operationalizing the asia-pacific defense strategy · 2011-05-13 · training center in kuala...

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T he Quadrennial Defense Re-view and National SecurityStrategy of the United Statescall for transforming the

Armed Forces to assure both allies andfriends of our commitment to existing

security arrangements, dissuade mili-tary competition, deter threats to vitalinterests, and decisively defeat enemiesthat are not or cannot be deterred. U.S.Pacific Command (PACOM) thereforeoperationalizes national security strat-egy and national military strategy witha regional emphasis. This effort re-quires an understanding of future

10 JFQ / Autumn 2002

Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, USN, is the twentieth Commander, U.S. PacificCommand, and formerly served as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Operationalizing the Asia-Pacific Defense StrategyBy T H O M A S B. F A R G O

Commander, U.S.Pacific Command,during Cobra Gold ’02.

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■ The window of opportunity to de-tect and engage enemy targets will shorten.Therefore the requirement to rapidly vali-date targets and strike with precision tominimize collateral damage will grow.

■ Proliferation of missiles, weapons ofmass destruction, submarines, mines, andother asymmetric capabilities, especially byunscrupulous or economically desperate na-tions, will continue. Emerging threats em-ploying these technologies gain dispropor-tionate killing power with relatively littleinvestment in money, time, training, or in-frastructure.

Allies and FriendsThe premise of the U.S. security

equation in the Asia-Pacific region willcontinue to be longstanding bilateral al-liances. The most important alliance isthe pact with Japan. Its self defenseforces and infrastructure support havebeen essential to mutual security. Tokyohas also contributed generously to theglobal war on terrorism. Shortly after9/11, the Diet passed legislation to pro-vide assistance as far forward as the

threats, an assessment of evolving po-litical-military realities of the region,and a well-charted course to the future.Just as the threat has been trans-formed, it is also clear that capabilities,command structures, and security rela-tionships must be transformed to guar-antee the stability on which the goalsof peace-loving nations depend.

The Security ContextAnticipating the changing threat

and resource constraints requires anew defense planning construct—a 4-2-1 strategy—to develop forces which,besides homeland defense and main-taining a strategic reserve, can projectpower in four geographic areas, posi-tioning to swiftly defeat two enemiessimultaneously, and decisively defeat-ing one of them. Three of four areas ofemphasis within the strategy (North-east Asia, the East Asian littoral, andthe Middle East/Southwest Asia) fallwithin or bear directly on the PACOMarea of responsibility.

The new security environment islikely to influence U.S. security as fol-lows:

■ Non-state actors will become an in-creasing security concern. Exploiting gapsin international law and governance, theycan find sanctuary behind sovereignboundaries regardless of the level of statesupport. Having little in common with ourvalue systems, no sovereign territory, and aready willingness to sacrifice human life fortheir cause, they are difficult if not impossi-ble to deter.

■ The need to dissuade strategic com-petition and deter conflict with or betweenstate actors continues.

■ Just as terrorism has come to be rec-ognized as a global threat, the response totransnational problems is normally multi-lateral. Such threats will continue to poseimmediate and recurring dangers to inter-national stability and security due to in-creasingly interrelated economies and na-tional interests.

■ Unable to challenge our militarypower directly, enemies will continue to at-tack value targets with surprise, employingasymmetric lethality.

Autumn 2002 / JFQ 11

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■ J F Q F O R U M

northern Arabian Gulf. The relationshipwith Japan has never been stronger.

Similarly, sound relations with theRepublic of Korea (ROK) have been thecornerstone of security on the penin-sula for some fifty years. Millions ofpeople live within 40 kilometers of thedemilitarized zone. Moreover, the mili-tary-first policies and nuclear weaponsprogram of North Korea are being pursued as its society atrophies. Pyong-yang is a primary proliferator of ballis-tic missile technology—capabilitiesthat threaten U.S. forces and that maysoon threaten Americans at home. Inspite of these developments, a strongand time-proven relationship with theSouth Korean government and armedforces continues to deter aggressionfrom the North. And Seoul has madegenerous contributions to the war onterrorism, invoking the spirit of theU.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty andproviding airlift and sealift as well asfield hospital support.

