparent account of non-material factors is
identified as a tool of the authoritarian government, and linked to the role of the
patrimonial networks in co-opting the middle classes, and not in and of itself
identified as a legitimizing force across society more broadly.
There are non-material factors not recognized or credited by Hadiz, Robison and
Winters, which are recognized by scholars falling into the ‘counter-oligarchic’ camp.
With regard to Indonesia’s transition to democracy, non-oligarchic scholars tend to
give a greater level of attention to the role that the reformasi movement played in
bringing about the fall of Suharto. In Aspinall’s case, he argues that popular
mobilization and protest has been too “blithely” written out of the picture. He
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contends that, in the ten years prior to Suharto’s fall and in the tumultuous months
that immediately preceded it, popular pressure was of great significance, including for
the influence it had on elites and elite fracture (Aspinall, 105).
Non-oligarchic scholars also focus their attention on a broader range of factors that
shape Indonesian politics and society post-Suharto, critiquing the oligarchic thesis for
its failure in this regard (CITE ALL Pepinsky, 87). Aspinall traces this a
misunderstanding of lower class organization in Indonesia to its differences to
democratisation in Latin America and Europe (CITE). To test his assertion that lower
class activism can be effective, he closely looks at two issues, labour rights and
healthcare, and how fragmented activism and electoral populism have been influential
in these areas. While he accepts that activism, as a result of decades of suppression
and disturbance, may be highly fragmented, he argues it is nevertheless effective,
particularly as a result of mobilizational political pressure. Secondly, he asserts that
the influence of democratisation has been felt through the pressure of the ballot box,
with many candidates’ forced to try and appeal to lower class interests and policy
demands.
LABOUR
Organised labour, like other non-material factors, is given little consideration by
Hadiz and Robison, or by Winters. In Hadiz and Robison’s case, they emphasize its
fragmentation and disorganization, and the absence of a social democratic, labour
based party (Caraway and Ford 2014, Hadiz and Robison 2013, 259). Winters
emphasizes the inability of labour to have any meaningful influence when faced with
oligarchic power. The sum of this analysis is an overemphasis on oligarchic power, at
the expense of a deeper understanding of the influence that labour can and does have
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in Indonesia’s democracy today (Caraway and Ford 2014, 1-2) This lack of attention
is partially remedied in the work of counter-oligarchic scholars, particularly Benny
Hari Juliawan and his focus on street politics, Edward Aspinall and his focus on
labour rights policy development and Teri Caraway and Michele Ford, and their work
on labour organization and its role in an apparent oligarchic framework.
Michele Forde and Teri Caraway write extensively on labour organization in
Indonesia (Caraway and Ford 2014, Caraway, Ford, and Nugroho 2014, 1-2, Ford,
2004b, 2006). They argue that organised labour has been able to advocate for change
and achieve certain goals far more effectively than they were able to under Suharto,
despite its fragmentation and despite functioning within an oligarchic framework.
These goals have been able to be achieved through two key methods, ill considered
and not explained by oligarchic scholars: mobilizational power, and elite competition
exploited by labour organizations (Caraway and Ford 2014, 3). Benny Juliawan
critiques the dominant writing on Indonesia’s democracy for its failure to
acknowledge the influence that organised labour has in Post Suharto Indonesia. He
argues that successful mass mobilization on the streets, across multiple instances and
across many jurisdictions; shows that labour can and does have an influence within
Indonesia.
POLICY CHANGE
The oligarchic argument gives limited attention to policy change, making little effort
to analyze the development of socially focused policy developments within Indonesia
(Aspinall 2013, 104). Edward Aspinall is particularly critical of the oligarchic
argument on this point, arguing that Hadiz and Robison give insufficient time and
attention to understanding how and why policies favoring the working classes have
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been enacted within an oligarchic framework, and within the framework of a
devastated left. Nevertheless, his understanding of this element of Indonesian
democracy does not entirely dismiss the oligarchic premise. Instead, he understands
policy developments as the result of a combination of factors, including fragmented
activism and electoral populism within the context of a fractured elite, under pressure
from institutional and structural change (Aspinall 2013, 103).
AGENCY OVER STRUCTURE
The oligarchic thesis, particularly Hadiz and Robison only gives limited attention
given to the role of personal and collective agency, with their primary focus instead
on the structural influences on Indonesian democracy. If individual reformers emerge,
they argue that they are simply drawn into the existing web of oligarchic influence,
leaving little room for appreciating and understanding reform. Countering this,
Aspinall argues that, while oligarchic power does have a huge influence, popular
agency is nevertheless important to shaping political outcomes, contributing to a
system that is marked by constant contestation, rather than oligarchy. In William
Liddle’s “theory of action”, he argues that individuals can and do have the ability to
“create, mobilize and deploy” political resources, rather than solely focusing on the
structural influence that originates in material inequality. The core point of the
‘agency over structure’ approach is that a ‘black and white’ analysis of Indonesian
democracy, based on material inequality alone, does little to capture shades of
difference and contest that are the result of popular and individual agency.
INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCESS CHANGE
25
Despite analyzing Indonesia since the fall of Suharto, and all the institutional and
process change that it has entailed, Hadiz, Robison and Winters consider that actual
power configurations have not changed a great deal. This approach has been criticized
for insufficient attention given to the way in which democratic institutions and
processes have forced oligarchic elite to consider policies that appeal to the masses,
for example health or labour reform (CITE- Aspinall)
Instituional and process change since the fall of Suharto has opened up a space for
labour to engage with formal politics, through the influence of votes as well as a
greater ability to mobilise and have their voice publically heard. This thesis will focus
on understanding what the increasing politicization of labour can indicate about the
state of Indonesian democracy and oligarchy.
CONCLUSION
In engagement with oligarchic and counter oligarchic theory on Indonesia, this thesis
will address a number of shortcomings in the current literature. Firstly, it will be
focused on labour organization and its engagement with oligarchic and elite politics, a
topic on which there has been limited research. Secondly, it will be commenting on a
contemporary event, and therefore one that has not yet had a significant amount of
analysis on it.
This thesis will argue that Indonesia’s labour movement is characterized by extreme
fragmentation and division, all the more acrimonious as a result of the increasing
politicization of labour in a fiercely divided presidential election. This contestation
and division is a characteristic of counter-oligarchic theory, in that it accounts for the
role of capital and oligarchic figures in shaping democracy and policies, as well as
genuine activism and reform from popular interests and electoral pressure. Like
26
counter-oligarchic theorists assert, labour politics in Indonesia can be characterized by
contestation and fragmented activism.
27
CHAPTER 3: ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTER OF LABOUR
Analysis of labour organization in developing countries, as well as labour
organization itself, has been heavily influenced by scholarship on and experience of
labour organization in Western, early industrialized countries (Ford 2004a, 3).
Following observations that transposing such theories and models to developing
countries was problematic, scholarship giving greater attention to factors and
explanations particularly common to developing countries proliferated (Kerr and
Siegel 1955 in Ford 2004, 3). Of these approaches, two distinct explanations on the
formation and nature of labour organization in developing countries can be
recognized: structural and cultural approaches (Siddique 1989). Structuralist analyses
have given their attention to Indonesia’s experience as a late-industrializing nation, as
well as emphasized corporatist elements of the New Order and post-New Order
political climate and structure. Culturalists instead emphasize the impact of local
culture, including patrimonialism and its restricting effect on the will of workers to
challenge authority (Ford 2004b). It is likely that both cultural and structural factors
have been influential, with features of the New Order, patrimonialism and paternalism
and Indonesia’s democratisation in a globalized, neo-liberal environment all
contributing to the organization of trade unions today. Further, Michele Ford argues
that the ideology and practice of Western labour organization cast a long shadow
across industrial relations under Suharto, and did indeed have some influence on New
Order era trade unionism. This chapter will assess the historical factors contributing to
28
the organization of trade unions today, in order to better understand divisions and
fragmentation of labour organizations in the 2014 presidential election.
