operational planning and conflict termination · 2011. 5. 13. · autumn/winter 2001–02 / jfq 97...

Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 97

A lthough the Armed Forces haveproven themselves a capable policyinstrument, the Nation has alwaysstruggled with conflict termination.

America has often prevailed militarily while fail-ing to achieve policy goals quickly and efficiently.A scan of joint publications suggests that military

professionals embrace the idea of a terminationstrategy, but doctrine offers little practical help. Itis time to take the next step, creating an intera-gency organization and practices that can effec-tively conduct termination planning. Each re-gional commander in chief (CINC) should have astanding interagency team to act as an operationstransition planning cell. This element must in-clude members well versed in the application ofthe military, diplomatic, informational, and eco-nomic instruments of national power.

Major John R. Boulé II, USA, is assigned to 2d Infantry Division andpreviously served as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy.

Operational Planning andConflict Termination

By J O H N R. B O U L É I I

Surrender aboardUSS Missouri inTokyo Bay.

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Title and Subtitle Operational Planning and Conflict Termination

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Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) National Defense University Institute for NationalStrategic Studies Washington D C 20319-5066

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■ C O N F L I C T T E R M I N A T I O N

Culture for CombatWhen the President decides to use force, the

military mindset is to deploy, defeat the enemy,then rapidly exit, turning affairs over to diplo-mats. Intense interagency coordination generallyoccurs only at the beginning and end. The mili-tary’s hasty exit breaks continuity and detractsfrom shaping the environment for winning thepeace and securing the desired endstate. Militaryculture is often oriented on its own finish line atthe expense of long-term national objectives.

Strategic aims are achieved in part by theproper transition of leadership from generals andadmirals to civilians. Interagency coordinationthroughout military operations is the linchpin.Operational planning should be guided not towardmilitary termination but toward setting the stagefor continued U.S. interaction by peaceful means.

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Opera-tions, emphasizes planning for conflict termina-tion, with the most extensive discussions in chap-

ters I and III. Chapter I, “TheStrategic Goal and Conflict Ter-mination,” describes properlyconceived termination criteriaas a key to lasting victory. It fur-ther states that termination isan essential link between na-tional strategy and post-hostil-

ity aims and that military victory is measured byhow it supports overall political goals.

Chapter III, “Combatant Command StrategicPlanning,” contains planning guidance, definesthe desired endstate, and discusses how the mili-tary scenario helps set the conditions for termina-tion. It continues with guidelines for the combat-ant commander that prescribe support to thenonmilitary instruments of power. Setting mili-tary transition conditions is one of the criticalfirst steps in the estimate and planning process. Itis clear from the manual that CINCs are responsi-ble for incorporating conflict termination intocampaign planning early on and in a mannerconsistent with national goals.

Since Joint Pub 3-0 introduces terminationplanning, one might expect detailed guidance inJoint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning JointOperations. Yet termination and transition arementioned fewer than a dozen times. The ab-sence of techniques and practices for transitionplanning is glaring.

The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia is the onlyother joint doctrinal source, containing six pageson termination. Some of its ideas repeat JointPub 3-0, but there is additional information aswell as guidance about termination when ap-plied to military operations other than war. Ser-vice publications provide little additional help.

Peace and the Operational ArtMilitary theorists have pointed out the im-

portance of conflict termination. Clausewitzstressed planning a campaign clear through tocompletion in order to achieve political objec-tives—including creating military conditions thatwould facilitate negotiations. His recommenda-tion is incorporated into U.S. doctrine in princi-ple. He also cautioned against “overshooting thetarget” in military operations.1 In limited wars,combatant commanders must seek the appropri-ate culminating point to shape the environmentfor favorable peace terms. Today, Milan Vego isequally emphatic about planning military opera-tions oriented toward the desired endstate, to in-clude political, diplomatic, economic, and socialconditions.2 What theorists fail to articulate,however, is how to conduct termination plan-ning. They are silent in defining the pathwayfrom war winning to peace winning.

