oktobar 2008 godina 1, broj 3 -...

OKTOBAR 2008godina 1, broj 3

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BANKARBroj 3. oktobar 2008.

IZDAVAČUdruženje banaka i finansijskih institucija Crne Gore, Novaka Miloševa bb/3 PodgoricaTel: +382 20 232-028 www.ubcg.info

TIRAŽ: 600 primjerakaČasopis izlazi kvartalno.

Rješenjem Ministarstva kulture, sporta i medija časopis Bankar je upisan u Evidenciju medija - štampani mediji 17. marta 2008, pod rednim brojem 641.

REDAKCIJSKI ODBORglavni i odgovorni urednikMirko Radonjić

Milija Vlahović, Prof. dr Aleksandar Živković, dr Nikola Fabris, dr Slobodan Lakić, dr Saša Popović, dr Evangelos Markopoulos, mr Nebojša Đoković

urednikPeko Nikolićdizajn i prelommr Nikola Latkovićfinalna priprema tekstova i korektura Marko Nikolićfotografijewww.photos.com i fotodokumentacija UBCGprevodTanja Luburić, Jelena Pralas, Vesna Radunović, Nada Stojović i Milena Ljumovićštampa Grafotisak, Grude, BIH

Prilozi - tekstovi se dostavljaju u elektronskom obliku na e-mail adrese: [email protected], [email protected], na disketi ili cd-u; maksimalna dužina teksta do 25.000 karaktera.- reklame po normativima UBCG na e-mail: [email protected]

Sadržaj / Contents

Guido RavoetKONSOLIDACIJA EVROPSKOG BANKARSKOG TRŽIŠTAConsolidation of European Banking Market

mr Aleksandar RadulovićSubprime mortgage kriza u SaD - geneza, poSljeDice i poukeU.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis – Background, Implications and Lessons

dr Nikola FabrisbankarSke krize i njihove poSljeDiceBanking Crisis and their Consequences

dr Slobodan LakićoD bankarSkog brenDa Do krize i vice verSaFrom Banking Brand to Crisis and Vice Versa

Ivana GogićBANKARSKI KLJUČ ZA KUR’ANBanking Key to Kur’an

dr Zorica VasovićoSvrt na FinanSijSku krizu u SaDThe View at the Financial Crisis in the USA

Mila Kasalicapovratak oSnovamaBack to Basics

Prof. dr Vuk OgnjanovićoboStrane koriSti i poSlovno povjerenjeMutual Benefits and Business Confidence

Aldo J. MartinezZAŠTITA INVESTITORA, OBRAZOVANJE I POVJERENJE U NOVO GLOBALNO OKRUŽENJEInvestor Protection, Education and Confidence in the New Global Environment

Goran Smolovićupravljanje rizikom kamatne StopeInterest Rate Risk Management

Dragan Vujošević, dipl. ecc.banke kao i DrugiBanks like the Others

bankarSki pojmovnikGlossary of Banking Terms

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BANKARČasopis Udruženja banakai finansijskih institucija Crne GoreBroj 3. oktobar 2008.

IMPRESUM

Na međunarodnom nivou korišćenje eura za trgovinu i finansijske aktivnosti izvan zemalja euro zone u sigurnom je porastu, pa tako i uloga eura kao rezervne valute. Euro je postao neodvojivi dio koncepta Evrope. Deset godina nakon uvođenja, euro danas predstavlja stabilnu i pouzdanu međunarodnu valutu. Članstvo u Evropskoj bankarskoj federaciji daje udruženjima banaka susjednih zemalja direktan pristup ogromnoj količini informacija o zakonima i propisima Evropske unije u oblasti finansijskih usluga, a isto tako i pristup stručnom znanju i poznavanju finansijskog sektora Evropske unije. Mislim da će sadašnja kriza dovesti do detaljne analize faktora koji stvaraju poremećaje između različitih tržišta, a nadajmo se, i do njihovog iskorjenjivanja. Neophodno je stvoriti jednake uslove za finansijske institucije širom svijeta ako evropske institucije žele na globalnom nivou da igraju ulogu koja im pripada

Gvido Ravoet Generalni sekretar Evropske bankarske federacije

konsolidacija evropskog bankarskog tržišta

velikim komitentima, tako i onih koje posluju sa stanovni-štvom. Kao Evropska bankarska federacija mi imamo ulo-gu da definišemo zajedničke stavove o ključnim pitanjima vezanim za zakone i propise, tako da se interesi bankarskog sektora mogu uzeti u obzir u svakoj fazi evropskog zako-nodavnog procesa. Činjenica je da 70% zakona i propisa u članicama Evropske unije kreće iz Brisela, te je stoga naše aktivno prisustvo na nivou Evropske unije izuzetno značaj-no. Stavovi banaka, sasvim sigurno, imaju veću težinu kada su banke ujedinjene i kao takve predstavljaju jedan od naj- značajnijih ekonomskih sektora Evrope. Sa stanovišta naših pridruženih članica, Evropska bankarska federacija ključni je sagovornik kada je riječ o evropskim temama. Naši susje-di redovno se suočavaju sa zakonima i propisima Evropske unije, a da bi uspješno poslovali sa svojim najznačajnijim partnerima treba da budu dobro informisani.

:B Udruženje banaka Crne Gore nedavno je takođe postalo pridruženi član Evropske bankarske federacije. Kako doživljavate vašu saradnju sa pridruženim članovima, posebno zemljama zapadnog Balkana čija je težnja da postanu članice Evropske unije?Pridruživanje zemalja susjednih Evropskoj uniji u formi pridruženog članstva od strateškog je značaja za Evropsku bankarsku federaciju iz više razloga. Najočigledniji jeste to što članstvo u Evropskoj bankarskoj federaciji daje udruže-njima banaka susjednih zemalja direktan pristup ogromnoj količini informacija o zakonima i propisima Evropske unije

:B Prije svega, željeli bismo da vas zamolimo da našoj čitalačkoj publici predstavite ulogu i značaj Evropske bankarske federacije. Kakve su obaveze vaših članova i što oni dobijaju članstvom u vašoj Federaciji, odnosno, što Evropska bankarska federacija nudi svojim punopravnim i pridruženim članovima?Naša Federacija okuplja nacionalna bankarska udruženja 31 države, članice Evropske unije i Evropskog udruženja za slobodnu trgovinu (EFTA). Zajedno oni predstavljaju jezgro evropskog bankarskog sektora, sa otprilike 5000 ba-naka, kako velikih tako i malih; kako onih koje posluju sa

oktobar 2008 | :Bankar

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RAZGOVORI

consolidation of european banking market

At the international level, its use for trade and financial purposes outside the euro area countries is steadily increasing, and so does the role of the euro as a reserve currency. The euro has become an indivisible part of the concept of Europe. Ten years after its introduction, the euro today proves to be a stable and reliable international currency. EBF membership gives the banking associations of neighbouring countries direct access to vast information on EU legislation in financial services, to the expertise and knowledge of the EU financial sector. I believe that the current crisis will lead to an in-depth analysis of the factors which create distortions between the various markets and hopefully to their eradication. It is necessary to create a level-playing field for financial institutions throughout the world if European institutions are to play their du role at global levelGuido Ravoet, EBF Secretary General

:B First of all, we would like to ask you to present to our readership the role and significance of EBF? What are your members’ benefits and obligations and what does EBF provide to its full and associate members?Our Federation brings together the national banking Associations of 31 countries, members of the European Union and of the European Free Trade Association. Together, they represent the core of the European banking sector, with some 5000 banks, large banks as well as small, whole-sale banks as well as retail ones. Our role as the European Banking Federation is to define common positions on key legislative issues, so that the interests of the banking sector are taken into consideration at every stage of the European legislative process. It is a fact that over 70% of the legislation in EU member states originate in Brussels, hence the impor-tance of an active presence at EU level. Banks obviously car-ry much more weight when they stand united as one of the major European economic sectors. From the point of view of our Associate members, the EBF is a key interlocutor on European issues. Our neighbours are regularly confronted with EU legislation, they need to be well informed in order to conduct fruitful business with their main partners.

:B Montenegrin Banking Association-UBCG recently also became associate member of EBF. How do you see your cooperation with associate members, especially Western Balkans, which aspire to EU membership?Associate membership of the EU neighbouring countries

october 2008 | :Bankar�

INTERVIEWS

u oblasti finansijskih usluga, a isto tako i pristup stručnom znanju i poznavanju finansijskog sektora Evropske unije. Sastanci Evropske bankarske federacije pružaju učesnicima platformu za umrežavanje, razmjenu iskustava, saznava- nje o dešavanjima na finanskijskim tržištima, uspostavljanje novih veza sa drugim zemljama. Koristeći ove mogućnosti bankarska udruženja zemalja susjeda Evropske unije pod-stiču jačanje finansijskih sektora u svojim zemljama i pod-stiču solidniji ekonomski rast.

:B Što mislite o iskustvu sa Evropskom monetarnom unijom do danas, posebno o vrijednosti eura i njegovom značaju na globalnom valutnom tržištu?Deset godina nakon uvođenja, euro danas predstavlja sta-bilnu i pouzdanu međunarodnu valutu. Osim činjenice da je Evropska monetarna unija dovela do stabilnosti cijena i podstakla kontrolisanu monetarnu i fiskalnu politiku, građani Evrope sve više cijene vrijednost zajedničke valu-te, pošto ona olakšava život onima koji putuju po zemlja-ma Eurozone i smanjuje troškove novčanih transakcija, da pomenemo samo neke od dobrih strana eura. Na među-narodnom nivou korišćenje eura za trgovinu i finansijske aktivnosti izvan zemalja euro zone u sigurnom je porastu, pa tako i uloga eura kao rezervne valute. Euro je postao ne-odvojivi dio koncepta Evrope.

:B Kakve će promjene principi iz Bazela II donijeti na bankarsko tržište? Da li se slažete da Bazel II favorizuje velike, a ne male banke (kako tvrde neki analitičari)?Ideja da će Bazel II diskriminisati male banke potpuno je neosnovana. Ne treba zaboraviti da je u kontekstu novih pravila Bazela II proporcionalnost, pošto ova pravila ima-ju za cilj prepoznavanje raznovrsnosti bankarskog tržišta. Princip proporcionalnosti nalaže supervizorima da u do-voljnoj mjeri uzmu u obzir prirodu, dimenzije i složenost poslovanja banke i njenu relevantnost u sistemu. Supervizori se slažu da banke koje su aktivne i posluju samostalno treba da imaju drugačiji tretman od banaka koje su integrisane u veće strukture ili, preciznije rečeno, da manje razvijene banke ne moraju nužno da postupaju po svakoj pojedinoj smjernici koju izdaju bankarski regulatori i, štaviše, da im treba dati više vremena da pokažu da su razumjeli rezon koji je osnov obaveza koje uvodi supervizija. Na primjer, opšte je prihvaćeno da male banke treba da budu izuzete iz pravila o korporativnom upravljanju kojim se nalaže odvo-jenost funkcija u određenim oblastima.

Način na koji se tretiraju male banke u okviru Stuba 2 po-sebno je ilustrativan, pošto je Komitet evropskih bankarskih supervizora (CEBS) izdao dokument - koji nikada nije ob-javljen - kojim se dozvoljava manjim institucijama da imaju lakši (tj. jednostavniji) pristup u ovoj oblasti.

Štaviše, u okviru Evropske unije, zakonodavac je imao razumijevanja za potrebe manjih banaka. Evropska komi-sija je to ilustrovala predlažući da se u Direktivu o obavez-nom kapitalu unesu neka specifična pravila u oblasti oba-veza vezanih za veliku izloženost koja imaju za cilj da se manjim institucijama da manje restriktivan tretman nego drugim bankama.

I na kraju, treba imati na umu da sadašnja struktu-ra supervizije u Evropi otežava život velikim bankama pošto one rade u više zemalja i stoga se suočavaju sa više različitih zakona. Obaveze primjene zajedničkog regu-latornog izvještavanja koje je uveo Komitet evropskih bankarskih supervizora, na primjer, posebno korisnim instrumentom smatraju i posebno su pozdravile man-je domaće banke koje često rade po standardizovanom pristupu. Banke koje posluju u više zemalja drugačije gledaju na to: za njih je ova Obaveza noćna mora poš-to se o obavezama za izvještavanje odlučuje na nivou država članica i ima domaćih “Obaveza za zajedničkim regulatornim izvještavanjem” koliko je i država članica. Posljedica toga je da banke koje posluju u više zemalja treba pažljivo da analiziraju 27 različitih zakonskih siste-ma u kojima se koriste različite definicije, imaju drugačiji stavovi o poljima koje se traže, sadržaji polja se tumače na različit način, itd.

U takvim okolnostima, ne može se tvrditi da bi došlo do diskriminacije manjih banaka u kontekstu Bazela II ovako kako se on implementira.

:B Kako vidite bankarski sistem u narednih 4 - 5 godina? Što bi mogle da budu mogućnosti i prepreke?Vjerujem da će predstojeće godine dovesti do dalje konsolidacije evropskog bankarskog tržišta. Ova kon-solidacija u više država biće pomognuta mjerama koje se uvode na evropskom nivou i kojima se pomaže bli-ža saradnja između različitih režima supervizije, vrši se

prvi prioritet je Da Se povrati povjerenjeTreba da pratimo akciju koju su vlade Evropskih zemalja na odgovarajući način koordinirale, ali takođe i na globalnom nivou, ako želimo da povratimo povjerenje u finan-sijska tržišta, kaže Gvido Ravoet, generalni sekretar EBF-a. Podržavamo Deklaraciju šefova država i vlada za podršku sistemskim finansijskim institucijama, koje mi smatramo konkretnim prvim korakom naprijed prema daljoj saradnji, ali takođe je potrebno da se uradi i više od toga.EBF upozorava na zloslutne javne izjave koje imaju direktan uticaj na paniku investitora i podudaraju se sa pogoršanjem krize, slabljenjem efekata usaglašenih odluka i akcijama osiguranja koje preduzimaju nacionalne vlade i evropska javna tijela.

RAZGOVORI

… Dalja eSkalacija?:B Da li mislite da je kriza hipotekarnih kredita koja je počela u Sjedinjenim Državama i koja utiče na Evropu dostigla svoj vrhunac ili možemo da očekujemo i dalju eskalaciju? Koje je posljedice do sada pretrpio evropski bankarski sistem i kakve su vaše projekcije?U ovoj je fazi veoma teško dati bilo kakve prognoze. Imamo sreću što je situacija u Evropi drugačija od situ-acije u Sjedinjenim Državama, ali mi funkcionišemo u globalnoj ekonomiji i, kao što smo vidjeli, neke velike evropske banke teško su pogođene ovom krizom. Vlade su brzo reagovale i mi pozdravljamo njihovu snažnu reakciju, ali želio bih da istaknem da je ono što nam je ova kriza pokazala upravo da moramo dalje da ostvaru-jemo saradnju na evropskom nivou, prije svega u oblas-ti supervizije, ali i u smislu koordinacije infrastrukture. Bliža saradnja između država članica je nešto što će nas spasiti, i ovog puta, ali još i više u slučaju nekih budućih turbulencija.


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is of strategic importance for the EBF for various reasons. The most obvious one is that the EBF membership gives the banking associations of neighbouring countries direct access to vast information on EU legislation in financial services, to the expertise and knowledge of the EU financial sector. EBF meetings provide the participants with a platform for networking, exchanging experiences, learning about the developments in the financial markets, establishing new links with other countries. Making use of these opportu-nities, the banking Associations of the EU neighbouring countries help strengthen their financial sector and foster more solid economic growth.

:B How do you see the experience with the European Monetary Union to date, especially the value of euro and its significance in the global currency market?Ten years after its introduction, the euro today proves to be a stable and reliable international currency. Aside from the fact that EMU has brought price stability and induced controlled monetary and fiscal policies, the European citi-zens appreciate the value of a common currency more and more, as it eases the life for those citizens who travel across the euro area countries and cuts costs on monetary trans-actions to name but a few benefits. At the international le-vel, its use for trade and financial purposes outside the euro area countries is steadily increasing, and so does the role of the euro as a reserve currency. The euro has become an in-divisible part of the concept of Europe.

:B What changes will Basel II principles introduce on the banking market? Do you agree that Basel II favours large rather than small banks (as some analysts claim)?The suggestion that Basel II would discriminate against small banks is obviously unfounded. One should not forget in this regard that proportionality is a key concept in the context of the new Basel II rules as they aim at recognising the diversity of the banking market. The principle of pro-portionality requires supervisors to take due account of the nature, size and complexity of a bank’s business ad its sys-temic relevance. Supervisors are in agreement that banks which are active on a stand-alone basis need to be treated

differently than banks which are integrated into larges struc-tures and, more particularly, that less sophisticated banks do not necessarily need to comply with each and every gu-ideline issued by banking regulators and, moreover, need to be given more time to demonstrate that they have un-derstood the rationale behind supervisory requirements. It is, for instance, generally accepted that small banks need to be exempted from the corporate governance rule requiring a segregation of functions in certain areas.

The way in which smaller banks are being treated within the Pillar 2 framework is particularly illustrative as the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has issued a docu-ment – which it has never published – allowing smaller insti-tutions to apply a light (i.e. more simple) approach in this area.

Moreover, within the EU, the legislator is sensitive to the needs of smaller banks. The European Commission has illustrated this in proposing to insert into the Capital Requirements Directive some specific rules in the area of Large Exposure Requirements which aim at treating smaller institutions in a less restrictive way than other banks.

Finally, it needs to be borne in mind that the current su-pervisory architecture in Europe makes life much more dif-ficult to large banks as these operate across borders and are, therefore, faced with a multiplicity of differing national le-gislations. The common regulatory reporting requirements (COREP which CEBS has introduced have), for instance, been particularly welcomed as an extremely useful tool by smaller, domestic banks which tend to work under the stan-dardised approach. Cross-border banks see it differently: to them, COREP is a real nightmare as reporting requirements are still decided upon at Member State level and there are as many national “COREP”’s as there are Member States. As a result, cross-border banks need to analyse carefully 27 legislations which use differing definitions, have divergen-cing views about the fields which are required, interpret the contents of the fields differently, etc.

Against this backdrop, one cannot argue that smaller banks would be discriminated against within the context of the Basel II as it has been implemented.

:B How do you see the banking system in the forthcoming 4-5 year period? What may be possible opportunities and obstacles on that track?I believe that the coming years will bring further consolida-tion on the European banking market. This consolidation

FirSt priority iS to reStore conFiDenceWe need to see properly coordinated action from European governments but also at global level, if we are to restore confidence in financial markets, says Guido Ravoet, Secretary General of the EBF. We welcome the Declaration of Heads of States and Governments to support systemic financial institutions, which we see as a concrete first step towards further coordination, but more is needed.The EBF warns against alarmist public statements which have an immediate impact on investors’ panic and concur to worsen up the crisis, weakening the effects of the concerted decisions and safeguarding actions taken by European public bodies and national governments.


INTERVIEWS

…Further eScalation?:B Do you believe that the mortgage loan crisis that set off in the US and is affecting Europe has reached its climax or that we can expect its further escalation? What have been the consequences for the European banking system so far and what is your projection?It is very difficult to predict anything at this stage. We are fortunate that the situation in Europe is different from the one in the US but we operate in a global eco-nomy and as we have seen some major European banks have been badly hit by the crisis. Governments have reacted swiftly and we welcome their robust respon-se, but I would like to insist that one thing the crisis has shown is that we must have further cooperation at European level, first of all in the field of supervisi-on, but also in terms of infrastructure coordination. Closer cooperation between the Member States is what will save us, this time but even more in case of future turbulences.

revizija PDV režima koji se može primijeniti na gru-pe koje rade u više zemalja, i revizija drugih zakonskih rješenja, sa ciljem da se pomognu pripajanja i kupovi-ne kompanija u drugim zemljama. Evropska bankarska federacija spremna je da bude od pomoći u traženju i pripremi ovih mjera. Takođe mislim da će sadašnja kri-za dovesti do detaljne analize faktora koji stvaraju po-remećaje između različitih tržišta, a nadajmo se, i do

njihovog iskorjenjivanja. Neophodno je stvoriti jed-nake uslove za finansijske institucije širom svijeta ako evropske institucije žele na globalnom nivou da igraju ulogu koja im pripada.

:B I na kraju, molim vas, recite nam nešto o budućim aktivnostima Evropske bankarske federacije i vašim očekivanjima za 2009. godinu.Federacija ima nekoliko velikih projekata koji su u toku. Kriza nas možda jeste prinudila da privremeno na stranu

stavimo svoj “strukturiraniji” rad, ali se on ipak nastavlja. Prirodno je da će nas napori koje nekoliko godina ulažemo u jačanje saradnje u oblasti supervizije i dalje preokupirati, i to uglavnom kao posljedica finansijske krize. Najznačajniji planovi takođe se fokusiraju na razvoj prekograničnih uslu-ga u radu sa stanovništvom, koje su za sada manje razvijene od prekograničnih bankarskih usluga u oblasti rada sa ve-likim klijentima. U to uključujemo finalizaciju pan-evrop-skog platnog sistema, poznatog kao SEPA (Jedinstvena euro platna zona). Zakonski okvir se sprovodi, a banke se pri-premaju za njegovu primjenu. Potrošači će uskoro osjeti-ti dobre strane situacije da mogu da koriste svoje sadašnje sredstvo plaćanja - euro širom Evrope, a ne samo u Euro zoni - kao da tamo žive.

Krajni cilj Evropske bankarske federacije jeste integracija evropskih finansijskih usluga. U posljednjih nekoliko go-dina ostvarili smo ogroman napredak i i dalje radimo na tome, ali ne vjerujem da ćemo postići taj cilj dok sam ja na čelu Federacije, a ni narednih nekoliko godina. I dalje tre-ba raditi, i bankari sa jedne, a i zakonodavci i političari sa druge strane ■

:B Iako nije članica Evropske monetarne unije, Crna Gora koristi euro kao domaću valutu od 2002. godine. Da li to vidite kao prednost na njenom putu ka Evropskoj uniji i što mislite o ovoj specifičnoj crti crnogorskog ekonomskog sistema?Korišćenje eura kao domaće valute u Crnoj Gori prije njenog ulaska u Evropsku uniju svakako je prednost. U ovom trenutku to pomaže građanima da uživaju u monetarnoj stabilnosti, što je veoma značajan aspekt za mladu privredu koja se razvija. To je takođe i velika prednost za međunarodni turizam, kako za st-rance u Crnoj Gori, tako i za lokalno stanovništvo u zemljama euro zone. Zbog toga to ima pozitivan uticaj na međunarodnu trgovinu sa nizom susjednih zemalja, pojednostavljuje i smanjuje troškove međunarodnih finansijskih transakcija i olakšava među-narodnim kompanijama da svoje firme osnuju u Crnoj Gori. Sa aspekta budućnosti, ovaj je korak pomogao da se krene sa pri-premama kako države tako i građana za promjene koje donosi članstvo u Evropskoj uniji.

rezervna globalna valuta?:B Nedavno ste bili u Crnoj Gori i učestvovali na Ruskom festivalu bankarstva u Budvi. Kako doživljavate ruski bankarski sistem danas i njegovu ulogu u evropskom bankarskom sistemu? Koji je vaš komentar na najave ruskih bankara o razmatranju projekta stvaranja rezervne globalne valute koja bi imala svoju osnovu u privredi Rusije, Indije i Kine?Ruski bankarski sistem se brzo razvija, a nemali doprinos tome dalo je širenje evropskog bankarskog tržišta na istok. Neke za-padno-evropske banke (Citibank, Raiffeisen, Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, ING, Hansabank, itd.) već su osnovale svoje filijale i poslovnice u Rusiji i uspješno posluju na tom tržištu. Ruska se privreda brzo razvija, i ima veliki potencijal za produbljivanje i dalju modernizaciju finansijskih tržišta. Mislim da će vremenom više evropskih banaka ući na rusko tržište, kao i da će ruske banke krenuti na zapad radi daljeg produbljivanja integracija bankarskih sektora ova dva geopolitička regiona.

Što se tiče globalne rezervne valute vezane za Rusiju, Indiju i Kinu koja je pomenuta na Drugom Ruskom festivalu bankarstva 7. septembra, koliko ja znam, ta ideja je još uvijek na nivou embri-onalnog razvoja. Za sada je teško govoriti o bilo kakvom stavu ili mišljenju o tome, s obzirom na to da se ni u tim zemljama još nije raspravljalo ni o jednom praktičnom ili političkom pitanju.

Zajednička izjava o previranjima na finansijskim tržištimaBrisel, 13. oktobar 2008…Nedavna podrška vlada kroz javno učestvovanje u privatnim finansijskim institucijama se pokazala kao održivo kratkoročno rješenje za izbjegavanje sistemskih rizika koji se razvijaju širom Evrope. Ove intervencije treba da se posmatraju kao prelazna rješenja i ne treba da imaju dugoročne efekte na javne finansije. Banke moraju dati sve od sebe kako bi povratile povjerenje čišćenjem svojih bilansa stanja i saopštavanjem preciznog finansijskog stanja.Koordinisana smanjenja referentnih kamatnih stopa kod sedam centralnih banaka predstavljaju priznanje rizika ka svjetskom rastu koji proizilazi iz previranja. Koraci koje je preduzela ECB za smanjenje ograničenja likvidnosti i tržišnih kamatnih stopa su bili blagovremeni i treba da pomognu da se podrži povjerenje i ekonomska aktivnost tokom teških mjeseci koji dolaze…

Ernest-Antoine Seillière

Joint statement on financial market turmoilBrussels, 13 October 2008 …Recent support from governments through public partaking in private financialinstitutions has proved a viable short term solution to avoid more systemic risks developing across Europe. These interventions should be viewed as transitory and should not have lasting effects on public finances. On their side, banks must do their utmost to restore confidence by cleaning up their balance sheets and communicating their precise financial situation. The coordinated cuts in seven central banks reference interest rates are a welcome acknowledgment of the risks to world growth arising from the turmoil. The ECB’s steps to ease liquidity constraints and lower market interest rates were timely, and should help to support confidence and economic activity during the difficult months to come…

Michel Pébereau


�

RAZGOVORI

across borders will be facilitated by the measures put in place at European level, supporting closer cooperation between the various supervisory regimes, the revision of the VAT re-gime applicable to cross-border groups, and other legislative developments aiming at facilitating cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The EBF was instrumental in asking for and supporting the development of these measures.

I also believe that the current crisis will lead to an in-depth analysis of the factors which create distortions between the various markets and hopefully to their eradication. It is ne-cessary to create a level-playing field for financial institu-tions throughout the world if European institutions are to play their du role at global level.

:B Lastly, please tell us about EBF future activities and your expectations for 2009?The EBF has several ongoing large projects. The crisis may have forced us to temporarily set aside some of our more “structural” work, but it continues nonetheless. Naturally, the efforts we have been investing for several years in re-inforcing supervisory cooperation will continue to keep us

busy, not least as an immediate consequence of the financial crisis. Major plans also focus on developing cross-border retail services, which are so far much less advanced than cross-border wholesale banking services. In this, we inclu-de finalising the pan-European payments system, know as SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area). The legislative framework is being implemented, banks are preparing its application. Consumers will soon feel the benefits of being able to use

their current means of payment in Euro throughout Europe – not just Euro Zone countries – as if they lived there.

The ultimate aim of the European Banking Federation is the integration of European financial services. We have made

huge progress over the last few years, and we are continuing to do so, but I do not believe that we will achieve this aim in my time at the helm of the EBF, nor for another several years. Work needs to continue, both on the part of bankers on the one hand and law-makers and politicians on the other ■

:B Although it is not a part of the EMU, Montenegro has used euro as its national currency since 2002. Do you see this as an advantage on its way to the EU and what is your view on this specific characteristic of Montenegrin economic system?The use of the euro as a national currency in Montenegro in ad-vance of its entry to the European Union is certainly an advan-tage. At present, it helps the citizens to enjoy monetary stability – a very important aspect for a young and growing economy. It is also a big advantage for international tourism, both for fore-igners in Montenegro, and for the local citizens in the euro area countries. Henceforth, it creates positive impact on international trade with a number of neighbouring countries, simplifies and reduces costs for the international financial transactions, makes it easier for international business to introduce their start-ups in Montenegro. Looking into the future, this step has helped to ad-vance towards preparing both the country and its citizens to the changes that the EU membership brings.

reServe global currency?:B You recently visited Montenegro and participated in a Russian banking festival in Budva. How do you see the Russian banking system today and its role in the European banking system? What is your comment on the Russian bankers’ announcement that they are considering a project to create a reserve global currency that would have as its base the economies of Russia, India and China?The Russian banking system is growing at a fast pace, not least be-cause of the expansion of the European banking market eastwards. Some west European banks (Citibank, Raiffeisen, Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, ING, Hansabank, etc) have already established their subsidiaries and branches in Russia and are successfully opera-ting on the market. Russia is a fast-developing economy, and has a great potential for deepening and further modernisation of the financial markets. I believe that with time, more European banks will enter the Russian market, as well as Russian banks will move westwards for further deepening of banking sector integration between the two geopolitical regions.

Regarding the issue of the global reserve currency for the RICH countries mentioned at the 2ⁿd All-Russian Banking Festival on the 7th of September: as far as I am aware, at this stage this idea is still in the embryonic stage. For the moment it is hard to speak about any positions or opinions on this, given that none of the practical or political issues have been discussed in the countries concerned.

Zajednička izjava o previranjima na finansijskim tržištimaBrisel, 13. oktobar 2008…Nedavna podrška vlada kroz javno učestvovanje u privatnim finansijskim institucijama se pokazala kao održivo kratkoročno rješenje za izbjegavanje sistemskih rizika koji se razvijaju širom Evrope. Ove intervencije treba da se posmatraju kao prelazna rješenja i ne treba da imaju dugoročne efekte na javne finansije. Banke moraju dati sve od sebe kako bi povratile povjerenje čišćenjem svojih bilansa stanja i saopštavanjem preciznog finansijskog stanja.Koordinisana smanjenja referentnih kamatnih stopa kod sedam centralnih banaka predstavljaju priznanje rizika ka svjetskom rastu koji proizilazi iz previranja. Koraci koje je preduzela ECB za smanjenje ograničenja likvidnosti i tržišnih kamatnih stopa su bili blagovremeni i treba da pomognu da se podrži povjerenje i ekonomska aktivnost tokom teških mjeseci koji dolaze…

Ernest-Antoine Seillière

Joint statement on financial market turmoilBrussels, 13 October 2008 …Recent support from governments through public partaking in private financialinstitutions has proved a viable short term solution to avoid more systemic risks developing across Europe. These interventions should be viewed as transitory and should not have lasting effects on public finances. On their side, banks must do their utmost to restore confidence by cleaning up their balance sheets and communicating their precise financial situation. The coordinated cuts in seven central banks reference interest rates are a welcome acknowledgment of the risks to world growth arising from the turmoil. The ECB’s steps to ease liquidity constraints and lower market interest rates were timely, and should help to support confidence and economic activity during the difficult months to come…

Michel Pébereau


INTERVIEWS

Subprime mortgage kriza u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama > geneza, posljedice i pouke

Nakon nekoliko godina kontinuiranog rasta bruto društvenog proizvoda, povoljnih ekonomskih uslova poslovanja i relativno niskih kamatnih stopa u javnosti se pojavljuju napisi i komentari o predstojećoj najvećoj ekonomskoj krizi od perioda 1929-1933. godine. Za početak krize krivac su Sjedinjene Američke Države a s obzirom da je svijet sada mnogo više integrisan nego ranije, (zahvaljujući tehnološkoj savršenosti i razvoju komunikacija), efekte krize osjetiće gotovo svi djelovi

Mr. Aleksandar Radulović

Kriza je nastala u finansijskom sektoru a kao glavnog uzročnika označen je enorman rast hipotekarnih zaj-

mova, posebno njegovog subprime segmenta. Dodatni uzrok krize predstavlja pojava sofisticiranih finansijskih instrumenata, njihova kreacija i trgovina i ponekad visoko udaljavanje od prvobitne misije te realnih i fundamentalnih podloga na osnovu kojih su kreirani ti proizvodi.

Kriza nastala u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama ima značajan sistemski karakter sa vrlo negativnom ulogom i pristupom zadovoljavanja isključivo svojih interesa koje su imale pojedine finansijske institucije podstaknute vrlo “prlj- avom” igrom rejting agencija.

Fenomenom subprime hipoteka u novije vrijeme bavilo se više autora. U novijim radovima Ashcraft A., Schuermann T. (2008.), Kiff J., Mills P. (2007.) i Jaffee D., Quigley J.(2007.) bavili su se načinom i organizacijom poslovanja na subpri-me tržištu. Pojedini autori su analizirali razloge gubitaka na hipotekarnom tržištu – Greenlaw D., Hatzius J., Kashiang A., Shin H.S.(2008), Dodd R. Mills P.(2008), dok Psalida L. Effie & dr. (2008.) dok ističu probleme sa strukturisanim proizvodima tj. novim finansijskim instrumentima na hipo-tekarnom tržištu čija trgovina i kotacija je dovela do kraha na hipotekarnom i tržištu nekretnina a primorala je i cen-tralne banke i vlade (prije svega SAD) na planove za spasa-vanje finansijske industrije.

Kongres Sjedinjenih Američkih Država nakon nekoliko “vatrogasnih” mjera donio je program podrške finansijskoj industriji težek 700 milijardi USD, početkom oktobra ove godine. I u Evropi je državna intervencija bila neophodna a prvobitna ideja o zajedničkom spasavanju finansijskih sistema i banaka u EU zoni o kojem je govorio francuski predsjednik Sarkozy, teškom 300 milijardi EUR nije pri-hvaćen ali su sve Vlade članice EUR zone obećale da će u svojim državama preduprijediti negativne posljedice finan-sijske krize izazvane u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama i pomoći novcem poreskih obveznika “svojim” finansijskim institucijama uz traženje pune odgovornosti menadžmenta “problematičnih” banaka.

geneza krizeNakon dvije godine povoljnih kamatnih stopa, u posljednjem kvartalu 2006. godine američko tržište nekretnina zabilježi-lo je usporavanje. Raste stopa neplaćenih subprime hipote-karnih kredita što je dovelo do propasti niza zajmodavaca. Kriza je zahvatila najveće banke iz Sjedinjenih Američkih Država koje su učestvovale u finansiranju subprime hipote-karnih aranžmana a dio krize se prenio i na banke i inves-titore iz SAD kao i sa neameričkih područja.

Subprime hipoteke predstavljaju rezidencijalne zajmove koji nisu potvrđeni kao “prime” hipoteke, i imaju očekiva-nu slabiju mogućnost za potpunu otplatu. Takva ocjena se bazira na ocjeni zajmotražioca slabije kreditne sposobnosti, odnosa duga i prihoda (debt/income ratio DTI), i odnosa hipotekarnog zajma i vrijednosti nekretnine (loan to value LTV). Prema Kiff, Mills, 2007. zajmopimci sa slabijim kre-ditnom sposobnošću, DTI od 55% i LTV od 85% su obič-no svsrtani u kategoriju subprime. Ovi zajmovi su prilično fleksibilni ne samo u pogledu utvrđivanja racija DTI i LTV već i u pogledu pribavljanja neophodne dokumentacije koju zajmoprimci dostavljaju finansijskim institucijama.

Subprime hipoteke su u principu rizičnije od tzv. konvenci-onalnih hipoteka jer su korisnici zajmova rizičnije grupe a ti zajmovi i nemaju posebnih osiguranja osim vrijednosti kola-terala tj. stambene nekretnine kojom se finansira kupovina.

Povoljni makroekonomski uslovi, niska stopa inflacije i kvalitet izvora pribavljanja kapitala na tržištima značaj-no je generisao rast obima subprime hipoteka. Bankarski sektor je duži vremenski period (2003-2007) bilježio viso-ku likvidnost što je dovodilo do rasta obima kreditiranja a banke su tražile prostor gdje i pod što povoljnijim uslovima plasirati sredstva koja su se činila sve jeftinijim. Očigledno da je upravljanje rizicima u bankama koje su se upuštale u takve aranžmane ipak “popustilo” i da su predviđanja risk menadžera bila suviše optimistična.

Kod subprime hipoteka prednjačile su velike banke, po-sebno u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama, koje su preko svojih specijalizovanih entiteta za hipotekarno finansiranje


10

SVJETSKA FINANSIJSKA KRIZA

u.S. Subprime mortgage crisis > background, implications and lessons learnedAfter several years of steady GDP increase, favorable business conditions and relatively low interest rates, articles and commentaries are being published on the imminent worst economic crisis since 1929-1933. The crisis originated in the United States and, the world being much more integrated than in the past (due to sophisticated technology and enhanced communications), its effects will be felt practically all over the globe

Aleksandar Radulović, M. Sc. Ecc.

The crisis started in the financial sector; the enormous increase in mortgages, in particular subprime ones, was

seen as its primary cause. Another cause was introduction of sophisticated financial instruments, their creation, trading and sometimes their considerable deviation from the ori-ginal mission as well as realistic and fundamental grounds for their creation.

The crisis that started in the U.S. is of a significant syste-mic nature and has a rather negative role, with some finan-cial institutions taking the approach of meeting exclusively their own interests, spurred by the rather “dirty” game pla-yed by the rating agencies.

A number of authors have dealt with the phenome-non of subprime mortgages recently. The recent work of Ashcraft A., Schuermann T. (2008), Kiff J., Mills P. (2007) and Jaffee D., Quigley J.(2007) discussed the method and organization of work in the subprime market. Some aut-hors analyzed the reasons for losses in the mortgage mar-ket (Greenlaw D., Hatzius J., Kashiang A., Shin H.S.(2008), Dodd R. Mills P.(2008)), while Psalida L. Effie et alia (2008) highlight the problems with structured products i.e. new fi-nancial instruments in the mortgage market – their trade and quotation brought about the collapse in the mortgage and real estate markets and made both central banks and governments (primarily in the U.S.) issue plans to bail out the finance industry.

After a series of “extinguishing” measures, in early October this year the United States Congress issued a USD700 billion program of support to the finance in-dustry. State intervention was needed in Europe as well. The initial idea of EUR 300 billion to rescue the EU zone financial systems and banks, as presented by the French President Sarkozy, was not accepted. However, all go-vernments of the Eurozone promissed to prevent adverse effects of the U.S. financial crisis in their countries and use taxpayers’ money to assist “their” financial instituti-ons, requesting full responsibility from the management of “problematic” banks.

backgrounD oF the criSiSAfter two years of favorable interest rates, the U.S. property market registered a slowdown in the last quarter of 2006. The share of default subprime mortgages increased, cau-sing failure of several lenders. The crisis spread to the ma-jor U.S. banks involved in financing subprime mortgages and there was a partial spillover to U.S and other banks and investors.

Subprime mortgages are residential loans that are not va-lidated as “prime” mortgages and are less leikely to be ful-ly repaid. Such an assessment is based on determining the borrowers’ weak credit standing, debt-income ratio – DTI and loan- to-value - LTV. According to Kiff, Mills, 2007, borrowers of lower credit standing - DTI 55% and more and LTV 85% and more – are usually categorized as subprime. These loans are rather flexible, not only in the sense of de-termining DTI and LTV but also in the sense of acquiring necessary documentation delivered by the loan applicant to the financial institution.

Subprime mortgages are generally riskier than “conventi-onal“ ones, since these borrowers belong to a riskier group and loans of this type do not have any specific guaran-tee except the value of the collateral, that is the residential property used to finance the purchase.

Favorable macroeconomic conditions, low inflation rate and the quality of sources of capital in the markets con-siderably generated an increase in the scale of subprime mortgages. Over a longer period of time (2003-2007), the banking sector recorded high liquidity, leading to increased lending, and banks searched for room adn favorable con-ditions to invest funds that appeared cheaper and cheaper. Evidently, risk management in banks that engaged in such schemes “gave in” and risk managers’ projections were too optimistic.

Major banks were leaders in subprime mortgages, espe-cially in the United States; through their specialized mor-tgage finance entities, they invested large sums in loans to risky groups of borrowers.

october 2008 | :Bankar11

WORLD FINANCIAL CRISIS

plasirale u obliku zajmova značajne svote rizičnijim grupama korisnika.

Problem kod subprime zajmova nasta-je u momentu kada korisnik postaje kre-ditno nesposoban da otplaćuje dospjele anuitete. Što je banka slabije procijenila zajmoprimca problemi u otplati zajma se lakše pojavljuju.

Jedno od značajnijih obilježja tog perioda bila je i okolnost da se i kod institucionalnih investitora (fondova, osiguravajućih kuća i sl.) pojavila značajna svota koja je tražila što više prostora za unosnije investicije u sigurne hartije od vrijednosti. Sigurnim hartijama od vrijednosti se svakako, pored državnih papira, smatraju i hartije emito-vane na bazi hipoteka koje imaju visoke rejtinge dobijene od poznatih institucija.

Kreiranje veće grupe subprime zajmova korisnicima slabijih zajmovnih sposobnosti samo je dio priče o subprime krizi na tr-žištu Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Pravi problem je nastao kada su banke, odnosno druge specijalizovane finansijske instituci-je, sekjuritizovale subprime zajmove i njih u formi hartija od vrijednosti plasirale na finansijskom tržištu. Prvi simptomi krize bili su uočljivi sredinom 2007. godine.

Sekjuritizacija stambenih zajmova u SAD moguća je na više načina i to:

konvencionalne hipoteke (po unapri-jed pripremljenim standardima dr-žavnih odnosno državno sponzori-sanih finansijskih institucija kao što su Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac); nekonvencionalne hipoteke koje pri-kuplja, pakuje i servisira privatni sektor i nemaju posebnih državnih garancija.

Subprime zajmovi pripadaju grupi nekon-vencionalnih hipoteka i njih u potpunosti realizuje privatni sektor.

U dijelu emisija hartija od vrijednosti kojima se sekjuritizuju stambeni zajmovi državne, odnosno državno sponzorisane institucije emituju različite vrste Mortgage Backed securities (MBS, uključujući i naj-poznatije pass through securities emitovane na pro rata bazi po kojima se investitori-ma prodaje učešće u pulu sekjuritizovanih zajmova). One obično predstavljaju dug vrhunskog kvaliteta.

Privatne finansijske institucije takođe emituju MBSS (pass through hartije) koje prolaze rejting proceduru kod renomiranih institucija i u zavisnosti od dobijenog rej-tinga “zaslužuju” tržišnu kotaciju.

Pored tih hartija privatne finansijske institucije emituju i takozvane structured finance proizvode na bazi stambenih zaj-mova. “Collateralised Debt Obligations”

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(CDOs). Na osnovu hartija od vrijednosti, na primer “subprime mortgage backed se-curities”, koje su strukturirane – što znači da nemaju sve hartije isti bonitet (kao i da su bez državnih garancija), “arranger” (“SIV” ili “conduit”) izdaje hartije od vrijednosti, koje se nazivaju “collateralised debt secu-rities”. I ti papiri su strukturirani na način da su najbolji na vrhu kao “senior” a na dnu “unrated” ili “equity”.

Kod MBSs ne zna se unaprijed ko će od dužnika konkretno bankrotirati, ali se predviđa da će se to desiti sa određenim brojem dužnika. U skladu s tim strukturi-raju se MBSs od AAA do na primjer “BB-unrated”. Isto važi za CDOs. Onaj koji ima papir AAA prvi je na redu kod naplate ka-mata i glavnice. Onaj koji ima na primer “BB-unrated” poslednji je. Kod sekuritiza-cije tih zajmova nije toliko značajno, kada će investitor, koji ima MBS, naplatiti dug, nego kakav je kreditni rizik tj. da li će in-vestitor uošte naplatiti dug.

Mogu se emitovati na primer dvije vrste CDO - „high-grade“ i „mezzanine“. U svakoj od tih grupa CDO se razlikuje po kreditnom riziku, koji nose - na primjer od „Senior“, koji imaju ocjenu AAA, do „Unrated“. Može se ići još napred i na osnovu strukturiranih CDO-ja izdati CDO-je na kvadrat („CDO-squared“). Postoje i CDO na treći stepen („CDO-cube“) koje se izdaju na osnovu „CDO-squared“. Logika tih operacija je da se dođe do hartija od vrijednosti različitih boniteta i time se on u prosjeku poboljša. Na taj način se postiže više ciljeva. Investitori dobiju hartije i visokog boniteta i pristoj-nog prinosa, oni koji su na početku svega toga, to znači stanovništvo-dužnici mogu doći do novca (na primer oni, koji su dobi-jali „subprime loans“ drukčije ne bi dobili zajam), a svi oni, koji se bave tim poslovi-ma dolaze do više nego pristojne zarade.

Kod tih hartija od vrijednosti emitovanih u više klasa i sa različitim rokovima do-spijeća najveći kvalitet imaju hartije klase A (što donosi i najniže prinose investito-rima) dok se ostale hartije amortizuju u skladu sa njihovim kvalitetom, odnosno kvalitetom kolaterala, kao reziduelne ve-ličine. Hartije nižih klasa kao što su Z ili R zbog većih prinosa su interesantnije inves-titorima sklonim većem riziku. Za CMO hartije sa klasom Z ili klasom R (“garbage class”) pitanje je da li uopšte mogu doći na isplatu, u turbulentnim vremenima kakvo je bilo prošlogodišnje.

Suština takozvanih strukturiranih fi-nansija (“structured finance”) i strukturi-ranih hartija MBS ili CDO, jeste u sledećem. Ukoliko imamo običnu HOV (“plain vanil-la”) kreditni rizik za sve papire jednak je.

Na osnovu očekivanja, da se na primjer neće naplatiti 1% zajmova određuje se ka-matna stopa - premija za kreditni rizik kao dodatak čistoj kamatnoj stopi (kamatnoj stopi koju plaća država kao dužnik). Kod strukturiranih hartija od vrijednosti one su podijeljene ili strukturirane u više razreda ili tranši. Najviša tranša, na primer A-1 obuhvata 27,18 % hartija. Kako je iza njih subordini-ranih hartija u vrijednosti od 72,82 %, vrlo mala je vjerovatnoća da se te hartije neće u cjelini naplatiti. Moralo bi doći do gubitka u visini od više nego 72,82 %. Svaka sledeća tranša manje je sigurna, jer je manje hartija koje su subordinirane. Kod hartije M-8 tak-vih je samo još 3,90 %. Kod poslednje tranše X nema nikoga da ispred njih nosi gubitak.

Očekujemo da se na primjer dug u visini 1% glavnice neće naplatiti, ali ne znamo koji su ti dužnici koji neće vratiti dug. Oni se nalaze negdje u grupi svih dužnika. Time, izdavanjem hartije posljednjeg razreda iza kojih nema subordiniranih hartija, se zna ko su povjerioci tih hartija, koji vjerovatno neće vratiti dug. Ne zna se ko će biti nepla-tiše, ali zna se ko su povjerioci tih neplatiša ili najslabijih dužnika.

U institucionalnom smislu nastanku problema sa subprime zajmovima, poseb-no sekjuritizovanim, dalo je postojanje tzv. SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle) odnosno SIV (Special Investment Vehicle), “Conduits” te fenomen tzv. “shadow banking”.1

Ove institucije su rezultat okolnosti da se banke pojavljuju kao posrednici na tr-žištu koje organizuju zajmove, servisira-ju ih i prodaju (sa napuštanjem njihovog bilansa stanja ka off balance) tzv. SIV koji ih sekjuritizuju i prodaju na finansijskom tržištu. Ovi entiteti predstavljaju posebnu vrstu finansijskih institucija kojima upravlj- aju posebna menadžment preduzeća. Kod ovih institucija se nalaze sakupljeni stambe-ni zajmovi koje banke prethodno iznesu iz svojih bilansa. Ove institucije se pojavljuju kao emitenti sekjuritizovanih zajmova i od efikasnosti upravljanja njima zavisi i kota-cija hartija od vrijednosti koje one izdaju. “Conduits” se financiraju isključivo emisi-jom hartija (“commercial papers”). Jedan dio tih papira ima karakter “rezidualnog” potraživanja, što znači vlasničkog kapitala (“equity”). Radi se o “capital notes”. SIV se finansira “asset-backed comercial papers”, srednjeročnim zapisima (“medium-term notes”) i “capital notes”. Portfelj SIV-a za razliku od portfelja “conduit-a” sastavljen je iz kompleksnijih hartija od vrijednosti kojima se može trgovati.1 Veomadobraraspravaofenomenu“shadowbanking”

objavljenajeuNewYorkTimes,23.03.2008:“WhatCretatedThisMonster”


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The problem with subprime loans emer-ges when the borrower is no longer able to repay due annuity. The more mistaken the bank’s assessment of the borrower, the sooner problems arise concerning loan repayment.

One of the prominent features of this pe-riod was also the circumstance that instituti-onal investors (funds, insurance companies etc.) had a considerable amount available that asked for maximum room for profi-table investments in safe securities. In ad-dition to government securities, these are also securities issued based on mortgages highly rated by renowned institutions.

Creation of a large group of subprime loans to borrowers of weaker credit stan-ding is only a part of the story on the U.S. market subprime crisis. The real problem appeared when banks, or other specialized financial institutions, securitized subprime loans and placed them on the financial mar-ket as securities. The first symptoms of the crisis were visible in mid-2007.

There are several ways to securitize hou-sing loans in the U.S.:

Conventional mortgages (according to the standards defined in advance by state or state-sponsored financial ins-titutions such as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac); Non-conventional mortgages col-lected, packaged and serviced by the private sector, with no specific state guarantees.

Subprime mortgages belong to non-con-ventional mortgages and are implemented entirely by the private sector.

With regard to issuance of securities used to securitize housing loans, state or state-sponsored institutions issue diffe-rent types of mortgage-backed securities - MBS, including the best known pass th-rough securities issued on a pro rata basis and used to sell a share in the pool of se-curitized loans to investors. These usually represent top quality debt.

Private financial institutions also is-sue MBSS (pass through securities) that undergo rating by renowned institutions and, depending on the rating, “earn” mar-ket quotation.

In addition to these securities, private financial institutions issue “structured fi-nance products“ based on housing loans - Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs). Based on securities, for example subprime mortgage-backed securities, which are structured – meaning that all securities do not have equal standing (and that there are no state guarantees), the arranger (SIV or conduit) issues securities referred to as

■

■

“collateralised debt securities”. These are structured so that the best ones are the top ones -”senior”- whereas the bottom ones are “unrated” or “equity” ones.

With MBSs, it cannot be anticipated which borrower will go bankrupt, but there is a projection that a certain number will. In line with this, MBSs are structured ran-ging from AAA to, for instance, BB-unra-ted. The same applies to CDOs. Those who hold AAA securities have priority in col-lecting interest and principal. Those who hold BB-unrated ones will be the last on the list. In securitization of such loans, it is not so improtant when the investor holding MBS collects debt but what the credit risk is, that is whether the investor will collect the debt at all.

Two types of CDOs may be issued - high-grade and mezzanine. CDOs in each group differ by the credit risk implied – going from senior, rated AAA, to unrated. It is possib-le to go further and, based on structured CDOs, issue CDO-squared. There are also CDO-cube, issued based on CDO-squared. The logic of these operations is to provide securities of different standing and thus improve the average. This accomplishes a number of goals. Investors obtain securities with both high standing and decent yield, the ones who begin the scheme, citizens- borrowers, get access to funds (for example, those granted subprime loans would not have been able to obtain loans otherwise), and all those involved in these operations get more than decent income.

Out of such securities issued in several classes and with different maturity, class A are top quality ones (rendering lowest yield to investors), while the rest are redeemed in line with their quality, that is the quality of the collateral, as residual amount. Due to a higher yield, securities in lower clas-ses such as Z or R are more interesting to investors inclined to taking higher risks. It is questionable whether CMOs class Z or R (garbage class) would be eligible for payments at all, in turbulent times such as last year.

The essence of structured finance and structured MBS or CDO securities is this: for an ordinary security (“plain vanilla”) the credit risk is the same for all securities. Based on expectations that, for example, 1% of loans will not be paid, the interest rate is set – premium for the credit risk in additi-on to the net interest rate (the rate paid by the state as a borrower). In structured se-curities, these are divided or structured in several grades or tranches. The top tranche, such as A-1, includes 27.18 % of securities. Since they are backed by subordinate se-

curities equaling 72.82 %, it is very unli-kely that these securities will not be fully recovered. The loss would have to exceed 72.82 %. Each subsequent tranche is less safe, given the declining share of subordi-nate securities. For M-8 securities, the share of subordinated securities is as low as 3.90 %. For the last, X tranche, there is no other tranche left to endure the loss.

The expectation may be that, for instance, a debt equaling 1% of the principal will not be recovered, but we do not know which borrowers will fail to repay the debt. They belong to the overall group. Thus, issuing a bottom grade security with no subordi-nated securities, you know who their cre-ditors are, who are not likely to repay the debt. You cannot identify the defaulters, but you can identify their creditors, or the weakest borrowers.

In the institutional sense, the problem with subprime loans, especially securitized ones, was caused by the Special Purpose Vehicle – SPV, that is Special Investment Vehicle -SIV, conduits and the phenome-non of “shadow banking”1.

These institutions result from the situ-ation that banks have the role of market intermediaries, organizing loans, servicing or selling them (leaving their balance sheet towards off balance) to SIV that securitize them and sell them on the finance market. These entities represent a specific type of financial institutions run by special ma-nagement companies. They pool housing loans previosuly removed from the banks’ balance sheets. These institutions act as is-suers of securitized loans; the level of ef-ficiency of their management determines the quotation of the securities they issue. Conduits are financed exclusively from is-suance of securities (commercial papers). Some of these securities have the charac-ter of residual receivables, meaning equity. These are capital notes. SIV is financed by asset-backed comercial papers, medium-term notes and capital notes. SIV portfolio, unlike conduit portfolio, consists of more complex securities that can be traded.

Using the model of organization and ser-vicing of loans that are subjected to secu-ritization, banks are relieved of the loans and do not involve their own capital. The model transfers the credit risk that would pertain to banks if they retained the loans in their balance sheets, to the investor in securitized loans. Banks that perform or-ganization and distribution of loans identi-fy interest mainly in the income obtained. 1 Averygooddiscussiononshadowbankingwas

publishedintheNewYorkTimeson23March,2008:“WhatCreatedThisMonster”.

october 2008 | :Bankar1�


Koristeći model organizacije i servisiranja zajmova koji postaju predmet sekjuritiza-cije, banke se oslobađaju tih zajmova i po tom osnovu ne angažuju sopstveni kapital. Tim modelom se kreditni rizik, koji bi ban-ke imale da zadržavaju odobrene zajmove u svojim bilansima, prenosi na investito-ra u sekjuritizovane zajmove. Banke koje obavljaju poslove organizacije i distribucije zajmova svoj interes uglavnom vide u pri-hodima koje ostvaruju po tom osnovu. Ti poslovi ne zahtijevaju njihov kapital, banke odustaju od ostvarivanja kamatne margine na razlici između pasivnih i aktivnih ka-matnih stopa i svoju zaradu vide u orga-nizacionoj i servisnoj naknadi kao i pre-prodaji rizika potencijalnim investitorima.

