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O N C O M M E R C I A L A V I A T I O N S A F E T Y

ISSUE 54 THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THEUNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE ISSN 1355-1523

SPRING 2004

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The Official Publication ofTHE UNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE

ISSN: 1355-1523 SPRING 2004 ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY

contentsEditorial 2

Chairman’s Column 3

Just Culture in Aviation Safety Management 4

Doug Church

Towards a Just Culture 7

Graham Braithwaite

Incident Reporting – A Small Airline’s View 8

UKFSC Members List 10

Sky Marshals: A Step too Far? 12

Simon Phippard and Edward Spencer

The CAA Initiative to Improve Birdstrike Reporting 14

Sandy Sawyer

Arrhythmias Present Pilots with Range of Risks 17

FSF Editorial Staff

Poacher turned Gamekeeper 23

Capt. Phil Jones

Front Cover Picture: Aerial view of Heathrow Airport,provided with the compliments of Flightimages.

FOCUS is a quarterly subscription journaldevoted to the promotion of best practises inaviation safety. It includes articles, eitheroriginal or reprinted from other sources, relatedto safety issues throughout all areas of airtransport operations. Besides providinginformation on safety related matters, FOCUSaims to promote debate and improvenetworking within the industry. It must beemphasised that FOCUS is not intended as asubstitute for regulatory information or companypublications and procedures.

Editorial Office:Ed PaintinThe Graham SuiteFairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking,Surrey. GU24 8HXTel: 01276-855193 Fax: 01276-855195e-mail: admin@ukfsc.co.ukWeb Site: www.ukfsc.co.ukOffice Hours: 0900-1630 Monday-Friday

Advertisement Sales Office:UKFSCThe Graham Suite,Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking,Surrey GU24 8HXTel: 01276-855193 Fax: 01276-855195e-mail: admin@ukfsc.co.ukWeb Site: www.ukfsc.co.ukOffice Hours: 0900-1630 Monday-Friday

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FOCUS is produced solely for the purpose ofimproving flight safety and, unless copyright isindicated, articles may be reproduced providingthat the source of material is acknowledged.

Opinions expressed by individual authors or inadvertisements appearing in FOCUS are thoseof the author or advertiser and do notnecessarily reflect the views and endorsementsof this journal, the editor or the UK Flight SafetyCommittee.

While every effort is made to ensure theaccuracy of the information contained herein,FOCUS accepts no responsibility for anyerrors or omissions in the information, or itsconsequences. Specialist advice should alwaysbe sought in relation to any particularcircumstances.

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Editorial

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Flight in Uncontrolled Airspace

For the past three years a number ofShairspace meetings have beenorganised by the Director of Air Staff ofthe Royal Air Force at various venuesaround the United Kingdom. The purposeof these meetings has been to createawareness about the use of class F andG airspace. These meetings are co-chaired by the Director of Air Staff and theChief Executive of the United KingdomFlight Safety Committee.

Many users of uncontrolled airspace areunaware of what other users are flying inthe airspace, at what height they areoperating and what they are doing. Theresult is that they may be choosing tooperate at height in high demand byother users, particularly when operatingclose to the ground.

On the 5th February the second NorwichShairspace meeting was held at theHilton Hotel, Norwich. This meetingattracted 85 interested delegates.

Speakers are generally drawn from themain users and service providers in thearea and have as their key objective theeducation of all those who attend.

Uncontrolled airspace is used by adisparate mix of operators from privatepilots to police and air ambulancehelicopters, pipeline and power lineinspection helicopters, military fast jets,military training aircraft, commercialairlines, gliders and microlights. From thisit will be understood that the range ofperformance and preferred operatingaltitude is very wide.

If one considers that the primary rule formaintaining separation in the open FIR isthat of see and avoid, then it should beobvious to all that there is a real need tobe cautious and to improve lookout skills.Some of the tasks being performedrequire the concentration of the pilot to bediverted away from this very importantlookout task and so it is therefore nowonder that aircraft sometimes come inclose proximity to others without beingseen until the last moment.

Coupled to this is the lack ofconspicuousness of the aircraft broughtabout by personal choice of colourscarefully selected by their owners to makethem look attractive without a thought forwhether they will be easily seen whenflying against a background of cloud orpale sky. Many military aircraft are paintedto make them all but invisible when flyingclose to the ground. The result of this isthat some aircraft paint schemes makethe principle of see and avoid moredifficult, even for the trained eye.

The obvious solution would seem to befor all aircraft to be fitted with TCAS. Thenat least the pilots would have amplewarning of other aircraft in their immediatearea, their direction of travel and theiraltitude. This solution is however, not asimple as it would seem.

Most commercial off the shelf (COTTS)equipment is too heavy and bulky to befitted to the smaller aircraft. The cost ofsuch equipment would also preclude itfrom being fitted by most small aircraftowners. Current commercial off the shelfequipment is not suitable for the militaryfast jets and it will be some time before asuitable solution is developed.

So where does that leave us?It would seem that until a suitable lightweight, low cost solution is developed forthe small aircraft and until the military canacquire a suitable system, the status quowill remain.

Pilots will therefore need to be far moreaware of what aircraft types that aresharing the uncontrolled airspace withand where they most frequently operateand at what altitude. They would then bein a better position to plan their route andchoose their altitude. Developing goodairmanship should be a priority for anypilot. At the end of the day goodairmanship could save your life.

For all those flying in the open FIRconsider the following:

1. When repainting your aircraft,consider making it more conspicuous.

2. Stay away from power lines and pipelines. Inspection helicopters followthese at about 600feet above groundlevel.

3. Avoid flying close to the ground. Apartfrom inspection helicopters the militaryoften lurk close to the ground.

4. Think about the approach anddeparture routes from airfields.

5. It is your responsibility and in yourown personal interest to improve yourlookout and visibility to other users.

6. Commercial aircraft operators shouldunderstand that the risk of operatingin uncontrolled airspace isconsiderably greater than operating incontrolled airspace.

7. Listen to your radio and pay attentionto who is flying in your area.

8. Police and medivac helicopters couldbe encountered anywhere.

9. If flying along the coast give thoughtto helicopters operating to the oil rigs.

Feedback from the Shairspace meetingshas been very positive. Those who attendfind the meetings not only interesting butmeet other operators from the area andhave an opportunity to discuss a greatnumber of related flight safety issues. Thepresentations involve all types ofoperations, are well researched andpresented in a professional manner.

It is the intention to continue to holdShairspace meetings throughout thecountry and is a practical demonstrationof the commitment of the military topromote open discussion in an effort toimprove flight safety.

Chairman’s Column

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This is my first Chairman's Column forFOCUS since stepping in as chairmanfollowing the premature retirement ofJohn Dunne.

John took over the Chair of the UKFSCsix months after the terrorist attacks in theUSA. World aviation was still trying torecover from the turmoil of those eventsand not only was aviation securityheadline news, but the war drums werestarting to sound in the Middle East.There then followed the war inAfghanistan and the second Gulf War.We all know that none of these events didanything to help aviation.

In spite of these disruptions and thecontinually changing demands of boththe UK and foreign governments, Johnmanaged to steer the UKFSC through thetide of change. He has been aware ofthe many pressures on aviationcompanies throughout this period and thedifficulties that we all now find ourselvesin trying to balance Flight Safety againstthe new kid on the block - security. The'Directions' being served on the industryregularly stray into areas of Flight Safety.The result of this has at least seen closerliaison between the DfT and CAA toachieve workable and safe compromises.This has also called for closer workingrelationships within companies betweenFSOs and Security Managers.

It is in all our interests, particularly theaircrew, to be more inquisitive of whomwe have in and around our aircraft. Theyare, after all, the last line of defenceagainst the new enemy. It is right that theUKFSC should take an active interest inthe security solution, but this must bebalanced against the objectives of theCommittee. We are here to promote andoffer Flight Safety to aviation and mustresist being side-tracked into an areaalready well served by others.

The task of the company Flight Safetyspecialist does not get any easier. Thefinancial backlash from the 11 Septemberattacks have resulted in 'leaner andmeaner' airlines, airports and serviceproviders. The changing role of the FSOmeans that not only are tact, diplomacy,logic and mediation essential skills, butfinancial wizardry at making cases forresources must now be added! Thetemptation to cut Flight Safety budgetsshould be avoided. If anything, moreresources are probably going to berequired in the future to ensure that allareas at the 'sharp end' remain pro-activein maintaining the high standards that wealready have. Flight Data Monitoring, dueby the end of this year, is, for those notalready running a system, another drainon company resources at a time whenmost could probably do without it. It canhowever if used wisely, apart fromsignificantly adding to Flight Safetystandards, contribute to the economichealth of the company.

The next few years see interesting timesfor aviation and the Committee inparticular. We must continue to strive toachieve our objectives in a continuallychanging environment. The way aheadrequires careful thought so that wemaintain maximum Flight Safetycontribution to aviation on the 'homefront', as well as being able to offerthoughtful and constructive advice toother organisations trying to establishappropriate flight safety standards.

Finally, we all wish John Dunne well in hisnew appointment.

By Stuart McKie-Smith,flybe.british european

UK FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE OBJECTIVES

■ To pursue the highest standards of aviation safety.

■ To constitute a body of experienced aviation flight safety personnel available for consultation.

■ To facilitate the free exchange of aviation safety data.

■ To maintain an appropriate liaison with other bodies concerned with aviation safety.

■ To provide assistance to operators establishing and maintaining a flight safety organisation.

by Doug Church – Executive Vice President Professional

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Aviation traditionally was an environmentin which no, or at least very few, errorswere made. We tended to believe thatindividuals working in the aviation industrybelonged to a special breed of super-humans who perform error-free throughouttheir careers. In a small number of caseswhere an accident occurred, industry andthe general public readily accepted anexplanation that one or more peopleinvolved had made an error or errors thatcaused the accident to happen.

Some twenty-five years ago thisperception of the aviation industry beganto change. People realized that theaviation industry is not populated bysuper-humans, but normal everydaypeople, each as prone to committingerrors as any other. Industry attention hasshifted from determining who made theerror to identifying the circumstancesunder which the error was made. Thepurpose was two-fold: first, byunderstanding the circumstances it mightbecome possible to introduce changesthat could make it less likely that similarerrors would be made again (ErrorPrevention); and second, understandingthe circumstances might make it possibleto develop strategies to minimise thenegative effect of the error (ErrorRecovery). Safety Occurrence ReportingProgrammes are a cornerstone for findingthese circumstances.

