ontological argument - a2 level notes

8/18/2019 Ontological Argument - A2 level notes

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The Ontological Argument A2: Crib Sheet:

Line of Argument:

The Ontological Argument is an a priori argument using deductive reasoning to reach a logically certainconclusion. By reaching its conclusion the ontological argument seeks to prove, necessarily, theexistence of God based on denition and tautological logic. o!ever, the argument fails due to anumber of inherent "a!s in its reasoning, namely that existence is not a predicate and attempts to dothat !hich it cannot. #espite this, Anselm$s ontological argument is not meant as a proof for theexistence of God and therefore does not fail as an argument for the existence of God. %ven though thisis the case the OA leaves an insu&cient and un'!orship able (God$ behind.

Ontological arguments al!ays follo! this format, the t!o most famous arguments coming from )t

Anselm and *en+ #escartes.

Nature of the Argument:

The argument is an a priori argument using deductive reasoning to reach a logically certainconclusion. This means that any ans!er the argument reaches !ill be necessarily true. or example, thephrase (All bachelors are unmarried$ or (All men are mortal, )corates is a man, )ocrates is mortal$ aredeemed necessarily, a priori true based on -. The logic . The denitions /tautological0 1. Theprogression of the arguments. According to arris (proof can be ac2uired only from valid deductivereasoning$.

All ontological arguments are syllogisms meaning they reach these conclusions based on t!o or more

propositions that are asserted to be true /via the previously stated methods0. This, !e call, arguingaccording to the Socratic Method

The argument is constructed reductio ad absurdum. The conclusion is reduced back to the point ofun!avering truth. Any other possible suggestion to resolve the argument !ould be completely absurd. orexample, (*ocks must have !eight$, any other suggestion as to !hy rocks don$t simply "y a!ay is absurd. The opposite conclusion of the Ontological Argument /than !hich it dra!s0 is absurd.

Ontos ! means "of the essence#. The argument looks at the essence of God, asking if !hat is perceived ( $

Anselm $art %:

/5n a typical AO argument you may not !ish to disclose the fact Anselm argues from a position of faithstraight a!ay, and use this as part of your 4ine of Argument. or example, (The Ontological argumentseems sound, ho!ever it fails, ho!ever it doesn$t matter because it is not a proof and comes from aposition of faith0

Note: &hen tal'ing about Anselm ma'e sure you are referring to "the fool# as the person (ith

(hich Anselm is conversing

)ormulation of the argument:

• God can be thought of as (That Than 6hich 7o Greater 8an Be 8onceived$ /TT67G8B80 or aliquid

quo nihil maius cognitari possit . This is a clear and sound denition for God. 9ltimately it meansthat nothing can be thought of that is greater than God. 5t is important to note that even (the fool$can understand this.

• There are di:erent types of existence-. %xistence in the mind ; in intellectu ; These are things !hich can be conceptualised !ithin

the mind and understood.. %xistence in reality ; in re ; These are thing that actually exist in reality

Anselm uses the example of a painter and a painting. The artist conceives of a painting !ithin hismind, !hat it looks like, the colours he !ill use and the e:ects he !ishes to create. 6hen he putsbrush to canvas this painting exists in re, in actual physical existence. or example, 5 can conceiveof holding <-=== in my mind /in intellectu0 and also physically possessing <-=== in reality /in re0.

%xistence in re ho!ever, is better than existence in intellectu according to Anselm. )urely actuallyhaving <-=== is better than merely thinking about possessing the money. Anselm argues that(existing in reality as !ell> is greater$ than simply existing in intellectu. A painting conceived by



(%ven the fool$ can understand the denition of God that !e have been given, (TT67G8B8$ it follo!s tosay that TT67G8B8 exists !ithin the mind. 5f TT67G8B8 exists in intellectu it follo!s that he has to existin re as !ell other!ise it !ould diminish his greatness to exist solely in the mind /as existence in re is

*aunilo#s criticism:

Gaunilo !rote his criticism of Anselm ‘On Behalf of the fool’ /5t makes sense to put Gaunilo here becausehe counters Anselm - but not Anselm as much0. is criticism is that you can#t +ust de,ne something

into e-istence. 5n other !ords, (Anselm is trying to move from a denition of God to the suggestion ofGod$s existence. This is not a valid move.$ e argues that by virtue of the fact he disagrees !ith Anselmand disagrees !ith the denition of God there is a possibility some may not understand him or apossibility God may not exist.