Za strukturirane hartije od vrijednosti suštinskog su značaja “rating” agencije, jer od njihove ocjene hartija različitih razreda, u koje se može imati povjerenje, ne može biti strukturiranih finansija. Tako su “ra-ting” agencije bile značajno involvirane kod finansijske krize.

Obligacije pokrivene hipotekama su rejtingovane od strane poznatih rejting institucija. Sasvim je normalno da naj-kvalitetnije CMO sa najnižim rizikom dobijaju visok rejting kao što je AAA i sl. a da sljedeće emisije u strukturi sekjuriti-zovanih pulova stambenih zajmova dobi-jaju niže rejtinge.

Banke prenose ili prodaju potraživanja i na toj osnovi “arranger” izdaju hartije od vrijednosti i prodaju investitorima. Formalno se banke pobrinu za to, da po-sebne finansijske institucije, koje se for-miraju u tu svrhu, nijesu u njihovom vlas-ništvu u tom obimu, da bi morali praviti konsolidaciju. Radi se o “cut-off ” princi-pu. Na taj način, nema kreditnih rizika u njihovim bilansima, smanjuje se po-treban kapital a time i troškovi. Problem je nastao kada je mnogo banaka, uprkos tome, kada se pojavila finansijska kriza, da ne bi došle na loš glas, preuzelo zaj-move natrag u svoj imovinski bilans da ne bi izgubile reputaciju.

Još jedan fenomen je bio interesantan na ovom polju a to je pojava tzv. “shadow banking”. U “shadow banking” su na jed-noj strani u portfelju finansijskih instituci-ja “conduits”, SIV-i ili SPV zajmovi banaka ili potraživanja, nastala na osnovu zajmova banaka, a na drugoj strani banke kratkoroč-no finansiraju te institucije kupujući i ima-jući u svom portfelju njihove kratkoročne papire. One zavise od mogućnosti stalnog refinansiranja, što znači obnavljanja hartija, koji dospijevaju sa emisijom novih papira. Kako su banke djelimično njihovi finan-

sijeri, nelikvidnost tih institucija pogađa i njih. Time su banke manje izložene riziku likvidnosti ali se taj rizik prebacuje na dru-ge institucije. Te institucije zavise od stal-nog finansiranja koje uglavnom nastavljaju emisijama novih hartija. Kako se “iza njih” na planu čuvanja likvidnosti nalaze banke gap nastaje kada banke ulaze u likvidonos-ne probleme. Tada intervenišu centralne banke kao “lender of last resort”.

Na taj način se dolazi do pojave mis-match problema, karakterističnog i za slom Saving/loans industrije sredinom 80-ih godina u SAD a to je da se dugo-ročni zajmovi, na primer hipotekarni, fi-nansiraju na osnovu kratkoročnih hartija od vrijednosti.

U ljetnjim mjesecima uočen je trend usporavanja novih emisija hipotekarnih hartija od vrijednosti emitovanih na bazi pula subprime kredita a nešto kasnije i svih hipotekarnih papira. Drugi simptom koji je tržište brzo verifikovalo je i povećavanje spread-a u trgovini hartijama od vrijednosti kojima su sekjuritizovani subprime zajmo-vi i to su bile naznake da je kriza na tržištu stambenih hipoteka na vidiku.

Usporavanje emisija hipotekarnih har-tija od vrijednosti (MBS) i hartija kojima

je sekjuritizovana druga vrsta aktive (tzv. Asset backed securities) kojima su refi-nansirani hipotekarni i subprime zajmovi može se vidjeti na slici 1.

Pored smanjivanja obima emisija novih hipotekarnih hartija od vrijednosti te tzv. ABS hartija tržište je zabilježilo i povećava- nje spread-a u trgovini tim hartijama. Tim hartijama se u periodu od 2003. do sredine 2007. godine uglavnom trgovalo sa spredo-vima od 20 do 0 bps. Prve naznake krize su spredove podigli na visokih 50 do 70 bps, da bi se spredovi kasnije smanjili ali se smanjio broj i obim novoemitovanih hartija, što je već prikazano na slici 1. Treba napomenuti i da se radilo o hartijama kojima su rejting agencije uglavnom dodjeljivale visoke oc-jene. Rejting tih hartija je uglavnom bio na nivou od BBB do AAA.

Povećavanje spread-a u trgovini hartija-ma kojima su sekjuritizovane rezidencijalne hipoteke, kao i pojedinim instrumentima koji imaju posredne veze i koje su od rej-ting institucija dobile ocjenu AAA, može se vidjeti sa slike 2.

Kod hartija od vrijednosti kod kojih je rejting bio BBB povećanje spread-a u trgovini je bilo još dramatičnije što se može vidjeti sa slike 3.

Slika 1: Prikaz rasta sekjuritizacije ABS i MBS hartija u SAD u periodu 2004-2007.Izvor: Deutshe bank, Global Market Research 2008.

Slika 2: Prikaz spread-a u trgovanju pojedinim hartijama AAA u periodu apr. 2005- okt. 2007. godine Izvor: Deutshe bank, Global Market Research 2008.


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These operations do not require their own capital, banks give up the interest margin of the difference between debit and lending rates and identify income in fees for orga-nization and servicing as well as in resale of risk to potential investors.

Rating agencies are essential to structu-red securities, since structured finance is impossible without their trustworthy ra-ting of different grades of securities. Thus, rating agencies have been considerably in-volved in the financial crisis.

Mortgage-backed obligations are rated by the well-known rating institutions. It is only natural that top quality CMOs with the lowest risk get a high rating, such as AAA or similar, and that the next issue in the structure of securitized pools of hou-sing loans gets a lower rating.

Banks either transfer or sell receivables; based on that, the arranger issues securities and sells them to investors. Formally, banks make sure that special financial institutions established for this purpose are not owned by them to the extent that would require consolidation. This is a cut-off principle. This way, no credit risk appears in their ba-lance sheets, the required capital is lower and therefore also the costs. The problem arises when many of the banks, inspite of this, in order not to lose their reputation when the financial crisis emerged, reinteg-rated the loans into their balance.

There was another interesting pheno-men in this domain – shadow banking. It includes, on the one hand, conduits in fi-nancial instutitons’ portfolios, SIV or SPV bank loans or receivables generated by bank loans, and on the other hand, banks finan-cing these institutions in the short term by buying and keeping in their portfolio their short-term securities. They depend on the possibility of constant refinancing, meaning issuing new securities to renew the ones due. Since banks are in part the-ir funders, lack of liquidity of these insti-tutions affects them as well. This reduces the banks’ exposure to liquidity risk, but the risk is transferred to other instituti-ons, which depend on constant financing that they mainly extend by issuing new securities. Since they are backed by banks in preserving liquidity, the gap emerges when banks face liquidity problems. This is when central banks intervene as “len-ders of last resort”.

This is the build up to the mismatch problem, characteristic both for the col-lapse of savings-and-loans industry in the US in mid-eighties: long-term loans, such as mortgages, are financed based on short-term securities.

A trend of slowing down new issue of mortgage securities securitized based on subprime loan pool - and later on of all mortgage securities - was observed in the summer months. Another symptom verified by the market very soon was the increased spread in trading in securities used to se-curitize subprime loans – these indicated a crisis in the mortgage market.

Slowing down in the issue of MBS and asset-backed securities used to refinance mortgage and subprime loans is shown in Graph 1.

In addition to reduced sacle of issue of new mortgage securities and ABSs, the market recorded the increased spread in trading in these securities. Between 2003 and mid-2007 the spread in trading in these securities ranged mainly between 20 and 0 bps. The first signs of crisis raised the spreads to 50 to 70 bps. They dropped later, accompanied by a reduced number and scale of new issue of securities, as sho-wn in Graph 1.a. We need to mention that these were mainly securities with high ra-ting - BBB to AAA.

The increased spread in trading in se-

curities used to securitize residential mor-tgages as well as some indirectly linked instruments and those rated AAA by ra-ting agencies is shown in Graph 2.

For BBB rated securities, the increase in spread was even more dramatic, as shown in Graph 3.

The autumn months of 2007 brought about a situation where it was very diffi-cult to place new issue of securities rela-ted to residential property on the market. The problem of liqudity of already issued securities emerged, and the crisis “spread” to numerous investors outside the U.S. and to international banks. There was a fall in international liqudity, and U.S. mortgage problems soon became manifest in other countries with increase in residential loans, securitization of mortgage protfolios and prior increase in home prices in excess of the average (UK, Spain etc).

A number of oversights took place in this network of relations between various institutions or entities, ulitmately resulting in an unexpectedly large number of bor-rowers that stopped servicing their debts. A chain reaction followed, along with ge-neral distrust.

New papers (Ashcraft A., Schuermann T., 2008) give a precise and concise summary of problems in subprime mortgage securitiza-tion. According to them, the securitization process conatined seven types of friction:

Graph 1: Increase in securitization of ABS and MBS in the US, 2004-2007 Source: Deutsche Bank, Global Market Research 2008

Graph 2: Spread in trading in some AAA securities, April 2005-October 2007 Source: Deutsche Bank, Global Market Research 2008



Jesenji mjeseci 2007. godine doveli su do okolnosti da je bilo veoma teško plasirati na tržišu nove emisije hartija od vrijed-nosti koje imaju veze sa rezidencijalnim nekretninama. Otvoren je problem i sa likvidnošću već emitovanih hartija a kriza je “zahvatila” i brojne neameričke investi-tore i međunarodne banke. Zabilježen je pad međunarodne likvidnosti a problemi sa hipotekama iz Sjedinjenih Američkih Džava ubzo su počeli da se manifestuju i u drugim državama kod kojih je bilježen rast stambenog kreditiranja, sekjuritizaci-ja hipotekarnih portfolija i prethodni nad-prosječni rast cijena stambenih nekretnina (Velika Britanija, Španija i sl.).

U tom spletu odnosa između različitih institucija ili subjekata došlo je do dosta propusta, koji su na kraju rezultirali u ne-očekivano velikom broju dužnika, koji su prestali servisirati svoj dug. Slijedila je lan-čana reakcija i opšte nepovjerenje.

U novijim radovima (Ashcraft A., Schuermann T., 2008) autori su na preci-zan i koncizan način sublimirali probleme u sekjuritizaciji subprime hipotekarnih zaj-mova. Prema njima proces sekjuritizacije imao je sedam frikcija i to:■ Frikcija između oganizatora i hipotekar-nog dužnika - svodi se na slabo poznavanje zajmopimca i predatorsko pozajmljivanje od strane zajmodavaca; ■ Frikcija između organizatora i aranžera emisije hartija - organizatori imaju infor-macionu prednost u odnosu na aranžera emisija; ■ Frikcija između aranžera i trećih strana - aranžeri emisija imaju bolje informacije o kvalitetu odobrenih zajmova u odnosu na treće strane i sekjuritizuju samo loše zajmove dok se kod dobro procijenjenih subprime zajmova pojavljuju kao velepro-metni zajmodavci;

■ Frikcija moralnog hazarda između se-visera i hipotekarnog dužnika - dužnici su obavezni da vrše osiguranje i da plaćaju po-reze na nekretnine kupljene zajmom. Kako se radi o zajmoprimcima slabije kreditne sposobnosti, kod prvog pritiska servisera hipoteka za izmirivanje tih obaveza dužnici lako postaju nesposobni da ih izvršavaju; ■ Frikcija moralnog hazarda između ser-visera i trećih sttrana - dohodak servisera raste a vremenom protoka zajma koji servi-sira. To dovodi do želje servisera da zajam zadrži što duže u svojim knjigama i na taj način “odloži” problem sa delikvencijom i protestvovanjem zajmova problematičnih dužnika. Ovo je posebno karakteristično kod protesta zajmova i nastojanja servisera da što više oduže proces kako bi naplaćivali što veću naknadu od dužnika; ■ Frikcija između asset menadžera i inves-titora - investitorima se prosleđuju sred-stva iz pula emitovanih hipotekarnih har-tija. Investitori nijesu toliko sofisticirani da mogu postaviti odgovarajuću investicionu strategiju kako bi dobili što bolju cijenu za svoje trgovine. Taj posao prepuštaju asset menadžerima koji nijesu pretjerano zain-teresovani da zaštite napore investitora;■ Frikcija između investitora i agencija za kreditni rejting - Agencije za kreditni rejting plaćaju aranžeri a ne investitori što može predstavljati potencijalni konflikt interesa. Agencije koriste modele koji mogu biti os-jetljivi na greške što dovodi do urušavanja kriterijuma i njihovog javnog ugleda;

Procjene Vlade SAD govore o stagnaciji i padu prosječne cijene novih kuća; cijene kuća su se jedva pomakle - za 0,2 odsto - i prosječno iznose 246.900 USD. To je na-lošiji učinak sektora posle pada cijena od 2,4 odsto tokom loma na američkom stam-benom tržištu 1991. Pad cijena i prodaje se pogoršavao kako se godina primicala kraju. Prodaja u decembru pala je za 4,7%, dok je prosečna cijena kuća u decembru 2007.

skliznula za 10,4% u poređenju sa decem-brom 2006, što je najveći godišnji pad u proteklih 37 godina.

Stambeni sektor je u krizi posle pet go-dina buma. Potražnja za novim kućama dostigla je rekord svih vremena krajem 2005. godine, da bi iduće pala za 18,1 od-sto. Nivo prodaja stambenih nekrtenina u decembru 2007. godine je za 56,5% ispod rekordnog jula 2005.

Da kriza na tržištu nekretnina traje i dalje i da prave razmjere još nijesu kvantifikova-ne, pokazuju i podaci iz ove godine. Cijene nekretnina u SAD za 20 najvećih gradova prema najpouzdanijem S&P/Case-Schiller indeksu u julu 2008. smanjene su 16,3% u odnosu na jul 2007.

procjene gubitaka Ekonomski odjel američkog Kongresa prognozirao je da će do kraja 2008. u ame-ričkom sektoru nekretnina biti dva mili-ona hipoteka koje se neće moći redovno servisirati. Vrijednost američkog tržišta nekretnina, procijenjena na 21.000 mi-lijardi USD, biće umanjena između 2 i 4.000 milijardi USD nakon što se uraču-naju negativni uticaji kreditne krize na to tržište.2 Prema procjeni New York Timesa financijske firme mogle bi se naći suočene s ukupnim gubicima u visini 400 milijardi USD, povezanima s posljedicama krize na američkom tržištu subprime hipotekarnih zajmova. To je više od 240 milijardi USD gubitaka koje je financijski sektor zabilje-žio kao posljedicu štedne i kreditne krize s početka ’90-ih.

DOMAĆI hIpOteKARNI Dug BIlIONI uSDUS institucije� 5,591Komercijalne banke 2,881- Direktno 1,935- RMBS 946Štedne institucije 1,148- Direktno 895- RMBS 253Kreditne unije 362- Direktno 300- RMBS (procjena) 61Brokersko-dilerske firme 213- Direktno 0- RMBS (procjena) 213Državno sponzorisane institucije 987- Direktno 457- RMBS (procjena) 530uKupNO 11,028

Tabela 1: Prikaz hipotekarne izloženosti SAD finansijskim institucijama Izvor: Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashiang, Shin, 2008.

2 NewYorkTimes,25.10.2007. 3 UovugrupuseračunajusvefinansijskeinstitucijekojeposlujuuSADbezobziragdjeimjesjedištematičneinstitucije (npr.uključenaHSBCbankakojaposlujeuSADiakojematičnabankauinostransvu)

Slika3: Prikaz spread-a u trgovanju pojedinim hartijama BBB u periodu apr. 2005- okt. 2007. godineIzvor: Deutshe bank, Global Market Research 2008.


1�


■ Between the organizers and the borro-wers - boils down to poor knowledge of the borrower and predator lending.■ Between the organizers and the arran-gers of securities issue – organizers have advantage concerning information. ■ Between the arrangers and the third parties – arangers have better informati-on about the quality of granted loans and securitize only bad loans, while acting as wholesale lenders with highly rated subpri-me loans.■ Moral hazard friction between the servi-cers and mortgage borrowers – borrowers are required to provide insurance and pay taxes on property purchased with the loan. Since these are borrowers of weak credit standing, with the first pressure of mor-tgage servicers to make due payment they easily fail.■ Moral hazard friction between the ser-vicers and third parties – servicer’s income rises with the duration of the serviced loan. This makes the servicr want to retain them in their books for as long as possible and thus “postpone” the delinquency problem and protesting loans of problematic bor-rowers. This is characteristic in particular when protesting loans and in the servicers’ efforts to delay the process in order to get maximum payment. ■ Between the asset managers and the investors – investors are forwarded assets from the pool of issued mortgage securi-ties. Investors are not sophisticated enough to be able to set up an appropriate inves-tment startegy in order to get the best po-ssible price for their transactions. They le-ave this to asset managers, who are not too keen on protecting the investors’ efforts. ■ Between the investors and credit rating agencies – agencies are paid by the arran-gers, not investors, which may represent a

potential conflict of interest. Agencies use models that may be sensitive to mistakes, which leads to jeopardizing the criteria and their reputation.

U.S. Government estimates show stagna-tion and fall of the average price of new ho-mes; prices have barely changed - by 0.2%, on average amounting to USD 246,900. This is the worst performance of the sector after the 2.4% fall in prices during the collapse in the American home market in 1991. The fall in prices and sales sharpened towards the end of the year. In December, sales went down by 4.7%, while the average price of a home in December 2007 dropped by 10.4% compared to December 2006 – the sharpest annual fall in the past 37 years.

The housing sector is in crisis after the five-year boom. Demand for new homes hit the all-time record at the end of 2005, to drop by 18.1% in the next year. Property sales in December 2007 were 56.5% below the record ones of July 2005.

Data for this year shows that the real estate market crisis is ongoing and that its true scale has not been quantified. Real estate prices in 20 major US cities, accor-ding to the reliable S&P/Case-Schiller in-dex, dropped by 16.3% in July 2008 com-pared to July 2007.

loSS eStimateSU.S. Congress Economic Committee esti-mated that two million mortgages in the US real estate sector will not be regularly servicable by the end of 2008. US real esta-te market, estimated at USD 21,000 billion, will lose between USD 2 and 4,000 billion in value, after incorporating the adverse ef-fects of the credit crisis.2 According to an estimate of the New York Times, financial firms may face an overall loss in the range of USD 400 billion related to the impact of the crisis in the US subprime mortgage loan market. This is more than the USD

240 billion loss recorded by the financial sector as a consequence of the savings-and-loan crisis in early 1990ies.

One of the recent papers on the con-sequences of mortgage meltdown appea-red in March 2008. The authors (Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashiang, Shin, 2008) provided a complex analysis of the estimated loss and the impact on monetary policy im-plemented in an effort to absorb the ef-fects of the crisis.

As given in Table 1, losses incurred by the hedge fund industry are not shown; espe-cially not U.S. funds (since U.S. is analy-sed here). According to the same authors, (Greenlaw et alia, 2008) around 80% of problematic securitized subprime loans in the form of securities in hedge fund port-folios are held by U.S. funds.

The same authors (Greenlaw et alia, 2008) present an estimate of exposure to loss in U.S. subprime market, by institu-tional agents and regional dispersion to the U.S. and the rest of the world, as sho-wn in Table 2.

Financial institutions’s losses related to subprime mortgages have reached USD 215 billion, with a 55% share of the U.S., as estimated by the Japan Financial Services Agency - FSA. This Agency estimates European losses at USD 78.5 billion, and the loss for Asia and Canada combined at USD 13. 74 billion.

Japanese financial institutions have avo-ided massive loss caused by subprime mor-tgages, but not entirely. In the last qaurter of 2007 their loss more than doubled, re-aching USD 5.9 billion, while the overall

Graph 3: Spread in trading in some BBB securities, April 2005-October 2007 Source: Deutsche Bank, Global Market Research 2008

hOMe MORtgAge DeBt $ tRIllIONUS institutions� 5,591Commercial banks 2,881- Directly 1,935- RMBS 946Savings institutions 1,148- Directly 895- RMBS 253Credit unions 362- Directly 300- RMBS (estimated) 61Broker-dealer firms 213- Directly 0- RMBS (estimated) 213State-sponsored institutions 987- Directly 457- RMBS (estimated) 530tOtAl 11,028

Table 1: US mortgage exposure to financial institutionsSource: Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashiang, Shin, 2008

1 NewYorkTimes,25Oct2007 3 ThisgroupincludesallfinancialinstitutionsoperatingintheUS,regardlessoftheseatoftheirparentinstitution (e.g.HSBCBank,operatingintheUS,isincludedalthoughtheparentbankisoverseas)



Jedan od novijih radova koji se bavi posljedicama topljenja hipotekarnog ulaganja objavljen je u martu 2008. godine. Autori (Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashiang, Shin, 2008) daju kompleksnu analizu procjene gubi-taka kao i uticaja na monetarnu politiku koja je sprovođena kao pokušaj amortiza-cije efekata krize.

Kao što se može vidjeti sa tabele 1. gu-bici koje trpi hedge fond industrija nijesu prikazani, posebno ne fondova iz SAD (s obzirom da je predmet analize i bila SAD) a prema istim autorima (Greenlaw, i dr. 2008) oko 80% problematičnih sekjuriti-zovanih subprime zajmova koji su u obli-ku hartija u portfolijima hedge fondova se nalaze kod fondova u SAD-u.

Isti autori (Greenlaw i dr, 2008) donose i procjenu izloženosti gubicima na subprime tržištu Sjedinjenih Američkih Država po institucionalnim nosiocima i regionalnoj disperziji na SAD i ostatak svijeta koja se može vidjeti u tabeli 2.

Gubici financijskih institucija povezani s drugorazrednim hipotekarnim zajmovima do sada su dosegli 215 milijardi USD, pri čemu 55% otpada na gubitke u Sjedinjenim Državama, procjena je Japanske Agencije za finansijske usluge (Japan Financial Services Agency - FSA). Ista agencija procjenjuje da Evropski gubici dostižu 78,5 milijardi USD, dok na Aziju i Kanadu zajedno ot-pada 13,74 milijardi USD.

Japanske finansijske institucije izbjegle su masovne gubitke povezane sa subpri-me hipotekarnim zajmovima, ali gubici ih ipak nijesu potpuno zaobišli. Njihovi

su se gubici u zadnjem prošlogodišnjem kvartalu više nego udvostručili na 5,9 mi-lijardi USD, a ukupna je izloženost ulaga- njima u drugorazredne zajmove dostigla 14,72 milijarde USD, objavila je Japanska Agencija za finansijske usluge u februaru 2008. godine.

Njemački finansijski regulator BaFin, procjenjuje da bi gubici izazvani krizom subprime hipotekarnih zajmova mogli dostići čak 600 milijardi USD. BaFin ističe kako je realnije da će se gubici kretati oko 430 milijardi USD. Njemački regulator u svojoj računici se vodio time da su banke već priznale oko 295 milijardi dolara gu-bitaka, od čega na njemačko finansijsko tržište otpada oko deset posto.

Analitičari švajcarskog UBS-a procjenjuju da će finansijske kompanije imati najmanje 600 milijardi USD gubitaka povezanih sa kolapsom na tržištu drugorazrednih hi-potekarnih kredita koji je pogodio banke, brokere i osiguravajuće kompanije.

Kriza na subrpime hipotekarnom tržištu prerasla je u krizu na kompletnom kredi-nom tržištu a značajni gubici su se osjeti-li i na tržištu akcijskog kapitala. Globalni gubici na tržišnoj vrijednosti akcija, koje su izazvali potresi na tržištu američkih hi-potekarnih zajmova, iznosili su od oktobra 2007. godine 7,7 biliona USD, saopšteno je iz Bank of America.

glavne „ŽRTVE“Kriza na subprime tržištu Sjedinjenih Američkih Država najviše je pogodila naj-veće američke investicione banke kao što su Goldman Sachs i Citigroup. Čelnici tih banaka bili su “primorani” da odstupe zbog značajnih gubitaka kojima su ove banke bile izložene u trećem kvartalu 2007. godine. Značajne probleme imale su i Wachovia ali i podružnice evropskih banaka koje posluju u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama kao što je Deutsche banka i sl.

Citigroup je snažno pogođen krizom na američkom tržištu drugorazrednih hipote-karnih zajmova i s njom povezanom kre-ditnom krizom. Njegovi čelnici krive krizu na američkom tržištu nekretnina za 9,83 milijardi USD gubitaka u četvrtom kvarta-lu 2007. godine što je rezultiralo odlaskom bivšeg izvršnog direktora. Izlaz iz krize ban-ka je pokušavala naći pribavljanjem svje- žeg kapitala od inostranih ulagačkih fon-dova poput singapurskog državnog inves-ticijskog fonda (Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte).

Dobit Bank of America, druge po veli-čini u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama

(SAD), pala je u četvrtom kvartalu 2007. godine 95% u odnosu na isti period 2006. Banka je do kraja 2007. zabilježila 7 mili-jardi USD gubitaka zbog kreditnog sloma tržišta hipotekarnih zajmova. Zbog istog je razloga četvrta banka prema veličini u SAD, Wachovia, zabilježila pad dobi-ti od 98 %. Neto dobit Bank of America u četvrtom kvartalu 2007. pala je na 268 milijona USD, a Wachovijina na 511 mi-liona USD.

Gubitke u 2007. godini su već objavili Fannie Mae i Freddie Mac, dvije najveće američke državno-sponzorisane institu-cije specijalizovane za hipotekarno stam-beno finansiranje. Njihovi gubici su u če-tvrtom kvartalu 2007. godine iznosili 6,1 bilion USD dok u za cijelu 2007. godinu agregatno iznosili 5,2 biliona USD5. Tim dvijema državno-sponzorisanim finansij-skim institucijama, koje iako nijesu imali direktnog učešća u subprime kreditiran-ju, zbog urušavanja tržišta nekretnina i problema na finansijskom tržištu neop-hodan je dodatni akcionarski kapital od 75 milijardi USD da bi imale zadovolja-vajuću adekvatnost kapitala, procijenjeno je u julu 2008.6

Američka vlada je preuzela posrnule hipotekarne divove Fannie Mae i Freddie Mac, koji inače garantuju polovinu ukup-nog tržišta koje vrijedi 12 biliona dolara. Isto tako to preuzimanje je spasilo potra-živanja Kine u iznosu od 400 milijardi do-lara, dok je Rusija (preko svoje Centralne banke) imala u papirima ove dvije državno spozorisane institucije prošle godine više od 100 milijardi USD, a njihovo učešće je smanjeno u 2008. godini.

Federalne rezerve osiguravaju hitna sred-stva JP Morganu za spašavanje Bear Stearnsa, što je prvi slučaj spašavanja od Velike depresije. Dva dana nakon toga JP Morgan objavljuje kupovinu Bear Stearnsa, dok Fed za tu akviziciju osigurava 30 milijardi USD u martu 2008. godine.

Sredinom septembra jedna od najvećih američkih investicionih banaka Lehman Brothers proglasila je stečaj. Istovremeno, Bank of America najavila je akviziciju Merrill Lyncha. JP Morgan je preuzeo Washington Mutual (najveću banku koja je bankroti-rala u američkoj istoriji).

American International Group (AIG), jedna od največih američkih osiguravajućih kompanija, izbjegla je najgori finansijski kolaps u istoriji prihvativši zajam američ-ke centralne banke u iznosu 85 milijardi američkih dolara, prepustivši američkoj vladi 79,9% udjela.

ukupno

subprime izloženost

Procenat objavljene izloženosti

SADInvesticione banke 75 5%Komercijalne banke 250 18%Državno spon. instit. 112 8%Hedge fondovi 233 17%

Ostali Inostrane banke 167 12%Inostrani hedge fond. 58 4%Osiguravajuće komp. 319 23%Finansijske kompanije 95 7%Zajed. i penzioni fond. 57 4%

SAD leveraged sektor 671 49%

Ostali 697 51%

uKupNO 1.368 100%

Tabela 2: Prikaz izloženosti subprime hipotekama u mlrd. USD 4, Izvor: Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashiang, Shin, 2008.

4 IzloženostkomercijalnihbanakauSADuključujeizloženostHSBCsubsidijarazasubprimehipotekeuSAD;Procjeneautorauključuju4/5izloženostisvihhedgefondovakojisuimaliuportfolijimasubprimehipoteke

5 InsideMortgageFinance,29.02.2008.6 Bloomberg,08.july2008.:Fannie,FreddieCapital

ConcernsSendBondRiskto14-WeekHigh


18


exposure to investing in subprime loans amounted to USD 14.72 billion, as stated by Japan Financial Services Agency in February 2008.

German financial regulator BaFin esti-mates that loss incurred by the subprime mortgage crisis may reach USD 600 billi-on. BaFin underlines that it is more likely that the loss will be in the range of USD 430 billion. The German regulator was guided in their calcualtions by the fact that banks have already admitted a loss of around USD 295 billion, the share of German financial market being around 10%.

Swiss UBS analysts estimate that the minimum loss to financial companies will be USD 600 billion due to the collap-se in the subprime mortgage loans market that affected banks, brokers and insuran-ce companies.

Subprime mortgage market crisis has expanded into a crisis in the overall cre-dit market, with considerable loss also in equity market. Global loss in market value of shares, caused by the turbulences in US mortgage loan market equaled USD 7.7 billion by October 2007, as stated by the Bank of America.

key “caSualtieS”U.S. subprime market crisis affected major US investment banks, such as Goldman Sachs and Citigroup. Theri management was “forced” to resign due to big losses fa-ced in the third quarter of 2007. Wachovia experienced considerable problems, as did subsidiaries of European banks operating

in the US, such as Deutsche Bank. Citigroup was hit by the crisis in the U.S.

subprime mortgage market and the rela-ted credit crisis. Its management blames the U.S. real estate market for a USD 9.83 billion loss in the fourth quarter of 2007, resulting in the resignation of their former CEO. The bank tried to find a way out by raising fresh capital from international investment funds such as Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte.

The profit of the Bank of America, se-cond largest bank in the U.S., fell in the fourth quarter of 2007 by 95% compared to the same qaurter in 2006. By the end of 2007, the bank incurred a loss of USD 7 billion due to the credit collapse in mor-tgage market. Due to the same reason, the fourth largest US bank, Wachovia, recor-ded a 98 % loss in profit. Net profit of the Bank of America in the fourth qaurter of 2007 dropped to USD 268 million, and Wachovia’s to USD 511 million.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two lar-gest US state-sponsored institutions spe-cialized in mortgage finance, have alrea-dy announced loss for 2007. In the fourth qaurter of 2007 their loss was USD 6.1 trillion, while the aggregate loss for 2007 was USD 5.2 trillion.5 These two state-sponsored financial institutions, though they were not directly involved in subpri-me lending, due to the real estate market break-down and problems in the financial market, need additional equity of USD 75 billion to achieve capital adequacy ratio, as estimated in July 2008.6

US Government took over the fallen giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which guarantee half of the overall USD 12 tril-lion market. This also saved China’s rece-ivables of 400 billion, while Russia (th-rough its Central Bank) held more than USD 100 billion in securities of these two state-sponsored institutions last year and cut down the share in 2008.

Federal Reserves are securing emergen-cy funds for JPMorgan to bail out Bear Stearns - the first bailout case since the Great Depression. Two days later, JPMorgan an-nounced acquisition of Bear Stearns, with Fed securing USD30 billion for that pur-pose in March 2008.

In mid-September, one of the largest US investment banks, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. At the same time, Bank of America announced acquisition of Merrill Lynch. JP Morgan took over Washington Mutual (the biggest bank bankruptcy in US history).

American International Group (AIG), one

of major US insurance companies, avoided the worst financial collapse in history by accepting a USD 85 billion loan from the US Central Bank, leaving a 79.9% share to the US Government.

Table 3 shows bad debt and credit loss write-off to 10 banks, due to the U.S. mor-tgage market collapse, in USD billions.

The most prominent British bank that faced a crisis due to granting mortgage lo-ans was Northern Rock. Due to problems in operation, the bank was nationalized by the British Government in late 2007. The takeover aimed to consolidate the balance and cut down mortgage loans, improve re-covery of problematic placements, down-size the personnel and perform an internal rationalization.

In order to resolve the liqudity problem, Northern Rock first took a GBP 25 billion loan from the Government to be repaid over the forthcoming three to four years. During the consolidation stage, the bank will cut down its assets in half. Northern Rock is not the only UK bank to be taken over by the government – similar problems were encountered by Bradford & Bingley.

The crisis in the U.S. subprime mortga-ge market exposed some major European banks to loss. Swiss UBS banks faced the biggest problems, together with French Credit Agricole and Societte Generalle.

Credit Agricole, the bank with second largest assets in France, announced a EUR 857 million loss in the last quarter of 2007 due to the crisis in the U.S. subprime mor-tage market.

The European bank with the most valu-able assets, Swiss UBS, iincurred a record net loss of USD 11.4 billion in the fourth qaurter of 2007 due to property write-off. The bank had a debt write-off of USD 14 billion in response to the U.S. subprime mortgage loan crisis. Write-off of USD 12 billion is directly linked to the U.S. mor-tgage market, while two additional billion relate to the situation in the U.S. housing market. UBS announced that it will need to write off additional USD 11 billion in the first quarter of 2008.

Deutsche Bank, the largest German bank, announced in early April 2008 that it was going to write off EUR 2.5 billion in the first quarter, due to the credit crisis im-pact. This German bank did not have major write-offs in the final quarter of last year. The biggest German “problematic bank” is Hypo Real Estate; German Government, together with a consortium of banks, has prepared a EUR 50 billion package for its

Total

subprime exposure

perc. of disclosed exposure

uSInvestment banks 75 5%Commercial banks 250 18%State-sponsored Inst. 112 8%Hedge funds 233 17%

Other International banks 167 12%Internat. hedge funds 58 4%Insurance companies 319 23%Financial companies 95 7%Shared and pension funds 57 4%

US Leveraged sector 671 49%Others 697 51%

tOtAl 1,368 100%

Table 2: Exposure to subprime mortgages in USD billions 4Source: Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashiang, Shin, 2008

4 ExposureofUScommercialbanksincludesexposureofHSBCsubsidiariestosubprimemortgagesintheUS.Theauthors’estimateincludes4/5ofexposureofallhedgefundsthathadsubprimemortgagesintheirportfolios.

5 InsideMortgageFinance,29Feb2008.6 Bloomberg,08.July2008.:Fannie,FreddieCapital

ConcernsSendBondRiskto14-WeekHigh



Na tabeli 3 vidi se prikaz otpisa potraživan-ja i kreditnih gubitaka u milijardama USD, za 10 banaka usljed sloma hipotekarnog tr-žišta u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama.

Najpoznatija britanska banka koju je za-desila kiza odobavanja hipotekarnim kre-ditima je Northern Rock. Banku je zbog problema u poslovanju krajem 2007. go-dine nacionalizovala Vlada Velike Bitanije. Cilj tog preuzimanja je saniranje bilansa i smanjivanje odobravanja hipotekarnih kre-dita, poboljšanje naplate problematičnih plasmana, smanjivanje broja zaposlenih i unutrašnja racionalizacija.

Northern Rock se najprije, zbog preva-zilaženja problema sa likvidnošću, zaduži-la kod države za oko 25 milijardi funti, a kredit državi će otplaćivati naredne tri do četiri godine. Banka će u fazi sanacije pre-poloviti svoju imovinsku osnovu. Northern Rock nije jedina banka u Velikoj Britaniji koju je preuzela Vlada već je slične prob-leme imala i Bradford & Bingley.

Talas krize u na subprime hipotekarnom tržištu Sjedinjenih Američkih Država izlo-žio je gubicima i pojedine velike Evropske banke. Najveće probleme imala je švajcarska UBS banka ali i francuske Credit Agricole i Societte Generalle.

Credit Agricole, druga po imovini fran-cuska banka, objavila je gubitak od 857 mil. eura u posljednjem kvartalu 2007. godine zbog krize na američkom tržištu drugo-razrednih hipotekarnih zajmova.

Najveća evropska banka po vrijednosti imovine, švajcarska UBS, u četvrtom kvar-talu 2007. godine zabilježila je rekordni neto gubitak od 11,4 milijarde USD koji je nastao zbog otpisa imovine. Ta banka je otpisala dugove u vrijednosti od 14 milijardi USD kao odgovor na krizu drugorazrednih hipo-tekarnih kredita u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama. Otpis 12 milijardi USD direkt-no je povezan sa američkim hipotekarnim tržištem, a dodatne dvije milijarde otpisa

odnose se na stanje stambenog tržišta u SAD-u. Za prvi kvartal 2008. UBS je sa-opštila i da će morati otpisati dodatnih 11 milijardi dolara.

Deutsche Bank, najveća njemačka banka, saopštila je početkom aprila 2008. godine kako će zbog posljedica kreditne krize u prvom kvartalu otpisati 2,5 milijardi eura. Ova njemačka banka nije u prošlogodiš-njem četvrtom kvartalu imala značajnijih otpisa imovine. Najveća njemačka “prob-lematična banka” je Hypo Real estate za čiju sanaciju je Vlada Njemačke u saradnji sa konzorcijumom banaka spremila paket težak 50 milijardi €.

Sredinom septembra 2008. godine za-jedničkom akcijom vlada “spašena” je i najveća bankarsko-osiguravajuća kuća u zemljama Beneluksa (Belgija, Holandija, Luksmebrug), Fortis.

Probleme su imali i Dexia, banka pozna-ta po finansiranju infrastrukture i komer-cijalnih nekretnina, te Depfa.

DRŽAVNE INTERVENCIJE Kako bi podržala oslabljenu ekonomiju i obnovila povjerenje u američki finan-sijski sistem, američka centralna banka - Federalne rezerve (Fed) od septembra 2007. godine je smanjivala kamatne stope šest puta(od toga dvaput u januaru 2008. godine). Posljednjim smanjenjem (mart 2008. godine) kamatna stopa je daleko is-pod stope inflacije što znači da je “prava” stopa, odnosno realna stopa u koju je ukal-kulisana inflacija ispod nule. Isto tako Fed-ova stopa daleko je ispod stope Evropske centralne banke (4%) te stope Engleske centralne banke (5,25 posto).

Veliki gubici uzrokovani su kolapsom tr-žišta nekretnina te zajmovima koji su “hra-nili” taj nekretninski mjehur od sapunice. Naime, do 14. marta 2008. najveće svjetske financijske kuće prijavile su najmanje 195 milijardi dolara gubitaka vezanih za tržiš-te hipotekarnih kredita u SAD-u. Odbor guvernera takođe je smanjio i diskontnu stopu, kao cijenu direknih zajmova cen-tralne banke, na 2,5 posto.

Početkom marta 2008. godine Ministarstvo finansija SAD (Treasury) objavilo je doku-ment7 koji sadrži nacrt preporuka za mo-dernizaciju i osavremenjivanje pravnog sistema u kojem posluju finansijske insti-tucije. U dokumentu se navodi i nužnost promjene nadzora hipotekarnih brokera i drugih hipotekarnih institucija8 koje su imale doprinos u nastanku subprime hipo-tekarne krize. Umjesto sadašnjeg nadzora predviđeno je formiranje posebnog tijela za nadzor hipotekarnih institucija koje bi ima-lo federalni karakter (Mortgage Origination

Commission). Istovremeno je preporučena i preciznija nadzorna distinkcija za hipote-karne institucije koje imaju državni nadzor a posluju na federalnom tržištu, posebno u dijelu organizacije i sekjuritizacije hipoteka.

Dokumentom je predviđena jača ulo-ga Federalnih rezervi (Fed) i kvalitativno drugačija pozicija nadzornih institucija. Federalne rezerve kao centralna banka trebao bi proširiti svoju nadležnost i na fi-nansijske usluge, a ne samo banke, a imao bi i funkciju stabilizatora prilika na tržištu.

Početkom 2008. godine lansiran je i prog-ram Lifetime a Fed je omogućio i bankama direktno zaduživanje kako bi amortizovao efekte krize koja je počela na tržištu subprime hipotekarnih kredita, zahvatila kompletno kreditno tržište, a odrazila se i na svjetskim berzama akcijskog kapitala.

Paket mjera koje je usvojio Senat Sjedinjenih Američkih Država 10.04.2008. godine donosi oslobađanje od poreza u iz-nosu 7000 dolara za kupce zaplijenjenih kuća, 150 miliona USD ide kreditorima za kupovinu nekretnina, a čak 4 milijarde USD za lokalne vlasti, koje bi na tržištu tim novcem otkupljivale nekretnine.

Američka administracija pokrenula je proceduru na svom programu pomoći (FHA Secure), koji bi Amerikancima osigurao po-voljne kredite za kupovinu nekretnina uz 30-godišnju otplatu, a država bi bila jamac.

Prema Dodd, Mils (2008) subprime kriza u SAD je pokazala i veliku zavisnost hipotekarnog tržišta od državnosponzo-risanih entiteta u doba krize. Naime, au-toriteti su posebno bili aktivni koristeći federalne agencije (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) i državno sponzorisane entitete da podrže hipotekarno tržište. Državne ak-tivnosti su bile usmjerene ka podršci refi-nansiranju hipoteka (FHA), dramatičnom rastu hipotekarnog kreditiranja banaka i kupovine hipotekarnih hartija od vrijed-nosti bankama iz sistema (Federal Home Loan banks), kupovine MBS hartija sa državnim garancijama kako bi bankama održale likvidnost. MBS hartije su do-datno mogle biti korišćene kao kolate-rali za zajmove koje su banke mogle do-bijati od Federalnih rezervi, tj. centralne banke u SAD.

Sredinom ljeta 2008. godine državna administracija je smijenila rukovodstva Fannie Mae i Freddie Mac te preuzela

BANKA Otpis Kred. gubitak Ukupno

Citygroup 37,3 5,6 42,9UBS 38,2 38,2Merrill Lynch 37 37HSBC 6,9 12,6 19,5IKB Deutsche 16 16Royal bank of Scotland 15,2 15,2

Bank of America 9,2 5,7 14,9Morgan Stanley 12,6 12,6JP Morgan Chase 5,5 4,2 9,7Credit Suisse 9,5 9,5

Tabela 3: Prikaz otpisa potraživanja i kreditnih gubitaka usljed hipotekarne krize u SAD za 10 najviše pogođenih banaka u milijardama USDIzvor: Bloomberg, may 2008.

7 TheDepartmentoftheTreasury(2008.):BlueprintforaModernizedFinancialRegulatoryStructured,218pages

8 UdokumentusenavodidavećinuhipotekanatržištuSADdržehipotekarnibrokeriipozajmljivačibezfederalnognadzoraaprocjenjujesedasuisteinstitucijeorganizovaleioko50%subprimemortgagehipoteka


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consolidation. In the middle of September 2008, a joint

government action rescued Fortis, the big-gest bank-insurance company of the Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg).

Problems have also been encountered by Dexia, banks known for financing in-frastructure and commercial property, as well as Depfa.

State interventionS In order to support the weakened economy and restore trust in the U.S. financial system, U.S. central bank – Federal Reserves(FED) - cut interest rates six times since September 2007 (twice in January 2008). The latest cut (March 2008) placed interest rate far below inflation rate, meaning that the “actual” or real rate that incorporates inflation was be-low zero. Also, FED rate is far below that of the European Central Bank (4%) or the Bank of England (5.25%).

Huge losses were caused by the real es-tate market collapse and loans that “fed” the rela estate bubble. On 14 March 2008 major global financial companies reported a minimum loss of USD 195 billion rela-ted to the US mortgage loan market. The Board of Governors also cut the discount rate, as the price of direct central bank lo-ans, to 2.5%.

In early March 2008 U.S. Treasury pub-lished a document7 containing draft recom-mendations for modernization and updating of the legal system for operation of financial institutions. The document states the need to change supervision of mortgage bro-kers and other mortgage institutions8 that

contributed to the emergence of subprime mortgage crisis. A separate federal body for supervision of mortgage institutions - Mortgage Origination Commission - is intended to replace the current supervision system. At the same time, a more precise supervisory distinction is recommended for mortgage institutions under state su-pervision operating on the federal market, especially with regard to mortgage organi-zation and securitization.

The document envisages a stronger role of Federal Reserves and a qualitatively dif-ferent position of supervisory institutions. Federal Reserves, in the capacity of the cen-tral bank, should expand its competence to include financial services, in addition to banks, and would act to stabilize the situ-ation on the market.

Lifetime program was launched in early 2008, and FED enabled direct borrowing to banks in order to absorb the effects of the crisis that began in subprime mor-tgage market, spread to the overall credit market and was also reflecting on global equity markets.

The package approved by the U.S. Senate on 10 April 2008 introduces a USD 7,000 tax exemption for buyers of foreclosed ho-mes, 150 million for lenders for real estate purchases, and as much as 4 billion for lo-cal authorities, to be used to buy back real estate on the market.

US administration started a procedu-re within its assistance program (FHA Secure) to secure favorable loans for real estate purchase to be repaid over 30 years, guaranteed by the state.

According to Dodd, Mils (2008), the U.S. subprime crisis highlighted the large depen-dency of the mortgage market on state-spon-sored entities in the time of crisis. In a word, authorities were particularly active in using federal agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) and state-sponsored entities to support the mortgage market. State activities focused on supporting mortgage refinancing (FHA), dramatic increase in mortgage loans and purchase of mortgage securities from banks within the system (Federal Home Loan banks), purchase of MBS state-guaranteed securities to preserve banks’liqudiity. MBSs could also be used as collateral for loans available to banks from Federal Reserves, that is US Central Bank.

In the middle of summer 2008, state ad-ministration dismissed the management of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, took over and applied a significant financial injection due to the drop of value of their securities on the market.

In ealry October, after several correcti-

BANK Write-off Credit loss Total

Citygroup 37.3 5.6 42.9UBS 38.2 38.2Merrill Lynch 37 37HSBC 6.9 12.6 19.5IKB Deutsche 16 16Royal bank of Scotland 15.2 15.2

Bank of America 9.2 5.7 14.9Morgan Stanley 12.6 12.6JP Morgan Chase 5.5 4.2 9.7Credit Suisse 9.5 9.5

Table 3: Bad debt and credit loss write-off to the 10 most affected banks, due to the US mortgage market collapse, in USD billionsSource: Bloomberg, May 2008

7 TheDepartmentoftheTreasury(2008.):BlueprintforaModernizedFinancialRegulatoryStructured,218pages

8 ThedocumentstatesthatmajorityofmortgagesontheUSmarketareheldbymortgagebrokersandlenderswithoutfederalsupervision;itisestimatedthattheseinstitutionsorganizedapproximately50%ofsubprimemortgages

october 2008 | :Bankar�1


rukovođenje njima i ubrizgala značaj-nu finansijsku injekciju zbog pada vri-jednosti njihovih hartija od vrijednosti na tržištu.

Početkom oktobra nakon više korek-cija u Kongresu SAD je usvojen program podrške težak 700 milijardi USD. Bitni ele-menti programa su davanje prava sekreta-ru Trezora (pandan Ministarstvu finansija) da može kupovati problematične hipoteke i držati ih u državnom portfelju dok se cijena nekretnina ne stabilizuje a onda ih prodati. Neki elementi iz programa spasa i ranijih intervencija navedeni su u tabeli 4.

Američki plan za spas koji je usvojio Kongres nije prošao bez oštrih kritika u javnosti. Vjerovatno najautoritarnija kri-tika došla je od 166 univerzitetskih profe-sora iz SAD (među kojima i tri dobitnika Nobelove nagrade) koji su u pismu čelniku Kongresa ocijenili da plan spasa ne treba prihvatiti iz tri grupe razloga: ■ Pravičnost. Plan je subvencija za ulaga-če a porezne obveznike “trošak”, smatrajući da banke i finansijske institucije koje su se upustile u takve rizike same treba da pod-nesu njegovu cijenu; ■ Dvosmislenosti. Misije nove agencije za nadzor nisu jasne; ■ Dugoročni efekti. Jer će plan imati da-lekosežne efekte za sistem ranije zasnovan na tržišnoj privredi;

Najveći britanski hipotekarni zajmo-davci pooštravaju uslove kreditiranja u okolnostima sve većih bojazni zbog izlo-ženosti bankarskog sektora posrnulom tržištu američkih drugorazrednih hipo-tekarnih zajmova i posljedičnoj globalnoj kreditnoj krizi.

Bank of England je objavio da će se ban-kama omogućiti zamjena njihovih hartija od vrijednosti pokrivenih hipotekom na rok u rasponu od jedne do tri godine. “Plan ima za cilj povećavanje likvidnosti bankarskog sistema i jačanje povjerenje u finansijska tržišta” - navedeno je u saopštenju Banke. Plan će u početku biti u vrijednosti oko 50 milijardi funti (63 milijardi eura).

Pored toga u Velikoj Britaniji su uvedene i posebne poreske stimulacije (izizimanje od poreza) za kupce prvih stanova, kako

bi se oživjelo tržište nekretnina i stambe-no finansiranje. Ipak, cijene i promet na tržištu nekretnina i dalje padaju.

pouke Iako kriza na hipotekarnom tržištu Sje- dinjenih Američkih Država nema direktnih posljedica na prostor ranije Jugoslavije, osim mogućeg djelimičnog povlačenja plasmana inostranih banaka, što će tek biti predmet kvantifikacije, iz ove krize valjalo bi izvući određene pouke.

Nastanak krize generisan je brzim ras-tom vrijednosti nekretnina i povećavanjem kreditiranja na temelju rasta vrijednosti hi-poteka. Odobravanje zajmova dužnicima slabije kreditne sposobnosti na bazi vri-jednosti nekretnina kao kolaterala veoma brzo je dovelo do problema. Problemi in-dividualnih dužnika se mogu posmatrati u dva nivoa:

problemi sa blagovremenom otplatom stambenih zajmova,problem sa vrijednošću kolaterala i njegovom depresijacijom na tržištu;

Prvi problem jasno ukazuje da banke koje se upuštaju u odobravanje dugoročnih stambenih zajmova moraju dobro utvrditi kreditnu sposobnost potencijalnih dužnika i stabilnost njihovih prihoda. Ovaj problem je posebno značajan za privrede u tranzi-ciji kod kojih stabilnost prihoda indivi-dualnih korisnika stambenih zajmova još uvijek nije dovedena do nivoa koji može zajmodavcu pružati punu sigurnost da će zajam biti uredno servisiran.

Problem sa vrijednošću kolaterala je po-sebno izražen na malim i volatilnim tržiš-tima nekretnina gdje je sekundarno tržište nerazvijeno i postoje značajna ograničenja u realizaciji kolaterala. Odobravanje većih zajmova na osnovu rasta vrijednosti nekret-nina je mač sa dvije oštrice a fenomen rasta tržišne vrijednosti nekretnina bio je prisutan prethodnih godina i na području ex-Jugoslavije.

Imajući u vidu da u finansiranju stano-gradnje na našim prostorima uglavnom dominiraju stambeni zajmovi banaka a da sekjuritizacije portfolija još uvijek nema, može se zaključiti da opasnost po cjeloku-pan finansijski sistem po efektu spojenih sudova (tržišta) za sada ne postoji. Naime, situacija da se kriza na stambenom odnos-no zajmovnom tržištu prenese na tržište hartija od vrijednosti za sada direktno ne postoji jer kod nas i nema emitovanih hi-potekarnih hartija od vrijednosti (obvez-nica ili založnica).

Međutim, moguće je očekivati uspo-ravanje rasta stambenih zajmova banaka jer potencijalni dužnici moraju biti suoče-

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ni i sa trajnijim korekcijama na tržištima nekretnina te eventualnim usporavanjem ekonomskih aktivnosti, te depresijacijama cijena nekretnina. Problem posebno dobija na značaju na manjim i netransparentnim tržištima gdje je efikasnost realizacije kola-terala izuzetno niska a sekundarno tržište gotovo da ne postoji.

Kod procjena stambenog tržišta dobri analitičari moraju imati na umu glavne ge-neratore tražnje i izvore finansiranja. Ako su u pitanju spoljni faktori (kao što su bili u Crnoj Gori u prethodne dvije godine) cijene na tržištu nekretnina će najman-jim povlačenjem egzogenih faktora biti “normalizovane”. Pored spoljnjeg faktora značajan faktor je i stambena dostupnost (housing affordability), posebno generi-sana kvalitetnom kreditnom ponudom te rastom obima stambenog kreditiranja banaka. Najvažniji generatori su svakako rast standarda i dohotka a oni su ujedno najteže ostvarivi i sigurno da je njihov do-prinos prethodnom rastu cijena nekretni-na u Crnoj Gori bio minoran.

Posmatrajući strukture finansijskih siste-ma na području ranije Jugoslavije, domi-nacija bankarske djelatnosti i marginalni uticaj fondovske industrije, odsustvo sek-juritizacije, smanjuje rizike od urušava- nja finansijskog sistema kakvo se dogodilo u SAD. Takva struktura pokazuje otpor-nost na eventualne probleme i na posre-dan način može dokazivati i prevagu mo-dela sa dominacijom bankarske djelatnosti i čistim zajmovnim relacijama na malim i slabije razvijenim tržištima, od modela sa dominacijom fondovske djelatnosti i sek-juritizacijom kakav je model iz Sjedinjenih Američkih Država koji se u subprime krizi pokazao prilično ranjivim.

No, uvijek treba imati na umu da je procjena i monitoring tržišne vrijednosti nekretnine (kolaterala) osnovna pretpostav-ka stabilnosti hipotekarnog tržišta.

Kako je i naš region otvoren i ne može djelovati izvan okruženja činjenica je da će se i ova kriza vidjeti i kod nas, samo ne tako brzo i ne u direktnoj formi. Kamatne stope biće veće, upravljanje rizicima će se morati poboljšavati. Ovo tim prije jer su menadžerske strukture u bankarskom sistemu u Crnoj Gori (iako u suštinski u inostranom vlasništvu) još uvijek psiho-loški relikt socijalističko-samoupravnog sistema.

Posebno bi trebalo imati uvijek na umu i ocjene iznijete prošle godine (Economist, 2007) da je subprime kriza u SAD sumrak sistema u kojem svi nastoje zaraditi što više bez obzira kakvu sudbinu će imati partner u poslu ■

OpIS MRD uSDRefinansiranje propalih hipoteka 300Sredstva za Fannie Mae i Freddie Mac 200

Zajmovi bankama 200Kupovina hartija od Fannie Mae i Freddie Mac 144

Otplata JP Morganu 87uKupNO 931

Tabela 4: Prikaz “troškovnika” državnih intervencije u SAD Izvor: Reuters, 25.09.2008.


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ons, U.S. Congress approved a USD 700 billion bailout program. The main elements of the program include entitling Treasury Secretary (Ministry of Finance counter-part) to buy problematic mortgages, keep them in the state portfolio until real estate prices are stable, and then sell them. Some elements of the program and earlier inter-ventions are presented in Table 4.