Australia is an old ally and specialpartner in the area. PACOM has workedto eliminate potential barriers, bothtechnological and procedural, between

Australian and American forces. Aus-tralians have taken a lead role in EastTimor, as a partner and regional leaderin the global war on terrorism, and inthe security and democratic develop-ment of the nations of the South Pa-cific. A strong and expanding relation-ship with Australia is fundamental totransformation efforts and continuedAsia-Pacific security.

The Republic of the Philippinesand Thailand are critical allies that arekey to the stability of Southeast Asia.Both nations have made substantialcontributions to the war on terrorism.Early in 2002, the United States re-sponded to a request from the Philip-pines for assistance in developing itscounterterrorist capabilities. In con-junction with Balikatan 02-1, PACOMhas helped the Philippine military es-

tablish a comprehensive intelligencearchitecture and continues to providetraining to combat the Abu Sayyaf ter-rorist group.

Singapore is a strategic partnerand strong friend in the region withwhich the United States enjoys maturerelations on many levels. Singaporehas been active in counterterrorism,thwarting attacks and arresting somethirty suspects. It was also the first na-tion in Asia to join the container secu-rity initiative—a project designed toimprove the safety of some 6 millionshipping containers entering U.S. portsevery year.

Malaysia has also arrested manyterrorists and contributed in signifi-cant ways. PACOM is encouraged bythe prospect of a counterterrorismtraining center in Kuala Lumpur.Malaysia is an active participant in hu-manitarian assistance, disaster relief,search and rescue, and peace opera-tions and continues to host Americantroops for exercises.

In addition, the United States hasa new and promising relationship withIndia, which is the most populous

democracy in the world and anatural friend. PACOM has re-vitalized military-to-militarysecurity cooperation in vari-ous mutually beneficial areas.India was an early contributor

to the global war on terrorism, provid-ing essential vessel escort through theStrait of Malacca and authorizing bothoverflight and access to the crucial airbridge for Operation Enduring Free-dom. Renewed relations with the In-dian armed forces holds promise for se-curity in the region.

Command and Control Emerging security challenges ne-

cessitate command and control con-structs that are adaptable and capableof meeting a range of threats. In oper-ationalizing the defense strategy, jointcommand and control (C2) willchange. The interdependent relation-ships between unified commandersand the countries of the region mustbe selectively nurtured without beingconstrained by sentiment or Cold Warinertia. In this respect, joint com-mand and control is undergoing atransformation.

Established with specific geo-graphic focus, subunified commandsunder PACOM exercise operationalcommand and control of assignedcommands within their respective op-erational areas. Command structuressuch as U.S. Forces Korea and U.S.Forces Japan have served the region forfifty years, organized for specific con-flicts. In continuing to seek C2 efficien-cies, adjusting to changes in the opera-tional environment, and benefitingfrom technologies that extend the op-erational reach of the unified com-mander, these organizations willevolve accordingly.

The Quadrennial Defense Reviewcalled for a look at the standing jointtask force (SJTF). This organization canact as operational testbed, exploitingasymmetries for “significantly greatermilitary capability at lower personnellevels.” The concept is enabled by jointcommand, control, communications,computers, intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architec-ture, dynamic training and exerciseprograms, and standard operating pro-cedures. These tools provide a commonoperational picture and the tactics,techniques, and procedures for missionplanning and operations across theconflict spectrum. Commander, U.S.Pacific Fleet, has been designated ashead of Joint Task Force 519, a mobile,tailorable SJTF that can respond tomajor conflicts in the region. It has astanding componency and thus bene-fits from habitual relationships withcommon operating procedures whichare routinely tested and improved inexercises. Other JTFs in the area will becommanded by regional three-star offi-cers as appropriate.