To highlight his point Gaunilo uses the example of an island. Gaunilo suggests that it is possible to (easilyunderstand his !ords, in !hich there is no di&culty$ that a perfect island exists. e lists a number ofthings that make this a perfect island including (inestimable !ealth>delicacies in greater abundance thanis told of the 5slands of the Blest>more excellent than all other countries$. Gaunilo argues that since !ecan understand this island and it is the most perfect island, follo!ing Anselm$s denition it must exist.

or example, 5 can conceive of the perfect !oman, she is beautiful, loving, kind and doesn$t stand me up.

But ?ust by virtue of the fact no'greater'!oman'than'!hich'any'can'consist this does not mean shenecessarily exists. Think of your o!n example, this could be the perfect !eekend, holiday, round of golf>anything@@@@@@

.s *aunilo successful/

7o. Anselm sho!s us that there is no possibility that God might exist, or that Anselm$s denition may be!rong, because Anselm moves from possibility to necessity. Anselm also doesn$t compare like to like sincean island is a tangible and God is not. urthermore, God surpasses all of Gaunilo$s denitions. God is that

Anselm $art 2:

/*emember don$t necessarily refer to them as Anselm - and . Only refer to (the second part of Anselm$s

argument$0ere Anselm moves to a greater form of existence, from contingency to necessity. /9se these key !ords,they look nice0 To do this Anselm suggests there is no possibility that God cannot exist. e constructs alogical syllogism in the same !ay the rst argument does

• .t is possible for us to thin' of t(o further categories of e-istence: Things that can not

e-ist0 (e call these contingent beings Things !hose existence !as at one stage non'existentand have the possibility of not existing in the future. or example, humans, plants, trees, theuniverse, any synthetic beings.

• &e can conversely thin' of things that cannot not e-ist0 (e call these necessary

beings These are things !hose existence are constant, un!avering and essential. 9ltimatelythese are abstract properties rather than substances. or example, states of a:air, properties,

numbers and relations.• .t is greater to e-ist necessarily 1or al(ays e-ist than it is to e-ist contingently 1have

the potential to not e-ist.

The Argument as a prayer: A lovely AO2 point The relationship bet(een faith and proof

comes later

Anselm accepted that reason alone is not enough to drive a philosophical argument to the point ofsureity it must come in tandem !ith belief. 5n fact, Anselm$s argument comes from a position of faith. eis not saying (#oes God existC$ e is saying (God exists, but am 5 right about thinking !hat 5 do aboutGodC$

5n fact, Anselm argues that his logic is sound but only because it takes the form of a prayer. *eason leadsto error and has to be supported by faith.

e !rites (7or do 5 seek to understand so that 5 can believe, but rather 5 believe so that 5 can understand.or 5 believe this too, that (unless 5 believe 5 shall not understand$. 5n Proslogion Anselm !rites continually

The Cartesian Ontological Argument 19escartes# Ontological Argument

#escartes begins by asserting his o!n existence, a priori. e uses the famous phrase ‘cogito ergo sum’

or ". thin'0 therefore . am# %ssentially this means that !hile he can doubt the existence of others, hecan be sure that he alone exists as he is self'a!are. There are other things that exist a priori, that is,!ithout empirical evidence and through logic. #escartes uses the example of a triangle.