THE BIRTH OF TRADE UNIONISM
The birth of labour movement in Indonesia can be traced to the early 20th century,
with the first trade unions forming in the 1920s, when Indonesian was still under
Dutch control (Tambunan 2014 119). Influences at this time were external, with
Western educated intellectuals, Western debate on socialism and Dutch socialists all
important to their initial growth and development (Ford 2004a, 6). Their
development went further than simply advocating for improved rights and conditions
for workers, however, and they also became an important vessel for organizing and
nurturing the growing independence movement (Tedjasukama 1958).
Following independence in 1945 these trade unions continued their activism, and
continued to be a sizeable component of Indonesian civil society and an influential
movement with in politics (Tambunan 2014 120, Juliawan 2014 20), the most
influential of which was All Indonesian Centre Workers Organisation (SOBSI), a
union with close links to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (Hadiz 2002 131).
As an indication of the level of involvement and membership trade unions enjoyed, in
1958, of a workforce of 32 million people and of that a reported 2.5 million formal
workers, 5 million were reported as trade union members (Hawkins, 1963 260; Ford
2009, 25 in Tambuna 2014 120). Their size and influence contributed to the
enactment of laws relating to workers rights, primarily on improvement to workers
wages and salaries (Tjandra 2008, 2). Throughout this time they also maintained their
links to Western socialist ideology, with Indonesian translations of texts on Marxism,
Leninism and the history of socialism in Europe commonly available (Tambunan
29
2014 120). By tracing the labour movement in Indonesia back to its birth and noting
its origins, it is possible to see that the labour movement in Indonesia initially had a
strong ideological underpinning and a strong role in civil society, and an influential
role among the political class.
TRADE UNIONISM AND THE NEW ORDER
The ousting of Sukarno, and with it a tidal wave of anti-left wing and anti-communist
rhetoric and violence, signaled a new era for labour in Indonesia1. There were two
initial, explicit objectives of Suharto’s New Order that were particularly influential,
the decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and rejection of any left-
wing ideology or movement and, secondly, upholding the official state ideology of
Pancasila (Ford 2004a, 8). In practice, these twin objectives were used to justify
policies that gave continuing economic development and political stability the utmost
primacy (Ford 2001 103, Wiratraman 2014 77). To achieve this a system called
Golangan Karya, or ‘functional groups’, was implemented. Under Golangan Karya
single organisations were permitted for representing particular groups in society, in
this case workers (Ford 2003, 96). It was in this climate, in the 1970s, that Pancasila
Industrial Relations were developed, and that a single unified union, the All Indonesia
Labour Federation (FBSI), was sanctioned (Wiratraman 2014 77).
1 On the 30th September 1965 a military coup resulted in the ousting of Suharto, as well as a
brutal attack against left wing political organizations and affiliates, particularly the PKI and
affiliated union, the SOBSI. Official data on the victims is not known, however it is estimated that
around half million people were killed and almost a million people arrested and imprisoned
(Hearman 2009).
30
HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND
WORKERS
Suharto’s Pancasila Industrial Relation system, like the New Order more generally,
followed a corporatist structure. Using a combination of oppression and
patrimonialism, state sanctioned groups in society were permitted to function only
where they contributed to economic development and political stability of the nation2.
In the case of labour organizations this meant that a “harmonious” relationship
between employers and employees was expected, and certainly not antagonism or a
class related conflict (Ford 2004a, 14, Wiratraman 2014 ). Conflict was expected to
be resolved by consensus, with the progress of the company given priority by all
parties in negotiations. This ‘harmonious’ relationship was built on the belief that
employers and employees had shared interests - so long as the company was
economically secure and profitable, workers’ social and economic interests would
also be met (Mufakhir 2014 103). Any action that threatened a company’s
profitability, for example strike action, was considered a threat to the harmonious
relationship between employers and employees, a threat to the interests of workers
themselves and, more broadly, a threat to the country’s economic stability, security
and development. As a result, the state would intervene, either using the military or
police, condemning and restricting such action as counter-productive to the country’s
economic development, as well as communist by nature.
2 In Opposing Suharto (2005) Edward Aspinall argues that coercion was only one element of the
methods used by the New Order to maintain power. In addition to coercion and oppression of potential
opposition groups, the New Order developed a system of patrimonialism and co-optation. This served
to channel potential threats to the regime into ‘semi-opposition’ groups, enmeshed into the New
Order’s system of corruption and deal making and therefore limited in their independence, will and
ability to oppose the regime (Aspinall 2005, 2010).
31
Illustrating this approach to unionism, at an event marking the 25th anniversary of the
SPSI (formerly the FBSI) the then Minister for Manpower, Latief, said:
“Unions are part of the infrastructure of Pancasila Industrial Relations. They
are not designed for confrontation, but to assist management as a partner in
running the company, which, in turn, helps improve the welfare of workers
and their families”
(Waspada 22 Fenruary 1997, cited in Ford 2004a, 26).
This attitude reveals an influence of both structural and cultural factors on the form
and organization unionism took. The state’s influence indicates a structural
understanding of labour, while the emphasis on family and not challenging authority
may, in part, be derived from traditional Javanese culture.
APOLITICAL TRADE UNIONISM
Under Pancasila Labour Relations the New Order used rhetoric and policies that
promoted the political independence of trade unions. The highly politicized form of
unionism common in the West was eschewed, and in its place an indigenous form of
trade unionism that stressed unions should be ‘pure’ and apolitical was promoted.
Under this regime, it was argued that unions should be concerned with economic
issues of their members only, and not with using workers as a political ‘tool’. As a
result trade unions had a strong market orientation, with largely economic goals and
concerns (Tjandra 2008, 45). Despite rhetoric, the function of this requirement was
less for the benefit of workers, and more to to ensure that the one state sanctioned
trade union, the FBSI was not politically active and a threat to the New Order. It was
also, likely, a response to the period under Sukarno in which unions had a great deal
32
of influence and political involvement (Ford 2004a, 27). In reality, trade unions’
independence from politicization simply meant that unions could be politically active
in a way that threatened the New Order - strong links existed between FBSI and
Golkar, Suharto’s political party. It’s leadership consisted of individuals with deep
links to Golkar, and its lower level membership often consisted of retired members of
the military or bureaucracy (Ford 2004a, 12).
Accompanying emphasis on economic unionism, as well as the focus on ‘pure’ and
‘independent’ unionism was the New Order’s strong anti-communist, anti- leftwing,
stance. The New Order’s legitimacy was constructed on a threat of communism; a
threat which they then continued to emphasize in rhetoric and in policy over the
course of the New Order (Hadiz 2008, 530). The threat of communism was used as
justification in the suppression of independent trade unions, and to ensure that there
was no deep left wing ideology underpinning them. In its place, state sanctioned
Pancasila ideology was upheld. The sum of trade unions’ apolitical, corporatist and
anti-left wing characteristics was a system of organized labour that was dedicated to
meeting only short-term socio-economic goals of its members, as opposed to working
toward any long-term, ideologically driven, political agenda. Further, they were
severely restricted in their activity and organizing ability. These characteristics
contribute to an understanding of the form and values of organized labour in
Indonesia has taken post New Order (Ford 2004a, 13).
LABOUR NGOS
The inadequate and weak nature of labour organisation and lack of independent and
effective representation of workers under the New Order left a gap in Indonesian
politics and civil society. Despite there being considerable discontent among workers
33
at various times throughout the regime, it was not able to be accomodated by sate
sanctioned trade union representation (Ford 2003, 96). Labour focussed non
government organisations, as actors outside of the state sanctioned union system,
were able to step in and fill this shortfall, acting as advocates on labour issues.
