on the notion of similarity in indian poetics

MADHAV DESHPANDE

O N T H E N O T I O N O F S I M I L A R I T Y I N I N D I A N P O E T I C S

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The concept of similarity is one of the most fundamental concepts in Indian poetics. It forms the basis of various definitions and classifica- tions of figures of speech (alam. kdra-s). The Sanskrit works use terms like s~dharmya, sdd.rgya and samya for this central notion, while the modern expositions of this subject use terms such as "similitude", "similarity", "equality" and "resemblance". From a commonplace point of view, there is no difference between notions signified by the words sddharmya (abbrev. SDH) and sad.rgya (abbrev. SDR), and in most of the works on Indian poetics, these two terms are used as synonyms signifying a singular notion of similarity.

Very few efforts are made in the works on Indian poetics to make any significant difference between the notions of SDH and SDR, or to interpret them in a rigorous philosophical way. Many discussions in the works on Indian poetics actually presuppose the vague identity of these two notions. This finally results in very unsatisfactory solutions to many problems. The tradition very seldom shows any awareness of these basic problems. This paper makes an attempt to point out some of these basic problems and offers solutions to them.

The concepts of SDR and SDH need a fresh study and new categorical definitions. On the basis of this primary investigation, we can study problems related to the definition of the figure of speech upama "comparison", as well as its classification.

2. S.~DHARMYA AND S.~DRSYA: TWO RELATIONS

2.1. I shall begin the study of these two concepts with the definitions given by Vamanacfirya Jha|kikar in his commentary Bdla-bodhini on Mammat.a's Kdvya-prakdga. 1 He defines sddharmya as:

Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1972) 21-52. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1972 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

22 MADHAV DESHPANDE

SDH is a relation which has the common property (samana-dharma) as its adjunct and both the object and the standard of comparison (upamana-upameya), as its subjunct# [D-l]

He defines sdd.rsya as:

SDR is a relation which has the object of comparison as its subjunct and the standard of comparison as its adjunct. [D-2]

The def ini t ion D-1 states tha t S D H is a re la t ion o f the object o f com-

pa r i son and the s t anda rd o f compa r i son to the c o m m o n proper ty , while

the defini t ion D-2 states tha t S D R is a re la t ion o f the objec t o f com-

pa r i son with the s t anda rd o f compar i son . The re la t ion o f S D R which

is thus a re la t ion between the objec t and s t anda rd o f c ompa r i son is said

to be caused by or based on the c o m m o n p r o p e r t y (samana-dharma- nimittaka). These two defini t ions are given by Jha.lkikar in the second

ed i t ion o f Bdla-bodhini (p. 541).

In the first ed i t ion o f Bdla-bodhing, Jha.lkikar defines bo th , S D H and

SDR, as re la t ions be tween the objec t and the s t anda rd o f compar i son .

In the second edi t ion, he gives the above s ta ted definit ions. Surpr is ingly

enough, a foo tno te in the four th edi t ion (p. 545) says tha t the defini t ions

o f the first ed i t ion are correct , while the defini t ions o f the second edi t ion

are no t correct . I t is no t cer ta in as to who a d d e d this footnote . 3 However ,

for the pu rpose o f the presen t paper , the defini t ions D-1 and D-2 as given

above are the i m p o r t a n t definit ions.

2.2. Two recent edi tors ofKdvya-prakdda, A r j u n w a d k a r and M a n g r u l k a r ,

f ind this defini t ion D-1 no t very sat isfactory. They t ry to show how it

leads to unaccep tab le results. 4 I shall summar i se their or ig inal Mar~t.hi

a rguments as fo l lows:

If D-1 is accepted as valid, then it follows that [a] SDH is the relation of the object of comparison with the common property (C1), and that [b] it is also the relation of the standard of comparison with the common property (C1). If [a] is valid, then the object of comparison and the common property (CD must have some other common property (C2). Similarly, if [b] is valid, then the standard of comparison and the common property (C1) must have some other common property (Ca). But in both the cases, there could be no other common property (C2/Ca) except the property of being an entity shared by the standard of comparison and the common property (C1) or by the object of comparison and the common property (CD. This common property (C2/C3) as entity-ness (padarthatva) is certainly not intended to be conveyed. For this reason, the definition D-1 is not acceptable.

ON THE N O T I O N OF S I M I L A R I T Y IN I N D I A N P O E T I C S 23

My English paraphrase of the original Mar~.thi is rather more formal, but it clarifies the original arguments. The criticism, however, seems to be unacceptable. The original statement of D-1 does not mean that SDH is a pair of relations or either of the two relations as understood by Arjunwadkar and Mangrulkar. It is only one single relation in which the standard and the object of comparison (upamdna and upameya) together form one relatum, the subjunct (cf. ubhaydnuyogika). This single subjunct cannot be divided to yield two relations exactly equivalent to the original relation. This can be explained by a simple example. The relation of A to [ B + C ] is not the same as the relation of A to B or C, or both of these relations. Once this is established, the rest of the criticism needs no independent refutation.

2.3. Both the relations, SDH and SDR, contain the notion of samdna "same or common". This term is related to the term sdmdnya "generic property, or a class property". This class property is defined as 5 a property which is eternal, single and shared by more than one entity. Putting aside eternality for the moment, it is clear that a class property is something which is a single property shared by many individuals or instances. Unless a dharma "proper ty" is shared by more than one dharmin "property-possesser", it cannot be called sdmdnya. SDH is a relation of the object and the standard of comparison together to a specific property. Each of them can be said to have some properties separately, but unless they share in common some specific property, that specific property cannot be called a common property (samdna-dharma). SDH is not a relation caused by or based on a common property, but the common property itself is directly involved in the relation as one of its relata.

2.4. In plain language, it may be said that the fact that two entities have some common property corresponds to the relation of SDH, whereas the cognitive result that those two entities appear similar to each other on account of that common property corresponds to the relation of SDR. In this sense, the relation of SDR is based on SDH. Two entities can have some common properties, and also some char- acteristically individual 'non-common' properties. In such a case, the relation of SDH would stand valid with reference to the common

24 M A D H A V D E S H P A N D E

properties, while the opposite relation of VDH (vaidharmya "relation of having non-common properties") would also be valid with reference to the non-common properties. Thus in the case of the very same entities, these two opposite relations can stand valid simultaneously, and such a proposition does not involve any logical contradiction.

The relation of SDR is different in its nature. It involves the cognitive factor of sarndna-dardana "same or similar appearance". This is a synthetic vision of similarity of the two entities. The two entities appear similar, since they have some common properties, real or imposed. Thus the relation of SDR has to be distinguished from the relation of SDH. The observation of common properties is a necessary preliminary stage in having a synthetic vision of similarity. In this vision, which is a state of cognition, the two entities appear similar as two wholes, irrespective of the differences they have.

Since the synthetic vision of similarity is a cognitive state, the realization of common properties is not the only causal factor in its production. In common experience, two entities do not appear similar and dissimilar to a person at one and the same time. In technical terms, if two entities can be related by SDR with reference to a given person and a given time, then they cannot be said to be related by the relation of VDR (vais~td.rgya "relation of having dissimilar appearance") with reference to the same person and the same time.

2.5. Though the resulting cognitive relation of SDR is conditioned by the realization of common properties, it does not consist of such common properties. It is synthetic in the sense that it is of a generalized nature in which the data of common and non-common properties are de-emphasized, and are psychologically synthesized to give rise to a uniform opinion or judgement. This could be demonstrated in a formal way as follows:

Let us suppose that the entity E has the p r o p e r t i e s / 1 , / 2 , Pa and Ps; and that the entity E has the properties P1, P2, P3 a n d / 4 . Then, with reference to the common properties /1 , Pz, and Pa, there is SDH, while with reference to the non-common properties Pa and P5, there is VDH. Since, in this case, SDH is stronger than VDH, there is a greater chance of cognizing SDR.

ON THE NOTION OF SIMILARITY IN INDIAN POETICS 25

But suppose that the entity E has the properties P1, P2, P4,

P6 and Pa; and that the entity/~ has the properties P1, P2, Pa, P5 and PT. Then, with reference to the common properties P1 and P2, there is SDH, while with reference to the non- common properties P3, P4, Ps, Pt, P7 and Pa, there is VDH. Since, in this case, VDH is stronger than SDH, there is a greater chance of cognizing VDR.

Thus, theoretically speaking, the proportion of SDH and VDH would determine the probability generating cognition of SDR and VDR, or the degree of their strength and weakness. One can take the extreme cases and say that if SDH is 100~ and VDH is 0~ , then the probability of SDR is 100~, and that of VDR is 0~o. On the other hand, if SDH is 0~ and VDH is 100~, then the probability of SDR is 0~ and that of VDR is 100~. Of course, these extreme cases are in practice impossi- bilities, but it shows that all the cases of SDR and VDR could be fitted somewhere in this scale of probability.

2.6. Actually, this demonstration only explains the objective factor involved in the production of the cognition of the relations of SDR and VDR. But this gives us only an index of probability and not of any degree of certainty. This is because there is a subjective factor involved in the production of SDR which plays a decisive role. This leads us to realize further differences between the relations of SDH and SDR.