• %ven if a triangle had never existed it !ould still have the properties necessary to make it a

triangle such as 1 sides, angles that add up to -D= degrees, only one right angle etc.• 9nderstanding the nature of triangles is not derived from sense experience, rather, through an

understanding in the mind.• Therefore !e can clearly distinguish ideas in the mind.

aving asserted that things exist !ithin the mind #escartes moves his argument on !ith his o!ndenition of God, (the supremely perfect being$. e arrives at this by saying that there is imperfection inthe !orld /for example, su:ering, pain, disease0 this imperfection only makes sense in the face ofabsolute perfection. The only being that can have an (absolute perfection$ is God.

• Triangles can be clearly conceived in the mind0 have inherent and necessary 2ualities

• *od can be conceived of in the mind as the (supremely perfect being$

• 3-istence is a form of perfection /since it is surely more perfect to exist than not0 and

possessing the quality of existence is a pre're2uisite to something be perfect. 5n other !ords,

existence is a 2ualityEproperty according to #escartes, !hich God /as the )3B0 must have.#escartes lists it alongside "independent0 all'no(ing0 allpo(erful0 creator#

• Since *od is the S$7 it (ould be illogical for him to not be e-istent /since it is a form of

perfection0, God therefore has to exist necessarily. or #escartes (existence$ is as necessary a2uality as it is for a triangle to have three sides, angles that add up to -D= and only one rightangle, (anyone !ho denied that a perfect being had the property existence !ould be like someone!ho denied that a triangle had the property three'sidedness>the mind cannot conceive oftriangularity !ithout also conceiving of three'sidedness>the mind cannot conceive of perfection



7o! !e have looked at both forms of the Ontological argument !e need to assess the relationshipbet!een the faith and reason. 6e !ill do this by looking at !hat a proof is rst and then the nature offaith before examining !hether faith re2uires reason, faith starts !here reason ends or reasonundermines faith.

5t does look as thought the OA is a theistic proof and #avis certainly thinks he is. 5t seems to belogically sound and it certainly strengthens the believers faith in God, supplying him !ith necessary

&hat is a theistic proof/

)tephen T. #avis !rote a discursive article on !hat a (theistic proof$ has. This involves believability,rationality, logic and purpose. This is particularly useful (hen tal'ing about faith and reason

&hen (e loo' at the Ontological Argument (e need to not only decide (hether or not it

works as a theistic proof0 but (hether it actually is one

6hat is a theistic proofC

Attempt to prove the e-istence of *od

• 4as to be logically sound "the argument must be informally valid# ; in other !ords, it has

to be a logical progression to a tight conclusion that does not allo! for interpretation /clarity0.

• The conclusion must be reasonable ; (5f a premise can be sho!n to be more plausible orreasonable than its denial, this !ill sho!, that it is, in itself, plausible or reasonable$. Basically, if it

makes more sense to accept the conclusion of an argument that deny it, it is rational.

The goal of a theistic proof

• 8onvincing premise

• )trengthens the faith of theists or strengthens their conviction in God. /8redibility is key here0

• 5t has the ability to convince people

5s it possible for one to !orkC

• 7ot yet, no'one has found an argument they all agree on yet. %veryone has a di:erent

metaphysical standpoint and therefore !ill naturally disagree. ‘Little arguments possess theirresistible force required’ to convince the atheist.

• Arguments (do not meet the spiritual need for people$ !hen experiencing God



existence. Fou may, of course, !ish to disagree !ith #avis$ understanding of !hat makes a successfultheistic proof, perhaps even calling it poppycock@

The usefulness /or not0 of the ontological arguments has been looked at. or #escartes and Anselm thisdidn$t matter at all since they !ere both coming from a position of faith. o!ever, this is not so usefulfor us. As Russell argued, it looks like the OA is sound but !ust don’t quite belie"e it# ‘f

something is true then belie"e it if it isn’t or can’t be pro"en do not’. )o !hy then do !e

not all believe itC 6hy does it look rubbishC 6here is the problemC Good 2uestion r 3@