To achieve the operational skill required fortermination, the military must reach beyond theconceptual constructs and traditional instru-ments of combat operations. Such expertise canonly be achieved by drawing on a wide comple-ment of talent. A number of agencies, includingthe Department of State, Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA), and Department of Commerce,have significant proficiency to contribute. Geo-graphic CINCs should create operations transi-tion planning cells within their Strategic Plan-ning Directorates (J-5), recruiting representativesfrom the interagency community, to deliberatelydesign transition strategies.

Some might argue that permanently assign-ing representatives of other Federal agencies to ajoint military headquarters is unnecessary andwould further devolve power from Washington tothe CINCs. Sound doctrine along with intera-gency exercises and conferences will solve theproblem. Such thinking is shortsighted. Transitionplanning is not a science. Although doctrine andtheory are guides, no formulas exist that will al-ways lead to favorable conflict resolution. The artof planning military operations requires close co-ordination from a staff accustomed to working to-gether all the time. The art of transition planningrequires nothing less. If anything, transitionstrategies are more difficult because they must in-corporate all instruments of national power in acoherent, synchronized fashion.

The A Team The purpose of the operations transition plan-

ning cell would be to assist CINCs in achieving as-signed political objectives. While most of the staff

98 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02

CINCs are responsible for incorporating conflicttermination into campaignplanning early on


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focuses solely on military matters, this team wouldprovide recommendations on achieving favorableconditions in all power dimensions. Using thisbrain trust, CINCs could develop and present op-tions to the National Command Authoritiesthroughout a campaign. Since the cell’s optionswould come from diverse experts encompassing allpolicy instruments, it could anticipate possiblecontingencies, obstacles, opportunities, and objec-tions and therefore have added legitimacy with na-tional leaders. The cell would be assigned a num-ber of tasks that would begin before a conflict andcontinue through the post-conflict period.

Assisting with endstate definition. After verify-ing initial objectives, the first task would be to rec-ommend the desired endstate. In some cases, thismight mean taking the initiative in planning.Crises develop quickly and unexpectedly, and thenational security team may not have time to fullydefine all the goals of an operation. Restore Hopewas a case in point. A tactical planning staff had to

assist the chain of command with desired endstateplanning, albeit with less than optimal results.3 Anextant interagency planning team would havelifted this additional burden from the military andgiven endstate definition the attention it demands.Such a process would encourage senior leaders toconduct serious deliberations on the subject andallow the rest of the planning staff to focus on de-ployment and initial employment of forces.

Defining military transition conditions. Afterachieving consensus on the endstate, the teamwould assist in defining the military conditionsthat will lead to a successful transition to diplo-matic leadership. These conditions would be-come military objectives for CINCs. In conjunc-tion with military planners, the cell could adviseon the appropriate ways and means to achievethese objectives. Its mission would be to incor-porate and synchronize all key dimensions inthe plan.

Sequencing. Favorable transition conditionswill take time to evolve. Thus the cell’s next taskis to develop a sequenced path to the militarytransition state. This may be a series of phases

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where the generation of specific circumstancesmay signal the end of one phase and the begin-ning of the next. Bruce Clarke developed a syn-chronization matrix that could be used forphased transition state planning.4 It shows the

planned status of vari-ables such as com-mand and control, se-curity, economy, anddiplomacy by opera-tional phase. The oper-

ation moves to the next phase when a variablemeets the tripwire definition described in the ma-trix. This tool could be tailored to any crisis.

When circumstances favor transition, thecell would advise on how to maintain this pre-ferred state in order to continue progress towardthe next phase. Ideally, when all transition condi-tions are met, CINCs are ready to hand off leader-ship to the diplomats.

Monitoring, assessing, and recommendingchanges to strategy. No plan survives contact withthe enemy. Political aims may change, the desiredendstate could be modified, and conditions thatlead to success may vary. Since objectives, end-states, and strategy are a continuum, team mem-bers would have an important monitoring and as-sessment role.