The bailout plan approved in the Congress was not spared severe public criticism. The one that had nost weight came from 166 US university teachers (including three Nobel prize winners) stating in their letter to the Congress that the plan should not be ap-proved for three groups of reasons:

Fairness. The plan subsidizes the in-vestors at the expense of taxpayers; the banks and financial institutions that engaged such risks should pay the price. Ambiguity. The mission of the new supervision agency is not clear. Long-term effects. The plan will have long-term effects on the system that used to be based on market economy. The biggest British mortgage lenders are

introducing more stringent lending condi-tions in the atmosphere of concern about the exposrue of the banking sector to the shaken U.S. subprime mortgage market and the global credit crisis generated by it.

Bank of England announced that banks will be allowed to exchange their mortga-ge- backed securities for a term between one and three years. “The Plan aims to im-prove the liquidity of the banking system and strengthen trust in financial markets”, as stated in the Bank’s announcement. The plan will start at GBP 50 billion (EUR 63 billion).

In addition, UK introduced special tax incentives (tax exemption) for first-time buyers in order to jumpstart the real estate market and home finance. Still, real estate market prices and turnover keep falling.

leSSonS learneD Although the crisis on the U.S. mortgage market has no direct implications for the region of former Yugoslavia - apart from potential partial withdrawal of internati-onal banks’placements, still to be quantified – certain lessons should be learned.

The crisis was generated by the rapid increase in the value of real estate and lending based on the mortgage value in-crease. Granting loans to borrowers of weaker credit standing based on ral estate value as collateral soon created a problem. Problems of individual borrowers may be observed on two levels:

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Problems with timely repayment of home loans,Problem with the value of the collate-ral and its market depreciation;

The first problem clearly indicates that banks that engage in granting long-term home loans must specify the credit stan-ding and income stability of potential bor-rowers. This is especially relevant for transi-tion economies, where income stability of individual borrowers still has not reached the level that would fully secure regular servicing.

The problem concerning the value of col-lateral is particularly present in small and volatile real estate markets with undeve-loped secondary market and considerable constraints in collateral implementation. Granting large loans based on the incre-ase in real estate value is a double-edged sword, and the phenomenon of real estate market value was present in the past years in former Yugoslavia region.

Bearing in mind that bank loans are pre-valent in financing home building in our region and that portfolio securitization is still not in place, it is possible to conclu-de that the for the time being there is no threat for the overall financial system ac-cording to the principle communicating vessels (markets). Namely, at the moment there is no ground for the crisis in housing that is credit market to spill over into the securities market, given that there are no issued mortgage securities (bonds or mor-tgage bonds).

However, one may expect a slowdown in the growth of bank home loans, since potential borrowers need to face also more lasting corrections on real estate markets and possible slowdown of economic activity, as well as depreciation in real estate prices. The problem gains particular importance in smaller non-transparent markets, with rather low efficiency of collateral implemen-tation and almost no secondary market.

With regard to housing market assessment, good analysts need to bear in mind main demand generators and sources of finance. If these are external factors (as in Montenegro in the past two years), real estate market pri-ces will “normalize” with their minimum withdrawal. In addition to the external one, housing affordability is another important factor, especially generated by quality loan supply and an increase in the scale of bank housing loans. The most important gene-rators are certainly better standard and in-come; at the same time, they are the most difficult ones to achieve and their contri-bution to the increase in real estate prices in Montenegro a minor one.

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When observing the structures of fi-nancial systems in the region of former Yugoslavia, the predominance of banking, the marginal impact of fund industry and lack of securitization reduce the risks of fi-nancial system breakdown similar to the one in the US. This structure proves resistant to possible problems and may indirectly prove preference for the model marked by predominant banking and clear loan relations in smaller and less developed markets, compared to the predominance of funds and securitization, which was the U.S. model that the subprime crisis expo-sed as rather vulnerable.

However, one should always bear in mind that estimate and monitoring of real estate market value (collateral) is the main precon-dition for mortgage market stability.

Since our region is also open and can-not operate in isolation from its environ-ment, it is a fact that the crisis will ma-nifest here as well, only not so soon and in such a direct form. Interest rates will grow, and risk management will need to be upgraded. Even more so since manage-rial structures in the Montenegrin banking system (though essentially internationally owned) still contains psychological traces of the socialist regime.

Last years’ statements about the U.S. subprime crisis as the decline of the sys-tem where everyone aims atr maximum profit regardless of the outcome for the-ir partners (Economist, 2007) should be particularly noted ■

DeScRIptION uSD BIllRefinancing failed mortgagges 300Funds for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 200

Loans to banks 200Purchase of securities from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 144

Repayment to JP Morgan 87tOtAl 931

Table 4: “Cost Table” of US state interventionsSource: Reuters, 25 Sept, 2008

october 2008 | :Bankar��



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bankarske krize i njihove posljedice

Tokom poslednjih nekoliko decenija finansijska tržišta i institucije su pošle kroz radikalnu transformaciju i naglu ekspanziju, koja je podstaknuta opštim trendom deregulacije, liberalizacije, globalizacije, kao i napretka u kompjuterskim tehnologijama. Medjunarodni tokovi kapitala su intenzivirani, tržišta su razvila nove, do skora nepoznate instrumente, a brzina obavljanja finansijskih transakcija se drastično ubrzala, značajno snižavajući troškove finansijskih transakcija. U poslednjoj dekadi razvoj finansijskog sektora je bio mnogo brži nego razvoj realnog sektora, a u razvijenim zemljama finansijska aktiva je višestruko veća od BDP. Istovremeno ovakav proces je doveo i do „surove konkurencije“, koja je bespoštedno vodila borbi za što veće tržišno učešće, često ne vodeći dovoljno računa o riziku kojem se izlažu pojedinačne institucije. Stoga je bila neminovna povremena pojava vrlo oštrih finansijskim krizama, kao što je bila Azijska kriza i kao što je tekuća Globalna finansijska kriza. Krize su uvijek predstavljale prave izazove, a i prouzrokovale su znatne troškove, za kreatore ekonomske politike da ih na vreme indentifikuju i da pravilno procijene rizike koje su nosile

Poslovanje banaka je vrlo osjetljivo, jer ono može stvoriti veliku nestabilnost u svakoj zemlji. Čak i bankrotstvo male

banke može generisati finansijsku nestabilnost, jer deponen-ti mogu biti zabrinuti za svoje depozite u drugim bankama, pa započeti proces masovnog povlačenja depozita. Priroda finansijskih proizvoda rezultira činjenicom da je njihova evaluacija teška, jer su u pitanju proizvodi koji se ne kupuju često poput ostalih, kao hleb, novine, mlijeko i sl. U slučaju nesolventnosti finansijske institucije sva imovina se može iz-gubiti, a tu je prisutan i problem transparentnosti, pošto nije lako procijeniti kredibilitet institucije i pratiti da li je njeno poslovanje povezano sa nekim od rizika. Institucije koje su trebale da olakšaju problem transparentosti, međunarodne rejting agencije, su u tekućoj krizi, na žalost samo produbile ovaj problem, dodjeljujući potpuno pogrešne kreditne rejtin-ge i na taj način dovodile investitore u zabludu.

Prema istraživanju P. Sinclaira od hiljadu finansijskih ins-titucija u prosjeku godišnje preživi oko 960. Od preostalih četrdeset, trideset četiri se uz preuzimanje ili kroz merdžer priključi nekoj drugoj finansijskoj instituciji, a šest završi u stečaju ili likvidaciji. Naravno, u slučaju krize ove brojke se drastično mijenjaju. Sklonost ka bankrotstvu ili da budu preuzete je mnogo veća kod manjih nego kod većih banaka, a dobra supervizija nesumnjivo produžava životni vijek ba-naka. Tokom tridesetih godina prošlog vijeka situacija je bila značajno drugačija i zatvaranja i bankrotstva banaka su bila

masovna pojava. Promjeni ovakvog ponašanja u velikoj mjeri je doprinijela stroga regulativa i efikasna supervizija.

Suočeni sa krizom, kreatori ekonomske i monetarne po-litike moraju preduzeti određene mjere, ali moraju razmot-riti kakav će uticaj imati te mjere na budući razvoj privatnog sektora, imajući u vidu da politika rješavanja kriza bankar-skog sistema može imati negativne efekte u budućnosti, jer može uticati na povećani stepen prihvatanja rizika od strane bankarskog sektora, ukoliko postoji kredibilno očekivanje da će vlada i/ili centralna banka pribjeći “spašavanju” u slu-čaju krize. Stoga se vlada može naći u nekoj vrsti nagodbe između održavanja tekuće stabilnosti finansijskog sistema i buduće stabilnosti.

Dr Nikola Fabris Glavni ekonomista

CBCG

KORIStI TROŠKOVI

Održava se likvidnost sistema,

Sprečava se širenje uticaja krize na realni sektor,

Sprečava se gubitak kredibiliteta finansijskog sistema i širenje krize na ostatak finansijskog sistema,

Čuvaju se radna mjesta i dr.

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Fiskalni, čime se kažnjavaju se poreski obveznici

Podstiče se moralni hazard u budućnosti,

Najčešće nijesu sankcionisani akcionari i menadžment za loše upravljanje bankom,

Ometa se tržišna alokacija resursa i dr.

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Tabela 1: Koristi i troškovi rješavanja bankarskih kriza


Bank operations are quite sensitive as they may provoke ma-jor instability in each country. Even the bankruptcy of a

small bank may generate financial instability as depositors may become concerned over their deposits in other banks and start to massively withdraw deposits. The nature of financial pro-ducts makes their evaluation difficult because these products are not bought that often like others, such as bread, newspa-per, milk and the like. In the event of insolvency of a financial institution all the assets may be lost, and there is also a trans-parency problem as it is not easy to estimate credibility of the institution and monitor whether its operation is connected with some of the risks. Institutions that were supposed to facilitate the transparency problem, that is international rating agencies, are in the crisis at this moment and unfortunately they only deepened the problem by allocating completely wrong credit ratings thus misleading investors.

According to the research conducted by P. Sinclair, out of thousand financial institutions, the average of around 960 sur-vives annually. Of the remaining 40, thirty-four integrate into some other institution through acquisition or merger, while the six of them end up in bankruptcy or illiquidity. Naturally, these figures drastically change in the event of a crisis. Tendency to bankruptcy or to being taken over is much higher in small than in big banks, while good supervision undoubtedly extends life of the banks. Over the thirties in the last century, situation was pretty much different and closing and bankruptcies of banks were

frequent phenomenon. Strict regulations and efficient supervi-sion have largely contributed to the change of this trend.

Faced with the crisis, creators of economic and monetary po-licy must undertake certain measures, but they also must con-sider the effects that the measures will produce on the future development of private sector, bearing in mind that the policy of resolution of banking crises may have adverse effects in the future as it may influence on increased level of acceptance of the risk by the banking sector if there is a credible expectation that the Government and/or Central Bank will offer salvation in the event of crisis. Therefore the Government may find it-self in some kind of settlement between maintaining current stability of the financial system and future stability.

BeNeFItS cOStS

The system liquidity is maintained

Expansion of the crisis effects on the real sector is prevented

The loss of credibility of financial system and expansion of crisis to the rest of the financial system are prevented

Jobs are preserved etc.

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Fiscal, which punishes taxpayers

Incitement of moral hazard in the future

Most often shareholders and management are not sanctioned for maladministration of the bank

Market allocation of resources is obstructed and the like.

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Table 1: Costs and Benefits of the Resolution of Banking Crises

banking crisis and their consequencesOver the last several decades financial markets and institutions have gone through radical transformation and sudden expansion stimulated by general deregulation trend, liberalization, globalization and advancement in computer technology. International flows of capital have been intensified, markets have developed new, until recently unknown instruments, while the speed of financial transactions has drastically increased substantially reducing costs of financial transactions. In the last decade development of financial sector has been much faster than development of real sectors, while in developed countries financial assets are several times bigger that the GDP. At the same time, this process has resulted in cruel competition which unsparingly resulted in struggle for the highest possible market share, often disregarding the risk certain institutions are exposed to. Therefore, occasional severe financial crises were inevitable, such as the Asian crisis and current global financial crisis. Crises have always represented real challenges and incurred significant costs for creators of economic policy in their timely identification of them and adequate estimate or risks they carried

Nikola Fabris, PhD Chief Economist at the Central Bank of Montenegro (CBCG)



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Bankrotstvo banaka mnogo košta društvo. Bankarska kriza u Japanu je procijenjena na oko 20% BDP-a, dok su prema procjeni Svetske banke fiskalni troškovi bankarskih kriza samo u zemljama u razvoju prevazišli jedan trilion dolara, tokom osamdesetih i devedesetih. Istaknuti ekono-mista G. Dages je procijenio da je od kraja sedamdesetih do kraja prošlog vijeka bilo 117 sistemskih bankarskih kri-za u 93 zemlje i 51 manja bankarska kriza u 45 zemalja. Sve bankarske krize su imale značajne fiskalne gubitke, koji su u prosjeku iznosili oko 19% BDP. Bankarskih kriza nijesu bile pošteđene ni razvijene ni zemlje u razvoju, kao ni pri-vrede u tranziciji.

Uzroci koji mogu dovesti do krize u bankarskom siste-mu su brojni. Makroekonomska nestabilnost može dovesti do opadanja cijena nekretnina, brzog rasta kamatnih stopa, hiperinflacije i sl. Do pojave krize mogu dovesti i loša po-slovna strategija ili loši poslovni potezi banke poput: loše procjene kreditnog rizika, prevelike izloženosti kamatnom ili deviznom riziku, prevelike koncentracije kredita na ne-koliko dužnika, lošeg menadžmenta i dr. Takođe, ne treba zanemariti ni mogući uticaj finansijskog tržišta, naročito nakon “izduvavanja cjenovnih mjehurića”, ukoliko su banke bile u značajnoj mjeri angažovane na finansijskom tržištu ili ukoliko su primile veći iznos HOV kao kolateral. Na kraju ne treba isključiti ni prevare, kojima je poslednjih godina naročito podložan informacioni sistem.

Istražujući uzroke bankarskih kriza na primjeru od 29 zemalja Caprio i Klingebiel (1998.) su ustanovili da je u 90% bankarskih kriza bila prisutna neadekvatna bankar-ska supervizija. Naravno, sama po sebi loša supervizija ne može biti uzročnik krize ukoliko već ne postoje problemi u bankarskom sistemu. Sa druge strane, supervizija koja bi eliminisala sve rizike, vjerovatno bi banci uskratila profitne mogućnosti i učinila bi banku nekonkurentnom. Sljedeći po značaju uzrok je loš bankarski menadžment (69%).

Savjet Centralne banke Crne Gore uveo je mjere koje su strožije od međunarodnih računovodstvenih standarda i Bazela II. Glavni razlog je to što su dešavanja na među-nardnom finansijskom tržištu pokazala da međunarod-ni standardi nijesu dovoljna garancija da se kriza neće pojaviti.

Predsjednik Džordž Buš je 29. septembra pozvao ame-ričke političare da postignu sporazum o paketu po-moći finansijskom sistemu u zemlji. Uprkos tome što Predsjednički dom Kongresa nije usvojio plan, čitav pro-ces nije završen. Kongres mora da djeluje kako bi obez-bijedio finasijsku sigurnost svakog Amerikanca.

Evropska komisija pozvala je SAD da hitno usvoje plan za izlazak iz finansijske ktize. SAD moraju da preuzmu odgovornost u ovoj situaciji u interesu svoje zemlje i in-teresu svijeta.

Američki zakonodavci i administracija predsjednika Buša postigli su uslovni sporazum o planu za spas ugro-ženih finansijskih tržišta i institucija, koji je težak 700 milijardi dolara.

Odgovorni u SAD, ali i u Njemačkoj i u drugim država-ma, još potcjenju obim i značaj krize, a mnogi ugledni ekonomisti i analitičari upozoravaju da se s tim stvari-ma ne treba šaliti.

Džordž Buš se obratio direktno naciji i zatražio podršku za plan vrijedan 700 milijardi dolara (ali neki analitičari smatraju da su dubioze i dvostruko veće).

Svjetska finansijska kriza se za sada vrlo ograničeno odrazila na svjetsku trgovinu, ali se već u ovoj godini može očekivati usporavanje trgovinskih aktivnosti usljed smanjenja potrošnje građana zabrinutih zbog finansij-ske krize.

Grafik 1: Troškovi bankarskih krizaIzvor: Dages, G., (2004.) , “Practical Challenges in Strengthening Banking Supervision: Focus on Emerging Markets

Grafik 2: Uzroci bankarskih kriza


Bankruptcy of the banks is costly to the society. Banking crisis in Japan is estimated at around 20% of GDP, whi-le according to the World Bank` s estimate, fiscal costs of banking crises only in developing countries exceeded one trillion dollars in the eighties and nineties. Distinguished economist G. Dages estimates that from the end of the seven-ties until the end of the last century there were 117 systemic banking crises in 93 countries and 51 minor banking crises in 45 countries. All the banking crises produced substan-tial fiscal losses which on average equaled 19% of the GDP. Banking crises struck developed and developing countries, including economies in transition.

Reasons of the crisis in banking system are numerous. Macroeconomic instability may result in drop of the real estate prices, fast growth of interest rates, hyperinflation and the like. Crisis may also be provoked by bad business strategy or bad business moves of the banks such as: bad estimates of credit risk, too large exposures to the interest or foreign exchange risks, too large concentrations of loans on few debtors, bad management etc. In addition, possible effects of the financial market should also not be neglected, particularly after blowing of price bubbles if the banks have been substantially engaged on the financial market or if they

have received large amounts of securities as collateral. At the end, frauds should also not be neglected as the information system has been subject to them over recent years.

Investigating reasons of banking crises on the example of 29 countries, Caprio and Klingebiel (1998) established that inadequate banking supervision was present in 90% of ban-king crises. Naturally, bank supervision alone may not cause crisis without already existing problems in the banking sys-tem. On the other hand, supervision that would eliminate all the risks would probably deny profit opportunities to the bank and render the bank uncompetitive. The next signifi-cant reason is inadequate bank management (69%).

The Council of the Central Bank has introduced me-asures that are stricter than the international accoun-ting standards and Basel II. The main reason is that the events occurring at the international financial market have shown that the international standards do not re-present sufficient guarantee for preventing the crisis from appearing.

The President George W. Bush invited American po-liticians on 29 September to reach an agreement on the Financial System Rescue Package. In spite of the fact that the House of the Representatives of the Congress has not adopted the plan, the whole process has not been completed yet. The Congress must act to provide financial stability for every American.

European Committee invited USA to immediately adopt the plan for the recovery from the financial crisis. USA must take the responsibility in this situation which is in the interest of its country and in the interest of the en-tire world.

The American policy makers and administration of the President Bush have adopted conditional bailout plan for financial markets and institutions which amounts to 700 billion US dollars.

Responsible persons in the USA as well as in Germany and other states still underestimate the volume and im-portance of the crisis, and many prominent economists and analysts warn on the seriousness of the situation.

George W. Bush addressed directly to the nation requ-esting the support for the bailout plan of 700 billion US dollars (but some analysts consider that doubtful items are twice as high as that amount).

The world financial crisis currently reflected in limited amount to the world’s trade, but the deceleration of the trade activities may be expected in this year, due to the decrease in consumption of citizens that are concerned for the financial crisis.

The American Senate adopted a series of measu-res to assist banks and other financial organiza-tions that have found themselves for the last se-veral weeks in serious crisis. Financial System Rescue Package must also obtain the majority in the other house of the Congress – the House of Representatives.

Graph 1: Costs of Banking CrisesSource: Dages, G. (2004), “Practical Challenges in Strengthening Banking Supervision: Focus on Emerging Markets

Graph 2: Reasons of Banking Crises


�8KRATAK OSVRT NA TEKUćU BANKARSKU KRIZUTekuća Globalna finansijska kriza je pokazala svu destruk-tivnost velikih ekonomskih kriza. Bez dileme u pitanju je najveća ekonomska kriza poslije Velike ekonomske krize. Višegodišnji predsjednik FED-a, A. Grinspan, je rekao da se ovako nešto viđa jednom u sto ili dvjesta godina. Koliki je njen intenzitet može se najbolje vidjeti iz činjenice da je ona dovela na rub bankrotstva tri od najvećih pet američ-kih investicionih banaka, najveću američku osiguravajuću kompaniju, kao i Fani Mej i Fredi Meka koji su kontrolisali preko polovine američkog hipotekarnog tržišta.

Kao posljedica krize preko 100 hipotekarnih banaka je bankrotiralo, a MMF je u junu procijenio ukupne gubitke ove krize na preko 600 miljardi dolara. Gubici 100 najvećih banaka - koje u stvari nose globalni finansijski sistem - su procijenjeni na 240 milijardi dolara. Inflacija je u Americi porasla i dostigla je nivo od 5%, a nezaposlenost je dostigla izuzetno visok nivo za američke prilike od 6%. Procijenjeno je da će kao posljedica ove krize do kraja godine oko pola miliona Amerikanaca postati nezaposleno. Jasno je da ovo nije ni približno konačna cifra troškova imajući u vidu naj-noviji Bušov plan kojim je predvidjeno 700 milijardi dolara za otklanjanje posljedica tekuće finansijske krize, naravno pod pretpostavkom da ovaj plan ugleda svjetlo dana ima-jući u vidu „prepucavanja demokrata i republikanaca“ pred predsjedničke izbore.

Uzroka krize je bilo mnogo, počevši od previše ekspanziv-ne monetarne politike iz prethodnog perioda, nagomilanog budžetskog deficita i deficita tekućeg računa platnog bilan-sa SAD, pucanja cjenovnog mjehura na tržištu nekretnina, neadekvatne supervizije, moralnog hazarda, lošeg mena-džmenta, neadekvatnih kreditnih rejtinga i dr. Objašnjenje tekuće bankarske krize možemo naći i u Kejnsovom eseju „Posljedice smanjenja novčanih vrijednosti po banke“ iz 1931. godine. U ovom radu on je stavio banku u poziciju malog djeteta kada uradi neku glupost i pravda se da su to radila i ostala djeca. Upravo su slične argumente iznosili direkto-ri Siti banke, Meril Linča i Kantrivajda ističući da su znali da su plasmani rizični, da su u njih ulagali svi, ali da nisu mogli da se povuku, jer bi u protivnom pozicije na tržištu zauzeli njihovi konkurenti.

Kriza je prinudila Ameriku, tradicionalnog zagovorni-ka liberalizma, da napravi zaokret u ekonomskoj politici i opredijeli se ka intervencionizmu. Pokazalo se kao i u slu-čaju Velike ekonomske krize da samo tržište nije u stanju da riješi veće poremećaje. Pored FED-a, intervenisale su i druge centralne banke, a prije svih ECB i Banka Japana, jer se zbog globalne međuzavisnosti finansijskih tržišta kri-za brzo prenijela i na tržišta razvijenih zemalja Zapadne Evrope i Azije.

uticaj na crnu goruKriza je najteže pogodila američku privredu, u blažem obli-ku je zahvatila razvijene zemlje Evrope i Azije, a privrede u tranziciji uglavnom pogađaju indirektni efekti. Tako i u slučaju Crne Gore banke koje posluju na našem tržištu nije-su bile direktno pogođene posljedicama Globalne krize, jer nisu imale plasmane u „sumnjive“ američke HOV. Ipak, kao posljedica krize, došlo je do rasta referentnih kamatnih sto-pa na međunarodnom finansijskom tržištu, tako da je ban-kama zaduživanje u inostranstvu postalo značajno skuplje.

Američki Senat usvojio je paket mjera za pomoć banka-ma i drugim finansijskim organizacijama, koje se posl-jednjih nedjelja nalaze u ozbiljnoj krizi. Zakon o pomoći finansijskom sektoru sada mora da dobije većinu i u drugom domu Kongresa - Predsjedničkom domu.

Lideri Francuske, Velike Britanije, Njemačke i Italije održavaju sastanak kako bi pronašli zajednički odgo-vor na finansijsku krizu. Situacija je veoma zabrinja-vajuća, jer su gubici banaka značajniji nego što je bilo procijenjeno.

Britanska vlada je saopštila i zvanično da će paketom pomoći od blizu 90 milijardi dolara poreskog novca po-kušati da ojača britanski bankarski sektor pogođen sv-jetskom finansijskom krizom.

Crnogorske poslovne banke trebalo bi da se, prema preporuci CBCG, pripreme za odliv depozita ka instituci-onalnim investitorima. Višak novca će se, kako se pred-viđa, prevashodno odlivati ka privatnim penzionim fon-dovima i investicionim fondovima.

15 lidera Eurozone se sastaje u Parizu kako bi ustanovi-li zajednički pristup u suprostavljanju globalnoj finansijs-koj krizi koja se pogoršava, uz upozerenje da se svjetski finansijski sistem nalazi na ivici kolapsa.

Evropske banke pogodilo je prelivanje krize započete u SAD kada je došlo do kolapsa cjelokupnog sistema trgo-vine nekretninama.

Vlada u Berlinu je nagovijestila da će garantovati sve štedne uloge u bankama, strahujući da bi građani mog-li panično da podižu svoju ušteđevinu, što bi, strahuje se, moglo da dovede do potpunog kolapsa bankarskog sistema.

Međunarodni monetarni fond je saopštio da su kreditni gubici u SAD vjerovatno dvostruko veći od iznosa “spa-sonosnog” vladinog paketa u iznosu od 700 milijardi dolara. Najnovija procjena MMF-a je da gubici iznose preko 1400 milijardi dolara.

Ruski ministar spoljnih poslova Sergej Lavrov izjavio je da nikome nije u interesu ekonomska kriza u SAD, ali se američka kriza ne može prevazići bez sagledavanja mul-tipolarnosti finansijskog sitema i cijele svjetske privrede.

Aktuelna globalna finansijska kriza može da bude rije-šena jedino ako države sarađuju. Svijet je na ivici re-cesije te bi oporavak mogao da počne krajem 2009. godine. Vrijednost dionica u Evropi se stabilizovala ug-lavnom zbog usklađenog poteza centralnih banaka vo-dećih zapadnih zemalja u kojem su smanjile kamatne stope i upumpale milijarde dolara u finansijski sistem.

Lideri 15 zemalja Eurozone donijeli su akcioni plan u kome se obavezuju da će garantovati za bankarski sis-tem u svojim zemljama koji potresa svjetska finansijska kriza. Zemlje Eurozone su se obavezale da podrže ban-ke tako što će uložiti kapital u njih, odnosno naciona-lizovati ih bar djelimično. Taj akcioni plan nije poklon bankama, već sprječavanje kraha finansijskog sistema. “Banke koje će primiti pomoć moraju da plate”.

oktobar 2008 | :BankarSVJETSKA FINANSIJSKA KRIZA

Naziv rubrike�9

Short overview oF the current banking criSiSThe current global financial crisis has shown destructi-ve power of all major economic crises. Undoubtedly, this is the biggest economic crisis after the Great Economic Crisis. Years long President of the FED, A. Grinspan, said that something like this happens only once in one or two hundred years. The scope of its intensity may be best re-cognized in the fact that it lead three of five American in-vestment banks to the verge of bankruptcy, together with the biggest American insurance company and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac who controlled more than a half of the American mortgage market.

The crisis resulted in bankruptcy of more than 100 mor-tgage banks, while in June the IMF estimated total loss of this crisis at around 600 billion dollars. Losses incurred by 100 largest banks-which actually support entire financial sys-tem-are estimated at 240 billion dollars. Inflation in America has increased reaching 5%, while unemployment reached extremely high level for American conditions amounting to 6%. It was estimated that around half a million of Americans will lose jobs because of this crisis by the end of the year. Obviously this is not a final figure of costs having in mind the latest Bush` s plan which provides 700 billion dollars for elimination of consequences of the current financial crisis, naturally under the assumption that this plan sees the light and recalling disputes between democrats and republicans before presidential elections.

There were many reasons of the crisis, starting from too expansive monetary policy from the previous period, ac-cumulated budget deficit and current account deficit of the USA balance of payment, blowing of the price bubble on the real estate market, inadequate supervision, moral hazard, bad management, inadequate credit ratings etc. Explanation of the current banking crisis may be traced in Keynes` essay Consequences of the Reduction of Monetary Values on Banks from 1931. In this paper he placed the bank in the position of a small child who does something stupid and justifies it by saying that other children were doing the same. Similar ar-guments were presented by Directors of the Citibank, Merrill Lynch and Countrywide stating that they had known that the placements had been risky and that everyone invested in them, but they could not have withdrawn, otherwise market positions would be taken over by their competitors.

The crisis forced America, traditional supporter of libe-ralism, to make turn in economic policy and opt for inter-ventionism. It has been shown that, just like in the case of Great Economic Crisis, the market itself is not sufficient for resolution of major turmoil. In addition to the FED, other Central Banks also intervened, primarily the ECB and the Bank of Japan, as global interdependence of financial mar-kets resulted in rapid expansion of the crisis into the markets of developed countries of Western Europe and Asia.

eFFectS on montenegroThe crisis had the most severe impact on American economy, less severe impact on the developed countries in Western Europe and Asia, while economies in transition are mainly struck by indirect effects. In case of Montenegro, banks operating on our market are not directly hit by consequences of the global crisis as they did not invest in suspicious American securities. Still, the crisis resulted in the rise of commercial interest rates

Leaders of France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy kept the meeting to find the mutual answer on the fi-nancial crisis. The situation is very concerning, since the losses of the banks are more significant than it has been evaluated.

British government announced officially that it will try to strengthen the British banking sector affected by the world financial crisis through the package of assistance of approximately 90 billion US dollars of tax funds.

Montenegrin commercial banks should, based on the recommendations of CBM, prepare themselves for the deposit withdrawal towards the institutional investors. The surplus of cash, as it has been predicted, will be primarily withdrawn towards private pension funds and investment funds.

Fifteen leaders of Eurozone met in Paris to establish mutual approach in fighting against global financial cri-sis that is on the verge of collapse.

European banks were influenced by the transferring of the crisis started in USA where the entire system of real estate trading collapsed.

The Government in Berlin announced that it will guaran-tee savings in banks, fearing that the citizens may pa-nicky withdraw their savings, which might lead to com-plete collapse of the banking system.

International Monetary Fund announced that credit los-ses in USA are probably doubled than the amount of the government “rescue” package in the amount of 700 billion US dollars. The latest assessment of IMF is that losses amounted to over 1400 billion US dollars.

Russian minister of foreign affairs Sergej Lavrov an-nounced that the economic crisis that is happening in the USA is in no one’s interest, but the American crisis cannot be exceeded without reviewing multipolarity of the financial system and entire global economy.

Current global financial crisis can be resolved only if the states are cooperating. The world is on the verge of re-cession so the recovery might begin at the end of 2009. The values of shares in Europe are stabilized mostly due to the harmonized movement of the central banks of the leading Western countries in which they reduced interest rates and injected billions of dollars in the fi-nancial system.

Leaders of 15 countries of the Eurozone adopted the action plan which obliges them to guarantee for the banking system in their countries faced with financial crisis. This action plan is not a gift to the banks, but re-presents the prevention from the bankruptcy of the fi-nancial system. “Banks that will receive help must pay”.

France will guarantee interbank borrowings up to € 320 billion and allocate € 40 billion for recapitalization of the banks faced with bankruptcy. In the emergencies, the state will take the control over the banks i.e. it will nationalize them. These government guarantees will be temporary, up to 31 January 2009. Carriers of the crisis will be sanctioned once the crisis calms.

WORLD FINANCIAL CRISISoctober 2008 | :Bankar

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Rezultat toga je da je prekinuta tendencija opadanja efektiv-ne aktivne kamatne stope koje je bila prisutna prethodnih nekoliko godina, a ukoliko se nastavi dalji rast referentnih kamatnih stopa na svjetskim tržištima, onda će vjerovatno i kod nas banke biti prinuđene da povećaju kamatne stope. Takođe, na crnogorsko tržište se prenio i rast cijena kao re-zultat teškoća na globalnom finansijskom tržištu.

Ova, kao i prethodne sistemske bankarske krize, je po-kazala da kreatori ekonomske politike treba da tretiraju finansijski sistem kao što doktor tretira zdravog pacijenta - fokusira se na prevenciju, kontrolne preglede i identifi-kaciju potencijalnih problema prije nego što nanesu štetu imunom sistemu i zdravlju pacijenta. Ukoliko se pacijent nije razbolio, a pokazuje znake potencijalne bolesti doktor će sprovesti dodatne testove, češće kontrole, preporučiće promjenu životnog stila ili će prepisati upotrebu ljekova. To znači da je od ključnog značaja dobro sprovedena su-pervizija koja treba da djeluje preventivno. Sa grafika broj 2 se jasno vidi koliki je značaj supervizije, jer u preko 90% sistemskih bankarskih kriza bila je prisutna neadekvatna supervizija bankarskog sistema. Upravo je to pravac akcije

Francuska država će garantovati međubankarske po-zajmice do 320 milijardi eura i izdvojiti 40 milijardi eura za dokapitalizaciju banaka kojima prijeti bankrotstvo. U hitnim slučajevima država će preuzeti kontrolu nad ban-kama, tj. nacionalizovaće ih. Ove državne garancije će biti privremene, do 31. januara 2009. godine. Uzročnici krize biće sankcionisani jednom kada se ona stiša.

Akcioni plan mjera za pomoć finansijskim institucijama za zemlje Eurozone “težak” je 2200 milijardi eura.

Berze u Londonu, Parizu i Frankfurtu ojačale oko četiri odsto čime je počeo drugi uzastopni dan oporavka.

…već sjutrašnjeg dana - Berzanski indeksi u minusu ši-rom svijeta zbog obnovljenog straha od recesije.

Lideri Evropske unije zatražili su duboku promjenu sv-jetskog finansijskog sistema da bi se izbjeglo ponavljan-je trenutne krize na svjetskim berzama, koja se smatra najgorom još od vremena velike depresije u prvoj polovi-ni 20. vijeka. Oni su zatražili održavanje svjetskog sami-ta na najvišem nivou već u novembru. Nikolas Sarkozi je pozvao na “promjene u kapitalističkom sistemu” koje bi donijele veću kontrolu država nad svjetskim tržištem novca, borbu protiv “poreskih rajeva” i rekonstrukciju institucija poput MMF-a. “Na samitu moraju biti donijete konkretne odluke, a ne samo principi”.

Novim Zakonom o podršci bankama u Crnoj Gori, drža-va garantuje za sve depozite privrede i građana u crno-gorskim bankama. Mjere se donose iz preventivnih raz-loga i biće upotrijebljene samo u slučaju samo u slučaju da budu neophodne. Država će garantovati za među-bankarske kredite, moći će da obezbijedi pozajmice bankama radi likvidnosti, ali i da ih dokapitalizuje.

Časopis Bankar u ovom broju objavljuje integralni tekst Zakona o podršci bankama, a u narednom broju koji ob-jvaljuje u prvoj polovini decembra, objavićemo razgovor sa ministrom finasija Crne Gore dr. Igorom Lukšićem.

Priredio Marko Nikolić

kojem je CBCG poklanjala veliku pažnju i koji će i nadalje imati prioritetno mjesto u akcijama CBCG.

Tekuća kriza je pokazala da primena međunarodnih standarda nije dovoljna da obezbijedi zadovoljavajući ste-pen sigurnosti bankarskog sistema. Stoga je CBCG propi-sala niz mjera koje su strože od međunarodnih standarda (bazelskih standarda i međunarodnih računovodstvenih standarda). Oni se naročito odnose na strožije standarde po pitanju visine koeficijenta solventnosti, a time i iznosa po-trebnog kapitala za pokriće kreditnog, tržišnih, operativnog i ostalih rizika, strožijeg tretmana kolaterala za obezbjeđe- nje izloženosti, kraće vremenske intervale za kategorizaciju dužnika koji kasne u izmirenju obaveza, strožije kriteriju-me za upravljanje kreditnim rizikom i rizikom likvidnosti, obavezu izdvajanja većih rezervi itd.

Na kraju možemo zaključiti da savremeni svijet karak-teriše povremena pojava bankarskih kriza i malo je vjero-vatno da se njihova povremena pojava neće nastaviti i u budućnosti. Stoga je potrebno fokusirati se na preventivno djelovanje prema svim onim faktorima koji mogu voditi u krizu, jer kada se ona pojavi troškovi njenog saniranja progresivno rastu ■

oktobar 2008 | :BankarSVJETSKA FINANSIJSKA KRIZA

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on international financial market which made the banks` in-debtedness abroad become more expensive. Consequently, the tendency of fall of effective active interest rate over several years has been interrupted, and if further rise of the commercial in-terest rates continues on world markets, our banks will also be forced to rise interest rates. In addition, the price rise resulting from difficulties on global financial market also expanded into the Montenegrin market.

This crisis, like the previous systemic banking crises, has shown that creators of economic policy should treat the fi-nancial system in the same way a doctor treats a healthy patient – focusing on prevention, control checks, and iden-tifying problems before they inflict harm to the immune system and health of the patient. If the patient is not sick, but still shows the signs of potential weakness, doctor will run additional tests, more frequent controls, recommend the change in a life style or prescribe medicines. This me-ans that well conducted supervision is of critical importance as it should act preventively. Chart number 2 clearly shows importance of the supervision as in more than 90% of sys-temic banking crises contained inadequate supervision of the banking system. It is the course of action to which the

CBCG attached enormous attention and it will continue to assume priority position in the CBCG` s actions.

The current crisis demonstrated that implementation of in-ternational standards alone is not sufficient to assure satisfying degree of security of the banking system. Therefore, the CBCG laid down several measures which are more strict than the inter-national standards (Basel standards and international accoun-ting standards). They particularly refer to more strict standards in terms of the amount of the solvency coefficient, and amount of necessary capital for the coverage of credit, market, operati-onal and other risks, more strict treatment of the collateral for securing exposure, shorter periods of time for categorization of debtors whose liabilities are overdue, more strict criteria for credit risk and liquidity risk management, obligation to allo-cate higher reserves etc.

At the end we may conclude that modern world is characte-rised by occasional occurrence of banking crises and it is very likely that their occasional occurrence will continue in the future. Therefore it is necessary to focus on preventive actions against all those factors that might result in crisis because once it emerges the costs of its healing are growing progressively ■

The action plan of measures for the assistance to the financial institutions for the countries of Eurozone amounts to € 2200 billion.

Stock exchanges in London, Paris and Frankfurt strengt-hened in the amount of approximately four percent se-cond day of the recovery in a row.

…but the next day – Exchange indices plummeted throughout the world due to the continued fear of recession.

Leaders of the European Union requested deep chan-ge in the global financial system to avoid repetition of the current crisis at world exchanges, which is consi-dered to be the worst since the time of great depressi-on that occurred in the first half of 20th century. They requested holding of the world summit at the highest level in November. Nicolas Sarkozy invited to “changes in the capitalist system” which would bring higher con-trol of the countries over global money market, fight against “tax paradises” and reconstruction of the insti-tutions such as IMF. “Specific decisions must be rea-ched at the summit, not only principles”.

The government guarantees for all deposits of eco-nomy and citizens in Montenegrin banks through the adoption of the new Law on the support for banks in Montenegro. The measures are adopted from the pre-vention reasons and will be used only in case of their necessity. The Government will guarantee for inter-bank loans, it will be able to provide borrowings to banks for the liquidity purposes and will be able to re-capitalize them.

Magazine “Bankar” will publish in this number in-tegral text of the Law on support to banks, and the interview with minister for Igor Lukšić will be publis-hed in the next number of the magazine in the first half of December.

Arranged by Marko Nikolić

WORLD FINANCIAL CRISISoctober 2008 | :Bankar

U praktično svim slučajevima bankarske krize su kao re-zultat imale velike gubitke imovine i prekide ponude

kredita za investiranje i trgovanje. Rješavanje krize obično je uključivalo velike rashode državnih sredstava. Povremene finansijske liberalizacije jesu donekle povećavale mogućnost rizika, mada najnoviji debakli u bankarskim sistemima su-gerišu da je problem (uzrok) krize i panike mnogo dublji. Ukoliko se pogorša okruženje, kriza se može pojaviti veoma brzo. Postojanje mogućnosti predviđanja tajminga bankar-ske krize ili barem stepen rizika krize (visok ili nizak), pod-razumijeva neophodnost identifikovanja pouzdanih indi-katora i njihove kontrole na promjene.

EfEKTI PONCI IGRE ZASNOVANE NA PIRAmIDNOJ ŠEmIKada su SAD i još 62 zemlje izdale 1906. međunarodni po-vratni kupon (IRC, international reply coupon), “sveopšti i opskurni finansijski instrument”, vjerovatno nisu ni slutile kakav će efekat proizvesti. Kupovanje više kupona u zemlja-ma sa slabim valutama, njihovo konvertovanje u poštanske marke i unovčavanje u SAD ili drugim zemljama sa snažnim valutama bilo je dovoljan podsticaj za sticanje bogatstva. Charles Ponzi je ubijedio ljude da mu dopuste da investira njihov novac, ali on nikada nije izvršio bilo kakvu realnu investiciju. Time nije ni imao bilo kakav realni novac kojim bi isplatio ranije ulaske u njegov sistem.

Osnovna ideja vezana za poštanski povratni kupon je da omogući pošiljaocu da kupi marke u stranoj valuti za povratnu poštansku pošiljku, umjesto zahtjeva da prima-lac plati za njih. Na primjer, advokat bi poslao dokument u Englesku na čitanje uključujući kupon kojim bi se pla-tile engleske marke, čime bi se omogućilo da ga primalac pošalje nazad. Budući da se devizni kurs za kupone nije mijenjao, tj. bio je originalno fiksiran tokom međunarod-ne poštanske unije 1907, takav kupon bi se mogao kupiti po originalnom kursu i zamijeniti za marke po tekućem deviznom kursu.

Poštanski kupon kupljen u Evropi za oko jedan cent sa američkim sredstvima mogao bi biti unovčen za oko 6 ame-

ričkih marki od jednog centa. Prvi korak je bio konverto-vanje američkog novca u valutu sa povoljnim deviznim kursem. Ova sredstva bi Poncijevi strani agenti potom ko-ristili za kupovinu poštanskih kupona u zemljama sa sla-bim ekonomijama. Kuponi marke bi potom bili zamijenjeni za povoljnu stranu valutu i konačno pretvoreni u američ-ka sredstva. Neto profit od ovih transakcija navodno je bio 400%, nakon troškova i deviznih kurseva. Dakle, u pitanju je bila arbitraža: kupovanje jeftinije i prodaja skuplje, što nije bilo nelegalno.

Ponci je nudio ulagačima 50% prinosa na njihov novac na 45 dana, tj. udvostručavanje na 90 dana. Kako su sva-kog dana depoziti rasli u iznosima desetina hiljada dolara, jedan dio je izdvojio za kupovinu dva preduzeća. Ideja, sva-kako neizvodljiva, je bila i da se kupe američki ratni brodo-vi za 300 miliona dolara i pretvore u plovni prodajni centar (shopping mall). Sve dok je novac priticao, Ponci je bio van konačnog kolapsa. Njegova kompanija je prikupila 9,6 mi-liona od najmanje 20.000 investitora, ili možda čak 40.000, uz obavezu da vrati gotovo 15 miliona dolara. Jednostavna finansijska analiza pokazala bi da on nije stvarao novac, već ga rapidno gubio.

Poncijeva “smicalica” biće prihvaćena dvadesetak godina kasnije kao zvanična politika vlade SAD. Franklin Roosevelt je 1935. kreirao Socijalno osiguranje (Social Security), koje je Friedman nazvao Ponci igrom. Po Samuelson-u, entuzi-jasti New Deal-a, rastuća nacija je najveća Ponci igra ikad smišljena, mada je demografska budućnost pokazala da je, u stvari, u pitanju samo najduža i neprekinuta Ponci šema. Kao i Čarls Ponci, Socijalno osiguranje u SAD na kraju neće moći dovoljno brzo da regrutuje nove kontributore kako bi se isplatili benefiti koje je vlada obećala. Ovaj aspekt Ponci igre, u kojoj svaka generacija uzima više nego što uloži, bliži se kraju zbog demografskih promjena. Analize Krugmana predstavljaju korisno štivo za Ponci šemu i njenu imple-mentaciju u SAD.

Čarls Ponci je igrao staru igru “pljačkanja Petra da bi platio Pavlu”. Za kompletnu računicu bilo mu je potrebno

SVJETSKA FINANSIJSKA KRIZA oktobar 2008 | :Bankar

�� od bankarskog brenda do krize i vice versa

Posljednje decenije su, osim po značajnom napretku u sektoru finansija, karakteristične i po učestalijim finansijskim krizama - bankarskim, valutnim, krizama platnog bilansa ili zaduženosti. Bankarske poteškoće ili krize u velikom broju zemalja stvarale su mnogo ozbilljnije negativne posljedice ostatku ekonomije ili monetarnoj politici nego krize drugih tipova finansijskih ili nefinansijskih firmi. Trenutna finansijska - bankarska kriza je potencijalno impozantnija u odnosu na one iz ’90-ih i ’80-ih, a ove učestalije i veće u odnosu na krize u ’70-im itd. U mnogim regionima gotovo svaka zemlja doživjela je makar jednu ozbiljnu bankarsku poteškoćudr Slobodan Lakić Ekonomski fakultet Podgorica


In almost all the cases banking crises resulted in severe losses of assets and suspension of the offer for financing

investment and trade loans. Tackling of the crisis mainly incurred large expenditures of public funds. Occasional fi-nancial liberalizations have to some extent increased the po-ssibility of risk, though the most recent collapses in banking systems suggest that the problem (cause) of crisis and panic is much deeper. If the environment deteriorates, the crisis may occur pretty soon. The possibility to anticipate timing of the banking crisis or at least the degree of the crisis risk (high or low) includes identification of reliable indicators and their control of changes.

eFFectS oF ponzi game baSeD on pyramiD SchemeWhen the USA and another 62 countries issued international reply coupon (IRC), overall obscure financial instrument, in 1906, they probably did not expect what results it would produce. Purchase of several coupons in countries with weak currencies, their conversion into postage stamps and cashing in the USA or other countries with strong currencies was a sufficient stimulus for getting rich. Charles Ponzi convinced people to let him invest their money, but he never did any real investment. Therefore he did not have any real money he would use to pay earlier entries in its system.

Main idea of the postage exchangeable coupon is to enable sender to buy stamps in foreign currencies for exchangeable postage consignment, instead of requesting from recipient to pay for them. For instance, an attorney would send a do-cument to England for reading including the coupon for payment of the English stamps to ensure that the recipient sends it back. Since foreign exchange for coupons remained unchanged, i.e. it was not originally fixed during the 1907 International Postal Union, such coupon might have been purchased at the original exchange rate and exchanged for stamps at the current foreign exchange.

Postage coupon purchased in Europe for around 1 cent with American funds might have been cashed for about 6 American 1 cent stamps. The first step was to convert

American money into the currency with favourable foreign exchange. These funds would afterwards be used by Ponzi` s foreign agents for purchase of postage stamps in countries with weak economies. Coupon of the stamps would then be exchanged for favourable foreign currency and finally con-verted into American currency. Net profit generated by the-se transactions was allegedly 400%, after deduction of costs and foreign exchange rates. Therefore, this was a matter of arbitration: buying cheaper and selling it at a higher price, which was not illegal.

Ponzi offered investors 50% of return to their money in 45 days, that is doubling in 90 days. As the deposits were growing each day by tens of thousands, he set one part asi-de for the purchase of two enterprises. The idea, certainly impossible, was to buy American war ships for 300 million Euros and transform them into navigation shopping mall. As long as money was coming in, Ponzi was secured against ultimate collapse. His company managed to collect 9.6 mil-lion from at least 20.000 investors, or maybe even 40.000, having committed to return almost 15 million dollars. Simple financial analysis revealed that he was not making money; instead he was rapidly losing it.

Ponzi ̀ s fraud was accepted twenty years later as the official policy of the USA government. In 1935 Franklin Roosevelt put in place social security which Friedman named Ponzi` s game. According to Samuelson, New Deal enthusiast, the growing population is the biggest Ponzi` s game ever con-ceived, even though demographic future has shown that actually it is the longest and uninterrupted Ponzi` s sche-me. Just like Charles Ponzi, the social security in the USA ultimately will not be able to recruit new contributors for the payment of benefits promised by the government. This aspect of Ponzi` s game, where each generation takes more than it has invested, is nearing its end due to demographic changes. Krugman` s analyses are useful reference for Ponzi` s scheme and its implementation in the USA.

Charles Ponzi played the old game robbing Peter to pay Paul. The whole calculation took him less than five minu-


From banking brand to crisis and vice versaIn addition to a significant progress made in the finance sector, previous decades have also been recognized by increasingly frequent financial crises-related to banking, currency, balance of payment and indebtedness. In many countries banking difficulties or crises resulted in much more severe adverse effects on the rest of economy and monetary policy than did the crises of other types of financial or non-financial firms. Current financial-banking crisis is potentially more dramatic than those from the nineties and eighties, while these were more frequent and larger than those in the seventies etc. In many regions almost every country suffered at least one severe banking difficultySlobodan Lakić, PhD Faculty of Economics in Podgorica

manje od 5 minuta, ali uz siguran zaključak. Ponci igra je proizvela Ponci brend, mada zakratko u konkretnom sluča-ju. Nije bilo dovoljno kupona u svijetu za osobu koja želi da zaradi milion dolara, mnogo manje za više miliona. Čarlsu, koji je od perača posuđa i konobara izrastao u “finansijsku legendu”, bilo je potrebno dodatnih pet minuta da shvati krajnji ishod. Kraj Ponci igre je neizbježno bankrotstvo i veliki gubici za investitore ukoliko se igra ranije ne zaustavi. Pritom, može posebno da zabrine politički uticaj “panike” finansijskih investitora.

Investitori su svuda uključeni u sve oblike finansijskih špe-kulacija, ili preciznije manipulacija. Rast cijena nafte OPEC-a ’70-ih doveo je do globalnih nagomilavanja (akumulacija) koja su bile iskorišćena (reciklirana) u vidu zajmova zemljama Trećeg svijeta. Wallerstein (1998) ukazuje da su ovi zajmovi na kraju iscrpili (osiromašili) zajmotražioce, ali su takođe održali globalno dohodak u “centralnoj zoni”. Ova prevara (prva igra) bila je nastavljena drugom Ponci igrom koja je predstavljala kombinaciju zaduživanja vlade SAD to-kom ’80-ih (“militarni kejnzijanizam Reagan-a”) i privatnih kapitalista (junk obveznice), sve dok igra nije prestala tzv. krizom deficita SAD. Treća Ponci igra tokom ’90-ih zasni-vala se na prilivima globalnog kapitala preko “kratkoročnih zaduživanja” u istočnoj i jugoistočnoj Aziji.

Zdušno podržan od vlade SAD, MMF je pružio “rje-šenje” za dužničku krizu s početka ’80-ih. Preporuka je da vlade u krizi praktikuju kombinaciju “fiskalne ozbiljnosti” i otvaranja tržišta na najširem planu za investitore. Henry Kissinger je svojevremeno izrazio zabrinutost da ovakve preporuke MMF-a, koje dovode do potpunog onesposob-ljavanja domaćeg bankarskog sistema u zemljama koje ne-maju “društvenu sigurnosnu mrežu”, predstavljaju katastro-fu prouzrokujući ono što je u suštini “politička” kriza, a što potencijalno ima vrlo negativan uticaj na poziciju SAD u svjetskom sistemu.

Prevara Parmalata, osme najveće industrijske grupe u Italiji, ima mnogo sličnosti, ali i razlika sa Ponci igrom. Poncijeva šema je funkcionisala iz centralne službe koja se sastojala od dvije prostorije, sa 12 službenika. Parmalat je multinacional-na multimilijarderska kompanija koja je listirana na Berzi u Milanu, sa preko 250 kompanija širom svijeta i 36000 za-poslenih. Prevara Poncija je trajala 9 mjeseci prije nego što je otkrivena, a Parmalata više od 10 godina, što je posebno

čudno iz razloga postojanja korporativnog upravljanja, izv-ještavanja, regulativa, revizija itd. Šema Poncija je bila visoko rizična, finansijska, bez pozadine u aktivi. Parmalat je fun-kcionisala u tradicionalnom sektoru proizvodnje i prodaje realnih roba, sa niskim rizikom.

Izgleda da je ovaj slučaj značio veći gubitak za američke nego za italijanske investitore, odnosno da je ovo bila više američka i međunarodna afera. Većina od 85000 vlasnika bili su iz SAD, a 80 procenata obveznica plasirale su među-narodne banke. Obrazlažući aferu Parmalat, Tabasso je su-gerisao da je izbjegnuto 9 nivoa kontrole: administratore, interne i eksterne revizore, berzanske regulatore i berzu, banke, Banku Italije, finansijske analitičare i rejting kom-panije. Primarni revizor je bio Deloitte, a najveći propust je bio upravo kod spoljnog revizora. “Problem” je bio i u koordinaciji i kontroli između Deloitte-a i drugog revizora - Grant Thorton-a. Paradoks je u jednom periodu bio u vi-sokoj likvidnosti u prisustvu velikog duga.

Neke banke, najaktivnije u plasmanu obveznica, imale su bliske i stalne odnose sa menadžmentom. Takođe, pomagale su sprovođenje složenog pozajmljivanja među kompanijama (back-to-back financing) na Kajmanskim ostrvima. Postoji dokaz da su banke bile upoznate sa slučajem, uz previsoko zaračunavanje provizija i “nametanje nekih neobičnih stavki u ugovorima koje na prvi pogled nisu imale smisla, ili zara-čunavanje penala kompaniji”. Problem kod banaka je, prema Tabbaso-u, bio u velikom konfliktu interesa između “inves-ticione i komercijalne ruke univerzalne banke”. Investiciona ruka je emitovala obveznice, a komercijalna ih prodavala i potom prikupljala prihode. Dvije strukture su formalno odvojene, ali se postavlja pitanje ko imenuje menadžere i ko odlučuje o budžetu ako ne holding kompanija.

Hough (2001) je analizirao debakl Ponci igre na prim-jeru Rusije tokom ’90-ih, u kojoj je konačni kolaps ubrzan azijskom monetarnom krizom i padom cijena nafte. Prije toga, Rusija se 1997. počela suočavati sa finansijskom krizom kao rezultat njenog “raskalašnog zaduživanja”. Obveznice su bile Ponci šema dizajnirana za plaćanje kamate na stari dug. Rusija tada nije imala “bazu održivog prihoda”, prikuplja- nje poreza bilo je blizu kolapsa, a ruski opštinski dug izgle-da da nije bio dovoljno kolateralizovan. Prisutna je bila za-padna žurba za kupovinom ruskih državnih i nedržavnih obveznica, uz izraženu očiglednu sumnju koja se odnosila na solventnost same vlade.

Uprkos rastu cijena nafte sa pomacima u prihodima ener-getskog sektora i rasta bruto domaćeg proizvoda, objavljeni rast industrijske proizvodnje bio je nizak, i ruska ekonomija je u proljeće 1999. patila od starih boljki. Realne promjene u jesen 1998. značile su kraj očekivanja inostranih zajmova ili investicija. Debate oko pomoći MMF-a bile su usmjere-ne na zajmove koji nikad nisu napustili Washington, već su bili iskorišćeni da se izvrši rol-over starih zajmova MMF-a. Skandal oko ruskog toka novca preko američkih banaka ugrozio je čak i ovu pomoć.

