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8/8/2019 Ooda in Chechnya

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9

Chapter Two

DOCTRINE

The five-month battle in and aroun d Stalingrad . . . was only apart of a far vaster dr ama p layed across an imm ense stage of stepp es and forests and mou ntains. . . . As stiffening Sovietresistance, plus their own difficulties, slowed the Germanadvance, Hitler milked more and more troops away from thevital northern flank . . . the hinge of the wh ole operation . . . tore-enforce Pauluss 6th Ar my at Stalingrad . 1

The Battle for Stalingrad

The role of doctrine in establishing a found ation for MOUT training,technological developm ent, and potential organizational chang e waswidely recognized, as was the fundamental necessity for a doctrinethat includes consideration of more than the tactical level of opera-

tions. There was a call for revision of curr ent d octrine at all levelswith an emphasis on maintaining continuity from strategic-levelguidan ce to that provided for the ind ividu al soldier and m arine. Thiscall also stressed the need for joint MOUT doctrin e. Both joint andservice doctrine need to be comprehensive not only in the sense of thelevels of operations, but also w ith regard to the comp lete spectrum of potential operations (e.g., stability and support missions as well asthose entailing combat), multinational issues, and interagencyconsiderations. There was some unresolved debate between aminority who believed the p rimary focus of MOUT d octrine should beat the tactical level and those who posited that current doctrinealready h ad too g reat a tactical focus.

______________1Han son W. Baldw in, in the introdu ction to Vasili I. Chuikov, The Battle for Stalingrad,New York: Holt, Rineha rt, and Win ston, 1964, p. 3.


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10 Denying the Widow-Maker: The RAND-DBBL Conference on MOUT

Several strategic and operational elements were thou ght to be essen-tial to the creation of effective doctrine. The respon sibilities of CINCsfor making requirements known, overseeing training, promotingtechnological d evelopment, an d sup porting other activities critical toMOUT prepared ness shou ld be identified. A definition of jointMOUT and analysis of current and future cooperative approachesto urban op erations was considered necessary. The difficulties con-fronting air and aviation elements du ring MOUT raised q uestions onwhether joint air operations in MOUT required specialized tactics,techniques, proced ures, and comma nd relationships. Several ind i-vidu als felt there was inadequ ate description of how joint operationsshou ld be condu cted du ring urb an contingencies. Effectiveoperational-level doctrine was thou ght to be fund amental for guidingJoint Task Force (JTF) operations an d tr aining. N one exists at present;current joint MOUT d octrine was seen a s little more th an lip serv ice.

Another imp ortant element of this doctrinal enhancement w ill be thead d ressing of the limits of U.S. capa bilities. Joint do ctrine mu st ac-count for d iminished force strengths; no longer can the Un ited Statesexpect to commit multiple divisions to a long-term urban operationunless means of dramatically reducing personnel losses are devel-oped . A precipitate conclusion is that do ctrine to achieve desired en dstates via m ethods oth er than complete seizure or clearing of a built-up area is necessary.

Doctrine should emphasize that urban operations may not be desir-able for many reasons, but that a policy of avoidance is no longerviable in m any circum stances. Given the alternative of fighting in acity or d oing so elsewhere, guidan ce to select the second is probablywise. Increasingly, how ever, no such alternative w ill be available; it istherefore essential to synchronize strategic expectations and ca-pabilities. To par aph rase Clausew itz, any representative of the Na-tional Command Authorities must be aware of the entire politicalsituation, while also understanding exactly how much he canachieve with the mea ns at his disposal. 2

A new doctrine must include the complete scope of likely militaryactivities. The USMC has recently labeled the po ssibility of hu man i-

______________2Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans.),Princeton, N J: Princeton Un iversity Press, 1976, p. 112.


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Terrain .5 Authors of subordinate man uals rely on those docum ents asthe basis for d evelopm ent of sup porting d octrine.