SDH and VDH totally depend upon the objective data. If there are common properties, then one must accept the appropriate degree of SDH, and similarly, if there are non-common properties, then one must accept the appropriate degree of VDH. These two relations can be realized through observation,

SDR depends on an important subjective factor. There may exist common properties, and yet one may not think that the two entities are similar to each other. For example a piece of paper and a mountain have a common property of substance-ness, and yet probably no one would regard them to be similar. On the other hand, except beauty and shining, there is nothing common in the moon and the face of a lady. Yet they appear similar to poetic insight. An observer has to accept the objective facts of SDH and VDH, but he is free to pass his judgement on the appearance of similarity between two objects under observation. Follow-

26 MADHAV DESHPANDE

ing the objective data and the personal inclination, he may or may not accept SDR.

Thus SDH is analytical in its character, while SDR is synthetic. While SDH and VDH are derived through collection of data, SDR and VDR depend upon the choice and taste of a person. SDH is a logical relation, while SDR is a cognitive or psychological relation.

3. S .~DHARMYA AND SADRSYA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHICALSYSTEMS

3.1. The basic concepts of SDH and SDR did occur to many Indian thinkers in the past, though these concepts were not fully utilized in Indian poetics. When I say that these notions did occur to Indian thinkers, I do not necessarily mean that we always have clear definitions of these distinct notions. In many cases, the distinction is implied. N~ge~abha.tt.a who makes a clear distinction between these two notions, speaks of "a common property which has both the standard and the object of comparison, as its loci". 6 He discusses sddhdran.a-dharma-sa.mbandha "relation [of the object and the standard of comparison] to the common property". He realizes that SDH is the cause of SDR, which is accepted as a separate category by some realists and which is established as the limitor of the property of the primary-meaning in the case of such words as sad.r~a "similar". 7 N~ge~a finds his sources in Kaiya.ta's Pradipa. Kaiya.ta speaks of the relation of SDR being caused by common properties, s P~m.ini himself uses the words sdmdnya "common property" and sdd.rAya "similarity", but we cannot be sure if he intended the above distinction between SDH and SDR. 9 In the above quoted reference, Kaiyat.a makes a distinction between a common property and the relation of SDR. Surprisingly, in another context, he says: "SDR is called sdrndnya." lo Actually, he is changing the meaning of the term sdrndnya in a specific context, rather than identifying SDR with the common property. He gives as an alternative explanation the interpretation of sdrndnya as the common property.

3.2. Bhim~c~rya Jha.lkikar provides interesting information about these concepts as discussed in various philosophical systems. 11 In the opinion of the Mimft .msaka-s, SDR is a different metaphysical category. It is to be noted here, that SDR is regarded to be different from sdmdnya "class


proper ty or a generic p roper ty" (which is accepted as an ontological category in the Vaige.sika system). The school o f Navya-ny~tya also differentiates S D R f rom a c o m m o n property. S D R is defined as: " I f x is different f rom y and still possesses a number o f properties o f y, then the possession o f such c o m m o n properties is called S D R . " ~2 Navya-ny~tya identifies S D H with the c o m m o n property. According to Navya-ny~tya, the proper ty o f beauty is the S D H of the two entities, i.e. a face and a lotus, in the expression " the face is beautiful hke a lo tus" (kamalam ira sundaram mukham). The properties such aspadarthatva "proper ty o f being an ontological ca tegory" , abhidheyatva "namabi l i ty" etc. are SDH-s, i.e. " c o m m o n propert ies", o f all the entities. Sad~nanda defines S D H as a proper ty tha t recurs in m a n y property-possessors. 13

3.3. I t is often maintained in the Ny~ya school that the determinat ion o f vydpti "pervasion, concomi tance" is to be accomplished on the basis o f S D H and V D H . Raghun~tha ~arma explains in his Sanskrit commentary on Vdkya-padrya as follows:

Logical reasoning attempts to establish facts by taking recourse to examples based on common and non-common properties. However, these common and non-common properties are uncertain. By the property of existence, all entities have common participation, while all entities lack common participation on account of non-common properties. 14

In the Ny~ya school, the logical fallacy o f false analogy is termed as sddharmya-sama. This term is very significant. I t clearly brings out the two stages in the realization o f cognitive similarity o f two entities. Two entities are considered sama "similar or equal" on account o f SDH. V~ttsy~yana has a very il luminating discussion on this topic. The discussion is as follows:

The Self possesses action. The reason is that a substance possesses properties causing an action. A stick is a substance possessing a property causing action. The same holds good for the Self. Hence it possesses action. After this conclusion is reached, the other party also defends himself by taking recourse to the same device of a common property. The Self is inactive. Indeed an all-pervading substance is inactive. The sky is all-pervading and is inactive. So is the Self. Hence it is inactive. There is no specific reason why the Self should be active by sharing a property with active things, and not be inactive by sharing a property with inactive things. 15

This a rgument is very simple. I f A has two properties, i.e. P1 and P2, and if B shares the proper ty P1 with A, then by analogy one thinks that


B also must have P2. This makes it clear how entities as wholes are considered to be similar due to the fact that they have some common properties. Because one thinks of two entities as being similar, one expects to find even other properties of one entity in the other. In having this synthesis, one forgets the differences. It is SDR or cognitive similarity which further leads to imposed identification (abhed~dhyavas~ya) of two entities. Kaiyat.a realized this phenomenon, is

3.4. Gautama defines the term hetu "middle term" as: " that which establishes the minor term [as having the major term] by the reason of having common features with the given example." 17 The original rule of Gautama has the term SDH, which V~ttsyayana replaces by sdmdnya, while Uddyotakara explains SDH by samdna-dharmata "the property of having a common property". 17 All these discussions in the Ny~ya works show that at least the notion of SDH is not identified with that of SDR. However, Vacaspati says that SDR as an entity different from the generic property is neither seen nor desired, is In other words, unlike the Mima.msakas, the Ny~tya school does not admit SDR as a separate ontological category.

3.5. Kum~rila goes into the details of the concept of SDR. He says that it is the possession of many common elements by entities belonging to two classes. 19 This can be explained by saying that the perception of a number of features in A accompanied by an awareness that they are present in B, gives rise to the notion of similarity, i.e. A is similar to B. P~rthas~rathi brings out the relative character of SDR. The degree of SDR depends upon the proportion of common properties. I f there are only a few common properties, then the resulting SDR would be less prominent, while if there are more common properties, then the resulting SDR would be more prominent.2° But this does not mean that the common properties themselves or their abundance itself is SDR. Kum~trila categorically rejects such a view. ~1 For him, it is a different ontological category (paddrthdntara).

3.6. Finally I would like to point out an interesting discussion by the Jain grammarian Abhayanandin. While discussing the relation between the sounds a and d, he says:

ON THE N O T I O N OF S I M I L A R I T Y IN I N D I A N POETICS 29

Though the sounds a and d are different (i.e., have vaidharmya or VDH) due to their short and long duration, they have SDH with reference to identical points of articula- t ion and articulators. Hence their designation as 'homogeneous sound' (savar.na) is established. I f there would have been SDH alone [among entities], then just as in the case of existence, there would be SDH with reference to all other properties, and everything would be just one [single entity]. I f there would be VDH alone, then there would be existence for one entity and non-existence for another. 2z

The author envisions a philosophical problem. No two entities have SDH or VDH in all respects. No two entities can have all the properties exactly identical, nor can they have all properties totally different. Every entity has something in common with others and something that makes it different from others.

4. T H E D E F I N I T I O N OF U P A M A : " C O M P A R I S O N "

4.1. After studying the notions of SDH and SDR, it is profitable to investigate the related problems of the definition and classification of the figure of speech uparnd "comparison". As far as the history of the definitions of upamd is concerned, there is almost no doubt about the nature of the definiendum (lak.sya). However, different definitions show variations in the exact logical definiens (lak.san. a) or the distinguishing characteristic of upamd. 23 Before going into the review of the available definitions of upamd in Sanskrit poetics, I propose to offer a fresh attempt to formulate a definition of upamd, keeping in mind the distinction between SDH and SDR, and the causal relation between them. It would help us to understand the logical aspects of the available definitions, if we compare them with the newly formulated definition.

4.2. From the view point of Indian logic, there are three major faults of a definition. A definition may involve over-pervasion (ativydpti), if that which is expressed by the definition is too wide to include more than what should be included. It may involve nonpervasion (avydpti), if the definition is too narrow, so that a part of definiendum is not pervaded by that which is expressed by the definition. A definition may involve impossibility (asambhava), if that which is expressed by the definition does not coincide at all with the definiendum. 24 The property which is to be accepted as the logical definiens for a particular definiendum must exist in all the individual instances of the definiendum, it must not exist in any

30 MADHAV DESHPANDE

individuals outside the definiendum, and obviously it must not be an impossibility for the definiendum to be covered by the definiens.

4.3. With this in mind, the notions of SDI-I and SDR are to be examined as possible candidates for the definiens of upamd. In logical terms, SDH is a causal condition for SDR. This cause-effect relation helps further logical analysis. A causal condition (kdran. a) is always a pervader (vyd- paka) with respect to the effect (kdrya) which is called the pervaded (vydpya). I f x occurs in all and more than all the loci of y, then x can be said to be the pervader and y is said to be the pervaded3 5 This pervader- pervaded relation between SDH and SDR may be explained in the form of three statements:

[1] If there is SDR, then in that instance, there must exist SDH, since an effect must be pervaded by its causal conditions.