Ponci šema funkcioniše kada je priliv novca veći od isplata novca (kamata). U suprotnom, dakle, debakl je neizbježan. U svijetu panike, kakav je sve češće na sceni, kada panika počne svaki investitor racionalno želi da pobjegne prije drugih. Izlazak iz šeme sa visokim kamatnim primanjima po principu “prvi ulazak, prvi izlazak”, rezervisan je samo za one sa dobrim osjećajem napuštanja igre ili, češće, bolje


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tes, but he was certain of the conclusion. Ponzi` s game gave rise to Ponzi` s brand, even though it did not last long in this specific case. There was not enough coupons in the world for a person who wished to make a million dollars, much less for few millions. It took Charles, who grew from a dishwasher and a waiter into the financial legend, addi-tional five minutes to grasp the final outcome. The end of Ponzi` s game is inevitable bankruptcy and major losses for investors if the game is not stopped earlier. In addition, political effect of the financial investors` panic may raise another concern.

Investors around the globe are involved in all kinds of fi-nancial speculations, or to be more precise manipulations. Rise in OPEC oil prices in the seventies resulted in global accumulations which were used (recycled) as loans to the Third World countries. Wallerstein (1998) pointed out that these loans ultimately exhausted (impoverished) borro-wers, but they also globally retained income in the central zone. This fraud (the first game) continued with the second Ponzi` s game which was a combination of indebtedness of the USA government in the eighties (Reagan` s Military Keynesianism) and private capitalists (junk bonds), until the game was over with the so-called USA deficit crisis. The third Ponzi game in the nineties was based on inflows of global capital through the short-terms indebtedness in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia.

Strongly supported by the USA government, the IMF of-fered solution to the debt crisis from the beginning of the eighties. The recommendation was for the governments in crisis to practice combination of fiscal seriousness and the broadest opening of the market for investors. Henry Kissinger expressed concern over such IMF recommenda-tions that completely incapacitate local banking system in the countries without social security network, they repre-sent disaster provoking what is essentially a political crisis which potentially exerts quite adverse effect on the position of the USA in global system.

The fraud of Paramalat, the eight biggest industrial group in Italy, is much similar to Ponzi` s game, but it also dif-fers. Ponzi` s scheme operated from the central service that consisted of two rooms with 12 employees. Paramalat is a multinational multibillion company listed on Milan Stock Exchange, which has over 250 companies world wide and employs 360.000 people. Ponzi` s fraud lasted nine months before it was discovered, while that of Paramalat took more that 10 years which is quite strange as there were corpora-te governance, reporting, regulations, audits etc. Ponzi` s scheme was highly risky, financial one, without assets in the background. Paramalat operated with low risk in traditional sector of production and sale of real goods.

It seems that this case caused more damage to American than Italian investors, and that this was more of an American and international affair. The majority of 85.000 owners were from the USA, while 80% of bonds were issued by internati-onal banks. Tabasso explained the Paramalat affair suggesting that 9 levels of control had been avoided: administrators, in-ternal and external auditors, stock exchange regulators and stock exchange, banks, the Bank of Italy, financial analysts and rating of the company. Primary auditor was Deloitte, and the major mistake was made by external auditor. The problem was the coordination and control between Deloitte

and another auditor - Grant Thorton. The paradox at one moment was presence of large debt during high liquidity.

Some banks, that were the most active ones in issuance of bonds, closely and permanently worked with the mana-gement. They also supported complex inter-company len-ding (back-to-back lending) on the Cayman Islands. There is evidence that banks were familiar with the case, with way too high calculation of commissions and imposing of some unusual provisions in the contracts which at the first sight made no sense, or calculation of penalties to the companies. According to Tobasso, the problem of the banks was the conflict of interest between the investment and commer-cial hand of universal bank. Investment hand issued bonds, while commercial one sold them and collected revenue af-terwards. The two structures were formally separated, but the question was who appointed managers and decided on the budget if it was not the holding company.

Hough (2001) analyzed the collapse of Ponzi` s game on the example of Russia during the nineties when ultimate col-lapse was accelerated by Asian monetary crisis and drop in oil prices. Earlier, Russia was facing financial crisis in 1997 caused by its exaggerated indebtedness. Bonds were Ponzi scheme designed for payment of interests to old debt. At the time Russia did not have the base of sustainable income, tax collection was nearing the collapse, while Russian municipal debt apparently was not sufficiently collateralized. The West hurried to buy Russian public and private bonds obviously distrusting the solvency of the government itself.

Despite the rise in oil prices with increase in revenues from the energy sector and growth of gross domestic pro-duct, the official growth of industrial production was low and Russian economy suffered old wounds in spring 1999. Actual changes in autumn 1998 marked the end of expectations of international loans and investments. Debates over IMF as-sistance were focused on loans that never left Washington, but instead were used for roll-over of old IMF loans. The scandal over Russian cash flow through the American banks threatened even this assistance.

Ponzi scheme works if money inflow exceeds money dis-bursement (interests). Otherwise, collapse is inevitable. In the world of panic, which becomes more frequent, each in-vestor driven by panic naturally wants to escape before the others. Exit from the scheme with high interest revenues on the principle first come, first go is reserved only for those with good feeling to quit the game or, which is more often the case, those who are better informed. It seems that Ponzi` s scheme in modern banking systems represented a quality mechanism for acquisition of enormous gain even though the ultimate result was collapse of one or more banks and other financial institutions.

overview oF the cauSe oF the banking criSiSSerious approach to the essence (actual causes) of the banking and generally financial crisis requires consequent analytical approach – sustainable methodology, consistent analysts and certain time flow. Superficial and groundless analyses of the said topics (issues) may appear to be effective, but they do not substantially benefit the general public, bankers and re-gulators. For example, despite almost an instant look at the negative role of the hedge funds in 1997 Asian crisis, which really was the case in earlier crises during the nineties, the



informisane. Izgleda da je u savremenim bankarskim uslo-vima Ponci šema predstavljala kvalitetan mehanizam za sti-canje enormne koristi iako je krajnji rezultat kolaps jedne ili više banaka i drugih finansijskih institucija.

oSvrt na uzrok bankarSkih krizaOzbiljan pristup suštini (stvarnim uzrocima) bankarske i uopšte finansijske krize zahtijeva konsekventan analitički pristup - održivu metodologiju, dosljedne analitičare i izv-jestan vremenski protok. Površne i neutemeljene analize pomenute tematike (problematike) mogu izgledati efekt-no, ali nisu od posebne koristi opštoj javnosti, bankarima i regulatorima. Na primjer, uprkos gotovo trenutnom pog-ledu na negativnu ulogu hedž fondova u azijskoj krizi 1997, što je zaista bio slučaj u ranijim krizama tokom ’90-ih, na-knadna validna analiza Brawn, Goetzmann i Park-a (1998) dovela je do zaključka da ne postoji empirijski dokaz koji podržava hipotezu da je Soroš ili bilo koji drugi menadžer hedž fonda bio odgovoran za krizu. Njihova studija suge-riše da globalna tržišta mogu da apsorbuju dolarske pozi-cije od više milijardi koje su postavljene na glavne valutne fondove, i to bez loših posljedica ili efekata.

Kao što se finansijske krize najčešće ne mogu predvidje-ti, tako se ne može kratkoročno ukazati na precizne uzroke šokova ili debalansa. Bankarske krize, sistemske ili pojedi-načne, predstavljale su i predstavljaće nezaobilazan segment bankarskog poslovanja i u razvijenim i u manje razvijenim finansijskim sistemima. Naizmjenična kretanja višeslojnih regulacija, neadekvatnog regulativnog instrumentarijuma ili deregulativnih “podsticaja” do nedavno su u značajnoj mjeri bila povezana sa propastima banaka, katkad finansijskih gi-ganata poput BCCI, Bearings-a ili nekog od najnovijih slu-čaja - Bear Stearns ili Merrill Lynch. Za kvalitetne analitičke okvire bilo kog segmenta finansijske krize (propasti) često su bile neophodne godine (ili decenije) do postizanja pot-punog konsenzusa relevantnih empirijskih analiza.

Opstanak banaka, pogotovo mega banaka iza kojih se nerijetko provlače i društveni (nacionalni), usko politički ili lobistički interesi, nezaobilazno nameće svakodnevno iz-laganje riziku ulaženjem i u visoko špekulativne aktivnosti obuhvatajući, pogotovo u posljednje vrijeme, i zasebne seg-

mente poput industrije hedž fondova. Posmatran kao širok spektar izlaganjima, rizik je konstanta i ne može se izbjeći, ali se mogu primijeniti odbrambene strategije i finansijske transakcije. Operacionisanje znači i mogućnost greške koja može biti korigovana relativno lako ili, pak, imati katastro-fične posljedice. S tim u vezi, osvrnimo se na nekoliko prim-jera iz dalje ili bliže prošlosti.

Velika kontrakcija (kriza) 1929-33. značila je preoblikovanje vladajućeg svjetskog sistema - liberalnog kapitalizma u dr-žavni kapitalizam, koji je i danas sa varijacijama na sceni, sa tada drastičnim političkim reperkusijama. Libertarijanizam je danas odstranjen iz razvijenih ekonomskih sistema, ali je zato bizarno i uspješno plasiran kao jedino spasenje u manje razvijenim zemljama. Liberalizam, neoliberalizam, liberta-rijanstvo i sl, sami po sebi nisu više uzrok bankarskih kriza. Svaka pojedinačna bankarska kriza ili propast banke slučaj je za sebe, gdje pojedinac predstavlja samo kariku u lancu pogrešne akcije, koordinacije ili kontrole. Uzroci ove kri-ze su trebali da budu dobra lekcija današnjim bankarima, uključujući svakako i centralne bankare.

Iako se odigrala prije gotovo osam decenija, konsenzus o stvarnim uzrocima Velike (ekonomske) krize definitiv-no je postignut tek u posljednjih deset do petnaest godina, polazeći naravno od prominentnih analitičara kao što su Friedman, Bordo, Blanchard. Sve ono što se dešavalo nakon 1932. pokazuje opravdan stav da je krizu najlakše izliječiti ukoliko su vrlo brzo poznati neposredni uzroci, što je sva-kako lako saopštiti. Sadašnji konsenzus je da je kontrakcija bila prouzrokovana monetarnim pritiscima u SAD. Naime, Fed su početkom 1928. otpočele sa čvršćom (restriktivnom) monetarnom politikom sa ciljem obuzdavanja buma na ber-zi, koji je počeo 1926.

Doktrina se zasnivala na zabrani bankarskog kreditiranja za svrhe finansiranja špekulativnih aktivnosti. Restriktivna politika je ubrzala recesiju u avgustu i slom na berzi u oktobru 1929. Prevođenje ozbiljne recesije u SAD u tim godinama u Veliku krizu generalno se pripisuje serijama bankarskih pa-nika u oktobru 1930, koje nisu bile praćene ekspanzivnom monetarnom politikom. Uz takvu politiku, kompenzira-li bi se efekti bankarske panike na ponudu novca, a velika kriza bi se mogla izbjeći. Povećane kupovine na otvorenom tržištu od jedne milijarde dolara uspjele su privremeno da stimulišu ekonomiju. Oporavak je potom oslabljen drugim politikama Ruzveltove administracije.

Najveći bankarski skandal je slučaj Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), jedan od 25 najvećih fi-nansijskih giganata na svijetu, koji je doveo do zaokupljanja pažnje javnosti na pranje novca. U djelokrugu poslova ove banke vezanog za pranje novca bilo je i krijumčarenje oruž-jem, terorističke aktivnosti, prodaja nuklearne tehnologije, nezakonita kupovina banaka i nekretnina, poreska evazija, ilegalna imigracija, multimilionska dolarska korupcija, za-strašivanje svjedoka ubistvom, prostitucija, a u nekim slu-čajevima cjelokupna slika nikad neće biti prikazana. Niko nije dugo mogao, a vjerovatno ni sada, da objasni gubitke i enormne diskrepance na računima. Dugo je vladala mis-terija zašto ova banka nije propala ranije.

Banka je brzo i stalno gubila novac od kreditnih operacija, trgovanja sa stranim valutama, svojih depozitnih računa, a bila je i omiljena banka peračima novca i teroristima. Price Waterhouse je 1988. dostavio Bank of England 10 izvješta-


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subsequent valid analysis of Brown, Goetzmann and Park (1998) led to the conclusion that there was no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that Soros or any other manager of the hedge fund were responsible for the crisis. Their study suggests that global market may absorb multi-billion dollar positions arranged by major currency funds without producing any bad consequences or effects.

As financial crises most often may not be anticipated, it is not possible to indicate on short-term the precise causes of shocks and imbalances. Banking crises, both systematic and individual, represented and will continue to represent inevitable segment of bank operations in developed and less developed financial systems. Occasional movements of multilayer regulations, inadequate regulatory instrumen-tation or deregulatory incentives have until recently been significantly connected with the collapses of banks, some-times even financial giants such as BCCI, Bearings or some of the most recent cases – Bear Stearns or Merrill Lynch. It took years (or decades) to reach full consensus of relevant empirical studies for quality analytical frameworks of any segment of the financial crisis (collapse).

Survival of banks, particularly giant banks which often represent social (national), strictly political and lobby-ist interests, inevitably imposes daily exposure to the risk caused by undertaking highly speculative activities inclu-ding, particularly recently, special segments such as hedge funds industry. Seen as a broad specter to exposures, risk is a constant that may not be avoided, but defense strate-gies and financial transactions may be imposed. Operating means the possibility to commit error that may be rectified relatively easily or, on the other hand, produce disastrous consequences. In relation to that, let` s take a look at few examples from near and distant past.

The Great Contraction (crisis) 1929-33: meant reshaping of the ruling world system - liberal capitalism into state capita-lism which is present on today` s stage with variations, with drastic political repercussions at the time. Libertarianism is today eliminated from developed economic systems, but is bizarrely and successfully placed as the only salvation in underdeveloped countries. Liberalism, neoliberalism, liber-tarianism and the like do not cause crises any longer. Each individual banking crisis or bank collapse is a case for itself where individual represents only one clog in the chain of wrong action, coordination and control. Reasons for this crisis should be a good lesson to bankers nowadays, inclu-ding central bankers as well.

Even though it took place eight decades ago, the con-sensus on actual causes of the Great (economic) Crisis was definitely reached only in previous ten to fifteen years, na-turally starting from prominent analysts such as Friedman, Bordo, Blanchard. All developments after 1932 show justified position that a crisis is best healed if direct causes of it are very soon discovered which is certainly easy to communi-cate. Current consensus is that the contraction was caused by monetary pressures in the USA. Namely, at the begin-ning of 1932 the FED introduced tighter (more restrictive) monetary policy aiming at restricting the stock exchange boom that began in 1926.

The doctrine was based on the prohibition of bank len-ding for the purpose of financing speculative activities. Restrictive policy accelerated recession in August and the

collapse of stock exchange in October 1929. Transition from serious recession in the USA in those years to the Great Crisis is generally assigned to a series of bank pa-nics in October 1930 which were not followed by expansi-ve monetary policy. Such policy would compensate effects of bank panic on the money supply and great crisis might have been avoided. Increased purchase at the open market worth 1 billion dollars succeeded in temporary stimulation of economy. Recovery was then weakened by other policies of Roosevelt` s administration.

The largest bank related scandal is the case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), one of 25 largest financial giants in the world, which drew attention of the public to money laundering. The scope of activities of the bank included, in addition to money laundering, smuggling in weapons, terrorist activities, sale of nuclear technology, illegal purchase of banks and properties, tax evasion, illegal migration, multimillion dollar corruption, frightening witnesses by murder, prostitution, and in some cases complete situation will not be revealed. For a long time, and even today, no one could explain losses and enormous discrepancies in accounts. It was mysterious for a long time why this bank had not collapsed earlier.

The Bank was rapidly and continuously losing money from loan operations, trade in foreign currencies, its deposit ac-counts, being also the favourite bank of money launderers and terrorists. The Price Waterhouse submitted 10 reports to the Bank of England in 1988, of which the two revealed a broad range of BCCI frauds – unconventional structures of banks (off-shore everywhere). The Central Bank under-took no actions (investigation), but participated in closing down of the BCCI as late as in 1991. Negative net value was initially estimated at 7 billion sterling pounds, with 12 bil-lion of estimated loss and other crashes. Even 28 local aut-horities in Great Britain who saved their funds in this Bank were also at a loss. BCCI applied several specific techniques to hide its losses. The BCCI assets valued at 20 billion dol-lars remained a mystery.

Mark Zepezauer` s book The CIA` s Greatest Hits po-ints out that BCCI`s important predecessor was the Nugan Hand Bank. This bank helped CIA to overthrow Australian government which they did not like, and to finance opera-tions of the Agency in Angola and Middle East. Profit ge-nerated from drug and trade in weapon over the last years of war in Vietnam served to capitalize the Bank whose bo-ard was influenced by a former CIA Director, Mr. William Colby. When the Bank of Australia closed down this bank in 1977, Nugan “committed suicide”, while Hand “was mis-sing” with billions of funds of depositors.

One of the BCCI employees claimed that it was well known that the bank was not Pakistani and that CIA (i.e. Director Mr. Richard Helms) started the bank. The BCCI was at a disposal to the gangster governments, cartels, mo-ney launderers, smugglers of weapon and drugs. The Bank was considered to be a mechanism for money laundering of the Agency and “mother and father” of financing terrorist operations. According to Zepezauer, the BCCI facilitated many CIA secret operations, and in particular endeavors of George W. Bush to deliver weapons to Sadam Hussein` s Iraq or Edwin Wilson to arm Libya “without authorisation” to do so. Directors of the Bank ensured that any investigation



ja, od kojih su dva ukazala na široku skalu prevara BCCI - nekonvencionalno strukturisane banke (“svuda ofšor”). Centralna banka nije preduzela bilo kakvu akciju (istragu), ali je učestvovala u zatvaranju BCCI tek 1991. Negativna neto vrijednost inicijalno je procijenjena na 7 milijardi funti ster-linga, uz procijenjene gubitke od 12 milijardi i dalje lomo-ve. Među gubitnicima je bilo i 28 lokalnih vlasti u Velikoj Britaniji koji su držali sredstva u ovoj banci. BCCI je koristila nekoliko specifičnih tehnika da sakrije svoje gubitke. Ostalo je neobjašnjivo oko 20 milijardi dolara aktive BCCI.

U knjizi “ The CIA’s Greatest Hits” Marka Zepezauera ukazuje se da je važan prethodnik BCCI bila Nugan Hand Bank. Ova banka je pomogla da CIA sruši vladu u Australiji koja joj nije bila po volji, odnosno da se finansiraju opera-cije Agencije u Angoli i Srednjem Istoku. Dobit od droge i trgovine oružjem u posljednjim godinama rata u Vijetnamu služila je za kapitalizovanje banke, čiji je odbor bio pod uticajem bivšeg direktora CIA William Colby-a. Kada je Banka Australije zatvorila ovu banku 1977, Nugan je “izvr-šio samoubistvo”, a Hand “nestao” sa milijardama sredsta-va deponenata.

Jedan od službenika BCCI je tvrdio da je bilo poznato da ova banka ni najmanje nije bila pakistanska već da je CIA (odnosno Direktor Richard Helms) pokrenula banku. BCCI je bila dostupna gangsterskim vladama, kartelima, peračima novca, trgovcima oružjem ili drogama. Banku su zvali sredstvom za pranje novca Agencije i “majkom i ocem” finansirajućih operacija terorista. BCCI je, prema Zepezaueru, olakšavala mnoge tajne operacije CIA, a po-sebno nastojanja George H.W. Bush-a da dostavi oružje Iraku Saddam Hussein-a ili, pak, Edwin Wilson-a da “ne-ovlašćeno” naoružava Libiju. Direktori banke su omogućili da bilo kakva istraga protiv visokih političara SAD iz obje partije bude bezvrijedna. Takođe, lobisti koji su bili pove-zani sa Agencijom bili su angažovani na miniranju bilo kakvog istraživanja.

Pojedini autori (Sirota i Baskin) ukazuju da administra-cija Reagan-a nije preduzela istragu nakon što je CIA po-slala izvještaje ministarstvima finansija, trgovine i spoljnih poslova, u kojima je opisana uloga BCCI u pranju novca od droge i drugim nelegalnim aktivnostima. Isplate Agencije Noriegi, koji je bio šef panamske vojne tajne službe od 1968, agent CIA, tj. saradnik Džordža Buša, nakon izvjesnog vre-menskog protoka nastavljene su 1981. kada je Regan zau-zeo svoju poziciju. CIA je deponovala novac Noriegi, di-leru drogama, na račun kod BCCI. Noriega je deponovao 33 miliona dolara na račun ogranka BCCI u Panami pod imenom Panamske odbrambene snage (Panamian Defense Forces). Britanska služba MI5 otkrila je da je u Londonu, u ogranku BCCI, teroristička grupa Abu Nidal imala račune u Sloane Street-u.

Predsjednik BCCI Agha Hassan Abedi, pakistanski bankar koji je 1972. zvanično osnovao banku, navodno je zamislio banku kao mašinu sa dva vodeća mehanizma: rast aktive i vjera (“poštenje”). Ključna komponenta strategije rasta ak-tive bila je podmićivanje. Banka je praktično još 1977. bila nesolventna koristeći novac od depozita za finansiranje operativnih troškova i otplatu ranijih deponenata, umjes-to za obavljanje investicija (zajmovi ili druga finansiranja), što je poprimilo karakteristike Ponci šeme. Stvorena je pi-ramida “insceniranja” obaveza koja će neizbježno i konačno

rezultirati kolapsom BCCI. Banka vjerovatno nikada i nije bila solventna, nikada nije imala značajnu bazu kapitala. To banci nije smetalo da se širi krajem 70-ih, uključujući tržišta Afrike, a potom i Azije početkom 80-ih. Dobila je i licencu za djelovanje u Kineskoj specijalnoj ekonomskoj zoni Shenzhen, gdje su neke od najvećih kineskih banaka bile deponenti BCCI.

Globalna strategija je uključivala i globalno podmići-vanje. Među poznatim ličnostima koje su imale značajne kontakte sa BCCI pominju se i Predsjednik SAD Jimmy Carter, Direktor budžeta Bert Lance, Jesse Jackson, britan-ski Premijer James Callahan, Generalni sekretar UN Perez de Kueller, porodica Indire Ghandi, Mugabe, predsjednici, premijeri i zvaničnici centralnih banaka više zemalja. Osama Bin Laden je bio među onima sa računima u banci, a njego-va finansijska mreža je slična mreži koju je BCCI izgradio u ’80-im. BCCI je bila povezana i sa najvećom italijanskom bankom Banco Nationale del Lavoro, čiji je ogranak u Atlanti bio dio šeme za obezbjeđenje četiri milijarde dolara lažnih zajmova kojima se olakšala ilegalna prodaja oružja vladi u Iraku. Za operacije CIA korišćena je First American, filijala BCCI koja je navodno tajno držana u SAD.

Prema relevantnim izvještajima iz SAD, Bank of England nije imala adekvatan regulatorni okvir u slučaju BCCI kako bi zaštitila deponente i kreditore. Takođe, Banka Engleske je zadržala informacije o prevarama BCCI od javnosti 14 mjeseci prije zatvaranja banke. Tvrdi se i da je akcija Banke Engleske osujetila otvaranje pune istrage Federalnih rezervi oko osam mjeseci. Odluka Bank of England iz aprila 1990. kojom se dozvoljava premještanje sjedišta, službenika i do-kumentacije van britanske jurisdikcije u Abu Dhabi imala je značajne negativne posljedice za opsežnu istragu.

Nakon podnošenja tužbe protiv revizora banke Price Waterhouse i Ernst&Young i glavnog akcionara Emira Abu Dhabi-a, 6500 kreditora BCCI podnijelo je tužbu vrijednu 850 miliona funti (1,5 milijardi dolara) protiv regulatornog tijela - Bank of England, prvu protiv 311 godina stare central-ne banke. Sudski postupak je zbog imuniteta Banke uslijedio početkom 2004, ali su likvidatori - Deloitte&Touche krajem 2005. obustavili bilo kakvu akciju protiv banke. Smatralo se da proces više nije u interesu kreditora nakon sugestije Vrhovnog suda (High Court). Očekivao se povraćaj, prema nekim podacima, od 6 milijardi dolara (81%) kreditorima.

Veliki hedž fond Long - Term Capital Management je pro-pao 1997, a na stvarne uzroke su ukazale brojne kvalitetne studije čiji su autori bili Edvards, Global Financial Stability Reports (IMF), Shirreff, Furfine ili Jorion (2000. godine do-bio nagradu za analizu). Špekulativni karakter bankarskog poslovanja se sve više dovodi u vezu sa strategijama hedž fondova. Mnoge velike banke, uključujući i Citigroup, fa-vorizuju ekspertizu hedž fonda u grupi. Pokazuje se da su inicijalne prednosti investicionih banaka u odnosu na hedž fondove, a koje se odnose na diversifikovanost bankarskih portfolija, prirodnu zaštitu (hedž) u odnosu na povećanu volatilnost ili pristup svježim sredstvima, u kriznim situaci-jama fiktivne ili čak prelaze u svoju suprotnost.

Investiciona strategija LTCM-a je značila nediversifikova-ne i visoko leveridžovane opklade na pojedine suptilne rizi-ke. Neke od pomenutih analiza su pokazale da je VAR mo-del upravljanja rizikom značajno doprinio slomu LTCM-a. Desetodnevni period - horizont za determinisanje mini-


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launched against the USA high politicians from both par-ties was worthless. In addition, lobbyists working with the Agency were engaged on discouraging such investigation.

Some authors (Sirota and Baskin) suggest that Reagan’s ad-ministration did not launch investigation after CIA submitted reports to the ministries of finance, trade and foreign affairs, which described the role of the BCCI in laundering money earned from drugs and other illegal activities. Payments that the Agency made to Noriega, Chief of the Panama Military Secret Service since 1968, CIA agent and Bush` s associate continued after some time elapsed in 1981 when Reagan as-sumed his position. The CIA deposited money to Noriega, drug dealer, into the BCCI bank account. Noriega deposited around 33 million dollars into the bank account of the BCCI branch office in Panama under the name Panama Defence Forces. British service MI5 discovered that a terrorist group Abu Nidal had opened bank accounts in the BCCI branch office in London, in the Sloane Street.

President of the BCCI Agha Hasan Abedi, Pakistani banker who officially founded the Bank in 1972, allegedly imagined the Bank to be a machine with two leading me-chanisms: growth in assets and confidence (respect). The key component of the assets growth strategy was a bribe. Back in 1977 the Bank practically was insolvent using the deposit money to finance operational costs and repayment of earlier depositors, instead of investing (loans and other investments) which took the form of Ponzi scheme. The imaginary pyramid of commitments was created which inevitably and ultimately resulted in collapse of the BCCI. The Bank had probably never been solvent, it never had a substantial capital base. That did not prevent the Bank from expanding at the end of the seventies, including markets in Africa, and then Asia at the inception of the eighties. It was granted operational licence in Chinese special economic zone Shenzhen where some of the major Chinese banks were the BCCI ` s depositors.

Global strategy also included global bribe. Some of fa-mous persons who had significant contacts with the BCCI were allegedly the USA President Jimmy Carter, Director of the budget Bert Lance, Jesse Jackson, British Prime Minister James Callahan, UN Secretary General Perez de Kueller, Indira Ghandi` s family, Mugabe, presidents, Prime Ministers and officials of the Central Banks of several countries. Osama Bin Laden was among holders of the bank account, while his financial network resembles that created by the BCCI in the eighties. The BCCI was also connected with the biggest Italian bank Banco Nationale del Lavoro, whose branch of-fice in Atlanta was part of the scheme for provision of four billion dollars of fake loans which facilitated illegal sale of weapons to the government in Iraq. The First American, the BCCI branch office which was allegedly kept secret in the USA, was used for CIA operations.

According to the relevant reports from the USA, the Bank of England did not have an adequate regulatory framework in the BCCI case to protect depositors and lenders. In addi-tion, the Bank of England kept information about the BCCI frauds from the public 14 months before the Bank was closed down. Allegedly, action of the Bank of England obstructed launching of complete investigation of the Federal Reserves around 8 months. Decision of the Bank of England from April 1990 to allow movement of the headquarters, staff

and documents outside British jurisdiction, to Abu Dhabi, produced substantial adverse consequences on comprehen-sive investigation.

After filing lawsuit against the Bank auditors, Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young and major shareholder Emir of Abu Dhabi, 6.500 creditors of the BCCI filed a 850 million (1.5 billion dollar) worth lawsuit against the regu-latory body-the Bank of England, the first lawsuit ever fi-led against 311 old central bank. The court proceedings took place in 2004 because of the Bank immunity, but liquidators – Deloitte & Touche suspended all actions against the Bank at the end of 2005. It was believed that the process was not in the interests of creditors after suggestion provided by the High Court. It was expected that, according to some data, 6 billion dollars (81%) would be returned to the creditors.

Large hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management collap-sed in 1997, while actual causes were indicated in numerous quality studies whose authors were Edvards, Global Financial Stability Reports (IMF), Shirreff, Furfine or Jorion (who re-ceived award for the analysis in 2000). Speculative nature of bank operations is increasingly linked with the hedge funds strategy. Many large banks, including the Citigroup, are in favor of expertise of hedge fund in the group. It is suggested that initial advantages of investment banks in comparison to hedge funds in terms of diversification of bank portfolios, natural protection (hedge) in relation to increased volatili-ty or access to fresh funds are imaginary in crisis situation or even become the opposite.

LTCM` s investment strategy meant non-diversified and highly leveraged bets on certain subtle risks. Some of the abo-ve mentioned analyses revealed that VAR risk management model significantly contributed to the collapse of LCTM.

Ten day period - horizon for determination of the minimum level of capital for the Basel Committee commercial bank was not suitable for LCTM. In case of this fund, horizon was supposed to correspond to the period necessary for the inc-rease of additional assets which was not simple thing to do. Needs for capital were roughly underestimated.

Enormous sizes of positions (particularly derivative con-tracts) prevented fast reduction of risk exposure, while it was impossible to attract new investors. Implemented strategies of the fund were fundamentally dangerous (risky). Collapse was inevitable. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York un-dertook unprecedented measures ever to save private hed-ge fund LCTM, while actions aimed at saving a complete liquidation of positions, that is formal bankruptcy. It was pointed out that consequences would be direct threat to the solvency of some major banks and broker companies, while credit crunch would loom and threaten the USA economy and possibly deteriorate the deflation problem in Asia.

Collapse of the Barings Bank is an obvious example of how to blame one man (merchant Nick Leeson) for a com-plete collapse of the financial institution, despite (or may-be not) written credit policies, hedging strategies, internal controls and the like. However, the lack of adequate control



malnog nivoa kapitala za komercijalnu banku Bazelskog Komiteta, nije bio odgovarajući za LTCM. U slučaju ovog fonda, horizont je trebalo da odgovara periodu koji je po-treban da se povećaju dodatna sredstva, što nije bilo jedno-stavno. Grubo su potcijenjene potrebe za kapitalom.

Enormne veličine pozicija (posebno derivativni ugovo-ri) nisu dozvolile brzo smanjenje izlaganja riziku, a nije bilo moguće privući nove investitore. Primijenjene strategije fon-da bile su fundamentalno opasne (rizične). Debakl je bio neizbježan. Federal Reserve Bank of New York preduzela je do tada bez presedana korake radi spašavanja privatnog hedž fonda LTCM, a akcije su bile usmjerene ka spašavanju kompletne likvidacije pozicija, odnosno formalnog bankrot-stva. Naglašeno je da bi posljedice bile direktno ugrožava-nje solventnosti nekih glavnih banaka i brokerskih kuća, uz opasnost kreditne krize koja bi ugrozila ekonomiju SAD i eventualno pogoršala problem deflacije u Aziji.

Krah Barings banke je očit primjer usmjeravanja krivice za sveukupni slom finansijske institucije na jednog čovje-ka (trgovca Nick Leson-a), uprkos (ili možda ne) pisanim

kreditnim politikama, hedžing strategijama, internim kon-trolama i slično. Ipak, nedostatak adekvatnog kontrolnog sistema za nadgledanje i upravljanje aktivnostima trgovanja konačno su dokrajčili Berings. U slučaju ove banke, regu-latorni i supervizorski okvir i okvir korporativnog uprav-ljanja u potpunosti su izostali. Ključni problem odnosio se i na loše menadžere koji nisu preuzeli odgovornost za uspostavljanje sistema i postupaka koji bi spriječili bankrot Beringsa. Trebalo bi svakako napomenuti da je Centralna banka Engleske bila isključivo odgovorna za superviziju cjelokupnog Beringsa.

Berings u Londonu je smatrao da je Lison ostvarivao pro-fite od arbitraže, mada su se gubici akumulirali na računu 88888. Lison je tražio i dobijao dodatne fondove da bi na-stavio svoje trgovačke aktivnosti. Centrala u Londonu je transferisala ogromne iznose sredstava u Singapur, koja bi bila iskorišćena za poslove klijenata, a koja su se u stvari ko-ristila za obezbjeđenje (margine) - da pokriju pozicije opcija Lisona. Samo u prva dva mjeseca 1994, Barings Futures-u u Singapuru usmjereno je 569 miliona funti. Kumulirani gubici na računu iznosili su 384 miliona funti.

Detalji sa računa 88888 nisu prenošeni u London, a ra-čun je korišćen za unakrsnu trgovinu sa drugim računima Beringsa i da prikaže pogrešne dobiti na ovim računima. Time je Lison mogao da prikaže pozitivnu pozicionu izlože-nost, dok je u stvarnosti imao velike duge i kratke pozicije. Njegove pozicije na tržištima opcija bile su nezaštićene kako bi se maksimizirale njegove potencijalne dobiti. U stvari, zvanična politika trgovanja Lisona bila je zauzimanje kratke

pozicije na Nikkei 225 fjučerse na SIMEX-u (Singapur) da bi se zaštitile duge pozicije Beringsa na Osaka tržištu. Ipak, zauzeo je dugu poziciju na Nikkei 225 fjučerse, nije štitio ove pozicije, i izložio Berings značajnom riziku.

Trezor Beringsa nikada nije vršio reviziju računa 88888, koji je uredno opisivao stvarne profite i gubitke Lisona i na kojem su knjiženi veliki iznosi transakcija. Ovaj račun je bila sat bomba koja je eksplodirala u februaru 1995. i srušila Berings. Teško je prihvatiti činjenicu da je “Čovjek zvani mi-lijardu dolara” sam uništio banku, kao i da je, recimo, Societe Generale ostvarila enormni gubitak isključivim pogrešnim operacionisanjem jednog eksperta. Post festum analize su relativno brzo pokazale da su u ovoj banci napravljeni pro-pusti kod tri važna elementa pri upravljanju operativnim rizikom: kultura interne kontrole, tj. nadgledanje - super-vizija poštovanja pravila poslovanja (trgovanja); snažne IT kontrole pristupa (veća sigurnost i efikasnost); automatski procesi - tehnologije sa upozoravajućim indikatorima o bruto i neto limitima za trgovanje.

Snaga i vrijeDnoSt u bankarStvu - bankarSki brenDPovećani životni standard doveo je prethodnih godina do značajnog rasta broja i popularnosti brendova u bankarstvu, osiguranju i finansijskim uslugama. Sve veća potreba za lik-vidnim aktivama (gotovinskim novcem) je faktor koji je uti-cao na povećanje značaja bankarstva i finansijskog sektora. Vjerovatno je tačna tvrdnja da nema boljeg organizirajućeg principa za kompaniju od samog brenda. Efektivno uprav-ljanje brendom postalo je vrlo bitno za banke, a razlog može da bude konkurencija koja se isključivo zasnivala na cijeni, dok se sve manje prepoznavala konkurentna diferencijacija između banaka velike i srednje veličine.

Razlog je bio i širenje posla u nove proizvode i usluge, kao i očigledniji prekid tradicionalnog odvajanja bankar-stva od sektora osiguranja i upravljanja novcem (investicije). Svakako, banke su shvatile koliko su brendovi važni za kli-jente koji su postajali sve više sofisticirani. Brendovanje mora biti zasnovano na korporativnim vrijednostima i trebalo bi da bude iskorišćeno da se poboljša i održi privrženost klije-nata. Vrijednost brenda je opažanje klijenata o jedinstvenoj vrijednosti u odnosu na konkurente. Uspješno upravljanje vrijednošću brenda povećava akcijski kapital brenda. Dobro upravljanje brendom je, dakle, suštinsko za uključivanje svih stejkholdera kompanije u stvaranju vrijednosti.

Bankarski brendovi se mogu klasifikovati na: banke koje posluju sa stanovništvom, investicione banke, štedionice, hipotekarne banke, komercijalne banke i zadružne banke. Kada je u pitanju analiza vrijednosti vodećih bankarskih brendova, jedini javno raspoloživ listing je Brand Finance,


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system for supervision and management of merchant acti-vities ultimately finished the Barings. In case of this bank, regulatory and supervisory framework and corporate go-vernance framework completely failed. The key problem was in bad managers who refused to assume responsibility for establishment of the system and procedures that would prevent collapse of the Barings. It should certainly be men-tioned that the Central Bank of England was exclusively responsible for supervision of entire Barings.

The Barings in London believed that Leeson genera-ted profit from arbitrage, even though losses accumulated on the account 88888. Leeson sought and acquired addi-tional funds in order to continue his merchant activities. The headquarters in London transferred enormous funds to Singapore for clients` businesses, that was actually used for the provisions of collateral (margin) - to cover Leeson` s positions of options. Only in these two months in 1944, 569 million pounds were transferred to the Barings Futures in Singapore. Accumulated losses on the account amounted to 384 million pounds.

Details from the account 88888 were not transferred to London, while the account was used for cross merchandise with other Barings` accounts and statement of inaccurate profits on these accounts. Leeson was thus able to show po-sitive position exposure, while in reality he had large, long and short positions. His positions on markets of options were unprotected so as to maximize his potential profit. In fact, Leeson` s official trade policy was to assume short po-sition in Nikkea 225 futures on SIMEX (Singapore) so as to protect other positions of the Barings on Osaka market. However, he assumed another position on Nikkea 225 fu-tures, did not protect these positions exposing Barings to a significant risk.

Treasury of the Barings never conducted audit of the 88888 account which duly described Leeson` s actual pro-fits and losses and contained entries of enormous amounts of transactions. This account was a bomb that exploded in 1995 and tore Barings down. It is difficult to accept the fact that a man called one billion dollars destroyed the bank by himself, just line, for instance, Societe Generale incurred enormous loss due to wrong operation of one expert. Post festum analyses reveled pretty soon that three important elements of the operational risk management were neglec-ted in this bank: internal control culture, that is supervision – supervision of the observance of the rules of operations (trade), strong IT controls of access (greater security and efficiency), automatic processes-technologies with warning indicators of gross and net trading limits.

power anD value in banking-banking branDIncreased standard of living over the last years has resulted in significant growth in the number and popularity of brands in banking, insurance and financial services. Increasing need for liquid assets (cash) is a factor that influenced on increased importance of banking and financial sector. The claim that brand is the best organisational principle for a company is probably true. Effective brand management has become very important for banks, while reason for it may be a competition that builds exclusively on price, while com-petitive differentiation between medium and large banks was less obvious.

Another reason was expanding the business into new goods and services area and more obvious interruption of traditional separation of banking from insurance sector and money management (investments). Certainly, banks reali-zed how much brands were important for their increasingly sophisticated clients. Branding must be based upon corpo-rate values and used to enhance and sustain commitment of clients. Value of the brand is in clients` observation of unique value relative to competitors. Successful value ma-nagement of brand raises its equity capital.

Good brand management is therefore critical for invol-vement of all stakeholders of the company in creation of value.

Bank brands mat be classified as follows: retail banks, investment banks, savings banks, mortgage banks, com-mercial banks and cooperative banks. In terms of analysis of the value of leading banking brands, the only publicly available listing is Brand Finance, the leading British in-dependent brand valuation consultancy that “created the biggest 500 financial brands”. Methodology applied by the Brand Finance for calculation of value is complex, while the following is important:

1. There are three styles of brand architecture (with ad-vantages and disadvantages), that is degrees of bank diver-sity: monolithic - one brand, one name, one visible identity (HSBC), group (endorsed) – several brands, but with group name and group visual identity (Citigroup, Santander, JP Morgan, ABM Amro), pluralistic – several brands exist one next to another, without group name or group visual iden-tity (Royal Bank of Scotland, Halifax).

2. Private and investment companies are lot listed due to the lack of relevant financial data.

The methodology above applies discounted cash flow technique (DCF) for discounting of future royalties with appropriate discount rate so as to achieve net present va-

lue (NPV) of trade mark and related intellectual property: brand value. Brand rating, whose concept is similar to cre-dit rating, is calculated based on the Brand Beta analysis which is a benchmarking study of risk, power and future potential of brand relative to its competition set ranging from AAA to C.

Top brands of financial services worldwide were measu-red on the basis of the power and value of brand. Shortened table shows 15 top brands, with sums in million dollars. Market capitalization is dated at December 31st 2007. Brand rating is based on Brand Beta analysis. Ratings may differ by including the (+) and (-) symbols so as to show more detailed positioning.

RAtINg DeFINItIONAAA Extremely strongAA Very strongA StrongBBB AverageBB UnderperformingB WeakCCC Very weakCC Extremely weakC Failing

Table 1: Definitions of Brand Rating Source: Global 100 Banking Brand Index, 2006, page 27



vodeća britanska nezavisna firma za vrednovanje bren-da, koja je kreirala “Najvećih 500 finansijskih brendova”. Metodologija koju koristi Brand Finance za računanje vri-jednosti je složen, a ono što je pritom važno je:

1. Tri su stila brend arhitekture (sa prednostima i nedosta-cima), odnosno stepena diversiteta banke: monolitična - je-dan brend, jedno ime, jedan vidljivi identitet (HSBC); grupna (endorsed) - nekoliko brendova, ali uz grupno ime i grupni vizuelni identitet (Citigroup, Santander, JP Morgan, ABN Amro); pluralistička - nekoliko brendova postoje jedan do drugog, bez grupnog imena ili grupnog vizuelnog identi-teta (Royal Bank of Scotland, Halifax).

2. Privatne i investicione kompanije nisu listirane uslijed nepostojanja relevantnih finansijskih podataka.

Pomenuta metodologija koristi tehniku diskontovanog novčanog toka (DCF) za diskontovanje budućih dobiti (ro-yaltis), uz odgovarajuću diskontnu stopu, kako bi se dobila neto sadašnja vrijednost (NPV) tržišne marke i povezane intelektualne svojine: vrijednost brenda. Rejting brenda, koji je konceptualno sličan kreditnom rejtingu, je izraču-nat korišćenjem BrendBeta analize, koja niveliše snagu, ri-zik i budući potencijal brenda u odnosu na konkurenciju na skali rangiranja od AAA do C.

Vrhunski brendovi finansijskih usluga na svijetu mjereni su i prema snazi brenda i vrijednosti brenda. Skraćena ta-bela prikazuje 15 najvećih brendova, sa iznosima u milioni-

ma dolara. Tržišna kapitalizacija je datirana na 31/12/2007. Rejting brenda je zasnovan na analizi BrendBeta. Rejtinzi se mogu razlikovati uključivanjem oznaka (+) i (-) kako bi se pokazalo detaljnije pozicioniranje.

Kriza (sub-prime) u SAD i ekonomski rast Kine utica-li su da HSBC postane najsnažniji i najvredniji bankarski brend na svijetu, sa rejtingom brenda AAA i vrijednošću brenda od 35,456 miliona dolara, potiskujući Citibank na drugu poziciju. Uprkos činjenici da je bio pogođen krizom na sub-primarnom tržištu u 2007, sa gubicima od oko 3,4 milijarde dolara, HSBC je postao najveća svjetska i najpro-fitabilnija banka u mladim tržištima, najvredniji bankarski brend i u sektoru sa stanovništvom i korporativnom sek-toru, odnosno sveukupno.

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, koju je osnovao Thomas Sutherland, predstavlja jednog od promi-nenata svjetskih brendova u oblasti bankarstva, osiguranja i finansijskih usluga, očito pružajući izvanredne finansij-ske usluge klijentima. Ova “Svjetska lokalna banka” posje-duje preko 10.000 ureda širom svijeta na pet kontinenata. Raspolaže aktivama u iznosu većem od jednog triliona dolara. Kao jedna od najvećih kompanija uopšte u svijetu pruža niz finansijskih usluga: tekućih i štednih računa, hipotekarnih zajmova, finansiranja automobila, osiguranja, kreditnih karti, zajmova, penzija i investicija. Osim Komercijalnog bankarstva, usluge obuhvataju Korporativno bankarstvo, Investiciono bankarstvo i tržišta i Privatno bankarstvo.

Citibank je sa rejtingom brenda AA i vrijednosti brenda od 27,81 milion dolara, što je lošije u odnosu na 2005, na drugoj poziciji. Kreditna kriza u SAD je nanijela štetu reputaciji Citi banke, čija je vrijednost brenda manja za 7,3 milijarde dola-ra u odnosu na 2006. i smanjenje rejtinga brenda sa AAA-. American Express je jedini finansijski brend, pored HSBC, sa trostrukim A rejtingom brenda, najvrednijim brendom na svijetu u sektoru kreditnih karti, kao i najvećom vrijed-nošću brenda prema vrijednosti firme (31%). Najvredniji brend u investicionom bankarstvu je bio Goldman Sachs, sa popravljanjem pozicije u odnosu na 2006. za sedam mjesta, povećavajući vrijednost brenda za 44%.

Među 20 top brendova, 11 je sa sjedištem u Evropi, a 7 iz SAD, što znači smanjenje brendova iz SAD za 4 u odnosu na 2006, i vjerovatno dalje smanjenje ili pogoršanje u 2008. Snažan ekonomski rast u velikim i brzo rastućim ekonomi-jama u razvoju, poput Brazila, Rusije, Indije i Kine (BRIC zemlje), uticao je u priličnoj mjeri na banke iz tih zemal-ja. Na primjer, tri kineska bankarska brenda - Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (rang 16, rejting brenda A-), China Construction Bank (18, A-) i Bank of China (23, A-) - su rangirani među 25 svjetskih finansijskih brendova. Svakako, očekuje se rast kineske ekonomije i brza konsoli-dacija bankarskog sektora u ovoj i narednim godinama, a samim tim i kineskih brendova. Tri brazilska brenda - ban-ke su među 60 brendova.

Bear Stearns je bila jedna od “najkvalitetnijih” investici-onih banaka šireći mrežu banaka širom svijeta i na broker-ske i poslove trgovanja hartijama od vrijednosti. Njen rang među brendovima (108) obuhvatao je rejting brenda A- i vrijednost brenda 1,392 miliona dolara. Među karakteristi-kama su se naglašavali: vrhunski menadžment, inovativna poslovna praksa i personalizovana usluga koja je razliko-vala Bear Stearns od svih ostalih investicionih banaka koje

RejtINg DeFINIcIjAAAA Izrazito snažan (Extremely strong)AA Veoma snažan (Very strong)A Snažan (Strong)BBB Prosječan (Average)BB Ispodprosječan (Underperforming)B Slab (Weak)CCC Veoma slab (Very weak)CC Izrazito slab (Extremely weak)C Neuspješan (Failing)

Tabela 1: Definicije rejtinga brenda Izvor: Global 100 Banking Brands Index, 2006; str. 27

Rang 2007 Kompanija

Vrijedn. brenda(2007)

Tržišna kapital. (2007)

Vb/Tk (%) (2007)

Rejting brenda (2007)

Vrijed. Brenda (2005)

Rejting brenda (2005)

1. HSBC (UK) 35,456 188,466 19 AAA 33,495 AAA2. Citi (US) 27,817 147,041 19 AA 35,148 AAA-3. Bank of America (US) 25,417 170,875 15 AA+ 31,426 AAA-4. Santander C. H. (ES) 20,718 67,214 31 AA- 17,063 AA-5. American Express(US) 16,183 51,455 31 AAA 18,109 AAA-6. Chase (US) 14,798 86,865 17 A+ 12,083 AA-7. BNP Paribas (FR) 14,637 97,501 15 A+ 12,278 A8. Well Fargo & Co (US) 13,130 94,593 14 AA 14,277 AA9. Goldman Sachs (US) 12,520 84,564 15 AA 8,712 A+

10. Credit Suisse (CH) 12,140 66,377 18 A- 11,519 A-11. Barclays (UK) 11,582 60,197 19 A- 12,182 A12. UBS (CH) 11,339 92,476 12 A+ 15,137 AA-13. JP Morgan (US) 9,064 65,244 14 A+ 6,383 A14. Wachovia Corp (US) 8,686 72,120 12 AA- 9,430 AA-15. Deutsche Bank (DE) 8,585 66,220 13 A 8,240 A-

Tabela 2: Vodeći svjetski finansijski brendovi Izvor: Prilagođeno prema The Banker, mart 2008; str. 37


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Crisis (sub-prime) in the USA and economic growth in China influenced on HSBC to become the strongest and most valuable brand in the world, with AAA brand rating and 35.456 brand value, pushing the Citibank to the second position. Despite its having been hit by a crisis on sub-pri-mary market in 2007, incurring 3.4 billion dollars losses, HSBC has become the leading bank in the world and the most profitable one on young markets, the most valuab-le banking brand in retail and corporate sector in general.

Hong Kong and Shangai Banking Corporation founded by Thomas Sunderland is one of the prominent world brands in the area of banking, insurance and financial services, ob-viously providing extraordinary financial services to its cli-ents. This “World Local Bank” owns around 10.000 offices on five continents worldwide. It disposes of more than one trillion worth of assets. As one of the biggest companies in world it provides a range of financial services: current and savings accounts, mortgage loans, financing of cars, insuran-ce, credit cards, loans, pensions and investments. In additi-on to commercial banking, services include corporate ban-king, investment banking and markets and private banking.

Citibank assumes the second position with AA brand rating and 27.81 million dollars brand rating which is worse than in 2005. Credit crunch in the USA damaged the reputation of Citibank whose brand value is reduced by 7.3 billion dollars relative to 2006 and the brand rating dropped from AAA. American Express is the only financial brand, in addition to HSBC, with triple A brand rating, the most valuable brand in world in credit cards sector and the highest brand value with regard to the company value (31%). The most valuable brand in investment banking was Goldman Sachs that improved its position relative to 2006 for seven lots increasing brand va-lue by 44%.

Among the top 20 brands, 11 is headquartered in Europe, 7 in the USA which means that the number of USA brands has been reduced by 4 relative to 2006 and probably the number will continue to fall or deteriorate in 2008. Strong economic growth in large and fast growing developing economies, such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC countries) has pretty much influenced on banks in these countries. For instance, three

Rank 2007 Company

BrandValue(2007)

Market Capital. (2007)

Vb/Tk (%) (2007)

Brand Rating (2007)

Brand Value (2005)

Brand Rating (2005)

1. HSBC (UK) 35,456 188,466 19 AAA 33,495 AAA2. Citi (US) 27,817 147,041 19 AA 35,148 AAA-3. Bank of America (US) 25,417 170,875 15 AA+ 31,426 AAA-4. Santander C. H. (ES) 20,718 67,214 31 AA- 17,063 AA-5. American Express(US) 16,183 51,455 31 AAA 18,109 AAA-6. Chase (US) 14,798 86,865 17 A+ 12,083 AA-7. BNP Paribas (FR) 14,637 97,501 15 A+ 12,278 A8. Well Fargo & Co (US) 13,130 94,593 14 AA 14,277 AA9. Goldman Sachs (US) 12,520 84,564 15 AA 8,712 A+

10. Credit Suisse (CH) 12,140 66,377 18 A- 11,519 A-11. Barclays (UK) 11,582 60,197 19 A- 12,182 A12. UBS (CH) 11,339 92,476 12 A+ 15,137 AA-13. JP Morgan (US) 9,064 65,244 14 A+ 6,383 A14. Wachovia Corp (US) 8,686 72,120 12 AA- 9,430 AA-15. Deutsche Bank (DE) 8,585 66,220 13 A 8,240 A-

Table 2. Leading Financial Brands in the World Sources: Adjusted according to the Banker, March 2008, page 37



su djelovale na globalnom tržištu. Po standardima Fortune proglašena je za najcjenjeniju kompaniju koja operiše sa hartijama od vrijednosti. Njena ukupna aktiva krajem 1996. iznosila je 350,4 milijardi dolara, dok je ukupni potencijal bio vrijedan 66,7 milijardi dolara. Institutional Investor je prepoznao ovog giganta kao sedmu najveću firmu, prema ukupnom kapacitetu iz aprila 2005.

Finansijski kolaps je uslijedio i uslijed likvidnosnih prob-lema, uprkos 18 milijardi dolara gotovinskih sredstava. Bear Stearns je bio posljednji i najalarmantniji indikator na-stupajuće bankarske krize. Napad na glavnu investicionu banku desio se uglavnom zbog ogromnih kvartalnih gu-bitaka i “glasina i nagovještaja bez osnove”. Mnogi na Wall Street-u su bili povezani sa bankom, i kao zajmotražioci i kao zajmodavci - druge banke, uključujući Merrill Lynch, investicione kuće i korporacije. Banka je prošlog ljeta imala probleme sa svojim hedž fondovima, uslijed zajmova onima sa lošim kreditnim rejtingom, što je iziskivalo 3 milijarde dolara. Tržište je brzo i lako prepoznalo probleme banke. Investitori nisu više vjerovali da banka može otplatiti zaj-move, čak i kratkoročno (prekonoćne). Banka je prodata 2 dolara po akciji, 93% ispod “closing” cijene. Očigledno je da su u osnovi kolapsa Bear Stearns bili dublji problemi ekonomije SAD.

Pitanje je da li su neke velike banke shvatile i/ili prihva-tile, kako se tvrdi, da njihovo ime, reputacija i lojalna baza klijenata, kao nematerijalna imovina, može biti njihova naj-vrednija aktiva i ključ za povećanje konkurentnosti. Pitanje je i da li su mega banke postale još više svjesne svog brenda i toga kako on podupire njihove aktivnosti u svim poslov-nim situacijama i geografskim područjima. Takođe, da li će investicione i banke “na veliko” pokazivati iznenađujuće velike vrijednosti brenda. Koliko se opšti principi arhitek-ture brenda - jasnoća kod zajedničke vizije, misije i skupa vrijednosti; dosljednost kod uvođenja, ugrađivanja i ma-nifestovanja vrijednosti brenda; upravljanje pri postizanju globalnog statusa vođenja - poštuju u hijerarhiji odnosa za svrhe portfolija kompanije. Izgleda da će posljedice sadaš-nje krize dati definitivan odgovor na ova pitanja.

