opinion of the court -...

08.07.2016 Yusupovv.AttorneyGeneralofUS,518F.3d185CourtofAppeals,3rdCircuit2008GoogleScholar

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=518+F.3d+185+&hl=en&as_sdt=6,33&case=14505269826770049563&scilh=0 1/12

518F.3d185(2008)

BekhzodBakhtiyarovichYUSUPOV,Petitionerv.

ATTORNEYGENERALOFtheUNITEDSTATES,Respondent.IsmoilSamadov,Petitioner

v.AttorneyGeneraloftheUnitedStates,Respondent.

Nos.054232,055411,063160.

ArguedApril16,2007.Opinionfiled:March14,2008.AsAmendedMarch27,2008.

UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals,ThirdCircuit.

*188LawrenceH.Rudnick,Esquire(Argued),Steel,Rudnick&Ruben,Philadelphia,PA,forPetitioner,BekhzodBakhtiyarovichYusupov.

188

PaulA.Engelmayer,Esquire,BassinaFarbenblum,Esquire(Argued),WilmerCutlerPickeringHale&Dorr,NewYork,NY,forPetitioner,IsmoilSamadov.

PeterD.Keisler,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,CivilDivision,MichaelP.Lindemann,AssistantDirector,JonathanPotter,Esquire(Argued),UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice,OfficeofImmigrationLitigation,Washington,DC,forRespondent.

Before:McKEEandAMBRO,CircuitJudges,ACKERMAN,[*]DistrictJudge.

OPINIONOFTHECOURT

AMBRO,CircuitJudge.

Analienunlawfullyinthiscountrymayhavehisremovalblockedundercertaincircumstances.OneiswithholdingofremovalunderImmigrationandNationalityAct(INA)241(b)(3)(A),8U.S.C.1231(b)(3)(A),whichprohibitsremovaliftheAttorney

Generalbelievesthatthealien'slifeorfreedomwouldbethreatenedinthecountryofremoval.[1]Eligibilityfor*189withholdingofremovaliserased,however,if"therearereasonablegroundstobelievethatthealienisadangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates."INA241(b)(3)(B)(iv),8U.S.C.1231(b)(3)(B)(iv).InthiscaseweconsidertheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationofthatexception(commonlyreferredtoasthenationalsecurityexception).

189

InInreAH,23I.&N.Dec.774,788(2005),theAttorneyGeneralconstruedtheexceptionasreferringto"anynontriviallevelofdanger"or"anynontrivialdegreeofrisk."Hefurtherinterpretedtheprovisiontoestablisha"reasonablepersonstandard,"whichhedeemedtobe"satisfiedifthereisinformationthatwouldpermitareasonablepersontobelievethatthealienmayposeadangertothenationalsecurity."Id.at789.

TheBoardofImmigrationAppeals(BIAortheBoard)reliedonthisinterpretation[2]inthedecisionsunderreviewhere.[3]Itaffirmedthedeterminationthatpetitioners,twoaliensfromUzkbekistan,wereentitledtodeferralofremovalundertheCAT

becausetheyfacedlikelypersecutionortortureifreturnedtothatcountry.[4]Italsoconcludedthatthenationalsecurityexceptionbarredpetitionersfromwithholdingofremoval.

PetitionersarguethatweshouldrejecttheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationofthenationalsecurityexception.Fortheexceptiontoapply,theybelievethedangermustbecurrent,itmustbe"serious"or"grave,"andthatthismustbeestablished

byatleastaprobablecausestandard.[5]TheAttorneyGeneralrespondsthathisinterpretationoftheexceptionisentitledtodeferenceundertheprinciplesannouncedinChevron,U.S.A.,Inc.v.NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,Inc.,467U.S.837,104S.Ct.2778,81L.Ed.2d694(1984).

*190WeagreewiththeAttorneyGeneralonallpointssaveone.Thechallengedinterpretationignoresclearcongressional

intenttotheextentthat,insteadoffollowingthestatutorylanguage[6]andaskingwhetheranalien"isadangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates,"itinquireswhetheranalien"mayposeadangertothenationalsecurity"(emphasisadded).Because

190



wecannotdiscernfromtherecordwhetherthiserrorintheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationledtoaresultcontrarytotheintentofCongressinpetitioners'cases,weremandforapplicationofthecorrectstandard.

I.FactualBackground

PetitionersBekhzodBakhtiyarovichYusupovandIsmoilSamadovareUzbeknationals.Theyclaimtobe"independentMuslims"whoattendedthemosqueofImamObidkhonNazarov,whosefollowers,theyassert,havebeensubjecttocontinuedpersecutionbytheUzbekgovernment.YusupovandSamadovstatedthattheyleftUzbekistantopursueeducationalopportunitiesinAmericabutrefusedtoreturntotheirformercountryforfearofpersecution.

PetitionersenteredtheUnitedStatesseparatelyin1999onF1studentvisastolearnEnglish.WiththeexceptionofafourweekcourseinEnglishattendedbySamadov,petitionersdidnotattendeducationalinstitutions.Instead,despitelackingpermissiontowork,theybothfoundemploymentinPhiladelphia,living*191togetherinahousewithotherUzbeknationals,includingErkinjonZakirov.

191

In2002,agentsfromtheFederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI)visitedYusupovandSamadovattheirhome.TheagentsaskedquestionsaboutcriminalchargesassertedbytheUzbekgovernmentandreceivedpermissionfromthemtosearchthehouseandthesharedhouseholdcomputer.TheFBIfoundnoevidenceofcriminalactivityonthepremises,buttookthecomputerforfurtheranalysis.Asearchofitsharddriverevealedthefollowingintheinternetcache:

avideoclipofaspeechbyOsamabinLadeninDecember2001

avideoclipofaspeechbyChechenmilitantShamilBasayev

avideoclipfromNovember2001,includingaviewofwhatappeartobeAfghanfighters

videoclipsofwhatappeartobeattacksonRussiantroopsandvehicles

apubliclyavailablestatemapshowinglocationsofPennsylvaniaStatePolicefacilitiesand

anemailsenttoZakirovthatreadasfollows:

Yourexitfromtheremightbringsomedifficultiestothethingswearetakingcareofhere.Therefore,ifyoudo

nothaveverystrongdifficulties,foryoutostaywhereyouareandworkforIslamisalsoabigjihad.[7]

FollowingtheFBI'svisit,SamadovwasdetainedbytheImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS)(predecessortotheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS))andservedwitha"noticetoappear"foroverstayinghisvisa.Hewasreleasedonbondonthebasisthatheposednodangertothecommunity,thetermsofwhichhefollowed.

In2003,YusupovmovedtoVirginiapurportedlytogetahigherpayingjob.HeworkedasaschoolbusdriverforaprivateMuslimgradeschool,wherehewasgivenaccesstoasmallstoreroomwithamattressandaninternetenabledcomputer.Healsoobtainedajobatafactory,falselyclaimingtobeaU.S.citizenonafederalEmploymentEligibilityVerificationFormI9.TheBureauofImmigration&CustomsEnforcement(BICE)ofDHSarrestedhimformakingafalsestatementonafederalform,andseizedacomputerandhisduffelbagfromtheschoolstoreroom.BICEfoundsomefilmcontainingpicturesoftheNewYorkskylineandanintersectionnearthehistoricFultonFerryintheBrooklynareaofNewYorkCity,aswellascachedpicturesfromtheinternetofviolentactivitiesinCentralAsia.Yusupovpledguiltytomakingafalsestatementontheformandwassentencedtopaymentofa$100specialassessmentandprobation.BICEalsodetainedhimandheenteredremovalproceedings.

In2004,SamadovwasdetainedagainaftertheUzbekgovernmentsentanoticeofcriminalcharges[8]alongwithan

extraditionrequest[9]forhim,Yusupov,andZakirov.[10]

*192II.RemovalProceedingsandAppealstotheBIA192

A.Yusupov

Yusupovconcededthathewasremovableforviolatingthetermsofhisstudentvisa,butappliedforasylum,withholdingofremoval,andCATrelief.TheIJdeniedtheasylumapplicationasuntimely.Buthemadeapositivecredibilitydetermination,andconcludedthatYusupovhadestablished,onthebasisofhissupportforImamNazarov,aclearprobabilityofpersecutionsufficientformeetingthestandardforwithholdingofremoval.