[2] If there is no SDH, then there cannot exist SDR, since the absence of a causal condition leads to the absence of the effect.

[3] I f there is SDH, then there may or may not be any SDR, since a single causal condition may not produce the effect in the absence of other causal conditions.

It is quite clear from these statements that SDH pervades a larger sphere of instances, which includes within itself the smaller sphere of the occur- rences of SDR.

4.4. Now, let us consider the nature of upama "comparison" as a poetic phenomenon. In poetry, charming and beautifully expressed ideas have a great value. In comparing two objects in an instance of upamd, a poet does not intend to state the bare fact of the two objects having a common property, but desires to present something beautiful. The aim is to present an appealing idea that would enhance the principal sentiment of the poem, and not to present the analysed data of two entities and a common property. It is often the synthetic vision of similarity which leads to the experience of beauty and charm. There is that synthetic vision of similarity when a poet likens the face of a charming lady to the shining moon. This is generally true of almost every case of poetic comparison.

However general, it cannot be taken to be universally true of all the instances of upamd. It is quite possible in some instance of upamd, that it

ON THE N O T I O N OF S I M I L A R I T Y I N I N D I A N P O E T I C S 31

is charming and yet does not aim at a synthetic vision of similarity. The mere participation of the common properties could be charming and poetic in itself. Where there is a synthetic vision, in those instances, the common participation must exist, but where there is no synthetic vision, in those cases also, the common participation can exist and be quite charming. The basic common participation or SDH would naturally have to be appealing (h.rdya) for a poetic figure.

For example, in an illustration such as kha-pu.spam iva mano-ratha.h "the desire is [baseless] like a sky-flower", the common property shared by both is baselessness. However, the sky-flower is a non-entity which has no form to be subjected to a synthetic vision. Therefore, SDR in a real sense is not possible. However, SDH could be still conceived of, since the baselessness as a property can be well thought of as characterizing a non-entity, whose non-existence itself stands as a symbol for vanity. One may think of unreal but imposed (dhdrya) synthetic vision. ~6 But as compared to this imposed SDR, SDH is more realistic and convincing. Actually, the non-entity sky-flower is in itself unreal and imaginary, but the conception of its synthetic vision is further unreal.

4.5. There is in fact no need to go into such dubious examples. Even in the example candra ira rnukha.m sundaram "the face [of a lady] is beautiful like the moon", theoretically, a similar problem could arise. Since SDR depends upon the attitudes and inclinations of a perceiver, one may say that the moon and the face share the property of beauty, but as two wholes, they do not appear similar enough to manifest a synthetic vision as such. Thus one may only accept SDH, and reject SDR. For another person, the moon and the face may appeal so much that he may forget the differences and enjoy a synthetic vision. Thus, depending upon a person's individual mental states, the same instance of comparison could be looked upon differently, resulting in different conclusions. For both, the instance of comparison is equally charming.

4.6. Thus, from a logical point of view, one must note that in all the cases, the realization of the SDH relation is the common factor, whether there is any synthetic vision or not. This analysis shows that it must be SDH which can be accepted as the definiens of comparison since it satisfies all the requirements of a valid definiens. Thus the definition of


upamd can be formulated as h.rdyam, sddharmyarn "charming participation of common properties". In this context, I am concerned only with this factor in the definition of upamd, and not with other factors which need be introduced to distinguish uparnd from other figures of speech based on SDH. 9'7

One may feel that in doing this, the importance of the synthetic vision of similarity or SDR is totally neglected. This is, however, not the case. By using the terms of Sanskrit poetics, we can say that SDH is svarftpddhd- yaka "a property that brings in the very essential form", while SDR is utkar.sddhdyaka "a property that brings in excellence". This settles the dispute involved in the formulation of the definition of upamd.

5. A V A I L A B L E D E F I N I T I O N S OF U P A M A IN

I N D I A N POETICS

5.1. As stated in Section 4.1, what is given in the last section is an independent investigation into the formulation of a logically valid definition of upamd, and not an interpretation of any of the available definitions in the texts on Sanskrit poetics. Now, the definition formulated above poses a very serious problem, when we turn to the available definitions. Vidy~td- hara, Udbha.ta and Mamma.ta use the term sddharrnya, Bh~tmaha, Vamana, Vidy~n~tha and Vi~van~ttha use the term sdmya; Dan..din, Appaya Dik.sita and Jagann~tha use the term sad.rgya; while Bhoja speaks of a possession of a plurality of common elements (bhayovayava-sdmdnya- yoga). 2s In these definitions, the different wording poses a problem for the interpreter, if we approach them with the distinct ideas of SDH and SDR as explained in the first part of this paper. They may appear advocating different views, and such a presupposition would create a colossal mis- interpretation. One must realize that the distinction of the concepts of SDH and SDR as envisioned here, was not present in the minds of most of these authors. They never intended this distinction, and hence one must examine how these authors deal with these various terms.

5.2. In his Kuvalaydnanda, Appaya Dik.sita uses the term SDR in his definition of upamd. ~9 And he uses the term SDH to define upamd in his Citramim~m. sd. 3o This could be interpreted to mean that the terms are synonymous for him and that they are mutually interchangeable. In his


Sdhitya-darpan. a. Vi~van~ttha uses the term sdmya in his definition of upamd. 31 He uses the term V D H in contrast to sdmya which is the same as SDH. Often the terms V D H and V D R are used in the same sense, and hence their counter-positive relations of SDH and SDR are also identified. Often the commentators interpret the term sdmya to mean both, SDH and

SDR.3~ In Kdvyddar~a, Da.n.din enumerates words expressing similarity with

a final comment saying that these are the words signifying SDR. z3 The commentators on this line interpret SDR with the term SDH. z8 Mammat.a uses the term SDH in his definition, while Jagann~ttha uses the term SDR. Jagann~tha criticizes other elements in the definition of Mammat.a, but does not criticize his use of the term SDH. This could be an indication that both the terms meant the same thing for Jagann~tha.

5.3. Though this is the general case, there are some exceptions. M a m m a - !a and Vidyfidhara seem to have realized this distinction between the notions of SDH and SDR. Vidyadhara, in his Ekdvali, defines uparnd in terms of SDH and then explains: "Those two entities which have a common property are the common-property-possessors (sadharman) . . . . This feature of these two [entities] is sddharmya. For instance, 'shining beauty ' etc. which is well known in the conventions of poets is to be accepted as SDH, and not the properties like substance-hess, cogniza- bility etc." 34 He specifically identifies SDH with the common property. 85 Mammat.a uses the term SDH in the definition of upamd and says that the SDH which constitutes upamd is only that SDH which exists between a standard of comparison and an object of comparison. He specifically says that the relation of these two alone with a common property be- comes upamd. 86 Mammat.a also realizes the cause-effect relation between the two notions of SDH and SDR. He says: "The consideration of SDH leads to the experience of similarity." 37 This very statement occurs in the Ekdval~ of Vidy~dhara.38

5.4. Mamma.ta has used the term SDR in the context of the secondary signification function of a word based on their common properties (gaun. i lak.san, d). He says that SDR is the cause of the secondary signification function in the examples: "Vfihika is Oust) a bull" and "This is (just) a bull".39 The person V~hika and a bull share the properties of dullness

34 MADHAV DESHPANDE

and stupidity etc. This leads to the similarity of V~hika and a bull. Further, this similarity causes the usages where Vahika and a bull are verbally identified (adhyavasdna), or one is superimposed on the other (dropa). This exactly corresponds to the stages discussed by Kaiya.ta. He says that common properties cause SDR, and this SDR further leads to imposed identification (abhedopacdra). 4o Thus Mamma.ta seems to have an awareness of the distinction between SDH and SDR, and also he seems to have used these terms with distinct meanings. Details of this question will be discussed later [Section 7].

6. THE SRAUTi-ARTHI CLASSIFICATION OF UPAM,~.

6.1. There are several ways of classifying upamcL The ~rauti-drthf classification is based on the difference in the way a property accepted as the definiens of uparnd is cognized from words. The term graut~ has been rendered differently as "direct", "auditory", "provenant de l 'audition" etc., while drthi has been rendered as "indirect", "implied", "provenant de sens" etc. By etymology, grautf means that kind of comparison, where the definiens is directly cognized from the heard word (gruti), or where the cognition of the definiens is a direct verbal cognition (g~bda-pratiti). .~rthi is that kind of comparison where the definiens is not directly cognized from a word, but its cognition is based on the meaning yielded by the word.

Instead of using the term "similarity", I am using above the term "definiens of comparison" purposely, because this is the starting point of all differences. There could be a difference of view as to what is the definiens of comparison, but once that question is settled, the above description of the classification stands true. In linguistic terms, the instances of grauti comparison involve indeclinables like iva, yathd etc., while the instances of drth~ comparison involve the adjectival nominals like tulya, sad.r~a etc. There are wide differences in the interpretation of this classification. I shall discuss these differences under two views, i.e. View A, and View B.