UmJESTO ZAKLJUČKAUzroke bankarskih poteškoća, bilo u razvijenim finansij-skim sistemima ili ekonomijama u razvoju, potrebno je analizirati obuhvatajući spektar raznovrsnih specifičnih bankarskih i/ili makroekonomskih indikatora. Očigledan je propust u otkrivanju bazičnih indikatora koji su mogli obezbijediti rane nagovještaje otpočinjanja bankarske krize, koja u SAD u segmentu investicionog bankarstva poprima karakteristike sistemske krize. Oprečna mišljenja vodećih

ekonomista SAD (Krugman, Greenspan, Bernanke) o ge-neralnim uzrocima trenutne krize u ovoj zemlji, uz povre-mene nedoumice, dovoljno govore o dubini i širini eko-nomskog problema (sa globalnim posljedicama), očigledno najvećeg od 1929. godine. Kao što je bio slučaj i sa ranijim sistemskim krizama, doprinos ovoj krizi dali su nepovoljni makroekonomski šokovi koji su u posljednje vrijeme slabili cjelokupni finansijski sistem.

Idealno, ponašanje indikatora trebalo bi da pokaže stepen rizika ili bi trebalo da nagovijesti vjerovatni tajming pojav-ljivanja problema u bankarskom sistemu. Varijable koje su korisne kao indikatori nisu obavezno u bilo kakvim uzroč-nim odnosima sa bankarskim krizama. Obično, i fluktuaci-je indikatora varijabli i nastanak problema u bankarskom sektoru su proizvod nekog trećeg, postojećeg uticaja. Kao i ranije, i u ovoj krizi se potvrđuje da brzo povećanje zajmova jednom sektoru može pokazati da su banke pribjegle tak-voj mjeri koja će na kraju i vjerovatno rezultirati velikim i eksplicitnim bankarskim gubicima. Upotrebljivi indikatori mogu da se pronađu iz različitih izvora i da se odnose na različite aspekte ekonomije. Mogu nastati iz samog bankar-skog sistema, iz nekog drugog sektora ili mogu imati mak-roekonomski karakter.

Suptilnost trgovanja na finansijskim tržištima u razvi-jenim finansijskim sistemima, koja se bazira na mnoštvu finansijskih instrumenata, brojnim finansijskim instituci-jama, sve značajnijem procesu finansijskog inžinjeringa (sekjuritizacije), odnosno zamršenom (ispreplijetanom) nizu finansijskih tokova, a koja zahtijeva preispitivanje po-stojećih regulativnih i institucionalnih (regulatornih) ok-vira i aranžmana, zahtijeva i suptilnost upravljanja i kon-trole takvom finansijskom strukturom. U ovakvoj kriznoj sistemskoj situaciji, za sada sa posebnim naglaskom na in-vesticiono bankarstvo, generalni recept (opcije politike) kao trenutni cilj vlasti je poznat: uspostavljanje finansijske stabilnosti sistema kao cjeline, vraćanje javnog povjerenja i izbjegavanje juriša na banke. Poznat je i spektar mogućih tehnika rješenja za suočavanje sa krizom.

Kao politički ekonomista, Kisindžer je sugerisao da je svjetskim liderima potrebno bolje razumijevanje globalnih tokova kapitala i njihovog potencijalnog uticaja na ekono-mije i industrijalizovanih i zemalja u razvoju. Takođe, oni bi morali biti svjesni opasnosti potencijalnih međunarodnih uticaja odluka koje se donose uglavnom zbog domaćih raz-loga. Svojevremeno, poteškoće u Japanu tokom ’90-ih omo-gućile su rast stope zaposlenosti u SAD. Ciklus hegemonije je došao do tačke kada je relativni (ili apsolutni) ekonomski pad SAD postao prednost ekonomskih konkurenata.

Što se zapravo promijenilo od slučaja poput BCCI na re-laciji Vlada - Centralna banka - Banka - Deponenti i uopšte stejkholderi, što bi moglo unaprijediti bankarsko poslova-nje kada je u pitanju rizičnost poslovanja? Da li je u pitanju kvalitet pristupa prudencione regulacije i supervizije ili ne-što sasvim drugo, kao i da li će promjene u sferi regulative i kontrole definitivno promijeniti bilo što što može osujetiti ili spriječiti bankarske krize - pojedinačne ili sistemske. Da li je finansijska kriza zaista rezultat pogrešne ekonomske politike koja se u kontinuitetu sprovodila u prethodnoj de-ceniji ili se, pak, teško može povjerovati da je uzrok u lošim ili nedalekovidim kreatorima te politike, nečijoj neznave-nosti ili globalnim ekonomskim kretanjima ?


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Chinese banking brands – Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ranked 16, A- brand rating), China Construction Bank (18, A-) and Bank of China (23, A-) are ranked among 25 world financial brands. Certainly, Chinese economy growth and fast consolidation of banking sector are expected this year and the years to come, together with the growth of Chinese brands. The three Chinese brands – banks are among 60 brands.

Bear Sterns used to be one of the “highest quality” in-vestment banks expanding its network of banks around the globe into the area of broker and securities operations. Its rank among the brands (108) included A- brand rating and 1.392 million dollars brand value. It was recognized by the following: top management, innovative business prac-tice and personalized service that distinguished Bear Sterns from all the other investment banks operating on global market. Based on the Fortune standards, it was announced the most appreciated company working with securities. Its total assets value at the end of 1996 equaled 350.4 million dollars, while total potential was valued at 66.7 billion dol-lars. Institutional Investor recognized this giant as the se-venth leading firm based on total capacity in 2005.

Financial collapse followed after liquidity problems despi-te 18 billion dollars in cash. Bear Sterns was the last and most alarming indicator of a forthcoming bank crisis. Attack on the main investment bank was mainly caused by enormous qu-arterly losses and groundless rumors and hints. Many on the Wall Street were connected with the Bank, either as lenders or borrowers, -other banks, including Merrill Lunch, investment firms and corporations. Last summer the Bank faced problems with its hedge funds resulting from granting loans to those with low credit worthiness which required 3 billion dollars. Market quickly and easily recognized problems of the Bank. Investors no longer believed that Bank may repay loans, not even short-term ones (overnight). The Bank was sold for 2 dollars per sha-re, 93% below closing price. Obviously, deeper problems in the USA economy caused the collapse of Bear Stearns.

The questions is whether some major banks realized and/or accepted, as it is claimed, that their name, reputati-on and loyal clients base, as intangible assets, may be their most valuable asset and key to increase competitiveness. The question is whether giant banks have become aware of the reputation of their brand and how it supports their activities in all business situations and geographic regions. In addition, whether investment and “wholesale” banks will demonstrate surprisingly high brand values. To what extent general principles of brand architecture - clarity of common vision, mission and set of values, consistency in introduction, integration and demonstration of the brand value, management in reaching global leader status- are fol-lowed in the hierarchy of relations for the purpose of com-pany portfolio. It seems that consequences of the current crisis will provide answers to these questions.

inSteaD oF concluSion Reasons of difficulties in banking, either in developed ban-king systems or developing economies, are to be analyzed with inclusion of the range of diversified specific banking and/or macroeconomic indicators. Failure to discover ba-sic indicators that might have provided early hints of ban-king crisis is obvious, as the crisis in the USA in the area of investment banking becomes systematic. contradicto-

ry opinions of leading economists in the USA (Krugman Greenspan, Bernanke) about general causes of the current crisis in this country, with occasional doubts, say sufficiently about the depth and width of the economic problem (with global consequences) which is obviously the most serious one since 1929. As it was the case with some earlier syste-matic crises, the crisis was also caused by unfavorable mac-roeconomic shocks which have recently weakened financial system in its entirety.

Ideally, indicators should show the level of risk or suggest probable timing of problem occurrence in banking sector. Variables which are useful as indicators are not necessarily in any kind of cause and effect relations with banking crises. Usually fluctuations of indicators of variables and problems occurrence in banking sector result from some third, existent influence. As earlier crises, this one too confirms that fast increase of loans to one sector may show that banks resor-ted to such measure that will ultimately and probably result in major and explicit banking losses. Usable indicators may be traced in various sources and refer to various aspects of economy. They may arise from the banking system itself, some other sector or may have macroeconomic nature.

Subtlety of trade on financial markets in developed financial systems which is based on a multitude of financial instruments, numerous financial institutions, increasingly important finan-cial engineering process (securitisation), and intricate (inter-twined) range of financial flows, requires examination of the existing review and institutional (regulatory) frameworks and arrangements and subtle management and control of such fi-nancial structure. In this type of systematic crisis, with a par-ticular focus on investment banking at this moment, a general recipe (policy options) as a current objective of power is fami-liar: establishment of financial stability of system as a whole, regaining public confidence and avoidance of the bank run. A range of potential resolution techniques for facing with the crisis is also familiar.

Kissinger, being a political economist, suggested that world leaders need deeper understanding of global flows of capital and their potential effect on economies of indus-trialized and developing countries. In addition, they should also become aware of threats of the potential effects of in-ternational decisions made primarily for national reasons. Formerly, difficulties in Japan over the nineties resulted in growth in employment rate in the USA. The hegemo-ny cycle has reached the point where relative (or absolute) economic fall of the USA has become advantage of econo-mic competitors.

What has actually changed since the cases like BCCI in relations between the Government, Central Bank, bank, de-positors and stakeholders in general, what might enhance bank operations when it comes to the risk of operations? Is it about the quality of approach of prudential regulations and supervision or something completely different, and will the changes in the area of regulations and control definitely make any changes that may neutralize or prevent bank cri-ses, both individual and systematic? Has the financial cri-sis really resulted from the mistaken economic policy that was continuously implemented in the previous decade or, is it still hard to believe that reason is in bad or inadequate creators of the policy, someone` s ignorance or global eco-nomic developments?




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Ovu godinu obilježio je nevjerovatan rast cijena nafte, dostigavši skoro 150 dolara za barel. Ogroman rast koji

područje Bliskog istoka bilježi poslednjih godina, najprije zahvaljujući golemim naftnim profitima, solidno razvijeni bankarski sistem i sve brojnija muslimanska populacija na globalnom nivou, čine sve značajnijom i islamsku finansij-sku industriju. Prema aktuelnim procjenama, danas islam-sko bankarstvo, poznato i pod nazivom ’’halal finansiranje’’, obuhvata tržište vrijedno 550 milijardi dolara i ostvaruje godišnju stopu rasta od 15 procenata.

Ključ za privlačenje tog novca je bankarski sistem u skla-du sa islamskim zakonom koji, između ostalog, zabranjuje ubiranje kamate. Umjesto kamate banka i osoba koja uzima kredit uspostavljaju partnerstvo u kome obje strane preuzi-maju rizik. Pored toga, islamski investitori kupuju akcije samo u poslovima čije aktivnosti i proizvodi nisu protivni učenju Kurana. Zabranjene industrije obuhvataju kocku, pornogra-fiju, trgovinu oružjem, duvanom i alkoholom, kao i sve po-slove vezane za svinjsko meso i njegove prerađevine.

Prva islamska banka osnovana je u Egiptu, 1963. godi-ne. Osnivanje ove, kao i drugih banaka koje su se opredi-jelile da posluju u skladu s principima šerijata (islamskim vjerskim zakonom) smatrano je utopijom. Poslovanje na principima islamskog bankarstva prošlih je četrdesetak godi-na prešlo put od egzotičnog eksperimenta do jednog od naj- brže rastućih oblika bankarskog poslovanja.

Najveća ekspanzija islamskog bankarstva i drugih islam-skih finansijskih institucija ostvarena je upravo u bogatim arapskim zemljama. Tri muslimanske zemlje (Iran, Pakistan i Sudan) zvanično su konvertovale svoje konvencionalne u islamske finansijske sisteme. Malezija i Bangladeš imaju implementiran paralelni bankarski sistem, u kojem pored konvencionalnih, po posebnom zakonu, posluju i islam-ske banke.

Veliki dio zasluga za razvoj savremenog islamskog finan-sijskog sistema pripada teoretičarima islamske ekonomije. Prvi studij islamske ekonomije uveden je 1967. godine na Umm Durman Islamic University u Sudanu. Danas se islam-ska ekonomija izučava na mnogim univerzitetima u svijetu, kako na Istoku, tako i na Zapadu. Ona, u osnovi, nastoji da

u ekonomsku teoriju ugradi etičke i moralne principe is-lama kao religije. Stoji na stanovištu da ekonomsko pona-šanje nije jedino motivisano ličnom korišću ili gubitkom. Ljudska bića motivisana su i etičkim principima u kojima su moralni stavovi često ispred materijalnih.

Osnovna razlika između islamskog i klasičnog bankar-stva je u tome što islamsko izbjegava bilo kakve špekulacije. U svakoj transakciji mora postojati neki stvarni proizvod, nešto što se kupuje i prodaje. Nije dopušteno nenamjensko finansiranje, kao ni kamata.

U pojašnjenju striktne zabrane kamate u islamu, teore-tičari islamske ekonomije ukazuju da razloge za to može-mo naći u moralnoj, socijalnoj i ekonomskoj sferi ovog pi-tanja. Posuđivanje novca uz kamatu podrazumijeva da oni koji imaju kapital zarađuju vrijednost bez da nešto daju u zamjenu za prihod (kamatu) koji primaju.

Ekonomski ugao posmatranja kaže da islam ne priznaje novac kao predmet trgovine, jer on nema upotrebnu vrijed-nost. Profit se stvara kada nešto što ima upotrebnu vrijed-nost bude prodato za novac ili kada se razmjenjuju različite valute. Zato je profit zarađen radeći sa novcem (iste valute) ili papirima koji ga predstavljaju, tj.kamata, zabranjen.

Iako su skeptici sa Zapada osporavali vitalnost šerijatskog bankarskog sistema zbog njegovog utemeljenja na naftnom bumu, islamske banke su preživjele sve padove cijena nafte. Islamski finansijski sistem danas uključuje hiljade različitih organizacija kao što su banke, osiguravajuće organizaci-je, lizing organizacije, računovodstvene kontrolne službe, konsalting firme.

Međutim, islamski bankarski pokret nije ograničen samo na muslimanske zemlje, jer su vodeće zapadnoevropske i američke banke brzo uvidjele priliku za zaradom na bogatim arapskim zemljama. Tako je u Luksemburgu, već 1978. godi-ne, osnovana banka pod nazivom Islamic Banking System, odnosno sada, Islamic Finance House, koja se smatra prvom islamskom finansijskom institucijom u Evropi.

Zapadne banke su bile aktivne u islamskom bankarstvu od samog početka, prije svega kroz uzimanje međubankar-skih depozita od islamskih finansijskih institucija, prikupl-jenih od muslimanskog stanovništva u zemljama u kojima

ISLAMSKE FINANSIJE

Bankarski ključ za Kur’anUmjesto kamate banka i osoba koja uzima kredit uspostavljaju partnerstvo u kome obje strane preuzimaju rizik. Pored toga, islamski investitori kupuju akcije samo u poslovima čije aktivnosti i proizvodi nisu protivni učenju Kurana. Zabranjene industrije obuhvataju kocku, pornografiju, trgovinu oružjem, duvanom i alkoholom, kao i sve poslove vezane za svinjsko meso i njegove prerađevine

Ivana Gogić


ISLAMIC FINANCE

Bankarski ključ za Kur’an

banking key to Kur’anInstead of interest, the bank and a person taking loan establish partnership where both parties take risks. In addition, Islamic investors buy shares only of those businesses whose activities and products are not contradictory to the Kur`an concept. Prohibited industries include gambling, pornography, trade in weapons, tobacco and alcohol and all matters related to pork meat and products

Ivana Gogić

This year has been marked by incredible rise in oil pri-ces, reaching almost 150 dollars per barrel. Enormous

growth of the Middle East region over the last years, pri-marily resulting from substantial oil profits, considerab-ly developed banking system and increasingly numerous Muslim population on a global level make Islamic finance industry increasingly important. According to the current estimates, Islamic banking, also known as halal banking, nowadays covers the market worth 550 billion dollars and generates annual growth rate of 15%.

The key to attract that money is the banking system har-monised with Islamic law which, among other things, pro-hibits collection of interest. Instead of interest, the bank and a person taking loan establish partnership where both parties take risks. In addition, Islamic investors buy sha-res only of those businesses whose activities and produc-ts are not contradictory to the Kur`an concept. Prohibited industries include gambling, pornography, trade in wea-pons, tobacco and alcohol and all matters related to pork meat and products.

The first Islamic bank was established in Egypt back in 1963. Establishment of this and other banks which were com-mitted to operating in accordance with the sharia (Islamic religious code) was considered utopia. Operations based on principles of Islamic banking have over the previous forty years been transformed from exotic experiment into one of the fastest growing forms of banking operations.

The largest expansion of Islamic banking and other Islamic financial institutions took place in rich Arab countries. Three Muslim countries (Iran, Pakistan and Sudan) officially con-verted their conventional financial systems into Islamic ones. Malaysia and Bangladesh have implemented parallel ban-king system where, in addition to the conventional banks, Islamic banks also operate under a special law.

Islamic economy theoreticians are those who take the major credit for development of modern Islamic financial system. The first study programme of Islamic economy was introduced in 1967 at the Umm Durman Islamic University in Sudan. Nowadays Islamic economy is studied in many universities around the globe in both, Eastern and Western

countries. It basically seeks to integrate ethical and moral principles of Islamic religion into the economic theory. Its position is that economic behavior is not only motivated by personal gain or loss. Human beings are also motivated by ethical principles where moral stands often come befo-re material ones.

The main difference between Islamic and conventional banking is avoidance of any kind of speculations by Islamic banking. A real product must exist in each transaction, so-mething to be sold and purchased. Non-targeted financing and interest are prohibited.

Islamic economy theoreticians explain strict prohibition of interest in Islam indicating that reasons for that may be found in moral, social and economic sphere of this matter. Lending money and charging interest means that those who have capital earn value, except if they give away something in return for the revenue (interest) they receive.

Economic aspect says that Islam does not recognize money as a subject of trade because it does not have any utility va-lue. Profit is generated when something with utility value is sold for money or when various currencies are exchanged. That is why profit generated from operations with money (the same currencies) or paper representing it, i.e. interest, is prohibited.

Even though Western skeptics disputed vitality of sha-ria banking system because of its foundation on oil boom, Islamic banks have survived all the drops in oil prices. Islamic financial system nowadays includes thousands of various organisations such as banks, insurance companies, leasing companies, accounting control services, consulting firms.

However, Islamic banking movement is not limited only to Muslim countries as the leading West-European and American banks soon spotted the opportunity for profit in wealthy Arab countries. Already in 1978 Islamic Banking System bank, which is now Islamic Finance House, was es-tablished in Luxemburg and is considered the first Islamic financial institution in Europe.

Western banks have been active in Islamic banking from the very beginnings, primarily by taking interbank deposits from Islamic finance institutions gathered from Muslim po-


�8su djelovale. Zapadne banke saglasile su se da koriste ta novčana sredstva u skladu sa is-lamskim principima, a neke od najaktivnijih do sada bile su Chase Manhattan, J.P. Morgan i Goldman Sachs.

Što se tiče Evrope, London je već prepoz-natljiv kao islamski fi-nansijski centar. Na Harvardu je formiran Institut za islamsko ban-karstvo, a na nekoliko engleskih sveučilišta postoje postdiplomski studiji iz islamskog bankarstva.

Grupacija Lloyds TSB je nakon osnivanja Islamic Bank of Britain postala vodeća u uslugama u skladu sa islam-skim zakonom. Generalno, broj klijenata takvih usluga je u Britaniji samo od 2005. do 2006. porastao čak 120 odsto, broj otvorenih računa 200 odsto, a broj štednih uloga za 76 procenata, dostigavši iznos od 83,9 miliona funti. Britanija je krajem prošle godine najavila namjeru da bude prva za-padna država koja će izdavati islamske obveznice - sukuk. Budući da islamski zakon zabranjuje isplatu kamata, obvez-nice sukuk nose profit ili rentu na temeljnu imovinu, pri čemu obveznica predstavlja dio vlasništva nad tom imovi-nom. To je tržište sve šire i likvidnije, a trenutno je vrijedno 40 milijardi funti, dok bi njegova vrijednost na globalnom nivou mogla dostići i preko 250 milijardi funti.

Zanimljivo da je, kao odgovor na prognozirani rast islam-skog bankarstva, belgijska banka KBC kreirala ’’katolički fond’’, koji se u svojoj ulagačkoj politici ravna prema načeli-ma katoličanstva.

Od zemalja sa bivših Yu prostora, iako bez zakonskog uporišta, tu vrstu finansijskih usluga od 2000. godine jedi-na pruža Bosnia bank International, čiji su osnivači Islamic Development Bank sa 45,46 procenata vlasničkog udjela, Dubai Islamic Bank i Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank sa po 27,27 odsto vlasništva.

U poslednje vrijeme poseban interes za islamske finansije iskazuju japanske banke, poput Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, koja je investirala u malezijsku investicionu banku CIMB, čiji je udio u svjetskom poslovanju sa islamskim obvezni-cama ili sukucima čak 30 procenata. I japanski finansijski

gigant Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. podržao je izgradnju rafinerija u Saudijskoj Arabiji 2006. godine, a u Kuvajtu proš-le godine, u sklopu svoje strategije uključivanja u finansijske tokove u is-lamskom svijetu i ulaganja u petrohemijsku in-dustriju i velike projek-te na Bliskom Istoku.

Danas se procjenjuje da u 75 zemalja posluje oko 300 islam-skih banaka.

Svi žele tamo gdje je novac, pa će bankarske insti-tucije morati još više ulaziti u islamsku finansijsku in-dustriju kako bi proširile svoje poslovanje na Bliskom Istoku, gdje su u toku veliki projekti zahvaljujući rastu cijena nafte.

Očekuje se da će islamska finansijska industrija samo do 2010. udvostručiti svoju vrijednost na 1.000 milijardi dolara ■

ISLAMSKE FINANSIJE

BANKAR €

Allah neće četvorici dozvoliti da uđu u Džennet, ili da

okuse Njegovu milost: notornom pijanici, osobi

koja uzima kamatu, osobi koja uzurpira jetimsku

imovinu nepravedno i osobi koja je nezahvalna svojim

roditeljima.

Hahim, El-Mustedrek „Kitabul-biju“

Mušareka je oblik zajedničkog ulaganja u poslovni poduhvat u kome svi učesnici dijele dobit ili gubitak (joint venture). Učesnici u mušareki zajednički učestvuju u upravljanju pro-jektom, sporazumno raspolažu kapitalom i radnom snagom i dijele troškove koji su potrebni za ostvarenje projekta, te na kraju dijele i dobitke i gubitke shodno visini uloženog kapi-tala u projekat.

U sistemu kamatonosnog finansiranja finansijer ne može pretrpjeti gubitak, dok u mušareki može ako zajedničko ula-ganje ne uspije. U sistemu islamskih finansija, ako dužnik podnese gubitak, nepravedno je da povjerilac traži fiksnu stopu prihoda, a isto tako, ako zajmoprimac ostvari visoku stopu dobiti, nepravda je prema povjeriocu dati mu samo mali dio dobiti.Mudareba je vrsta partnerstva u kojem jedna strana ulaže kapi-tal (rabbul-mal) a druga rad i ekspertizu (mudarib) i upravl-ja investicijom. Cilj mudarebe je ostvarenje profita. Njome se omogućava onome ko posjeduje kapital i onome ko ima sposobnost da upravlja investicijom da zajednički učestvuju u realizaciji nekog projekta. Dok se profit dijeli u dogovore-noj srazmjeri, definisanoj ugovorom, gubitak snosi isključivo investitor, tj. strana koja ulaže kapital ukoliko se ne utvrdi kr-šenje ugovora ili nemarnost preduzetnika. Preduzetnik snosi samo gubitak svog rada i uloženog truda.Murabeha je danas najrasprostranjeniji instrument islam-skog bankarstva. Banka, uz prethodni dogovor s klijentom, kupuje njemu potrebnu nekretninu, opremu, robu, materi-jal, itd., koju on, zbog nedostatka sredstava, nije u stanju da sam kupi. Banka potom klijentu prodaje predmet ugovora, po većoj cijeni od nabavne, otkrivajući mu stvarnu cijenu po kojoj je roba nabavljena i samim tim i profit koji je ostvarila. Interes klijenta ogleda se u mogućnosti da kupljeni predmet ugovora može otplatiti u ratama, a interes banke je zarada koju ostvaruje prodajom predmeta ugovora po višoj cijeni od nabavne.Selem i Istisna obezbjeđuju srednjoročno finansiranje pro-izvodnje, gradnje i nabavke dobara poput industrijske opre-me i proizvoda, građevinskih objekata, poljoprivrednih repro-materijala i sl. Cijena sredstava u ugovoru može biti plaćena unaprijed odjednom ili u ratama tokom proizvodnje.

Osnovna razlika između selema i istisne je u predmetu fi-nansiranja koji je kod istisne vezan isključivo za proizvodn-ju, dok kod selema može biti bilo koja druga roba. Razlika je i u cijeni koja kod selema mora biti isplaćena unaprijed, dok kod istisne može u ratama.Qard Hasan je nenamjenski beskamatni kredit. Svaka islam-ska banka ima fond u koji usmjereva određeni dio sredstava za nenamjensko beskamatno finansiranje. S obzirom da su sredstva u tom fondu ograničena, obično se finansiraju na-jugroženije kategorije stanovništva.


ISLAMIC FINANCE

pulation in countries where they operated. Western banks agreed to use these financial assets in compliance with Islamic principles, while some of the most active ones so far have been Chase Manhattan, J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs.

As for Europe, London has already become a recogni-sed Islamic financial centre. The Islamic Banking Institute

has been established in Harvard, while several English universities offer postgraduate studies in Islamic banking.

Following the estab-lishment of the Islamic Bank of Britain, the Lloyds TSB Group has become leader in ser-vices provided in com-pliance with Islamic law. In general, the number of clients of these ser-vices in Britain rose by as much as 120% only in 2005 -2006 period, the number of opened accounts rose by 200%, while the number of sa-ving deposits rose by 76% reaching the sum of 83.9 million pounds. At the end of last year Britain declared its intention to become the first Western country to issue Islamic bonds – sukuk. Since Islamic law prohibits collection of interest, the sukuk bonds generate profit or rental fee on fundamen-tal assets whereby the bond represents a part of ownership over that property. This market has become increasingly larger and liquid, at this moment it is valued at 40 billion pounds, while its value on a global level might reach more than 250 billion pounds.

Interestingly, as a response to projected growth of Islamic banking, the Belgium bank KBC established the catholic fund whose investment policy follows Catholic principles.

As for ex-Yugoslavia countries, it is only the Bosnia Bank International whose founders are Islamic Development Bank with 45.46% of equity share, Dubai Islamic Bank and Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank with 27.27% of share respectively, which has been providing this type of services since 2000 even wit-hout having legal grounds for such operation.

Recently, particular interest for Islamic finances has been demonstrated by Japanese banks, such as Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ that invested into Malaysian investment bank CIMB whose share in the world transactions with Islamic bonds or sukuk equals as much as 30%. Japanese financial giant Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. supported the construction of oil refineries in Saudi Arabia in 2006 and investments into petrochemical industry in Kuwait last year in the framework of its strategy for involvement into financial developments in Islamic world and large projec-ts in the Middle East. Nowadays it is estimated that around 300 Islamic banks operate in 75 countries.

Everyone wants to go where money is, which is why ban-king institutions will even more be entering Islamic finan-cial industry so as to expand their operations to the Middle East where large project are currently run due to the rise in oil prices.

Islamic financial industry is expected to double its finan-cial value to 1.000 billion dollars by 2010 ■

BANKAR €

To the four persons Allah shall refuse entry into

Heaven and taste of His mercy: Notorious drunkard, a person charging interest, person unfairly usurping property of the poor and

person who is not grateful to parents.

Hahim, El-Mustedrek Kitabul-biju

Mushareka is a type of common investment in joint venture where all the participants share profit or loss. Participants in Mušareka jointly manage the project, dispose of the capital and labor force in agreement and share costs necessary for implementation of the project, and finally share gains and losses proportionately to the amount of capital invested in the project.

In the system of interest financing, the financier may not suffer loss, while in mušareka it may if the joint investment fails. If the debtor suffers loss in the Islamic finance system, it is unfair for the creditor to require fixed income rate, and if the borrower generates high income rate it would be unfair to allocate the creditor only a small portion of the profit.Mudareba is a type of partnership where one party invests capital (rabbul-mal), while the other one invests work and expert knowledge (mudarib) and manages the investment. The objective of mudareba is to generate profit. It enables the one possessing the capital and the one having the capacity to manage the investment to jointly participate in implementa-tion of the project. While profit is shared in agreed propor-tion defined in the contract, the loss is borne exclusively by the investor, that is party investing capital except if the bre-ach of contract or negligence of an entrepreneur have been established. Entrepreneur only bears the loss of its work and invested efforts.Murabeha is nowadays the most common instrument of Islamic banking. The Bank, following the previous agreement with the client, buys property, equipment, goods, material etc. needed to the client which he may not buy due to the lack of funds. The Banks afterwards sells the subject of the contract to the Client at the price higher than the purchase price, revealing to him the actual price at which the goods have been purcha-sed and accordingly the profit it has generated. Interest of the client is reflected in the possibility to pay off purchased sub-ject of the contract in installments, while the interest of the Bank is the profit it generates by the sale of the subject of the contract at the price higher than the purchase price.Salem and Istisna provide medium-term financing of the pro-duction, construction and acquisition of goods such as indus-trial equipment and products, building constructions, agri-cultural production materials and the like. The price in the contract may be paid entirely in advance or in installments during the production.

The basic difference between salem and istisna is the sub-ject of financing which in case of istisna is explicitly related to the production, while in case of salem it may be any other goods. The difference is also reflected in the price which in salem case must be paid in advance, while istisna allows pa-yment in installments.Qard Hasan is a non-targeted interest free loan. Each Islamic Bank has a fund where it directs a certain amount of its as-sets for non-targeted interest free financing. Since the assets of such fund are limited, it is the most vulnerable categories of the population that receive funding.


�0


Osvrt na finansijsku krizu u SaD

Finansijski i ekonomski uragan koji je uzdrmao svjetsku javnost u septem-

bru ove godine imao je tužnu završnicu uz proglašenje bankrotstva banke Lehman Brothers. Barclays Capital je završila kupo-vinu North American investment Banking i Capital Market businesses Lehman Brothersa 22. septembra 2008.g. Kao dio transakci-je, indikatori Lehman Brothers su posta-li dio Barclays Capitala. Samo nekoliko dana ranije, tačnije 14. septembra, ova in-vesticiona banka je objavila bankrotstvo nakon velikih gubitaka na tržištu nekret-nina i pada povjerenja investitora. Ovim je okončano poslednje poglavlje u istoriji Lehman Brothers koju su 1850.g. osnovala braća Henry, Emanuel i Mayer Lehman, u Montgomeriju u Alabami. To je dramatič-na sudbina banke koja je nekada smatrana veoma opreznom i bankom sa odličnim menadžmentom.

Propast Lehman Brothers-a je počela sa kolapsom tržista nekretnina 2007.g. kada su akcije ove banke počele naglo da pada-ju. Lehman Borthers je bila glavni igrač na tržistu tzv. sabprajm kredita. Podsjetimo da su sabprajm (eng. subprime) namjen-ski krediti za kupovinu nekretnina koji se dodjeljuju “rizičnim” kategorijama stanov-ništva u SAD (u rizične kategorije spadaju lica koja ne posjeduju nikakvu dokumen-taciju u vezi primanja i aktivnosti). Banke ovim licima pružaju “šansu” prihvatajuci na sebe rizik da im se kredit nikada ne otplati. Lehman Brothers je progresivno odobravala ove kredite a u međuvremenu je zajedno sa Tishman Speyer-om platila $22 miliona da bi kupila gigantskog konstruktora sta-nova Archstone. Gubici u ovom poslu su odmah izašli na vidjelo.

Tokom 80-ih, dosadašnji izvršni direktor Lehman Brothers-a, Richard Fuld, je bio na čelu frakcije brokera koja se borila pro-tiv bankarske u istoj banci na čelu sa Steve Swartzmanom i Peter Petersonom, koji su tražili da firma koristi sopstveni kapital u poslovanju. Brokeri su se tome suprostav- ljali. Ovaj rat između brokera i bankara je toliko oslabio Lehman Brothers da je 1984.g. prodata American Express-u. Richard Fuld je ostao u Lehman Brothers-u dok su je Švarcman i Piterson napustili otišavši u Blackston Group gdje su se obogatili. U toku 1994.g. American Express je napus-tila “strategiju finansijskog supermarketa” oformivši “novu” banku Lehman Brothers, sa Richardom Fuldom na čelu kao izvrš-nim direktorom. Zbog toga je potrebno precizirati da Lehman Brothers o kojoj se toliko priča ovih data nije banka stara 158, vec samo 14 godina sa 158 godina sta-rim imenom. Zbog fatalnih odluka koje su dovele do kraha Lehman Brothers-a i lo-šeg menadžmenta, ovih dana se spekuliše da bi Richard Fuld, koji je u toku 2007.g. prijavio primanja u iznosu od 37 miliona dolara, mogao da dobije maksimalnu kaz-nu od 24 godine zatvora.

Činilo se da ce Lehman Brothers opsta-ti nakon objave Odbora direktora Federal Reserve u martu 2008.g. da će odobriti jednu veću sumu određenim bankama. Međutim, ova banka nije uspjela da po-vrati povjerenje tržista, uprkos činjenici da iza nje stoji država.

Bankrotstvo Lehman Brothers-a, kupo-vina banke Merryl Lynch od strane Bank of America i spasavanje tri gigantske fi-nansijske institucije u SAD, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac i AIG, od strane države, su

toliko uzdrmali svjetsku finansijsku i po-litičku1 javnost da su se u finansijkim kru-govima na globalnom nivou počele javljati teze o početku finansijskog Armagedona a ne hvale ni poređenja sa krizom iz 1929.g. Svako poređenje je neadekvatno obzirom da aktuelni problemi imaju nezapamćene razmjere u istoriji.

Kako je sve počelo – Izvor problema su nepokretnosti u SAD. Posjedovanje nekret-nine oduvijek je dio američkog (i ne samo američkog) sna. Da bi olakšao kupovinu nepokretnosti, američki, neadekvatno kontrolisani finansijski sistem, je počeo da nudi kredite koji su pokrivali 100% vrijednosti nepokretnosti, sa niskim ra-tama, bez garancija o finansijskoj posto-janosti klijenta.

Postavlja se pitanje zašto su banke odob-ravale kredite onima koji nisu mogli da ih otplate? Odgovor je (a u njemu leži drugi problem) u činjenici da je rizik o neotplati duga prenesen na druge. Banke su “pako-vale” ove kredite u hartije od vrijednosti koje su kasnije prodavane na tržistu dru-gim investitorima. Na ovaj način banke su mogle odmah da nastave sa odobravanjem novih kredita. Tako se pothranjivala trgo-vina nepokretnostima, dok se pogoršavao kvalitet kredita. Ovakva situacija nije mogla dugo da traje i u avgustu 2007.g. sve izlazi na vidjelo. Hartije od vrijednosti vezane za kredite su izgubile vrijednost. Tržiste postaje svjesno da mnogi korisnici kredi-ta ne mogu da ih otplate. Strah je počeo da se širi na sve hartije od vrijednosti i one koje su imale u zaleđu “loše” kredite ali i one koje su iza sebe imale “dobre” kredite. Osim toga, ideja o prenosu rizika nije se odnosila samo na kredite vezane za nepok-

1 RepublikanskikandidatMcCainjenajaviosuspenzijusvojepredizbornekampanje25.septembra2008.PoštojekonstantnooptuživaosaradnikeBarakaObamedasusarađivalisaFannieMaeiFreddieMac,gigantksiminstitucijamakojesuodobravalerizičnekredite,NewYorkTimesjekrajemavgustaobjelodaniodajefirmanadležnazakampanjuMcCaina,RickDavis,bilanaplatnomspiskuFreddieMacaod2005.g.RickDavisjeunovčavala15000dolaramjesečnozakonsaltingilobiranje,čimesenegiraMcCainovatvrdnjadaDavisvećgodinamanesarađujesaFannieMaeiFreddieMac.Ustanovljenojetakođedaje26McCainovihsaradnikasarađivalosaFannieMaeiFeddieMac.

Krajem septembra 2008.g. predsjednik SAD, George Bush je, obraćajuci se naciji dramatičnim govorom, potencirao da su SAD u opasnosti. Ovog puta nije terorizam već ekonomija koja uliva strah. Ostavljajući po strani liberalizam, predsjednik Bush je sazvao sastank sa oba predsjednička kandidata - a što je inače presedan u istoriji SAD-a - u cilju donošenja odluke o odobravanju plana spašavanja Wall Street-a pripremljenog od strane ministra finansija Paulsona

Dr. Zorica Vasović


the view at the Financial crisis in the usa

At the end of September 2008 the president of the USA, George Bush, when addressing to thenation with a dramatic speech, insisted that the USA were at danger. This time it is not terrorism buteconomy that strikes with fear. Leaving aside liberalism, the president Bush called the meeting with both presidential candidates – which is a precedent in the history of the USA – to make a decision on approving the plan for Wall Street salvation prepared by the Minister of Finance - Paulson

Ph.D. Zorica Vasović

The financial and economic hurricane that shook the world public in September

this year had a sad ending with procla-mation of the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers Bank. Barclays Capital com-pleted the purchase of North American Investment Banking and Capital Market Businesses of Lehman Brothers on 22nd September 2008. As a part of the transac-tion, Lehman Brothers indicators became a part of Barclays Capital. Only a few days earlier, more precisely on 14th September, this investment bank announced bankrupt-cy after major losses in the real estate mar-ket and fall of trust of investors. This was the end of the final chapter in the history of Lehman Brothers which was founded in 1850 by brothers Henry, Emanuel and Mayer Lehman, in Montgomery in Alabama. This is a dramatic destiny of a bank that used to be considered as very conservative and as a bank with excellent management.

The fall of Lehman Brothers commen-ced with the collapse of the real estate market in 2007 when the shares of this bank began going down rapidly. Lehman Brothers was the key player in the market of so called subprime loans. Let’s remind that subrpime loans are purpose-defined loans for purchase of real estate approved to “risk-bearing” categories of population in the USA (the risk-bearing categories include persons who possess no docu-mentation about their income or activi-ties). Banks give these persons a “chance” assuming the risk that loans will never be repaid. Lehman Brothers progressive-ly approved such loans, and in meantime together with Tishman Speyer it paid $22 million to buy the gigantic constructor of

apartments - Archstone. The losses in this business immediately came to light.

During 80’s, the previous executive di-rector of Lehman Brothers, Richard Fuld, led the fraction of brokers which fought against the banking one within the same bank headed by Steve Swartzman and Peter Peterson, who demanded that the compa-ny should use its own capital for business. Brokers resisted it. This war between brokers and bankers weakened Lehman Brothers so much that in 1984 it was sold to American Express. Richard Fuld remained in Lehman Brothers while Svarcman and Piterson left to Blackston Group where they became rich. In 1994 American Express abandoned the “financial supermarket strategy” by cre-ating a “new” Lehman Brothers Bank, with Richard Fuld managing it as its executive director. Therefore it is necessary to state precisely that Lehman Brothers, which is so much talked about these days, is not a bank 158 years old, but only 14 years with the name which is 158 years old. Due to fatal decisions which led to the disaster of Lehman Brothers and poor manage-ment, these days it has been speculated that Richard Fuld, who reported income in the amount of $37 million in 2007, might be imposed the maximum sentence of 24 years of prison.

It seemed that Lehman Brothers would survive after the announcement of the Board of Directors of Federal Reserve in March 2008 that they would approve a large amount to specific banks. However this bank failed to regain the trust of the market, despite the fact that the state was backing it.

The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the purchase of Merryl Lynch Bank by the Bank

of America and salvation of three gigantic financial institutions in the USA, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG, by the State shook the world financial and political1 public so much that in the financial cir-cuits at the global level theses commenced to arise about the beginning of a financial Armageddon, and the comparisons with the crisis from 1929 is not something to be praised about either. Each comparison is inadequate given that the current problems are of unprecedented scale in history.

How did it all begin – The source of the problem are real estates in the USA. The possession of real estates has always been a part of American (and not only American) dream. As to facilitate the purchase of real estates, American, inadequately controlled financial system, began to offer loans which covered 100% value of real estate, with low installments, without guarantees for finan-cial creditworthiness of clients.

The question arises: why did banks appro-ve loans to those who could not pay them back? The answer is (and this is where anot-her problem lies) in the fact that the risk of non-repayment of debt was transferred to others. Banks “packed” these loans into securities which were subsequently sold in the market to other investors. In this way, banks could immediately continue with approving new loans. This is how the tra-de in real estate was encouraged, while the quality of loans deteriorated. Such situati-on could not last long and in August 2007 everything came to light. Securities related to loans lost their value. The market beco-mes aware that many users of loans may not repay them. The fear started to spread to all securities, those backed with “bad”

1 RepublicancandidateMcCainannouncedthesuspensionofhispre-electioncampaignon25thSeptember2008.ConstantlyaccusingtheassociatesofBarackObamatohavecooperatedwithFannieMaeandFreddieMac,thegiganticinstitutionswhichapprovedrisk-bearingloans,NewYorkTimesattheendofAugustdisclosedthatthefirmcompetentforthecompanyofMcCain,RickDavis,wasatthepayrollofFreddieMacsince2005.RickDaviscashed15000dollarsamonthforconsultingandlobbying,whichdeniesMcCain’sstatementthatDavishasnotbeencooperatingwithFannieMaeandFreddieMacinyears.Itwasalsoestablishedthat26McCain’sassociatescooperatedwithFannieMaeandFreddieMac.



��retnosti. Ostale pozajmice su upakovane u hartije u vrijednosti i prodate na tržištu kao npr. pozajmice za kupovinu kola, kreditne kartice, pozajmice vezane za finansiranje kupovine preduzeća.

Čija je krivica - Krivica leži u slaboj kon-troli. U SAD kontrola nije centralizovana. Postoji veoma veliki broj kontrolora u bankama, kako na saveznom nivou, tako i na nivou saveznih država. Kompleksnost ovakvog nadzora na više nivoa, kao i mentalitet zasnovan na povjerenju u fi-nansijski sistem, otežava da se sazna šta se zaista desilo.

Kakvi su rizici za privredu - Osnovni rizik je nedostatak povjerenja. Na pitanje koliki je broj korisnika kredita koji ga nikad neće otplatiti i koliki će biti stvarni gubici nakon prodaje nepokretnosti niko ne može odgovoriti. Bilo koja racionalna pretpostavka je bez sumnje inferiornija od onoga na šta uka-zuju cijene hartija od vrijednosti koje iza sebe imaju kredite. Moguće je računati da se u mnogim slučajevima te cijene procjenjuju na 70% od vrijednosti koje su banke odobrile na ime kredita. Tržište je u strahu i ne želi da se bavi tim hartijama, cijene padaju, tržište snižava vrijednost banaka koje iza sebe imaju te “otrovne” hartije. Nepovjerenje se širi i rizikuje da zarazi od-luke pojedinaca i preduzeća što vrlo lako može da vodi ka recesiji.

Da li se isplati moralni hazard - Kada jed-nu banku spase moćne državne institucije postoji rizik da tako radeći, ostale banke se ohrabruju da i one rizikuju jer je presedan učinjen i postoji pretpostavka da će neko stati i iza njih. Ovakav moralni hazard je veoma precijenjen. I kad uslijedi spašavanje, rukovodstvo spašene banke ostaje bez posla a akcionari gube dobit. Dakle, ne može se govoriti da spasavanje ohrabruje moralni hazard. I u slučaju Bear Sterns, Fannie Mae i Freddie Mac kažnjavanje rukovodstva je bilo veoma oštro a nakon septembarskog sloma finansijskog tržišta predložene su mjere kojima se ograničavaju veoma vi-soke plate menadžera.

FBI je otvorio istragu o poslovanju Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Lehman Brothers, AIG. U slučaju da se ustanovi da je došlo do nepoštovanja Sarbaines-Oxley zakona, rukovodstvo i konsultanti bi mogli lično odgovarati. Komisija SAD za hartije od

vrijednosti (SEC) je takođe otvorila istra-gu. Procjenjuje se da bi istraga FBI mogla dugo trajati, čak i nekoliko godina. Sjetimo se slučaja Enron. Bivši predsjednik i izvrš-ni direktor Kenneth Lay i Jeffrey Skilling su optuženi za niz krivičnih djela. Lay je u međuvremenu preminuo a Skilling je osuđen na 24 godine i 4 mjeseca zatvora. U slučaju Worldcom-a, giganta visoke teh-nologije, bivši generalni direktor Bernard Ebers je osuđen na 25 godina zatvora za ulogu koju je imao u poslovima koji su doveli do bankrotstva kompanije, čime je ova kompanija ušla u istoriju kao najveće

korporativno bankrotstvo. Ista kazna je izrečena Dennisu Kozlowskom koji ce ostati upamćen po rođendanskoj zabavi priređenoj na Sardiniji u čast supruge, po cijeni od 2 miliona US$ - cijeni koju je platila kompanija Tyco na čijem se čelu nalazio. Martha Stewart, TV zvijezda, je optužena za insajder trejding. Naime, prodala je akcije jedne farmaceutske fir-me nekoliko dana prije nego što je firmi odbijen zahtijev za licencu novog lijeka čime je prevarila investitore. U toku 2004.g. je osuđena na 5 mjeseci zatvora. Ovo su samo neki primjeri kažnjavanja ruko-vodilaca velikih kompanija u SAD, koje u pogledu strogih i visokih kazni predn-jače u svijetu.

Zašto bankrotiraju banke - One koje su propale, u prvom redu su bile banke koje nemaju bazu depozita. Da bi odobrile kredit trebalo je da ga one same prvo pozajme, što je vodilo do veoma rizičnog odnosa između duga i kapitala. Ovo uvijek dovodi banke u opasnu situaciju ako se rezerva fondova isprazni a kreditori fondova investicionih banaka ne obnove pozajmicu, tako da je logičan sljed događaja da investiciona ban-ka ulazi u krizu likvidnosti.

Ko profitira iz krize - Spašavanje banaka u SAD i Engleskoj je izazvalo velike kritike. Treba se podsjetiti da je početkom ‘90-ih Švedsku zadesila velika bankarska kriza, koja je dovela do masovnih spašavanja i nacionalizacije mnogih banaka. Banke su na kraju prodate, a država je zaradila. I u slučaju spašavanja Chryslera 1979.g. poreski obveznici u SAD su na kraju imali koristi. Nije isključeno da će i američka vlada zaraditi u slučaju spašavanja AIG, Fannie Mae i Freddie Maca.

Lekcija koja se može izvući iz krize - Kriza kroz koju prolazi SAD nije samo finansijska, već prije svega moralna. Upravo zbog pada morala na političkom, ekonomskom, finansijskom i u manjoj mjeri građanskom nivou, došlo je do finansijske krize. Za tehničke razloge krize na Wall Street-u, kao što su velike pozajmice i nepostojanje adek-vatne kontrole, lijek postoji - uspostavljanje stroge kontrole i transparentnosti. Međutim, biće to privremeni lijek ukoliko se ne bude napravila analiza korijena zla - korupcije i gramzivosti koje karakterišu dobar dio za-padne kulture. Svjesna zloupotreba položaja

od strane pojedinaca kao i glad za profitom su minirali kredibilitet mnogih institucija i učinili da ovakav model menadžmenta i kontrole bude ocijenjen kao neprihvatljiv u većini zemalja.

U starim civilizacijama zaduživanje se smatralo povredom časti, a dužnici su zavr-šavali kao robovi ili, kako je opisao Flober u “Madam Bovari”, samoubistvom.

Kao što je izašlo na vidjelo ovih dana, upravo je finansijski i bankarski sektor u SAD bio taj koji se zaduživao i to po ne-koliko stotina miliona US$ i pozivao pre-duzeća i pojedince da učine to isto. Na početku prošlog vijeka, SAD su investirale kapital koji je dolazio iz Evrope u indus-triju, a nakon 50 godina u infrastrukturu i transport u interesu napretka nacije. U poslednje vrijeme, američke banke su spe-kulisale u svoju korist, uvlačeći pojedince i porodice u vrtlog sabprajm kredita i viso-korizičnih fondova. Bušova administracija je to podržavala tako što nije odobrila po-većanje plata i penzija, zdravstvena pomoć je (p)ostala privilegija imućnih, šaljući na taj način milione porodica u siromaštvo. Slično se zbilo i 1929.g. ali za razliku od tad, država je intervenisala, pa ostaje da se nadamo da ce naslednik Bush-a biti novi Roosvelt, koji će raditi na vraćanju starih dobrih moralnih vrijednosti.

Ne može se ignorisati da je suma od 700 milijardi US$ predloženih od strane admi-nistracije SAD za spas Wall Street-a i to u godini izbora (ista suma je utrošena za rat u Iraku i Avganistanu), uskraćena građani-ma, i da se ista suma mogla uložiti u hitne ekonomsko-socijalne refome. Nadamo se da će ova kriza podstaći vrh SAD-a da vrati tržištu izgubljenu humanu dimenziju ■




loans and those backed with “good” loans too. In addition, the idea of transfer of risk did not relate only to loans related to real estate. Other borrowings were packed into securities and sold in the market such as e.g. borrowings for purchase of cars, cre-dit cards, borrowings related to financing purchase of companies.

Who is the culprit – Poor control is to be blamed. The control is not centralized in the USA. There is a large number of exam-iners in banks, both at the federal level and at the level of federal states. The complexity of this supervision at several levels, as well

as the mentality based on the trust in the financial system, makes finding out what really happened difficult.

What are the risks for economy – The basic risk is the lack of trust. The question about the number of users of loans that will never repay them and the size of real losses after the sale of real estate no one can answer. Any reasonable assumption is, without doubt, more inferior than what is indicated by prices of securities backed by loans. It is possible to count that in many cases such prices are estimated to 70% of the value ap-proved by banks in the name of loans. The market is in fear and doesn’t want to deal with such securities, the prices go down, and the market lowers the value of banks backed by such “poisonous” securities. The distrust spreads and is at risk to infect the decisions of individuals and companies which may easily lead to recession.

Is moral hazard worth it – When one bank is rescued by powerful state institutions there is a risk that doing so would encour-age other banks to take risks since there has been such a precedent and there is an assumption that somebody would back them up too. Such moral hazard is very overrated. Even in the case of salvation, the management of the saved bank is laid off, and shareholders lose profit. Therefore, it may not be said that rescuing would en-courage moral hazard. And in the case of Bear Sterns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac the management was strictly punished, and after the September crisis of financial market measures were proposed to limit very high salaries of managers.

FBI opened an investigation about the business activities of Freddie Mac, Fannie

Mae, Lehman Brothers, and AIG. In case it has been established that there was non-observance of Sarbaines-Oxley law, the management and consultants might be personally accountable. The US Securities Commission (SEC) also initiated an inves-tigation. It is assessed that the FBI investi-gation might take a long time, even a few years. Let’s remind ourselves of the Enron case. The former president and the exe-cutive director, Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling were accused of a range of cri-minal actions. In meantime Lay died and Skilling was sentenced to 24 years and 4 months of prison. In case of Worldcom, a high technology giant, former general di-rector Bernard Ebers was sentenced to 25 years of prison for the role he had in busi-ness operations that led to the bankruptcy of the company, which made this company enter history as the largest corporate ban-kruptcy. The same sentence was imposed on Dennis Kozlowski who will always be remembered because of the birthday party organized in Sardinia in honor of his wife, at the cost of $2 million - the cost paid by the company Tyco which head officer he was. Martha Stewart, a TV star, was accu-sed of insider trading. Namely, she sold shares of a pharmacy firm a few days pri-or the firm was denied the application for the license of a new medicine and thereby deceived investors. In 2004 she was senten-ced to 5 months of prison. These are only some examples of the punishments for managers of large companies in the USA, which in respect of strictness and amount are the leading in the world.

Why do banks bankrupt – Those which bankrupted, primarily were the banks with-out deposit base. In order to approve a loan they were supposed to borrow it themselves, which led to a very risky debt/capital ratio. This always brings banks to a dangerous situation if the reserve funds clear out, and creditors of funds of investment banks do not renew the borrowing, therefore a log-ic course of events is that the investment bank enters the liquidity crisis.

Who makes profit from the crisis – Salvation of banks in the USA and England provoked major criticism. We should remind that at the beginning of 90s Sweden was hit by a major banking crisis, which led to mass salvation and nationalization of many banks. Banks were eventually sold, and the State made money. Also, in case of rescuing Chrysler in 1979 taxpayers in the USA finally had benefits. It is not impossible that the American government will make profit

in case of rescuing AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

The lesson that may be learnt from the crisis – The crisis to which the USA is currently subject is not only financial, but primarily moral. It is just the fall of moral on the po-litical, economic, financial and to a lesser extent civil level that led to the financial crisis. For technical reasons of the crisis in Wall Street, such as large borrowings and nonexistence of adequate control, reme-dy exists – establishment of strict control and transparency. However, it will be only a temporary remedy if the analysis is not made with regard to the roots of the evil – corruption and greed that characterize a major part of Western culture. Intentional abuse of the position by individuals as well as the hunger for profit undermined the credibility of many institutions and made such model of management and control to be evaluated as unacceptable in most of the countries.

In old civilizations borrowing was consi-dered as offence of honor, and debtors en-ded up as slaves or, as Flaubert described in “Madam Bovary”, committing suicide.

As it has come to light these days, it was the very financial and banking sector in the USA that borrowed in the amount of even several hundred million US$ and invited enterprises and individuals to do the same. At the beginning of last century, the USA invested capital that came from Europe into industry, and after 50 years in infrastruc-ture and transport of interest for the prog-ress of the nation. Lately, American banks speculated in their own interest, involving individuals and families in the whirlpool of subprime loans and high-risk funds. Bush’s administration supported it by not approving the increase of salaries and pen-sions, health care has become (remained) the privilege of the rich, sending thereby millions of families into poverty. Similar happened in 1929, too, but unlike then, the state intervened, so all that remains for us is to hope that the successor of Bush will be a new Roosevelt who will work on re-turning good old moral values.