Michele Ford has identified two main approaches that have been utilised by NGOs in
labour advocacy, particularly prominent during the latter years of the New Order
(Ford 2003, 97). The first approach adopted local level strategies, for example legal
advocacy and workers’ education, and usually in cooperation with workers’ groups.
Upon the collapse of the New Order and relaxation of regulation on unions, many of
these NGO supported workers’ groups became trade unions. The second approach
utilised by labour NGOs and identified by Ford was those NGOs that gave greater
attention to policy advocacy and research. It was these NGOs that aso engaged more
deeply in international campaigns of significance to labour rights and conditions in
Indonesia (Ford 2003, 98). NGOs have been a significant part of the growth and
development of labour activism, contributing to the growth of trade unionism, but
also active on behalf of labour in their own right.
34
LABOUR ORGANIZATION POST SUHARTO
The fall of Suharto in 1998 was the result of a number of factors, with academic
debate over the significance that popular interests had compared to the role of elites
and elite fracture not settled3. While several scholars do give greater credit to the role
of popular action, they do not consider trade unions, specifically, as particularly
influential or significant, a result of the tight restriction of independent unionism over
the course of the New Order (Aspinall 2013, 119). Upon the collapse of the New
Order the new government ratified a number of ILO conventions fundamental to the
freedom of workers to collectively organize, namely the ILO Convention No. 87 on
the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (Suryomenggolo
2014, 5, Ford 2001 108). There was a subsequent explosion in activity in organized
labour. A mere two years after the collapse of Suharto, when there was only one trade
union permitted, “twenty-four national unions and more than ten thousand enterprise
unions” were registered with the state (Aspinall 2013, 109). Despite this explosion in
organized labour, a number of scholars have noted that labour’s power and influence
in the years following the New Order was limited (Aspinall 1999, Hadiz 2002 ,
Juliawan 2014 , Tornquist 2004). There are a number of reasons that unions have had
limited influence and power post Suharto, namely the influence of the New Order on
society and organization, and their experience growing within a neo-liberal,
globalized political and economic context (Suryomenggolo 2014, 10).
3 For further discussion on the divide between oligarchic and counter-oligarchic assessments of
Indonesian democracy see Chapter One.
35
NEO-LIBERALISM AND GLOBALIZATION
Democratisation in Indonesia has occurred during a period of time when neo-liberal,
‘market friendly’ policy has been the norm. Further, organized labour has had to
contend with the challenge of globalization. In reflection of this, following the
immediate democratisation and liberalisation of labour law following the New
Order’s collapse, was a ‘swing’ toward more ‘flexible’ neo-liberal labour policy, a
pattern common to many late democratizing, post authoritarian nations as they seek to
replace instruments of authoritarian control (Suryomenggolo 2014, 5). Wiratraman
has examined different ways in which neo-liberal policy, influenced or directly
instigated by institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF and aimed at enhancing
market flexibility, has threatened the rights and organizing abilities of labour
(Wiratraman 2014 74).
There are three ‘rounds’ of labour reform or attempted labour reform that Wiratraman
identifies as significant. The first was from 1997 - 1998, following the onset of the
Asian Financial Crisis, the second was in the early 2000s, under the Wahid and
Megawati. Administrations and finally, the third, which was during President
Yudhoyono’s tenure (Wiratraman 2014 84-85). Each of these waves of reform were
aimed at enhancing labour flexibility, and included policies related to more flexible
outsourcing, increased foreign workers, greater levels of contract workers, limiting
the role of the state in settling labour disputes, more flexible minimum wage and
limiting the right to strike (Wiratraman 2014 85). While still under debate, the most
recent wave of reforms has been identified as potentially highly damaging for
institutionalizing labour market flexibility, including through contractual work and
outsourcing, and thereby endangering trade unions’ ability to collectively organize
36
(Suryomenggolo 2014, 5). Furthermore, neo-liberal rhetoric has contributed to the
sidelining of left wing ideology.
LEGACY OF THE NEW ORDER
As has already been discussed, the New Order was highly controlling of trade
unionism and the left. For thirty years the Pancasila model of industrial relations was
strictly upheld, including apolitical unionism, a suppression of left wing ideology and
emphasis on ‘harmony’ between employers and employees.
The apolitical nature of unionism persisted in the election immediately following the
end of the New Order. In research undertaken by Michele Ford (2005) and Ollie
Tornquist (2004) on the 1999 General Election, many activists and leaders from
labour organizations showed negative attitudes towards engagement with political
parties, including towards forming a ‘labour’ party, arising from a suspicion of the
motives and interests of these parties. While this does show a persistence of New
Order era rhetoric and Pancasila industrial relations, it was not an entirely
unjustifiable position to hold, either. In the 1999 general election four political parties
with a purportedly labour base contested the election. Three of the leaders from these
four parties had a history as an elite in the state sanctioned union SPSI or the New
Order regime. Juliawan, during research conducted in 2008 and 2009, similarly found
that many leaders and activists were suspicious of overtly political unionism. Similar
to criticism of political unionism and the requirement for “pure” unionism during the
New Order, trade unionists expressed concern that their interests would be “hijacked”
by forces outside of the union and contrary to the union’s interests (Juliawan 2014 20-
21).
37
Anti-left wing sentiment has similarly persisted in Indonesia’s post New Order trade
union movement, leading to the ongoing marginalization of left wing ideas (Juliawan
2014 19). New Order rhetoric linking trade unionism to communism has been
successful in stigmatizing the movement, persisting in some areas even today. The
1965 anti-communist/left wing purge may have also “traumatized” workers in
particularly affected areas, making deep involvement in trade unionism a less
attractive prospect (Tambunan 2014 123). Further, unions do not necessarily identify
strongly with left wing ideology. In an interview with a union leader from XXXX in
Karawang, the union was identified as more of a “community” focused organization
than a left-wing organization. This is not only limited to trade unions directly,
however. Interviews with NGOs working with trade unions undertaken in September
2014 cited anti-left wing sentiment among the public more broadly persisting as well,
with strong left-wing ideology not usually articulated strongly for this reason. Public
anti-left and union sentiment has been exacerbated employers’ groups and investors
using the media to condemn strike action, union campaigns and minimum wage
campaigns. Common fears/criticism voiced by employers in such situations is similar
to rhetoric used during the New Order, arguing union action is disruptive to economic
growth and damaging to foreign investment (Ford 2013, 233).
In addition to challenges from neo liberalism and the legacy of Pancasila Industrial
Relations, unions have had to contend with more practical shortcomings in terms of
organizational ability. The suppression of trade unions for thirty years meant that
trade unions, save for the state sanctioned union, had no opportunity to build
organizational structures or experience. Several scholars have noted that the
institutional capacity to “collect membership fees, to conduct collective bargaining,
and to defend their members in disputes” has been lacking among many unions
38
(Quinn 2003, Isaac and Sitalaksmi 2008, and Kelly 2002, in Juliawan 2014 36). In
addition, trade union membership is generally comprised of low wage, unskilled
workers with little job security, for whom union organizing represents a high risk,
particularly given the practice of union busting (Tambunan 2014 123).
39
CHAPTER 4: LABOUR IN THE 2014 ELECTION
The labour movement in Indonesia has been described as fragmented, divided and
weak. Nevertheless, this election marked a significant moment for trade unionism in
Indonesia, with unions engaging in the formal political contest, following a trend of
increasing political engagement first notable in the 2004 election. The means through
which they have gained influence include mass mobilization and engagement with
presidential candidates, although all are ultimately related.
The two presidential candidates in the 2014 presidential election represented a stark
contrast in the development of Indonesia’s democracy, however this did not mean that
trade unions united behind one candidate. Instead, unions have been divided, with a
great many supporting Jokowi, but one of the most powerful union confederations,
KSPI, opting to support Prabowo. This split has caused deep division within the
movement, continuing after the election of Jokowi (Iqbal 2014 , Chandra 2014 ,
Manuswar 2014). The position trade unions have taken in this election and the means
through which they have engaged with the democratic process are of interest to
understanding labour’s role within Indonesia’s democracy, particularly within the
context of significant oligarchic power.