6.2. View A

6.2.1. This is the usual view of most of the authors on Indian poetics, traditional and modern. Since the traditional poetics does not make any

ON THE N O T I O N OF S I M I L A R I T Y IN I N D I A N P O E T I C S 35

distinction between SDH and SDR, these two and other similar terms signify a single concept of similarity. This unique concept is the definiens of comparison. This is the first assumption of View A. Sometimes the followers of this view do accept the duality of SDH and SDR and the cause-effect relation between these two. But on the ground of the same cause-effect relation, they identify these two concepts, following the Ved,~ntic doctrine of non-difference between a cause and an effect. 41

6.2.2. According to View A, the particles like ira signify the relation of similarity directly, while the adjectival nominals like tulya signify this relation of similarity indirectly. According to the view of grammarians, the indeclinables (nipata-s) actually do not signify any meaning primarily, but they co-signify or assist other words used in construction with them to signify some special aspects of their meanings. Thus, ira by itself does not signify anything. But used in construction with the words candra.h "moon" and mukham "face", it helps these two words to signify the inherent relation of similarity. This similarity thus signified is the co- signified (dyotya) meaning of the particle ira. Thus the particles like ira directly co-signify the relation of similarity, without the intervention of any other meaning. 4z

On the other hand, words like tulya "similar" are adjectival nominals. According to the grammarians and logicians, if the denotata of two nominals are directly related, then that relation must be non-difference (abheda). 4a In the expression kamalena mukham, tulyam "the face is similar to a lotus", the two words tulya "similar" and mukha "face" refer to the same object. In other words, the word tulya signifies "a similar (thing)" or the dharmin "property-possessor" which is referentially non-different from the face. Thus the direct meaning of the word tulya, according to this View A, is "possessor of similarity", and hence the relation or the property of similarity is cognized only through the cognition of the relatum or the locus. In this sense, the cognition of the relation of similarity derived from the words like tulya is indirect or implied.

6.2.3. Vidyan~tha, in his Pratdpa-rudriya, holds this view. I quote from Filliozat's translation: 44

L'upam~ compl6te est de dcux sortes ~rautf et ~rthL Elle est dire ~rautf, "provcnant de l'audition"~ quand il y a cmploi des mots yath~, iva etc. qui introduiscnt d'ernb16e l'idde

36 MADHAV DESHPANDE

de ressemblance. Elle est dit arthf, "provenant de sens", quand il y a emploi de mots comme sad.rga, sa.mkaga etc. qui introduisent l'id6e de ressemblance, en s'interposant comme porteurs de la propri6t6 de ressemblance qui affecte les deux termes.

The con t ras t between the ways s imi lar i ty is signified is b rough t ou t by

the expressions such as (1) "qu i in t rodu i sen t d'emblde l ' id6e de ressem-

b lance" and (2) "qu i in t rodu isen t l ' id6e de ressemblance, en s 'interposant comrne porteurs de la propridtd de ressemblance ". The c o m m e n t a r y Ratnd- pa.na on Vidy~dha ra fur ther explains the way different words signify

s imilar i ty. I aga in quote f rom Fi l l ioza t ' s t r ans la t ion : 45

L'upama est dite ~rauti quand il y a appr6hension de l'id6e de ressemblance par l'audition . . . . Les roots yatha, ira etc. du fait qu'ils n'expriment pas un sens dont l'id6e de ressemblance pure et simple. Dans ces conditions, "un visage comme la lune" signi- fierait "un visage ressemblance la lune"... . De m~me les roots ira etc. qui d6terminent le comparant, en eveillant l'id6e de ressemblance portent aussi sur le porteur de la ressemblance, en l'intention de celui qui prononce la phrase.

Ma l l ina tha , in his c o m m e n t a r y Tarala on Ekdvali, expresses a s imilar

opin ion . A c c o r d i n g to him, even the words l ike iva indirect ly convey

the idea o f " s imi l a r " , bu t d i rect ly they co-signify only " s imi la r i ty" . On

the o ther hand , words l ike tulya direct ly signify " s imi la r " , and in-

d i rec t ly they convey " s imi la r i ty" by the force o f impl ica t ion . 46 Recently,

S. D. Joshi has expla ined and uphe ld this view. His expos i t ion is the best

and the mos t deta i led expos i t ion on this view. 47

6.2.4. Recent ly , two edi tors o f an excellent Mar~.thi ed i t ion o f Kdvya- prakdga, A r j u n w a d k a r and M a n g r u l k a r , have offered some unconvincing

bu t in teres t ing explana t ions o f the grauti-drth~ classification. I summar ize

thei r Mar~.thi a rguments as fo l lows: 4s

Though it is true that words normally signify meanings by their primary signification function etc., there are some words which can generate a cognition of some peculiar significance just by their very nature as sounds. For instance, the sound of a drum signifies an auspicious event, not by any primary signification function, but by its very nature as a sound. The words like Om, ~ri and the Vedic recitals signify auspicious- ness just by their sound-nature. Similarly, words like ira which qualify the standard of comparison signify the relation of similarity just by their nature as sounds, and not by any primary signification function. The term ~rautf should be understood in the sense of "by nature as a sound", and not in the sense of the cognition of meaning directly from words. It should be translated as "auditory" and not as "direct".

The fantas t ic ex t ravagance o f this exp lana t ion is obvious ly clear. N o one


in the history of grammar and poetics ever meant anything mysterious and extra-linguistic by the terms grauti and drthL

6.3. View B

6.3.1. Before going into the exposition of View B, it is necessary to take a critical glance at View A. The first merit of View A is that it has been accepted by a large majority of authors in the tradition of Sanskrit poetics, and even by most of the modern authors on Sanskrit poetics. Another basic assumption of this view is that there is no difference between SDH and SDR, and all the terms signify a single concept of similarity. With this assumption, View A is perhaps the best method to account for this classification, and this has been systematically demonstrated by S. D. Joshi in his excellent Sanskrit article. Though View A must be accepted as historically valid for most of the authors, still, in the light of new conclusions about the difference between SDH and SDR, this view needs a thorough investigation. What follows is an independent criticism of View A, and View B is also a conclusion independently arrived at. This should not be mistaken for an interpretation of any part icular text in Sanskrit poetics.

6.3.2. In actual experience of an entity as a relatum, there are several stages. Two entities, A and B, are first cognized as just two entities. Then due to some reason, one realizes the existence of a relation, R, between them. After the realization of this relation, R, the two entities, A and B, are cognized as the relata of the relation R. Without cognizing R, it is possible to cognize A and B, but one cannot cognize A as a relatum of R. When a word describes a relatum, it cannot avoid a reference to the relation. It cannot describe an entity in itself. It expresses an entity as a locus or a possesser of a relation. Thus a word expressing a relatum, in fact, expresses an entity, a relation and possession or locus-hess with reference to that relation. The entity is the qualificand, while the relation is the qualifier. Whatever difference there may be in the logical status of the relation, it is certainly expressed directly by a word expressing a relatum.

6.3.3. According to the theory of primary signification of a nominal word, upheld by the Navya-naiy~yikas and grammarians, a word

38 MADHAV D E S H P A N D E

expresses an individual entity (vyakti) qualified by a class-property (jdti) or just a property (dharma). A word like go "bull" denotes an individual qualified by the property of bull-hess (gotva). This property which quali- fies the individual and itself occurs in the primary meaning is called prav.rtti-nimitta "a property that causes or conditions the use of a given word with reference to a class of entities". For instance, the word "bull" could be applied to any individual which possesses the property, bull-hess. A word, whose usage with reference to an entity is promoted by the occurrence of a specific property in that entity, expresses that entity possessed or qualified by that property. Gad~dhara specifically says that the primary meaning of a word consists of three elements, i.e. a property, a locus of that property and the relation of qualification. 50

The Neo-grammarian Kau.n.dabhat.ta discusses the two extreme views that either the property alone is the primary meaning or the individual alone is the primary meaning. After discussing them, he says that actually both of them are primary meanings of a nominal. 51 Nage~a also says that a word expresses a property which conditions its usage and a locus of that property. 52 Thus, the word gu.da "raw sugar" expresses an individual entity qualified by the property of raw-sugar-ness (gu(latva). 53 N~ge~a says that there is absolutely no sequence involved in a cognition of a property and its locus. Neither a property without its locus, nor an individual without a property could be cognized by anyone. 54

6.3.4. The quality-words (gu.na-vacana) have been subjected to interesting discussions in grammar, Nage~a says that the word gukla "white" expresses both, a color (i.e. a quality) and the colored entity. 55 The discussion originates in a v~rttika of K~ttyayana. K~ty~yana is considering the comparison gastrt-gydmd devadatta "Devadatt~ is dark like a sharp knife". Commenting on this example, K~tty~tyana says that the word gyama "dark" denotes the property gydmatva "dark-ness" which resides in both, the object and the standard of comparison. 56 Thus, according to him, the word gydma "dark" not only denotes the dark entity, but also the property of dark-ness. A logical principle concerning a qualificative cognition must not be forgotten. Unless the qualifier is cognized, there can be no cognition of an object qualified by that qualifier. 57 This makes it necessary that the property of dark-ness be also a primary meaning of the nominal "dark", which denotes a dark entity.