It may not be ignored that the sum of $700 billion proposed by the USA administration for salvation of Wall Street, yet in the year of elections (the same sum was spent for the war in Iraqi and Afghanistan), will be denied to citizens, and that the same sum could have been invested in urgent eco-nomic-social reforms. We hope that this crisis will encourage the ruling circles of the USA to return the human dimension to the market ■


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aktuelnoSt – Kada se centralni bankari i vodeći finansijski administratori počnu koristiti medicinskim vokabularom u smislu: “krvotok će stati jer je “gangrena” unutar sistema jaka; biće izazvan srčani udar sistema; samo ne znamo da li će se desiti sjutra ili za mjesec dana, ali znamo da će se si-gurno desiti” (B. Bernanke, H. Paulson 18/09/2008), a po-tom sličan prilaz primijene političari i državnici, dobijamo potvrdu o velikom finansijskom globalnom poremećaju. Bail-out plan američke administracije (TARF “Troubled Assets Relief Program”) uz još niz jednokratnih intervencija trošak željene stabilizacije precizira na skoro 7% BDP-a na-cionalne ekonomije,1 uz napomenu da se u kalkulaciji ovog troška ne uključuju značajne primarne podrške od Fed-a ili podrška nacionalizovanim hipotekarnim kompanijama (Fanny Mae&Freddy Mack).2

Treba stručno prihvatiti da nije u pitanju samo još jedna kriza tržišta u nizu očekujuće i jake revaluacije vrijednosti tržišnog materijala sa kojim se trguje. Fokusirati se samo na jednu stranu krize koja je otpočela polovinom septembra, a ne sagledati “korijene” od prije 14 mjeseci, kada je konačnim objelodanjivanjem gubitka vrijednosti nekretnina u SAD,3 a samim tim i svih vezanih i uvezanih finansijskih proizvo-da koji su tu vrijednost koristili kao garanciju dugoročnosti i pouzdanosti prema najširem krugu klijenata i malih in-vestitora širom svijeta, bio bi pojednostavljen pristup kom-pleksnoj kriznoj situaciji. Analitički, pošto još nije vrijeme realne imparcijalnosti struke i akademije zbog goruće te-kuće turbulentnosti, a priori odbaciti poređenja sa Velikom depresijom neodrživo je i nedovoljno argumentovano jer se izvještaji o kolapsu tek sumiraju (mada već pristižu podaci o nezapošljenosti koji ne mogu ništa značiti bez usporavanja ekonomskog razvoja) i na mjesečnom nivou objavljuju sa sada već intencionim kašnjenjem, da bi se panika pokušala sistemski kontrolisati.

U retrospektivi, u avgustu 2007. godine, prva faza krize je, naravno, udarila u komercijalne banke koje svakodne-vno podnose račune akcionarima i malim deponentima. Međutim, kratkovido uvjerenje struke je bilo da su Fed os-tale centralne banke uspjele u ujednačenom nastupu uba-civanjem novih primarnih novčanih sredstava da pomognu i umire krizu, jer je u pitanju kratkoročna izloženost, od-nosno pitanje svakodnevne likvidnosti. Samim tim, kriza je privremeno okončana podacima otpisa i čišćenjem bilansa komercijalnih banaka u narednim kvartalima.

Ipak, čim je granica od 12 mjeseci pređena, dotaklo se pi-tanje solventnosti, a uz odsustvo ozbiljnog restrukturiranja pristupu slobodnim fondovima, ukupne rizične izloženosti investicionih banaka, pojačane neuspjehom snaženja ka-pitalnih osnova ovih banaka, sučeljavaju ih sa potrebom sravnjenja trgovačkih knjiga. Nakon toga se, likvidacijom ili nasilnim pripajanjem, okončavaju sudbine ključnih tr-žišnih igrača u jednom danu.

Ovo je značilo da je kriza finansijskog sistema stigla u svoje središte, među “finansije u sjenci”4, najrespektabilniji pro-dukt globalizacije. Bez spoljnjih faktora koji su u bilo kojem trenutku mogli narušiti princip rasta bez granica, uz realno odsustvo analitičkog sagledavanja mogućih posljedica tak-vog rasta, ukupna industrija nebankarskih subjekata koji su se bavili bankarskim poslovima je implodirala unutar sebe same. Zbog veličine i interkonektibilnosti sa komercijalnim bankarstvom i sa realnim sektorom privređivanja, brisanje ukupne industrije jednostavnim tržišnim sučeljavanjem je ipak bio više teorijski “eksperiment” nego realni, odgovorni potez. Zato je administrativna intervencija bila neophodna, bez obzira na ideologije. Kreatori tekuće krize jesu investi-cioni bankari jer su neprincipijelno i nesmotreno izmjerili rizike, ali sravnjenje obimnog krajnjeg troška uvijek je od-govornost najšireg kruga tržišnih i ostalih participanata u

SISTEMSKA FINANSIJSKA KRIZA

povratakoSnovama

1 MMFekspertiLucLaeveniFabianLavenciasunaosnovustudijeranijihkrizaprocijenilidajetrošakfinansijskihkrizauprosjeku16%BDP-arespektivnenacionalneekonomije,uznapomenudasurijetkodonošenipotezikojiodjednomuvodeznačajnesumesredstava,osimkadajeupravljanjekrizomjasnoupućivalodajeostalasamojošopcija“stabilizacijeposvakucijenu”.

2 ProfesorNourielRoibini,NewYorkUniversity,smatradaćetrošakkrizebitiznačajnovećiidotaćigranicuod1.000milijardidolara,februar2008.godine“TheRiskof

SystemicFinancialMeltdown:12StepstoaFinancialDisaster”(www.rgemonitor.com);3 Vodećiakademiciglobalizacijevećulazeuanalizedalijeunipolarniekonomskii

političkisvijetsaSADucentrukojijetrajaodesetgodinapredkrajem,idalićetajkrajzadosadaekonomskinajjačuzemljuusvijetutrajatiznačajnokraćeoddekade;

4 “Finansijeusjenci”čineinvesticionebanke,ostalefinansijskeinstitucijekojenisudepozitneinstitucije,vanbilansneinstitucije(SPV-specialpurposevehicle,SPI-specialpurposeinvestment),javnifondovi,hedžfondovi.

Mila Kasalica


SYSTEM FINANCIAL CRISIS

back to baSicSMila Kasalica

recent eventS - When banking regulatory authorities and leading financial administrators start using medical expressi-ons such as: “blood circulation will stop since the ’gangrene’ within the system is acute; heart-failure of the system will be brought about; the only thing that we don’t know is whet-her it will happen tomorrow or in a month, but we know it will happen for sure“ (B. Bernanke, H. Paulson 18/09/2008), and then politicians and statesmen start applying a similar approach, we should be aware of a huge financial disrupti-on at the global level. The bail-out plan of the USA admi-nistration, (TARF “Troubled Assets Relief Program”) along with the array of one-shot interventions, specifies the cost of the desired stabilization at the level of almost 7% of nati-onal economy’s GDP , with the note that the calculation of this cost does not include the considerable primary support from the Federal Reserves, or the support to nationalized mortgage companies (Fanny Mae & Freddy Mack).

Professionally it should be accepted that this is not just another market crisis in the series of anticipated and strong revaluation of the tradable market material. Focusing on just one side of the crisis, which has commenced in the mid of this September, without viewing “the roots” from 14 months ago, when the final disclosure of the loss in the value of real estates in the USA , and thereby all related and linked finan-cial products which used such value as the guarantee of long duration and reliability to the broadest base of clients and small investors around the world, would represent a simpli-fied approach to this complex crisis situation. Analytically, since it is not the time yet for realistic impartiality of profes-sionals and academics due to the burning turbulence, a pri-ori rejecting the comparisons with the Great depression is not sustainable and sufficiently reasoned, as the reports on the financial collapse are yet to be summarized (although the data on unemployment are already coming, which may mean

nothing without the slowdown of economic development) and published on monthly basis now with intentional delay, in order to attempt to systemically control the panic.

Retrospectively, in August 2007, the first phase of the cri-sis naturally hit the commercial banks which daily report to shareholders and minor depositors. However, the short-sighted conviction of the professionals was that the Federal Reserves and other Central Banks succeeded in achieving balance by injecting new primary funds in order to provide assistance and relieve the crisis, as it was about the short-term exposure, i.e. day-to-day liquidity issue. Therefore, the crisis was temporarily terminated by write-off data and clearing of commercial banks’ balances in subsequent quarters.

Nevertheless, as soon as the 12 month period limit expired, the solvency issue was raised, followed by the absence of serious restructuring of the free funds access, the investment banks’ overall risk exposure, reinforced by the failure in strengthe-ning the capital base of such banks, makes the banks face the necessity of settling their trading books. Afterwards, the key market players’ destiny comes to the end in a single day, either through liquidation or forced acquisition.

This means the financial system crisis reached its midpoint and joined the “shadow finance” , the most respectable product of the globalization process. Without external factors, which could violate the principle of growth without frontiers at any moment, along with practical absence of analytical conside-ration of such growth’s potential consequences, overall indus-try of non-banking entities, dealing with banking business imploded within itself. Due to its size and inter-connectibi-lity with commercial banking and real sector, the wiping out of the whole industry through simple market confrontation was, after all, theoretical “experiment” rather than a realistic, responsible action. For this reason, the administrative inter-vention was a necessity, regardless of ideologies. Investment

1 MMFexpertsLucLaevenandFabianLavenciaappraised,basedonthepriorcrisisstudies,thatthecostofthefinancialcrisisrepresentinaverage16%oftherespectivenationaleconomy’sGDP,withthenotethattheactionswhichabruptlyintroducedsignificantamountsoffundswererarelyundertaken,exceptincaseswhencrisisma-nagementclearlyshowedthatthelastremainingoptionwas“stabilizationatallcost“.

2 ProfessorNourielRoibini,NewYorkUniversity,isoftheopinionthatthecostofthecrisisisgoingtobesignificantlyhigherandwillreachthelimitof1.000billiondollars,February2008,“TheRiskofSystemicFinancialMeltdown:12Stepstoa

FinancialDisaster”(www.rgemonitor.com);3 Leadingglobalizationacademicsarealreadyanalyzingwhethertheone-polar

economicandpoliticalworldwiththeUSAinitscenter,whichlastedfortenyears,isfacingitsend,andwhethersuchendfortheto-dateeconomicallystrongestcountryintheworldwilllastsignificantlylessthanadecade;

4 “Shadowfinance”constitutesinvestmentbanks,otherfinancialinstitutionsotherthandepositaryinstitutions,off-balanceinstitutions(SPV-specialpurposevehicle,SPI-specialpurposeinvestment),publicfunds,hedgingfunds.


��privrednom životu, jer globalizacija čini prostor za potpuni kolaps zajedničkim, a ne pojedinačnim.

Nestajanje velikog Wall Street-a u kratkom periodu doka-zalo je da veliki broj proizvoda i finansijskih instrumenata u koje se mogu uložiti slobodna novčana sredstva ne čini tržište kapitala “dubokim”, odnosno rezistentnim na šoko-ve. Prva kontrakcija sistema u aprilu tekuće godine (Bear Stearns) je uvela pitanje nelikvidnosti kao primarno, poti-rući argumente prvoklasnih rejtinga tržišnog materijala i malih raspona rizika kao argumente marketinga, a ne do-kaze struke o upravljanju rizicima, što je dodatno evidenti-ralo neodrživost aktuelnog stanja. Zašto? Jednostavno, čim je povjerenje uzdrmano, najširi krug komitenata donosi istu odluku - prodati i čuvati pare “pod dušek”, a takva reakcija pokreće “spiralu bezdana”. Gubitak povjerenja u bankare i finansijere, bez obzira na kvalitativno-subjektivnu karakte-rizaciju koja ide uz ovu odrednicu, postaje i ostaje osnovni pokazatelj “plitkosti” odnosno “dubine” nekog tržišta finan-sijskih instrumenata, odnosno jačine i rezistentnosti prema strukturnim šokovima.

Dodatno, jasna identifikacija suštinske slabosti koja je do-prinijela dužini i jačini krize je vezana za limite postojeće primjenljivosti regulative bankarskog i ukupnog finansijkog tržišta. Vrijeme velike likvidnosti je posljednjih deset godina struku i supervizore držalo u ubjeđenju da je Bazel II okvir koji može detektovati i preduprijediti sve eventualne stresne situacije. Ali, suočavanje sa parcijalnim posljedicama mu-tirajuće krize finansijskog sistema vodi ka zaključku da će se nakon stabilizacije tekuće krize, ući u fazu promišljanja o novom kapitalnom sporazumu ili novim regulatornim saradnjama i ICT uvezanostima. Vremena krize daju jači-nu novim argumentima dok periodi niskog nivoa rizika, a visoke likvidnosti, proizašli iz ekspanzivne monetarne po-litike vodećih ekonomija, uvijek vode ka slobodnom po-našanju bez granica. SREDIŠTE KRIZE – Možemo li jasno argumentovati da je ovog septembra ipak doživljen “uragan” i da uz manje, iako potencijalno jake šokove, ukupna kriza ulazi u mirniji pe-riod stabilizacije i strukturisanja.

Prvo, efekti primjene bail-out plana tek treba da dokažu da nije odobren “previše kasno” i da nije u pitanju “previše malo”. Spašavanje investicionih bankara nije pitanje ideolo-gije, nego ulaganja u povratak povjerenja, a na visoko od-sustvo povjerenja jedini pravi tržišni leveridž može i mora da pruži nosilac javnih fondova i javnih aktivnosti. Investicioni i ostali bankari nisu radili ništa nelegalno, ali jesu pristupali sopstvenoj profesiji i zadacima struke nepametno. Potvrđuje se da kontrola štete tekuće krize ne rješava problem, dok se ne sagleda suština i kreatori poremećaja s ciljem identifika-cije budućih adekvatnih zaštitnih mehanizama.

Drugo, iako je za poštovanje pomenuti da je 166 vodećih profesora udarnih američkih univerziteta osporilo u javnom obraćanju potrebu za ovako drastičnim ulaskom na tržište igrača koji su fokusirani na lične interese, ipak je vrijedno osporiti njihovo nesagledavanje snage aktuelnog nepovje-renja na finansijskom tržištu. U pitanju su akademici koji su do sada istraživali odsustvo povjerenja na finansijskom tržištu kroz anegdote zemalja u razvoju, uz pretpostavku da slična situacija nikada ne može uzdrmati najjaču zem-lju razvijenih ekonomija. Ovo je kriza koja potvrđuje da su neprikosnovene istine akademije podvrgnute preispitivanju,

posebno jer ni tržište, ni država, ni neko treći ne mogu pružiti signale povratka povjerenja na bazi gašenja i pro-čišćavanja učesnika, a nesagledavanja detaljnih i ukupnih odnosa među “igračima”.

Treće, širenje posljedica na mnoge druge nacionalne eko-nomije, čak i one koje su imale unutrašnje snage i znanja da se suprostave ekonomskim receptima MMF-a i SB, u situaciji globalne zavisnosti je podrazumijevajuće, čime se potencijalno najavljuje vrijeme budućih preraspodjela i pre-usmjeravanja slobodnih fondova u dosadašnje nerazvijene za razvoj, a u aktuelno razvijene za gašenje požara.

Četvrto, da li je moguće zaustaviti “spiralu beznađa” savre-menog bankarstva i finansija, jer su veliki gubici već otpi-sani u bilansima komercijalnih banaka tokom prethodne godine, koji automatski znače potrebu za dodatnim kapi-talom kojeg su otpisi umanjili, dok su mogućnosti za odo-bravanjem kredita značajno smanjene. Nastupilo je vrijeme prekonoćnih likvidacija (Leahman Brothers, 17-09-2008) i nasilnih merdžovanja bankarskih subjekata i interventne prodaje aktive zbog nekvalitetne politike zaduživanja, ali po sniženim cijenama jer tekuće sučeljavanje ponude i tražnje ne rezultira u realnoj nego umanjenoj cijeni, zbog odsustva povjerenja (JP Morgan prodat Bank of America, po duplo manjoj cijeni od tržišne, 17-09-2008). ŠTA DALJE – Sljedeća faza nakon umirivanja krize, odnos-no savladavanja većine promptnih negativnih signala, uvodi potrebu za pročišćavanjem ukupnog finansijskog sistema i povratka osnovama struke.

Prvo, “ekonomija papira” kako se najčešće u kriznim situ-acijama etiketiraju bankarstvo i finansije je industrija pro-izvoda i usluga koja se zasniva na uspješnosti bankarskog subjekta da sakupi slobodna sredstva sa tržišta i intermedi-jacijom ih plasira putem raznovrsnih vidova kreditne podrš-ke projektima klijenata koji obećavaju da će na vrijeme is-pratiti obavezu vraćanja sredstava u skladu sa ugovorenim definicijama. U međuprostoru ove kompleksne jednačine su visoko nepouzdane kategorije moralnog hazarda i ne-gativne selekcije,5 dopunjene neprikosnovenim interesnim odrednicama da će se slobodna sredstva akumulacije umjes-to realnih 3-5 puta kroz obećanja, marketinške projekte ili neistražene finansijske instrumente zavrtjeti i do 20 puta. Ova pretjerana intermedijacija je srž tekućeg poremećaja i budući regulatorni principi će maksimalno pratiti indika-tore koji će davati preglede gdje se i na koji način usmje-ravaju slobodna sredstva investitora. Sigurno se neće limi-tirati slobodni tržišni kreativni efekti, ali će se vjerovatno nalaziti mehanizmi da se bankarski “snovi” o novim pro-izvodima i uslugama limitiraju u mjeri koja će davati jasne i jake transparentne informacije o prinosu, rasponu rizika i eventualnim slabostima koji su potrebni investitorima da donesu pouzdanu odluku o plasmanu, odnosno depono-vanju fondova.

Drugo, povjerenje klijenata i najšireg kruga investitora se ne može vratiti u kratkom periodu. Mora proći određe-ni period samo da se povrati jednostavni mehanizam sva-kodnevnih overdraft kredita, proizvoda koji najšire podrža-vaju mali i srednji biznis. Tek onda stupaju na scenu veliki projekti, veliki investitori, značajne preraspodjele bankarske pasive u aktivu, i ispunjenih očekivanja.


5 Ukratko,nemožesesvakomaplikantuodobritikredit,ainklinacijapremavećimprinosimaje,podefiniciji,bitsvakeprofitabilneaktivnosti.


bankers are the creators of the current crisis because of their unprincipled and incautious measuring of risks. However, the settlement of massive ultimate cost is always the responsibi-lity of the widest circle of market and other participants in economic life, as the globalization makes the environment for total collapse common not individual.

The disappearing of Wall Street in a short period has pro-ved that an ample number of products and financial instru-ments in which free funds can be invested does not make the capital market “deep”, i.e. resistant to shocks. The first con-traction of the system in April this year (Bear Sterns) inflic-ted the question of insolvency as primary, obliterating the arguments of the first ratings of market material and narrow risks spreads as marketing arguments rather than eviden-ce of professionals with regard to risk management, which additionally indicated the non-sustainability of the existent situation. Why? Simply, the moment when confidence was shaken, the widest circle of clients made the same decision – sell and keep the money “under the mattress”, and such reaction initiates a “spiral of abyss”. The loss of trust in ban-kers and financiers, regardless of qualitative-subjective cha-racterization that goes along to this determinant, becomes and remains the basic indicator of “shallowness” or “depth” of a market of financial instruments, i.e. its strength and re-sistance to structural shocks.

In addition, the clear identification of the essential wea-kness which contributed to the length and the intensity of the crisis is related to the limits of existing applicability of banking and overall financial market regulation. The time of great liquidity has kept professionals and supervisors for the last ten years in conviction that Basel II represents a fra-mework capable of detecting and preventing any potential stress situations. However, the facing with partial consequ-ences of financial system mutating crisis leads to the conc-lusion that a phase of consideration of a new capital accord or new regulatory cooperation and ICT connectivity will follow the stabilization of the current crisis. The times of crisis strengthen new arguments, while the periods of low risk level and high liquidity ensued from expansive mone-tary policy of leading economies always lead to liberal be-havior, with no restraints. miDpoint oF the criSiS - Can we clearly argue that the “hur-ricane” was experienced this September and along with lower, though potentially intensive shocks, overall crisis is entering a quieter period of stabilization and structuring?

Firstly, the effects of the bail out plan implementation need yet to prove that the plan was not approved “too late” and that it is not “too little”. The salvation of investment bankers is not a question of ideology but rather an investment in restoring confidence and in case of high absence of trust the only genu-ine market leverage may and must be provided by the entity responsible for public funds and public activities. Investment and other bankers did not commit anything illegal, but they did act unwisely in respect of their profession and vocational tasks. It is confirmed that the damage control of existing crisis does not resolve the problem, without prior consideration of the substance and creators of disruptions for the purpose of identifying future adequate protective mechanisms.

Secondly, worth of respect, the fact that 166 leading pro-fessors of the most prominent American universities publicly disputed the need for such drastic entering into market by the

players focused on personal interests, it is still worth challen-ging their not considering of the power of current distrust on financial market. These are academics who previously studied the absence of trust on financial market through anecdotes in developing countries, assuming that a similar situation could never agitate the strongest country of developed economies. This crisis confirms that inviolable truths of the academics are subject to revision, particularly since neither the market nor the state, or someone third, can provide signals for re-gaining of the trust based on closing and cleansing of par-ticipants without considering detailed and overall relations among “the players”.

Thirdly, the expansion of consequences to many other na-tional economies, including those which had internal vigor and knowledge to confront economic recipes of the IMF and the World Bank, is implied in the situation of global depen-dence, which potentially announces the time of future redis-tribution and redirection of free funds for development of the currently undeveloped, and for fire extinguishing in the currently developed.

Fourthly, is it possible to stop “the spiral of abyss” of modern banking and finance, as massive losses were already written off in commercial banks’ balances during the previous year, which automatically implies the need for additional capital reduced by the write-offs, while the possibilities for approval of new loans are significantly reduced? The time has come for overnight liquidations (Leahman Brothers, 17-09-2008), forced mergers of banking entities and urgent selling of assets, due to poor borrowing policy, but at reduced prices, as the cur-rent confrontation of demand and supply does not result in realistic but diminished prices due to lack of confidence (JP Morgan sold to the Bank of America at the price that was half the market one, 17-09-2008). how to proceeD - The next phase after settling the crisis, i.e. overcoming most of the prompt negative signals, introduces the need for cleansing the overall financial system and return to the basics of the profession.

First, “paper economy”, as banking and finance are most frequently tagged in crisis situations, represents an industry of products and services based on efficacy of a banking entity to collect free funds from the market and, through interme-diation, place them in the form of various aspects of credit support to projects of their clients who promise to timely ful-fill the obligation of paying back the funds in accordance with contracted definitions. Highly unreliable categories of moral hazard and negative selections , supplemented by inviolable interest determinants that the accumulated free funds will be multiplied up to 20 times instead of the realistic 3-5 times th-rough promises, marketing projects or unexplored financial instruments, lie in the interspaces of this complex equation. This excessive intermediation represents the core of the current disruption, and future regulatory principles will with full ca-pacity monitor indicators that will provide the views of where and in what manner free funds of investors are directed. The liberal market creative effects most probably shall not be li-mited, but certain mechanisms will probably be invented to limit the banking “dreams” of new products and services to the extent which will provide firm, clear and transparent in-formation on the yield, risk spread and potential weaknesses 5 Ukratko,nemožesesvakomaplikantuodobritikredit,ainklinacijaprema

većimprinosimaje,podefiniciji,bitsvakeprofitabilneaktivnosti.



�8


I, krajnje, kada se sistem vrati na pouzdane osnove tre-ba se pripremiti za hedžovanje nove štednje, jer će nosioci nove akumulacije zahtijevati da budu obezbijeđeni od strane banke kod koje budu deponovali sredstva. Sistemska kon-centracija štednje i na osnovu toga formiranih bankarskih oligomonopola će biti maksimalno supervizirana u buduć-nosti, kako bi se izbjeglo aktuelno stanje - “previše je veliki da bi propao” - u upravljanju krizom.

Treće, ako je margina likvidnosti prvi put u posljednju 21-u godinu skočila na LIBOR sa 2.4% na preko 6.2 %, tada bankarstvo gubi svoju funkciju jer “cash on hands”, odnosno gotovina na računima banaka ili plasiranje u državne obvez-nice ili samo repo hartije je posao amatera i početnika, a ne školovanih finansijskih hazardera. Kada banke ne plasiraju sredstva među sobom, odnosno nemaju povjerenja u svo-jeg konkurenta, a ovaj plasman je uvijek strukom definisan kao plasman niskog rizika, onda je vrijeme za preispitivanje kako ukupni esnaf mora i treba da vrati povjerenje među sobom. A, potom ujednačenom i zajedničkom akcijom sa supervizorima važno je nastupiti prema ukupnoj javnosti globalne ekonomije i tržišta. Kao što niko nije veliki da ne bi propao, tako ni bankari ne mogu da se zatvore u svoje

mahagoni kabinete i vjeruju da će sve proći bez odgovornog pristupa javnosti, klijentima i investitorima, akcionarima i deponentima. Bankari obezbjeđuju likvidnost realnoj eko-nomiji i to je najjača uloga finansijskih in-

termedijatora koja uvijek čini najvažniji izvor prihoda banaka.

Četvrto, visoko je vjerovatno da će budući re-gulatorni okviri za praćenje likvidnosti posebnu pažnju posvećivati ukupnoj slici likvidnosti, uključujući i pozicije iz trgovačkih knjiga i u procijenjenoj mjeri vanbilansnih pozici-ja. Tekuća nesolventnost potvrđuje da kada nastupi “sušni period” prije svega se potiru prvoklasni rejtinzi finansijskih instrumenata i “bespogovornih” klijenata što posljedično umanjuje postojeće rezerve likvidnosti i au-tomatski uvećava troškove koji su, dvojako, rezultat: 1) uvećane, interventne tražnje za monetarnim ekvivalentima i 2) drastičnog rasta rizičnih pozicija. Prvi put su likvid-nost i minusi, gubici, troškovi na istoj strani problema, među ruševinama neprocijenjenih

potreba za redovnim ispunjavanjem oba-veza i neprecizno izmjerenim profilima

rizika plasiranih proizvoda i usluga. Povratak određivanju potrebnih

rezervisanja kapitala za pozicije trgovinskih knjiga uz rezerve

likvidnosti u aktivi treba da budu logični potezi koji će supervizori, ali i bankari

širom svijeta ekpresno unijeti u sistem potencijalne zaštite od sistemskih rizika.

Peto, na planu ozdravljenja bankarskog sistema, otpočeo je period značajne konsolidacije i svaki budući veliki subjekt preuzima niz toksičnih pozicija koje će morati da otpiše, a po-tom iznalazi načine da riješi sporne izloženosti. Ukrupnjavanje kapitalnih osnova samo može privremeno da proizvede po-zitivne signale kojima su oslobođeni mehanizmi za daljne ulaganje i pokretanje novog ciklusa oplođavanja slobodnog kapitala. Preispitivanje koncepta finansijskih konglomerata, tekućim gašenjem investicionih sektora unutar banaka uslj-ed koncentracije troškova i otpisa, je kratkog roka. Izlazak iz krize će pružiti potpunije informacije na koji način će se bankarski proizvod i usluga mijenjati u budućnosti.

Šesto, na mikroekonomskom planu, tinjajuće a nepro-duktivno odsustvo saradnje između front office-a, bankara i trejdera, s jedne strane, i back office-a, odnosno risk me-nadžera, s druge strane, je kao krajnju posljedicu imala an-tagonizam između onih koji donose i završavaju poslove i onih koji samo prigovaraju i “šire defetizam”. Pametna, odm-jerena i snažna interna organizatorska korektivnost bankar-skih subjekata je potrebna, bez obzira na postojanje ekster-ne supervizije. Tu korektivnost obezbjeđuju risk odjeljenja, za pozicije prodaje, i controlling i compliance odjeljenja, za ukupne pozicije finansijskog nastupa banke.

Tekuća kriza je naglo, ali opravdano naučila profesional-ce koji se bave upravljanjem rizicima njihovom osnovnom zadatku - profili rizika koji se prezentuju su trenutna slika stanja klijenta ili proizvoda koja se može promijeniti na ne-izmjerenu štetu banke, ili određen ali limitiran uspjeh banke. Ukratko, kada krene nizbrdo onda je zaustavljanje teško, a ako uspijemo i krenemo na gore to je samo do sljedeće kote. Menadžerima rizika nije zadatak da ukupni rizik izmjere, a samim tim se opredijele za minimalno profitabilne poslo-ve. Njihov posao je da upoznaju sve rizične strane projekta, plasmana, instrumenta a potom iznađu uravnotežen način da rizik svrsishodno rasporede i ne ograniče profitabilnost banke. Bankari i trejderi se ovoj paradigmi struke moraju podsjećati na dnevnoj osnovi.

Dodatno, na mikroekonomskom planu, regrutacija senior menadžerskih profila će ubuduće uzimati u obzir ukupnost iskustvenih i rezultatskih komponenti svakog pojedinca, jer tekući krizni period identifikuje potrebu ukupnog tr-žišta top-menažmenta da se pored opravdano agresivnih i tržišno-orjentisanih, uvijek nalaze i prate ih umjereni, analitički profili. Jer, vijesti da su menadžeri KfW-a, velike državne uzdanice njemačkih diplomata, na dan bankrota Leahman Brothers-a prebacili sredstva klijenata-doznake u visini od nekoliko stotina miliona dolara je dokaz da u izboru menadžera ni jedan teorijski model, ni američki, ni anglo-saksonski, ni njemački nije bio otporan na odsustvo koordinacije prioritetnim informacijama (odnosno, eto bio je vikend, pa smo se morali malo odmoriti). KOmE PRIPADA BUDUćNOST – Ukoliko se poslužimo koc-karskim rječnikom, od avgusta 2007. godine do septembra tekuće godine, investicioni bankari su uspjeli u javnosti da sačuvaju “pokeraško lice”, uvjereni da će sve proći i da će na kraju partije novac sa stola biti u njihovim džepovima. Ali, čim je ulog na stolu prešao mogućnosti i granice predvid-ljivog i mogućeg, odlaska od stola i povlačenja više nije bilo. I, koliko god kuća uvijek dobijala, apstrahujući pojedinač-


required by investors to make reliable decisions on placement, i.e. on depositing their funds.

Second, the trust of clients and the broadest circle of in-vestors cannot be regained in a short period of time. A cer-tain period must go by before only the simple mechanism of day-to-day overdraft loans is restored, which are the products providing the major support to small and medium size bu-sinesses. Only then large projects and investors will enter the scene, as well as significant redistributions of banking liabi-lities into assets, and expectations fulfilled. Finally, when the system is restored to the sound bases, the hedging of new sa-vings should be prepared, as the bearers of fresh accumulati-on will demand their deposits to be secured by the banks in which they are held. The systemic concentration of savings, and banking oligo-monopoles formed based thereon will be subject to supervision at the fullest extent in future, in order the situations similar to the current – “too big to fail” – are avoided in crisis management.

Third, if the liquidity margin increases to LIBOR from 2.4% to 6.2% for the first time in the last 21 years, then the banking loses its function since “cash on hands”, i.e. cash in banking accounts or placement into government bonds, or repo securities only, is the job for amateurs and beginners, not educated financial hazarders. When banks do not place funds with each other, that is, do not have confidence in their competitors, although this placement is always defined as low risk, then the time has come for revision of how the overall industry must and should regain mutual trust. After that, a joint action coordinated with the supervisors needs to be ta-ken towards overall public of global economy and market. As no one is too big to fail, not even bankers can stay closed in their mahogany offices and believe that everything will pass by without responsible approach to the public, clients and investors, shareholders and depositors. Bankers provide liquidity to the real economy and that is the strongest functi-on of financial intermediaries, which always makes the most important source of banks’ revenues.

Fourth, it is highly probable that future regulatory frame-works for monitoring liquidity would pay particular attenti-on to overall shape of liquidity, including positions from the trading books and estimated off-balance positions. The cur-rent insolvency confirms that when “dry season” arrives, the first thing to be cancelled is the first-class ratings of financial instruments and “inviolable” clients which consequentially decreases existing reserves of liquidity and automatically in-creases costs that are result of both of the following: 1) incre-ased, emergency demand for monetary equivalents, and 2) drastic growth of risk positions. For the first time, liquidity and minuses, losses and expenses are on the same side of the problem, among the ruins of unvalued needs for regular ful-filling of obligations and imprecisely measured risk profiles of placed products and services. The return to determination of required capital provisioning for trading books’ positions along with liquidity reserves in the assets should represent lo-gical actions to be promptly introduced by supervisors, and bankers as well, all over the world in the system of potential protection from systemic risks.

Fifth, in the area of recovery of the banking system, the period of significant consolidation has started and every future large entity assumes a range of toxic positions which it will need to write off, and then invent modules for resolving controversial

exposures. Enlargement of capital bases can only temporarily generate positive signals which releases mechanisms for further investing and launching of a new cycle for multiplication of free capital. Reconsideration of the concept of financial conglome-rates, through the current extinguishing of investment sectors within banks due to concentration of expenses and write-offs, is of short-term nature. Termination of the crisis will provide more complete information about the manner in which ban-king products and services will change in future.

Sixth, from the microeconomic aspect, smothering and unproductive absence of cooperation between the front offi-ce (bankers and traders) and the back office (risk managers) resulted in antagonism between those who make and conduct business and those who only have objections and “spread de-featism”. Rational, appropriate and robust internal organiza-tional corrections of banking entities are required, regardless whether external supervision exists or not. These corrections are provided by risk departments for selling positions and con-trolling and compliance departments for overall positions of financial appearance of the bank.

Current crisis abruptly, but justifiably taught professionals dealing with risk management about their basic task – risk profiles to be presented are a snap shot of the condition of cli-ents or products that can be applied to unmeasured damage of the bank, or specific but limited success of the bank. In short, when the situation is going downhill, stopping is difficult, and even if we succeed and start moving uphill, that is only up to the next level point. Risk managers’ task is not to measure the overall risk, and thereby choose minimum profitable operati-ons. Their job is to get acquainted with all hazardous aspects of the project, placements, instruments and then invent a ba-lanced manner of distributing risk adequately without limiting profitability of the bank. Bankers and traders must keep this professional paradigm in mind every single day.

Additionally, from the macroeconomic aspect, the rec-ruitment of senior managerial profiles in future will take into consideration the experience and results of every in-dividual, as the current crisis period identifies the need of the overall market of top-management to have apart from justified aggressive and market-orientated profiles, the moderate, analytical profiles as well to be there and sup-port them. Therefore, the news that managers of KfW, the great national pride of German diplomacy, on the day of Leahman Brothers’ bankruptcy made transfer to that com-pany in the amount of several million dollars, proves that when it comes to selection of managers, none of several theoretical models, neither American, nor Anglo-Saxon, or German, was immune to absence of coordination with priority information (that is, it was weekend, so we had to take a little rest). who DoeS Future belong to - If we use gambling vo-cabulary, from August 2007 to September of the current year, investment bankers succeeded to save “poker face” in public, convinced that everything will just pass by and at the end of the game the money from the table will end up in their pockets. However, as soon as the stake on the table exceeded the possibilities and boundaries of the foreseeab-le and possible, there was no possibility to walk away from the table or withdraw from the game. And, no matter how much the house always wins, leaving out individual win-ners, the house turns out to be the loser at the end of this



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CG bankarska realnostU bilansu uspjeha ukupnog bankarskog sektora CG uzevši u obzir analizu godišnj- ih podataka iz bilansa banaka na 30.06 respektivnih godina, primjetan je snažan rast prihoda od osnovne bankarske djelatnosti, t.j. prihoda od kamata i naknada (tabela). Ali, na kraju analiziranog perioda 2008. godine ne ponavlja se ukupni po-zitivni rezultat od prethodne godine iz dva osnovna razloga: 1) značajnog uvećanja operativnih troškova, ali i još jasnijeg i jačeg 2) povećanja troškova za gubitke ko-jima se pokrivaju uvećana rezervisanja i izraženiji rizični profili unutar kreditnih portfelja banaka.

Posljedično, da bismo detaljnije ukazali na suštinske razvojne dinamike i potencijalne slabosti unutar bilansa stanja bankarskog sektora, fokus analize će biti usmjeren na specifičnosti tri segmenta: sektor ako cjelinu, lidera sektora i najslabiju kariku u sektoru. Sistem u cjelini - Neto krediti bankarskog sistema su u prosjeku rasli za 170% (07/06), odnosno 80% respektivno (08/07); rast ukupnog kapitala je obilježen dinamikom od 61%, odnosno 40% za posmatrane periode. Ukratko, dvogodišnji rast aktive na nivou sistema kao cjeline od 386% je finansiran iz rasta kapitala od 125% i ukupnih obaveza od 319%. Lider sistema - Stabilni, ali kontinuirani rast lidera obilježen je rastom neto kredita od 120%, odnosno 62% respektivno, sa prosječnim dvogodišnjim rastom od 257%. Kapital je na dvogodišnjem nivou porastao 198% (87%; 59%), ali bio i dodatno ojačan subordiniranim kreditom. Ukupno visoko rastuće potrebe našeg tržišta u razvoju su dodatno finan-sirane rastom ukupnih obaveza na dvogodišnjem nivou od 218% (107%; 54%). Najslabija karika u sistemu - Neto krediti ovog bankarskog subjekta na prosječnom dvogodišnjem nivou su rasli na nivou od previsokih 1122% (1055%; 92%); rast je finansiran iz neznatnog rasta ukupnog kapitala na dvogodišnjem nivou od 273% (123%; 67%), i dvogodišnjim prosjekom rasta ukupnih obaveza od 1393% (1084%; 102%). Zašto obično kvantitativno prikazivanje planiranog ali strateški nestrukturisanog rasta ukazuje na maksimalnu potrebu internog i regulatornog praćenja likvidnosti predmetnog bankarskog subjekta? Zato što su podaci o stanju novčanih sredstava i računa depozita kod depozitnih institucija (pozicija 1. ukupne aktive iz opšte klasifikacije bilansa stanja) jasni, jer predstavljaju svega 13% ukupnih obaveza predmetnog subjekta, dok je prosjek na nivou sistema minimum 20%, odnosno kod lidera je u pitanju 25% od ukupnih obave-za. Upravljačka i izvještajna potreba ove banke za nedo-voljnim zalihama gotovog novca na kraju 30-06-2008 je zasljepljujuća i prisutna kod rastućih bankarskih subjeka-ta. Međutim, ako je prati logična i očekivajuća neusklađenost ročne strukture izvora sredstava, onda je to signal maksimalne nategnutosti unutrašnjih bilansnih kapaciteta da se obaveze u ime klijenata i za klijente ispune u dogovorenom roku. Takva jedna nepovoljna činjenica bi mogla uznemiriti ukupan strukturni i dugoročni raz-voj bankarskog i privrednog sistema nacionalne ekonomije jer, sumarno sagledano, kreditni portfelj predmet-nog bankarskog subjekta predstavlja 18% kreditnog portfelja sistema, odnosno 14% učestvuje u ukupnoj aktivi sistema, ali je za 66% veći od ukupnog kapitala našeg bankarskog sektora.

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BIlANS uSpjehA 2006 2007 2008Neto dobit na kraju perioda 1.995 11.013 8.917Neto prihodi iz osnovne djelatnosti nakon rezervisanja 10.916 17.519 23.066

Neto prihod po osnovu kamata i naknada 22.884 37.193 50.736

Opšti troškovi 24.924 33.278 45.140Troškovi za gubitke 5.904 14.227 31.511

ne pobjednike, na kraju ove pokeraške partije kuća se našla kao gubitnik, jer je morala da gasi požar koji nije izazvala, ali jeste dozvolila i ohrabrivala.

Treba jačati uvjerenje da će povratak osnovama struke imati pozitivan uticaj na ukupnu javnu finansijsku scenu koja sada panično predviđa naglo jačanje regulatornog pristupa ukupnom finansijskom i bankarskom sistemu. Još uvijek je preuranjeno ulaziti u ove detaljne analize, mada treba zna-ti naći pravilni balans između potrebe da se masivne krize izbjegnu u budućnosti i činjenice da je bankarstvo posao, a ne ideologija mase. Davati a priori povjerenje uvećanoj regulatornoj ulozi ne može imati prave pozitivne efekte jer svaki supervizor je sveden na djelovanje na osnovu podata-ka koji mu stižu bar sa kvartalnim zakašnjenjem, što znači

da se anticipativnost njihovog korektivnog uticaja minimi-zira, a ne maksimizira. Koordinacija među supervizorima u svijetu može imati onaj presudni benefit za globalni sis-tem, čiji će principi jačanja esnafa tek budućom razradom i implementacijom davati ograničene, ali visoko potrebne prostore za umanjenje narednih kriznih poremećaja.

Bankarstvo je konzervativna djelatnost, bez obzira na savremene marketinške masovne prezentacije. Finansije su profesija postupnosti, a ne prekonoćnog kratkovidog sagledavanja potencijalnih prinosa. Ali, i bankarstvo i fi-nansije se profesionalno bave budućim definicijama (t.j. sredstva se odobravaju na određeni period u budućnosti) koje su uvijek neizvjesne bez obzira na početne pozitivne projekcije i parametre ■

Osnovne bilansne pozicije (presjek 30/06 podaci)


october 2008 | :Bankar�1poker game because it had to extinguish the fire that it did

not cause but did allow and encourage.The conviction that return to basics of the profession would

have positive influence on the overall public financial scene, which now with panic anticipates abrupt strengthening of re-gulatory approach to the whole financial and banking system, needs to be strengthened. It is still too soon to make these de-tailed analyses although it should be able to find appropriate balance between the need to avoid such mass crises in future and the fact that banking is a job, not a mass ideology. Giving a priori confidence to enhanced regulatory role cannot result with real positive effects as every supervisor is brought to acting based on data delivered with the delay of at least three months, meaning that the predictability of supervisors’ corrective influ-

ence is minimized rather than maximized. The coordination among supervisors at the global level could have the crucial benefit for modern world, which principles of the profession strengthening will provide limited but extremely needed spa-ce for mitigating future crisis disruptions, only through their further elaboration and implementation.

Banking is a conservative industry, regardless of contem-porary marketing mass presentations. Finances became a profession of gradualism rather than overnight shortsighted viewing of potential yields. Nevertheless, both banking and fi-nance are dealing professionally with future definitions (that is, the funds are approved for certain period in future) that are always uncertain regardless of initial positive projections and parameters ■

Montenegrin Banking RealityIn the income statement of Montenegrin banking sector as a whole, taking into con-sideration the analysis of annual data from banks’ balances as of 30th June of the three observed years, an intensive growth of revenues from basic banking activities, i.e. from revenues based on interests and fees (see the table) is noticeable. However, at the end of analyzed period of 2008 there is no repetition of overall positive results from the previ-ous years for two elementary reasons: 1) significant increase of operating costs, but even more apparent and superior 2) increase of expense for losses aimed to cover enlarged provisions and more expressive risk profiles within the loan portfolios of banks. Consequently, in order to indicate in details the essential developmental dynamics and potential weaknesses within the balance sheet of the banking sector, focus of our analysis will be directed to specificities of three segments: sector as a whole, sector leader and the weakest link in the sector. System as a whole - Net loans of banking sector in average increased by 170% (2007/2006), or 80% respectively (2008/2007); the dynamics of the growth of total capital were 61%, i.e. 40% for observed periods. In short, biennial growth of the assets at the level of the system as a whole of 386% was financed from the growth of capital of 125% and total liabilities of 319%. The system leader - Stable, but continuous growth of the leader is featured by the growth of net loans of 120%, i.e. 62% respectively, with average biennial growth of 257%. Capital increased by 198% (87%; 59%) at biennial level, but it was additionally strengthened by a subordinated loan. Total high growing needs of our developing market were ad-ditionally financed through the growth of total liabilities of 218% (107%; 54%) at biennial level. The weakest link in the system - Net loans of this banking entity showed growth of extremely high 1122% (1055%; 92%) on av-erage biennial level; the growth was financed from insignificant growth of total capital of 273% (123%; 67%) on biennial level and biennial average growth of total liabilities of 1393% (1084%; 102%). For what reason, simple quantitative presentation of planned but strategically unstructured growth denotes maximum need for internal and regulatory monitoring of relevant banking entity’s liquidity? Because the data on the condition of funds and deposits with depositary institutions (position 1. of total assets from general classification of balance sheet) are clear, as they represent only 13% of total liabilities of the observed entity, while the average on the system level was at least 20%, whereby the sector leader achieved 25% of total liabilities. Managerial and reporting requirements of this bank for insufficient level of cash at the end of the observed period (30th June 2008) is blinding and immanent for growing banking entities as well. However, if this requirement is accompanied with logical and expecting non-harmonized time structure of the funds’ resources, then this represents a signal of maximum efforts of internal balance capacities for meeting its liabilities on behalf of and for the account of the clients. One such adverse fact could disturb the overall structural and long-term develop-ment of banking and economic system of national economy as, viewed in summary, the loan portfolio of the relevant banking entity makes 18% of the system loan portfolio, i.e. it represents 14% of total assets of the system, although it is by 66% higher than the total amount of capital in our banking sector..

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INcOMe StAteMeNt 2006 2007 2008Net profit at the end of the period 1.995 11.013 8.917Net revenues from core activity after provisioning 10.916 17.519 23.066

Net revenues based on interests and fees 22.884 37.193 50.736

General expenses 24.924 33.278 45.140Expenses for losses 5.904 14.227 31.511

Basic balance positions (30/06 data)



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KORPORATIVNO UPRAVLJANJE I TRŽIŠTE HOV

Primjena principa i regulative na tržištu finansijskih usluga uopšte, i tržištu hartija od vrijednosti posebno, teče sporo, i uglavnom zavisi od političke volje partija na vlasti, odnosno od pozicije “njihovih” učesnika na tržištu novca i kapitala. Regulacioni sistem treba da obezbijedi i afirmiše transparentnost trgovanja, odnosno da posjeduje sposobnost da otkriva i sprečava manipulacije i nepoštenu praksu na tržištu. Zapravo, ovaj princip posebno naglašava zahtjev da se adekvatno reguliše velika „izloženost“ rizika od kašnjenja u izvršavanju obaveza i poremećaja na tržištu. Dobro korporativno upravljanje ne može se zamisliti bez poslovne etike. Koncepcije dobrog korporativnog upravljanja, nameću akcionarima i menadžerima nekoliko obaveza u cilju zaštite investitora. To su, prije svega, mjere za zaštitu manjinskih akcionara, a posebno mjere koje garantuju da svi akcionari imaju ravnopravan pristup informacijama. Ipak, istorija razvoja tržišta hartija od vrijednosti potvrđuje da nikad nije bilo moguće ustanoviti regulacioni sistem koji ne bi mogao biti „prevaren“

Prof. dr Vuk Ognjanović

obostrane koristi i poslovno povjerenje

Zaštita investitora u hartije od vrijednosti, a i smisao standarda i regulatornih aktivnosti koje su imanentne

javnom interesu u modernim koncepcijama tržišta hartija od vrijednosti, podrazumijeva neke bitne identifikacije i ciljeve. Prije svega, pošten pristup sređenom i transparent-nom tržištu, brzo i tačno izdavanje dozvola i saldiranje transakcija, zabrana nezakonitog rukovođenja i nezako-nitih transakcija, te izbjegavanje nekorektne konkurencije u primjeni i ostvarivanju određenih ciljeva. To je složen i pravno razuđen sistem. Uz to, masovno prisustvo i mno-štvo različitih trgovina s hartijama od vrijednosti i drugim instrumentima na savremenim finansijskim tržištima nov-ca i kapitala, dodatno povećava „temperaturu“ odgovor-nosti za racionalno uređivanje ovih često protivurječnih i kontroverznih odnosa i međuzavisnosti.

Uređivanje organizacije tržišta, sistema posredovanja u transakcijama, te posebno regulisanje procedura koje „omekšavaju“ proces donošenja odluka o investiranju, odnosno obaveza da se investitoru predstave sve relevan-tne informacije o emitentu i o samoj hartiji od vrijed-nosti, visoki su principi javne trgovine hartijama od vri-jednosti. Zapravo, to znači pošteno regulisano tržište, tj. položaj akcionarskih društava i investitora na njemu, za-tim korektno uređene posredničke usluge i odgovornosti brokerskih kuća, te i uređena pozicija berze i regulisano vanberzansko tržište. U tom kontekstu, biće bitni i okviri korišćenja povjerljivih informacija, mogući manevarski prostor za manipulacije sa cijenama, kao i vrlo specifična odgovornost za objavljivanje nepotpunih ili lažnih infor-macija povezanih sa uvođenjem hartija od vrijednosti u javno trgovanje.

Uz sve to, više drugih aspekata potencira značaj institu-cionalnog razvoja i jačanja nadzornog kapaciteta u cilju za-štite investitora u hartije od vrijednosti, odnosno „zaštite“ dobrog upravljanja finansijama korporacija. Uostalom, zar pojavni oblici nekontrolisanih dešavanja kao što su snažne finansijske liberalizacije na međunarodnom tržištu finan-sijskih usluga, agresivno pojavljivanje novih bankarskih proizvoda na tržištu, a i kontroverzno širenje informaci-onih sistema i elektronskog načina plaćanja, te bankarske prevare, pranje novca i terorizam na sektoru finansija, ne upozoravaju na dramatičnost situacije.

Upravo zbog tih, a i drugih razloga, pravno uspostavljanje infrastrukture za zaštitu investitora u hartije od vrijednosti,


obostrane koristi i poslovno povjerenje

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SECURITIES MARKET

Implementation of the principle and regulation on the financial services market in general, and securities market in particular, is slow and mainly dependant upon political willingness of the parties in power, that is position of their players on the money and capital market. Regulatory framework needs to provide and promote transparency of trade, that is to possess the capacity to detect and prevent manipulations and unfair practice on the market. In fact, this principle particularly emphasizes the requirement to adequately control high exposure to the delay in performance of commitments and trade turmoil risks. Good corporate governance is inconceivable without business ethics. Conceptions of good corporate governance impose several obligations to the shareholders and managers with the aim of protecting investors. These are primarily measures for the protection of minority shareholders, particularly measures guaranteeing equal access to information to all the shareholders. However, history of the development of securities market confirms that it has never been possible to establish regulatory framework which could not be deceived

Vuk Ognjanović Professor, PhD

mutual Benefits and Business Confidence

Protection of securities investors and the essence of stan-dards and regulatory activities which are immanent

to the public interest in modern concept of the securities market implies some important identifications and goals. First of all, fair approach to the organised and transparent market, fast and correct issuance of licences and netting of transactions, prohibition of illegal management and illegal transactions, avoidance of unfair competition in implemen-tation and achievement of specific goals. It is a complex and legally broad system. In addition, mass presence and mul-titude of various trade in securities and other instruments on modern financial markets of money and capital additi-onally increases the temperature of responsibilities for ra-tional arrangement of these often contradictory and con-troversial relations and interdependence.

High principles of public trade in securities are arrange-ment of the market organisation, brokering in transactions, and particularly regulation of procedures that soften the de-cision making related to investing, i.e. obligation to present to the investor relevant information about issuers and securi-ties. In fact, that includes fairly regulated market, i.e. position of stock companies and investors on it, then fairly arranged brokering services and responsibilities of broker companies and arranged position of the stock exchange and regulated over-the counter market. Framework of use of confidential information, potential maneuver room for price manipulation, and very specific responsibility for disclosure of incomplete or false information concerning introduction of securities into public trade will be important in that context.

In addition, several other aspects emphasise importance of institutional development and building of supervision capacity with the aim of protecting investors in securities, that is protecting good finance management of corporations. Besides, emerging forms of uncontrolled developments such as strong financial liberalizations on international financial services market, aggressive entry of new bank products into the market and controversial expansion of information sys-tems and electronic payments, bank frauds, money laun-dry and terrorism in financial sector warn of the dramatic nature of the situation.

For these, and other reasons, legal establishment of in-frastructure for the protection of investors in securities and establishment of the new authoritative regulators in financial services industry and area of self-regulatory or-ganisations is objectively an extensive, difficult and com-plex process.

main principleS oF the protection oF SecuritieS inveStorS Previous practice and reform and building of financial mar-kets in the developing countries and countries in transition still fails to inaugurate adequate and necessary concept of the coherent implementation of principles and regulations in financial services market in general and securities mar-ket in particular. The process is slow and mainly dependant on political willingness of parties in power, that is positi-on of their players in money and capital market. In fact, in the majority of countries, there is obvious lack of real and


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kao i za uspostavljanje autoritetnih regulatora u industriji finansijskih usluga, ali i na području samoregulativnih or-ganizacija, objektivno je širok, težak i složen proces.

GLAVNI PRINCIPI ZAŠTITE ULAGAČA u hartije oD vrijeDnoSti Dosadašnja praksa, pa i reformisanje i izgrađivanje finan-sijskih tržišta u zemljama u razvoju i tranziciji, još uvijek ne inauguriše adekvatnu i neophodnu koncepciju kohe-rentne primjene principa i regulative na tržištu finansij-skih usluga uopšte, i tržištu hartija od vrijednosti posebno. Taj proces teče sporo, i uglavnom zavisi od političke volje partija na vlasti, odnosno od pozicije „njihovih“ učesni-ka na tržištu novca i kapitala. Zapravo, u najvećem broju zemalja, primjetno je odsustvo prave i potpune strategije za zaštitu investitora u hartije od vrijednosti, odnosno za pozitivan razvoj koncepcije racionalnog korporativnog upravljanja.

Prije svega, principi za regulatore, nisu ni inaugurisani, ni promovisani. Još uvijek nema adekvatnih ovlašćenja glavnih regulatora. Naime, regulator mora biti operativ-no potpuno nezavisan, i, naravno, odgovoran za izvrša-vanje svojih funkcija i ovlašćenja. Takođe, u istoj ravni je i područje poštovanja najviših profesionalnih standarda, odnosno, i posebno, standarda povjerljivosti u trgovini hartijama od vrijednosti.

Inače, poznato je, ciljevi zaštite investitora i zabrana nezakonite prakse ne mogu biti u potpunosti ostvareni ukoliko je regulativa o hartijama od vrijednosti determi-nisana samo na berzanske transakcije, ili transakcije koje se ostvaruju putem ovlašćenih finansijskih međuposred-nika. Uostalom, uvijek će biti beskrupuloznih osoba koje se angažuju u transakcijama koje su nezakonite i koje su van organizovanog tržišta. U zemljama u tranziciji (Rusija, Rumunija, Srbija, Albanija) je bilo više primjera rušenja povjerenja investitora nezakonitim transakcijama koje ni-jesu (prethodno) date na uvid institucijama od autoriteta, ili ih te institucije nijesu uopšte odobrile!?

Ovi principi, komplementarno, obuhvataju i područje samoregulative. Upravo, uspostavljanje ozbiljnih i profe-sionalno ubjedljivih samoregulativnih organizacija, ne-ophodno je u svim zdravim i efikasnim koncepcijama fi-nansijskih tržišta. Uostalom, ove organizacije treba da su pod kontrolom glavnih regulatora, tj. da poštuju standar-de poštenja i povjerljivosti u izvršavanju ovlašćenja koja su im povjerena (delegirana).

Principi izvršenja regulative hartija od vrijednosti, dra-matično se zapostavljaju. Regulatori nemaju sveobuhvatna ovlašćenja izvršenja, odnosno potpuna inspekcijska, istraž-na i nadzorna ovlašćenja. Jednostavno, aktuelni sistemski - zakonodavni okviri u zemljama u tranziciji, još uvijek ni-jesu otvorili mogućnosti, da glavni regulatori autonomno izgrade koncepciju efikasne i povjerljive „upotrebe“ ins-pekcije, tj. istrage, nadzora i procedura izvršenja.