MOBILIZATION
Since the fall of Suharto the labour movement has needed to contend with the shadow
of thirty years of authoritarianism and suppression of their independence, as well as
the challenges of trying to have their voice heard in a developing democracy, where
economic pressures for flexibility and competitiveness are high (Juliawan 2011, 349).
40
Despite these challenges trade unions have become increasingly adept at mobilization,
gaining influence with government and private industry primarily through street
protests and strikes
While labour’s particular role as a significant political force is still developing, its
ability to mobilize on a nationwide scale, as well as on a more regular, smaller scale,
is more certain. Labour has successfully staged mass mobilization events both in
response to broader social issues, for example social security, as well as in response to
more traditional labour issues such as minimum wage or working conditions. Indeed,
since the fall of Suharto and restrictions on dissent, there has been a significant
expansion in the number of street protests (Juliawan 2011, 356). As an indicator of
the growth since the New Order, from 1989 to 1994 there were 2263 work stoppages
across Indonesia (Kammen 1997, 357, in Juliawan 2011) From 1999 to 2005 Juliawan
found there were 2759 work stoppages in the Tanggerang area alone (2011, 356).
Another, more recent, set of analysis from Anom Astika (sourced from media reports)
identified 1,114 demonstrations across Indonesia in the period from 5th January to 25th
January 2013 (Astika 2013 in Aspinall 2013, 107).
There have also been a gradually increasing number of protests in the years following
the collapse of Suharto. Juliawan examined the occurrence of street protests in Medan
and Tanggerang from 2005 to 2008. He found in 2005 there were 124 and 125 street
protests in Tanggerang and Medan respectively. In 2008 there were 289 and 189
protests respectively, indicating expansion the number of street protests in the post-
Suharto years, (Juliawan 2011, 356).
This proliferation of labour mobilization indicates that labour have managed to
establish a space where dissent and possibly influence with state and capital is
41
possible. This protest does not rely on formal institutional structures and interplay
between elites, instead gaining power from the mass mobilization of workers in public
spaces (Juliawan 2011, 352). These labour protests in Indonesia have taken a variety
of forms, though Juliawan has described a typical labour protest as follows:
“[they] vary from a quiet work stoppage followed by sit-ins within the walls of
the factory premises to noisy marches through the streets and lengthy
occupations of government buildings. In many cases, the struggle starts with
unanswered demands or failed negotiations; a demonstrasi then ensues either
in the factory compound or in public spaces, such as the streets, urban
landmarks or government buildings” (Juliawan 2011, 357).
Depending on the size of the action, protestors usually block the streets they are
adopting as their stage, in the process causing significant interruption to traffic
(particularly in Jakarta, notorious for traffic problems). Indeed, it is not always a side
product of the protest, but often an explicit purpose. In an informal interview with the
organizer of a toll road workers union, blocking the toll road was cited as an
achievement of a protest against the use of short term contracts. Disruption to the
traffic and surroundings areas has the effect of making the size of the protest appear
more significant, forcing the engagement of the public with the protest and issues
raised, as well as potentially demanding the attention of the media.
PROVEN ABILITY TO MOBILISE
Labour has managed to prove mobilisational ability and influence by a number of
successful, mass mobilization protests and strikes, as well as by numerous smaller
scale actions. These protests and actions, as well as larger scale mobilisations, have
been a regular feature of post Suharto Indonesia, indicating that labour are gaining
42
influence with government and capital through this method of engagement. There are
a number of potential benefits to workers unifying in protest action, including policy
gains in social security issues and working conditions, as well as a sense of dignity
and pride in self-expression. Importantly however, the influence of mobilization goes
beyond immediate policy responses or wage rises. Incidences of mass protests or
work stoppages also demonstrate the ability of labour to mobilize and gain influence,
and as a result increase their power and bargaining ability, without necessarily having
to mobilize each time. These incidences cause government and capital to response to
the potential labour have to mobilize. This means that, while mobilization in relation
to the 2014 election may be important to labour’s influence and power in it, what is of
greater influence are incidences of mass mobilization in which labour proved its
ability, and the need for it to be noted.
There have are a number of examples of labour mobilizing on a national scale
successfully influencing policy as well as demonstrating their ability to mobilize and
influence policy. Particularly significant incidences include mobilization in 2001 to
support the reinstatement of ‘Ministerial Decree 150/2000’ on redundancy and
severance payments, to abort anti-labour reforms to the Manpower Law in 2006, and
to prevent a temporary wage rise freeze proposed in 2008 (Juliawan 2011, 364).
More recently, there was a wave of mass mobilization in 2011 and 2012, in relation to
labour based issues, as well as broader issues on social security and fuel subsidy
reform (Aspinall 2013, 111). In October 2012 a two-day national strike was held, with
workers demanding minimum wage increase, universal healthcare, abolition of
outsourcing and protection for domestic workers. These demands indicated labour’s
increasing politicization, and expansion into social areas, rather than simply labour
issues (as was typical of New Order era unionism).
43
A broad coalition of union confederations formed a unified workers council, the
Majelis Pekerja/Buruh Indonesia or Indonesian Workers Council (MPBI) to
coordinate and participate in the strike action, including major confederations the
KSPSI, KSBSI, KSN and KSPI confederations (IndustriALL 2013). Approximately 2
million people participated in the action, marking a significant milestone for the
labour movement (Lane 2012). This was the first national strike in Indonesia’s
history, and was indicative of excellent organizational ability and confidence on the
part of the labour movement.
The response of the government was also indicative of their sensitivity to the strike
action. Negotiations with MPBI on the issues they were raising occurred on the first
day of the action and, following this strike, minimum wage increases of forty percent
occurred (Lane 2013). This was in the context of opposition from the powerful
employers union, and often-corrupt politics, demonstrating that mobilization is an
effective tool against these challenges, and the success of democratic protest and
action against the oligarchy (Ford and Caraway 2014).
In October 2013 a second, though smaller, national strike was held, with workers
demanding an end to outsourcing, an increase to the minimum wage (of 50%) and a
social security scheme for all Indonesians. This national strike was coordinated by a
new coalition of unions called the Labour Movement National Coalition (KNGB),
instead of MPIB. KNGB was comprised of KSPI, as well as smaller left leaning
unions, such as KSN. Larger confederations such as KSPSI and KSBSI did not
support the strike, believing it was not time to again call for a large increase to the
minimum wage, although it may have also indicated a breakdown in the relationship
between the major federations (Lane 2013).
44
KSPI AND MOBILIZATION
While demonstrating the power of labour, these national strikes particularly showed
the power of the main organizing union behind them, the Metal Workers Federation
(FSPMI), and its confederation, the Indonesian Trade Union Confederation (KSPI).
The KSPI is one of the largest confederations in Indonesia, with 1.8 million members,
and the largest when also considering factional division within other unions (Iqbal
2014). It is also one of the best-funded and best organized unions in Indonesia, a
result of a good ability to collect dues, strong institutional structures, strong
leadership and funding from overseas sources (Siljabat 2013).
In an interview with Iqbal he articulated the importance of labour having been able to
mobilize, directly relating policy successes to the two national strikes held in 2012
and 2013 respectively. He expressed frustration felt by KSPI that, that despite
Indonesia’s economic growth, there was initially “no attention [for labour]. Nothing
from government or employers about what could improve labour. Nothing.”
Following this inattention from government KSPI pursued a strategy (called ‘concept,
lobby and action’ or ‘CLA’), in which mobilization is a key component. First, they
focus on developing a concept, such as an end to outsourcing or decent wages.
Second, they lobby government, parliament members and employers associations.
Finally, if they are unsatisfied with the response, they take action by mobilizing
members to pressure government, parliament and employers groups (Iqbal 2014).