6.3.5. With this background, let us consider the signification of the words like tulya "similar". They can be easily compared with the words like guda "raw sugar", gukla "white" and gyama "dark". In the case of the word tulya "similar", the property tulyatgt "similar-ness or similarity" is the property which conditions the use of the word tulya. Thus the word expresses an individual entity qualified by the property tulyatd 'similarity'. It denotes a locus of similarity. Like the word gydma, the word tulya 'similar' finally expresses three elements, i.e. an individual, the property of similarity and the relation of qualification. Just as the word gyama "dark" is an expresser (vdeaka) of the property of darkness, similarly, the word tulya' similar" is a direct expresser (vaeaka) of the property tulyatva similarity'. Thus the property similarity forms an inseparable part of the

primary meaning of the word "similar". This fact has been frankly ad- mitted by the commentary Prabha on Kaun..dabha.t.ta's Vaiydkaran.abhft- .sa.nasdra. It speaks of SDR as a part of the primary meaning of the word sad.rga "similar". 58 Since tulya and sad.rga are synonyms, both of them primarily signify SDR, along with the locus of SDR, i.e. a similar entity. This most certainly goes against View A, which holds that words like tulya "similar" primarily signify only the locus of similarity, but not similarity itself.

6.3.6. In the consideration of the indeclinables like ira "like", the distinction between SDI-/and SDR and the causal relationship between them must be introduced. Similarly, the definiens of upamd is SDH and not SDR. As it is explained previously, words like ira have no independent primary signification function. They are co-signifiers (dyotaka). They assist other words used in construction to signify some specific meanings.89 According to this theory, the particle ea"and" in the construction ghat.a.h pat.ag ca "a pot and a cloth" has no primary meaning of itself, but it helps the words gha.ta "pot" and pat.a "cloth" to signify the relation of collocation (samuecaya) existing between their denotata. Similarly, in the construction with ira, the particle by itself has no primary meaning, but it helps words used in construction with it to signify the relation existing between their denotata.

Now, SDH is the cause of apprehending SDR. Unless SDH is cognized, SDR cannot be cognized. In other words, unless the particle ira "like" first co-signifies SDH, there is no way it can signify or imply SDR. For

4 0 MADHAV D E S H P A N D E

this reason, it could be concluded that the particles like ira directly co- signify SDH, and then they may or may not imply SDR, depending on other factors. Thus words like ira differ from the words like tulya. The word tulya directly signifies tulyatd which is identical with SDR. As SDR is directly spoken of, one infers the existence of SDH without which this directly signified SDR would be baseless. In this way, SDR is directly signified by the word tulya, while SDH is inferred or implied.

Another important difference to be noted is that words like ira directly co-signify the relation of SDH as the principal qualificand, and not as a qualifier. On the other hand, words like tulya "similar" primarily signify the relation of SDR as a qualifier and not as the qualificand.

6.3.7. This last difference explains why only words like ira are compared with a genitive affix (.sa.s.tM-vat). Traditionally this comparison is understood to suggest that like the genitive affix, only words like ira can signify a relation, while words like tulya do not signify a relation. 6° Actually, both kinds of words do signify relations, but only ira can signify a relation in the same fashion as that of a genitive affix.

A genitive affix conveys a relation as the principal qualificand. Struc- turally it is bound with only one word, but by its specific ability it directly signifies the relation between two denotata. Helfifftja explains that in the sphere of a genitive affix, a relation is manifested as the principal element.61 He clarifies that the primary meaning signified by a word ending in a genitive affix represents a relation limited by its relata. 62 He speaks of a relation as having gdbda-prddhdnya" principal importance in the verbal cognition" in the case of a genitive affix. ~3

The word ira, though it always structurally follows the word signifying the standard of comparison, directly co-signifies the relation of SDH as the principal element. In this respect, it compares well with a genitive affix. This also makes it clear that this analogy need not be taken to mean that words like tulya do not directly signify a relation.

6.3.8. With this analysis, let us look into the history of the word grautL This is an established technical term of the Mimfi .ms~ system, and it is accepted in other systems in the same meaning. Murfiri defines the term gruti as a word that causes a cognition of a particular meaning by its primary signification function. 64 ~aflkarabha.t.ta uses the term gruti for


primary signification function itself. 65 gabara says that that which is cognized immediately after cognizing a word is said to be cognized by gruti, e6 He also uses the term gruti in the sense of a direct statement of something. Kum~trila uses this term to refer to a direct assertion. 67 According to the Mimer .msaka-s, the primary meaning of a word is only a generic property, and an individual entity having that property is cognized by implication or by secondary signification function. Thus Some~vara says that a primary signifier word (gruti) has no primary signification function to relate to the individual entity, os Thus gruti is a word which causes a cognition of a meaning without expecting intervention of any other meaning. 69

6.3.9. From this discussion, it is clear that if a word directly expresses a certain meaning, then that word is called gruti with respect to that meaning, and that meaning is called grauta "directly signified meaning" with reference to that word. The meaning which is not so directly signified, but is implied or cognized through secondary signification function is called drtha.

Since the word tulya "similar" directly expresses tulyatd "similarity" or SDR, this SDR is to be termed as grauta. However, the cognition of SDH is derived from implication or inference, and hence with respect to words like tulya, SDH or common-property-participation is to be termed drtha. Similarly, the word ira directly co-signifies SDH, and hence with respect to that word, SDH is to be termed grauta. This cognized SDH may imply SDR. If it is implied, then this SDR is to be termed drtha with reference to the word ira. Since SDH is the definiens of upamd, that upamd where SDH is grauta "directly signified" is the grauti upamd, and where SDH is artha, that upamd is drthI upamd. This is what I have called View B. A perfect statement of this view is found in Nage~a's Laghu- ma~jfq, d: 70

With the use of the words ira etc., the comparison which is of the nature of the relation of the common property [to the object and the standard of comparison] is directly signified, while the apprehension of SDR is through implication. With the use of the words like sad.rga, the apprehension of SDR is a direct verbal cognition, while the comparison is [cognized] through implication.

I believe that this is the right view concerning the grautf-drtht classification of upamd.

42 MADHAV DESHPANDE

7. ~RAUTi-,~RTHi CLASSIFICATION IN MAMMATA

7.1. After a general discussion of this classification, and after expressing my approval of N~tge~a's interpretation, I wish to discuss the classification as handled by Mamma ta in his Kdvya-prakdJa. Most of the commentators on Mammat.a, ancient and modern, believe that Mamma.ta's classification fits in View A as discussed in this paper. In other words, they believe that Mammat.a did not know and did not preach the distinction between SDH and SDR. They also believe that according to Mam- ma.ta, words like tulya "similar" stand only for the individual and do not directly signify the property tulyatd 'similarity'. With all respect to the scholarship and authority of these ancient and modern critics, I would like to differ from them. In the following section, I shall offer my arguments in refutation of these critics, and I shall attempt to prove that Mamma.ta's classification moreover follows View B as I have explained in the last section.

7.2. As 1 have shown in Sections 5.3-4, Mamma.ta believes in the difference between SDH and SDR, and he also accepts the causal relation between them. Thus, when he uses the term SDH in his definition of uparnd, it is purposeful. He also uses the term aupamya for the definiens of upamd, which is actually identical with SDH. He says that aupamya is ~dbda "directly signified" by the words like ira, and it is ~rtha 'implied by the force of the signified meaning' in the case of words like tulya. 71 He himself renders the term grauta by gabdopdtta 'obtained directly from words' and drtha by artha-sdmarthyad avasfyate 'inferred by the force of meaning'. 7z These are Mammat.a's own definitions.

7.3. According to View A, the word tulya signifies only the individual or the relatum, and not the relation of similarity. According to that view, the relation of similarity is known by implication. To study the validity of these concepts ascribed to Mamma.ta by commentators, it is necessary to study Mamma.ta's own views on the primary signification of words.

He discusses a number of views. 73 He defines a primary signifier word (vacaka) as that word whose significative association (sa.mketa) with a meaning has been established. He refutes right away the view that only an individual is the primary meaning of a word. He finally concludes


that it is upadhi 'attribute' alone (upddhav eva sam. keta.h) with which the significative association of a word is grasped. These attributes are of four types, i.e. a jati 'generic property', guga 'a quality', kriya 'action' and yad.rccha 'speakers' desire'. For instance, the word go "bull" signifies bull-hess alone, the word gukla signifies the white color alone, the word cala "moving" signifies the action alone, and the word rdma signifies the desire of the speaker to name somebody as R~ma. The main point is that the primary meaning is only an attribute. Mamma.ta discusses some other views summarily, but this is his final view. 74 As far as the cognition of the individual or the property-possesser is concerned, Mammat.a thinks that the individual is implied by the generic property, since the generic property is invariably connected with an individual. 7s Thus for Mammat.a, the word go "bull" primarily signifies only the property buU-ness, and it implies the individual which possesses that property of bull-ness.

7.4. The view of Mammat.a is different from the view of the Mim~m. saka-s in as much as they believe that all words primarily signify generic properties. ~abara says that a word, primarily signifying a generic property, signifies secondarily an individual associated with it. 76 Kha.n.dadeva states that an individual is cognized through secondary signification function (lak.san.a).