The Legal System – FundamentalDifferences

A similar shift, as in aviation, has not (yet)occurred in the judicial world. In manylegal systems aviation professionals (e.g.pilots, air traffic controllers, andmaintenance personnel) can and will facecriminal prosecution if they becomeinvolved in an incident or accident, eventhough they were acting in accordancewith their professional training andexperience. In the International

Federation of Air Traffic ControllersAssociations (IFATCA) view criminalprosecution is counterproductive toimproving aviation safety. Instead ofcreating an open culture in which errorsand incidents are reported for analysisleading to systemic improvements,prosecution creates a “don’t get caught”culture in which few reports are made andconsequently little systemicimprovements occur.

In today’s environment RegulatoryRequirements related to Safety issuescall for both States and ServiceProviders to implement SafetyOccurrence Reporting Systems. Manyfeel that by sharing knowledge andexperience(s) by way of comprehensiveand systematic reporting, occurrence of airnavigation incidents can be prevented, orperhaps more realistically, be significantlyreduced. This approach centres on twovery important initiatives: a confidentialreporting system, and a non-punitiveenvironment. IFATCA takes the positionthat voluntary reporting systems areessential; however we do not encouragejoining a voluntary incident reportingsystem unless there is guaranteedimmunity for the individuals who areproviding the information. Reluctance ofindividuals to participate for fear ofretribution jeopardizes the programme.What has to be remembered is that only avery small percentage of control/pilot errorcan be attributed to a lack of intellectual,physical or emotional ability. The reasonpeople fail to perform is that they work in aflawed system. Simply blaming (an)individual(s) is an expedient form ofremoving blame from the organization andeffectively masks any latent flaws in it.

As the sole objective of any investigationis the prevention of accidents and /orincidents, the investigation process mustnot apportion blame or liability. This isnot to say there is no role for legal actionsin aviation. In many countries there arelaws enabling (or obliging) authorities to

investigate aviation-related occurrences.In cases where operators are guilty ofwilful misconduct in a form perceived tobe beyond the limits of acceptability suchas acts of sabotage, gross negligence orsubstance abuse it is necessary thatcriminal prosecution will follow. In theseinstances the operators could reasonablyforesee the negative outcome of his or heractions. But in the majority of cases theoperators were acting with best intentionsand did not wish, nor expect, their actionswould lead to disastrous results.

Blame and Punishment

This brings to light another difficult aspectof the equation for consideration: theissue of blame. Blame focuses on thedefects of individuals; it does notnecessarily take into account all systemcomponents. Blame leads to theadoption of defensive attitudes, andencourages an ineffective reportingsystem. IFATCA does not subscribe tothe theory that progress on safety issynonymous with learning from failure, asit categorizes learning and punishment asmutually exclusive activities. It impliesthat we either learn fromaccident/incidents or punish theindividuals involved in them, but not to doboth at the same time (Dekker, 2002).The result of the “punishment” theory isthe perpetuation of false beliefs about thesafety of the system, and characterizeshumans as unreliable components.

Just Culture in Aviation Safety Management

Who caused the problem?

It doesn'tmatter who caused

the problem as long aslearn from it.

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Punishment emphasizes that failures aredeviant, that they do not naturally belongin the system. Learning means thatfailures are seen as “normal” as resultingfrom the inherent pursuit of success.Punishment points a “guilty” finger andconditions others to not get caught nexttime something goes wrong. Learning isabout avoiding a next time altogether.Punishment is concerned with closure,about moving beyond and away from theevent, whereas learning is aboutcontinuous improvement, and closelyintegrating the event into the system.Most of us who are in a position to bedirectly affected by this (air trafficcontrollers and pilots) seem to agree thata non-punitive and confidentialenvironment cannot be equated with totalimmunity.

There always is, and always will be athreshold beyond which an ANS safetyoccurrence will be subject to a punitivetreatment. A crucial first step in clarifyingthe matter is to recognise and makepublic the fact that Confidential IncidentReporting Programmes will be based on“honest mistakes.” It is to be understoodthat any behaviour beyond the notion of“honest mistake” cannot be protected byconfidentiality and immunity.

The Need for Non Punitive ReportingSystems

If this becomes the agreed-to scenario,the possibility for difficulty exists in thefact that the categorizing of behaviour asan “honest mistake” or otherwise, cannotbe determined until after an investigationhas been carried out. No guarantees forconfidentiality or for non-punitivetreatment can be given until theinvestigation process is completed. Airtraffic controllers, as an example, may, infull good faith, report incidents based onthe understanding that they did nothingwrong, but still face the risk that theinvestigation board takes a different view

on the subject. In most cases, ServiceProviders will not have the luxury to ignorereports filed in a non-punitive reportingenvironment, should they not conform toconditions for immunity. A necessaryimprovement to the process will be toprovide for assurances of fair treatment,and the respect for confidentiality. It is ofparamount importance to demonstratethat individual reporting systemsguarantee the fair treatment of personnelinvolved, particularly as far as the notionof “honest mistakes” is concerned.

Based on ICAO guidelines the aviationindustry has an effective system to learnfrom incidents and accidents and hasachieved an impressive safety level. Thefree flow of safety related informationamong the various levels and players inthe industry is key. Safety reports areforthcoming only when their originators(e.g. pilots, controllers and maintenancestaff) know they are in a non-punitiveenvironment and are secure in theknowledge that whatever deficienciesthey do report will not backfire on them.

Criminalization of Error

Possibly the most feared of allrepercussions is what has come to beknown as the “criminalization of error”.This may simply be defined as “criminalproceedings against a person or personsinvolved in an incident or accident.”Witness the ever-increasing occurrencesof these actions against individuals in theaviation industry, and it would appearthere is a distinct increase in cases inrecent years. Among them have beenseveral high-profile examples wherebyaviation professionals, acting inaccordance with appropriate levels oftraining and experience in their respectiveareas of operation, have fallen victim tosome unfortunate transgression.Typically, the guilty party is not anorganization but an individual orindividuals; be they air traffic controllers,

aircrew or technicians. The reason? Itcould be many reasons, but whateverthey may be, the threat of any form ofretaliation (punishment) leads people toadopt a “don’t get caught” attitude. Thisdoes little to foster meaningfulimprovements to system safety.

From a Human Factors perspective, thisis a lose-lose proposition. To quote Dr.Sidney Dekker of the Swedish Center forHuman Factors in Aviation: “Incarcerationor alternative punishment of pilots orcontrollers has no demonstrablerehabilitative effect (perhaps becausethere is nothing to rehabilitate). It doesnot make a pilot or air traffic controller (orhis or her colleagues) any safer-indeed,the very idea that vicarious learning orredemption is possible through criminaljustice is universally controversial.”

Accidents are rarely the result of thefailures of individuals. There are alwaysadditional factors, each on its own anintegral part of, and a contributor to, thewhole. Accidents are the products of thesystem, not individual parts of it. Blame-free, or no-blame cultures are extremelyrare; however we believe real progresswill come as we move beyond a “blame”culture. Criminalization of error is a keycontributor to adversarial relationships wesometimes see in the aviation industry,and as long as there is the potential for itto play a role in an incident or accident,the “real” truth may never surface.Various versions of the truth will emerge,perhaps following particular agendassuch as staying out of jail or limitingcorporate liability. Learning becomesseverely restricted, if not impossible.

The Role of Human Error

The aviation industry has accepted thathumans cannot be changed butnonetheless are required to make thesystem work safely. The legal world holdsthe view that the system is inherently safe

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and that the humans are the main threat tothat safety. As mentioned earlier, the safetyimprovements in the aviation system arelargely achieved as a result of an openexchange of information between thelayers of the system. Contrary to whatsome may believe, human error cannot beavoided by “designing it out of the system”or disciplining operators. Error is a normalcomponent of human performance. Thisfact must be incorporated into the design,implementation and operation of complexsystems where safety is the expectedoutcome. Air Traffic Management (ATM)

systems are a prime example of such acomplex system.

The IFATCA View

IFATCA is of the opinion that criminalprosecution is counter-productive toimproving aviation safety. The effect oflegal prosecutions is that if pilots andcontrollers perceive they will be heldpersonally liable for any safety relatedevents in their work, they will stopreporting such events. This means legal

prosecutions achieve the exact oppositeof what they are aiming to achieve – theydon’t help to improve aviation safety.However, we must still have a mechanismfor holding people accountable even in ablame-free atmosphere. Blanket amnestyon all unsafe acts would lack credibility inthe eyes of employees (workforce) andmay even be seen to oppose naturaljustice. Accountability is possible if wecan come up with workable solutions tore-constructing our relationships witheach other throughout the industry.Perhaps such “mending of fences” willenable us to move toward a “just” culture.

References

Dekker, Dr. Sidney W.A., When HumanError Becomes a Crime. The Journal ofHuman Factors and Aerospace Safety.

SKYGUIDE (2003), Non-Punitive ATMSafety Occurrence Reporting. HighLevel European Action Group for ATMSafety (AGAS), 4th Meeting.

Ruitenberg, B. (2001) Accepting HumanError as a Normal Component inBehaviour. Presentation-AviationSafety and Juridical Actions, HIASSymposium, Toulouse, France

IFATCA (2003), Just Culture, WorkingPaper (Draft Version), IFATCA StandingCommittee 4, Annual Conference, HongKong, China

ICAO (2001) Annex 13 to the Conventionof International Civil Aviation, Aircraft andIncident Investigation, Ninth Addition,Montreal, Canada.

The article is an abbreviated version of theIFATCA Working Paper submitted to theICAO Eleventh Air Navigation Conferenceheld in Montreal between 22 Septemberand 3 October 2003

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Towards a Just CultureGraham Braithwaite from Cranfield University examines how organisations can learn from their mistakes

Error is fundamental to learning. Frombeing a child, we learn from our mistakesand, as we get older, hopefully we start tolearn from other people’s mistakes withouthaving to repeat them for ourselves.

This is the same for organisations, whereerror is a fact of daily life and also part ofthe learning process. In terms of systemdesign, we work to ensure that errorsmade in aviation can either be trapped ormanaged before they are consequential.However, when such errors occur, howdoes the organisation maximise its abilityto learn from the experience?