Iqbal noted that this strategy has been successful. In reference to the influence of
national strikes in 2012 and 2013, as well as KSPI’s regular mobilization of on May
Day, Iqbal said the following:
45
“After that we are win. After that we can get some issues. For example in
2012, increasing minimum wage 30-42%...inflation only 6%. Social security
reform, health insurance for lifetime…and also outsourcing, reduced because
government announced a new regulation for outsourcing workers. Only five
industries can use outsourcing workers. This is a win.”
Apart from the strategic focus on mobilization, KSPI‘s creation of the Garda Metal
has been important to their mobilization ability. The Garda Metal is a union run
brigade charged with protecting workers during strikes and actions from employer
sponsored gangsters, or providing a sense of security in the face of strong military and
police presences at rallies (Lane 2014, interview with Said Iqbal 2014). The presence
of the Garda Metal demonstrates organized labour’s participation in a political system
in which violence and physical intimidation are commonly used tools.
An additional, important, factor in KSPI’s organizational success is the president of
KSPI, Said Iqbal. Iqbal has a reputation for being highly charismatic and highly
persuasive, important skills for persuading workers of the need to strike and which
candidate to offer their support to.
Attempts at mass mobilization or protest in Indonesia without the participation or
support of KSPI will have only a limited influence. During interviews with activists
from two labour NGOs two interviews stated that, despite some unions unfavorable
attitude towards KSPI, the labour movement still needs KSPI due to their excellent
organizing and mobilizing ability (November 2014).
MOBILIZATION IN THE 2014 ELECTION
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Trade unions ability to mobilize has been the source of their power in a political
system where there is no institutionalized means for them to contribute, nor any left
wing, workers party, through which they have representation. Their ability to
mobilize has likely contributed to Prabowo actively seeking the support of trade
unions, with regular demonstration a significant feature of elections in Indonesia.
Indeed, street activism was a particular feature of this election, with Jokowi
particularly recognized for a large network of volunteers expressing their support for
him publically.
PAYMENT FOR DEMONSTRATIONS
Complicating the increase in mass mobilization in Indonesia are concerns that public
protest and strike action are motivated by factors external to the workers and their
needs. These accusations likely have their root in New Order era mobilization, when
labour was accused of having outside influence from academics, foreigners or
communism. Following the collapse of Suharto, public protests were instead
discounted by arguing they had been paid to protest, thereby delegitimizing the issues
raised. It is possible they were indeed paid; the economic recession meant small sums
may have been enough to suffice for enticement to protest (Juliawan 2011).
Despite this, Juliawan has argued that in Post Suharto years the level of organization,
coordination and persistency shown by organized labour protests in indicates a level
of commitment and consistency that is unlikely to be the result of financial
motivation. This is supported by the size of national strike action, as well as the
regularity of smaller actions. Instead, Juliawan argues that labour protest is discounted
by the public, as a reflection of the suspicion people feel towards elite politics.
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It is possible that there were instances of donations from political parties to trade
unions for campaigning during the 2014 election, and there are many unverified
reports of this occurring. This would not run counter to Juliawan’s argument that
sustained commitment indicates genuine motivations. Engagement for political
campaigning does not have a long history, and would require participation of workers
for a short period of time only.
In an interview with KPBI, a union alliance that supported Jokowi, the chairperson
said ‘Team Prabowo’ had offered KPBI 100,000RP per person campaigning in Bekasi
and Jakarta. When questioned about whether Prabowo had assisted with campaign
financing, Said Iqbal said all campaign costs were paid for by the union.
When asked about whether Jokowi funded campaigns of unions that supported him,
many interviewees commented that Jokowi did not have any funds to be able to do
this, and all support for him was on a volunteer basis only. However, Jokowi was
supported by APINDO, the employers group. In an interview with an official from
KSPSI, there was commentary that Andi Gani (from another KSPSI faction) had
received funding assistance from APINDO for campaigning purposes, although this
cannot be verified.
FORMAL POLITICS
The 2014 election was another milestone in the increasing politicization of labour,
with all major confederations choosing to align with one of the two of the main
candidates. This was indicative of the increasing politicization and confidence of
labour in working within the formal political system, however also the continuing
fragmentation of the movement and division between trade unions.
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The most powerful trade union confederation, KSBI, as well as a number of smaller
trade unions, aligned with Prabowo in the electoral contest, while the remaining major
confederations supported Jokowi. There are a number of interesting points that can be
drawn from trade union alignments, particularly in relation to trade unions offering
their support to Prabowo, a candidate who represented a return to a more authoritarian
style of governance.
The following section will discuss the contrasting candidates, Prabowo and Jokowi,
before assessing the motivations and incentives behind different elements of the
labour movement supporting different candidates, and what this indicates about the
role of labour functioning within an oligarchic system.
PRABOWO SUBIANTO
HISTORY
Prabowo Subianto has been a recurring character in Indonesian politics, with a
background highly representative of the New Order, as well as oligarchic politics post
New Order. His great wealth, family ties to Suharto and military power in the New
Order, but also recurring power in post-New Order politics, are representative of the
oligarchic argument that New Order era elites have merely adapted to democratic
structures and institutions to retain power.
Prabowo has been accused of committing a number of serious human rights abuses
during his military career, in West Papua, East Timor and (Klinken 2014). This is
particularly related to his long career with Kopassus, Indonesia’s Special Forces unit,
which has a record of human rights abuses in internal conflicts (Adams 2010). Most
politically damaging to him are accusations of human rights abuses during the fall of
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Suharto, when Prabowo was Lieutenant General of Kopassus, Indonesia’s Special
Forces unit. He was accused of orchestrating the kidnapping of twenty two pro-
democracy activists, of which seven have never been found. In 1998 Prabowo was
investigated for this incident by a military honor board, and discharged after they
apportioned responsibility to him (Mietzner 2014, Human Rights 2010). In 2006
Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights recommended he should be
prosecuted for this incident. However, to date he has not been prosecuted (Cochrane
2014). Prabowo has said he accepts responsibility for the kidnappings, as the
commander of the forces that undertook them. However he denies knowledge of the
kidnappings or ordering them.
In addition to the well-publicized accusations of kidnapping, Prabowo has a
questionable human rights record in East Timor and West Papua. Prabowo was a
senior military officer with Kopassus in East Timor in 1983, then again from 1988 to
1989. In East Timor he is associated with training militia groups, which have had
many human rights abuses recorded against them, as well as unproven suggestions
that his unit was involved in a massacre of civilians in the village of Kraras, East
Timor (Santoso 2013). When in West Papua he was associated with an incident in
which civilians were shot at from a helicopter marked with the Red Cross symbol,
however this is also unproven.
Following the collapse of the New Order, Prabowo made the transition to democratic
politics, initially as a member of Golkar, Suharto’s political vehicle during the New
Order. In 2004 he nominated to become Golkar’s presidential candidate, however
failed. Following this failure he left Golkar to form Gerindra, with the intention of
nominating for President in the 2009 election. His party did not receive the requisite
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number of votes in the legislative election, and he instead ran with Megawati’s (PDI-
P) ticket as the Vice Presidential nominee. He was again unsuccessful.
Attitudes of trade unions and other civil society groups towards Prabowo have
included criticism of this background, including of alleged human rights abuses
during his time in the military. Further criticism has been directed at his commitment
to democracy and intent to return to authoritarianism and his credentials as a
supporter of the labour movement and labour rights (Interviews, November 2014).
Many academics have also written on the risk of democracy reversal under Prabowo.
ANTI-DEMOCRATIC
Prabowo’s anti-democratic characteristics can be identified in his military and New
Order background, but also in rhetoric used in his campaign, policies he was
advocating and behavior immediately following the election. This was supported by
interviews with a deputy chairman of Gerindra, in which anti-democratic attitudes
were regularly and openly expressed. This included criticism of democracy and its
suitability for Indonesia and ‘Asian’ culture, criticism that the media is ‘too free’,
admiration of Lee Kwan Yew and China’s system of governance and concerns that
the military does not have enough power at present.