The cell should conduct a rolling net assess-ment, taking full account of the economic, social,psychological, and diplomatic aspects of existingcircumstances. Team members must be integratedinto all available theater informational resourcesto accomplish this vital task. The cell would ad-vise CINCs on ways to calibrate objectives and re-fine strategy. As components of strategy change,

regional commanders could provide higher qual-ity feedback to national leaders on the implica-tions of modifying strategy.

Developing contingencies. J-5 developsbranches and sequels to the base plan during theplanning of a major joint operation. Similarly, thetermination planning cell must develop offshootsand follow-on activities that would lead to peacewinning. As branches and sequels often developthrough wargaming, the members should what ifthe consequences of the command’s strategy.

Leading the transition. A hand-off to diplo-matic leaders would eventually occur as the mili-tary transition state approaches. The cell’s teammembers should take the lead in planning theevent. Functional experts would coordinate withtheir counterparts from the country teams to en-sure a smooth changeover.

During peacetime engagements, the cellshould be directly involved in strategic planningas well as political-military coordination and the-ater engagement strategy. The CINCs could alsouse the team to strengthen ties with other gov-ernment agencies. Transition planning exercisescould be conducted in conjunction with majorjoint operations to provide the cell experience intransition state planning.

Team members could assist the joint taskforce (JTF) plans cell as crises erupt and CINCsform task forces. Functional experts from theplanning cell would be available to act as liaisonswith other agencies. Under certain circumstances,such as the employment of a sizable task force fora long duration, it might be wise to stand-up anadditional planning cell for the JTF commander.

Organizational InnovationThe cell should include functional experts

from several agencies as a strategic asset within J-5.In addition to being conversant in nonmilitary in-struments of power, these staff members should beformally trained in military decisionmaking doc-trine and methodologies. The core of the teamshould consist of no more than a dozen individu-als, half from non-DOD agencies.

The political advisor (POLAD) would be akey player in planning cells. POLADs counsel onways and means that ensure that military objec-tives are in harmony with political policy and areusually key players in engagement and contin-gency planning. Consistent with these assignedduties, he should be appointed as co-chairman ofthe transition planning cell.

The advisor should have a planner assignedto the office of POLAD with duty to J-5. This for-eign service official would be primarily responsi-ble for the diplomatic aspects of transition state


when all transition conditions aremet, CINCs are ready to hand off leadership to the diplomats

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planning and, working with the political advisor,would act as diplomatic liaison to country teamsand State Department leaders during military-dominant operations. The advisor and diplomaticplanner would play vital roles in assisting CINCsif they were tasked to conduct negotiations, asGeneral Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, did duringthe Persian Gulf War.

A member of the Department of State’s Inter-national Information Programs Bureau shouldalso be assigned to each planning cell. The mis-sion of the bureau is to promote foreign under-standing and acceptance of U.S. policies. It oper-ates internationally, managing press strategiesand providing information about the UnitedStates. The bureau representative would workclosely with the command’s public diplomacy ad-visor but would focus on helping plan the infor-mation component of strategy. Using host nationand regional contacts, this representative wouldprovide J-5 with information on foreign attitudesand trends. The data would be used to adjust fea-tures of command strategy to gain support for na-tional objectives. This staffer would also devisemethods for countering enemy propaganda, al-lowing Washington to maintain the initiative inthe information operations arena.

Moreover, the planning cell would requiremembership from national intelligence agencies.As the lead U.S. intelligence organization outsidethe Department of Defense, CIA should provide arepresentative. The role of this planner would betwofold: to provide strategic-level intelligence

analysis and furnish covert action planning rec-ommendations. He would also assist joint militaryintelligence planners with the estimate of the situ-ation. The CIA representative would look at allenemy instruments and how they could be ap-plied to defeat the U.S. military operation whilemilitary planners focus on possible enemy armedcourses of action. This member would provideCINCs with military and nonmilitary options forcountering enemy strategies and shaping condi-tions to effect conflict resolution.