Reporting culture

In part, this is dependent upon thereporting culture, or moreover the safetyorganisational culture. The term“reporting culture” refers to thewillingness of individuals to report anerror or violation and can be described inseveral ways.

An anonymous system allows anyone toreport anything in complete anonymity,but such a system is open to abuse bythe reporter, which in turn can affect thecredibility of the output.

A confidential system increases theintegrity of the output whilst still protecting

the reporter from identification. However,both of these types of systems, whilstbeing a vast improvement on noreporting, have a common weakness.That is that they suggest that employeesfeel a need to be protected if they reportsafety deficiencies.

The ideal system is one where theorganisation is eager to learn andaccepts that errors are the natural by-product of being human.

No blame

This is where the debate between “no-blame” or “just culture” comes to the fore.The concept of “no-blame” has beencrucial to the success of safetyinvestigation from the start. It is humannature that individuals are more likely tobe truthful if they are not incriminatingthemselves.

Accident investigators have as their soleaim the prevention of future accidents andnot to apportion blame. Only by knowingwhat really happened (and why) can theappropriate measures be put in place toprevent recurrence. The problems startwhen “no-blame” is seen as a way ofabsolving all responsibility, especially inthe case of deliberate violations.

Just culture

A “just culture” takes the extra step ofsaying “we will not blame individuals forgenuine errors, but reserve the right todiscipline those who wilfully violate”.How effective a just culture is dependsupon the implementation of such a policy.Imagine an employee who violates thespeed limit on the airport ramp eventhough they had received appropriatetraining. This may be a clear violation,but as violations are motivational, the

organisation may need to seek out thereasons why.

If the speeding was because of an overlyambitious turnaround schedule and theemployee is violating to maintain on-timeperformance then their motivation is verydifferent from one who is speeding simplybecause they want to get a longer lunchbreak.

A just organisation recognises that thetwo scenarios are different and will actaccordingly.

A just culture does not guaranteeimmunity from consequence, but doessuggest fair treatment of individuals. Thisworks for individuals and their workcolleagues alike.

A “blame free” culture that was seen tobe unable to touch a serial offenderwould have a negative effect on themorale of other staff, just as one thatunfairly prosecuted an individual that hadmade an error trying to do the right thingfor the company.

A just culture starts at the top and is afunction of the organisational culture atlarge. There is no magic solution toguarantee a “just culture”, but everyemployee, not just those in safety, caninfluence the establishment of such aculture.

About the author: Dr Graham Brathwaiteis a Senior Lecturer and Director of theSafety and Accident Investigation Centreat Cranfield University. His main researchinterests are in the fields of humanfactors, system safety and the influenceof culture on safety.

Reprinted with kind permission fromCathay Pacific Kai Talk magazine

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1. Improving the Number of IncidentReports

The key to improving the number ofreports is an understanding of whypeople submit reports – and why theydon’t.

In addition to dealing with the incidentsreported, the successful Safety Managerwill constantly monitor the reportingculture in his domain. As well as lookingfor particular trends in the incident types,one has to take note of trends in reportingitself. Key indicators include:-

1. Who is reporting?

2. What is reported?

3. How successful is the investigation ofevents?

4. How good is the feedback?

5. Are there any specific issues thatmight be affecting trends at the time?

Much has been made of “Safety Culture”and its effects on the reporting culture.Operators must strive to develop a culturethroughout the management andworkforce that seeks to discover the ‘why’of incidents without placing too muchemphasis on the ‘who’. At the same timethey must draw the difficult line between“blame free” reporting and tolerating aslack workforce if they are to maintain theprofessional standards of the industry onwhich safety depends. The problem liesin the average employee’s perception thateven a call to the office to discuss areport they have submitted somehowimplies “blame”.

A general summary of the reportingculture in the writer’s organisation at thepresent time would be:-

1. Pilots are good at reporting.

2. Cabin Crew are not good at reporting.

3. Ground staff are starting to see theadvantages.

4. Engineering staff consider reportinginto an open environment to be agross invasion of their professionalprivacy!

It is noticeable, however, that there arereporting trends even within the pilotgroup:-

1. New pilots, and particularly newcaptains, tend to submit more reportsthan the established group. Onereason for this may be theestablishment of a level at which thereports are perceived to be ‘useful’.This in itself might depend on thesuccess of the feedback system.

2. Particular individuals report more.Generally these are pilots who havepreviously worked in Flight Safety (eg.FSO in the military), or have a multi-disciplinary background (eg. inEngineering or Law).

3. The small core of pilots who join thecompany after retiring from BritishAirways tend to report well. Thisundoubtedly reflects the goodreporting culture within thatorganisation.

Outside of the pilot group, one majorinfluence on the reporting culture stemsfrom the traditional implementation of a“Flight” Safety system run from within“Flight” Operations by a “pilot” reportingto the Chief “Pilot”. Flight Safety can beperceived as a “pilot thing” and thisfeeling can be exacerbated when the FSOis given insufficient time to deal effectivelywith the other groups.

One of the greatest barriers to reportingby other groups is the “dirty washing inpublic” syndrome which often stems fromthe management within the groups. In alarge organisation it is possible to haveseparate Safety Officers within eachgroup and deal with issues in-house.This is not possible in a smallorganisation and, in any event, tends tostifle the flow of valuable safety dataacross departmental boundaries.

In the writer’s organisation (smalloperator), small but significantimprovements have come from an earlyadoption of the JAR principles of an“Accident Prevention and Flight SafetySystem” and the development of acompany wide Safety ManagementSystem. Significant points include:-

1. The appointment of a full time SafetyManager.

2. The dropping of the term “Flight” fromthat title.

3. A continuous process of developingthe acceptance of Safety as an inter-departmental discipline that hasadvantages for all.

Incident Reporting – A Small Airline’s View

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Whilst the Safety Manager still does nothave full autonomy and, from anadministrative point of view, is a memberof Flight Operations, there is a growingacceptance of his role in the otherdepartments. This is reflected in agrowing number of reports from thosedepartments. Education is the key.In summary, the number (and, moreimportantly, the breadth) of incidentreports will improve in an organisationthat can convince all staff andmanagement of the value of their reportsand can sustain a culture that issupportive of reporters.

2. Improving the Quality of IncidentReports

In general, much of what has been statedabove also applies to improving thequality of reports.

Again, education is the key. The SafetyManager must use effective feedback todemonstrate the positive results that canbe achieved from a high quality report.

Probably the most effective means ofassisting people to produce good qualityreports are well designed reporting formsand an easily understood reportingprocess. These must take account of thefact that it is not always possible tocompile a report at the time of theincident. Flight crew in particular mayhave to wait until the end of a flight whenthey are tired and want to get home. Awell designed set of forms with simpleguidance on who should use which andwhen is essential. These will guide thereporter along a logical path that willencourage correct recall of all theessential data needed to carry out aneffective investigation. In general, it hasbeen found that a series of “tick boxes” ismore effective than relying on wordyprose.

In summary, the quality of incident reportswill improve in an organisation with a welldesigned reporting system and which candemonstrate the positive value of thatquality.

3. Barriers to Successful Data Sharing

Two main barriers to successful datasharing exist, one cultural and onepractical.

The cultural barrier tends to exist at topmanagement level and again has its rootsin the “dirty washing” syndrome. Evenorganisations with a good open safetyculture in-house can be reluctant to sharetheir problems outside. The fear is thatinformation will fall into the hands of themedia and be misinterpreted to thedetriment of the organisation.

The justification of this fear wasexemplified by an article in the SundayTimes in 2002. This broadsheet is notnormally taken to sensational reporting.In this case it had managed to obtaindetails from the UK CAA MandatoryOccurrence Reporting (MOR) databaseand dedicated two whole pages to tryingto prove the “danger” of flying in oneparticular aircraft operated by a UKcharter operator. The basis of theargument was the number of incidentsrelating to this aircraft in the MORdatabase. Notwithstanding the effects onthe travelling public, this vilification of anoperator whose only “failing” was a veryopen reporting culture brought the wholeMOR system into disrepute. The incidenthighlighted the question of whether theoperator with the least incident reports isthe safest.

The cultural barrier is also sustained bythe increasingly litigious approach to life.One of the most obvious means ofsharing safety data concerning similar

types is by support of the manufacturer’sSafety Information Exchange (SIE).However, promulgation of event data maybe delayed while the manufacturerconsiders the legal implications of theevent.

The practical barrier arises from the needfor data consistency if a sharing system isto be fully effective. Much work has beenput into the development of the popularsafety information systems (such asBASIS) in an attempt to produce thisconsistency, but, at the end of the day, itis down to the person entering the data.One person’s perception of which eventsfall under which of the primary headingsof “Operational”, “Technical” and“Environmental” are not necessarilyshared by others. Extend this downthrough the various sub-classificationsand the usefulness of the system, whichrelies on data mining techniques, declinesrapidly.

An example of the magnitude of thisproblem comes from the IATA“STEADES” programme. IATA took overthe basic British Airways SIE in 2001 withthe intention of extending it into a fullstatistical analysis product. Mid waythrough 2003 the full STEADES product isstill awaited and the main stumbling blockhas been the lack of data inputconsistency.

In summary, while there remains a needto protect individual, departmental andorganisational interests there can neverbe a fully effective safety data exchange.Equally, until a totally consistent means ofgathering the core data is devised, theusefulness of a true SIE in accidentreduction will not be realised.