Thus, for Mammat.a, the word tulya, like the words go "bull" and gukla "white", must primarily signify the attribute (upadhi) of tulyata 'similarity'. There can be no argument against considering that the cognition of tulyatd 'similarity' is derived directly from the word tulya, and hence &aura. If there would be no difference between SDH and SDR (or tulyatd), then by this objective analysis, there would be a grautf comparison with the use of the word tulya "similar". Yet Mammat.a says that it is an drthr comparison. The only way to explain this is to say that though tulyata 'similarity' [= SDR] is directly signified by the word tulya "similar", still the definiens of comparison is SDH, and this SDH is only inferred in the case of words like tulya. Mammat.a clearly says: v8

"SDH is implied [when the words like tulya are used], due to the reason that the apprehension of tulyata 'similarity' [= SDR] can be generated only by the consideration of samya [ = SDH]."


7.5. One may have an objection to this interpretation of Mammat.a's classification. If we accept that according to Mammat.a a word primarily signifies only an attribute, then we might have a problem in explaining co-referentiality (sdmdnddhikara.nya) in the example tulyarn mukham "the face is similar". The words tulya and mukha would, then, signify merely tulyatd 'similarity' and mukhatva 'face-ness'. Then the primary meaning of the phrase would be 'the faceness is similarity'. The expression "the face is similar" actually means "an entity which has face-ness is an entity which [also] has similar-hess". This could be obtained only by implication (arthdpatti). Due to this difficulty, one may not be inclined to accept my interpretation of Mamma.ta.

However, undoubtedly this very view has been adopted by Mamma.ta. This also has been accepted by the Mim~tm. saka-s. Kumarila clearly says that in the view of ~abara that a generic property alone is the primary meaning, co-referentiality (sdmdnddhikaran.ya) has to be explained by taking recourse to the secondary signification function: 9 Khan..dadeva says that an individual can be cognized only through the secondary signification function, and then the necessary co-referentiality of expressions could be explained through the individual cognized from the secondary signification function, s° Some~vara replaces the secondary signification function (lak.san. d) by intention (tdtparya). sl Mamma.ta's exact position can be certainly inferred. According to him, the expression gaur anubandhya.h "a bull should be tied [to the sacrificial post]" primarily means that 'bull-ness should be tied'. Since this is absurd, the sentence means by implication that a bull should be tied. The same would apply to the problem of co-referentiality.

7.6. Whether to accept Mammat.a's view as a satisfactory view or not is a different question. We are of course free to disagree with the view of Mammat.a. Actually for this reason, I preferred the view of the Naiy~yikas and Neo-grammarians in Sections 6.3.3-5. According to this view, a word signifies an individual qualified by a property. Thus, co-referentiality could be explained on the basis of direct primary signification function. Thus the words tulya "similar" and mukha "face" primarily signify 'an entity qualified by similar-hess' and 'an entity qualified by face-ness'. If the entity signified by both the words is identical, the expressions are co-referential. With such a view, Kaiya.ta says that co-referentiality in


the expression tulya~ kriya [ = tulya kriyd] "s imilar ac t ion" is cognized

directly by the p r imary signification func t ion of the words, s2 Even

Kum~r i l a admits that, in the view that an individual a lone or an individual

qualified by a proper ty is the p r imary meaning, one can explain co-refer-

ential i ty on the basis of direct p r imary signification funct ion, s8

7.7. Wi th all this discussion, I conclude that the grauti-drthf classification

in Mammat.a is certainly based on the difference in the way S D H is

cognized. I have already cited N~tge~a in suppor t of my in terpre ta t ion

[Section 6.3.9]° I also find suppor t for my view in the commenta ry

Sudhdsdgara on Mammat.a 's Kdvya-prakd~a. I shall quote a passage

f rom this commentary , by way of giving my concluding remarks: sa

If on account of something being cognized through implication, a comparison is called 'implied', then it is appropriate to say that on account of the same thing being directly signified, a comparison is called 'directly signified'. Moreover, the relation of common property [= SDH] alone is [the defmiens of] comparison. Therefore, the classification of comparison should be based on this [SDH] being directly or indirectly signified. For this very reason, the following interpretation should not be entertained: words like yatha directly signify the relation of similarity like the genitive atfix, while words like tulya directly signify the property-possesser also.

NOTES

1 ya.h sadhara.na-dharma-pratiyogika upamanopameyobhayanuyogika.h sambandha.h sa sadharmyam ucyate, ya~ copamana-pratiyogika upameyanuyogikab sambandha.h sa sad.rgyarn ucyata iti sadharmya-sad.rgyayor bheda~/ Bala-bodhinL Kavya-prakaga (Jhal), p. 541. A. B. Gajendragadkar accepts the distinction between SDH and SDR as a psychological distinction, though he admits that the two terms are often used as synonyms. Explaining the causal relationship between the two concepts~ he says: "We first realize that two things have a common property and then the idea that they are, therefore, similar arises in us." Notes, Kavya-prakaga (Gajendra), p. 244.

I follow Ingalls in translating anuyogin as "subjunct" and pratiyogin as "adjunct". Ingalls (1951), p. 44. and Matilal (1968), p. 31-33. 3 Arjunwadkar and Mangrulkar refer to this footnote, but are probably not sure as to who added it. Notes, Kavya-prakaga (Arjun), p. 365. This note is added most probably by R. D, Karmarkar, the editor of the fourth edition, and not by Jha!kikar himself, since the definitions of the second edition are still retained in the text of Bala-bodhinL (Fourth edition, p. 541). 4 Kavya-prakaga (Arjun), Notes, p. 365. 5 nityam ekam anekanugata.m sdm~nyam/ Tarka-sa.mgraha, p. 60. 6 upam~nopameyobhaya.ni.stha.s~dh~ra.na.dharmavattvena.." Parama-laghu-magj:t.sa, p. 121, and Laghu-maRia~a, p. 618.


v s~.rgyar~ tu sffdharana-dharma-sambandha-prayojya.m sad.rd~di-pada-gakyatavaccheda- kataya siddham. Laghu-ma~ja.sa, p. 635, tasmat sadhara~a-dharma-sambandhas tat-prayojya~n sad.rgya~ cavagya~ svfl~ryam. ibid:, p. 340. a gu.na-nimitta-sad.rgya-pratiti... Pradfpa on Maha-bha.sya, Vol. I, See. ii, p. 397. Also see: Scharfe (1961), p. 115-6. a The term samanya occurs in P. II.1.55, P. II.1.56, P. III.4.5, and P. VIII.1.74. The term s~l.rgya occurs in P. II.1.6-7 and P. VI.2.11. K~tty~yana uses the term samanya a number of times and the term sacl.rgya in one place (Varttika 1 on P. V.2.39.) The te rm sadharmya is absent f rom all the three grammarians including Patafijali. lo tatra sad.r~ya~ sarnanyam ucyate/gu.no va dvi-v.rttir bhinno'py abhinnatvena vivak.sitab samanyam. Pradfpa on Maha-bhas.ya. Vol. I, Sec. II, p. 398. 11 Nyaya-koga on the terms sadharmya and sad.rgya, p. 990 ff and 994 ft. 1~ tad-bhinnatve sati tad-gata-bhftyo-dharmavattvam Nyaya-koga, p. 991. This definit ion presents S D R as a proper ty rather than as a relation. But in Navyany~ya, a proper ty is often treated as a relation. Matilal (1968), p. 49. 1~ anugato dharma.h. Ny~ya-ko~a, p. 994. 14 sadharmya-vaidharmya-malakabhya~ hi dr.s.tantabhyarp tarko vastu sadhayitum prakramate/te ca sFulharmya-vaidharmye avyavasthite/sattaya hi sarve.sam sadharmyam eva, vige.sa-r@ataya ca sarve.sa.m vaidharmyam eva/ Amba-kartri, p. 81. 15 kriyavan atma/dravyasya kriya-hetu-gu.na-yogat/dravya.m lo.st.a.h kriya-hetu-gu.na- yuktab kriyavan/tatha catm~/tasmat kriyavan iti/evam upasa.mh.rte parab sadharmyenaiva pratyavati.slhate/ni.skriya atma/vibhuno dravyasya ni.skriyatvat/vibhu cakaga.m nLskriya.m ca/tatha catma/tasman ni.skriya iti/na casti vige.sa-hetu.h kriyavat-sadharmyat kriyavata bhavitavya~, na punar akriya-sadharmyan ni.skriyeneti/ Nyaya-koga, p. 997. 16 gastri-sad.rgyad devadatta gastrf-gabdenocyate, sad.rgya-nimittad abhedopacarad yatha gaur vahika iti/ Prad~pa on Maha-bha.sya, Vol. I, Sec. II, p. 396. 17 udahara.na-sadharmyat sadhya-sadhana.m hetu.h. Nyaya-satra 1.1.34.; udahara.nena samanyat. Ny~ya-bha~ya; sadharmya~ samana-dharmata. Nyaya-varttika, Nyaya- dargana, p. 526-527. ~s na ca sam~ny~tirikta~ s~drgyar~ vastvantara~ dr&tam i.st.a.m va. Nyaya-varttika- tatparya-lika, Nyaya-dargana, p. 560. 1~ bhftyovayava-samanya-yogo jaty-antarasya tat. ~loka-varttika, p. 438. so samanyalpa-bhftyastva-vagena sad.rgyasy~lpa-bhftyastva-darganat/ Nyaya-nirttaya on ~loka-varttika, p. 439. ~ na dharma eva sadrgyam, bhayasta va tad-agraya/ ~loka-varttika, p. 440. ~ akarakarayo.h hrasva-dirgh&ti-kala-bhedena vaidharmye'pi tulya-sth~na-kara.natvena sadharmyam asHti sva-sa~nj~a-vyavahara.h siddhyati/yadi ca sadharmyam eva syat tada astitvenevanyair api dharraaib s&tharmye sarvam ekam prasajyeta/yadi ca vaidharmyam eva syat tada kasyacid astitvam aparasya n~stitvam anyasya canyat syat/ Jainendra- maha-v.rtti, p. 2. za F o r a long list o f definitions o f upama in Sanskrit poetics, see: Ekavalf (Trivedi), Notes, p. 530. ~ Ingalls (1951), p. 81, and Staal (1961), p. 122 ft. z~ Ingalls (1951), p. 28. ~6 An aharya "unrea l but imposed" cognition is defined as badha-kalikam iccha- janyar~ jhanam [Nyaya-koga, p. 135-6.] " A cognit ion which is generated just by a desire for it, and which is coeval with an invalidating cognit ion." ~v See Kavya-praka~a (Gajendra), Notes, p. 244-5.