Istovremeno, ni principi saradnje u regulaciji nijesu afir-misani. Regulatori hartija od vrijednosti treba da imaju ovlašćenja za razmjenu javnih i nejavnih informacija sa domaćim i inostranim (posebno regionalnim) regulato-rima, tj. da su ovlašćeni da grade i ustanove informativni mehanizam koji omogućuje racionalnu i efikasnu razmje-nu informacija. Inače, ovaj princip saradnje podrazumije-

va da domaći regulatorni sistem pruži adekvatnu pomoć stranim regulatorima u istragama, u izvršenju funkcija, i u drugim kritičnim procedurama.

Ovi principi su racionalno povezani sa principom obaveze emitenata hartija od vrijednosti da u potpunosti, pravo-vremeno i tačno objavljuju finansijske i druge informacije koje su bitne za donošenje odluka investitora u hartije od vrijednosti. Naravno, i sa primjenom računovodstvenih i revizorskih standarda u međunarodno prihvatljivom kvali-tetu.. U tom kontekstu, za dobro korporativno upravljanje, specifično je važna i obaveza da se akcionari korporacija tretiraju korektno i na ravnopravan način.

Principi u vezi kolektivnih investicionih šema su višestru-ko zanimljivi u koncepcijama efikasne zaštite investitora u hartije od vrijednosti. Naime, regulatorni sistem treba da ima standarde za licence i regulaciju onih koji žele da tr-guju ili posluju kao kolektivna investiciona šema, odnosno da obezbijedi pravila koja uređuju strukturu kolektivnih investicionih šema (te i imovinu klijenata).

Isto tako, regulatorni sistem treba da ustanovi zahtjeve i standarde za objavljivanje informacija koje su relevantne za procjenu stabilnosti investicionih šema. Ovi zahtjevi i standardi, uobičajeno je, treba da budu isti kao i za emi-tente hartija od vrijednosti.

Posrednici na tržištu vrijednosnih papira, prije svega banke i investicioni fondovi, imaju ozbiljnu, specifičnu, jasnu, pa i presudnu odgovornost za zaštitu investitora u hartije od vrijednosti. Kako posrednici imaju primarnu odgovornost u zaštiti interesa klijenata, tako i zahtjevi za njihovo „konstituisanje“ moraju biti oštri i cjelishodni.

Zbog toga, regulacioni sistem treba da inauguriše viso-ke standarde za ulazak posrednika na finansijsko tržište. Posebno na pitanju početnog i osnovnog kapitala, kao i propisivanjem prudencijalnih uslova usklađenih sa rizici-ma koje posrednici preuzimaju. Isto tako, visok prioritet u koncepciji ovog principa ima i potreba da se precizno utvrdi procedura za slučajeve u kojima posrednici prave propuste tokom određenih radnji na tržištu hartija od vri-jednosti. Cilj bi bio, da se na račun imovine posrednika,



complete strategy for the protection of securities investors, that is for positive development of the concept of rational corporate governance.

First of all, principles for regulators have not been either inaugurated or promoted. There are still no adequate powers of public regulators. Namely, a regulator must be operati-onally completely independent and, naturally, responsible for execution of functions and powers. In addition, the same refers to the area of observance of the highest professional standards and particularly standards of confidentiality in trade in securities.

Anyhow, it is well known that goals to protect investors and prohibit illegal practice may not be completely achie-ved if the securities regulations are determined solely ba-sed on stock exchange transaction or transaction executed through authorized financial intermediaries. Besides, there will always be unscrupulous persons engaged in illegal prac-tice outside organised market. In the countries in transition (Russia, Romania, Serbia, Albania) there were few examples of reducing of investors` confidence by illegal transactions

that had not (previously) been submitted to the authorita-tive institutions for examination or these institutions in the first place did not approve them.

These principles complementary include the area of self-regulation. In fact, establishment of serious and professi-onally convincing self-regulatory organisations is necessary in all sound and efficient conceptions of financial markets. Besides, these organisations should be controlled by main regulators, i.e. they should follow the standards of respect and confidentiality in execution of powers entrusted (de-legated) to them.

The principles of implementation of securities regulations are dramatically neglected. Regulators do not have extensive powers of execution, that is complete inspection, investiga-tion and supervision powers. To put it simply, current syste-matic-legislative frameworks in the countries in transition have still not opened up opportunities for main regulators to autonomously build the concept of efficient and confi-dential use of inspection, that is investigation, supervision and procedure of execution.

At the same time, principles of cooperation in regulation have also not been promoted. Securities regulators should have powers to share public and non-public information with national and international (particularly regional) re-gulators, i.e. power to build and establish informative me-chanism that ensures rational and efficient exchange of in-formation. Besides, the cooperation principle means that national regulatory system offers adequate support to fo-reign regulators in investigations in execution of functions and other critical procedures.

These principles are reasonably connected with the prin-ciple of the obligation of the issuers of securities to com-pletely, timely and correctly disclose financial and other in-formation important for decision making of the securities investors. Naturally, that involves implementation of ac-counting and audit standards in internationally acceptable terms. In that framework, the obligation to treat sharehol-ders in a fair and equal manner is of particular importance for good corporate governance.

Principles related with collective investments schemes are interesting from several aspects for the concepts of ef-ficient protection of securities investors. To be more preci-se, regulatory system needs to define standards for licen-ces and regulation for those wishing to trade and operate as a collective investment scheme, that is to lay down rules governing the structure of collective investment schemes (and clients` assets).

At the same time, regulatory system needs to establish requirements and standards for disclosure of information relevant for the evaluation of stability of investment sche-mes. These requirements and standards should be the same as those applicable to the securities issuers.

Intermediaries on the securities market, primarily banks and investment funds, are tasked with serious, specific, clear and critical responsibility to protect securities investors. As intermediaries have prime responsibility to protect interests of the clients, requirements of their establishment must be strict and functional.

Therefore, regulatory framework must inaugurate high standards for entry of intermediaries on the financial mar-ket particularly in terms of initial and founding capital and


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minimiziraju štete i gubici investitora u hartije od vrijed-nosti, i na taj način „omekšaju“ tzv. sistemski rizici.

Principi za sekundarno tržište takođe su bitni za zaštitu investitora u hartije od vrijednosti, ali i za poremećaje na finansijskim tržištima uopšte.

U tom kontekstu, sistem trgovanja, kao i razmjena vri-jednosnih papira, moraju biti podvrgnuti strogom reži-mu odobrenja i nadzora od strane regulatornih organa. Regulacioni sistem treba da obezbijedi i afirmiše tran-sparentnost trgovanja, odnosno da posjeduje sposobnost da otkriva i sprečava manipulacije i nepošte-nu praksu na tržištu. Zapravo, ovaj princip posebno naglašava zaht-jev da se adekvatno reguliše velika „izloženost“ rizika od kašnjenja u izvršavanju obaveza i poremećaja na tržištu. U istom smjeru, tj. na sman-jenje sistemskog rizika za investitore u hartije od vrijednosti, djelovaće i adekvatan, efikasan i efektan sistem kliringa i saldiranja transakcija sa hartijama od vrijednosti.

NEOPhODNA JE NOVA – ŠIRA DeFinicija „kapaciteta“ hartija oD vrijeDnoSti U cilju efikasne zaštite investitora u hartije od vrijednosti, a i zbog ak-tuelnih dešavanja na finansijskom tržištu, područje relevantnih ele-menata za zaštitu ulagača u harti-je od vrijednosti, pored poštene, i sa stanovišta međunarodnih stan-darda korektne primjene principa o kojima je ovdje bilo govora, zah-tijeva još jednu bitnu komponentu. Naime, obezbjeđivanje određenih indikacija i informacija o tržištu hartija od vrijednosti, snažno i ar-gumentovano insistira na široj de-finiciji pojma „hartija od vrijednosti“. Jednostavno, u današnjem vremenu je evidentan veliki broj nezakonitih finansijskih transakcija, pa i „finansijskih aranžmana“ koji veoma često uključuju investicije koje su struktu-risane sa ciljem da izbjegnu zakone koji se odnose na hartije od vrijednosti.

Definicija „kapaciteta“ hartija od vrijednosti, sadrži sve tradicionalne karakteristike kapitala, odnosno duž-ničkih hartija od vrijednosti. Moderna, i šira koncepci-ja definicije međutim, između ostalog uključuje i neke druge relevantne elemente i indikacije realnih zbivanja na tržištu hartija od vrijednosti.

Ovaj pristup insistira da se u kapacitet definicije uklj- uči nekoliko sledećih relevantnih elemenata:

različitim povodima limitirani partnerski interesi, te interesi pri limitiranim odgovornostima korpo-racija, posebno transnacionalnih banaka i drugih kompanija; sertifikati o prethodnoj organizaciji ili upisu za har-tije od vrijednosti, te glasački povjerilački sertifika-

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ti, i sertifikati o depozitu za hartije od vrijednosti; prava, opcije i ovlašćenja za kupovinu hartija od vrijednosti; evidencije o nezaduženosti; sertifikati o interesu ili učešću u bilo kakvom profit-nom (diobnom) sporazumu; garancije za hartije od vrijednosti; investicioni ugovori, ili investicione šeme u koji-ma određene osobe investiraju u zajedničke po-

slovne aranžmane, i sa razum-nim očekivanjem profita koji se proizvodi naporima i preduzi-mača i menadžera. Činjenica je da ovaj kompleks nije lako urediti. Zbog toga je, čini se, najbolje rješenje ono koje daje dis-kreciono pravo regulatorima u tre-tiranju (ili izuzimanju) posebnih tipova hartija od vrijednosti u ok-viru specifičnih i fleksibilnih od-redbi Zakona.

Inače, pravljenje razlike između hartija od vrijednosti i drugih komer-cijalnih i finansijskih instrumenata, objektivno, neće biti lako. Posebno i zbog toga što je korišćenje određenih finansijskih instrumenata povezano sa širokom strukturom transakci-ja komercijalnih banaka, odnosno i transakcija koje se ne odnose na hartije od vrijednosti.

Ipak, i šira koncepcija definici-je za hartije od vrijednosti kojima se trguje na tržištu, ne bi mogla da uključuje neke druge „interesantne“ instrumente!? Recimo, instrumen-te kojima se trguje isključivo među bankama, zatim netransferbilne ob-ligacije o regulativi domaće banke ili štedionice, odnosno osigurava-juće polise koje su emitovane od

regulativne domaće osiguravajuće kompanije, i čija vri-jednost polise nije „u odnosu“ sa vrijednošću hartija od vrijednosti.

Istom logikom sadržine odnosa, ni naznake emitovane povodom primarnih trgovinskih ili potrošačkih transak-cija, ne bi bile uključivane u operativnu definiciju hartija od vrijednosti. Time bi i “prostor” za dobro korporativno upravljanje bio i širi i čistiji.

korporativno upravljanje, poSlovna ETIKA I TRŽIŠTE hARTIJA OD VRIJEDNOSTIDobro korporativno upravljanje ne može se zamisliti bez poslovne etike. Jednostavno, to su neobično važni fak-tori u koncepcijama upravljanja akcijama kao glavnim instrumentom u korpusu hartija od vrijednosti. Odnosno, kako je stvaranje vrijednosti za akcionare u direktnoj vezi sa ciljevima dobre prakse korporativnog upravljanja, od suštinske je važnosti da tržište i učesnici na njemu (ko-tirana privredna društva, regulatori, brokeri, i dr.) budu racionalno i transparentno “organizovani” i informisani

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Istorija tržišta kapitala potvrđuje, da je povjerenje investitora u tržište i njegove instrumente, glavni faktor razvoja tržišta vredonosnih papira. Mehanizmi i instrumenti su važni, ali je jos važnije i presudnije uvjerenje investitora, da cjelina pravnog, obligacionog i moralnog sistema jedne zemlje, štiti one koji ulažu u industriju hartija od vrijednosti. Zbog toga je, a i zbog visokih zahtjeva na području razvoja akcionarstva i dobrog korporativnog upravljanja, zaštita investitora u hartije od vrijednosti, prioritet u mukotrpnoj izgradnji mladih finansijskih tržišta u zemljama u razvoju i tranziciji. Pri tome, u savremenoj poplavi agresivnih trgovina i spekulativnih investitora, potreban je ozbiljan tretman, pa i inovirana i šira defincija „kapaciteta“ hartija od vrijednosti.



prescription of prudential regulations harmonized with the risks taken by intermediaries. At the same time, high pri-ority of the concept of this principle is given to the need to precisely establish the procedures for the cases where in-termediaries make mistakes on the securities market. The aim is to minimize damage and losses of securities investors and to soften the so-called systemic risks on the account of intermediaries` s assets.

Principles for secondary market are also important for the protection of securities inves-tors and turmoil on financial mar-ket in general.

In that framework, the trading sys-tem and exchange of securities must be subjected to the strict regime of approvals and supervision by regu-latory bodies. Regulatory framework must provide and promote transpa-rency of trade, that is to possess the capacity to detect and prevent mani-pulation and unfair practice on the market. In fact, this principle parti-cularly emphasizes the requirement to adequately control high exposu-re to the risk of overdue liabilities and market turmoil. To that end, reduction of the systemic risks for securities investors will be affected by an adequate, efficient and effec-tive system of clearing and netting of securities transactions.

in neeD oF a new-broaDer DeFinition oF the SecuritieS capacitieSIn order to efficiently protect securi-ties investors and in circumstances of actual developments of the finan-cial market, the area of relevant ele-ments for the protection of securities investors requires another impor-tant component, in addition to the fair and internationally correct implementation of mentioned principles. Namely, provision of certain indications and information about the securities market strongly and argumentatively insists on the broader definition of the term securities. To put it sim-ply, there are many obvious illegal financial transactions and financial arrangements today which often include in-vestments structured with the aim of going around the laws governing securities.

Definition of the securities capacities contains all the traditional characteristics of capital, that is debt securities. However, modern and broader concept of the definition also includes some other relevant elements and indications of real developments on the securities market.

The principle insists on including several significant ele-ments in the capacity of the definition:

Partnership interests limited by various causes, interests in the event of limited liability of corporations, particu-larly transnational banks and other companiesCertificates on previous organisation or registration for

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securities, voting creditor certificates, and certificates of deposit for securitiesRights, options and powers for purchase of securitiesRecords of non-indebtednessCertificates of interest or share in any kind of profit (sharing) agreementGuarantees for securitiesInvestment contracts, or investment schemes where certain person invest in joint business arrangements,

with reasonable expectation of profit generated through efforts of both, entrepreneurs and managersThe fact is that this complex structure may not be easily arranged. Therefore, it seems that the best solution is the one providing discretionary right to the regulators in treating (or exempting) certain types of securities within spe-cific and flexible provisions of the law. Besides, drawing a distinction between securities and other commercial and financial instruments will not be easy, particularly because the use of certain financial instruments is connected with the broad structure of transactions of commercial banks, i.e. transactions not related to securities.

However, even broader concept of the definition for securities traded on the market could not include some ot-her interesting instruments. For ins-tance, instruments traded exclusively among the banks, then non-negotiable obligations on regulations of the na-tional insurance company or savings bank, that is insurance policy issued by regulatory national insurance com-pany whose policy value is not in re-lation with the securities value.

Following the same logic of the contents of relations, designations

issued due to primary and consumer transactions would not be included in the operational definition of securities. This would make room for corporate governance to beco-me broader and cleaner.

corporate governance, buSineSS ethicS anD SecuritieS marketGood corporate governance is inconceivable without bu-siness ethics simply because these are unusually important factors in the concept of management of shares as the main instrument in securities corpus. In fact, as creating value for shareholders is directly related with the objectives of good practice of corporate governance it is of critical importan-ce that market and its players (listed companies, regulators, brokers etc.) be rationally and transparently organised and informed of the function of the provision of efficient pro-tection to securities investors.

Concepts of good corporate governance impose seve-ral obligations to the shareholders and managers aimed at protecting investors.

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The history of the capital mar-ket confirms that investors` con-fidence in the market and its instruments is the major factor of development of securities mar-ket. Mechanisms and instru-ments are important, but inves-tors` s confidence is even more important while entire legal, obligatory and moral system of a country needs to protect those who invest in securities indus-tries. Owing to that and to the high requirements in the area of development of shareholding and good corporate governance, protection of securities investors is prioritized in a difficult deve-lopment of young financial mar-kets in the countries in develop-ment and transition. Therefore, modern flood of aggressive trade and speculative investors requ-ires serious treatment and inno-vated broader definition of the securities capacity.

Na osnovu ove kratke i kritičke analize, moguća su bar dva pouzdana i bitna zaključka. Prvi. Brz i kontroverzan, a značajnim dijelom i interna-cionalizovan i globalizovan razvoj tržišta hartija od vri-jednosti i bankarskog sistema, stvara potencijalno opasan „koktel“ agresivnih finansijskih trgovina „lukavog nov-ca“, spekulativnih investitora i krajnje složene finansij-ske instrumente i investicione šeme. Taj kontekst „haosa“, učesnici ili namjernici na finansijskim tržištima, obično (ili vrlo često) i ne razumiju do kraja. A to su, između os-talog, i glavni razlozi što je pravno uspostavljanje infras-trukture za zaštitu investitora u hartije od vrijednosti, kao i za uspostavljanje kompetentnih regulatora u industriji finansijskih usluga i samoregulativnih organizacija, težak, multidisciplinaran i složen proces. Moderna i postojana koncepcija za zaštitu investitora u hartije od vrijednosti, podrazumijeva prisustvo mena-džera sposobnih za dobro upravljanje finansijama korpo-racija. Odnosno, to podrazumijeva i operativnost princi-pa za zaštitu investitora (principi za regulatore, principi izvršenja regulative, principi saradnje u regulaciji, prin-cipi za kolektivne investicione šeme, principi za posredni-ke i sekundarno tržište), te etičke principe u poslovanju. Najzad, u kontroverznim savremenim dešavanjima na domaćem i međunarodnom tržištu finansijskih i bankar-skih proizvoda, ta koncepcija podrazumijeva i inoviranu i širu definiciju hartija od vrijednosti. Drugi. Crna Gora, odnosno njeni nadležni i odgovorni organi, uporedo sa omekšavanjem nekomercijalnih – po-litičkih rizika za ulaganja, kao i sa izgrađivanjem demok-ratskih političkih struktura, mora hitno graditi i zdravu, te i međunarodno harmonizovanu koncepciju zaštite in-vestitora u hartije od vrijednosti. Jednostavno, svako zaostajanje je skupo. Ili, bolje je reći - može biti mnogo skupo. Zato, efikasnim i blagovremenim dejstvima u nekoliko relevantnih (i dijelom naznačenih) blokova aktivnosti, zemlja mora žurno graditi i izgraditi realnu, nekorumpiranu i efikasnu koncepciju investicione strategije i investicione kulture. Na taj način, gradiće se i pouzdane osnove za utemeljenje djelotvornog preduzet-ništva i dobrog korporativnog upravljanja. Samim tim, i racionalne šeme ekonomskih aranžmana i poslovnih ko-alicija, u funkciji jačanja potencijala za finansiranje svr-sishodnog, izvozno motivisanog i održivog domaćeg eko-nomskog rasta i razvoja.


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u funkciji obezbjeđenja efikasne zaštite ulagača u harti-je od vrijednosti.

Koncepcije dobrog korporativnog upravljanja nameću akcionarima i menadžerima nekoliko obaveza u cilju zaštite investitora.

To su prije svega, mjere za zaštitu manjinskih akci-onara (odredbe o sprečavanju tzv. razvodnjavanja, oba-vezujuće ponude i minimalna cijena ponude), zatim

obavezno i blagovremeno objelodanjivanje znatnog holdinga akcija, odnosno javnih tendera (npr. više od 10% u toku perioda od dva ili tri mjeseca), te i mjere koje garantuju da svi akcionari imaju ravnopravan pri-stup informacijama. U tom bloku, važne su i mjere za zaštitu od zloupotreba tržišta od strane insajdera (što podrazumijeva regulisano poslovanje svih insajdera), a i mjere koje se tiču glasanja (svi akcionari moraju biti u mogućnosti da glasaju). Isto tako, posebno i ra-cionalno treba struktuirati mjere za usklađivanje in-teresa, odnosno mjere u vezi s posjedovanjem akcija i opcija od strane direktora, kao i mjere u vezi sa zara-dama menadžera.

Korporacije sa dobrim i koherentnim sistemom upravl-janja, obično imaju bolje rezultate, veću zaštitu investi-tora i bolji tretman na berzi. Zanimljivo je da je korela-cija između dobrog korporativnog upravljanja i dobrih rezultata na berzi, izraženija u zemljama sa slabim prav-nim sistemima. Zapravo, tamo gdje je više prostora za zloupotrebe prava akcionara. Odnosno, korporacije mogu dijelom amortizovati uticaj slabih zakonskih rje-šenja, ako svojim internim aktima uspostave racionalnu koncepciju dobrog korporativnog upravljanja. Samim tim, i da poboljšaju zaštite investitora u „svoje“ hartije od vrijednosti.

Zaštita investitora u hartije od vrijednosti u savre-menim tržišnim privredama, ostvaruje se efikasnom i objektivnom pravnom regulativom i kontrolom. Ipak, istorija razvoja tržišta hartija od vrijednosti potvrđuje da nikad nije bilo moguće ustanoviti regulacioni sistem koji ne bi mogao biti „prevaren“. Zbog toga je, tim tra-gom i tim povodom, uvijek bilo aktuelno pitanje afir-macije i aktuelizacije etičkih vrijednosti u poslovanju. I to počev od običajnog prava, preko standardizacije i kodifikacije etičkih principa, do rigoroznih kazni za nji-hove prekršioce.

Osnovni etički principi u trgovanju finansijskom imo-vinom i hartijama od vrijednosti, u osnovi su isti kao i na drugim područjima poslovanja i ponašanja privred-nih jedinica na tržištu. U biti, neposredno su uslovljeni kvalitetom prirodnog i poštenog ponašanja pojedinaca i privrednih jedinica naspram ostalih aktera na tržištu.

Poštovanje i primjena etičkih vrijednosti podrazumi-jeva zaštitu interesa onih koji štede, deponuju ili ulažu u kupovinu vrijednosnih papira. U toj koncepciji, od posebnog značaja su princip obostrane koristi i interesa (nijedan od partnera ne treba da ima osjećanje prevarene ili izigrane strane), te princip izgrađenog međusobnog poslovnog povjerenja, koji obično sadrži i dobre (pošte-ne) namjere, ali i visok stepen poslovnog kompromisa i poslovne tolerancije.

Ove čistokrvne etičke principe, u savremenim uslovima, snažno podržavaju dvije moćne poluge. Standardizacija finansijskih proizvoda, pa i vrijednosnih papira, odnos-no kodifikacija principa poslovne etike. U sadejstvu sa oficijelnim regulacionim državnim sistemima, i politič-kom voljom, tj. političkom odgovornošću partija (koali-cija) na vlasti, ovo bi bili moćni i snažni podupirači kon-sekventne primjene poslovne etike i njenih vrijednosti u zdravim koncepcijama razvoja tržišta kapitala i razvoja tržišta hartija od vrijednosti ■

Based on this short and critical review, at least two reliab-le and important conclusions may be drawn. First. Fast and controversial, and therefore interna-tionalized and globalized development of the securities market and banking system, creates potentially dangerous cocktail of aggressive financial trade, cunning money, spe-culative investors and extremely complex financial instru-ments and investments schemes. This context of chaos is usually (or very often) not quite understood by players and those wanting to participate on financial markets. This is, among other things, the main reason why legal es-tablishment of infrastructure and establishment of com-petent regulators in the financial services self-regulatory organisations industry is a difficult, multidisciplinary and complex process.Modern and firm concept for the protection of securities investors means presence of managers capable to manage appropriately the finances of the corporations. In fact, that includes the operation of the principle for the protection of investors (principles for regulators, principles of imple-mentation of regulations, principles for collective inves-tment schemes, principles for intermediaries and secon-dary market) and ethical principles in business. Finally, in controversial modern developments on national and international market of financing and banking products that concept includes innovated and broader definition of securities. Second. Montenegro, that is its relevant and responsible authorities, in parallel with softening of the non-commer-cial -political risks for investments, together with building democratic political structures, must urgently build sound and internationally harmonized concept of the protection of securities investors. To put it simply, each delay is costly. Or, it is better to say that it may be very costly. That is why efficient and ti-mely actions in several relevant (and partially designed) sections of activities of the country must hurriedly develop and build realistic, non-corrupted and efficient concept of investment strategy and investment culture. In that way reliable grounds for establishment of effective entreprene-urship and good corporate governance will be laid. This, reasonable schemes for establishment of economic arran-gements and business coalitions, serve to build potential for financing of the functional, export oriented and sustai-nable domestic economic growth and development.



These are primarily measures for the protection of mi-nority shareholders (provisions on the prevention of the so-called diluting, binding offers an minimum price of the offer), then mandatory and timely disclosure of a sig-nificant holding of shares, and public tenders (for ins-tance, more than 10% in two to three month period) and measures providing that all the shareholders have equ-al access to information. Other important measures in this section are those for the protection against misuse of the market by insiders (which means regulated opera-tion of all insiders) and measures concerning voting (all the shareholders must have the opportunity to vote). At the same time, measures for the harmonization of inte-rest must also be particularly and rationally structured, together with the measures related to the ownership of shares and options by directors and measures related to managers` earnings.

Corporations with good and coherent management system usually have better results, higher protection of investors and better treatment at the stock exchange. Interestingly, the correlation between the good corporate governance and good results on the stock exchange is more present in the countries with weak legal systems, that is where the-re is more space for misuse of the shareholders` rights. In fact, corporations may partially depreciate the influence of weak legal concepts if their internal acts establish balanced concept of good corporate governance. This will improve protection of investors in their securities.

Protection of securities investors in modern market economies is exercised with efficient and objective legal regulations and control. However, history of the securi-ties market development confirms that it has never been possible to establish regulatory system that could not be deceived. Therefore, in that respect the issue of promotion and actualization of ethical values in business has always been important, starting from the common law through standardization and codification of ethical principles, up to strict penalties for their violators.

Basic ethical principles of trade in financial assets and securities are generally the same like in other areas of ope-ration and conduct of commercial entities on the market. Essentially, they are directly influenced by the quality of natural and fair conduct of an individual and companies with regard to the other players on the market.

Observance and implementation of ethical values means protection of interests of those who are saving, depositing or investing in the purchase of securities. The following is of particular importance in that concept: The principle of mutual benefit and interest (none of the partners should feel deceived or betrayed), the principle of mutual busi-ness confidence which usually contains good (fair) inten-tions and also a high level of business compromise and business tolerance.

These pure ethical principles in modern conditions stron-gly support two powerful levers: standardization of financial products and securities and codification of the principles of business ethics. In line with official regulatory public systems and political willingness, that is political accountability of parties (coalitions) in power, these would be powerful and strong drivers of the consequent implementation of business ethics and its values in sound concepts of the development of capital and securities market ■


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UPRAVLJANJE RIZICIMA NA TRŽIŠTIMA HOV

Zaštita investitora, obrazovanje i povjerenje u novo globalno okruženjeBudući uspjeh ekonomskih i poslovnih modela zavisi od toga da se na efikasan način upravlja modelima rizika za preduzeća i cijelu ovu privrednu granu. Ima pojedinaca koji vjeruju da zakoni i propisi destimulišu preduzetništvo. Međutim, baš kao što zemlja ima sjeverni i južni pol i suprotne magnetske sile, baš kao što postoje hladno i vruće i vlažno i suvo, tako se i naši poslovni sudovi nalaze na suprotnim pozicijama, preuzimanja i nepreuzimanja rizika. Ove sile koje doživljavamo kao suprotstavljene ne funkcionišu zasebno, već su međusobno isprepletene u naporima da uspostave ravnotežu i stvore bolje mogućnosti za stabilnu budućnost. Ljudska sredina diktira da ove konkurentne ili suprotne sile moraju da koegzistiraju. Te sile određuju kada iniciramo neku aktivnost a kada stojimo i ne učestvujemo. Tako je to u biznisu. Tek kada prihvatimo da kultura efikasnog upravljanja rizicima koja se bazira na konceptu da je biznis uspješan zbog preduzetništvu svojstvene discipline poštovanja razumnih pravila i regulacije koji imaju za cilj da uklone rizik i tako vode naš posao, stvoriće se pravi uslovi da klijenti i investitori razviju povjerenje i pouzdanje u tržište. Upravo takvo povjerenje i pouzdanje obezbjeđuje osnove za održivo poboljšanje životnog standarda nekog društva

Upravljanje rizicima osmišljeno je tako da predviđa što bi moglo poći kako ne treba i da utvrdi povoljne mo-

gućnosti koje preduzeća treba da iskoriste. Opšte je pozna-to da su uspješni preduzetnici prilično nevoljni da rizikuju. Međutim, organizaciono gledano, izgleda da imamo velikih problema da upravljamo rizicima na pravi način. U prvom broju (maj 2008.) ovog časopisa, gospođa Mila Kasalica, govoreći o ranijem problemu “SocGen”-a, pomenula je da su bankari tri godine prodavali ove problematične hipote-karne proizvode bez realnog sagledavanja i da je radi poja-čane konkurencije od strane institucionalnih investitora i ostalih nebankarskih finansijskih subjekata, analitički pri-stup upravljanju rizicima bio zamijenjen marketingom ovih proizvoda. Istorija nas uči da prije ili kasnije, kada se upravljanje rizicima ne primjenjuje na pravi način, ovakve greš-ke kod proizvoda ili poslovne linije budu izložene i najčešće to ima katastrofalne posljedice za organizaciju, investitore a povremeno i za privredu cijele zemlje.

poSljeDice - iStog trenaU današnjem svijetu sve veće ekonomske globalizacije ka-tastrofični finansijski događaji uzrokovani lošim upravlja-njem modelima rizika mogu da se prošire na ostale privrede u svijetu gotovo istog trena, spuštajući životni standard u velikoj mjeri i izazivajući značajne gubitke sredstava i efe-kat smanjivanja interesovanja investitora.

Trenutno je na Koledžu “St. Peters“ u Nju Džersiju, SAD, u toku rad na projektu u oblasti upravljanja rizikom u pre-duzećima. Na ovom projektu, između ostalih radi profesor Džon Dž. Hampton (John J. Hampton), profesor na pred-metu biznis i dekan Fakulteta za profesionalno usavrša-vanje, kontinuirano obrazovanje i postdiplomske progra-me na Odsjeku za biznis na pomenutom koledžu. Profesor Hampton, jedan od vrhunskih umova u oblasti upravljanja rizikom u preduzećima u SAD, predložio je da se upravljanje rizikom u preduzećima koristi u nekoj organizaciji tako što će se primijeniti hijerarhijska struktura kategorija

Aldo J. Martinez bivši Potpredsjednik NYSE Regulacije, a sada Generalni direktor Savjetodavne kompanije AJM


investor protection, Education and Confidence in the new global environmentThe future success of our economic and business models depends on effectively managing our enterprise and industry risk models. There are some individuals who believe that laws and regulations stifle entrepreneurship. However, just as the earth has North and South poles and opposite magnetic forces, just as cold and hot and wet and dry conditions exist, our business judgments are also pulled into opposing positions, taking and not taking risks. These perceived opposing forces do not work separately but are intertwined to bring balance and a better chance at a stable tomorrow. The human environment dictates these competing or opposite forces to coexist. These forces determine when we initiate action and when we stand by and take a pass. So it is in business. Once we accept that a culture of effective risk management based on the concept that a business is successful because inherent in entrepreneurship is a discipline of adhering to reasonable rules and regulations which aims to eliminate risk and conduct our business in such fashion, only then conditions will be right for customers and investors to develop a sense of trust and confidence in the market place. It is such trust and confidence which provides the foundation for the sustained improvement of a society’s living standards

Risk management is designed to anticipate what could go wrong and identify favorable possibilities which the

business enterprise should undertake. It is common kno-wledge that successful entrepreneurs are quite adverse to risk. However, organizationally, we seem to have difficul-ty properly managing risk. In the first issue (May 2008) of this magazine, Ms. Mila Kasalica, referring to the earlier SocGen problem, mentioned that for three years, bankers were selling these troubled mortgage products without ta-king a realistic view of risk and due to intensified competi-tion among institutional investors and other non-banking financial entities, the analytical approach to risk mana-gement was replaced in the marketing of these products. History teaches us that sooner or later, when risk manage-ment is not appropriately applied, the flaws of the product or business line will be exposed and more often than not with catastrophic results to the organization, investors and at times, even to the country’s economy.

conSequenceS - at the Same momentIn today’s world of ever increasing economic globalization, catastrophic financial events caused by a mismanagement of risk models can spread throughout the world economies almost instantaneously, weakening living standards in broad scales and causing significant loss of wealth and a chilling effect in investor participation.

Currently, work is being done at St. Peter’s College (SPC), New Jersey, USA by, among others, Professor John J. Hampton, KPMG Professor of Business and Dean of the School of Professional and Continuing Studies and Graduate Business Programs at SPC in the field of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). Professor Hampton, one of the top minds on ERM in the USA, has proposed using ERM in an organization by applying a hierarchical structure of risk categories and mat-ching them to the organization’s business model. In other words, risks are organized into clusters and then sub-risks. For example, as Professor Hampton explains, a new product

RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS

Aldo J. Martinez, Esq. retired Vice President, NYSE Regulation and now CEO of AJM Advisory Services


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rizika i tako što će se to uklopiti sa biznis modelima organizacije. Drugim riječima, rizici su organizovani u grupe, a zatim u podrizike. Na primjer, kako objašnjava profesor Hampton, neki novi proizvod ili usluga mogu da predstavljaju poduhvat visokog rizika i zbog toga se u prvom ko-raku utvrđuju četiri kategorije rizika - pro-izvodni rizik (razvoj ili tehnologija); tržišni rizik (utvrđivanje/stvaranje tržišta za pro-izvod ili uslugu); rizik finansiranja kapitala (adekvatnost kapitala za puštanje u promet proizvoda ili usluge); i rizik intelektualne svojine (krađa tehnologije od strane kon-kurenata). Ove kategorije dalje će se razra-diti i utvrditi podrizici. Zatim se utvrđuju lica koja su stručna i zadužena za rizike i njima se dodjeljuju kategorije rizika kojima treba da se pozabave. Tada se poziva sektor za izradu proizvoda i provjeravaju se tre-nutne sposobnosti organizacije i da li one odgovaraju potrebama novog proizvoda ili usluge. Ova pitanja obuhvataju sljedeće: što će biti standard kvaliteta ili nivo oče-kivanog učinka proizvoda ili usluge - da li

organizacija ima potrebne tehničke vješti-ne; je li kapacitet da se proizvede proizvod ili pruži usluga odgovarajući i adekvatan; koje su sposobnosti za podršku, i na koja pravna pitanja treba obratiti pažnju, kao što su propisi koji utiču na proizvod ili uslugu. Postoji sofisticirana tehnologija koja stva-ra “vizuelne grupe rizika” omogućavajući jasnije shvatanje odnosa između utvrđenih rizika. Zato se mora postaviti pitanje: Kako upravljanje rizicima proširiti i na ovu pri-vrednu granu?

Samoregulacija - preDnoSti i...U Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama sa-moregulacija je metod kojim se upravljanje rizicima proširuje na aktivnosti sa hartija-ma od vrijednosti. Ovakvim se pristupom upravljanju rizicima otkriva da većina firmi i posebno oblasti/tržišta hartija od vrijednosti i svi oni koji su uključeni u ovu privrednu

granu ima međusobno povezane kompo-nente rizika. Ukoliko se jedna od njih ne uoči to može dovesti do “nepredviđenih” negativnih posljedica. Na primjer “subpri-me” hipoteke, kada se ne iscrpu razumni, potencijalni rezultati u zajedničkom rizi-ku - riziku kapitala koji je uložen - može da dođe do toga da investitori, preduzeća i privrede pretrpe značajne gubitke novca i da se smanji vrijednost stabilne aktive čime se dovodi u opasnost sama ekonomska odr-živost ovih subjekata. Uz to, na ova tržiš-ta utiču nacionalni, globalni, ekonomski i politički događaji i to sve više, prvenstveno zbog toga što globalna tržišta sazrijevaju i na taj način postaju relevantnija jedna za druge. Zbog toga, vlade zemalja u kojima nalazimo ova tržišta, da bi zaštitili svoja tržišta i investitore, moraju da utvrde pra-vila igre u svojim domaćim ekonomijama a i onima koji učestvuju u međunarodnom biznisu. Ove vlade tako postaju uključene u upravljanje rizikom, možda čak i ne shva- tajući u potpunosti što efikasno upravljanje rizicima obuhvata. Ja ovaj tip rizika nazivam regulatorni rizik.

Da bi se bolje shvatila samoregulacija, zamislimo jednu piramidu. Na dnu te pi-ramide nalaze se brokeri/dileri, a nakon njih dolaze tržišta ili berze, zatim Komisija Sjedinjenih Država za hartije od vrijednosti i berzu, pa Kongres Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Predmeti obuhvataju adekvatnost kapitala i obavezan kapital preduzeća, vođenje odgovarajućih evidencija i knjiga, postupke prodaje ili odnose između broke-ra/izvršilaca računa i njihovih klijenata koji investiraju, te nadzor poslovanja od strane zaposlenih i trgovanje sa sopstvenih raču-na firme. Lica uključena u proces samore-gulacije imaju obavezu da imaju razumne procedure za superviziju da bi obezbijedili da se organizacija i njeni zaposleni ne uklju- čuju u postupke kojima se krše savezni za-koni o hartijama od vrijednosti ili pravila i propisi tržišta čiji su članovi. Što se tiče tržišta ili berze, ove obaveze obuhvataju praćenje trgovanja koje se odvija na nji-hovim tržištima. Odgovornost berzi jes-te da obezbijede pravično i uredno tržište svojih kotiranih hartija od vrijednosti i da odvrate postupke lica koja trguju koristeći njihove kapacitete za trgovanje kojima se krše zakoni i propisi.

Ova tržišta imaju ograničenu jurisdik-ciju. Odgovornost berze jeste da ispituje i sprovodi praćenje ponašanje njenih člano-va, organizacija koje su članovi, zaposlenih njihovih članova i organizacija koji su čla-novi, te lica koja su pridružena članovima i organizacijama koje su članovi i kada je

potrebno da disciplinuje lica koja su pod njenom jurisdikcijom. Naredni nivo pro-cesa samoregulacije predstavlja Komisija za hartije od vrijenosti i berzu na mjestu nosioca odgovornosti za čitavu struktu-ru - brokera, dilera/članova, investitora i tržišta. Misija Komisije za hartije od vri-jednosti i berzu jeste da zaštiti pravičnost i konkurentnost u ovoj oblasti koja je od kritičkog značaja za nacionalne interese. Posljednji ili prvi nivo procesa samoregu-lacije, zavisno od toga odakle sagledavamo samoregulaciju, jeste Kongres Sjedinjenih Država. Kongres na kraju mora odgovoriti na pitanja građana. Samoregulacija je zbog toga, u svojoj suštini, proces upravljanja ri-zicima koji ima za cilj da sva lica uključe- na na tržišta hartija od vrijednosti mogu da se pozovu na odgovornost za svoja činje- nja i nečinjenja.

…LOŠE STRANESamoregulacija funkcioniše jednako dobro kao i bilo koji drugi sistem koji se mogao osmisliti. Samoregulacija, međutim, ima i svojih loših strana. Neki ljudi vjeruju da ovaj sistem pothranjuje previše konflikata interesa pošto poziva ovu granu privrede da sama sebe kontroliše. Još jedan argu-ment protiv samoregulacije jeste da je ovaj proces previše komplikovan i previše skup, pošto različiti regulatori tržišta imaju raz-ličita pravila, a članovi nekoliko regulatora tvrdili su da je posljedica samoregulacije situacija da oni nepotrebno imaju teret da moraju da obrazuju svoj kadar tako da bi mogli na odgovarajući način da izvrše su-perviziju kada je potrebna. Ostali razlozi su da kada su pravila regulatora ista onda dolazi do dupliciranja aktivnosti kada više regulatora odlazi kod člana brokera/dilera da izvrši ispitivanje. Takođe, ostali inves-titori izrazili su mišljenje da su nezakoni-te aktivnosti s kraja devedesetih godina prošlog i početka ovog vijeka u koje su bili uključeni značajni subjekti investicionog bankarstva i analitičari istraživanja, te bro-kerski skandali, doveli u pitanje efikasnost samoregulacije u adekvatnoj zaštiti inves-titora. Kongres je u vezi sa tim održao od-govarajuća saslušanja.

Proces upravljanja rizicima efikasan je kada je osmišljen tako da otkrije one koji se svjesno bave kršenjem propisa da bi napunili svoje džepove na račun kli-jenata kao i one koji nenamjerno krše principe upravljanja rizicima, pravila i propise. Neko može greškom da smatra da proces u okviru kojeg se otkriva ne-zakonito postupanje, kao što je samore-gulacija, ne funkcioniše zato što građani



or service can be a high risk venture, the-refore, initially four categories of risk are identified – Product risk (development or technology); Market risk (identificati-on/creation of a market for the product or service); Capital Financing risk (adequacy of capital to launch the product or service); and Intellectual Property risk (competitors stealing technology). These categories would be further explored and sub-risks would be identified. Then, risk owners who are experts in certain areas are identified and they are assigned risk categories to address. Next, taking product development and asking what are the organization’s current capa-bilities and do they meet the needs for the new product or service. These questions include what will be the quality standards or the level of expected product or service performance; does the organization have the needed technical skills; is the capacity to deliver the product or service suitable and adequate; what are the support capabilities; and what are the legal concerns such as the regulations impacting the product or service. Sophisticated technology exists which cre-ates “visual risk clusters” making it possible for a clearer understanding of the relations-hips among the risks identified. A question must therefore be asked: How is risk mana-gement extended to an industry?

SelF-regulation – aDvantageS anD…In the USA, self-regulation is a method which expands risk management to the securities industry. This approach to risk management discloses that most businesses and particularly the securities markets/in-dustry and all those involved in this industry have interlocking risk components. Failure to ignore one can lead to “unforeseen” nega-tive consequences. For example, subprime mortgages, failure to play out reasonable, potential outcomes in a commonly shared risk - the risk of capital invested may cause investors, the enterprise and economies to experience significant losses of money and decreased values in stable assets endange-ring, the very economic viability of these entities. In addition, these markets are af-fected by national, global, economic and political events in an ever increasing man-ner, primarily due to global markets matu-ring thus becoming more relevant to each other’s economies. Therefore, the govern-ments of the countries where we find these markets, in order to protect their markets and investors, must determine the rules of the game in their domestic economies as well as for those entities engaged in inter-national business. These governments thus

become involved in risk management, even perhaps without fully understanding what effective risk management entails. I refer to this type of risk, as regulatory risk.

To better understand self-regulation, en-vision a pyramid. At the bottom of the py-ramid are the broker/dealers, followed by the market places or exchanges, then the U.S Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), then the U.S. Congress. The subject matters include but are not limited to, capital adequacy/requirements of the enterprise, the maintenance of appropriate books and records, sales practices or the relationship between the broker/account executive and his/her investing clients and, supervising the trading by its employees and the trading by the firm’s proprietary accounts. Those involved in the self-regulatory process are obligated to have reasonable supervisory procedures to ensure that the organizati-on and its employees are not engaging in conduct which violates federal securities laws or rules or regulations of the market places of which they are members. As to

market places or exchanges, these obligati-ons include conducting surveillance of the trading taking place in their market place. The responsibility of the exchanges is to provide a fair and orderly market in their listed securities and deter violative conduct by those trading within their trading facili-ties. These market places have limited juris-diction. The exchanges’ responsibility is to examine and conduct surveillance over the conduct of their members, member organi-zation, the employees of their members and member organizations and associated per-sons of their members and member organi-zations and when needed, discipline those under their jurisdiction. The next level in the self-regulatory process places the SEC as responsible for the entire structure – the broker dealer/members, investors and the market places. The mission of the SEC is to protect the fairness and competitiveness

of this critical matter of national interest. The last level or the first, of the self-regu-latory process, depending on how one vie-ws the self-regulation, is the U.S. Congress. Congress ultimately must answer to the in-vesting public. Self- regulation is therefore, at its essence, a risk management process aiming to make all those involved in the securities markets accountable for their actions or failures to act.

…DiSaDvantageSSelf-regulation has worked as best as any other system which could have been conce-ived. Self-regulation is not however, without its retractors. Some believe that this system breeds too many conflicts of interest since it calls for the industry to police its own. Another argument against self-regulation is that the process is too complicated, too expensive since different market regula-tors have different rules and members of several of these regulators claimed they are consequently unduly burdened in having to educate their staff accordingly so they

can appropriately effect supervision, as required. Other reasons include that whe-re the regulators’ rules are the same; there is duplication of efforts when multiple re-gulators go into a broker/dealer member to conduct their examinations. Also, other investors charged that the illegal activities of the late 1990s and early 2000s involving large and significant investment banking and research analysts and broker trading scandals, questioned the effectiveness of self-regulation to adequately protect in-vestors and the U.S. Congress appropria-tely held hearings.

A risk management process is effective when it is designed to detect those who are engaging in willful misconduct to line the-ir pockets at the expense of the customers as well as those who inadvertently violate risk management principles, the rules and regulations. A process under which illegal


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nijesu zadovoljni dužinom vremena u kome je trajala nezakonita aktivnost prije nego što je otkrivena ili zato što “prva linija odbrane” ili subjekat koji je trebao da ot-krije nezakonitu aktivnost nije to učinio. Međutim, pošto samoregulacija nosi sa sobom odgovornost (procjenjuju se rizik i zaduženja) svih koji su uključeni u ovu granu privrede, lakše je procijeniti gdje se u samom procesu nalazi slaba tačka i lakše ju je ispraviti. Štaviše, proces samo-regulacije postavlja eksperte za regulaciju u neposrednu blizinu tržišta, a ponekad dovodi do toga da oni postanu i dio tržišta, da bi se pobrinuli za to da iskusni i obavi-ješteni pojedinci budu dio samog procesa trgovanja. Takođe, pošto ova ekonomska grana preuzima troškove regulacije, sa-moregulacija na minimum svodi poresko opterećenje poreskih obveznika.

ČUVANJE BIZNISA I NJEGOVOG INTEGRITETAČinjenica da se nezakonita aktivnost na kraju otkrije jeste dokaz da samoregulaci-ja funkcioniše. Međutim, kada su događaji poznati, događaj treba da se rekonstruiše i pregleda da bi se ponovo procijenili princi-pi upravljanja rizikom i izmijenili kako je potrebno, ali ne nužno da bi se sam proces odbacio. Da bi ovaj proces procjene fun-kcionisao on se mora obaviti objektivno i bez emocija da bi se na minimum svela sklonost da se donose sudovi prije nego što se prikupe činjenice. Stvarnost je da je pohlepa uvijek cvjetala a i dalje će, tako da upravljanje rizicima i regulacija predstavl-jaju oružje koje nam je na raspolaganju da bismo sačuvali biznis i njegov integritet. Pošto se pokazalo da se nezakonite aktiv-nosti prije ili kasnije u samoregulaciji otkri-ju, ovaj proces dobio je velike zagovornike. Kako sam ranije aludirao, upravljanje rizi-cima zahtjeva periodične i redovne revizije procesa koji su u funkciji, a najznačajnije je da se nešto otkrije, bez obzira kako je otkriveno. To se takođe može reći i u si-tuacijama kada se neko vrijeme ne otkri-ju nikakve nezakonite aktivnosti jer mož-da principi upravljanja rizikom više nisu odgovarajući ili se možda ne primjenjuju kako je bilo namjeravano.

S obzirom na dešavanja u Sjedinjenim Državama krajem devedesetih godina dva-desetog i početkom dvadeset i prvog vije-ka, bilo je sasvim prikladno da Kongres Sjedinjenih Država i ova privredna gra-na izvrše reviziju samoregulacije i njenih komponenti. To je dovelo do toga da se značajno obrade i tržišni rizici. Većina ljudi vjeruje da je proces samoregulacije tako ojačan. Došlo je do regulatorne kon-

solidacije i ona će nastaviti da se odvija tokom predstojećih godina. A berze su kupili ili NASDAQ ili NYSE Euronext. Na primjer NASDAQ je vlasnik Bostonske i Filadelfijske berze. NYSE Euronext se spojio sa Archipelagom, koji je ranije bio Pacifička berza i sada je u procesu kupo-vine Američke berze. Naravno, svi znamo kako su se NYSE i NASDAQ proširili i u globalnim razmjerama. Zato nije neobično očekivati regulatornu konsolidaciju. NASD je napravila kombinaciju sa nekim aspek-tima Regulacije Njujorške berze i oformila posebnog regulatora ove privredne grane, Regulatorni organ za finansijsku privredu (FINRA). Globalno gledano, kako se tržište konsoliduje, finansijske institucije i vlade moraju da se suoče sa dva glavna aspekta: (a) kako da pozicioniraju svoje finansijske institucije (tržišta i banke) da se nadmeću na svojim domaćim i na globalnom tržištu - na primjer: Da li su Crnoj Gori potrebna dva tržišta hartija od vrijednosti?; i (b) Koji će model za upravljanje rizicima uvesti - ko će što regulisati? Pravilnici NASD i NYSE prolaze kroz reviziju da bi se riješila nejed-naka primjena regulacije. Neka od pitanja odnose se na to kako će pravila biti napisa-na ili prepisana, da li će se sve više bazirati na pravilima ili na principima?

Pravila, sva pravila, u okviru upravljanja rizikom, moraju biti uravnotežena sa potre-bama poslovanja i zaštite konkurentnosti na tržištu kao i lica koja učestvuju u po-slovanju. Ovi izazovi za finansijska tržišta dolaze u vrijeme kada proizvodi ove grane privrede, bilo da su to poznati problema-tični hipotekarni proizvodi, širenje broja strukturiranih proizvoda i međusobno povezane globalne privrede, kao i druga politička i ekonomska dešavanja kao što su promjenjivost berzi i cijena nafte (je li to manipulacija?) mogu da počnu previše da opterećuju investitore i mogu dovesti do “ukopavanja” koje je izazvano značaj-nim smanjenjem znanja, povjerenja i po-uzdanja kod investitora. U jednoj drugoj globalnoj inicijativi, tržišta širom svijeta koja posluju sa hartijama od vrijednosti rade na postizanju zajedničkog definisanja postupanja koja predstavljaju kršenje. Teme vezane za međunarodno poslovanje kao što su praćenje tržišta, istražne tehnike i de-finisanje kršenja u poslovanju kao što su kupovina na osnovu unaprijed dobijenih informacija ili manipulisanje tržištem pu-tem praksi trgovanja, uključujući direk-tan pristup tržištu, ali ne samo to, nešto su o čemu se aktivno razgovara u okviru Međunarodne grupe za praćenje (ISG). To je međunarodna mreža nekih od najvećih

berzi i tržišta u svijetu koja trenutno ima 36 članova. Osnovana je 1983. godine sa ciljem da se obezbijedi mreža za tržišta i berze koje se inače međusobno nadmeću za udio na tržištu, da bi one mogle sarađi-vati jedna s drugom u rješavanju regula-tornih pitanja od zajedničkog interesa i da međusobno razmjenjuju informacije kako bi svaka od njih mogla da ispuni svoje re-gulatorne obaveze. Ova i druga pitanja na-laze se u fokusu tržišta širom svijeta pošto upravljanje rizicima/regulacija prolazi kroz ponovnu procjenu na globalnom nivou da bi se riješile potrebe investitora.

POVJERENJE U TRŽIŠNU EKONOmIJUI da zaključim, osim izrade odgovarajućih uravnoteženih principa za rizike koji ne sprečavaju efikasan rad preduzeća, nalazimo se u mnogo sofisticiranijem dobu investi-cionih proizvoda i obnovljenog shvatanja postupaka koji predstavljaju kršenje. Kao posljedica toga, da bi se na pravi način za-štitili investitori i tržišta, biće potrebno da finansijska tržišta/ova privredna grana stal-no radi na revizijama globalne regulacije ili revizijama upravljanja rizicima gdje će biti potrebno da se ova aktivnost podvrgne globalnom praćenju i saradničkoj razmjeni informacija. Uz to, značajno treba razmot-riti i prioritet dati obrazovanju sadašnjih i potencijalnih budućih investitora tako što će se veći fokus staviti na finansijsku pismenost, kako ulagati i kakva je uloga regulacije u ovoj oblasti privrede. Samo sa kombinovanom ponovnom procjenom pristupa upravljanja rizicima i obrazova- njem svojih građana, jedna zemlja može da pripremi ili zadrži kritičnu masu investito-ra koji će se osjećati dovoljno zaštićenima da nastave da vjeruju i imaju povjerenje u tržišnu ekonomiju koja bi bila dovoljno snažna da podstakne proces prikupljanja kapitala. Tada se suočavamo sa sljedećim pitanjima: Da li se slažemo da nam naše vrijeme nameće da moramo da reagujemo? Koliko smo daleko spremni da idemo da bismo obrazovali naše građane i stvorili i zaštitili tu tako značajnu kritičnu masu koju neki nazivaju srednja klasa? Koju ulogu igraju naše finansijske institucije u ovom subjektivnom ili stvarnom budućem riziku za preduzeće? I konačno, koje su to druge kategorije rizika kojima treba da se bavimo? U zavisnosti od odgovora na ova pitanja, kako da se okupimo da bismo se nosili sa ovim izazovom? I na kraju, za one koji misle da izazovi predstavljaju moguć-nosti i, da uključuju upravljanje rizicima u preduzeću, koje su poslovne prilike koje ovi izazovi stvaraju za naša preduzeća ?



conduct is uncovered such as self-regula-tion, can be confused by some as not wor-king because the public may not be content with the length of time the illegal activity occurred before it was detected or because the “the first line of defense” or the entity which should have detected the illegal ac-tivity, failed to pick it up. However, since self-regulation brings accountability (as-sesses risk and responsibilities) of all tho-se involved in the industry, it is easier to assess where the weakness in the process lies and to correct. Moreover, the self-re-gulatory process places regulation experts close and in some instances as part of the market places making sure that an expe-rienced and knowledgeable individual is part of the trading process. Also, since the industry assumes the cost of regulation, self-regulation minimizes the tax burden on the taxpayers.

preServing the buSineSS anD itS integrityThe fact that illegal activity is eventually detected is proof that self-regulation works. However, once the events are known, the events should be reconstructed and revie-wed in order to reevaluate the risk mana-gement principles and modify them accor-dingly but not necessarily to discard the process itself. For this assessment process to work, it must be done objectively and dispassionately in order to minimize the tendency to make judgments before the facts are gatherered. Reality is that greed has been, and will always be, well and alive so risk management and regulation are the weapons available to preserve the business and its integrity. Since sooner or later illegal activity has been uncovered under self-re-gulation, the process has strong followers. As alluded to before, managing risk calls for periodic and regular review of the pro-cesses put into place and most significantly when something has been uncovered no matter how they were discovered. This is also true in situations when no illegal ac-tivity has been discovered for some time since the risk management principles may not be the appropriate ones any more or they may not be applied as intended.