10

Full members

Chairmanflybe. british europeanStuart McKie-Smith

Vice-Chairmanawaiting election

TreasurerFirst Choice AirwaysCapt. Martin Pitt

External Affairs OfficerRAeSPeter Richards

Aegean AirlinesCapt. Dimitris Giannoulatos

Aer LingusCapt. Tom Curran

Aerostructures HambleDr. Marvin Curtiss

AIG AviationJonathan Woodrow

Air ContractorsCapt. Tony Barrett-Jolley

Air MauritiusCapt. Francois Marion

Air ScandicJonathan Annet

Air SeychellesBob Blagborough

Air WalesCapt. David Warren

ALAEDave Morrison

Astraeus LtdCapt. Simon Robinson

BAA plcFrancis Richards

BAC Express

BAE SYSTEMS Reg. A/CAlistair Scott

BALPACarolyn Evans

bmi regionalCapt. Steve Saint

British AirwaysSteve Hull

British Airways CitiExpressCapt. Ed Pooley

British InternationalCapt. Terry Green

British Mediterranean AirwaysRobin Berry

BUZZ Stanstead LtdPeter Walton

CAADave Lewis - MRPSChrys Hadjiantonis - Safety Data Dept.Ed Bewley - Flight OperationsAlison Thomas - Intl. Services

CargoLux AirlinesCapt. David Martin

Cathay Pacific AirwaysCapt. Richard Howell

Channel ExpressRob Trayhurn

CityJetCapt. Mick O’Connor

CTC Service Aviation (LAD)Steve Flowers

DARABrian Plenderleith

DHL AirPeter Naz

DragonairAlex Dawson

DUO Airways LtdCapt. Graeme England

Eastern Airways UK LtdCapt. Jacqueline Mills

easyJetCapt. Lance Jordan

Emerald AirwaysCapt. Roley Bevan

Members of

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European Aviation Air CharterDerek Cottrill

EVA AirwaysRichard Lovegrove

Excel AirwaysPeter Williams

FlightLineCapt. Derek Murphy

FLS Aerospace (IRL)Frank Buggie

Flyjet LtdF/O Martin Wood

Ford Flight EuropeRichard Newton

GATCORichard Dawson

Goodrich Actuation Systems LtdKeith Joyner

Independent Pilots AssociationCapt. Mike Nash

Irish Aviation AuthorityCapt. Bob Tweedy

KLM uk Eng.Jim Gibbons

LoganairDoug Akhurst

London City AirportSimon Butterworth

London-Manston AirportWally Walker

Lufthansa ConsultingCapt. Simon Searle

Malaysia AirlinesCapt. Ahmed Zuraidi

Manchester Airport plcPeter Hampson

Monarch AirlinesCapt. Tony Wride

MyTravelCapt. Phil Oakes

NATSPaul Jones

PrivatAirCapt. Boris Beuc

RyanairCapt. Gerry Conway

SBACMartyn Graham - SecretariatVic Lockwood - FR Aviation

ServisairEric Nobbs

Shell AircraftSteve Walters

The Boeing Co.Thor Johansen

Thomas Cook AirlinesCapt. Graham Clarke

Virgin Atlantic AirwaysCapt. Jason Holt

Willis AerospaceIan Crowe

Group members

bmiDavid Barry

bmi Eng.Peter Horner

Bristow HelicoptersCapt. Derek Whatling

Bristow Helicopters Eng.Richard Tudge

Britannia AirwaysJez Last

Britannia Airways Eng.Adrian Vaughan

Cardiff Intl. AirportGraeme Gamble

Belfast Intl. AirportAlan Whiteside

CHC ScotiaPeter Cork

CHC Scotia Eng.

EurocypriaCapt. Constantinos Pitsillides

Cyprus AirwaysCapt. Spyros Papouis

flybe. british europeanStuart McKie-Smith

flybe. british european eng.Chris Clark

GB AirwaysCapt. Phil Lintott-Clarke

GB Airways Eng.Terry Scott

MODDASC Col. Arthur GibsonDASC Eng. Cdr. Ian PeckHQ STC MOD Sqn. Ldr. Paul CoxMOD (DASC RN) Cdr Steve Pearson

RAeSPeter Richards

RAeS Eng.Jim Rainbow

Co-opted Advisers

AAIBCapt. Margaret Dean

CHIRPPeter Tait

GASCoJohn Thorpe

Royal Met. SocietyDr John Stewart

12

With the recent refusal to allow certainflights to operate to the USA asscheduled, fears are rife that terroristsmay still be looking to target civil aviationas a vehicle for their atrocities. Againstthis background, all passengers oninternational air services may now beasking themselves whether an armed skymarshal is on board their aircraft and, ifso, whether that presence is morereassuring or less so.

Under the overall responsibility of theDepartment for Transport, sky marshals orAPOs (Aircraft Protection Officers) havebeen cleared for deployment on UK-registered aircraft. The APOs aregovernment employees, specificallymembers of the police service. The CAAin this country gives a specialdispensation to allow APOs to travel onboard civil aircraft.

Officially, the flights on which APOs areallocated are chosen randomly.Concerns have been voiced, however, asto whether it would be appropriate todeploy APOs on specific flights on anintelligence-led basis. The issue iswhether, in that event, the flight should beallowed to operate at all: if there isspecific intelligence of a heightened riskfor a certain flight, should it not begrounded?

The operator has its own responsibility, asdoes the captain to ensure the safety of theservice. While the issue has not beentested before the courts, it is unlikely thatthat duty is delegable. This does in turnraise very sensitive issues: plainly there is alimit to which the security and intelligenceservices should share all their knowledgenot only with the operator, corporately, butalso with the individual captain.

It is equally clear that there is a range ofviews as to the likely efficacy of APOs inany event. Leaving aside the debate asto whether the particular events of 11September 2001 were foreseeable, fromthe perspective of a passenger on one ofthe hijacked aircraft, it is obviouslyarguable that the presence of APOsmight have reduced or minimised theconsequences.

Time, however, has since moved on andterrorists will be all too aware of theadditional obstacles which they will nowneed to overcome in pursuit of theirobjectives. This has provoked fears thatthe deployment of APOs risks creating asmuch of an opportunity as a deterrent.Sophisticated terrorists could, forexample, create a disturbance or adiversion to draw APOs into taking action,thereby revealing their identity andincreasing their vulnerability to other

attempts to overcome them or seize theirweapons. It is also said that with flightdeck doors now generally strengthenedand secured, the risk of terrorists turninga commercial airliner into a missile issignificantly lower.

Views on the usefulness or otherwise ofAPOs vary greatly and this is not theplace to debate them. Clearly, there are anumber of difficult policy issues at stake,including such factors as whether APOsshould be dedicated full-time to aircraftprotection duties or whether they shouldbe allowed to combine them with theirother roles on the ground. Obviously anyoperator must be satisfied that there is anet benefit but this is a highly subjectivejudgment.

Details of APOs’ precise rules ofengagement are being withheld forsecurity reasons, although it is widelyaccepted that the captain will continue toenjoy overall command of the aircraft.Quite how this would actually work inpractice in a fast-moving terrorist incidentis hard to conceive. Nevertheless, theprinciple that the captain remains incommand is understood to have been asignificant factor in the agreement whichsaw UK airlines abandoning theiropposition to APOs. Another is thoughtto have been a government concessionto accept full liability for insurance claimsin the event of a hijacking over the UK.

Even if a concerted terrorist effort isultimately defeated by the intervention ofAPOs, it would not be unreasonable toanticipate some collateral damage, eitherin the form of damage to the aircraft orinjury to innocent passengers. This wouldof course raise questions over the airline’sliability, with Article 17 of theWarsaw/Montreal Convention systemimposing an assumed or strict liability foran ‘accident’. Defined as ‘an unexpected

Europe and the United States appear to be as far apart on the issue of sky marshals as they are geographically divided. As politicalpressure hastens their introduction, Simon Phippard and Edward Spencer examine the potential legal implications.

Sky Marshals: A Step too Far?

13

or unusual event or happening that isexternal to the passenger’ the test wouldin all likelihood be satisfied in the event ofpassengers being caught in the crossfire,however benign the weapons used.

In such circumstances, the airline may beable to rely on a defence under Article 20,if it can demonstrate that it took ‘allnecessary measures’ (which is oftenunderstood to mean all reasonablynecessary measures) to avoid thedamage or that it was impossible to takesuch measures. Given that APOs in theUK are government employees andairlines are more or less obliged to acceptthem on their aircraft, it is conceivablethat an Article 20 defence could besustained, thus avoiding or, in the case ofEC carriers, limiting their legal liability.

The position may, however, be differentwhere APOs are privately commissionedby the airline, either as employees oragents. In these circumstances, pursuingan argument under Article 20 could bemore difficult; it perhaps being harder tocontend that the airline had no practicaloption but to accept APOs if it wished tocontinue to operate the route in question.

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001,there was, for a while, a hope thatplaintiffs would refrain from legal actionagainst anybody and everybody againstwhom some criticism could be levelled.The volume of litigation now pendingagainst certain carriers, however much,on any balanced view, those carriers weremore sinned against than sinners, shows

that that hope may have been misplaced.It further demonstrates that if APOs wereinvolved in a terrorist incident in whichinnocent people were injured or killed, thebasis upon which decisions were taken todeploy APOs, not to mention the safetyand security judgments, would comeunder very close scrutiny.

There may now, in practical terms, be littlechoice for many carriers other than todeploy APOs in certain circumstances,but it could prove invaluable to givecareful consideration to the basis onwhich a decision to deploy is taken, orthe specific instructions issued to thosepersonnel.

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14

The Continuing Hazard

From the beginning of aviation history,aircraft have faced the threat ofbirdstrikes. The first known incident wasin 1908 and in 1912 the first fatality wascaused when the pilot of a Wright Flyercollided with a gull. This set a trend thathas continued throughout thedevelopment of aviation. For example, inthe last ten years alone many thousandsof birdstrike incidents have beenrecorded in the UK and, worldwide, anumber of catastrophic birdstrikeaccidents have occurred, including thefollowing:

Falcon 20Paris Le Bourget 10 fatalities

C130Eindhoven 34 fatalities

E3Elmendorf 4 fatalities

E3Aktion, Greece aircraft destroyed

AN-8Congo over 20 fatalities

Lear 45Milan Linate 2 fatalities

Over the same period there also havebeen a number of serious incidents in theUK, some of which are still underinvestigation, with B747, B767, B737 andA319 aircraft losing engines on take-offand returning or diverting, and aMetroliner crashing, apparently afterstriking gulls on takeoff.

In addition to passenger and public safetyissues, birdstrikes have major financialimplications. A recent study, extrapolatingfrom data supplied by a majorinternational airline that tracks andrecords costs meticulously, suggests thatthe annual cost of birdstrikes to civilaviation worldwide may be as high as$1.2billion. There are also liability issuesfor aerodromes: A number of airportshave faced costs amounting to millions ofdollars following birdstrike incidents.