)aith and 6eason and the Ontological argument: There is a nice section in the boo' on this

but these are my o(n notes:

%ssentially the 2uestion of this part of the argument is likely to be something along the lines of, !ill theOA help the non'believer come to faith, or !ill the OA strengthen the faith of the believer, or is it useful inany !ayC

9ltimately this boils do!n to the gravitas theistic proofs have !hen presenting themselves, are faith andreason compatible or does reasonErationality undermine faithC 8an you have bothC

5 !ould argue, in an exam, that it !ill never be useful for the non'believer as it re2uires a certain amountof faith /in a denition or in God0. 5t looks reasonable but is undermined. o!ever, this is not to say it isnot useful for the believer. 5t does prove that if God exists he exists necessarily and provides the believer!ith a !orth God to !orship ; the maximally great being, the supremely perfect being or TT67G8B8. Asransceschi puts it> "that (ould only produce a shift in one;s prior sub+ective probability

concerning the e-istence of *od##

.s it useful for the nonbeliever/

• The argument appears to be logically sound. 5t looks as if the reasoning makes sense and !elogically arrive at a conclusion !hich is tautologically sound. 5n other !ords, it appears to belogically sound. *ussell famously exclaimed !hile !alking in Oxford one day , ‘$reat $od in

boots the Ontological Argument works%’

• 7o. As <ardy says, "Ontological Arguments move from the de,nition of *od to the reality

of *od#. 7ot only do !e have to accept the denition of God !e are given, but it also seemsillogical in some !ay. 6ussell argues that +ust because (e can conceive of Santa Claus

e-isting and set out a tight de,nition0 the parameters of (hich (e can surely

recognise0 the language alone of our statement cannot render it true . Therefore, !hile theOA may appear to be logically sound, non'believers !ill never be convinced to faith through it,because it re2uires accepting something unproven

• *ussell and ume !ere empiricists, they believed that denition alone !as not enough to prove

something exists. Fou can prove co!s exist but you can$t prove unicorns exist. Therefore0 forme0 unicorns are none-istent 3ssentially then0 for the nonbeliever they (ill still

re=uire more than +ust a de,nition

• 7o because they don$t have faith and the OA re2uires faith and belief in God.

&ou should de'nitely use (.).*a"is +see the pre"ious page here for useful for the non-

belie"er, especially the bullet points on ‘s it possible for one to work’

&hat is the nature of faith/ 1it might be (orth saying a nice little phrase li'e0 "faith is

ambiguous any(ay#

• A=uinas ; faith is un!avering, ine:able )o one who has faith, no eplanation is necessary.

)o one without faith, no eplanation is possible. +Ama/ing 0uote from 1ig )om e

argued that faith and reason must cohere together. 6e need faith in God because there are certainthings !e cannot understand about him. )ince faith is beyond our understanding there is nothingrational about it, but to A2uinas this does not matter. 5t is the nature of faith that it is not rational.or him this makes perfect sense. or him.

• 5ier'egaard ; aith is like (being suspended over H=,=== fathoms$, there is an element of risk.

• Sessions ; faith is (constructive scepticism$ belief in that !hich you kno! could be untrue but a

denial of the fact its false.

5ant: 3-istence is not a predicate and e-istential tautologies are incoherent

Please note, if you are asked to do a criticism in the exam, this is you main one

3-istence is not a predicate:

5ant undermines ontological arguments using logic0 reason and grammar 6hat a fun guy. edoes this by arguing that existence is used by Anselm and #escartes as a predicate, but it cannot be usedas such.

