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Sebastian Navarro

Philosophy 160 Paper Assignment

26 February 2015

Utilitarian and rights-based views each provide good components as to what should

constitute as a good moral theory. Neither view, however, are immune to objections and an array

of counterexamples. This essay will highlight the strengths of utilitarian and rights based views

and their variations as well as raise objections to each. Considering such, the view of morality

which would face the least amount of objections will incorporate components of each view while

remaining sufficiently distinct to avoid their objections.

In his essay "The Archangel and the Prole", R. M. Hare attempts to defend his conception

of utilitarianism. Hare suggests that the conventional objections against utilitarianism are not

mindful of its actual world implications. Hare introduces two levels of moral thinking, "critical"

and "intuitive". At the intuitive level of moral thinking, we act accordingly to moral rules which

we have internalized by maturing in a society (Hare 1). When moral rules conflict, critical level

moral thinking is activated, where we consider what we are bound to do by assessing all relevant

factors in our decision, thus being a more comprehensive form of moral reasoning (Hare 1).

Hare offers definitions of the "archangel" and the "prole" to indicate the different types of

moral thinkers, where the archangel always performs actions which are resultant of critical, good

moral thinking and the prole always performs actions which are resultant of selfish, bad moral

thinking (Hare 1). Hare believes that we need moral rules because humans are inclined to act

selfishly, similar to the prole. Through our intuitive thinking, Hare asserts that we generally are

provided good rules to guide our actions. We are unable to think in a similar fashion and reason

as fast as the archangel in every decision problem, so rules generated by our intuitive level of

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reasoning will provide a generally good outcome for most societal members and thus is good by

utilitarian standards. The rules which we act upon are at times similar to what Nozick and

Thomson would conceive as rights, though Hare would not perceive these rules to be as stringent

as rights. Moral rules therefore often provide us a good outcome even by the standards of rights-

based views. However, the rules we adopt are dependent on how our intuitive thinking is, which

is further dependent on the society in which we mature in. The rules are only good rules, such as

those which generally respect rights, if we live in a good society. A malicious society would

likely have bad rules. Therefore, Hare's view would only be probable in societies which have

favorable rules that often coincide with conceptions of rights.

In totality, Hare defends his version of utilitarianism well. The rules which we act upon

are at many times favorable by utilitarian and rights-based view standards. If we follow the rules

of our intuitive thinking, which in good societies will often coincide with our conception of

rights, we often attain a good outcome. The rules are also not as stringent as rights; critical level

of moral thinking may provide better outcomes where rights-based views are rigid. Nonetheless,

given the relative nature of moral rules in different societies, what we may intuitively value, such

as our lives, may be compromised on behalf of faulty grounds in societies with bad intuitive

rules and have it be morally permissible. Consequently, I do not believe that Hare provides a

substantially strong theory of morality.

In his essay "Moral Constraints and Moral Goals", Robert Nozick asserts that rights

should be viewed as side-constraints on our actions, rather than goals to be promoted. Nozick

holds that rights are never to be violated against our will under any circumstances. He ascribes

moral rights to be rights that all persons possess, irrespective of any societal factors such as

social status, third-party opinions, and cultural arrangements. Nozick's side-constraints view of

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rights would recommend that when one is deciding what course of action to take in a decision

problem, one should consider all the options, and eliminate all options which would violate a

person's moral rights; after such deliberation, it is morally permissible to choose from the

remaining options which do not violate a person's moral rights (Nozick 139). Consistent to his

notion, Nozick states that no person shall be treated as a means to promote a certain end, which

is often permissible by utilitarian standards, as doing violate a person's moral right (Nozick 138).

Nozick would agree that just because Maria is healthy and her blood is of a rare type, she is not

morally bound to donate blood even if it would save one hundred lives. Maria's right to her body

should not be utilized as a means to save lives if she does not want to do so. We may intuitively

think of Maria as selfish, but there is more to Nozick's view. Rights may be waived

voluntarily,voluntarily transferred, and involuntarily forfeited. Considering such, Nozick

believes that Maria can waive her right to her body and donate blood to save another person's life

as it is done voluntarily through her waiver. The ability to waive a right may make us feel more

at ease with Nozick's absolutist view of rights, but I do not think there is reasonable belief to

assert that all people are willing to take such selfless action.