TheIJalsofoundthattherewerenoreasonablegroundstobelievethatYusupovwasadangertoU.S.nationalsecuritybecausehehadengagedinnoviolentactivitiesnorhadheshownapropensityfordoingsoinseveralyearsofresidencehere,therewasnothingtosuggestthatheespousedviolence,theextraditionrequestwaslikelyatoolofpersecution,andthecachedwebfilespertainedtoworldeventsnearhishomeregionthatwereofgeneralinterestandhavebecomegenerallyavailabletothepublicinrecentyears.InreYusupov,No.A79729905,at58(IJDec.Nov.19,2004).Accordingly,theIJgrantedYusupov'sapplicationforwithholdingofremoval.

DHSappealedtotheBIA,whichdismissedYusupov'sappealfromthedenialofasylumandreversedtheIJ'sdeterminationthattherewerenoreasonablegroundstobelievethatYusupovwasadangertoourNation'ssecurity,thusmakinghim

ineligibleforwithholdingofremoval.[11]TheBoardemphasizedthat"thelevelofdangerrequiredunderthestatuteneednotbeparticularlyhigh,"andthatDHS'sevidencesufficedtomeetthis"relativelylowburdenofestablishing`reasonablegrounds,'"namely:(1)theUzbekextraditionrequestandanInterpolwarrantwithallegationsthatYusupovconspiredwithotherstouseviolence,(2)theFBI'sdiscoveryofcachedvideofilesofspeechesbybinLadenandothersaswellasofbombingsinChechnya,(3)the"jihad"emailsenttoYusupov'sroommate*193Zakirov,(4)thefactthatYusupoventeredtheUnitedStatesonastudentvisabutneverattendedschool,and(5)Yusupov's2003convictionformakingafalsestatementonafederalform.InreYusupov,No.A79729905,at23(BIADec.Aug.26,2005).Nevertheless,theBIAagreedwiththeIJ'sdeterminationthatYusupovwouldfacepersecutionand/ortortureuponreturntoUzbekistan,andthusgrantedthemore

limitedremedyofdeferralofremovalundertheCAT.[12]

193

B.Samadov

Samadovalsoconcededremovabilityandappliedforasylum,withholdingofremoval,andCATrelief.TheIJdeniedhisapplicationforasylumasuntimely,butgrantedwithholdingofremovalundertheINAonthebasisofthefindingthatSamadov'stestimonywas"extremelycredible"that,ifremovedtoUzbekistan,hewouldfacepersecutiononaccountofhisbeliefsasanindependentMuslim.TheBIAaffirmedinJuly2004.

DHSmovedtheBIAtoreopeninSeptember2004onthegroundthatithadobtainednewevidencethathadbeenpreviouslyunavailablenamely,theemailmentioning"jihad"foundduringthe2002FBIsearchofthecomputer'sharddriveandanInterpolsearchwarrantbasedonUzbekcriminalchargesinconnectionwithbombingsinUzbekistaninMarchandApril2004.DHSlateracknowledgedthatthe"jihad"emailwasaddressedtoZakirovratherthanSamadovandthatithadnoevidenceconnectingSamadovtotheUzbekbombings,whichoccurredwhilehewasintheUnitedStates.ButtheBIAalreadyhadreopenedandremandedthecasetotheIJ.

Onremand,Samadovtestifiedthathehadnotviewedthevideoclips(andnowpointstoYusupov'screditedtestimonythathe,Yusupov,hadviewedtheclips),neverengagedinviolentactivities,andthatIslamcondemnsviolence.InresponsetoaquestionwhetherhehadsentmoneytofollowersofImamNazarov,Samadovansweredthathehadsentapproximately$200toUzbekistanincharitabledonations.Hesaidthathecouldnotrecall*194whetherhehadwiredadditionalmoneyforcharity,butthatifhediditwouldhavebeentohisbrother.Atalaterhearing,Samadovconcededthathehadsent$3,000tohisbrother,butassertedthathehadnotmentionedthissumpreviouslybecauseitwasarepaymentofadebtratherthanthetypeofcharitabledonationaboutwhichhewasasked.TheIJmadeanadversecredibilitydeterminationonthebasisofthisexchange.

194

TheIJdeniedSamadov'ssecondapplicationforasylumasuntimely.SheconcludedthatSamadovwasineligibleforwithholdingofremovalbecausethenationalsecurityexceptionapplied.Thebasisforthefindingstemmedfrom(1)thecomputerfilesfoundontheharddriveofthecomputerinSamadov'sresidence,(2)hislackofcandorconcerningthemoneysenttoUzbekistan,and(3)openinghishousetoUzbeknationals,oneofwhomreceivedanemailmentioning"jihad."InreSamadov,No.A79729711at11(IJDec.Aug.2,2005)."Attheveryleast,"theIJstated,Samadov"providedmaterialsupporttoanindividualwhomhekneworshouldhaveknownhadcommittedorintendedtocommitterroristactivity."Id.(citationomitted).Nevertheless,theIJgranteddeferralofremovalundertheCATonthegroundthatSamadovfacedlikelypersecutionuponreturn.BothpartiesappealedtotheBIASamadovappealingthedenialofasylumandwithholdingofremoval,andDHSappealingthegrantofdeferralofremoval.

TheBIAdismissedbothappeals.ItagreedthatSamadovwasineligibleforwithholdingofremovalbecause"thereissufficientevidencethatwouldpermitareasonablepersontobelievethattherespondentmayposeadangertotheNation'sdefense,foreignrelations,oreconomicinterests."InreSamadov,No.A79729711,at2(BIADec.May24,2006).DecliningtostateconclusivelywhetheritagreedwiththeIJ"thatthematerialsupport[toterrorism]barissatisfiedbythefactsofthiscase,"theBIAheldthatSamadovwasineligibleforwithholdingofremovalbecausetheAttorneyGeneralstatedthat"`reasonablegrounds'existwherethereis`informationthatwouldpermitareasonablepersontobelievethatthealienmayposeadanger



tothenationalsecurity.'"Id.(citingInreAH,23I.&N.Dec.at788)(emphasisadded).Itbasedthisdecisiononthefollowingevidence:(1)the2003extraditionrequest,(2)the2004Interpolnotice,(3)theaforementionedvideoclipsfromthecomputerinSamadov'shouse,(4)aDHSMemorandumofInvestigationdescribingthecontentsofthosevideos,(5)thePennsylvaniaStatePolicemaptakenfromthecomputerinSamadov'sresidence,(6)the"jihad"emailtoZakirov,and(7)DHSSpecialAgentMarkW.Olexa'stestimonythatZakirovlater"fled"toCanada.Id.at23.Nevertheless,theBIAupheldtheIJ'sgrantofdeferralofremovalbecause"[t]herecordisrepletewithdocumentaryevidence...whichsupportsthefindingthatitismorelikelythannotthat[Samadov],anIndependentMuslim,wouldbesubjectedtotortureifremovedtoUzbekistan."Id.at3.

C.PetitionsforReview

YusupovandSamadovnowpetitionusforreview.[13]TheyarguethattheBIA*195erredinapplyingtheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationofthenationalsecurityexception.Petitionerscontendthatthisinterpretationisunreasonable,andthusnotentitledtoChevrondeference,becauseitisinconsistentwiththeplainmeaningofthestatuteanditsstatutorycontext,andis

contrarytoUnitedStatestreatyobligations.[14]

195

III.Jurisdiction&StandardsofReview

A.Jurisdiction

WehavejurisdictiontoreviewtheBoard'sfinalordersofremovalunderINA242(a)(1),8U.S.C.1252(a)(1).See

Sukwanputrav.Gonzales,434F.3d627,631(3dCir.2006).[15]Anorderofremovalbecomesfinalupon,interalia,"adeterminationbythe[BIA]affirmingsuchorder."8U.S.C.1101(a)(47)(B)(i).TheSupremeCourthasspecifiedthatadministrativeordersarefinalwhentheymarkthe"consummation"oftheagency'sdecisionmakingprocess,andwhen"rightsorobligationshavebeendetermined"orwhen"legalconsequenceswillflow"fromthedecision.Bennettv.Spear,520U.S.154,17778,117S.Ct.1154,137L.Ed.2d281(1997).