Marcus Mietzner has argued that democracy can be characterized by policy and
rhetoric that is moderate, pragmatic and pluralistic in nature, as candidates or leaders
attempt maintain to their legitimacy by appealing to a broad cross section of society.
Conversely, Meitzner identifies “populist militancy” or “radical populism” as an
important precursor to authoritarianism, particularly in post-authoritarian nations.
Prabowo’s strategy in this election can be characterized as “populist militancy”, as he
utilized strong and aggressing nationalist and populist rhetoric.
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As an example, the following translation is taken from an impassioned speech given
in Medan, in which Prabowo incited anger against a vaguely defined foreign ‘enemy’.
“Beware all you foreign stooges! All you who can only slander, can only
insult people, but have never never defended the people, never gave thought to
the people, never gave thought to the poor, who only at election time pretend
to care for the people (Subianto 2014, translated by Gammon 2014).
As another example, during a speech at a campaign event at Jakarta’s Bung Karno
Stadium Prabowo targeted “unnamed liars, corruptors, weaklings… and foreign
powers” for Indonesia’s problems (Mietzner 2014). Prabowo was painting an image
of threats against Indonesia, particularly in relation to foreign interests taking
Indonesian natural resources that only he, a ‘strong’ leader, would be able to resolve.
This rhetoric may appear hollow when considered against Prabowo, and his tycoon
brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo’s, own financial interests and wealth, gained in the
mining industry, and likely as a result of rent seeking and patronage (Mietzner 2014,
114).
Prabowo’s blustering and aggressive nationalist rhetoric was accompanied by imagery
strongly associated with Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno. Prabowo wore a
traditional cap associated with Sukarno, and also used a vintage style microphone
associated with him. The purpose of this association was to link Prabowo to
Indonesia’s anti-colonial movement, and to enhance further his nationalist and
populist appeal.
As well as imagery related to Sukarno, Prabowo adopted a strong military style
throughout his campaign, using private militias and marching bands throughout. This
strong militaristic approach can also be seen in Prabowo’s political party. In
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interviews undertaken in November 2014, Gerindra’s deputy chairman described
cadre-training camps conducted by Gerindra, in which men are trained in “ideology
and discipline”. Imagery of the training camps (below), show they are highly
reminiscent of military training. The same Gerindra official also expressed a belief
that the military in Indonesia is too weak, particularly in comparison to a powerful
police force. This strong militaristic style of campaigning was tapping into a sense of
longing within the electorate for the New Order, as well as Prabowo’s projected
image of a ‘strong leader.’
A RETURN TO THE 1945 CONSTITUTION
Prabowo’s anti-democratic tendencies went further than militant populist rhetoric, as
he hinted at features of Indonesian democracy being detrimental and ill suited to
Indonesia. Speaking at an event on the 28th July he said:
“I believe much of our current political and economic systems go against our
nation’s fundamental philosophy, laws and traditions, and against the 1945
Constitution…Many of these ideas that we have applied are disadvantageous
to us, they do not suit our culture”
This was similarly supported by interviews with the Deputy Chair of Gerindra, Arief
Poyuono, who stated that democracy is not suited to Indonesia, that Indonesians were
not ready for democracy and that governance in nations such as China or Singapore
present a better alternative for Indonesia (Interviews undertaken in November, 2014).
Continued reference to a return to the 1945 Constitution is also of interest to assessing
Prabowo’s commitment to democracy. The 1945 Constitution implies removing all
post-Suharto, democratizing reforms, including “direct presidential elections, a
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stronger parliament, a human-rights charter, and…a system of checks and balances”
(Mietzner 2014, 115). Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner have argued that
Prabowo intended to wind back direct elections of local and national leaders if elected
(Mietzner 2014, Aspinall and Mietzner 2014). Indeed, following Jokowi’s election
Gerindra’s Merah Putih faction introduced legislation to abolish direct elections of
governors and local mayors, only halted when there was public outcry and President
Yudhoyono issued an emergency government regulation to maintain direct elections
(Parlina 2014).
LABOUR SUPPORT FOR PRABOWO
PRABOWO’S RECORD ON LABOUR ISSUES
Prabowo has a poor record on labour issues, evident in his own businesses and in
comments he has previously made about labour. Prabowo’s business interests are
predominantly through the Nusantara Group, which engages in the mining, forestry,
plantation and energy industries. His wealth, as reported to the Corruption Eradication
Commission (KPK), is approximately US$140.46 million (Jong and Widhiarto 2014).
Prabowo’s track record on labour is compromised by issues at Kertas Nusantara, a
paper mill he is the majority owner of. Following financial difficulties of the company
in early 2014, 600 workers went on strike saying they had not been paid for five
months (Hidayat 2014).
In relation to the 2012 national strike Prabowo discussed the importance of labour
taking into consideration the needs of the employers in their demands. Recounting a
conversation he had with workers he said the following:
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“Some time ago I met with a group of workers, they asked for a wage
increases. I said we don't have the money. You need to be wise…It was my
duty to remind [them]… Think first, if you force the issue, who knows, we may
all suffer financially” (Atriana 2012).
This language is strongly evocative of New Order era industrial relations policy,
which focused on the need for employees and trade unions (SPSI) to work for the best
interests of the company.
POLITICAL CONTRACT
Prabowo committed to a ten point political contract ten issues important to labour, as
a result of negotiations with KSPI. Prabowo agreed to all of KSPI’s ten demands,
with no substantive change to them. He sought changes only to wording, but not to
the principles of these demands (Interview with Said Iqbal 2014)
In this contract, Prabowo’s commitments included the following:
1. Raise the minimum wage by 30% in 2015
2. Rejection of minimum wage suspensions
3. Mandatory pensions for workers by July 2015
4. Health insurance for all workers and poor
5. Remove outsourcing, particularly for state owned enterprises
6. Increased protections for migrant workers and domestic workers
7. Revision of bill relating to law societies
8. Raise wages of teachers, particularly part time teachers
9. Introduce/improve public housing and pubic transportation for workers
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10. Introduce compulsory education up to year twelve and scholarships for
children of workers4.
This political contract represented a milestone for organized labour, with no other
comparable offer ever made to trade unions in previous presidential elections. Iqbal
emphasized how, despite labour’s achievements as a result of mass mobilization,
labour has been locked out of negotiation with parliament in previous years. In
relation to social security reform and not being able to directly negotiate with
government, he said “its very tough…its very, very tough and difficult”, expressing
great frustration with labour’s ability to negotiate and have a voice in government.
As a result of this frustration of labour’s goals, KSPI focused on a political strategy as
well as the concept-lobby-action approach. Part of this political approach was seeking
to become more partisan in the 2014 presidential election, and entering into an
alliance with the candidate that was most accommodating to their demands. Prabowo
was the only candidate in the election that agreed to their demands, and as such he
received the full support of KSPI.
These commitments are undoubtedly attractive to organized labour, however the
reliability of these promises is questionable, given Prabowo’s history and track record
on labour rights. When trade unions and labour NGOs who either supported Jokowi
or remained unaligned, were questioned about Prabowo’s commitment to labour they
were scathing about whether he was genuine.
4 See Appendix 1 for original Indonesian version
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The chair of KPBI, a council of labour organizations that supported Jokowi (and the
successor of MPBI), was asked why he did not support Prabowo, given his promises
to labour, said the following:
“[the commitments are] only a statement. Not included in the vision and
mission of Prabowo. Different to Jokowi’s vision and mission. Jokowi have
many many concepts for the workers. Everything is good for workers. For
Prabowo, only a statement, nothing else…Prabowo only ‘okay Iqbal, okay
Iqbal’“
Similarly, other union leaders and activists, when interviewed on the likelihood
Prabowo could have raised the minimum wage by 30% in 2015, were highly skeptical
and scathing of his promises. This is supported by Prabowo’s negative attitude
towards union demands in 2012 to raise the minimum wage by 40%.