I am partially sympathetic to Nozick's conception of rights as side-constraints as it holds

all humans to an equal standard in that our rights should be equally respected (except when rights

are forfeited). Nozick rejects pure utilitarianism, which measures morality based on the relative

and subjective concept of happiness and well-being. This stands in stark contrast against Hare's

view as Nozick would not compromise what we hold inherently valuable, such as our life, for the

sake of promoting someone's subjective view of happiness. Nonetheless, Nozick's view is too

rigid, as there exists situations in which it should be permissible to violate someone's rights. If

Martha's right to her rope (her property) is violated to prevent the death of Jose from falling off a

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cliff, I think that such a rights violation is permissible. I do not think that the two rights should

share equal moral standing as they are implicitly given by the side-constraints view. If Nozick's

valuing of rights is derivative of the notion that humans are morally important beings and their

lives should be valued highly, why would it be morally permissible for someone to refuse to lend

their rope to save another person's life? It seems that in cases such as this, human life is not

valued to the degree that Nozick supposedly perceives them to be.

I believe rights-based views of morality would prevent the unpredictable nature of

utilitarianism, but there seems to be situations in which rights must be violated against someone's

will if such a violation would amount to a substantially good outcome. The side-constraints view

is too stringent and may at times undermine too much for the sake of preserving rights.

In her essay "Tradeoffs", Judith Thomson partially agrees with Nozick in that rights

should be held to a high regard, but disagrees with his belief that one should in any circumstance

never act against another person's rights. She believes that not all rights are equal in importance

and thus it is not the case that not all rights are never to be violated as Nozick would suggest.

Thomson's view holds that there are two different types of rights, both of which have a different

level of importance than the other. For the purposes of this essay, I will focus on her notion of a

"claim" right, which she holds to be more valuable than a "privilege" (Thomson 1). A claim right

is essentially a contract, where if Jose has a claim against Martin, Martin has a binding duty to

fulfill Jose's claim through whatever action that is.

Unlike Nozick, Thomson believes there are situations such that it is acceptable to act

against another persons right, given the proper conditions. Thomson supports this by introducing

her notion of an infringement of a right. Infringements of a right occur when one does not fulfill

a claim (Thomson 1). A violation of a right only occurs when the infringement of a right is

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wrong with respect to all things considered. Not all infringements amount to violations, and thus

not all infringements are morally bad. Jose may infringe on Martha's right to her property, say

her wrench, to fix a pipe that would flood the city and cause a catastrophe. Thomson would hold

this to be an infringement of Martha's claim to her property, but not a total violation of her right

with all things considered, as the infringement resulted in an outcome that was substantially

better than the the outcome of not infringing. Thus, the infringement is morally permissible. I

believe that Thomson's assertion provides a better version of a rights-based view of morality than

Nozick's view. Utilizing Thomson's terminology, Nozick's notion that all infringements are

violations is too rigid.

Thomson later introduces the tradeoff idea, which holds that it is acceptable to violate a

right when it is sufficiently bad for others in the instance where the right is not violated; it

essentially consults the ratio of interests between the claim holder and non-claim holders to

determine when it is permissible to violate a right. Thomson believes that the basic conception of

the idea does not necessarily value basic rights. Thomson raises several objections to the tradeoff

idea, all but one of which I do not view as problematic. She objects against the tradeoff idea by

providing the "High Threshold Thesis" which holds that the benefits resultant of violating a right

cannot be added up among people and weighed against the benefits of not performing such an

action (Thomson 10). Moreover, the thesis only concerns itself with the benefits that one person

receives as a result of a rights violation; a right may only be violated when the benefits that one

person receives is sufficiently good. With this thesis, Thomson derives the notion that "numbers

don't count". Alternatively said, just because tripping Jose and injuring him would make Martin,

Ramon, and Alexa laugh and gain an aggregate of 3 units of utility (1 each), this does not make it

permissible to trip Jose, minding that he would have 2.5 utility points if he was not tripped. It

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may seem unfair that Jose would have to suffer consequences in order to make Martin, Ramon

and Alexa laugh. Thomson believes that only an instance where either Martin, Ramon, or Alexa

individually substantially benefit by tripping Jose, such as by saving themselves from death, is

morally permissible.