"[O]rdinarilyaremandtoanadministrativeagencyisnotafinalorder"forpurposesof"appellatejurisdiction."Dir.,OfficeofWorkers'Comp.Programsv.Brodka,643F.2d159,161(3dCir.1981).ButseveralofoursistercircuitcourtsofappealshaveconcludedthatanorderisfinalforjurisdictionalpurposeswhenaremovabilitydeterminationhasbeenmadethatisnolongerappealabletotheBIA,regardlesswhetheraformalorderofremovalhasbeenenteredsee,e.g.,Lazov.Gonzales,462F.3d53,54(2dCir.2006)("[T]hestatutoryrequirementofanorderofremovalissatisfiedwhenasheretheIJeitherordersremovalorconcludesthatanalienisremovable."(emphasisinoriginal))SolanoChicasv.Gonzales,440F.3d1050,105354(8thCir.2006)(holdingthatBIAreversalofIJ'scancellationofremovalcreatedafinalorderofremoval)Nrekav.Att'yGen.,408F.3d1361,1367(11thCir.2005)(assertingjurisdictionoveraBIAdeterminationdenyingasylumwithoutanexpressfinalorderofremovalbecausedenialofasylumissocloselytiedtoremoval)andeveniftheBIAhasremandedforlimitedfurtherproceedings.See,e.g.,Saldarriagav.Gonzales,402F.3d461,466n.2(4thCir.2005)(findingjurisdictionwhenvoluntarydeparturemotionstillpendingbeforeIJ)DelPilarv.Att'yGen.,326F.3d1154,115657(11th*196Cir.2003)(findingjurisdictionwherecountryofremovalatissuebeforeIJ)CastrejonGarciav.INS,60F.3d1359,136162(9thCir.1995)(holdingthataBIAorderreversinganIJ'sdecisiontograntsuspensionofremovalandremanding"foradeterminationofvoluntarydepartureinlieuofdeportation"wasafinalorderofremoval,asnothingwaspendingbeforetheBIAand"thepetitionerhadnoreasonorbasisforappealingthe[IJ's]decisioninhisfavor").

196

Weagreewiththesedecisionsandconcludethatwehavejurisdiction[16]overthesepetitions.TheBIAaffirmedtheIJ'sdenialofeachasylumapplicationasuntimely,vacatedthedecisiontograntwithholdingofremoval(forYusupov),deniedwithholdingofremoval(forSamadov),andupheldthedecisionstograntthelimitedremedyundertheCATofdeferralofremoval(forboth).

TheBIAremandedbothcasestotheIJpursuantto8C.F.R.1003.1(d)(6)[17]"forthepurposeofallowing[DHS]theopportunitytocompleteorupdateidentity,lawenforcement,orsecurityinvestigationsorexaminations,andfurther

proceedings,ifnecessary,andfortheentryofanorderasprovidedby8C.F.R.1003.47(h)."[18]Theseadministrativemattersdonotaffectthecontrollingremovaldetermination.Accordingly,theBIAdeterminationsherearefinalwithinthe

meaningoftheINA,andwehavejurisdictiontoreviewthem.[19]

*197B.StandardsofReview197



WeupholdtheBIA'sdeterminationsiftheyare"`supportedbyreasonable,substantial,andprobativeevidenceontherecordconsideredasawhole.'"Liv.Att'yGen.,400F.3d157,162(3dCir.2005)(quotingINSv.EliasZacarias,502U.S.478,481,112S.Ct.812,117L.Ed.2d38(1992)).WereviewtheIJ'sfactualfindingsunderthissamesubstantialevidencestandardwhere,ashere,"`theBIAdirectsustotheopinionanddecisionoftheIJwhooriginallyassessed[the]application.'"Shahv.Att'yGen.,446F.3d429,434(3dCir.2006)(quotingDiav.Ashcroft,353F.3d228,240(3dCir.2003)(enbanc)).

Weexercisedenovoreviewoverconstitutionalclaimsorquestionsoflawandtheapplicationoflawtofacts.8U.S.C.1252(a)(2)(D)Alaka,456F.3dat94n.8,102Kamarav.Att'yGen.,420F.3d202,21011(3dCir.2005).

"Thejudiciaryisthefinalauthorityonissuesofstatutoryconstructionandmustrejectadministrativeconstructionswhicharecontrarytoclearcongressionalintent."Chevron,467U.S.at843n.9,104S.Ct.2778.However,"judicialdeferencetotheExecutiveBranchisespeciallyappropriateintheimmigrationcontextwhereofficials`exerciseespeciallysensitivepoliticalfunctionsthatimplicatequestionsofforeignrelations.'"AguirreAguirre,526U.S.at425,119S.Ct.1439(quotingINSv.Abudu,485U.S.94,110,108S.Ct.904,99L.Ed.2d90(1988)).TheSupremeCourthasexplainedthat"[i]tisclearthatprinciplesofChevrondeferenceareapplicable"totheINAbecausethatstatutechargestheAttorneyGeneralwiththeadministrationandenforcementofthestatute,makescontrollingthedeterminationsandrulingsoftheAttorneyGeneralwithrespecttoallquestionsoflaw,andconfersdecisionmakingauthorityontheAttorneyGeneralwithrespecttoanalien'sentitlementtowithholdingofremoval.Id.at42425,119S.Ct.1439(quoting8U.S.C.1103(a)(1),1253(h)).Wealso"affordChevrondeferencetotheBIA'sreasonableinterpretationsofstatuteswhichitischargedwithadministering."Kamara,420F.3dat211(citingAguirreAguirre,526U.S.at424,119S.Ct.1439,andChevron,467U.S.at842,104S.Ct.2778)seealsoTineov.Ashcroft,350F.3d382,396(3dCir.2003)("ThereisalsonolongeranyquestionthattheBIAshouldbeaccordedChevrondeferenceforitsinterpretationsoftheimmigrationlaws.")Gaov.Ashcroft,299F.3d266,271(3dCir.2002)(explainingthatBIAinterpretationsoftheINAareentitledtoChevrondeferencebecausetheAttorneyGeneralvestedtheBIAwithpowertoexercisethediscretionconferredonhimbylaw).ThusweturntohowChevronaffectsthiscase.

Chevrondeferenceinvolvesatwostepinquiry.Atstepone,thecourtmustdetermine"whetherCongresshasdirectlyspokentotheprecisequestionatissue"and"unambiguouslyexpressed[its]intent."Chevron,467U.S.at84243,104S.Ct.2778.Ifso,theinquiryends,asboththeagencyandthecourtmustgiveeffecttotheplainlanguageofthestatute.Id.at843n.9,104S.Ct.2778("Ifacourt,employingtraditionaltoolsofstatutoryconstruction,ascertainsthatCongresshadanintentionontheprecisequestionatissue,thatintentionisthelawandmustbegiveneffect.").

*198When"thestatuteissilentorambiguouswithrespecttothespecificissue,"thecourtproceedstosteptwo,whereitinquireswhethertheagency's"answerisbasedonapermissibleconstructionofthestatute."Id.at843,104S.Ct.2778."Ifastatuteisambiguous[orsilent],andiftheimplementingagency'sconstructionisreasonable,Chevronrequiresafederalcourttoaccepttheagency'sconstructionofthestatute,eveniftheagency'sreadingdiffersfromwhatthecourtbelievesisthebeststatutoryinterpretation."Nat'lCable&Telecomms.Ass'nv.BrandXInternetServs.,545U.S.967,980,125S.Ct.2688,162L.Ed.2d820(2005)(citingChevron,467U.S.at84344&n.11,104S.Ct.2778).

198

IV.Analysis

Havingconcludedthatwehavejurisdictionanddeterminedthestandardsforreview,weturntothenationalsecurityexceptiontomandatorywithholding.Weconsidertheinterpretationoftwoportionsoftheexception:"reasonablegroundstobelieve,"and"isadangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates."Forthesakeofclarity,weperformtheChevronanalysisseparatelyforeachchallengedportionoftheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationofthenationalsecurityexception.See,e.g.,Sec'yofLabor,MineSafety,&HealthAdmin.v.Nat'lCementCo.ofCal.,494F.3d1066,1073(D.C.Cir.2007)(takingasimilarapproachbyanalyzingseparatelyunderChevronsteponetheterms"private"and"appurtenantto"inthestatutorydefinitionof"coalorothermine").Insodoing,weadheretotheinstructionthatin"ascertainingwhethertheagency'sinterpretationisapermissibleconstructionofthelanguage,acourtmustlooktothestructureandlanguageofthestatuteasawhole."NationalR.R.PassengerCorp.v.Boston&MaineCorp.,503U.S.407,417,112S.Ct.1394,118L.Ed.2d52(1992).