The SJTF organization evolvedfrom work produced under the matur-ing joint mission force (JMF) program,the centerpiece C2 initiative that isfundamental to change management.JMF is a capabilities-based package of20,000 people drawn from designatedcomponent ready forces, augmentedby supporting component commands,coalition partners, and a coordinatedgroup of information operations/non-governmental/private volunteer or-ganizations from which a commander


the Republic of the Philippines and Thailand are key to the stabilityof Southeast Asia


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this offensively oriented, premier C2 el-ement serves to synchronize and oper-ationalize the theater counterterrorismcampaign plan, shortening the intelli-gence-to-action response time by fus-ing information relevant to an emerg-ing threat and rapidly coordinatingmilitary or civilian responses.

A second approach developed after9/11 for antiterrorism/force protection(AT/FP) is the joint rear area securitycoordinator program. PACOM imple-mented a structure to facilitate coordi-nation and establish unity of effortamong command components, local,state, and Federal agencies, host na-tions, and in some instances commer-cial resources to secure infrastructure,assets, and support personnel. Consist-ing of geographically focused C2 cellsin Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, Japan, andKorea, these defensively oriented ele-ments serve as quick response cells toassess and implement force protectionmeasures in the Pacific.

can assemble tailored forces for a vari-ety of missions. Jumpstarted with acore joint team known as a deployableJTF augmentation cell, JMF turns asingle subordinate command head-quarters into a trained and mission-fo-cused joint warfighting team that isready and capable of accomplishingsmaller scale, mission-specific contin-gencies. An element of the JMF con-cept is linking potential missions to asubordinate three- or four-star com-mand based on core competencies, op-erational strengths, and theater forceposture. This is intended to provide anatural fit for a commander with min-imal force augmentation from othersubcomponents. The joint missionforce suite includes forcible entry,strikes and raids, deterrence options,sea lines of communication protec-tion, foreign consequence manage-ment, peace operations, noncombat-ant evacuation operations, and foreignhumanitarian assistance/disaster relief.

Prior to 9/11, PACOM leveragedthe power of joint interagency cooper-ation through Joint Interagency TaskForce-West (JIATF–W), the Pacificcounterdrug task force. In the after-math of the terrorist attacks, it tookthe joint interagency C2 structure to anew level by forming the Joint Intera-gency Coordination Group for Coun-terterrorism (JIACG/CT). The missionof the group is fusing interagency ca-pabilities into operations to destroyterrorism in the Pacific theater. Start-ing from a nucleus of personnel fromacross the PACOM staff, the group hascalled on select expertise from civilianagencies including the Central Intelli-gence Agency, Federal Bureau of Inves-tigation, National Security Agency,Treasury Department, Defense Intelli-gence Agency, Defense Threat Reduc-tion Agency, and National Imageryand Mapping Agency. Taken together


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Established in 1947, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has an area of responsibility that contains over 50 percent of the surface of the globe and 43 nations. In addition, the six largest militaries in the world (China, India,North Korea, and South Korea, Russia, and the United States) operate in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States maintains five of its seven worldwide defense treaties with countries of the region: U.S.-Republic of the Philippines, ANZUS (U.S., Australia,

and New Zealand), U.S.-Republic of Korea, South East Asia Collective Defense (U.S., Australia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines,and Thailand), and U.S.-Japan.

Major command exercises include Team Challenge (Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), linking three bilateral exercises:Tandem Thrust (Australia), Cobra Gold (Thailand), and Balikitan (the Philippines); Keen Sword/Keen Edge (Japan); and Rim of the Pacific (Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom). PACOM has participated since 1996 in disaster relief operations in China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Madagascar,Myanmar, Palau, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand,Vietnam, and the U.S. Territory of Guam.

Some 100,000 military personnel are forward deployed in theater with 300,000 members overall in the region.Component commands include U.S. Army Pacific,Marine Forces Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and U.S. Pacific Air Forces. In addition there are five subordinate unified commands:U.S. Forces, Japan; U.S. Forces,Korea; Eighth U.S. Army; Special Operations Command Pacific; and Alaskan Command; two standing joint task forces: Joint Interagency Task Force West and Joint Intelligence Center Pacific; and three supporting units: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific, and Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Studies.

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in Alaska remain assigned to U.S. Pacific Command.]

The PACOM area also includes: Comoros,Cook Islands, Kiribati, Maldives, Republicof Marshall Islands, Mauritius, FederatedStates of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Republicof Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga,Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.