Thomson's claim is reasonable in examples as such, but is questionable in the context of

examples where there is only a slight disparity between the benefits between the claim holder

and non-claim holders. If one was given the option to either cut off Alexa's leg, which would

subtract 5 utility points from her, or cut off both legs of 10,000 people resulting in a reduction of

4.9 utility points in each person, Thomson's thesis would hold that it is not sufficiently better for

one person than Alexa's and thus it is morally permissible for Alexa to refuse to cut her leg off.

At some number, we would feel inclined to believe that it truly is wrong to not infringe on one's

right in order to prevent a large number of people from having a very similar outcome. Though I

cannot give a finite number as to where the High-Threshold Thesis is wrong, as doing so is

arbitrary, I do not believe I am too vague in stating that the thesis would seem morally wrong at

some point, compromising too much for the sake of respecting one person's decision.

Thomson's claim allows for more leeway than Nozick's in that it is sometimes

permissible to violate a right. She provides strong counter-examples against the tradeoff idea

enough to generally discount it, but I find the High Threshold Thesis is too restrictive and

intuitively implausible in some situations. It does not provide comprehensive consideration in

every situation and thus holds the same fault as Nozick's view.

In his essay essay "Rights and Agency", Amartya Sen notes examples against "welfarist

consequentialism", which is the notion that morality is based on the total utility that an action

entails and the distribution of utility across all affected persons (similar to Hare's view), and

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"constraint-based deontology", a similar view to that of Nozick (Sen 3). Welfarist

consequentialism may seem as a plausible theory as it recognizes that everyone's utility may not

be the same but we should attempt to maximize it for each person so that it is the best it could be.

Nonetheless, Sen shines light on the fact that welfarist consequentialism does not guarantee that

very basic rights could be respected. Under such a view, an event where I am beaten to maximize

the utility of many others would be morally permissible; but since the theory attempts to mind

the utility of all, my utility would be attempted to be maximized by my hospital bills being paid

for. Thus, welfarist consequentialism may violate my well-being for the sake of other's utility.

Regarding "constraint-based deontology", a view to Nozick's liking, Sen believes that rights are

not equal in worth, a notion which I mentioned in my discussion of Nozick. Martha's right to her

rope is not the same to Jose's right to his life; both are rights and both should be respected

equally according to constraint-based deontology. Similar to Sen, I do not intuitively hold such

rights to be equal to one another.

Sen's view raises very strong objections to Hare's and Nozick's views of morality. I share

the same objections as Sen and thus I also believe that neither welfarist consequentialism and

constraint-based deontology are the best notions of morality. However, Sen does not commit to

any view of morality. Consequently, there is no moral view to agree with Sen despite his relevant

objections to other views of morality.

Considering all the problems with the above mentioned views of morality, I cannot

commit fully to any of them. Hare's view does not always protect what we may consider to be

moral rights. Nozick's view is too rigid and allows no room for consideration of any option that

would violate a right, even if the outcome were substantially bad. Thomson's view values rights

and recognizes the need to infringe them in some situations, but her High-Threshold Thesis is too

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stringent as well. Sen, while acknowledging the weaknesses of Nozick's and Hare's view,

provides no explicit guidance to any form of moral theory.

The best theory of morality, considering my reasoning and objections, would be one

similar to Thomson's view in that rights should be valued highly and there exist situations in

which it is permissible to infringe upon a right, but dissimilar to her view by not fully accepting

the "numbers don't count" implication by the High-Threshold Thesis. Such an implication should

be revised in that the numbers do count when a sufficient number of non-claim holders are

permanently harmed psychologically or physically to an extent where they will never fully

recover. Whether the number is sufficient will vary per case and should thus be evaluated per

case, due to the notion that not all rights violations are equally bad. In a sense, a good view of

morality should also adopt some form of utilitarianism; minding the net utility should not

entirely dictate the morality of an but it should be taken into consideration such that it could

affect what is moral or not. In all, a view that highly values rights, allows for infringements of

rights in some situations, amends the High-Threshold Thesis as mentioned above, and considers

utility in the assessing the morality of actions would be the strongest notion of morality.