A."Reasonablegroundstobelieve"

1.ChevronStepOne

YusupovarguesthatCongress'useofthephrase"reasonablegroundstobelieve"demonstratesitsclearintentto

incorporateaprobablecause[20]standardborrowedfromcriminallawintothenationalsecurityexception.However,itisnotclearthatweshouldreadthisphrasethroughthelensofcriminallaw.Congresswasfreetowriteastandardwithout



consideringourcriminallawjurisprudence.ThestatutorycontextdoesnotindicatethatCongressclearlyintendedtoincorporatecriminallawstandards.Forexample,immediatelybeforethenationalsecurityexception,thestatuteprohibitswithholdingofremovalif"thereareseriousreasonstobelievethatthealiencommittedaseriousnonpoliticalcrimeoutsidetheUnitedStates."INA241(b)(3)(B)(iii),8U.S.C.1231(b)(3)(B)(iii).The"seriousreasons"standarddoesnotmapclearlytoanycriminallawcriterion.Thissuggeststhatthestatutecreatesaseriesofstandardsthatmaysharesurfacesimilarities

withthose*199ofcriminallaw,butthatneednotbereducedtocriminallawequivalents.[21]199

Moresimply,ifCongresswishedtoensuretheincorporationofaprobablecausestandard,itcouldhavedonesoexplicitly.Inthatevent,wewouldassumethat,becauseCongressusedatermofart,itintendedtoincorporatetherequirementsimposedbythejurisprudenceregardingthatterm.SeeMcDermottInt'l,Inc.v.Wilander,498U.S.337,342,111S.Ct.807,112L.Ed.2d866(1991)Morissettev.UnitedStates,342U.S.246,263,72S.Ct.240,96L.Ed.288(1952).Absentexplicituseofatermofart,wehesitatetomakecomparableassumptions.

Accordingly,weareunpersuadedthatthephrase"reasonablegroundstobelieve,"whichisnotdefinedintheINA,isunambiguous.Aspetitionersnote,therearestrongargumentsthatitmeans"probablecause,"includingthefactthatBlack'sLawDictionarydefines"reasonablegrounds"asequivalentto"probablecause."SeeBlack'sLawDictionary,supranote20,at1239.However,justasatermwithmultipledefinitionsmaybeunambiguousincontext,seeBrownv.Gardner,513U.S.115,118,115S.Ct.552,130L.Ed.2d462(1994),theexistenceofasingledefinitioninBlack'sLawDictionarydoesnotprecludeatermfrombeingambiguousincontext.Becauseoftheambiguityweperceive,wepasstothesecondstepoftheChevronanalysisastothattermwhethertheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationisreasonable.

2.ChevronStepTwo

TheAttorneyGeneral[22]begantheinterpretationof"reasonablegroundsforregarding"byagreeingwiththeconclusionoftheFirstCircuitCourtofAppealsinAdamsv.Baker,909F.2d643,649(1stCir.1990),thatthestatutoryreferenceto"reasonable"grounds"impliestheuseofareasonablepersonstandard."InreAH,23I.&N.Dec.at788.This,theAttorneyGeneralconcluded,was"consistentwiththeBIA'srelianceon`probablecause'cases."Id.HefaultedtheBIA,however,forequatingprobablecausewithapreponderanceoftheevidencestandard,explainingthat"`reasonablegroundsforregarding'issubstantiallylessstringentthanpreponderanceoftheevidence."Id.at789.Instead,theAttorneyGeneralconcluded,"[t]he`reasonablegroundsforregarding'standardissatisfiedifthereisinformationthatwouldpermitareasonablepersontobelievethatthealienmayposeadangertothenationalsecurity."Id.

Inthiscontext,theAttorneyGeneralappearsimplicitlytohaveadopteda"probablecause"standardfromcriminallaw,afactacknowledgedintheresponsestothesepetitions.AttyGen.'sBr.inSamadov27("TheAttorneyGeneral...heldthattheterm`reasonablegrounds'...wasakintothestandardrequiredforprobablecause.")AttyGen.'sBr.inYusupov22(same).Indeed,theAttorneyGeneralappears*200tohaveassumedthat"probablecause"and"reasonablegrounds"are

synonymous.WefocusouranalysisontheresultinginterpretivestandardadoptedbytheAttorneyGeneral.[23]200

WeknowofnobasisfordoubtingthereasonablenessoftheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationof"reasonablegroundsforregarding"asbeingsatisfied"ifthereisinformationthatwouldpermitareasonablepersontobelieve."Althoughweconcludethatthestatutorylanguagedoesnotdemonstrateaclearcongressionalintenttoadoptaprobablecausestandard,theAttorneyGeneral'sadoptionofastandardakintoprobablecauseincriminalcasesisalsoreasonable,andthus"apermissibleconstructionofthestatute."SeeChevron,467U.S.at84344&n.11,104S.Ct.2778.

TheAttorneyGeneralalsodecidedinInreAHthat"[t]heinformationreliedontosupportthe`reasonablegrounds'determinationneednotmeetstandardsforadmissibilityofevidenceincourtproceedings."AH,23I.&N.Dec.at789.Werejectthecontentionthatthiswasunreasonable,asnothinginthestatuterequiresthattheinformationtobeconsideredmustbeadmissibleundertheFederalRulesofEvidence.Insodoing,weagreewiththeFirstCircuitCourtofAppealsinrecognizingthattheimmigrationcontextisdifferentfromthatofacourtroom.SeeAdams,909F.2dat649.PetitionersfailtopointtoanythingintheINAthatincorporatestheRulesofEvidence.Rather,theINAimposesanimplicitrequirementthattheevidencebereliableenoughtoallowareasonablepersontodecidethatthealienposesanationalsecurityrisk.TheAttorneyGeneralthusisreasonabletointerpretthenationalsecurityexceptionasallowingtheconsiderationofanyevidence

thatis"not`intrinsicallysuspect.'"[24]SeeAH,23I.&N.Dec.at790(quotingAdams,909F.2dat649).

BecausetheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationsoftheambiguousphrase"reasonablegroundstobelieve,"andthetypeofevidenceallowableinmakingthatdetermination,arereasonable,wedefertothemunderChevron.

B."IsadangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates"



WeturntotheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationofthephrase"isadangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates."Theordinarymeaningof"danger"is"peril""exposuretoharm,loss,pain,orother*201negativeresult""causeofperil"or"menace."Black'sLawDictionary,supranote20,at421.Here,theAttorneyGeneralreasons:"Readasawhole...thephrase`dangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates'isbestunderstoodtomeanarisktotheNation'sdefense,foreignrelations,oreconomicinterests."AccordInreAH,23I.&N.Dec.at788.Thisinterpretationfollowsthedefinitionof"nationalsecurity"usedforaseparatesectionoftheINA.SeeINA219(d)(2),8U.S.C.1189(d)(2)(defining"nationalsecurity,"forthepurposesofthatsection,as"thenationaldefense,foreignrelations,oreconomicinterestsoftheUnitedStates").

201

WearenotaskedtodeterminethecontoursofrisktoourNation'sdefense,foreignrelations,oreconomicinterests.Instead,applyingtheChevronanalysis,weconsiderpetitioners'argumentsthat,forthenationalsecurityexceptiontoapply,(1)itisincorrectfortheAttorneyGeneraltoconcludethatanalienmayposearisktonationalsecurity,and(2)anydangertonationalsecuritymustbe"serious"andnotjust"nontrivial."

1."Isadanger"versus"mayposeadanger"

AlthoughwedefertotheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationofthephrases"reasonablegroundstobelieve"and(asdiscussedbelow)"dangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates,"wedonotdefertohisreadingof"isadanger.""Is"doesnotmean"may,"assuggestedbytheAttorneyGeneral'sformulationthatthenationalsecurityexception"issatisfiedifthereisinformationthatwouldpermitareasonablepersontobelievethatthealienmayposeadangertothenationalsecurity."InreAH,23I.&N.Dec.at789(emphasisadded).Thisinterpretationaccordswithneithertheplainwordingnortheordinarymeaningofthestatutorytext,whichdoesnotrefertobeliefinamerepossibility.Inotherwords,"is"anditssubjunctiveform"would"connoteamorecertaindeterminationthanthat"thealien`might'or`could'be"adangerforthenationalsecurityexceptiontoapply.SeeINSv.Stevic,467U.S.407,422,104S.Ct.2489,81L.Ed.2d321(1984)("Thesection[`wouldbethreatened']literallyprovidesforwithholdingofdeportationonlyifthealien'slifeorfreedom`would'bethreatenedinthecountrytowhichhewouldbedeporteditdoesnotrequirewithholdingifthealien`might'or`could'besubjecttopersecution.").