■ J F Q F O R U M

Force PostureThe 4-2-1 construct has obvious

planning implications and requires theimproved speed, precision, and lethal-ity of transformed forces. PACOMmust position credible combat capabil-ity as far forward in theater as possible.Taking advantage of improvements incommand and control, mobility, andlethality allows the command tostreamline its forces and reduce ad-verse impact on allies while maintain-ing combat power westward. Thetransformed forces must communicateboth improved capability and contin-ued commitment to allies and friends.

The command is homeportingthree freshly overhauled and refuelednuclear-powered attack submarines inGuam. Regular deployments ofbomber, fighter, and intelligence, sur-veillance, and reconnaissance assets toGuam or other locations are being con-sidered. Refueled submarines and de-ployed bombers are not transformedforces in their own right. However,when employed with new operational

concepts, they represent a significantmove of rapidly available, flexiblecombat power westward as part ofoverall transformation.

As PACOM moves forces west, itmust ensure that the logistic infra-structure supports rapid and sustain-able employment while minimizing itsfootprint. Streamlined commandstructures and improved informationreachback capabilities, such as thoseprovided by a new air operations cen-ter at Hickam Air Force Base on Oahu,will relieve pressure resulting from theburgeoning population in the region.Already this is an issue of concern inboth Korea and Japan. For example,the Republic of Korea has enacted aland partnership plan to position U.S.

forces in proximity to likely areas ofemployment while consolidatingAmerican facilities. By 2011 the U.S.military will release over half of its

holdings of 55,000 acres and500 buildings, valued at over$1 billion, in exchange foraccess to 1,200 new acresand more ranges. The planalso establishes safety ease-ments around some facilities

to reduce untoward interactions. Simi-lar initiatives are underway in Japanunder a special action committee onOkinawa.

Access and LogisticsThe requirement to project com-

bat power forward is growing and callsfor reliable access to suitable locations.The theater security cooperation pro-gram plays a major role in providingaccess while improving common de-fense arrangements and coalitioncompetence. As before, places thatprovide access to support security co-operation, training, and joint opera-tions are most relevant.


Korea has enacted a plan to position U.S. forces in proximity to likely areas of employment

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Forces carriers (SSGNs) are examples ofcapabilities that position major fire-power and forces forward in theater ona survivable, long-dwelling platform.Acting either alone or as part of a tai-lored expeditionary strike group,SSGNs hold great promise.

The proliferation of ballistic mis-siles demands an effective theater mis-sile defense capability. Secure, mobile,and enhanced by joint intelligence,such a defense is vital to security andstability throughout the region, partic-ularly Northeast Asia. The capability todeal with short range ballistic missilesis a particularly high priority.

For forces and matériel not prepo-sitioned forward, the capability tomove them quickly to the battlefieldmust be improved. One initiative is thehigh speed vessel, which was recentlytested in Millennium Challenge ’02and proven while in support of III Ma-rine Expeditionary Force and Aus-tralian-led coalition operations in EastTimor. A joint, reconfigurable highspeed vehicle could enhance responsetime with a range of forces. The con-siderations relevant to this joint capa-bility include service ownership of theprogram, asset disposition, and com-mand and control.

The Army Stryker is a highly de-ployable combat vehicle that combinesfirepower, battlefield mobility, situa-tional awareness, survivability, andversatility with fewer logistic demands.The Stryker brigade combat team will

Singapore, for example, sits at thejunction of the Singapore and Malaccastraits—the most crucial waterway inthe theater. Singapore is a great sup-porter of U.S. presence within the re-gion, hosting a modest logistic pres-ence that was established afterPhilippines bases closed and a port fa-cility was built at Changi to accommo-date aircraft carriers. Access to the portat Sembawang and Paya Lebar airfieldhave long been key enablers to re-gional security and were stops in thelogistic bridge for Enduring Freedom.PACOM is studying other ways to im-prove access while incorporating othertransformational improvements.

Retaining a combat edge requirestraining and facilities to permit realis-tic training profiles. PACOM is a stew-ard of the environment and shares aninterest in achieving security mandateswithout any harm to people andecosystems. These goals will be met byboth leveraging access and applyingcreative technology to gain combat-rel-evant training.