The Historical Situation

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) hasbeen collecting and analysing data onbirdstrikes to UK-registered aircraft andon UK aerodromes since the 1960s.Most birdstrikes, including those withserious consequences, involved birds ofspecies that are commonly found onairfields. However, over time, there havebeen changes in the proportions of birdsof different types.

Throughout much of the period for whichdata are available, about two thirds ofbirdstrikes reported in the UK involvedgulls and lapwings. However, since thegeneral adoption of effective habitatmanagement and active surveillance anddispersal procedures on major UKairports, incidents involving these birds,and especially multiple strikes with flocks,have decreased. At the same time, otherbirds such as woodpigeons and rookshave become more important. Thereasons for this are probably complex

and related to population andenvironmental changes. There have beensignificant increases in the relatively lownumber of birdstrikes involving large andpotentially very hazardous waterfowl, suchas Canada goose, mallard and heron.Populations of these species, whichexploit a variety of man-made wetlandhabitats, are increasing with theproliferation of water bodies created inmineral extractions and for drainage,recreational use and environmentalenhancement.

Using the Data

Aerodrome bird control is a complexmulti-faceted task. It is impractical forCAA aerodrome inspectors to review allaspects of aerodromes' bird controlorganizations during each inspection visit.However, by using analyses of recenthistorical birdstrike data by bird controlspecialists as a starting point, they areable to identify areas where there may beproblems that require furtherinvestigation. Clearly, full and accuratebirdstrike reporting is vital to enable theCAA to do this and to assist aerodromesto correct any weaknesses.

Safeguarding is the consultationprocedure that protects aerodromes fromhazardous new developments throughthe local government Planning process.Recently, responsibility has beentransferred from the CAA to theaerodrome operators. There is increasingpressure from developments likewetlands and landfills around aerodromesthat attract hazardous birds.Consequently, it is necessary to supportthe aerodromes' safeguarders byensuring that planning authorities areprovided with full information on thenature and importance of the birdstrikehazard, and that they are given clearguidance on the priority that air safetyshould be given in relation to many other

The CAA Initiative to Improve Birdstrike ReportingBy Sandy Sawyer, Flight Standards Officer, Civil Aviation Authority

15

competing demands, such as mineralsupply, flood relief and conservation. ForGovernment to be able to act to improveguidelines on planning and, possibly,introduce strengthened legislation infavour of air safety, it is necessary for theCAA to be able to demonstrate fully thecost and safety implications of birdstrikes,and the relation between the risk anddevelopments that attract birds. Again,therefore, the need for comprehensivereporting of birdstrikes is evident.

Limitations of the Data

Despite the extensive work undertaken bythe CAA and industry to reduce thenumbers of hazardous birds present onlicensed aerodromes, the potential forbirdstrikes continues to rise withincreases both in air traffic and inpopulations of some hazardous birds.However, it is clear that variations inreporting standards over time, andbetween different airports and aircraftoperators are responsible for seriousdistortions in the picture presented by theavailable data. While reporting standardsand the identification of the birds involvedhave improved generally, there remainsignificant differences between airports,and in some instances the standard ofreporting has deteriorated, rather thanimproved. In recent years, a number ofmajor aircraft operators have ceased touse the CAA Birdstrike Occurrence Form(CA1282), but instead submit partialinformation on in-house air safety report(ASR) forms. Others have ceased toreport any birdstrikes at all.

These are serious weaknesses that limitthe usefulness of the data for monitoringthe birdstrike hazard and theeffectiveness of current control measuresand airport bird control organisations.Inadequate and incomplete informationdoes not assist the CAA to persuade

Government that the birdstrike issue isserious, both in terms of safety andeconomically. The shortcomings are due,at least in part, to the lack of cleardefinitions of the incidents that should bereported and because the reportingsystem is voluntary. At present, thesystem only mandates the reporting ofbirdstrikes that cause damage to aircraft,and has allowed airports and aircraftoperators to adopt arbitrary local"birdstrike" definitions, leading to asignificant understatement of the truescale of the problem. It is believed thatless than 50% of birdstrikes are reportedto the CAA. More accurate and moredetailed reporting would enable theindustry and the CAA to determine thereal extent of the costs and safetyimplications of birdstrikes, and identifytrends and their causes earlier and withmore confidence.

There is a perception by some in theaviation industry that the number ofbirdstrike reports originating from anaerodrome or airline will be, or can be,used as indicators of inadequateperformance of aerodrome bird controlorganisations. This can lead to reluctanceto report all incidents in the hope ofavoiding criticism. This attitude does nothelp anyone: not the aerodromes, whoneed to justify the investment in birdcontrol measures, the aircraft operators(and their insurers?) who generally dealwith the direct and indirect costs ofbirdstrike incidents, nor the CAA who arestriving to determine the true scale of theproblem and produce the necessaryguidance, policies and legislation. TheCAA does not judge aerodromes'performance on the numbers of birdstrikeincidents reported. The types ofbirdstrikes that are reported, the riskfactors that are involved and whetherthere are practical control measures thatcould reduce the incidence of the morehigh-risk incidents are, however,

important. "Raw" birdstrike numbers, oreven rates corrected for aircraftmovements, should never be consideredto be a measure of the performance ofaerodrome bird control organisations norof risk to aircraft operations. As anexample, one birdstrike with ten Canadageese carries infinitely more risk to anaircraft and it occupants than tenbirdstrikes with swallows - but by thecrude statistical measure the lattersituation could be represented as tentimes worse! Birdstrikes with small birdsare unavoidable and are statisticallyimportant as a measure of reportingstandard because there are many suchincidents at all airports. In order toappreciate the true picture we need full,uninhibited reporting of all bird incidentsas defined below.

Improving Reporting Standards

NOTAL 6/2002 set four criteria for whatthe CAA requires aerodromes and aircraftoperators to regard as a "reportable birdincident." These are:

1. A bird/aircraft collision is observed (orthought to have occurred) and isnoted by a pilot or observer on theground, with or without physicalevidence.

2. Direct physical evidence in the form ofsigns of impact/damage on the

16

aircraft is found, even though nocollision was observed or reported bythe pilot or observer on the ground.

3. Physical evidence in the form of freshbird remains are recovered from alocation on the ground in which thebird was likely to have been struck byan aircraft, even though no collisionwas observed or reported by a pilot orobserver on the ground, and nophysical evidence found on anyaircraft.

4. Any incident in which a flight isaffected (aborted take-off,precautionary landing, go-around,delayed departure, returned to stand,engine shutdown, speed reduction,etc.) by birds, irrespective of whetheran actual collision occurred.

Also, at the aerodrome or aircraftCaptain's discretion a report may be filedfor any other "near miss" or similarincident where it is felt that safety marginswere or could have been compromised orwhere hazardous concentrations of birdshave been repeatedly noted in the samelocation whether on or off an aerodrome.These "near miss" incidents, and incidentswhere the recovery of birds remainscannot be tied to a specific aircraft, willbe recorded, but not regarded as"confirmed birdstrikes" in accordance withcurrent ICAO guidelines. All incidentswhere the occupants of an aircraft or anobserver on the ground believe that a birdhas been struck will be treated as"confirmed" whether or not confirmatoryevidence is found. Many birdstrikes leaveno obvious mark on the aircraft, and birdremains may fall beyond the aerodrome

perimeter or be lost inthe airfield grass.

As a further measureto improve reporting,the Air NavigationOrder (ANO) willshortly be amendedto mandate thereporting of allbirdstrikes, regardlessof whether damagewas caused to theaircraft. Any aircraftcommander flying inUK airspace whobelieves his aircrafthas collided with oneor more birds willhave to inform theCAA, unless it hasalready been reportedas an accident ordamage occurrencethrough the CAA'sMandatoryOccurrence Reportingsystem.

The first fruits of the current drive forimproved reporting are beginning to filterthrough. To mid October 2003 we havealready logged more than double the totalnumber of reports received in 2000, withmany airlines still yet to join the reportingscheme. It has become clear that manybirdstrike reports filed by airlines haveremained internal only, are missing fromthe CAA birdstrike database and, in manycases, were unknown to the aerodrome atwhich they occurred! This situation isclearly unsatisfactory, but it is anticipatedthat it can be corrected with the newreporting system and the whole industrycan cooperate in both fully describingand dealing with the birdstrike issue aswide-ranging team effort.

Filing a Report

Individuals reporting a birdstrike shouldcomplete the Freepost Form CA1282(version 2 dated 01/02/2003), which isheld at every licensed aerodrome and isalso available on the CAA website athttp://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/FORSRGCA1282.pdf.

Alternatively, where companies have astandard reporting procedure anautomatic data transfer will beestablished. Airlines may continue to usein-house ASR forms to report birdstrikesbut these forms should be amended,where necessary, to include all the fieldsincluded on the CA1282 form, as this isbased on international ICAO reportingstandards. Additional information can beobtained by emailing the CAA atbirdstrikes@srg.caa.co.uk, or by phoningNick Ahmed on 01293 573273.

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17

Arrhythmias Present Pilots With Range of Risks

An arrhythmia (also called a dysrhythmiaor an irregular heartbeat) is a change in theregular beating of the heart that, in mostpeople, presents no risk. In some people,however, the arrhythmia may be associatedwith heart disease or may constitute aserious health problem that can result inloss of consciousness or death.

For pilots, arrhythmias typically requirefurther evaluation by medical specialiststo determine whether the conditionprohibits medical certification.

The International Civil AviationOrganization (ICAO) Manual of CivilAviation Medicine says that medicalcertification generally should not begranted if a pilot’s arrhythmia is a result ofheart disease, if recurrence of thearrhythmia cannot be predicted or if otherelements of the pilot’s condition couldpresent a risk to safe flight operations.

Annette Ruge, M.D., Ph.D., medicalcoordinator for the European Joint AviationAuthorities (JAA), said that JAA is reviewingits requirements for the evaluation of pilotswith arrhythmias and that thoserequirements may be changed in late 2003or early 2004. Current requirements are thatall but the most minor arrhythmias requirefurther medical evaluation.

Warren Silberman, D.O., M.P.H., managerof the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) Civil Aerospace Medical InstituteAerospace Medical Certification Division,said that arrhythmias are “one of themore common things that we deal with.”In many cases, after medical authoritiesare satisfied that the arrhythmia does notpresent a risk to the pilot’s safe operationof an aircraft, he or she is issued amedical certificate; in cases involvingmore serious arrhythmias, medicalcertification is denied.”