Instead,wemusttakethestatutetomeanwhatitsays:"is"indicatesthatCongressintendedthisexceptiontoapplytoindividualswho(underareasonablebeliefstandard)actuallyposeadangertoU.S.security.Itdidnotintendthisexceptiontocoveralienswhoconceivablycouldbesuchadangerorhavetheabilitytoposesuchadanger(acategorynearlyanyone

canfit).[25]Accordingly,theAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationof"isadanger"as"mayposeadanger"failsatthefirststepoftheChevronanalysis.

Theintroductionof"may"inthestatementofthestandardinInreAHperhapsisnomorethananunintentionalandinartfularticulationonthepartoftheAttorneyGeneral.Indeed,inremandingthecase,theAttorneyGeneraldirectedtheBIAtoinquirewhether"theevidencewouldsupportareasonablebeliefthatrespondentposesadangertoournationalsecurityinterests."InreAH,23I.&N.Dec.at790(emphasisadded).However,asdiscussedbelow,theBIAquotedtheformer,incorrectphrasinginpetitioners'*202cases.ThuswecannotconcludethattheerrorofInreAHreflectsnothingmorethanthespecificpostureofthatcaseandthatitcouldnothaveaffectedpetitioners.

202

Nordoweagreewithanargumentthatwemayaffirmnonethelessonthispointbecause,evenifitrecitedanincorrectstandard,theBIAappliedthecorrectstandardi.e.,itinquiredwhethereachpetitioner"is"adangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates.Weagreethatweshouldaskwhetherthecorrectstandardwasappliedinpetitioners'cases.SeeLavirav.Att'yGen.,478F.3d158,165(3dCir.2007).However,wedisagreethattheapplicationofacorrectstandardcanbediscernedfromtherecordbeforeus.InYusupov'sproceedings,theBIAstatedthattheIJdeterminedthat"thegovernmentfailedtomeetthethresholdforestablishingthatanalienposesanationalsecurityrisk"beforeitselfconcludingthat"therecordcontainsinformationthatwouldleadareasonablepersontobelievethattherespondentmayposeadangertonationalsecurity."InreYusupov,No.AXXXXXXXX(BIADec.Aug.26,2005)(emphasesadded).Similarly,intheSamadovproceedings,theBIAnotedthattheIJhadfound"therequisite`reasonablegroundstobelievethatthealienisadangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates'"beforeaffirmingonthebasisthattherecordcontained"sufficientevidencethattherespondentmayposeadangerto[nationalsecurity]."InreSamadov,No.AXXXXXXXX(BIADec.May24,2006)(emphasesadded).Thesedifferencesmaynothaveaffectedtheresultineithercase,butwecannotassumethistobetrue.GiventheimportantinterestsatstakeandtheBIA'sexpertise,weconcludethatitwouldbemostappropriatetoremandthesecasestothatbodyforreview

underthecorrectstandard.[26]

2.Whether"dangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates"RequirestheModifier"serious"



PetitionersarguethatanalienthreatensthesecurityoftheUnitedStatesonlyifthedangeris"serious."AlthoughtheydonotmakethatclaimwithintheChevronframework,weconsideritintermsofthatanalysis,askingwhethertheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationofthestatutorylanguageisentitledtodeference.Weconcludethatweshoulddefer.

Torepeat,atthefirststepoftheChevronanalysisweaskwhetherthestatuteannouncesaclearcongressionalintentastothemeaningofthephrase"dangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates."PetitionersarguethatthelegislativehistoryofU.S.adoptionofrefugeeprotectionsandaninternationalconsensuscompeltheconclusionthatCongressclearlyintendedforanationalsecuritydangertobe"serious"foranexceptiontomandatorywithholdingofremovaltoapply.

ThenationalsecurityexceptionwaspassedaspartoftheRefugeeActof1980,Pub.L.No.96212,94Stat.102.SeeAguirreAguirre,526U.S.at41920,119S.Ct.1439.ItgrewoutoftheUnitedNationsConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees.189U.N.T.S.150(July28,1951)(the1951U.N.Convention).Section203(e)oftheRefugeeActamendedexistinglawonthewithholdingofremoval,"basicallyconformingittothelanguageof*203Article33oftheUnitedNationsProtocol[RelatingtotheStatusofRefugees,Jan.31,1967,[19]U.S.T.6223,T.I.A.S.No.6577]"(the1967U.N.Protocol).Stevic,467U.S.at421,

104S.Ct.2489.[27]Themainprovisionofthe1967U.N.ProtocolisArticle33.1thesocalled"nonrefoulement"obligation.[28]Itprovidesthatacontractingcountrymustnotexpelorreturnarefugeetoacountrywherehis"lifeorfreedomwouldbethreatenedonaccountofhisrace,religion,nationality,membership[in]aparticularsocialgrouporpoliticalopinion."Article33.2providesanexceptiontothatrulewhen"therearereasonablegroundsforregarding[therefugee]asadangertothesecurityofthecountryinwhichheis."

203

Foreigncourts[29]andinternationallawscholars[30]appeartobeunanimousinviewingtheArticle33.2exceptionas

referringtoaseriousdanger.Thelegislativehistory[31]oftheRefugeeActof1980makesclearthatCongressintendedto

protectrefugeestothefullestextentofourNation'sinternationalobligations.[32]Indeed,*204petitionersappeartobecorrectthatCongressintendedtoallowexceptionstoournonrefoulementobligationsonlyinanarrowsetofcircumstances.

204

However,petitioners'argumentignoresthat"dangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates"includesaninherentseriousnessrequirement.Itdoesnoteasilyaccordacceptablegradations,asalmostany"danger"toU.S.securityisserious.CongressdidnotannounceaclearintentthatthedangertoU.S.securitybe"serious"becausesuchamodifierlikelywouldberedundant.Asweunderstandtheirargument,petitionersineffectaskustoholdthatCongressclearlyintendedthatthenationalsecurityexceptiononlyapplytoindividualswhoposeaseverelyseriousdangertoourNation.Wecannotgrantsucharequest,asitwouldbeillogicalforustoholdthatCongressclearlyintendedforanalientobenonremovableifheposesonlyamoderatedangertonationalsecurity.

Congresswasobviouslysilentastoanymodifierfor"danger."ThusweproceedtosteptwoinourChevronanalysis.SeeChevron,467U.S.at843,104S.Ct.2778(directingreviewingcourttopasstosteptwoifthestatuteis"silentorambiguous

withrespecttothespecificissue").Accordingly,theonlyremainingquestioninthesepetitionsforreview[33]iswhethertheAttorneyGeneralinterpretedthenationalsecurityexceptionreasonablyinconcludingthatitappliedtoany"nontriviallevelof

danger"or"nontrivialdegreeofrisk"[34]toU.S.security.SeeAH,23I.&N.Dec.at788.Likea"seriousness"requirement,

themodifier"nontrivial"likelyisredundant.[35]Inthiscontext,theAttorneyGeneralwasnotunreasonable,evenifthisturnsouttoreflectanexcessofcaution,toensurethatimmigrationjudgesdonotconsidertrivialdangersinapplyingthenationalsecurityexception.Accordingly,wedefertotheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretation.

*205V.Conclusion205

PertheprinciplesofChevron,wedefertomostoftheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationofthenationalsecurityexceptiontomandatorywithholdingofremoval.Wedefertohisinterpretationofthereasonablenessanddangerrequirementsinthatexception.However,hisinterpretationconflictswiththeintentofCongressbyalteringtherequirementthatanalien"is"adangertonationalsecuritytoonewhereanalien"maypose"adangertonationalsecurity.Becausewecannotdiscernfromtherecordwhethertheresultsinpetitioners'caseswereaffectedbythismisinterpretation,weremandforapplicationofthecorrectlegalstandard.

[*]HonorableHaroldA.Ackerman,SeniorUnitedStatesDistrictJudgefortheDistrictofNewJersey,sittingbydesignation.

[1]ThisprovisionwasaddedtotheINAbytheRefugeeActof1980,Pub.L.No.96212,94Stat.102.SeeINSv.AguirreAguirre,526U.S.415,419,119S.Ct.1439,143L.Ed.2d590(1999).Itissometimesreferredtoasmandatorywithholding.