Flexible CapabilitiesUnable to specify future threats

with certainty, PACOM is instead focus-ing on the manner in which threatsmight subsist, execute strategies, andemploy developing capabilities. Exist-ing assets must be adapted to improvefuture relevance, and evolving capabili-ties must be tailorable to the manner (ifnot timing or location) in which anenemy may threaten us. Many transfor-mation goals hinge on the combinedfuture lethality of U.S. and coalitionforces. We must also help allies buildcapabilities to enhance their contribu-tions to their own security, which has acomplementary effect on footprintconsolidation, and ensure that the ca-pabilities they bring to the fight marrywell with future U.S. capabilities.

Increasing reliance on accurateand timely information has beenreemphasized in Enduring Freedomand is particularly crucial in light ofemerging dangers. Future threats em-ploying stealth and surprise will at-tempt to exploit gaps in intelligencecoverage and establish tactical ambi-guities to complicate responses. Fur-thermore, worldwide demand for in-formation requires intelligence assets

with increased joint utility. Intelli-gence collection, analysis, and dissem-ination capabilities (including bilateraland multilateral sharing constructs)must be expedited, with authority toact on validated information pushedto the lowest possible level. In the newsecurity context, intelligence of offen-sive value will be crucial. However,there will still be a premium on defen-sively oriented intelligence that di-rectly enables force protection.

The nature of future threats andunacceptability of absorbing a debili-tating first strike dictate the require-ment to minimize the interval betweenthreat detection and response. Further,the shooter must be provided with theright information to minimize ambigu-ity and make sound engagement deci-sions. Eliminating unnecessary infra-structure between sensor and shootercan help—on land, in the air, or inspace. Arming the sensor and maxi-mizing the time it spends in range ofpotential targets can reduce the sensor-to-shooter cycle time. This capabilitywas seen in unmanned combat aerialvehicles over Afghanistan and more re-cently in Yemen. Global Hawk or othersystems may also play a similar role inthe future, operating from Guam orperhaps Australia.

Conversion of some USS Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines tocruise missile/Special Operations


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add a capability to joint forces, espe-cially in the Pacific. Flexible trans-portation and sustainment are key toits quick operational employment.Thoughtful lift posture, such as theC–17 aircraft or the high speed vehicleforward in theater, can make thebrigade a very attractive option.

Improved network capacity andsecurity enclaves are top informationneeds. Initiatives that address theshortfall are the wide area relay net-work (WARNET), combined operationswide area network (COWAN), andjoint information capabilities enhance-ment environment (JICEE). JTF WAR-NET ensures a high capacity on thejoint tactical level via satellite andnonsatellite airborne relay communi-cations, while COWAN promises toshare information among coalitionpartners of differing interests on acommon network. Both are critical toagile command and control.

Combatant commanders, workingwith the Joint Staff, must provide aframework that will enable technologyto proffer solutions that maximize op-erational effectiveness and combatpower. The global information grid is agood start, but it needs more rigor tointegrate service-developed solutionsinto a coherent infrastructure for net-work centric operations. PACOM hasdeveloped an information capabilitiesframework to map solutions on thegrid and align systems through JICEE.

This will bring C4ISR systems into thecommand headquarters building as apilot program.

Advanced concept technologydemonstrations offer a streamlinedprocess for linking joint operational requirements with technological advances. With capabilities-baseddemonstrations and evaluations, tech-nological innovation and commercialproducts are focused on their militaryutility to provide quantum improve-ments in warfighting. PACOM spon-sors 19 demonstrations, several of

which are showing operational utilitytoday in support of Enduring Freedom.

Operating ConceptsNew flexible capabilities must be

integrated into meaningful operatingpatterns and concepts. PACOM will de-velop new concepts forward and inconcert with allies.