Two interviewees from labour NGOs, interviewed informally, expressed concern that
Prabowo was simply seeking support from whichever corner he could, and would
agree with all demands in order to gain such support, without necessarily keeping
such promises. This is supported by Prabowo’s agreement to all ten of KSPI’s
demands, with no substantive changes sought, as well as the unlikely nature of some
promises (e.g. raising the minimum wage by 30%). This is particularly concerning in
light of Prabowo’s anti-democratic attitudes, and the possibility that he was seeking
election only to return Indonesia to authoritarianism.
MINISTERIAL POSITION
In addition to the political contract, the Minister for Manpower position was promised
to Said Iqbal if he won the election. In an interview with Iqbal, conducted after the
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election, this was defended as a way in which labour could have decent representation
within government. Indeed, this in itself is not necessarily problematic. Trade union
leaders filling government positions is not unusual, or hidden, among liberal
democracies where trade unions have a considerable amount of power or have their
own political representation. More concerning, however, is that the offer was not
made public as the ‘ten commitments’ to labour were. It was rumored, however not
publically admitted to by Prabowo or Iqbal. It is likely this was either to avoid the
perception that Iqbal was concerned only with an appointment to this powerful
position and that this was the genuine reason for his support to Prabowo.
POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
In 2009 Said Iqbal ran as a candidate in the 2009 legislative elections for PKS, the
Prosperous Justice Party. PKS is an Islamic political party that has had moderate
success in legislative elections, currently holding 40 seats in the legislative assembly.
Like other Islamic parties, PKS supported Prabowo in the election and is part of
Gerindra’s Merah Putih faction. During an interview Iqbal commented on the need for
unions to remain independent, and on the independence of KSPI. This was
particularly compared to KSPSI, with criticism given to the close PDI-P affiliation of
one of its factional leaders, Andi Gani. Despite this, his own political affiliation with
PKS shows that KSPI is not necessarily entirely independent, and political links with
PKS may have an influence on which candidate was supported.
JOKO WIDODO
Jokowi represented a stark alternative to Prabowo Subianto, and a break from the
New Order. Jokowi has no background in politics under Suharto, and no family
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connections that assisted his rise to prominence. Through a laid-back, humble and
approachable style, he presented an image of an ordinary, middle class Indonesian
rather than one of the elite.
Jokowi first achieved success in his hometown of Solo, where he built a successful
furniture business. In 2005 he successfully ran for Mayor of his hometown, and
gained a reputation for improving health and education services, strategies to address
corruption, and for a blend of pro-poor and pro-business policies. He was reelected
Mayor of Solo in 2010 with 90.1% of the vote
In 2012, thanks to a rising national profile, he caught the attention of the PDI-P, and
other elites (including Prabowo), and received the nomination in Jakarta’s
gubernatorial election. He won this election, defeating candidates who had appeared
stronger and better funded than he was. After improving healthcare access for the
poor, introducing a university scholarship program and prioritizing public transport to
tackle the city’s traffic issues, his media presence and popularity rose further.
Jokowi’s popularity began to be reflected in polling on possible presidential
candidates. Although initially seeming reluctant, Jokowi’s positive polling gave
Megawati and the PDI-P little option to offer him their nomination for the presidency.
In March 2014 he officially began his campaign (Sherlock 2014).
In Jokowi’s mission and vision statement he laid out his aims to regain trust in public
institutions, particularly law enforcement, enhance economic independence, increase
productivity and competitiveness, raise citizens quality of life and bring about a
“mental revolution” in national culture. These goals and aims were based on
Pancasila, as well as Trisakti, the principles of political sovereignty, economic
independence and distinct cultural character that were popularized by Sukarno. These
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policies are not highly distinct from Prabowo’s. Like Prabowo, he advocates for
nationalist economic policies, although his approach is far more moderate than
Prabowo’s, and the aggressive, anti-foreigner style is absent. Like Prabowo, he also
references Sukarno and Pancasila in his campaign.
Despite similarities in their policies, however, the approach they take is drastically
different. Prabowo advocated change through a ‘top down’ approach, greatly focused
on a need for ‘strong leadership’, worrying when his anti-democratic rhetoric and
background are also considered. Conversely, Jokowi’s approach to ‘change’ in
Indonesia was based, not on the actions of the state, but on the actions of the people.
He advocated a ‘mental revolution’ and on the development of a nation based on
gotong royong, a philosophy of working together towards a collective goal. He
represented a moderate, continuation of reformasi while Prabowo represented a
potential return to authoritarianism.
Despite Jokowi’s good reputation as being a ‘clean’ politician, and his image
representing a departure from New Order politics, he is not immune from accusations
of being a part of the oligarchy or ‘old’ elite His selection as PDI-P’s candidate for
the Jakarta gubnertorial election was the result of a number of oligarchic elites
selecting and backing him, including Megawati, Jusuf Kalla and, ironically, Prabowo
and his tycoon brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo (Winters 2014). Similarly, he
received substantial media coverage during his stint as Mayor of Jakarta, a result of
his great popularity, but also of backing from oligarchic media barons. He has also
had to contend with criticism that he is merely a puppet of Megawati, the unpopular
past president and powerful chairperson of the PDI-P (Kapoor and Thatcher 2014).
This image is not undeserved. His cabinet appointments upon his election show a
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substantial number of appointees owe their position to an affiliation with PDI-P and
Megawati, as opposed to experience and talent (Hill and Resosudarmo 2014).
The requirement for Jokowi to have oligarchic and elite backing to be successful in
elections show that he is operating within a strong oligarchic context, where wealth
and connections are very important. However his personal popularity has been able to
counter this, and enabled him to gain first the nomination for Jakarta’s gubernatorial
election, and from this the PDI-P presidential nomination, despite elite unwillingness
to back him in this instance (Sherlock 2014, 22).
LABOUR SUPPORT FOR JOKOWI
JOKOWI’S RECORD ON LABOUR ISSUES
Jokowi’s record on labour issues is mixed, however he has a strong record on social
welfare policies. In 2012, when Jokowi was in office in Jakarta, he approved a 44%
raise to the minimum wage for 2012-2013 (Manning 2014) . This extraordinary jump
was seen as the result of successful mass mobilization of workers, a sense that
Indonesia should rely less on unskilled cheap labour, and more on between paid,
skilled labour for investment and finally that labourers were genuinely underpaid in
comparison to Indonesia’s growing middle class. It is all the more significant when
considering that regional wages set in Jakarta are influential around the nation,
serving as standard against which other regions minimum wages are set and
measured.
During wage negotiations in 2013, Jokowi did not again offer large increases to the
minimum wage, granting only a ten percent increase to workers. This increase was
minimal when compared to the previous years increase of 44%, but also when
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compared to an inflation rate that negated the small rise. The wage increase was set
as an outcome of the Jakarta Wage Council, a body usually made up of government,
employers and workers. In this case workers boycotted it, so Jokowi only received
input from government officials and employers. The resulting raise angered some
unions, with Iqbal commenting “If Joko really approved that wage, that means that he
does not side with the poor…It means that he defends the employers’ interests”
(Primanita 2013).
NEGOTIATION
Jokowi appeared uninterested in negotiation with KSPI. When discussing the political
contract entered into with KSPI, Iqbal commented that his union would consider
supporting any candidate that signed it. He also said that his organization contacted
Jokowi multiple times to negotiate, however received no response. Alternatively,
unions that supported Jokowi and NGO activists said that the relationship between
Iqbal and Prabowo had been developing well before KSPI declared for Pabowo, and
that Jokowi was reluctant to meet with a union that was already intent on supporting
Prabowo. While the truth of this is difficult to determine, it is clear that only Prabowo
and KSPI, and not KSPI and Jokowi, entered into negotiations.