RegulationsimplementingtheINAandtheUnitedNationsConventionAgainstTortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishment(CAT)alsoprovideforwithholdingofremoval.See8C.F.R.208.16(c).LikewithholdingofremovalundertheINA,withholdingofremovalundertheCATisunavailabletoanalientowhomthenationalsecurityexceptionapplies.8C.F.R.208.16(d)(2).Becausethequestionbeforeusistheapplicabilityofthatexception,weneednotdistinguishherebetweenwithholdingofremovalundertheCATandthe



INA.Instead,wesimplyrefertothatreliefundereithertheINAortheCATas"withholdingofremoval."

[2]Thecurrentnationalsecurityexceptionincludesthephrase"reasonablegroundstobelieve,"whichdiffersfromthephrase"reasonablegroundsforregarding"thatwasatissueinInreAH.See23I.&N.Dec.at787(referringto"formersection243(h)(2)(D)oftheAct").TheBIAtreatedthesetwoformulationsasidenticalforthepurposesofthesecases.Nopartyarguesthattheformulationsdifferinasubstantivewayandweseenoreasontotreatthemdifferently.SeealsoinfraSectionIV.B.2(discussingcomparablelanguageintheUnitedStates'internationalobligationstowardrefugees).

[3]Yusupov'scasewasheardbytheU.S.ImmigrationJudge(IJ)WalterA.Durling.Samadov'scasewasheardbyIJGraceA.Sease.

EachIJdeniedtherespectiveasylumapplicationsbutgranteddeferralofremoval(definedbelow).JudgeDurlingandJudgeSeasedifferedintheirholdingsregardingthenationalsecurityexception.JudgeDurlingheldthatYusupovwasentitledtomandatorywithholdingofremoval.JudgeSeaseheldthatSamadovwasbarredfromwithholdingofremovalbythenationalsecurityexception.

[4]ThemorelimitedremedyofdeferralofremovalundertheCATisunaffectedbythenationalsecurityexception.8C.F.R.208.17(a).Analienisentitledtodeferralofremovalifheis"morelikelythannottobetortured"inthecountryofremoval.Id.Deferralofremovalwillenduponachangeincountryconditionsthatmakesitnolongermorelikelythannotthatthepetitionerwouldbetorturedinthecountryofremoval.Id.208.17(d).TheAttorneyGeneralalsomayterminatedeferralofremovaluponreceiptofdiplomaticassurances,forwardedbytheSecretaryofState,thatthealienwouldnotbetortureduponremoval.Id.208.17(f).

ForahistoryoftheUnitedStates'adoptionoftheCAT,seeSilvaRengifov.Att'yGen.,473F.3d58,64(3dCir.2007).

[5]SeeinfraSectionIV.A.1(discussingprobablecausestandard).

[6]Thestatutespecifiesfourenumeratedexceptions,precededbyanadditionalexceptioninitsleadinparagraph.Thefulltextfortheexceptionsreadsasfollows:

(3)Restrictiononremovaltoacountrywherealien'slifeorfreedomwouldbethreatened

(A)Ingeneral

Notwithstandingparagraphs(1)and(2)[governingcountriestowhichaliensorderedremovedmaybedeported],theAttorneyGeneralmaynotremoveanalientoacountryiftheAttorneyGeneraldecidesthatthealien'slifeorfreedomwouldbethreatenedinthatcountrybecauseofthealien'srace,religion,nationality,membershipinaparticularsocialgroup,orpoliticalopinion.

(B)Exception

Subparagraph(A)doesnotapplytoanaliendeportableundersection1227(a)(4)(D)ofthistitle[statingthatanyalienwho"[p]articipatedinNazipersecution,genocide,orthecommissionofanyactoftortureorextrajudicialkilling"isdeportable]oriftheAttorneyGeneraldecidesthat

(i)thealienordered,incited,assisted,orotherwiseparticipatedinthepersecutionofanindividualbecauseoftheindividual'srace,religion,nationality,membershipinaparticularsocialgroup,orpoliticalopinion

(ii)thealien,havingbeenconvictedbyafinaljudgmentofaparticularlyseriouscrime[,]isadangertothecommunityoftheUnitedStates

(iii)thereareseriousreasonstobelievethatthealiencommittedaseriousnonpoliticalcrimeoutsidetheUnitedStatesbeforethealienarrivedintheUnitedStatesor

(iv)therearereasonablegroundstobelievethatthealienisadangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates.

Forpurposesofclause(ii),analienwhohasbeenconvictedofanaggravatedfelony(orfelonies)forwhichthealienhasbeensentencedtoanaggregatetermofimprisonmentofatleast5yearsshallbeconsideredtohavecommittedaparticularlyseriouscrime.TheprevioussentenceshallnotprecludetheAttorneyGeneralfromdeterminingthat,notwithstandingthelengthofsentenceimposed,analienhasbeenconvictedofaparticularlyseriouscrime.Forpurposesofclause(iv),analienwhoisdescribedinsection1227(a)(4)(B)ofthistitle[governing"terroristactivities"]shallbeconsideredtobeanalienwithrespecttowhomtherearereasonablegroundsforregardingasadangertothesecurityoftheUnitedStates.

INA241(b)(3),8U.S.C.1231(b)(3)(emphasesadded).

[7]Aspetitionersacknowledge,jihadiscommonlyunderstoodtomean"holywar."However,theyhavepresentedevidencethatitcanhavealternativemeanings,including"fromaninwardspiritualstruggletoattainperfectfaithtoanoutwardmaterialstruggletopromotejusticeandtheIslamicsocialsystem."BriefofSamadov50(citingEncyclopediaofPoliticsandReligion42526(RobertWuthnowed.,1998)).Theweight,ifany,thatthisevidencedeservesanditsrelevancetopetitioners'casesarequestionsforremand.

[8]SamadovtestifiedattheIJhearingthatwhenFBIagentscametohishouseinJune2002theyinformedhimthattheUzbekGovernmenthadsentanearliernoticeofcriminalcharges.

[9]TherequestspecifiedthatthecriminalchargeswerebroughtunderArticle244oftheUzbekCriminalCodeforallegedparticipationin"forbiddenorganizations."InresponsetotheIJ'srequest,theU.S.StateDepartmentwrotealetterexplainingthattheUzbekgovernmenthasuseditsCriminalCodeagainstpoliticalopponentsfornonterrorismrelatedactivities.Inaddition,SamadovtestifiedthatoneofthefourorfiveshorttermboarderswhohadstayedwithYusupovandhimin2000apersonwhosesurnamewasOripjanovwasalsoafollowerofImamNazarov.SamadovstatedthatOripjanovwasarrestedandtorturedwhenhereturnedtoUzbekistan,andthathewasforcedtosignfalseaccusationsagainstSamadov,hisotherroommates,andotherindependentMuslims.SamadovclaimedthatOripjanovinitiallyofferedtotestifyonSamadov'sbehalfbutsubsequentlywithdrewthatoffer.



[10]ZakirovwasgrantedwithholdingofremovalfromtheUnitedStatesin2004.SeeInreZakirov,No.A79729712,at3(BIADec.Sept.21,2004)(findinga"lackofpersuasiveevidencethattherespondentisamilitant,terrorist,oranextremist"and"aclearprobabilityofpersecutionandtortureupon[Zakirov's]returntoUzbekistan").WhenaskedatoralargumentaboutZakirov'swhereabouts,givenDHSSpecialAgentMarkW.Olexa'stestimonythatZakirov"fled"toCanada,Samadov'scounselstatedthathehadnot"fledtoCanada"butinstead"wenttoCanada"openly.

[11]Indoingso,theBoardemployedtheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationofthenationalsecurityexception:"thereasonablegroundsstandard`issatisfiedifthereisinformationthatwouldpermitareasonablepersontobelievethatthealienmayposeadanger'tothesecurityofthiscountry."InreYusupov,No.A79729905,at2(BIADec.Aug.26,2005)(emphasisadded)(quotingInreAH,23I.&N.Dec.at789).

[12]Atoralargument,counselfortheGovernmentrepresentedthat,untiltheUzbekregimechanges,theAttorneyGeneralwouldnotacceptanyassurancesthatitwillnottorturepetitioners.Healsorepresentedthat,althoughunabletobindtheStateDepartment,theAttorneyGeneralwasseekingathirdcountrythatwouldagreetotakeYusupovandSamadovandwaswillingtodiscussassurancesfromsuchcountriesforthesafetyofbothpetitioners.Samadov'scounselnoted,inresponse,thatlitigationpositionsarenotbindingontheAttorneyGeneral,particularlyifheisreplaced.Indeed,theAttorneyGeneralhasbeenreplacedbetweenthetimeoforalargumentandtheissuanceofthisdecision.