28 See Note 23. 29 upama yatra sad.rgya-lak.smfr ullasati dvayoO. Kuvalayananda, p. 2. a0 upam~nopameyatva-yogyayor eva sgtdharmyam upama Citra-mfma~nsa, p. 7. al samya.m vaeyam avaidharmya.m vakyaikya upama dvayoO Sahitya-darpana, p. 473. 3z Ibid, pp. 473, 476 and 492. 33 Kavyadar~a, p. 166. 34 vilasati sgtdharmye syad upamanopameyayor upama]samano dharmo yayos te sad- harma.nL tayor bhavab sadharmya.m, kavi-samaya-prasiddharo kantimattvadi, na tu vastutva-prameyatvadi grahyam Ekavalf, p. 195. a5 sadharmya~a . . gu.na-kriya-rgtpam anugatam iha bhavet ... tasya dharma-rapataya ... Ibid, p. 197. a6 upamanopameyayor eva ... s&tharmyam bhavati iti tayor eva sam~nena dharmet~a sambandha upama Kavya-praka~a (Gajendra), p. 34. Gajendragadkar 's interpretation of this passage is not acceptable. He says: "Samanena dharme.na is kara.ne trtiya and not saha. Also the relation between upamanopameya and sam~na-dharma will not be sgtdharmya but samavaya, they being related as gu.na-gutzinau . . . . Sadharmya means a relation between updmana and upameya brought about by a common property." Kavya-prakaga (Gajendra). Notes, p. 244. Actually, sadharmya has never been regarded as being caused by a common property. It is either considered as a relation of the common property to bo th the object and the standard of comparison, or it is identified with the common property. Hence, samanena dharme.na must be interpreted as sam~nena dharmega saha "wi th or to the common property". The relation of the common property with the object and standard of comparison may be, ontologically speaking, inherence (samavaya), conjuction (sa~nyoga) or any other type of relation, but if both are related to one and the same property, then that relation of possessing a common property is sOdharmya. Thus the relations like samavaya do not oppose the relation of sadharmya. a7 samya-paryalocanaya tulyata-pratTti.h Kavya-prak~ga (Gajendra), p. 35. Gajendrag- adkar has some confused remarks on this passage: "This furnishes another glaring example of Mamma~a's careless diction. Samya and tulyata exactly mean the same thing. So the expression as it stands makes no sense. We must therefore suppose that tulyata has been used for sfutharmya. This has been clearly shown by the following clause iti sadharmyasyarthatvat." [Kavya-prakaga (Gajendra), Notes, p. 251.] The expression of Mamma.ta does make perfect sense. The term s~mya refers to sadharmya while the term tulyata refers to s~d.rgya. [K~vya-prakOAa (Jhal), p. 552.] Mamma~a is making a plain statement that the consideration of sadharmya is a cause of the similarity of objects, and as the words tulya "similar" etc. directly speak of this similarity of objects, one has to infer the relation of sadharmya by taking recourse to the cause-effect relation between SDH and SDR. Another reason to equate samya and sadharmya is that if tulyata were identical with sgutharmya, then it would be directly signified by the word tulya and it would not be ~rtha "implied". [See Section 6.3.5.] The diction of Mamma~a's expression is far from being careless. I t is rather an established diction. Vidyadhara's Ekavali uses exactly the same expression. [See Note 38.] as s~mya-paryaloeanay~ tulyatti-prat~ti.h Ek~val~, p. 196. a9 Kavya-prakaga (Gajendra), p. 17. 4o See Note 16. 41 For an excellent exposition of this view, see S. D. Joshi (1964), p. 37 ft. With all respect to Dr Joshi, who happens to be my revered teacher, I beg to differ from his view that the graut~-artM classification in Kavya-prakaga is in accordance with View A,

48 MADHAV D E S H P A N D E

as I have explained. My disagreement is articulated by way of my exposition of View B. [See Sections 7.1-7.] However, I am most thankful to Dr Joshi for his constant comments and criticism. 42 S. D. Joshi (1964), p. 38. 48 Ibid., p. 38. also: n6marthayor abhedanvaya-vyutpatti~ ... nip6t6tirikta-vi¢aya Pa- rama-laghu-ma~j&s~, p. 117. Also Vyutpatti-v6da, p. 1 ft. 44 Pratapa-rudriya (Filliozat), p. 210. pf~rod dvividha irautf arthi ceti/s6k¢at sad.riya- pratipddakev~di-~abd~nam prayoge ~rauti/dharmi-vyavadhanena sdd.r~ya-pratip6dak~n~ra sad.r~a-sa~k6da-nikaJa-pratikag6di-gabddnam prayoge 6rtM/ Prat@a-rudra-yago- bhas.aea, p. 356. 45 Ratn@aea, Pratapa-rudrfya (Filliozat), p. 210-1. grutya sadrgya-pratip6dan6t grauti/nanu yathev6di-gabdana~ sad.rgadi-gabdavat sadrgya-vigi~fa-paratvabhavat kevala- sad rgya-paratva~ vaktavyam/tatha sati mukham candra-s6d.rgyam ity artha~t syat/ ... evam upamdna-vige.sa.na-bhata yathevadaya.h gabda.h ~rutya sad.r~yarn bodhayanto'pi ~abda-gakti-svabhavy6t tatparye.na sd~.rgyavati varttante/ Ratn@aea, Prat@a-rudra- yago-bh~a.na, p. 356. 46 ivad~n6m apy arth6t sad.r~a-paryavasana~, grutya tu sad.rgya-gamakatvam eva iti ... tulyadi-gabdanarp tu ~rutya sad.rga-paratvarn, arthat tu s6d.rgya-paryavasanam. Tarala on Ek~valt, Ek6vali, p. 198. This explanation by Mallinfitha is a very good explanation of View A, but I doubt if this is the view of Vidyhdhara, whose diction bears a verbatim correspondence to the diction of Mammata. Mallin~tha himself is not totally consistent with his own view. In a different context [Tarala on Ekavali, p. 216], he says that the word tulya directly signifies sdd.rgya "similarity" (sad.rgya-v6cakaea tulyadi-padam), while in the passage quoted above, he says that the word tulya directly signifies only sad.rga "similar", while sadrgya "similarity" is implied. 47 S. D. Joshi (1964), p. 39. as K6vya-prakaha (Arjun). Notes, p. 373-4. This discussion by the editors of Kdvya- prakaga has really missed the point. aa This has been fully supported by V. M. Kulkarni. He comments: "Chronologically speaking this discussion of the distinction between s6dharmya and sad.rgya is of very late origin and the early ~la~kfirikas were not aware of any such distinction as is clear from their usage of the words s6d.rgya, samya and sadharmya as synonymous. It is Udbha ta who first uses the word sadharmya instead of sad.rdya employed by his eminent predecessors Bharata, Bhfimaha and Dao0in. I f he had in his mind the supposed distinction, he would have definitely expressed it in his V.rtti. Even Mammata who borrows that word from Udbhata nowhere gives any clue to assume any such distinction. On the contrary, he employs the words sadharmya, samya and s6d.rgya synonymously." Kulkarni (1957), p. 1957. I agree with Kulkarni except that I think Mamma~a knows and intends the distinction. Recently, Brahm~nanda Sharma claims that if at all there is any distinction between ira and tulya, it can only be explained by taking recourse to the distinction between s6dharmya and sad.r~ya. Sharma (1964), p. 14. 5o tad-viSible ,~aktir it), asya tad-dharma-tad-vaiJi~tya-tad-6graye~u tri.sv eva ~aktir it), artha.h ... prav.rtti-nimitte'pi gakte~ sattvat tasyapi vacyataya vacyatve sati vacya- v.rttitve sati vacyopasthiti-prakaratvam iti prav.rtti-nimitta-lak~atte vacyatve satiti vige- .saea-dana~, ]6tydk.rti-vyaktayab pad6rtha iti nydya-satrokta~ gotv~di-jdter gav-adi- pad6rthatva~n copapadyate/ ,.~aktl-vada, p. 41. According to this Nyfiya view, both the individual and the generic property are primary meanings, while according to the view of Mim~!as~, only a generic property could be the primary meaning. The extreme