The planning cell may require augmentationfrom other specialized intelligence agencies if theCIA representative needs intelligence planningsupport. A national intelligence planning teamshould be formed that would function like a na-tional intelligence support team; however, thefocus would be on strategic planning for transi-tion operations.

Since economics is a crucial instrument of na-tional power, the cell would also require dedicatedspecialists in that field. A representative from theU.S. Agency for International Development(USAID) should be assigned to bolster the com-mand’s designated experts. The agency has themission of assisting foreign governments with eco-nomic growth, political freedom, and good gover-nance. It is a primary player in U.S. foreign disasterrelief; thus its officials would be especially suitedfor dealing with chaotic post-conflict conditions.

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An official from the Department of Com-merce, which promotes national economic in-terests abroad, should be part of the team aswell. This member could assist transition plan-ning by recommending trade and market accesscomponents to conflict resolution strategies.Commerce and USAID representatives wouldgive counsel in the development of economy-building strategies. Their skills would be espe-cially useful in planning the post-transitionphase of military operations.

The planning cell would also have militaryrepresentatives from throughout the major staffdirectorates. The other co-chairman of the cellshould be one of the J-5 deputies responsible for

deliberate planning. Thisparticipant should receiveformal instruction in inter-agency operations. Trainingcan be integrated into thecurriculum at institutionssuch as the National De-

fense University, Kennedy School of Governmentat Harvard University, and Fletcher School of Lawand Diplomacy at Tufts University. Members ofState, Commerce, CIA, and USAID could also besent to these schools for short courses on conflicttermination and transition planning.

The cell should have a standard nucleus ofmembers; however, the CINC should modify theteam to meet unique regional conditions. It mustbe dynamic, with complete membership depend-ent on the contingency. Planners from othercountries may be included during multinationaloperations, for instance. In other circumstancesit might be appropriate to seek advice fromnongovernmental or volunteer organizations.Extending invitations to members outside the

Federal Government would produce additionalchallenges. For instance, access to some sourcesof intelligence would be restricted. Nonetheless,United Nations and other coalition operationshave shown that the benefits of a long-term col-lective approach may outweigh the constraints.

To launch these organizational initiatives, anew publication must be drafted to outline howinteragency transition planning should be done.Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination DuringJoint Planning, contains information that shouldbe incorporated. However, an operations transi-tion doctrine is needed before a publication canbe developed. Operational planning concepts al-ready in use—like the commander’s estimate ofthe situation—can be modified to provide a basisfor more detailed guidance. Planners from theState Department, CIA, and other agencies shouldbe consulted as doctrine is advanced. Theoristsand scholars at the senior military colleges shouldprovide recommendations.

A beta-transition planning cell should be or-ganized now under one of the unified commandheadquarters. This trial cell could be put throughintensive exercises and wargames to determinethe appropriate interagency organization. Teammembers could also develop tools for transitionplanning. A validated fielding version could bestood up after testing.

The future application of military power islikely to be within the context of a limited war ormilitary operation other than war. These environ-ments are complex and filled with uncertaintyand constraints. Success requires a clear strategyfor winning the peace through successful transi-tion planning. The military must shift focus frommilitary termination to military transition. Tomake this adjustment, mindsets need to change.Interagency coordination throughout military-dominant operations must be improved. The op-erations transition planning cell is a step in theright direction. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translatedby Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Prince-ton University Press, 1976), p. 579.

2 Milan Vego, On Operational Art (Newport: NavalWar College, 1999), p. 345.

3 S. L. Arnold, “Somalia: An Operation Other ThanWar,” Military Review, vol. 73, no. 12 (December 1993),p. 34.

4 Bruce B.G. Clarke, “End-State Planning: The Soma-lia Case,” in Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars ofSuccess, edited by Max G. Manwaring and William J.Olson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 55.


the planning cell would havemilitary representatives fromthe major staff directorates

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operational planning and conflict termination · 2011. 5. 13. · autumn/winter 2001–02 / jfq 97...

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