Electrical Impulses Determine HeartRate and Rhythm

The heart is a muscular pump, dividedinto four chambers (Figure 1). The twoupper chambers are the left atrium andthe right atrium; the two lower chambersare the left ventricle and the rightventricle. The right atrium contains theheart’s sinus node (sinoatrial node), anatural pacemaker that transmits anelectrical impulse through the heart,causing it to contract (beat).

For the heart to pump blood properly, theelectrical impulse must follow a path thatbegins in the right atrium and spreadsthrough the atria to the atrioventricularnode, an area between the atria thatconnects to fibers that carry the impulseto the ventricles. The impulse causes theheart to contract — the atria contract first,pumping blood to the ventricles. Whenthe ventricles contract a fraction of asecond later, blood is pumped out of theheart. Normally, when the electricalimpulse is transmitted properly, thesecontractions occur about 60 times to 100times per minute in a person at rest (moreoften during periods of exercise, pain or

anger), and the heart beats at a regularrate. (Aerobically trained athletes,however, may have normal resting heartrates below 50 beats per minute; restingheart rates of more than 90 beats perminute are unlikely in healthy adults.)

If the impulse is not transmitted properly,however, an arrhythmia may result. Thereare many types of arrhythmias; they occurwhen the heartbeat is inappropriately fastor more than 100 beats per minute(tachycardia), inappropriately slow or lessthan 60 beats per minute (bradycardia),or when the electrical impulse travels onan abnormal path and the heartbeat isirregular.

Irregular heartbeats often are eitherpremature heartbeats, which occur whenthe regular beating of the heart isinterrupted by an early beat, or fibrillations,which occur when a chamber of the heartexperiences a spasm and does not pump.

Arrhythmias are identified according tothe part of the heart in which theyoriginate and the effect they produce onthe heart rhythm (see “ArrhythmiasClassified According to Location, Effect,”page 38). For example, in atrial fibrillationthe most common type of arrhythmia —the atria undergo rapid, uncoordinatedcontractions. (The ICAO Manual of CivilAviation Medicine says that atrialfibrillation “may cause pilotincapacitation” and that pilots with atrialfibrillation often should be denied medicalcertification; some pilots who haveexperienced single episodes of atrialfibrillation, however, “may be consideredfor restricted flight crew duties, subject to[further evaluation].”) In ventriculartachycardia, an accelerated heart ratebegins in the ventricles. (ICAO says thatpilots with this condition, which typically isassociated with heart disease, usually“are medically unfit for licensing.”)

Some irregular heart rhythms are harmless, but others are associated with loss of consciousness or sudden death. Thoroughmedical evaluation often is required to determine the severity of a pilot’s arrhythmia and whether the ailment might affect the safetyof flight operations.FSF Editorial Staff

18

Heart Disease Is Most CommonCause of Arrhythmia

The causes of arrhythmias sometimes arenot apparent. Most are a result of heartdisease, especially coronary arterydisease (in which the flow of bloodthrough the arteries is obstructed by anaccumulation of fatty deposits on theartery walls), heart failure (in which theheart fails to pump enough blood tosatisfy the body’s requirements) andheart-valve function (in which the heartvalves either leak or fail to open fully).Arrhythmias also can be caused by somediseases and medications. For example,hypothyroidism (low thyroid activity) andsome blood-pressure medications areamong the causes of bradycardias.Tachycardias can result from use ofmedications such as decongestants, diet

pills and thyroid medication; exercise;and diseases such as adrenal tumors,hyperthyroidism (elevated thyroid activity),lung disease, imbalances in bloodelectrolytes, dehydration and anemia.

Minor arrhythmias can result from stressor excessive consumption of alcohol ortobacco.

Also among the risk factors for arrhythmiaare advancing age; a family history ofheart disease; a high-fat, high-cholesteroldiet; and obesity.

Symptoms Include Palpitations, ChestPain

People with arrhythmia may experience anumber of symptoms — or they may

have no symptoms. The most frequentsymptoms include the following:

■ Palpitations can be felt as a poundingor racing of the heart or a flutteringsensation in the chest. Sometimes, theheart seems to skip a beat. (In reality,this is an extra heartbeat that comesearlier than normal.) The sensationmay be over in seconds or maycontinue for several minutes or hours;

■ Lightheadedness may occur as aresult of the reduction in bloodsupplied to the brain as a result of aheart rate that is too fast or too slow. Ifthe abnormal heart rate persists forlonger than six seconds, loss ofconsciousness may occur;

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1919

Arrhythmias Classified According toLocation, Effect

Different types of arrhythmias areidentified according to the part of theheart where they originate and theeffect that they have on the heart’srhythm.Types of arrhythmias originating in theatria include the following:

■ Atrial fibrillation occurs whenmuscles of the atria emituncoordinated electrical impulses.The atria attempt to pump too fast(about five times to seven timesfaster than normal) and unevenlyand do not contract completely.Because not all of the atria’selectrical impulses affect theventricles, the ventricles continue topump blood, but the ventricular ratemay be uneven. A trial fibrillationcan be associated with variousarrhythmias, congestive heart failureand stroke; people with atrialfibrillation are about five times morelikely to suffer strokes than peoplewithout atrial fibrillation. Atrialfibrillation is the most common of allserious arrhythmias;

■ Atrial flutter occurs when rapidelectrical impulses cause the atria tocontract quickly, as many as 200contractions to 320 contractions perminute. The result is a fastheartbeat;

■ Premature atrial contraction occurswhen premature heartbeats or extra

heartbeats cause irregularity in heartrhythms. Premature atrialcontraction produces the sensationthat the heart has skipped a beat; inreality, there is no skipped beat butrather an extra beat that comesearlier than normal. Most peoplehave premature heartbeats at sometime in their lives. Usually notreatment is required, and thepremature beats may eventuallycease. Sometimes, becausepremature heartbeats can be aresult of illness or injury, furthermedical evaluation may be required;

■ Sick sinus syndrome occurs whenthe sinus node (the primarypacemaker, located in the upperright atrium) does not sendelectrical impulses properly and theheart rate slows. In some cases, theheart rate may be alternately tooslow and too fast;

■ Sinus arrhythmia occurs when theheart rate slows when an individualinhales and speeds up when theindividual exhales. Sinus arrhythmiais normal;

■ Sinus tachycardia occurs when thesinus node transmits signals fasterthan usual and the heart rateincreases (above 100 beats perminute). This arrhythmia canaccompany fever, excitement andexercise; in these cases, treatmentis not required. Rarely, diseasessuch as anemia (low blood count)or hyperthyroidism (increased

thyroid activity) cause sinustachycardia; in these cases,treatment of the disease eliminatesthe arrhythmia;

■ Supraventricular tachycardia (alsocalled paroxysmal atrial tachycardiaor paroxysmal supraventriculartachycardia) occurs when a seriesof early beats in the atria cause theheart rate to increase (to 160 beatsto 190 beats per minute) .Treatmentoften is not required; and,

■ Wolff-Parkinson-White syndromeoccurs when the pathways betweenthe atria and the ventricles areabnormal, and as a result, theelectrical impulse arrives too soonto the ventricles. The result can bebursts of accelerated heart rates.

Types of arrhythmias originating in theventricles include the following:

■ Premature ventricular contractionoccurs when a prematurecontraction or extra contractionsresult in irregular heart rhythms. Inthis type of arrhythmia, thepremature contractions begin in theventricles, and, as with prematureatrial contraction, prematureventricular contraction produces thesensation that the heart has skippeda beat. Usually no treatment isrequired, and the premature beatsmay eventually cease. Sometimes,because premature heartbeats canbe a result of illness or injury; furthermedical evaluation may be required;

■ Chest pains may result fromtachycardias. The increased beatingof the heart causes an increase in theheart’s oxygen requirements; whenthe increased oxygen cannot beprovided, chest pains occur;

■ Shortness of breath sometimes is asymptom of a rapid heart rate thathinders the ability of the heart to fillwith blood and results in a back-up ofblood into the lungs; and,

■ Fatigue — although usually associatedwith a cause unrelated to the heart —sometimes is a symptom of arrhythmia.A heart rate that is either too slow ortoo fast can cause tiredness.

20

■ Ventricular fibrillation occurs whendisorganized electrical impulseswithin the ventricular muscle resultin rapid and uncoordinatedcontraction of the ventricles,causing the heart to pump little orno blood. Without immediatemedical treatment, this arrhythmiacan result in collapse and suddendeath within four minutes. Treatmentincludes electric shock to restorenormal heart rhythm. Subsequenttreatment may include medicationor surgical implantation of anelectronic defibrillator: and,

■ Ventricular tachycardia occurs whenan accelerated heart rate begins inthe ventricles. This arrhythmia maybe a result of heart disease andusually requires prompt treatment inthe form of medication, ablation (thenonsurgical elimination of hearttissue or electrical pathways thatcause arrhythmia) or surgery.

Other types of arrhythmias includethose caused by obstructions of otherpathways traveled by the electricalimpulses that are generated by thesinus node. These arrhythmias include:

■ Adams-Stokes disease occurs whenthe normal heartbeat between theatria and the ventricles isinterrupted, causing a heart block(improper transmission of theelectrical impulse from the atria tothe ventricles), a decrease in heartrate, an inadequate supply of bloodto the brain and fainting:

■ Bundle branch block occurs whenthere is a block in one of the twopathways (the right bundle branchor the left bundle branch) that arefollowed by electrical impulses asthey travel through the heart. Theblock forces the electrical impulsesto follow a longer, alternate path; theslowdown means that the ventricleon that side contracts more slowlythan the other ventricle;

■ Heart block occurs in the followingthree forms:

- First-degree heart block, in whichthe heart rate and rhythm remainnormal, occurs when the electricalimpulse moves more slowly thannormal through the atrioventricularnode;

- Second-degree heart block occurswhen some signals from the atria donot reach the ventricles; and,

- Third-degree heart block (completeheart block) occurs when none ofthe electrical impulses from the atriareach the ventricles. This can causethe heart to beat too slowly. In thesecases, secondary pacemaker cellsin the ventricles deliver electricalimpulses to contract the ventricles,but the contractions occur at aslower rate than would be directedby the atrioventricular node; and,

■ Long Q-T syndrome is a relativelyrare hereditary disorder in theheart’s electrical-conduction systemin which a longer-than normal timeis required for the electrical systemto recharge after each heartbeat.The syndrome, which usually affectschildren and young adults, canresult in a fast abnormal heartrhythm that prevents blood frombeing pumped out of the heart andcan lead to sudden cardiac arrest.