A predicate is a (ord that adds meaning to the sub+ect in a statement or example, in thesentence (y car is red$, the !ord (car$ is the sub?ect and the !ord (red$ is the predicate. or #escartesthis !ould be saying, (A triangle has 1 sides$, here, the (triangle$ is the sub?ect, and having (1 sides$ is thepredicate. %ssentially a predicate is a property (hich is ascribed to a sub+ect to give it meaning

/the redness of my car for example0. o!ever, existence cannot be used this !ay, argues Iant. 6hen youascribe existence to something it tells you nothing more about the sub?ect, it is not a property. orexample, a triangle !ould have 1 sides whether or not it existed. y car !ould be red whether or not it

existed Therefore the phrase (God necessarily exists$ /!hich is !hat Anselm and #escartes are trying tosay0 attempts to use existence as a predicateEproperty !hich it cannot be.

Iant concludes, therefore, by saying that existence is not a real predicate. Attempting to use it as such, isincoherent. e !rites, ‘ 21eing2 is ob"iously not a real predicate3 that is, it is not a concept of

something which could be added to the concept of a thing.’

3-istential Tautologies are incoherent:

Iant continues, using the phrase (God has necessary existence$ to prove that the OA fails as existentialtautologies are incoherent. To do this he denes t!o di:erent types of statement

-. Analytical statements ; These are tautologies, !here the predicate of a statement is contained!ithin the sub?ect. Or, in other !ords, !here the denition resides !ithin the statement. orexample, the phrase (bachelors are unmarried$ contains the predicate (unmarried$ !ithin theunderstanding of the sub?ect (bachelors$, for the statement is a tautology the denition iscontained !ithin the sub?ect. )imilarly, (my bike has t!o !heels$, has the predicate (having t!o!heels$ as a necessary part of the !ord (bicycle$.

. )ynthetic statements ; These are statements that re2uire further proof in order to be deemed(true$. Tests are re2uired in order to prove synthetic statements true or false. or example, thephrase (m car is red$ is a synthetic statement, as !e !ould need to examine my car in order toprove that it is red /it$s not, it$s silver0. urthermore, attempts to universalise synthetic statementsre2uire the empirical evidence of each individual source. or example, 5 have seen !hite s!ans,therefore all s!ans are !hite, re2uires the individual assessment of every s!an. 5t is not !ithin thesub?ect (s!ans$ that they are !hite /predicate0.

The error that #escartes and Anselm make is that they attempt to make existential analytical claims,



7ertrand 6ussell and *ottlob )rege:

5t is easy to group these t!o together because the pretty much say the same thing. *efer to them in yourexam as *ussell'rege.

*ussell asserted that it is much easier to "at out deny the argument than to nd exactly !here it fails. eargued that the !ord (exists$ is used incorrectly in the argument, building on from Iant. 5f existence couldbe used as a predicate he could rationally argue that ()anta 8laus is a man !ith a big !hite bushy beardthat delivers presents to children. en !ith big !hite bushy beards exist. Therefore )anta 8laus exists$.)tatements about existence must refer to something meaningful. God is not, therefore !e cannot makeexistence claims about him.

rege continued from this by separating irst and )econd Order predicates.

• -st order predicates tell us about the property of an ob?ect in the real !orld. or example, 5 have a

red apple, tells me something about the apple in the real !orld.• nd order predicates tell us about the concept of something. or example, 5 have t(o apples. This

tells us about the concept of apples.

%xistence is a second order concept that does not add to our understanding of the concept and cannot be

7rian 9avies and uses of the (ord is:

There are t!o !ays of using the !ord (is$

-. )aying !hat something actually is or example, a Jueen is a female monarch, a vampire is acorpse that leaves it grave at night to drink the blood of unsuspecting victims and Iristen )te!art.. )aying that something exists or example, There is such a thing as a vampire or there is a current

2ueen of %ngland.