Sofarasweunderstand,theGovernmenthasbeenunabletofindasafethirdcountryforeitherofthepetitioners.SeeYusupovv.Lowe,No.061804,slipop.at8(M.D.Pa.Jan.12,2007).ReviewingYusupov'shabeaspetition,theDistrictCourtruledthatYusupovwasentitledtoimmediaterelease,subjecttotheconditionsofBICEsupervision,becausetheGovernmenthaddetainedhimbeyondthestatutorilypermitted90dayperiodwithoutestablishingthatthealien'sremovalwouldbeeffectedinthereasonablyforeseeablefutureandwithoutestablishingthat"specialcircumstances"existedtojustifycontinueddetention.See8U.S.C.1231(a)(1)(A)(givingtheAttorneyGeneral90daystoremoveanalienafteraremovalorder)id.1231(a)(3),(6)(permittingalienstobeheldincontinueddetentionorreleasedundercontinuedsupervisionattheendoftheinitial90dayperiod)Zadvydasv.Davis,533U.S.678,689,121S.Ct.2491,150L.Ed.2d653(2001)(prohibitingindefinitedetentionandlimiting"analien'spostremovalperioddetentiontoaperiodreasonablynecessarytobringaboutthatalien'sremoval")8C.F.R.241.13(b)(2)(i),(c),(e)(6),(g)(mandatingspecialreviewproceduresandthereleaseofthealienintheabsenceof"specialcircumstances"justifyingcontinueddetention).

[13]Samadovwasrepresentedsuperblybycounselactingprobono.TheCourtexpressesitsappreciationfortheoutstandingeffortsofPaulA.EngelmayerandBassinaFarbenblum(thelatterarguedSamadov'scase)intheNewYorkofficeoftheWilmerCutlerPickeringHaleandDorrlawfirm.(NotonlydidtheyrepresentSamadovtheyalsosubmittedanamicuscuriaebriefinYusupov'scaseonbehalfoftheHarvardImmigrationandRefugeeClinicandothers.)

WhileYusupov'scounselLawrenceH.RudnickoftheSteel,Rudnick&RubenlawfirminPhiladelphiaisnottechnicallyprovidingprobonoservices,weunderstandthatheisacceptingasubstantiallydiscountedfee.Thataction,andhisadroitadvocacy,aremuchappreciatedaswell.

[14]Samadovdoesnotargue,ashehaddonepreviously,thatheisentitledtoremaininthiscountrybecauseofhismarriagetoaUnitedStatescitizen.Thuswedonotaddressthisissue.

[15]Wehaveconcludedpreviouslythat8U.S.C.1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)doesnotstripusofjurisdictiontoreviewtheAttorneyGeneral'sdeterminationspertainingtothemandatorywithholdingofremovalprovisionandthe"seriouscrime"and"dangertocommunity"exceptionoftheINAbecauseCongressdidnot"specif[y]"discretionintheAttorneyGeneral.SeeAlakav.Att'yGen.,456F.3d88,9697&n.14(3dCir.2006)(analyzing8U.S.C.1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)).Thatlogicappliesequallytothenationalsecurityexception,afactdemonstratedbyourexercisingjurisdictioninMcAllisterv.Att'yGen.,444F.3d178,189(3dCir.2006)(reviewingapplicationofnationalsecurityexception).

[16]TheBIAhadjurisdictiontoreviewtheappealsfromtheIJ'sdecisionsintheremovalproceedingsunder8C.F.R.3.2(amendedas8C.F.R.1003.1(b)(3)(effectiveApril1,2005)).Thechangeinregulationsisnotsignificanttoourreviewofthecases.

TheAttorneyGeneralcorrectlynotesthatwelackjurisdictionoverSamadov'spetitiontotheextentthatSamadovarguesthattheIJandtheBIAerredinfailingtofindthathequalifiedforanexceptiontotheoneyearlimitforfilingforasylum.SeeSukwanputra,434F.3dat63334.

[17]ThissectionrequirestheBoardtoupdateidentity,backgroundchecks,andothersecurityinvestigationsbeforeissuingadecisiongrantingprotectionfromremoval,8C.F.R.1003.1(d)(6)(i)(A),andallowstheBoardto"determinethebestmeanstofacilitatethefinaldispositionofthecase,"includingthrougharemand,id.1003.1(d)(6)(ii).

[18]Section1003.47(h)requiresIJstoconsider,onremand,"theresultsoftheidentity,lawenforcement,orsecurityinvestigationsorexaminations,"and"[i]fnewinformationispresented,[allowsthemto]holdafurtherhearingifnecessarytoconsideranylegalorfactualissues,includingissuesrelatingtocredibility,ifrelevant,"and"then[to]enteranordergrantingordenyingtheimmigrationreliefsought."

[19]Anotheropinionfiledtodayatfirstglancemaygiveareadertheimpressionthatitandouropinionareatoddsonthisjurisdictionalpoint.Vakkerv.AttorneyGeneral,519F.3d143(3dCir.2008),involvedanalienwhoprevailedbeforetheBIA,successfullyclaimingthathewasentitledtowithholdingofremoval.TheBIAsubsequentlyremandedforabackgroundcheck.Thatbackgroundcheckcouldhaveaffectedhiseligibilityforwithholdingofremoval.Forexample,itcouldhaverevealedthathewasamemberofaterroristorganizationandthusbarredfromwithholdingofremovalbythenationalsecurityexception.ThustheBIA'sordergrantingwithholdingofremovalinVakkerwasnotfinalpriortothecompletionofthebackgroundcheck,andjurisdictionwaslacking.

Ourcase,ontheotherhand,involvestwoalienswhotheBIAconcludedwerebarredfromwithholdingofremoval.Nothingintheirbackgroundcheckscouldaffectthatdetermination.NorcouldthebackgroundchecksaffectYusupov'sandSamadov'seligibilityfordeferralofremoval.Deferralofremovalmaybewithdrawnonlyifnewevidenceindicatesthatitnolongerismorelikelythannotthatanalienwillbetorturedinthecountryofremoval.See8C.F.R.208.17(d).Discoveryofanegativefactinthealien'sbackground(e.g.,thathehascommittedaggravatedfeloniesorthathehasjoinedaterroristorganization)wouldnotalterhiseligibilityfordeferralofremoval.Infact,therelevantregulationpresumesthatanalienreceivingdeferralofremovalstill"issubjecttotheprovisionsformandatorydenialofwithholdingofremoval."Id.at



208.17(a).Accordingly,theBIA'sordersinthesecasesprovidedafinaladjudicationofthesubstantiverightsofYusupovandSamadov.Weconsequentlyhavejurisdiction.

[20]Black'sLawDictionarydefines"probablecause"inthecriminallawcontextas"[a]reasonablegroundtosuspectthatapersonhascommittedoriscommittingacrimeorthataplacecontainsspecificitemsconnectedwithacrime."Black'sLawDictionary1239(8thed.2004).Itexplainsthat"[u]ndertheFourthAmendment,probablecausewhichamountstomorethanabaresuspicionbutlessthanevidencethatwouldjustifyaconvictionmustbeshownbeforeanarrestwarrantorsearchwarrantmaybeissued."Id.Itidentifiesassynonymstheterms"reasonablecausesufficientcausereasonablegroundsreasonableexcuse."Id.(italicsremoved).(Black'salsodefines"probablecause"inthetortscontextas"[a]reasonablebeliefintheexistenceoffactsonwhichaclaimisbasedandinthelegalvalidityoftheclaimitself."Id.)

[21]ItistruethattheBIAadoptedwhatappearstobeaprobablecausestandardinanalyzingthesimilarlanguageofINA212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II)(prohibitingentryintotheUnitedStatesiftheAttorneyGeneral,aconsularofficer,ortheDHSSecretary"knows,orhasreasonablegroundtobelieve,[thatanalien]isengagedinorislikelytoengageafterentryinanyterroristactivity").SeeInreUH,23I.&N.Dec.355,356(BIA2002).However,thisisnotequivalenttoacourtconcludingthatCongressclearlyintendedtoadoptaprobablecausestandard.