ECG Aids in Diagnosis

Diagnosis of an arrhythmia usuallyrequires an electrocardiogram (ECG; alsoknown as EKG) to measure the electricalcurrent that travels through the heartwhen the heart beats and to provideinformation needed to analyze the heart’srhythm and rate. To administer an ECG,small patches containing metal contacts(electrodes) are placed on the skin tomeasure the electric currents emitted bythe heart; the information is recorded onpaper or in a computer.

The record shows three major waves ofelectrical impulses: the P wave, whichmeasures the electrical activity of the

atria; the QRS wave, which measures theelectrical activity of the ventricles; and theT wave, which measures the heart’selectrical repolarization and its return tothe resting state. The shape and size ofthe waves and the time between thewaves can be analyzed for informationabout how long electrical impulses take totravel through the atria, the atrioventricalconduction system and the ventricles.

In addition to identifying abnormal heartrhythms, ECGs can help identifyinadequate blood supply to the heart,thickening of heart muscle (sometimes aresult of high blood pressure) and athinning or absence of heart muscle(often a result of a heart attack). ECGs

are either “resting” ECGs, conductedwhile the person is lying down, or“exercise” ECGs, conducted while theperson pedals a stationary bicycle orwalks on a treadmill. The results ofexercise ECGs can show whetherexercise causes an arrhythmia or makes itworse and whether blood flow to the heartmay be inadequate.

Other diagnostic tests include a 24-hourECG documented by a portable ECGrecorder (Holter monitor). Electrodes areplaced on the patient’s chest, with theelectrode wires connected to the battery-powered recorder. The monitor operateswhile the patient continues his or hernormal activities. Afterwards, the data

2121

collected by the portable ECG areanalyzed using computer software thatidentifies abnormalities in the heart’srhythm and helps determine whether theabnormalities are a result of the patient’sactivity level.

For monitoring arrhythmias that occurless often than once a day, the patientwears a portable ECG “event monitor.”After the patient feels an arrhythmia, he orshe transmits the ECG by telephone tospecialists who analyze the resulting data.

Other diagnostic tools also may be used,including the following:

■ Echocardiography uses sound wavesto observe the size, structure andmotion of the heart;

■ Electrophysiologic testing can beused to collect information oninfrequent arrhythmias or suspectedarrhythmias. After a local anesthetic isadministered, temporary electrodecatheters are placed in the atria, theventricles and along the electrical-conduction system to record electricalimpulses and determine how theyspread with each heartbeat. Theprocess shows where in the system aheart block is located and wheretachycardia originates;

■ Esophageal electrophysiologicprocedures are used to diagnoseand/ or treat tachycardias. A thin,flexible tube is inserted through anostril into the esophagus (the tubeconnecting the mouth and thestomach), where — because of thelocation near the atria — an ECGrecording can provide more preciseinformation than a regular ECG.During the procedure, specialists mayuse an electrical stimulator to restartan arrhythmia for diagnosis, and theymay test different medications to findthe most effective one;

■ Intracardiac electrophysiologicprocedure (cardiac catheterization)involves inserting a thin, flexible tubethrough a large blood vessel in thelegs or arms into the heart to recordthe heart’s electrical impulses. Thisprocedure can provide more preciseinformation than a regular ECG;

■ Radionuclide ventriculography (first-pass technique or multiple-gatedacquisition scanning) is a nuclear-medicine test to measure the heart’spumping ability. The test involves theinjection of a radioactive isotope intoa vein. Cameras or other equipmentare used to observe the radioactiveisotope as it travels through the heart;and,

■ Tilt tests may be used to diagnose thecause of recurrent fainting spells. Thetests are conducted using tables thatcan be tilted to specific angles whilethe patient’s heart rhythm and bloodpressure are monitored throughplastic tubes inserted into the bloodvessels.

Civil aviation authorities use several ofthese diagnostic tests when conductingfurther evaluation of pilots witharrhythmias. For example, Ruge said thatif, during a routine ECG, a pilot is found tohave one of the most minor arrhythmias,the aviation medical examiner enters anotation in the pilot’s medical records. JAArequirements specify that pilots with mostother arrhythmias undergo resting ECGs,exercise ECGs, 24-hour monitoring with aportable ECG and echocardiograms.Some pilots also may require eitherelectrophysiological testing or coronaryangiograms (X-rays that can determine thecondition of coronary arteries), Ruge said.

Silberman said that FAA requires similartesting for many types of arrhythmias andthat, in many cases, after medicalauthorities are satisfied that thearrhythmia does not present a risk to the

pilot’s safe operation of an aircraft, he orshe is issued a medical certificate,Medical certification generally is denied incases involving the more seriousarrhythmias, such as most ventricularfibrillations and many ventriculartachycardias; in such serious arrhythmias,decisions on medical certification takeinto consideration the underlying medicalcondition that led to the arrhythmia.

Treatments Include Medication,Pacemakers, Surgery

Some mild arrhythmias require nomedical treatment, or they can bealleviated if the patient holds his or herbreath or slowly drinks water. Otherarrhythmias require treatment of anunderlying cause, such as heart disease,or treatment of the arrhythmia itself. Insome cases, treatment may precludemedical certification for pilots with allclasses of medical certificates.

Treatment often includes antiarrhythmicmedication to stop the abnormaltransmission of electrical impulses, but thespecific medication depends on severalfactors, including the type of arrhythmia,other medications being taken by thepatient and the patient’s response to thearrhythmia medication. Medicationsintended to manage arrhythmia can haveserious side effects, including theworsening of the existing arrhythmia or thecreation of a new arrhythmia. If medicationis prescribed, an ECG or some other testoften is conducted to monitor itseffectiveness. JAA sometimes does notgrant medical certification to pilots whouse antiarrhythmic medications. FAAgenerally does grant certification.

Other medications sometimes areprescribed, including anticoagulants toprevent the clotting of blood pooled in theatria. JAA requirements prevent medicalcertification of pilots using anticoagulationmedications; in many cases, while FAA

22

allows medical certification of pilots whouse anticoagulants.

Some tachycardias are treated withradiofrequency ablation, in which a thin,flexible tube with an electrode at its tip isinserted into the heart muscle to deliverradiofrequency energy to kill the aberrantheart muscle cells that were transmittingthe electrical impulses responsible for therapid heartbeats.

Patients with serious ventricular arrhythmiacan be treated with surgical implantationof an automatic defibrillator in the chest.The defibrillator monitors the patient’sheart rhythm, identifies serious arrhythmiasand delivers an electrical stimulus toprevent fatal arrhythmia. FAA and JAA donot grant medical certification to pilots withimplanted automatic defibrillators.

In other cases, when the heart’s sinus nodeis not functioning properly as the naturalpacemaker or when one of the pathways forthe heart’s electrical impulses is blocked, anartificial pacemaker can be implanted. Theartificial pacemaker then replaces the sinusnode to send the electrical impulses thatmake the heart beat. Most civil aviation

authorities require that medical certificationbe denied to a pilot who is dependent on apacemaker.

When other treatments are ineffective,open-heart surgery may be performed toalter or remove the heart tissue that iscausing an arrhythmia. One relativelyrecent surgical approach to treating atrialfibrillation is the Maze procedure, in whichan incision is cut in the heart and thensewn together; the incision blocks irregularheartbeats and stops the fibrillation.

In emergencies, cardioversion (electricalstimulus) may be administered to restorea normal heart rhythm. Afterward,medication usually is administered toprevent a recurrence of the arrhythmia.

Prevention Measures Include HealthyDiet, Exercise

Because people with heart disease havethe greatest risk of developing arrhythmia,medical specialists say that prevention ofarrhythmia involves preventing thedevelopment of heart problems in general(and receiving proper treatment for

existing heart problems). To eliminate riskfactors for heart disease and arrhythmia,medical specialists recommend actionsincluding the following:

■ Exercise regularly. Typicalrecommendations are for 30 minutesof exercise on most days of the week;

■ Consume a healthy diet that includesa variety of foods in moderateportions — especially fruits andvegetables, whole grains and low-fatmeats — and that limits fats,cholesterol, sugar and salt;

■ Maintain a healthy weight;

■ Do not smoke, and avoid second-hand smoke;

■ Limit consumption of caffeine, alcoholand other substances that maycontribute to arrhythmias or heartdisease;

■ Avoid unnecessary stress and learn tomanage stressful situations that areunavoidable; and,

■ Schedule regular physical examinationsand seek treatment for health problemsthat may contribute to arrhythmia orheart disease, including elevated bloodpressure, elevated cholesterol, diabetesand thyroid disease.

An arrhythmia can be harmless,symptomatic of a serious disease or life-threatening. In pilots, a thorough medicalevaluation is necessary to assess theseverity of an arrhythmia, develop thebest course of treatment and determinethe advisability of continued medicalcertification.

Acknowledgement to Flight SafetyFoundation.

23

As an ex-military fast jet flying instructorand now a civilian airline Captain, l havebeen asked to write an article, which willhopefully enable crews on both sides ofthe fence to be more aware of a numberof the concerns which can impact on all ofour lives in aviation. The article will alsohighlight some of the over-archingproblems from our (the civilian)perspective, cover working conditions andcontain a number of personal thoughts.

Communication is a wonderful thing, but itis seldom perfect. So I have agreed towrite this (with the risk of personal ridicule)for the simple reason l do think that thereis a basic lack of awareness of thedifferent roles between military and civilianflying (the them & us syndrome) and someof the issues surrounding this. So heregoes, but please remember that these aremy views based on my experiences, theyare probably not PC (how refreshing!!) butmay lay to rest several injustices that floatabout in both crew rooms.

Planning

Civil pilots report for work one hour prior topushback, to meet the crew, collect theweather and flight plans, have a cup ofcoffee, decide on the all-important fuelfigures for the day and so on. We try tosecond-guess what might go wrong: arethe French on strike, will the Spanishrefuellers turn up on time, are there slotdelays etc? Simple really, mainly due to thefact that we use repetitive flight plans, theaircraft computers are excellent and we arebut one very small cog in the wheel ofcommercial aviation.