ON THE N O T I O N OF S I M I L A R I T Y IN I N D I A N POETICS 49

views that the individual alone is the primary meaning, and that the property alone is the primary meaning are discussed by Patafijali. See: Samarthahnika, Text, p. 23 if, and Translation, p. 148 ff. 51 vastutas tu "na hy ~k.rti-padarthakasya dravya.m na padartha'" iti bha.sy6d vigi.s.tam eva vacyarn. Vaiyakara.na-bha.sa.na-sara, p. 236. 53 pratipadikartha-padena prav.rtti-nimitta-tad-agrayayor eva graha.nam. ~abda-ratna, pp. 758-9. 58 gu(ladi-gabdena gud. atva-j~ty-avacchinno gud. a-padav6cyaO... Parama-laghu-mahj~.sa, p. 27. 5a atra viJe.sa.na-vi~e.syayor ubhayor api gaktiO gabdato jati-dravyayo.h kramena bodhananubhav~t... 6grayanali~gita-jati-pratyak.sasy6py anubhava-viruddhatvena tatr~pi vastutab kram6bhavat/ Laghu-mafzj~.sa, p. 1107. 55 eva.m ca gukladaya ubhayatra ~akt~.h Ibid., p. 1130. ss na va gyamatvasyobhayatra bh~vat, ubhaya-gutza-vacakatvac ca gyama-gabdasya samanya-vacanatvam Varttika 2 on P. II.1.55, Maha-bha.sya, Vol. II, See. II, p. 397. 57 n~g.rhfta-vi~e.san~ buddhir vige.syam upasa.mkr~mati. 58 sad.r~a-padarthaika-dege sad.rgye Prabha on Vaiyakaratta-bhft.sat~a-sara, p. 375. 59 dyotakatva~ ca sva-samabhivy6h.rta-pada-ni.st.ha-~aktyudbodhakatvam Parama- laghu-magj~.sa, p. 113. For different views concerning the meaning of ira. See: Ibid, pp. 120-2. s0 S. D. Joshi thinks that if bo th ira and tulya are directly said to signify the relation, the statemenent of Mammat.a, i.e.s.a.st.h~vat sambandham pratipadayanti, would be contradicted. In his opinion only words like iva directly signify the relation, and hence only with them there is graut~ comparison. Joshi (1964), p. 39-40. 51 yatra tu pr~dhanyena udbhata.h sambandhab sa vis.aya.h .sa.st.hya.h PraMr.naka- prakaga, p. 108. 53 abhidha-vy~p6re.na ¢as..thy-antasya padasya sambandhy-avacchinna-sambandha- pradhanatvat Ibid, p. 110. ~ sambandhasya gabdam pradhanyam Ibid, p. 113. 5~ yae chaktya padartha-j~6na.m janayati, yad yatra gakta.m tat tatra grutir ity asyaiva suvacatvat/ Murari in his A~gatva-nirukti, quoted in the M~ma.msa-koJa, Vol./VII, p. 3981. ~5 grutya abhidhaya lak.sa.na badhyate ~aflkara-bhat.~a in his Bala-mirnarl~sa-prakaga, quoted in Mima~sa-koga, Vol. VII, p. 3969. 6~ gruty-avagata.m hi grava.nad avagatam ~abara, quoted in Mima.msa-koga, Vol. VII, p. 3973. 87 grutib lak.saeaya baliyasr Sabara and KumArila, quoted in Mima.rnsa-koga, Vol. VII, p. 3968. 5~ gruter dravyanvaye vyaparabhavab Some§vara in his Nyaya-sudha, quoted in Mimar~sa-koga, Vol. VII, p. 3972. 59 grutiO nirapek.so rava.h / yac-chabda-]Kanam anya-vyavadhanam anapek.sya yad-artha- j~a-nam janayati sa tasminn arthe Jrutib Mimd~ns~-ny~ya-ko~a, quoted in Mim~nsa- koJa, Vol. VII, p. 3968. 7o eva~n ca ivadi-yoge sadhara.na-dharma-sambandha-rftpa upama vKcya / sKdrgya- pratftis tv arth~ / sad.r~adi-pada-prayoge sad.r~ya-prat~ti.h gabdt/ upama tv arth~/ Laghu- rnag]a.s6, p. 334-5. For more details, see Ku~jika on Laghu-makja.sa, p. 631-2. ~ iva-gabdasya sad-bh~vat gabdam aupamyam.., tulyarthe vatir iti artham aupamyam Kavya-prakaJa (Gajendra), p. 70-1. 73 Ibid., p. 49.

50 MADHAV DESHPANDE

73 Ibid., p. 10-11. 74 " In discussing the question of the conventional meaning of words, Mamma~a mentions the jatyadi view of the grammarians first and apparently accepts it. This is confirmed by his ~abda-vy~p~tra-vicara where he refutes the jatir eva view of the Mim~msakas." Kavya-prakaga (Gajendra). Introduction, p. 6. For the exact difference between these two views, see: Kdvya-prakfiga (Arjun), Notes, p, 248-9. 75 vyakty-avina-bhdvat tu jatya vyaktir ak.sipyate .... na tu ~abdenocyate Kfivya- pral~ga (Gajendra), p. 15. ~6 akrti-vaeanab gabda~ tat-saha-caritfi~ vyakti.m lak.sayati ~abara in his Bhfi.sya on Jaimini, quoted in Mtmfi.rns~-koga, Vol. II, p. 780. 77 vyakter lak.sa.nay~ bodha~ Kha~tOadeva in his Bh~.tta-Dfpikfi, quoted in M[m~ns~- koga, Vol. II, p. 806. 7s Kfiwa-praka~a (Gajendra), p. 35. 79 sarnanadhikaranyadi ca... lak~anaya kalpyam (bhas.ya-mate) Kum~rila in his Tantra-varttika, quoted in Mim~.msff-koga, Vol. II, p. 796. 8o vyakter lak.sa~ayfi bodha.h.., sam~n~dhikara~ya~ ca vyakti-dvarakam Khan..dadeva in his Bhfit.t.a-dipika, quoted in Mima.msfi-koga, Vol. II, p. 806. sl samanadhikara.nyarn bhinna-prav.rtti-nimittfinfirn ekasminn arthe v.rttis tatpary~khyfi Some~vara in his Nyfiya-sudh~, quoted in Mirna~sa-koga, Vol. VII, p. 4293. 82 tulya~n kriya ity anayos tu padayoO grutyaiva samanadhikara.nyopapatti.h Pradipa on Maha-bh~.sya, Vol. II, p. 533. This is a very convincing explanation, though there is no reason to believe that Mammat.a held this view. Chaudhuri in fact criticizes Mammata for considering that the individual is cognized through implication (arthapatti), and he admits that the Ny~ya view that the individual and the property are both primarily signified is the most satisfactory view. Chaudhuri (1959), p. 82-3. This is also the criticism of Arjunwadkar and Mangrulkar against Mammata. Kavya- prakaga (Arjun), Notes, p. 280-1. Mahfi-bh~¢ya discusses a view called gu.na-vada, which holds that a property alone is the primary meaning of a word. Thus the words v~rab puru.sa.h " a brave man" primarily mean, according to this view, "brave-hess" (v~ratva) and "man-hess" (puru.satva). Co-referentiality (s~manadhikara.nya) of the two expressions could be, then, explained only by taking recourse to the individual which is the common locus of these two properties, but which is by itself not primarily signified. [avacyasy~py upakfirakatvam agriyate Prad~pa on Maha-bh8~ya]. See: Samarthfihnika, Text, p. 24 and Trans. p. 153-4. 83 jfiti-gu.na-vigi.s.ta-vyakti-vacanatvena duddha-vyakti-vacanatvena va pratyak.se bhavati samanadhikaran.yam Kumarila in Tantra-varttika, quoted in Mimfi.msa-koga, Vol. II, p. 793. s~ yasyaiva hy arthatayopamayfi ~rthatva.m, tasyaiva grautataya grautatvaucityfit [ k i~ ca sfidharmyam evopameti tasyaiva drautatvdrthatvabhydm upamfi-bhedo yukta~ / ata eva "'yathfidinfi s~l.rgya-rfipa.h sambandha eva sak¢fid abhidh~yate, s.a.st.hfvat, tulyfidibhis tu dharmy api" iti w~khyanam anupfideyam/ Sudhfisagara on Kfivya-prak~ga, Kfivya- prakaga (Sudha,) p. 553-4. The only difference between view A as discussed in this paper and the view rejected by Sudhfi-s~gara is that, according to view A words like tulya primarily signify only the individual or 'something similar' and not the property of similarity. According to the view rejected by Sudh~-sagara, words like tulya seem to signify both, the individual and the property. Note the expression dharmy api "also the property-possesser". However, the interpretation supported by Sudha-sagara is view B~ which I believe is the view of Mamma~a.


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52 MADHAV DESHPANDE

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on the notion of similarity in indian poetics

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