This does also not indicate that Jokowi negotiated with no unions, however. In public
commentary Andi Gani, of KSPSI, commented that while there had been no political
contract entered into with Jokowi, there was regular close communication with him.
In June 2014 he said “ (Mr Joko) has shown us he is a man of reason and listens
before acting, so we prefer that than a leader who is the opposite” (Nazeer 2014).
Other, smaller, unions, such as KSN or and KPBI (a council of different unions) said
they had received no contact from Jokowi.
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NEO LIBERALISM AND EMPLOYER SUPPORT
Discussion with different unions that supported Jokowi conveyed a sense that he was
not necessarily going to be highly considerate of labour and trade unions. Several
interviewees expressed concern that he would not buck Indonesia’s focus on neo-
liberal policies and on attracting foreign investment at the expense of good working
conditions.A further concern was the support given to Jokowi by APINDO, the
powerful employers association, as well as personal support from Sofyan Wanandi,
the powerful chair of APINDO and wealthy businessman (The Jakarta Post 2014).
Mukhtar Gunter, the leader of KSN, a “red”, left leaning trade union confederation,
said in an interview that the union was more intent on putting their support behind
Jokowi, to stop Prabowo, as opposed to endorsing Jokowi. This was reflected in the
level of support they offered Jokowi, only declaring their support late in the campaign
when it appeared Prabowo had a good chance of winning. Similarly, during an
interview with Jumur Hidayat, Chair of ARM, a small council of unions that
supported Jokowi, leader of the Maritime Workers Union and longtime labour
activist, it was stressed that Jokowi would not be ideal for the labour movement, but
at the very least supporting him held no liabilities. Supporting Prabowo, on the other
hand, would have been damaging to the labour movement’s reputation and a much
riskier move for labour’s future.
POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Like KSPI and Iqbal’s affiliation with PKS, some of the labour unions that supported
Jokowi are also affiliated with political parties. One of the largest trade union
confederations, KSPSI supported Jokowi early in his campaign. This was
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unsurprising given that the leader of a major faction within KSPSI, Andi Gani Nena
Wea, has strong PDI-P affiliations. Andi Gani (as he is known) is the son of Jacob
Nuna Wea, a former labour activist and Minister for Manpower under Megawati.
Interviewees from unions that supported Jokowi and unions that supported Prabowo
commented on this affiliation, saying that Andi Gani is not independent, and never
would have supported another candidate. One official, from an alternative KSPSI
faction, commented that unions are simply instruments of political parties, including
KSPSI.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has discussed the division of labour in the 2014 election, assessing how it
has developed to have increasing engagement with formal politics, as well as the
motivations behind labour’s engagement with formal politics.
Chapter 2 assessed literature on oligarchy and democracy in Indonesia, including
counter oligarchic and oligarchic approaches to understanding Indonesian politics and
power. Broadly, the oligarchic thesis emphasizes the role of political elites and capital
in shaping power and democracy in Indonesia, at the expense of any focus or
consideration given to lower class, genuine democratic influence from the populace.
While this approach is not entirely incorrect, this thesis asserts that ‘counter
oligarchic’ approaches are a more accurate portrayal of Indonesia politics and society,
given their attention given to a broader range of influences on power, while also
accepting oligarchs hold considerable sway.
Chapter 3 examined the history and background of labour in Indonesia, particularly
the role of organized labour under the New Order and its relation to formal politics.
This chapter showed how organized labour in Indonesia has a history of being
apolitical, a trend that has continued to today in some instances, or is only recently
changing. Understanding the background of labour is important to understanding the
recent politicization of labour., as well as reluctance to become politically partisan
Chapter 4 examines this election in detail, focusing on the two main presidential
candidates, Prabowo and Jokowi, and their respective qualities and offers to labour. In
relation to these candidates this chapter analyzed mobilization of trade unions, and
how this has assisted them in gaining the ear of candidates in the Presidential election.
65
It also examined the formal negotiations and motivating factors in labour’s support of
Prabowo and Jokowi respectively.
This chapter found that there are still oligarchic forces influencing labour, particularly
linked to the candidate Prabowo. Prabowo characterizes oligarchic power in many
ways, as a result of his background in the New Order and reputation for human rights
violations. In addition to his poor democratic credentials, however, are anti-
democratic practices that occurred among unions supporting him, including the
possibility of funding in exchange for support, and the offering of ministerial or other
high-level positions to unions leaders in exchange for support.
Support for Prabowo from different unions is complicated by Prabowo’s extensive
promises to labour. These promises raise the question of whether KSPI, in this case,
managed to co-opt oligarchic power, of if labour was co-opted for its mobilization
power. This assessment can be made by evaluating the promises Prabowo made, and
whether he would have been of benefit to labour.
Prabowo’s ten promises would undoubtedly have been of benefit to labour, if he was
able to keep them. However, it is unlikely Prabowo could keep these promises, or that
he intended to keep them, indicated by his anti-labour background as well as the
nature of the commitments. Many unions commented it was not possible to keep
promises around outsourcing or the minimum wage, and that he was only saying what
labour wanted to hear in order to gain their support.
Prabowo’s anti-democratic tendencies and attitudes are also of particular concern. It is
unlikely organized labour would have had increased power or improved living
conditions under a more authoritarian government. These concerns with Prabowo,
should he have come to power, indicate that it is likely some organized labour groups
66
were co-opted by oligarchic forces, as opposed to co-opting oligarchic power for their
own use.
In relation to Jokowi, there are also indications of oligarchic influences, however their
impact is not so severe given the perception of him as a break from New Order era
politicians, and the need many unions felt to halt Prabowo. Nevertheless, there are
strong links between a number of unions that supported Jokowi and political parties,
calling into question the motivations behind their support of Jokowi.
In sum, divisions between labour in the 2014 election indicate that labour in Indonesia
is highly fragmented, a result of a number of different factors, though this thesis has
focused on its position within an oligarchic context. This thesis has found that
labour’s behavior in the 2014 presidential election indicates labour, while becoming
increasingly politicized and showing great mobilization ability, it is still divided by
oligarchic and reformist influences.
67
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81
APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1
Source: Personal correspondence with KSPI
BANGKIT & BERGERAKLAH KAUM BURUH
1. Meningk atk an day a bel i upah pek er j a/ buruh dan masy arak at dengan cara
mengubah jum lah j enis barang dan j asa y ang menjadi k omponen untuk
k ebutuhan hidup lay ak ( KHL ), dar i 60 j enis m enjadi menjadi 84 j enis
barang dan jasa ser ta m eningk atk an produk t i f i tas pek er ja / buruh.
2. Menghapus Kebi j ak an Penangguhan Upah Minimum.
3. Menjalank an Jam inan Pensiun Waj ib bagi buruh / pek er ja per 1 Jul i 2015
sesuai UU SJSN dan BPJS
4. Jalank an Jam inan Kesehatan seluruh rak y at dengan cara cabut perm enk es
69/ 2013 tentang tar i f , gant i INA CBG’s dengan Fee For Serv ice, audi t BPJS
Kesehatan dan BPJS Ketenagak er j aan.
5. Hapus Outsourcing, k hususny a Outsourcing di BUMN.
6. Sahk an RUU PRT dan Rev isi UU Per l indungan TKI.
7. Cabut UU Ormas gant i dengan RUU Perk umpulan.
8. Angk at Pegaw ai dan guru Honorer menjadi PNS, ser ta subsidi Rp 1 Juta per
orang/ per bulan dar i APBN untuk Guru Honorer .
9. Sediak an Transpor tasi Publ ik dan perumahan Murah untuk Buruh.
10. Jalank an Waj ib belaj ar 12 Tahun dan bea sisw a untuk anak Buruh hingga
Perguruan Tinggi .