Conversely, for a normal military trainingsortie a briefing of 45 minutes is notuncommon, with safety issues, rules andairspace considerations probablyaccounting for 40% of that time. For a largeexercise the planning can take days orweeks. So, we'd be wrong to think that the'chaps' are just hooligans flying at low levelfor a 'buzz' - those days are long gone.With serviceability problems, the Britishweather and manning issues, if a fast jetgoes flying there is every chance that it ispart of a well co-ordinated exercise with avery serious training purpose.

Fuel

The first area where military pilots differfrom their civil colleagues must be on thesubject of fuel. Fast jets have only one fuelload - FULL. In the civil world, theperformance characteristics of each airportthat we operate to and from mean we haveto balance the requirements of fuel loadand passenger weights to ensure we canmake the journey. Sometimes theseconsiderations can be very tight (hot day,wet runway, short runway with obstacles atthe end, heavy payload etc). At other timeswe are easily able to carry extra fuel(tanking) to achieve economic advantage.Airliners are very efficient machines, but thebasic truth is that it costs fuel to carry fuel,so there have to be valid reasons why wecarry more fuel than the flight plan tells us(oh boy, could this open a can of worms!).So how does this affect me once airborne?Well quite simply. I want every short cut Ican get, I want to push back and taxiexpeditiously, fly as many 'directs' aspossible at the heights I want - above all Iwant to do it safely. Remember the 'secondguess' statement earlier. Well this is all partof it, but on a Liverpool to Barcelona run Ican easily save 5% of fuel with a helpfulATC service, but I can conversely lose 10%if ATC keep me low or vector me off route,etc. Here is an interesting fact: I can flyfrom Liverpool to Madrid with a fullpassenger load and use less fuel than an

F3 Tornado uses in a 30 minute combatsortie or an hour-long intercept sortie!OK - so what? Well, a large amount ofairspace is reserved for the military; fromthe civilian perspective this airspace isplaced annoyingly in big blocks inbetween airways and control zones. Wewant the most direct routings possibleand see airspace as a commercial assetthat enables us to reduce both time andfuel; we also want the protection that goesalong with Class A airspace, primarily noVisual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic. Ultimatelywe would like airways between theairports. Conversely, the military want -and some would argue need - moreairspace, yet this valuable commodity isunder threat as the airlines expand andthe public benefit from the joys of low costtravel. The military sees this as anintrusion into their ability to train andoperate a modern fast jet fleet of aircraftto safeguard our nation, particularly as theintroduction into service of future aircrafttypes such as Typhoon and the JointStrike Fighter (JSF) with their increasedagility, new weapons systems and tacticshas brought significant new demands forairspace: we see it as saving time andfuel. I'm glad I'm not a politician.

Professionalism

Please be under no illusions: the militarypilots are highly trained professionals whoare extremely safety-conscious. In myexperience nothing gets in the way ofFlight Safety. However, there was a feelingamongst the military that the civilian pilotwas a fat chap who pontificated a lot andcouldn't fly an aircraft without an autopilot.Far from it. All those who know someonewho has gone over to the other side ofthe fence will know that the CAA examsare not an annoying inconvenience - theyare actually quite hard and the InstrumentRating Test (IRT) is no pushover. Findingthat dream job takes time and effort too.So a little more respect for the civilianpilot please - we may not do air-to-air

Poacher Turned GamekeeperBy Captain Phil Jones, easyJet

24

refuelling or close formation, but thenagain we don't have to!

Conflictions

What are the problems? Well, airlineshave had numerous encounters with fastjets in various areas, arriving or departingat airports outside Controlled Air Space(CAS). Inverness is a case in point. Thereare several reasons for this: first, RadarControl is not always available, and ATCrequirements may include handovers,such as from Scottish Control toLossiemouth; there is only an AdvisoryRoute (ADR) connecting Inverness toPerth and ADRs do not offer the level ofprotection that we civilians so crave. It isa busy area for the military, with aircraftoperating from Kinloss and Lossiemouth,as well as those aircraft transiting through

the area, and there have been closeencounters, which need to be learnedfrom. Military pilots need to be madeaware of the increased civilian activity andthe civilians informed of the probablelocations of the military operations, suchas the area between Newcastle andEdinburgh. Sounds simple really, but theword 'communication' crops up yet again.

Why is this important? Well, the revolutionof low cost airlines is changing the face ofaviation in the UK, whether we like it or not.Recently, Liverpool has had its StandardInstrument Departures (SIDS) and Arrivals(STAR s) changed to enable more efficientco-ordination with traffic using Manchester.The number of aircraft movements haveexploded at Stansted and Luton,Blackpool is now host to Ryanair, the oldRAF Finningley is being proposed as anew civil airport, and easyJet have recently

moved intoNewcastle.

Basically, it is not theprincipal airports thatshould give themilitary crews causefor concern, as theyare already protected.Rather, it is theregional airports,which are not yet asfully protected interms of airspace astheir moreestablished cousins.Of course, this maychange in the futureunder the FlightSafety umbrella -which gives theairliners moreprotection: althoughalso reducing theavailable airspace forthe military. Forexample see the'NORCA' betweenPole Hill and

Newcastle where an advisory route wasestablished, which subsequently becamea full airway a couple of years later.

We all need to be more aware of eachother's operations; civilians want straightlines and gentle manoeuvres, the militarywant to hang upside down, go very veryfast at low level and to use large volumesof airspace in order to achieve theirtraining needs. So who gets the priority?Well that's up to the politicians. But let'snow look at ways to help each other on aday-to-day basis.

Consideration to our Fellow Aviators

In essence, Fast Jets are verymanoeuvrable, have impressiveperformance characteristics, and areflown by highly trained, professional andsafety-conscious aircrew. Importantlymany of the military are still not fitted witha collision avoidance system (TCAS), thecockpits are claustrophobic workspacesand at the end of the day, the onlypurpose of getting these chaps airborneis for them to train as intensively aspossible in the art of detecting andeliminating targets, whether these targetsare airborne or on the ground. It is veryeasy to get target-fixated (I've done it atlow level when the overriding urge toshoot down the Jaguar that hasside-stepped the Squadron Boss orbetter still the arrogant QWI - outweighsall else) so what if I clipped the Newcastlecontrol zone? Let's be brutally honest, theonly perceived success in militaryterms is to achieve the aim. A kill is a kill.Possibly not the most helpful attitude tohave, while we are all trying to make bestuse of the congested airspace available.

When conflict with another aircraft isdetected, military crews are able tomanoeuvre as required, but due to thefact that close formation flying isdrummed into the pilots from basictraining, their impression of a 5nm visual

25

Book Review

FFaattiigguuee iinn AAvviiaattiioonnA Guide to Staying Awake at the Stick

By John A.Caldwell, Jr. andJ. Lynn Caldwell

Published by Ashgate ISBN 0 7546 3300 4 Paperback £20.00

This overview of fatigue includes fatiguedefinitions, the measurement/assessment offatigue, and the performance, mood, andsafety problems associated with fatigue inthe operational setting. The physiologicalbases of fatigue are discussed, so thereader understands that fatigue is aphysiological phenomenon that is not ‘just astate of mind’. Scientifically validcountermeasures are discussed and datafrom a variety of sources are included to

provide readers with a ‘toolbox’ from whichthey can choose solutions to fatigue-relatedproblems.

The book is of interest to aviation crews inboth civilian and military sectors, managersas well as aviators, flight deck as well asmaintenance crews. It aims to be ‘user-friendly’, although scientific information isincluded to help the reader understand whycertain behaviours occur.

About the AuthorsJohn A.Caldwell, Jr, Principal ResearchPsychologist, and J.Lynn Caldwell, SeniorResearch Psychologist, both work for theWarfighter Fatigue CountermeasuresProgram in the U.S. Air Force. They are

Consultants for Fatigue-Management inMilitary Aviation, Commercial/Civilian AirOperations, and Emergency Air-Ambulance

separation from an airliner is probably alot different from ours, simply due to thesize and relative speeds of the two aircrafttypes. This point can be highlighted by thefact that I have yet to fly with another pilotwho has not remarked that 1,000 feetseparation in airspace with ReducedVertical Separation Minima (RVSM) 'is alittle too close for comfort' when crossingwith high relative speeds.

The airline pilot is also a highly-trainedprofessional, intent on flying safely from Ato B, avoiding all other aircraft by therequired separations, keeping to theschedule, burning as little fuel as possible(and keeping up the coffee intake!). Weare TCAS equipped - and a very valuabletool it has proved to be in improving'Situational Awareness' of what'shappening around us - but we areobviously not as manoeuvrable as ourmilitary counterparts and our crews andpassengers are not strapped in all of thetime. An 'avoiding action' turn can easilycause personal injury and this is one

reason why we are so concerned aboutflight outside controlled airspace. I knowthe military take great delight in ribbing usabout our 'seat belt signs off / seat beltssigns on' - but in this litigious world, thatswitch is very important. One day youmay be grateful for it.

Conclusion

I've gone on long enough, so inconclusion, I'd ask all pilots to respecteach other's professional skills andjudgements. We all want to operate ouraircraft, in our own way, SAFELY. Airspaceis a valuable commodity; if the militarywants to keep the free airspace exactlythat, then they need to ensure that theydon't violate CAS and that they stay awareof the increasing number of civilianoperations outside CAS. Please, giveairliners more avoidance than you mightthink we deserve. Conversely, it doesn'thelp if airline pilots cry 'foul' every timethey see a fast jet - we are not trained in

range estimation, we only have TCAS andif we accept a direct routing which takesus outside CAS, then it is our decisionand the idea is to then look out of thecockpit a little more than usual; we haveto decide whether the 2-minute saving isworth the increased risk?

I'm not an authority on anything I havewritten here, it's just my opinion havingjumped the fence. But I hope it causesdiscussions on the flight decks and in thecrew rooms around the country becauseit means that we can all be a little moreaware of the need for mutual respect.

Fly safe and happy landings.

Reproduced with kind permission of the

Defence Aviation Flight Safety Magazine

‘Aviate’.

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