Those attending the conference generally agreed that although im-provements in the current approach to MOUT (designated as closecombat MOUT du e to its reliance on closing w ith an ad versary andengaging him at short range) might mitigate friendly casualties to alimited extent, success in addressing todays strategic requirementsmay not be attainable unless an alternative method is adopted.However, there was no universal agreement on the nature of that al-ternative. The aforementioned RAND strategy designed to removeU.S. soldiers and marines from an environment in wh ich short-rangeengagements were the norm was believed by some to be both desir-able and feasible for the long term. Given a comm itment to movetow ard this capability, steps to capitalize on ad van ces in that d irectionshould be taken wh en possible. Others were unconvinced that thiswas the prop er approach, but no other predom inant concept emerged.It was agreed, however, that future doctrine should supportredu ctions in force vulnerability and the emp loyment of alternativesto the commitment of friendly forces in high-risk situations whenother v iable cour ses of action ar e available.

The following ad ditional areas were n oted by one or m ore persons asrequiring further attention in MOUT d octrine:

Fire support: Both fire sup port d octrine and the training derived

from it were seen as deficient in the urban opera tions arena. Casualty evacuation: Current reliance on limited numbers of

medical personnel results in combat personnel having to assistwith m edical evacuation, further d raining fighting strengths in anenvironment notorious for manp ower consump tion.

Intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination: The shortduration of response times and the fleeting nature of oppor-tuni t ies demand rapid and accurate complet ion of thecollection analysis d issemina tion intelligence cycle. MOU Tare squad leaders operations to a large degree, so promulgation

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5The Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, M O U T, was beingreviewed and u pd ated at the time of the conference. The document wa s released inApril 1998.


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Doctrine 13

of real-time intelligence must be to the lowest levels if they are tobe of value.

Psychological op erations: Chechens effective use of psycholog-ical operations against their Russian adversaries emphasized boththe value of well-conceived psyops and the need to preparefriend ly forces for an ad versarys emp loyment of this resource.

Early d eploymen t of hum an intelligence (HUMINT), psycholog-ical operations, information operations, and deceptions assetsinto theaters involving MOUT: Preliminary identification of critical nodes, preparation of the indigenous population, deter-mination of optimum insertion points, establishment of contactswith local guides, and other activities crucial to success andrequiring significant lead times are difficult or impossible toaccomp lish effectively if initiation is too gr eatly d elayed.

Defensive MOUT: Doctrine for defensive urban combat opera-tions is very limited. Future doctrinal improvem ents shouldadequately add ress friend ly and enemy d efensive operations toinclud e the u se of layers or belts.

Anti-tank defen se: Techniques to better deny an enemy effectiveemployment of RPGs and use of defensive positions above orbelow the depression limits of IFV and tank guns were seen asessential. 6

Deception: The conference attendees called for doctrine that(1) sup ports seizing opp ortun ities offered by d eception, an d(2) ensures su perior friend ly C4ISR operations.

Command and control operations: Russians in Chechnyamodified the well-known OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act)loop to account for cultural differences confronted d uring opera-tions in the city of Grozny, labeling it an OCODA (Observe, Cul-tura lly Orient, Decide, Act) loop instead . U.S. forces must beready to operate in built-up areas where communications are

______________6The significance of RPGs in MOUT is evident from their status as the most fearedweapon during Russian fighting in Grozny (Timothy L. Thomas, lecture at RAND-DBBL MOUT conference, Febru ary 24, 1998) and the v ulner ability of circling he licoptersto their fires in 1993 Mogadishu .


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I remembered battles against the White Guards and White Poles in the [Russian] Civil War when we had to attack under artillery and machine-gun fire without any artillery support of our own. We used to run up close to the enemy, and his artillery would be unable to take fresh aim and fire on rapidly approaching targets. . . . I came to the conclusion that the best method of fighting the Germans would be close battle, applied night and day in different forms. We should get as close to the enemy as possible so that his air force could not bomb our forward units or trenches. 7

Vasili I. Chuikov

degraded and the pace of decisionmaking is increaseddue to the close proximityand den sity of forces.

Enemy hugging tactics (asused by the Russians inStalingrad): These wereenvisioned as a likely re-sponse of an adversary toU.S. targeting capabilities.There is therefore a need toadd ress countermeasures.

Clearing techniques, toinclude how to select andprioritize structures to becleared: There is a requirement to develop doctrinal proceduresfor clearing rooms and structures that (1) best meet missionrequ irements, (2) minimize dan ger to friend ly force members, and(3) preclude unnecessary noncombatant casualties.

______________7Vasili I. Chuikov, The Battle for Stalingrad, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,1964, p. 72.

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