[22]TheAttorneyGeneraloverruledthedecisionoftheBIAinInreAHafterthatcasewasreferredtohimbytheActingCommissioneroftheINS.See8C.F.R.3.1(h)(1)(iii)(nowamendedas8C.F.R.1003.1(h)(1)(iii)toreflectcreationofDHS).

[23]Accordingly,wedonotattempttodiscernwhetheranotherstandard,suchasthe"reasonablesuspicion"testarticulatedinTerryv.Ohio,392U.S.1,88S.Ct.1868,20L.Ed.2d889(1968),wouldbemoreappropriate.WenotethattheAttorneyGeneraldidnotdiscussTerryinInreAH.Anysuggestion(includingthesuggestionmadebygovernmentcounselatoralargumentand,somewhatobliquely,initsbriefing)thatweshouldadoptthatstandardwouldbealitigationpositionentitledtonodeference.SeeBowenv.GeorgetownUniv.Hosp.,488U.S.204,212,109S.Ct.468,102L.Ed.2d493(1988)(explainingthatcourtsshouldnotdefer"toagencylitigatingpositionsthatarewhollyunsupportedbyregulations,rulings,oradministrativepractice").

[24]BecausewedonotreachthemeritsofSamadov'scase,weneednotconsiderhisargumentthattheAttorneyGeneral'sdecisiontofollowAdamsviolatestheFifthAmendment'sDueProcessClause.Wehaveexplainedthat,intheremovalcontext,"whetheranindividual'sconstitutionalrightsareviolatedturnsonwhethertheevidenceconsideredbytheBIAisreliableandtrustworthy."Ezeagwunav.Ashcroft,325F.3d396,405(3dCir.2003).TheAttorneyGeneral'srefusaltoconsiderevidencethatis"intrinsicallysuspect"mayappeartodefeatadueprocessclaim.However,becausewedonotconsidertheevidenceinthiscase,wedonotruledefinitivelyonthisissue.

[25]Asnotedbelow,courtsinothercountriesalsohaveinterpretedthenationalsecurityexceptiontorequireaseriousdangerthatisactual,nottheoretical.

[26]WethusmakenocommentonthesufficiencyoftheevidenceforadeterminationthatYusupovandSamadovaresubjecttothenationalsecurityexceptiontomandatorywithholding.Insorefraining,wefollowtherulelaiddownbytheSupremeCourtinINSv.Ventura,537U.S.12,16,123S.Ct.353,154L.Ed.2d272(2002)(percuriam).AccordSilvaRengifo,473F.3dat71(remandingthecaseafterclarifyingtheproperlegalstandard,thusallowingtheBIAtoapplythecorrectstandardinthefirstinstance).

[27]The1967U.N.Protocol"boundpartiestocomplywiththesubstantiveprovisionsofArticles2through34ofthe[the1951U.N.Convention]."Stevic,467U.S.at416,104S.Ct.2489.TheUnitedStatesisnotasignatorytothe1951U.N.Convention.Id.n.9.

[28]Foradetailedexplanationoftheterm"refouler,"seeSalev.HaitianCentersCouncil,Inc.,509U.S.155,18082&nn.3740,113S.Ct.2549,125L.Ed.2d128(1993).

[29]Foreigncourtsuniformlyhavereadthenationalsecurityexception(inequivalentwording)torequirereasonablebeliefinadangerthatisseriousandactual.SeeZaouiv.AttorneyGeneral,[2005]1N.Z.L.R.690,13536(C.A.)(interpretingthephrase"dangertothesecurityofNewZealand")Sureshv.Canada(MinisterofCitizenship&Immigration),[2002]1S.C.R.3,90,92(interpretingthephrase"dangertothesecurityofCanada")NSHv.Sec'yofState,(1998)Imm.A.R.389,395(Eng.C.A.)(interpretingthephrase"dangertothesecurityofthecountry").

[30]Internationallawscholarsagree(unanimouslysofaraswecantell)thatArticle33.2carvesoutalimitedexceptiontomandatorywithholding,andthatthe"danger"sufficienttothreatennationalsecurityencompassesonlyseriousacts.See,e.g.,JamesC.Hathaway,TheRightsofRefugeesUnderInternationalLaw346(2005)SirElihuLauterpacht&DanielBethlehem,TheScope&ContentofthePrincipleofNonRefoulement,170,191(UNHCR2001)AtleGrahlMadsen,CommentaryontheRefugeeConvention1951,236(UNHCR1963)(that"danger"encompasses"actsofaratherseriousnature")PaulWeis,TheRefugeeConvention,1951:TheTravauxPreparatoiresAnalysedwithaCommentary34243(1995).

ItisworthnotingthattheSupremeCourthascitedGrahlMadsenandLauterpachtasauthoritative.See,e.g.,INSv.CardozaFonseca,480U.S.421,440n.24,107S.Ct.1207,94L.Ed.2d434(1987)(GrahlMadsen)AlfredDunhillofLondon,Inc.v.Cuba,425U.S.682,710n.3,96S.Ct.1854,48L.Ed.2d301(1976)(Lauterpacht)id.at728n.14,96S.Ct.1854(Marshall,J.,dissenting)(Lauterpacht).

[31]Werecognizethatcourtsoftenlooktolegislativehistorybecauseitcanbeausefulaidtostatutoryconstruction,andtointernationallawtotheextentthatithasbeenincorporatedintoourlaw.SeeCardozaFonseca,480U.S.at43233&n.12,107S.Ct.1207.

[32]"TheprincipalmotivationfortheenactmentoftheRefugeeActof1980wasadesiretoreviseandregularizetheproceduresgoverningtheadmissionofrefugeesintotheUnitedStates,"Stevic,467U.S.at425,104S.Ct.2489,andtomake"U.S.statutorylawclearlyreflect[]ourlegalobligationsunderinternationalagreements."Id.at426n.20,104S.Ct.2489(internalquotationmarksomitted)seealsoHaitianCentersCouncil,509U.S.at178,113S.Ct.2549(pointingoutthatthe"historyofthe1980ActdoesdiscloseageneralintenttoconformourlawtoArticle33oftheConvention")CardozaFonseca,480U.S.at436,107S.Ct.1207(notingthat"oneofCongress'primarypurposeswastobringUnitedStatesrefugeelawintoconformancewith"the1967U.N.Protocol)Marincasv.Lewis,92F.3d195,198(3dCir.1996)("[T]heRefugeeActwasenactedtofulfillourtreatyobligationsunderthe[1967]U.N.Protocolforthebenefitofaliens...whoclaimtobefleeingpersecutionintheirhomelands.").



TheadoptionofessentiallyidenticallanguagetothatcontainedinArticle33ofthe1967U.N.ProtocolisimportantbecauseitisoneofthestrongestindicatorsthatCongressintendedtoincorporatetheunderstandingoftheProtocoldevelopedunderinternationallawintotheU.S.statutoryscheme.SeeHaitianCentersCouncil,509U.S.at180&n.36,113S.Ct.2549CardozaFonseca,480U.S.at429,432,437,107S.Ct.1207.

[33]FuturecasesmaychallengetheAttorneyGeneral'sinterpretationofwhatconstitutes"thesecurityoftheUnitedStates."Forexample,wecanimaginequestionsarisingastowhethercertainfinancialcrimesmightrisetothelevelofimplicatingtheeconomicinterestsaspectofnationalsecurity.Thatisnotthequestionbeforeushere,however,asthebasicallegationaboutpetitionersis,ineffect,thattheysupportillegalterroristgroupswhoaimtocommitviolentactsagainsttheUnitedStates.

[34]"Danger"inherentlyrequiresaheightenedlevelofrisk."Risk"canbeusedsynonymouslywith"probability,"withoutgivinganindicationoflikelihood.Incontrast,"risk"isusedincommonlegalparlancetoindicateaheightenedlikelihoodthataneventmayoccur.Forexample,whilethereisapossibilitythatanycriminaldefendantwillflee,acourtwillnotconsideradefendanta"flightrisk"unlessthereisaheightenedpossibilityofsuchflight.Thedistinctionbetween"danger"and"risk"isnotatissueinthiscase,butwehavenodoubtthattheAttorneyGeneraluses"risk"assynonymouswith"danger."

[35]WerecognizethattheAttorneyGeneraldefined"nontrivial"dangersorrisksindistinctiontothosethatare"serious,""significant,"or"grave."Seeid.However,wenotethatthedistinctionbetween"serious"and"nontrivial"maybeonewithoutadifference,andinanyeventappearstohavenopracticaleffect.

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