The Ontological argument, according to #avies attempts to combine the t!o by saying that God is necessarily existent ie. That he has existence as part of !hat he is /point -.0 and this means that he is inexistence /point 0. This is incoherent. Fou can do one or the other but they cannot overlap. A 2ueen is afemale monarch but that doesn$t mean she actually exists, other!ise you could do the very same thing



Together !ith ume /!ho argues that a priori statements can never be made about existence since heis an empiricist0 !e have seen the key criticisms to the ontological argument. *emember to includeexamples along the !ay and that Iant is your go'to'guy for criti2uing the ontological argument. )hey

broadly take the guise of 4. 5istence is not a real predicate which is compounded by 6.

7rege and types of predicate 8. 5istential tautologies are incoherent which is compounded

by 9. *a"ies and and Russell and their discussion of the improper use of eistence and :.

Aquinas who says that we cannot know anything about $od for certain and any attempt to

de'ne him is impossible.

7ig Tom A=uinas: The $roblem (ith the de,nition of *od ! another big criticism

%ssentially A2uinas argues that humans cannot be certain !e have the correct concept of God, since he isso far removed from our understanding.

• (The proposition "*od e-ists# is not selfevident to the human mind for the human mind

does not have an intuition of the essence of *od#

• God is ine:able, completely removed from our understanding, therefore ho! can !e assume that

!e have the right denition of GodC• Although !e may kno! that something exists, !e cannot not kno! exactly !hat this is. e uses

the example of someone coming to the other side of a door. 6e kno! someone is there but !e donot kno! that it is 3eter.

6eponses to the criticisms:

% Alvin $lantinga: The Modal Ontological Argument

!he "ost prominent modern response to criticisms.

This is a modern revisiting of the argument. This is particularly good for AO studies and as a response tocriticisms of Iant, A2uinas et al. through its resting place on the possibility of God, not necessarily theabsolute certainty.

3lantinga o:ers his argument from the stance of modal logic as a reformed epistemologist. e !orks fromIant$s basis that if God can be proven as a possibility he has to exist as a necessity .

• #enition God is the being !ith aximal Greatness, this entails aximal %xcellence in every

possible !orld

• There exists the possibility of innite !orlds• 5t is possible there is a !orld in !hich God exists

• 5f it is possible that there is a !orld in !hich God exists, he does exist some!here

• )ince he is the aximally Great being he has to have aximal excellence in every possible !orld

• Therefore God has to exist in every possible !orld

• Therefore he exists in this !orld.

%ssentially 3latninga argues that, through modal logic, since God is a possibility he is then a logicalnecessity. This harks back to 4iebniK !ho argued that God$s existence is non'contradictory, thereforepossible and therefore /due to his nature0 necessary.

2 Malcolm: Anti6ealism and language games

rom and Anti'*ealist perspective it is easier allo! for the possibility of God$s existence. )ince some maybe able to tangibly recognise the possibility of God$s existence, !ithin a specic language game, hetherefore exists, necessarily. Basically alcolm argues that the concept of necessary existence does

5arl 7arth: >our gotoman (hen tal'ing about it being a prayer

Barth is a proponent of the school of (5t$s a prayer you idiots$. 9ltimately he argues that Anselm comes fromthe primacy of faith. e says Anselm "passes from the language of theological in=uiry into prayer

Or rather0 once again he sho(s that the (hole theological in=uiry is intended to be understood

as underta'en and carried through in prayer#

is intention !as not to deduce the existence of God from the denition of his being

as the greatest conceivable perfection, so that the ool is a fool precisely because he denies !hat is already implied, but rather to provide a meditation on the supremacy of God asan article of faith, in !hich the role of the ool is to conrm the vie! that it is the believer alone !ho is in aposition to undersand.

Barth actually argues that the denition of God given by Anselm TT67G8B8 is itself a revealed name,given to him by God. Therefore rendering the !hole thing a prayer and not a proof.



ere ends the reading. *emember if you are unsure of anything feel free to email me. 5n particular 5!ould adivse you look at these notes in tandem !ith the book for stu: on faith and reason, make sureyou kno! this, Barth and !hat a theistic proof is /you can get that into A;& essay0.

ontological argument - a2 level notes

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