Theater security cooperation em-braces defense and defense-related ef-

forts conducted with allies,friends, and potential coalitionpartners to both build mutualcapabilities and address issuesof common interest. Unlikepast emphasis on broad-based

engagement, recent guidance calls forcombatant commanders to developand implement a more focused strat-egy. In this regard, theater security co-operation is the vehicle to establish fa-vorable conditions for futureoperations, whether to support the waron terrorism or longer-term objectivessuch as interoperability, transforma-tional capabilities, and hedges againstsurprise. PACOM is pursuing an inte-grated, iterative approach to theater se-curity cooperation in which supportactivities are linked with clearly de-fined objectives to facilitate the opera-tional focus.

The joint training plan providesguidance for planning, executing, andassessing training in the theater. Thisplan specifies improvements in jointand combined readiness while facilitat-ing transformation and security coop-eration. In practice it follows the tenetsof joint training, uses the joint missionessential task list assessment method-ology for exercises, integrates the mostlikely and dangerous missions, andseeks to optimize joint and multina-tional training opportunities with em-phasis on identifying and resolving in-teroperability issues.

The joint operations and experi-mentation program provides anothervenue for change. By leveraging jointwarfighting concepts, doctrinal inno-vations, and new technology in an op-erational environment, PACOM canbenefit from improved operationswhile eliminating the gap between in-novative ideas and operational utility.The task of transformation is urgent.There is neither the time nor money topursue programs that fail to yield divi-dends. Particular relevance can befound in those activities that fallwithin the nexus of all the initiatives.


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theater security cooperationembraces efforts to address issuesof common interest


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advances in technology and empower-ing force innovation. Strategic guid-ance directs operational endstates, andsupporting objectives lead to measura-ble progress.

The PACOM focus ensures that theright things are done at the right timeand for the right purpose. Integrated ef-forts that improve command and con-trol structures, update plans, enhanceforward force posture and access, trans-form capabilities, and integrate thosecapabilities into new operating patternsand concepts provide vehicles for ef-fecting meaningful change. JFQ

A number of operating conceptsunder development promise todemonstrate utility in each program.In addition to the joint mission force,new concepts include the Navy andMarine Corps expeditionary strikeforce and the Air Force air and spaceexpeditionary force. Capabilities likethe Stryker combat vehicle lifted byC–17 aircraft or high speed vessels,submarine conversions, Patriot ad-vanced capability 3 systems (and ulti-mately Aegis-based theater ballisticmissile defense squadrons), bombers,and ISR deployments must be inte-grated into these concepts. As theseconcepts mature, however, the mis-sions for which they are intended mustbe well defined and incorporate suffi-cient flexibility to accommodate shiftsin enemy capabilities. The effects cre-ated on future battlefields must drivecapability development, not the re-verse. Furthermore, the logistic infra-structure for sustainability must besynchronized for joint missions.

Coordination among the services,defense agencies, and unified com-mands has never been more crucial.Combatant commanders bear a majorresponsibility to define missions intheir areas with a high degree of rele-vance. Evolving C2 relationships musthave a global impact. The ability toshift between supported and support-ing roles—especially for U.S. PacificCommand in relation to U.S. StrategicCommand and U.S. Special OperationsCommand—must be seamless.

U.S. Joint Forces Command(JFCOM) is the premier experimenta-tion and transformation command.PACOM serves as one of its field surro-gates, providing ideas, forces, and thetheater as a testbed. And cooperationwith the Office of Force Transforma-tion and JFCOM must promote effi-cient experimentation and testingwhile producing reliable and timelyfeedback.

Acquisition programs must maxi-mize rather than marginalize contribu-tions by allies. With other nations, in-formed dialogue, experimentation, andworking relations will identify coopera-tive efforts to enhance capabilities, pro-mote access to fulfill commitments,and develop competencies. Allies willassume even greater shares of their own

defense burden through flexible expe-ditionary forces, diversified access, con-solidated footprints, credible infrastruc-ture, and improved interoperability.Such advances will allow PACOM, aspart of a team, to project combat powerforward, maintain host nation rela-tions, and deal with economic realities.

For combatant commanders, thechallenge of transformation is clear—make the operational link between na-tional strategy and tangible regionalsecurity improvements by leveraging


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operationalizing the asia-pacific defense strategy · 2011-05-13 · training center in kuala...

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