Given the developments in the U.S in the late 1990s and early 2000, it was very appropriate for the U.S. Congress and the industry to review self-regulation and its components. The results in addressing the market risks have been very significant. Most believe that the self-regulatory process has been strengthened. Regulatory consolida-tion has taken place and will continue to

play itself out over the years to come. Also, exchanges have been purchased by either NASDAQ or NYSE Euronext. For example, NASDAQ owns the Boston Stock Exchange and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. NYSE Euronext had merged with Archipelago, formerly, the Pacific Exchange and it is in the process of acquiring the American Stock Exchange. Of course, we all know how NYSE and NASDAQ have expan-ded globally as well. So it is not unusual to expect regulatory consolidation. The NASD combined with some aspects of NYSE Regulation to form a new separate industry regulator, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Globally, as market places consolidate, financial ins-titutions and governments must confront two principal aspects: (a) How to position their financial institutions (market places and banks) to compete in their domestic and global market – for example: Does Montenegro need two securities markets?; and (b) What will be the risk management models they will set in place – who will be responsible for regulating what? The NASD and NYSE rule books are undergoing re-vision to eliminate unevenly applied regu-lation. Some of the questions involve how rules will be written or rewritten, more principle based or rule based?

Rules, any rules, under risk management, need to balance the needs of the business and protect the competitiveness of the mar-ket place as well as those who participate in the business. These challenges to the fi-nancial markets come at a time when the industry products, whether the familiar troubled mortgage products, the prolifera-tion of structured products and intercon-nected global economies as well as other political and economic developments such as the volatility of the stock markets and oil pricing (is it manipulation?), may start to overwhelm the investing public and create a retrenchment caused by a critical decrease in investor knowledge, trust and confiden-ce. In another global initiative, market pla-ces around the world within the securities industry are working to reach a common understanding of what to recognize as vi-olative conduct. Cross border trading topics such as market surveillances, investigation techniques and what constitutes trading violations such as frontrunning and mar-ket manipulation with respect to trading practices, including but not limited to di-rect market access, have been actively dis-cussed within the Intermarket Surveillance Group (ISG). The ISG is an international network of some of the largest exchanges

and markets in the world, currently num-bering thirty six (36). The ISG was created in 1983 to provide a network for markets and exchanges which otherwise compete for market share to collaborate with each other to address and resolve regulatory issues of common interest and to share informati-on with each other in order for each to ful-fill their regulatory obligations. These and other issues are on the forefront of market places throughout the world as risk mana-gement/regulation is being reassessed in a global manner in order to address the ne-eds of the investing public.

conFiDence in a market economyIn conclusion, besides developing appropria-tely balanced risk principles which do not hinder the effective working of the business enterprise, we are in a significantly more sophisticated age of investment products and a renewed understanding of what cons-titutes violative behavior. Consequently, in order to appropriately protect investors and the markets, the financial markets/indus-try will need to, on an ongoing basis, work on world-wide industry regulatory or risk management revisions where activity will need to be subjected to global surveillan-ces and cooperative information sharing.. In addition, significant consideration and priority needs to be given to educating pre-sent and potential future investors placing increased focus in financial literacy, how to investment and the role of regulation in the industry. Only with a combined reeva-luation of the risk management approach and education of our citizens, will a coun-try be able to develop or maintain a strong critical mass of investors who would feel protected enough to continue trusting and having confidence in a market economy which would be strong enough to fuel the capital raising process. We are then faced with the following questions: Do we ag-ree that our time presents us with a call to action? How far are we prepared to go to educate our citizens and create and protect that so very important critical mass which some call the middle class? What role can our financial institutions play in this per-ceived or real future risk to the business enterprise? Eventually, addressing what are the other risk categories we need to add-ress? Depending on the answers to these questions, how do we come together to meet this challenge? Finally, to those who believe that challenges present opportu-nities and, as ERM includes, what are the business opportunities these challenges create for our enterprises ?


�8 upravljanje rizikom kamatne stope

Jedinstveno je gledište po kome se svi rizici mogu svrstati u tri velike grupe: kreditne rizike, tržišne rizike i rizike

kamatne stope. Kreditni i tržišni rizici se posmatraju kao dio riziko portfolio modela, dok se kamatni rizici posmat-raju kao modeli za upravljanje aktivom i pasivom. Iz rizika portfolio modela proizilazi alokacija kapitala (izdvajanje dijela kapitala kojim se mogu pokriti statistički mogući gu-bici pri izabranom nivou tolerancije). Modeli upravljanja aktivom i pasivom dovode do formiranja fondova trans-fernih cijena kojima se nastoje napraviti pravilne margine između troškova pozajmljivanja, margine zarada i margine dodatne cijene za pokriće preuzetog rizika (preko rejtinga) i rizika: ročnosti, valute, tržišta, zemlje, transfera i sl. kako bi pravilno formirali transferne cijene, u skladu sa principom odnosa rizik-prinosi. Alokacija kapitala doprinosi kontroli rizika, tržišta i bilansa uspjeha a preko fonda za transfer cijena i bankarskih spread-ova nastoje formirati trade-off rizik-prinos i formirati efikasan riziko proces.

Po definiciji, kamatna stopa je naknada koju plaća zaj-moprimac zajmodavcu u povremenim obrocima za peri-od korišćenja pozajmljene sume (glavnice). Odmjerava se i naplaćuje u procentualnom iznosu od glavnice. Teorijske rasprave o njenom postojanju i opravdanosti se srijeću još u prvim zapisima.

mjerenje rizika kamatne StopeBanka je podložna rizicima (mašina rizika), i ne može ih izbjeći. Osuđena je da posluje sa njima, a rizici utiču kako na njenu egzistenciju, tako i na performanse i osnovne kate-gorije: likvidnost, rentabilnost, sigurnost i profitabilnost.

Većina stavki u bilansima stanja, banaka, stvara priho-de i rashode koje se pojavljuju u bilansu uspjeha. Svako ko kreditira (kreditor) ili ko uzima kredite (debitor) je izlo-žen kamatnom riziku. Stavke u bilansu stanja su vezane ili za varijabilne kamatne stope ili za fiksne kamatne stope. Rast i pad tržišnih stopa utiče na prihode po ovim stav-kama, i ima različite uticaje na stavke koje su vezane za jednu od ove dvije vrste kamatnih stopa u vidu direktnih ili oportunih troškova.

Promjene kamatne stope utiču na visinu marže (mar-gine), pozitivno ili negativno. Promjene tržišne kamatne stope utiču na profitabilnost banke. Kamatni rizik dije-lom potiče iz nepotpune sinhronizacije promjena kamat-ne stope na aktivi i obavezama banke. Banke daju kredite sa relativno dužim rokovima u odnosu na rokove izvora sredstava. Uslijed ročne transformacije banke mogu da upadnu u kamatonosnu zamku, ukoliko se primjenjuju fiksne kamatne stope.

Kamatna stopa se posmatra u sklopu kreditnog rizika i u sklopu tržišnog rizika. U bilansu stanja komercijalnih banaka najveće je učešće kredita u ukupnoj bilansnoj sumi, pa možemo reći da je kreditni rizik najveći rizik u banka-ma. U investicionim bankama najveće stavke su dugoroč-ne hartije od vrijednosti pa možemo reći da su promjene cijena ovih hartija od vrijednosti najveći rizik za njih (tr-žišni rizik). Zajedničko za sve tipove banaka je da su ka-matni prihodi druga po veličini stavka koja ugrožava po-slovanje banke, pa je kamatni rizik drugi, po redu veličina, rizik banaka. Loše procjene ovog rizika utiču na uvećanje troškova banke koje mogu izazvati probleme solventnosti,

Intenzivnije interesovanje banaka za oblast rizika javilja se u posljednjoj deceniji 20. vijeka, kada dolazi do deregulacije u oblasti bankarstva kao i razdvajanja investicionih banaka, komercijalnih banaka i osiguravajućih kuća. Uslijed deregulacije u ovoj oblasti postaje moguće formiranje finansijskih holding kompanija, sa sve većim uticajem na nacionalnom i internacionalnom nivou. Zbog ovakvih trendova u svjetskoj ekonomiji, banke postaju osjetljivije na sve brojnije rizike koji ih okružuju i sa kojima treba da posluju. Zbog toga banke formiraju specijalizovana odjeljenja - direkcije - koje se bave ovom djelatnošću i u skladu sa tim nastoje da formiraju timove profesionalaca iz različitih oblasti, kako bi efikasno upravljali rizicima. Efikasno upravljanje rizicima podrazumijeva stabilno poslovanje banke, ispunjavanje zadatih ciljeva uz pravilno održanje trade off-a između rizika i prinosa. Za to su zainteresovani i menadžeri banke, koji nastoje da ispune zadate targete a da pri tome poslovanje zadovoljava tražene racije ROA i ROE (Return on Assets i Return on Equity). Za menadžere je jako bitno da dugoročno održe dobre racio indikatore a da pozicije bilansa stanja imaju zadovoljavajući kvalitet aktive i pasive

Goran Smolović Mr. Finansija i bankarstva

BANKARSKI RIZICI


upravljanje rizikom kamatne stope

In the last decade of 20th century, banks became more intensively interested in the risk area. Deregulation in the banking industry and the separation of investment banks, commercial banks and insurance companies also occurred in the same period. Due to the deregulation in this area, it became possible to establish financial holding companies, which have higher influence at national and international level. Moreover, for the reason of such trends in the world’s economy, banks became more sensitive to numerous risks they are encountering and operating with. Therefore, banks are establishing specialized departments – directorates – dealing with this type of activity and, simultaneously, they try to establish teams of experts from different areas that will manage risks more efficiently. Effective risk management includes sound operations of a bank, accomplishment of the assigned objectives with proper trade off between risk and return. Managers of a bank are interested for it and they try to fulfill the assigned objectives, bearing in mind that the performance should meet required ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity) ratios at the same time. It is very important for managers to maintain good ratios in long run, and that the balance sheet positions have satisfactory quality of assets and liabilities

Goran Smolović M.S. in finance and banking

interest rate risk management

There is a uniform view that classifies all risks in three large groups: credit risk, market risks and interest rate

risk. Credit and market risks are viewed as a part of risk portfolio model, while interest rate risks are viewed as mo-dels for assets and liabilities management. Capital allocati-ons (allocation of portion of capital which may cover statis-tically possible losses at the selected tolerance level) results from risk portfolio model. Models of assets and liabilities management lead to the establishment of funds for trans-fer of prices, which tend to make regular margins between borrowing costs, earnings margin and margin of additional price for covering the assumed risk (through rating), and the following risks: maturity, currency, market, country, and transfer risks, etc., to properly form transfer prices in accor-dance with the principle of risk to return ratio. Capital al-location contributes to the risk control, market control and profit and loss control, and through the fund for transfer of prices and banking spreads, the banks are making trade off between risk and return and make efficient risk process.

By default, interest rate is a fee paid by the borrower to the lender in periodical installments for the period of utilizati-on of the borrowed amount (principal). It is measured and paid in the percentage amount from interest. Theoretical discussions on its existence and justification were encoun-tered even in the first documents.

intereSt rate riSk meaSurementBank is subject to risks (risk machine), and it cannot avo-id them. It is doomed to operate with them, and risks have impact both on its existence, and on performances and

main categories: liquidity, cost efficiency, security, and profitability.

Most of the items in the balance sheet of the banks create income and expenses that appear in the income statement. Anyone who gives loans (creditor) or who takes loans (deb-tor) is exposed to interest rate risk. Balance sheet items are connected either with variable or fixed interest rates. The growth or fall in market rates has impact on income from these items, and has different impacts on items that are con-nected to either one of these two types of interest rates as direct or opportune expense.

Changes in interest rates influence positively or negati-vely on the amount of margin. Changes in market interest rates influence on bank’s profitability. Interest rate risk co-mes partly from incomplete synchronization of the chan-ges in interest rates on bank’s assets and liabilities. Banks give loans with relatively long maturities in relation to the terms of sources of funds. As a consequence of the maturity transformation, banks may fall into interest bearing trap, if fixed rates are applied.

Interest rate is observed within credit risk and market risk. The share of loans in total bank’s assets is the highest in the balance sheet of banks. Therefore, we can say that the credit risk is the highest risk in the banks. The largest items in investment banks are long-term securities, so the changes in prices of these securities represent the highest risk for them (market risk). What is common for all types of banks is that interest income is the second largest item which endangers bank’s operations, so interest rate risk is second risk of the banks by size. Poor assessments of this

BANKING RISKS


80odnosno dovesti do umanjenja kapitala ili oduzimanja licence za rad.

Kreditni rizik predstavlja eksponiranost banke u ukupnoj bilansnoj sumi (bilansa stanja) po kreditnim poslovima i vjero-vatnoću da će neki od njih (ili više njih) zapasti u probleme delikvencije. Krediti se nalaze na strani aktive bilansa stanja banke. Kamatni rizik je stavka koja po-tiče i iz pasive i iz aktive bilansa stanja banka, kao i vanbilansnih pozicija (po osnovu derivativnih poslova, garanci-ja, akreditiva, kontigentnih obaveza ili potraživanja itd.). Promjene kamatnih stopa utiču istovremeno i na prihode i na troškove (rashode) u bilansu uspje-ha. Odnosno, kamatni rizik može imati pozitivan ili negativan neto rezultat u za-visnosti od promjena prihoda i rashoda, odnosno od uticaja na maržu (marginu). Zbog ovakvog uticaja na profitabilnost banka, ovaj rizik se svrstava na drugo mjesto po svom značaju.

Ukoliko se posmatraju bilansi uspjeha banaka, vidjećemo da su najveće stavke u njima kamatni prihodi i rashodi odnosno neto kamatni prihodi (na neto podzbirovi-ma). Iz ove osobine proizilazi da je kamat-na marža (margina) od izuzetnog značaja za menadžment banke. Bolje upravljanje znači bolju profitabilnost banke. Bolja pro-fitabilnost znači veće koeficijente ROE i ROA (Return on Equity; Return on Assets; uobičajeni targeti su 25% za ROE prije oporezivanja i 15% poslije oporezivanja), a to znači veće dividende za akcionare, veće investicije iz sopstvenih izvora, veće cijene akcija. Svi ovi elementi su neophod-ni za bolje pozicioniranje menadžmenta. Suprotne efekte ima loše upravljanje ka-matnim rizikom.

Zbog značaja ovih indikatora banke na-stoje da projektuju bilanse, odnosno da projektuju kamatne margine. Za ovakve pretpostavke neophodne su im pretpostav-ke o osjetljivosti kamatne stope, transak-cija i referentnih kamatnih stopa (Libor, Euribor, itd.). Da bi ovo napravile banke prave informacije o svakoj transakciji i bankarskom proizvodu.

Banke u skladu sa ciljem (ROA i ROE) projektuju pojedinačne bankarske proizvo-de, transakcije u skladu sa konkurenci-jom i svojim ciljevima. Nakon projekcija svaki profitni (proizvodni) centar dobija planove koje treba da ispuni. Samo mje-renje rizika u bilansu uspjeha nije tako jednostavno kao kod kalkulisanja pri-hoda i rashoda. Vidljivost gubitka nije jednaka vidljivosti rizika, jer je ovaj širi i potencijalan je.

Upravljanje aktivom i pasivom u ban-ci (Assets Liability Management - ALM) je organizaciona jedinica koja je zaduže-na za upravljanje rizikom kamatne stope i likvidnošću banke. Posmatra kamatni rizik iz dva ugla. Prvi je uticaj promjena kamatne stope na aktivu i pasivu i uticaj na profitabilnost (uticajem na prihode i rashode). Drugi ugao posmatra opcije koje se nalaze unutar bankarskih proizvoda, kao npr. opcija prijevremenog vraćanja kredita u slučaju pada kamatne stope, pre-tvaranja određenih vanbilansnih pozicija u bilansne i obrnuto.

Kod kamatnog rizika, izazivači su svi ti-povi kamatnih stopa (fiksne i varijabilne, a u okviru varijabilnih po vrstama refe-rentnih stopa) po svim valutama.

Postoje dva izvora eksponiranosti rizi-ku kamatne stope:

Tokovi likvidnosti i resetovanje (usklađivanje indexa) kamatne stope. Dugoročni krediti (depoziti) vezani za varijabilnu kamatnu stopu imaju nekoliko datuma za usklađivanje

Kamatna stopa zavisi od prirode, tj. da li je fiksna ili varijabilna. Kada transak-cija zarađuje (prihoduje) varijabilnu ka-matnu stopu usklađivanje kamatne sto-pe utiče na kamatne prihode (rashode) i pozitivno i negativno. Kada zarađuje (prihoduje) fiksnu kamatnu stopu, akti-va ima manju vrijednost ako su tržišne kamatne stope iznad fiksne stope jer ge-neriše prihode manje od tržišnih i obr-nuto. Varijacije kamatne stope povlače promjene u računovodstvenim priho-dima ili rashodima.

Svaka kamatna stopa je zajednički indeks za nekoliko stavki bilansa stanja na strani aktive i pasive. Kako su izloženi istoj stopi neto vrijednosti (razlika između aktive i pasive), gepovi služe za utvrđivanje neto eksponiranosti bilansa stanja za svaku re-levantnu stopu.

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Kamatni gep varijabilne kamatne stope jednog perioda je razlika između sve ak-tive i obaveza čiji se periodi usklađivanja (resetovanja) poklapaju u zadatom vre-menskom periodu. Gep fiksne kamatne stope je razlika između aktive i obaveza čije kamatne stope ostaju fiksne unutar vremenskog perioda. Postoji samo jedan gep fiksne kamatne stope i on je inverzan u odnosu na sve gepove varijabilne kamat-ne stope (kojih može biti više u zavisnosti od referentnih stopa).

Gepovi obezbjeđuju globalnu ekspo-niranost na kamatne stope. Neto razli-ka aktive i obaveza je kamatno osjetljiva. Ako u aktivi i obavezama imamo stavke koje se vežu za istu referentnu kamatnu stopu onda se one upoređuju i ako nema razlike u iznosima i ročnosti onda kaže-mo da je kamatno neosjetljiv bilans ban-ke na tu referentnu kamatnu stopu. Ako postoji razlika, onda je ta razlika gep od-nosno osjetljivost (izloženost) na rizik. Promjene u kamatnoj stopi utiču na prom-jene u kamatnoj marži. Koncept gepova u upravljanju aktivom i pasivom ima dva glavna razloga:

To je najjednostavnija eksponiranost na kamatni rizikNajjednostavnije je mjeriti promjene kamatne stope na periode od kamate

Preciziranje vremenskog horizonta je neophodno kada je u pitanju kalkulisanje kamatne stope. U suprotnom, nije mo-guće utvrditi koja je stopa varijabilna a koja fiksna između današnjeg vremenskog trenutka i budućeg vremenskog horizon-ta. Što je duži vremenski horizont veći je i obim kamatno osjetljive aktive i obaveza, zbog većeg broja usklađivanja (resetovanja) kamatnih stopa. Alternativan pristup ka-matnom gepu je gep između prosječnih reset datuma aktive i obaveza. Ako npr. uvećavamo aktivu sa varijabilnim kamat-nim stopama dok izvori ostaju fiksirani ili ne, prosječna ročnost usklađivanja aktiva se skraćuje, jer se uvećava broj reset peri-oda prilikom računanja varijabilne kamat-ne stope naspram eksponiranosti:

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BANKARSKI RIZICI

AKTIVA: 100Fiksna kamatna stopa 40Varijabilna kamatna stopa 60PASIVA: 100Fiksna kamatna stopa 50Varijabilna kamatna stopa 50Fiskni gep -10Varijabilni gep 10

Prihodi i rashodi za debitora/kreditora u zavisnosti od kretanja kamatne stope i vezanosti za fiksnu ili varijabilnu kamatnu stopu Suma fiksnog i varijabilnog gepa jednaka je nuli

VREM. peRIOD Danas Reset

period Dospijeće

Tip kamatne stope

Fiksna Fiksna Sigurna

Varijabilna Varijabilna Varijabilna NesigurnaRizik kamatne stope u vremenskom periodu u zavisnosti od tipa kamatne stope. Prihodi/rashodi su inverzni za kreditora i debitora

Promjena Kreditori Debitori

Tip kamatne stope

Fiksnakam.stopa

Raste Troškovi PrihodiPada Prihodi Troškovi

Varijabilnakam.stopa

Raste Prihodi TroškoviPada Troškovi Prihodi

Prihodi i rashodi za debitora /kreditora u zavisnosti od kretanja kamatne stope i vezanosti za fiksnu ili varijabilnu kamatnu stopu


risk influence on the increase in expenses of banks that may cause solvency problems and lead to capital reduction or revocation of the bank license.

Credit risk represents exposure of a bank in total bank’s assets (balance sheet) to cre-dit operations and probability that some of them (or several of them) will have delinqu-ency problems. Loans are placed on the as-sets side of the bank’s balance sheet. Interest rate risk is an item that results from both assets and liabilities of bank’s balance sheet, as well as from off balance sheet positions (based on derivative operations, guarante-es, letters of credit, contingent liabilities or commitments, etc.). Changes in interest ra-tes influence simultaneously on both inco-me and expenses in the income statement. Moreover, interest rate risk may have positive or negative net result depending on changes in income and expenses or impact on mar-gin. This risk is placed on the second place by its significance, because of its influence on bank’s profitability.

Observing the income statements of the banks, it can be seen that the largest items in them are interest income and expenses or net interest income (on net sub totals). This characteristic shows that interest mar-gin is extremely important for the mana-gement of the bank. Better management means better profitability for the bank. Better profitability means higher ROE and ROA ratios (common targets are 25% for ROE before taxes and 15% after taxes). This means higher dividends for shareholders, higher investments from own sources, and higher share prices. All of these elements are necessary for better positioning of the management. Poor interest rate risk ma-nagement has opposite effects.

Because of the significance of these indi-cators, banks tend to project balances, i.e. to project interest rate margins. They need as-sumptions on interest rate sensitivity, trans-actions’ and reference interest rate’s sensitivity (Libor, Euribor, etc.) for the above-mentioned assumptions. In order to prepare this, banks are preparing information on each situation and banking product.

In accordance with their targets (ROA and ROE), banks project individual ban-king products and transactions depending on the competition and their goals. After the projections are made, revenue-earning business unit gets plans that need to be met. Risk measurement itself in the income sta-tement is not that easy as it is the calculati-on of income and expenses. The visibility of loss is not equal to the visibility of risk, since the latter is wider and potential.

Assets and Liability Management repre-sents an organizational unit of the bank responsible for interest rate risk management and liquidity risk management. It observes interest rate risk from two aspects. The first one represents an impact of changes in in-terest rates on assets and liabilities and im-pact on profitability (through the influence on income and expenses). The second aspect observes options that are embedded in ban-king products, such as option of premature loan repayment in case of decrease in interest rate, conversion of certain off balance she-et positions into the balance sheet positions and vice versa.

In respect of interest rate risk, all types of interest rates (fixed and variables, and within variables by types of reference rates) by all currencies represent triggers.

There are two sources of exposure to in-terest rate risk:

Liquidity flows and resetting (indices adjustment) of interest rate,Long-term loans (deposits) tied to va-riable interest rate have several dates for adjustment.

Interest rate depends on nature, i.e. whether it is fixed or variable. When the transacti-on earns variable interest rate, the adjus-tment of interest rate influences on interest income (expenses) both positively and ne-gatively. When it earns fixed interest rate, assets have lower value if market interest rates are above fixed rate since it genera-tes income in lower amount than market ones and vice versa. The variations of in-terest rate incur changes in accounting in-come or expenses.

Each interest rate is mutual index for several balance sheet items on assets and liabilities side. When they are exposed to the same rate of net value (difference bet-ween assets and liabilities), gaps serve to determine net exposure of balance sheet for each relevant rate.

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Variable interest rate gap of one period represents the difference between all as-sets and liabilities where adjustment pe-riods (resetting periods) are matched in given time period. Fixed interest rate gap represents the difference between assets and liabilities where interest rates remain fixed within time period. There is only one fixed interest rate gap which is inver-sed in relation to all variable interest rate gaps (they may be numerous depending on the reference rates).

Gaps provide global exposure to interest rates. Net difference of assets and liabilities is interest rates sensitive. If we have items on assets and liabilities side that are tied to the same reference interest rate, they are compared and if there is no difference in amounts and maturity, the balance of the bank is not rate sensitive to that reference interest rate. If there is difference, that dif-ference represents gap or sensitivity (expo-sure) to risk. Changes in interest rate in-fluence on changes in interest margin. The concept of gaps in assets and liabilities ma-nagement has two main reasons:

It is the simplest exposure to interest rate risk,The easiest way is to measure changes in interest rates on periods from inte-rest rate

Making precise time horizon is neces-sary when it comes to the calculation of interest rate. Otherwise, it is not possib-le to determine which rate is variable and which is fixed one between today and fu-ture time horizon. The longer time horizon the higher volume of rate sensitive assets and liabilities is, due to higher number of adjustments (resetting) of the interest ra-tes. Alternative approach to interest rate gap is gap between average reset dates of assets and liabilities. If, for example, assets with variable rates are increased regardless of whether the sources remain fixed, the average maturity match of assets is decre-ased, since the number of reset periods is increased when calculating variable rate against exposure:

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tIMe BucKet Today Reset

period Maturity

Interest Rate Type

Fixed Fixed Secure

Variable Variable Variable UnsecureInterest rate risk in time periods (buckets) depending on type of interest rate Income/expenses are inversed for creditor and debtor

Change Creditors Debtors

Interest Rate Type

FixedGrowth Expenses IncomeFall Income Expenses

VariableGrowth Income ExpensesFall Expenses Income

Income and expenses for debtor/creditor depending on the interest rate movements and fixed or variable interest rate

ASSETS: 100Fixed interest rate 40Variable interest rate 60LIABILITIES: 100Fixed interest rate 50Variable interest rate 50Fixed gap -10Variable gap 10

Income and expenses for debtor/creditor depending on interest rate movements and fixed or variable interest rate Sum of fixed and variable gap is equal to zero

BANKING RISKS

Analiza odnosa aktive i obaveza, kao i kamatnih gepovaIzvor: Hypo Alpe Adria Banka a.d. Podgorica; 2006.


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Gep kamatne stope i varijabilna kamatna margina su indikatori kamatnih promjena. Kamatni gep je osjetljivost kamatnih pri-hoda kada se kamatna stopa mijenja. Ako je pozitivan gep (aktiva minus obaveze), prihod raste zajedno sa rastom kamatne stope. Ako je gep negativan, prihod opa-da zajedno sa rastom kamatne stope. Kod pozitivnog gepa kamatni prihod opada kada kamatna stopa opada, dok kod ne-gativnog gepa prihod raste kada kamatna stopa opada. Ako je gep jednak nuli, ka-matna margina je neosjetljiva na promje-ne kamatne stope.

Kamatna marža = (Varijabilno indek-sirana aktiva – Varijabilno indeksira-ne obaveze) × ∆i = kamatni gep × ∆i

Kamatni i likvidonosni gepovi su po-vezani jer svako buduće davanje ili uzi-manje kredita je pod uticajem nepoznate buduće kamatne stope.

Osnovna sredstva – Ulozi= –150Aktiva po fiksnoj kam. stopi – pasiva

po fiksnoj kam. stopi =150 – 120 = 30

Aktiva po varijabilnoj kam. stopi – Pa-siva po varijabilnoj kam. stopi =

300 – 100 = 200

Menadžment banke nastoji kontrolisati ka-matni rizik. Njega nastoje riješiti kroz limiti-ranje kamatnih gepova i permanentnim mo-nitoringom od strane komiteta za upravljanje aktivom i pasivom i preduzimanjem korek-tivnih akcija. Limitiranje kamatnog gepa se obično prezentira kao procenat od ukupne aktive. On se dinamički usklađuje sa portfolio kamatnom strukturom banke, kao i zadatim targetima (ROE i ROA). Za svaku referent-nu kamatnu stopu daju se limiti kamatnog gepa. Takođe se nastoji vezati portfolio za referentne kamatne stope koje imaju supro-

ne tendencije (negativnu korelaciju) tako da u slučaju poremećaja na tržištu amortizuju automatski negativne efekte. Treći rizik koji nastoje da limitiraju je valutni rizik i njega određuju kao procenat dozvoljenog gepa u odnosu na ukupnu aktivu.

Takođe prilikom rada sa vanbilansnim pozicijama i opcijama prijevremenih otplata kredita (povlačenja depozita) i sl. kreditni konverzioni faktori koje propisuju regu-latorni organi se pokazuju neefikasnim. Rješenje se nalazi u formiranju internih metoda uz back-testing i stres-testing. Da bi se izbjegla pogrešna mapiranja (uvezi-vanja) prilikom izvještavanja, banke tre-baju bolja softverska rješenja (tzv. on-line rješenje izvještavanja).

Simulacioni moDeli i metoDe upravljanja kamatnim rizikomBanke formiraju komitete za upravljanje aktivom i pasivom u cilju što boljeg ostva-rivanja postavljenih planova pred mena-džment banke. Uobičajeno se komitet za upravljanje aktivom i pasivom sastaje je-danput nedeljno. Za sve sektore pripre-maju se izvještaji, koji se sumiraju kroz sektor rizika i sublimiraju na nivou banke. U okviru tih izvještaja spadaju:

Izvještaji o upravljanju likvidnošću. Mjerenje i kontrolu kamatnog rizika. Preporuke vezane za vanbilansne pozicije. Sistem formiranja cijena. Određivanje cijena u skladu sa rizi-kom označava transferne cijene

Uobičajena agenda Komiteta za upravlja-nje aktivom i pasivom (ALCO-a) sadrži sljedeću istorijsku analizu:

Kako se obim i i margine ponašaju;Kako i koliko se prethodne projek-cije razlikuju u terminima margina i obima;Šta objašnjava aktuelne gepove, pro-jektovanje budućih gepova i preporu-ke menadžmentu banke.

Menadžment banke je odgovoran za postav-ljene planove. U skladu sa odgovornošću, oni zahtijevaju da imaju blagovremene i preciz-ne, pouzdane i detaljne (iscrpne) izvještaje, na osnovu kojih mogu ocjenjivati ostvari-vanje postavljenih planova, sagledati odgo-vornosti i predložiti korektivne instrukcije, smjernice i rješenja za budući rad.

Sistem upravljanja aktivom i pasivom (ALM-Assets liabilities management) se sastoji iz čisto finansijskih i drugih po-slovnih dimenzija i sagledavaju se ukrš-teno kroz matrice kako bi se bolje ra-zumjeli. Poslovna dimenzija zahtijeva razdvajanje agregata, po proizvodima,

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4.5.

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tržišnim segmentima, poslovnim jedini-cama i transakcijama.

Razdvajanja se vrše razbijanjem aktive i obaveza na varijabilne stavke, vezane za fiksnu kamatnu stopu, likvidonosne ge-pove, novu aktivu i obaveze.

Razbijanje kamatnog prihoda na sličan način se vrši po segmentima:

BANKARSKI RIZICI

Analiza odnosa aktive i obaveza, kao i kamatnih gepova; Izvor: Hypo Alpe Adria Banka a.d. Podgorica; 2006.

Analiza aktive i obaveza po bankarskim proizvodimaIzvor: Hypo Alpe Adria Banka a.d. Podgorica; 2006.



Aktiva: Pasiva:

Aktiva po fiksnoj kamatnoj stopi (AFKS)

Pasiva po fiksnoj kamatnoj stopi (PFKS)

Aktiva po varijabilnoj kamatnoj stopi (AVKS)

Pasiva po varijabilnoj kamatnoj stopi (PVKS)

GEPOVI KAMATNE STOPE Gep fiksne kam. stope = - Gep Varijabilne kam. stope

Odnos i povezanost kamatnog i likvidonosnog gepa

AKTIVA: PASIVA:Osnovna sredstva: 50 Ulozi: 200Aktiva po fiksnoj kamatnoj stopi: 150 Pasiva po fiksnoj

kamatnoj stopi: 120

Aktiva po var. kamatnoj stopi: 300 Pasiva po var.

kamatnoj stopi: 100

UKUPNO: 500 UKUPNO: 420

Likvidonosni gep = 500 – 420 = 80


Interest rate gap and variable interest margin are indicators of changes in inte-rest rates. Interest rate gap is sensitive to interest income when interest rate changes. If gap is positive (assets minus liabilities), income increases with the interest rate gro-wth. If gap is negative, income decreases with interest rate growth. Interest income decreases when interest rate decreases at positive gap, while income increases when interest rate decreases at negative gap. If gap is equal to zero, interest margin is not sensitive to changes in interest rate.

Interest margin = (Var. indexed assets – Variable indexed liabilities) × ∆i =

interest rate gap × ∆i

Interest rate gaps and liquidity gaps are connected since making or taking of lo-ans in the future is under the influence of unknown future interest rate.

Fixed assets – Investments = –150Assets at fixed interest rate –

Liabilities at fixed interest rate = 150 – 120 = 30

Assets at variable interest rate – Liabilities at var. interest rate =

300 – 100 = 200

Management of the bank tries to control interest rate risk. The management tries to resolve it through establishing of the limits of the interest rate gaps and their permanent monitoring by ALCO and undertaking cor-rective actions. Limiting of the interest rate gap is usually presented as the percentage of total assets. It is dynamically matched with the portfolio interest rate structure of the bank and assigned targets (ROE and ROA). Limits of interest gap are given for each reference interest rate. In addition, the management tends to tie portfolio to reference interest

rates which have opposite trends (negative correlation), so that in case of disturbance at the market, it immediately depreciates negative effects. Third risk the management tends to limit is currency risk, which is de-termined as the percentage of allowed gap in relation to total assets.

Moreover, when dealing with off balance sheet positions and options of early loan repayments (deposit withdrawals) and the like, credit conversion factors prescribed by regulatory authorities seem inefficient. The solution is in determining internal met-hods with back testing and stress testing. To avoid incorrect mappings when reporting, the banks need better software solutions (so called on-line reporting).

Simulation moDelS anD methoDS For intereSt rate riSk management Banks establish asset and liabilities com-mittees for better accomplishment of their plans set up by the management of a bank. It is usual that the Assets and Liabilities Committee (ALCO) meets once a week. Reports are prepared by all sectors, which are summed through risk sector and ag-gregated at the bank’s level. These reports include the following:

Liquidity management report, Interest rate risk measurement and control,Recommendations for off balance she-et positions, System for establishing prices,Pricing in accordance with the risk in-dicates transfer prices

Common agenda of the ALCO contains the following historical analysis:

How the volume and margins behave;How and how much of the previous projections differ in terms of margins and volume;What explains actual gaps, projection of future gaps and recommendations to the management of the bank?

Management of the bank is responsible for the prepared plans. Pursuant to their responsibility, the management requires timely and precise, reliable and detailed reports, based on which it can assess the accomplishment of the prepared plans, re-view responsibilities and suggest corrective instructions, guidelines and solutions for future work.

Assets and liabilities management sys-tem consists of purely financial and other business dimensions, which are cross-re-viewed through matrices for the purpose of their better understanding. Business dimension requires breakdown of the ag-

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4.5.

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gregates, by products, market segments, business units and transactions.

Breakdowns are carried out by segre-gation of assets and liabilities to variable items, tied to fixed rate, liquidity gaps, new assets and liabilities.

Breakdowns of interest income are si-milarly performed by segments:

The relat. and connectivity of inter.rate and liquid. gap

ASSETS: LIABILITIES:Fixed assets: 50 Investments 200Assets at fixed interest rate 150 Liabilities at fixed

interest rate: 120

Assets at variable interest rate 300 Liabilities at var.

interest rate: 100

TOTAL: 500 TOTAL: 420

Liquidity gap = 500 - 420 = 80

The analysis of the assets and liabilities relations, as well as interest rate gapsSource: Hypo Alpe Adria Banka a.d. Podgorica; 2006

The analysis of the assets and liabilities relations, as well as interest rate gaps; Source: Hypo Alpe Adria Banka a.d. Podgorica; 2006

The analysis of assets and liab. by banking productsSource: Hypo Alpe Adria Banka a.d. Podgorica; 2006



Assets: Liabilities:

Assets at fixed interest rate

Liabilities at fixed interest rate

Assets at variable interest rate

Liabilities at variable interest rate

Interest rate gaps Fixed interest rate gap = – Variable interest rate gap

BANKING RISKS


8�

Na sličan način se pravi izvještaj za sve bilansne i vanbilansne pozicije. Svrha svih ovih izvještaja je da se na jednostavan i sažet način sagleda pozicija banke i vrši lakše upravljanje. Najznačajniji doprinos ostvarivanju ovog zadatka daju blagovre-meni, tačni i precizni izvještaji sa dovolj-no detalja, kako bi se sagledala cjelokupna pozicija banke i kako bi menadžment usp-ješno vodio instituciju. Ovakvi izvještaji se formiraju u komercijalnim, investici-onim i univerzalnim bankama.

Prihodi od kamata su popularni tar-get upravljanja kamatnim rizikom. To je jednostavna mjera tekuće profitabilnosti koja se pojavljuje direktno u finansijskim izvještajima. Prihod po kamati karakteri-še specifičan period, ignorišući bilo koji

prihod izvan tog vremenskog perioda. Ako uključimo i dugoročnu profitabilnost dobijamo mnogo složeniju i neizvjesniju situaciju. Da bi smo mogli da izračuna-vamo buduće prilive moramo ih porediti (uskladiti) sa tekućim kamatnim stopama. Ovo usklađivanje se u engleskoj literatu-ri označava kao „Mark-to-market“. Ovo poređenje (usklađivanje) se vrši diskon-tovanjem budućih priliva po diskontnim (kamatnim) stopama.

Diskontovana vrijednost se naziva sadaš-njom vrijednošću (SV). Da bi se došlo do sadašnje vrijednosti može se koristiti više diskontnih stopa. Ako koristimo tržišne kamatne stope onda je to vrednovanje po „poštenoj vrijednosti“ (eng. „fair value“). Ova vrijednost zavisi od vrijednosti aktive/

pasive i od ugovorene nominalne kamat-ne stope. Ona se može utvrđivati na nivou pojedinačne stavke u aktivi ili pasivi i na porfolio nivou aktive/pasive. Definicija sadašnje vrijednosti bi bila:

SV= ∑ BV / (1 + pm)tSV sadašnja vrijednost BV buduća vrijednostpm tržišna kam. stopa (eng. Market price)

Ova formula pretvara buduće vrijednosti u sadašnju vrijednost i za aktivne stavke i za pasivne stavke finansijskih izvještaja. Neto sadašnja vrijednost bi bila sadašnja vrijed-nost aktivnih stavki finansijskih izvještaja minus pasivne stavke finansijskih izvješta-ja. Neto sadašnja vrijednost je usklađena nominalna vrijednost sa tržišnom.

Efekat se odražava na neto sadašnju vri-jednost. Ako je ona pozitivna i dođe do rasta kamatne stope, efekat je pozitivan, ili suprotan ako je negativna. Uvećanje, odnosno umanjenje tekuće kamatne stope može uticati na vrijednost neto sadašnje vrijednosti, odnosno na njegovo uvećanje ili umanjenje.

Da bi banke utvrdile efekte promjena tekućih kamatnih stopa na prihode od kamata, prave projekcije budućih priliva (prihoda) i promjena kamatnih stopa, od-nosno prave modele višestrukih scenarija. Ovi modeli podrazumijevaju pravljenje vremenskih grupa (perioda) u kojima se dešavaju prihodi/ rashodi. U okviru ovih vremenskih perioda se svrstavaju prihodi i rashodi. Nakon što se svi prihodi/ ras-hodi razvrstaju, diskontovanjem se dolazi do sadašnje vrijednosti.

SV (aktive) = Vrijednost aktive 1 / (1 + pm)¹ + Vrijednost aktive 2 / (1 + pm)² + Vrijednost aktive 3 / (1 + pm)³ +…+

Vrijednost aktive n / (1 + pm)ⁿ

SV (pasive) = Vrijednost pasive 1 / (1 + pm)¹ + Vrijednost pasive 2 / (1 + pm)² + Vrijednost pasive 3 / (1 + pm)³ +…+

Vrijednost pasive n / (1 + pm)ⁿ

BANKARSKI RIZICI

Raste kam. stopa Pada kam. stopa

Fiksna aktiva Sadašnja vrijednost pada

Sadašnja vrijednost raste

Var. aktiva 1 Sadašnja vrijednost pada


Var. aktiva 2 — —

Fiksna pasiva Sadašnja vrijednost pada


Var. pasiva 1 Sadašnja vrijednost pada


Var. pasiva 2 — —Odnos stavki aktive i pasive bilansa banke i njihova vrijednost u zavisnosti od rasta ili pada ovih kamatnih stopa (kretanja na tržištu)


Similarly, the report for all balance sheet and off balance sheet positions is prepared. The purpose of these reports is to review bank’s positions in simple and condensed manner and to make managing of the bank easier. Timely, accurate and precise reports with sufficient amount of details to review overall position of the bank represent the most important contribution for accom-plishing this task. They help management to successfully lead the institution. Such reports are prepared in commercial, in-vestment and universal banks.

Interest income represents popular tar-get of interest rate risk management. It re-presents simple measure of current profi-tability which appears directly in financial reports. Interest income is characterized by specific period, ignoring any income bey-ond that time period. If long-term profita-bility is also included, much complex and uncertain situation is obtained. In order to calculate future inflows, they must be compared (matched) with current interest rates. This is called mark to market. It is performed by discounting future inflows at discounted (interest) rates.

Discounted value is called present value (PV). In order to reach present value, se-veral discounted rates can be used. If inte-rest market rates are used, it represents the valuation by fair value. This value depends on the value of assets/liabilities and agreed nominal interest rate. It can be determined at the level of individual item in assets or liabilities and at the level of assets/liabi-lities portfolio. The definition of the pre-sent value would be following:

PV= ∑ FV / (1 + pm)tPV present value FV future valuepm market rate/price

This formula converts future values in present value for both asset items and lia-bilities items of the financial reports. Net present value would be present value of asset items of the financial reports less

liabilities items of the financial reports. Net present value is marked to market nominal value.

The relation of the asset and liabili-ties items of the balance of the bank and their value depending on the increase or decrease in these interest rates (market movements)

The effect is maintained at net present value. If it is positive and the interest rate increases, the effect is positive or it is opposite if it is negative. The increase or decrease in current interest rate may have impact on the amount of net present va-lue, i.e. its increase or decrease.

The banks prepare projections of future inflows (income) and changes in interest rates to determine the effects of changes in

current interest rates on interest income, i.e. they prepare multiple scenario models. These models include the preparation of time buc-kets (periods) where income/expenses oc-cur. Income and expenses are placed within these time buckets. Upon the classification of all income/expenses, they are discounted to reach present value. PV (assets) = Asset value 1 / (1 + pm)¹ +

Asset value 2 / (1 + pm)² + Asset value 3 / (1 + pm)³ +

+…+ Asset value n / (1 + pm)ⁿ

PV (liabilities) = Liabilities value 1 / (1 + pm)¹ + Liabilities value 2 / (1 + pm)² + Liabilities value 3 / (1 + pm)³ +

+…+ Liabilities value n / (1 + pm)ⁿ

Increase in interest rate

Decrease in interest rate

Fixed assets Present value decreases

Present value increases

Variable assets 1 Present value decreases


Variable assets 2 — —

Fixed liabilities Present value decreases


Variable liabilities 1

Present value decreases


Var. liabilities 2 — —The relation of the asset and liab. items of the balance of the bank and their value depending on the increase or decrease in these interest rates (market movements)

BANKING RISKS


8�

U Crnoj Gori se sa sistemom praćenja ri-zika počelo u skorije vrijeme. Razlozi za ovo su svima, manje više, dobro poznati. Sa ulaskom stranog kapitala i inostranih banka na crnogorsko tržište, tržišna utak-mica je postala dinamičnija i počele su se primjenjivati metodologije i sistemi koji se u zemljama Zapadne Evrope već za-dnje dvije decenije primjenjuju.

I domaće banke su počele da primjen-juju organizacione šeme banaka u skla-du sa Bazelom II i počele da formiraju odjeljenja (sektore/ direkcije) za praćenje rizika, kao zasebne organizacione cjeli-ne. U skladu sa tim i kod nas su počela razdvajanja bilansnih pozicija banke i praćenja izloženosti kamatnom riziku i uticaju promjena kamatnih stopa na poslovne performanse banke.

Neto sadašnja vrijednost = Sadašnja vri-jednost (Aktive) – Sadašnja vrijednost

(Pasive)

Kao što smo rekli prihodi i rashodi po os-novu kamata su najveće stavke u bilansu uspjeha. Uspješno upravaljanje kamatnim rizikom ima odraza na krajnji rezultat ban-ke, odnosno na uspješnost menadžmenta banke. Poslije kreditnog rizika, ovaj rizik je najznačajniji, za investicione, komer-cijalne i univerzalne banke.

Prilikom kalkulisanja neto sadašnje vrijed-nosti bilansa stanja vrijednost se usklađuje sa promjenama tržišne kamatne stope. Vrijednost aktive i obaveza koristeći originalne stope (konstantne tržišne stope) se kalkuliše, i neto sadašnja vrijednost je npr. (diskontna stopa je 10% tj. -tržišna kamatna stopa):

Sadašnja vrijednost (aktive) = 110 / (1+0,10) + 110 / (1+0,10)² +

1.110 / (1+0,10)³ = 1.024.869

Sadašnja vrijednost (pasive) = 90 / (1+0,10) + 90 / (1+0,10)² +

1.090 / (1+0,10)³ = 975,13

Neto sadašnja vrijednost je:vrijednost (pasive) =

NSV = NSV (aktive) – NSV (pasive) = 49,737

Drugi način da izračunamo neto sadaš-nju vrijednost je diskontovanje margine po vremenskim periodima:

Margine sadašnje vrijednosti = 20 / (1 + 0,10) + 20 / (1 + 0,10)² +

20 / (1+0,10)³ = 49,737

Ovo ukazuje da je neto sadašnja vrijed-nost iz Cash flow-a u potpunosti jednaka sadašnjoj vrijednosti kamatnog prihoda po istoj stopi:

Neto sadašnja vrijednost = = Sadašnja vrijednost margine

Na osnovu kalkulacija može se praviti i scenario analize neto sadašnje vrijednosti i projektovanje kamatnih prihoda sa prom-jenama kamatne stope. Kada se kamatne stope mijenjaju, cash flow se ne mijenja, ali se projektovane margine mijenjaju, obzirom da je trošak duga podložan resetovanju, po tržišnim kamatnim stopama.

Ukoliko uzmemo realne bilanse banaka, primjenjuju se identični principi, bilo da je riječ o investicionim, komercijalnim, uni-verzalnim ili nekim specifičnim oblicima bankarskih organizacija.

Cjelokupna bilansna suma se razdva-ja na aktivu i pasivu. U okviru aktive se dalje stavke svrstavaju u određene grupe (segmente) u zavisnosti od uticaja na njih, zatim se vrši razdvajanje na one stavke na koje utiče fiksna kamatna stopa i na one na koje utiču varijabilne kamatne stope. U okviru varijabilnih kamatnih stopa ra-zdvajanja se vrše po pojedinim vrstama referentnih kamatnih stopa i indeksa.

Nakon što se izvrše ova razdvajanja sve stavke se moraju svrstati u određene vre-menske grupe (periode). Broj grupa (peri-oda) i njihovo trajanje se prilagođava spe-cifičnim potrebama banke tj. specifičnim proizvodima koje banka ima. Uobičajeni periodi su: do 1 mjeseca, od 1 do 3 mjese-ca, od 3 mjeseca do 6 mjeseci, od 6 mjeseci do godinu dana, od 1 do 3 godine, od 3 do 5 godina, od 5-7 godina, od 7-10 godina i period za 10 godina i više. Slično se radi i za pasivu bilansa stanja banke, s tim što se prvo razdvaja kapital banke od obaveza banke. Obaveze se zatim grupišu u zavis-nosti da li su izložene fiksnim kamatnim stopama ili varijabilnim kamatnim stopa-ma. U okviru varijabilnih kamatnih stopa se diferenciranje vrši u zavisnosti od veza-nosti za referentne kamatne stope i indek-se. Ovako dobijene stavke se razvrstavaju u okviru vremenskih grupa (perioda).

Tako razdvojene stavke aktive i pasive (po grupama i vremenskim periodima) se upo-ređuju i utvrđuju se kamatni gepovi. Nakon utvrđenog gepa banke nastoje da vide svoju izloženost riziku promjena kamatnih stopa. Banke nastoje napraviti nekoliko scenarija (vjerovatnih) kako bi mogle da sagledaju svoju poziciju za svaki od njih. Za svaki scenario se sagledava krajnji rezultat kao i mogućnosti primjene finansijskih derivata, kako bi se optimizirao rezultat i na vrijeme preduzele korektivne mjere.

Scenariji obuhvataju planske bilan-se uspjeha i njihovo ponašanje u sluča-ju kretanja kamatnih stopa u različitim pravcima ili prikazom uticaja promjene kamatne stope na kamatne margine i na neto sadašnju vrijednost. Ove scenario analize pokušavaju da predvide ponašanje deponenata banke u slučaju promjena ka-matnih stopa i pojavljivanja supstituta za klasične depozite, kao i njihove migracije. Nastoji se razdvojiti stabilna deponent-ska baza od fluktuirajuće. Takođe nasto-je predvidjeti ponašanje klijenata banke (onih koji uzimaju kredite i koriste druge bankarske proizvode).

Banke sa dužim iskustvom u ovoj ob-lasti imaju pripremljene limite i brojnije scenario analize. One su razvile i infor-

macionu tehnologiju koja im daje frek-ventnije izvještaje o poziciji banke i odstu-panjima od planskih pozicija, na osnovu kojih one mogu pravovremeno da reaguju i preduzimaju korektivne akcije i da svo-je poslovne poteze prilagode najbližem scenariju a da pri tom ne naruše strateš-ke pozicije banke.

Svoju internu metodologiju ove banke nastoje testirati na istorijskim podacima kako bi uvidjele da li zadovoljavaju njihovi modeli. Primjenjuju se stres testovi i back testovi kako bi uvidjeli da li postavljeni ni-voi tolerancije (statističke vjerovatnoće) zadovoljavaju i da li banka ima odgova-rajuće pragove tolerancije i odnosa (trade off-a) između rizika i prinosa. Pri ovim mjerenjima koriste se savremene tehni-ke analize i kvantitativni modeli mjerenja tipa VAR i CAR (Value at Risk i Capital at Risk). Njihov smisao je mjerenje rizika na cjelokupnom nivou banke.

Banke sa manje iskustva u ovoj oblas-ti pokušavaju primijeniti modele koje su razvile veće i u ovoj oblasti iskusnije banke (Citicorp, J.P.Morgan, Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank of America, Bankers Trust, USB; Deutche, Morgan Grenfell itd. ). Pri tome, ne nastoje samo iskopirati njihove modele već nastoje izvući iz njih pozitivne elemente, prilagoditi ih konkretnim uslo-vima i modelirati za sopstvene potrebe a da pri tome pruže informacionu i stra-tešku podršku kakvu imaju veći sistemi i savremenija informaciona metodologija. U tom cilju manji sistemi nastoje imple-mentirati sopstvena informaciono-tehno-loška rješenja i metodologije ■

BANKARSKI RIZICI


Net present value = Present value (assets) – Present value

(liabilities)

As previously mentioned, interest in-come and expenses are the largest items in the income statement. The successful interest rate risk management reflects on the final result of the bank, i.e. on the successfulness of the bank’s management. After the credit risk, this risk is the most important for investment, commercial and universal banks.

When calculating net present value of the balance sheet, the value is adjusted to the changes in market price. The va-lue of assets and liabilities using original rates (constant market rates) is calcula-ted, and net present value is, for example, (discounted rate at 10% - market price) as follows:

Pres. value (assets) = 110 / (1+0,10) + 110 / (1+0,10)² + 1.110 / (1+0,10)³ =

1.024.869

Pres. value (liabilities) = 90 / (1+0,10) + 90 / (1+0,10)² +

1.090 / (1+0,10)³ = 975,13

Net present value is:NPV =

NPV (assets) – NPV (liabilities) = 49,737

The different way to calculate net pre-sent value is discounting margin by time periods:

Present value margins = 20 / (1+0,10) + 20 / (1+0,10)² +

20 / (1+0,10)³ = 49,737

This points out that the net present va-lue from cash flow is completely equal to present value of interest income at the same rate:

Net present value = = present value of the margin

Based on the calculations, the scenario analysis of net present value and the pro-jection of interest income with changes in interest rate can be prepared. When interest rates change, cash flow does not change, but the projected margins are changing, since the cost of loss is subject to resetting, at market prices.

If realistic balances of the banks are ta-ken into considerations, identical princip-les will apply whether they are investment, commercial, universal or some specific forms of banking organizations.

Total balance sheet is divided into assets and liabilities. Items within the assets are further classified into certain groups (seg-ments) depending on the impact on them, and then they are broken down to the items influenced by fixed interest rate and to the items influenced by variable interest rate. The classification within variable interest rates is performed by individual reference interest rates and indices.

After these classifications are made, all items must be classified in time buckets (pe-riods). The number of buckets (periods) and their duration is adjusted to specific needs of the bank, i.e. it is adjusted to the specific products the bank has. The common periods are: up to 1 month, from 1-3 months, from 3-6 months, from 6-12 months, from 1-3 years, from 3-5 years, from 5-7 years, from 7-10 years and period 10 years and over. Similar also applies to the liabilities and capital of the balance sheet of the bank, but in this case, capital of the bank is firstly separated from the liabilities of the bank. Liabilities are grou-ped depending on whether they are exposed to fixed or variable interest rates. Within va-riable interest rates, differentiation is based on their pegging to reference interest rates and indices. Items obtained in such way are classified within time buckets (periods).

Assets and liabilities items broken down in this way (by groups and time periods) are compared and interest rate gaps are determined. Banks tend to prepare se-veral scenarios (possible ones) to review their position for each one of them. The final result is reviewed for each scenario,

and the possibilities to apply financial de-rivatives in order to optimize the result and take corrective actions on time are also reviewed.

The scenarios include projected inco-me statements and their behavior in case of movement of interest rates in different directions or presentation of changes in interest rates on interest margin and net present value. These scenario analyses try to predict the behavior of the bank’s depo-sitors in case of changes in interest rates and appearance of the substitutes for clas-sical deposits, as well as their migrations. Stable depositor’s base is being separated from the floating one. In addition, the be-havior of the bank’s clients (those that take loans and use other banking products) is being predicted.

Banks with longer experience in this area have prepared limits and numerous scenario analyses. They have also deve-loped information technology that gives them more frequent reports on the posi-tion of the bank and deviations from the projected positions, based on which they can react on time, undertake corrective ac-tions and adjust their business moves to the closest scenario without jeopardizing strategic positions of the bank.

These banks test their internal metho-dologies on historical data to convince themselves if their models are at satisfac-tory level. Stress tests and back testing are applied to see if the tolerance levels (statis-tical probabilities) are met and if the bank will have appropriate thresholds of tole-rance and trade off between the risk and return. Modern techniques of analysis and quantitative models of measurement such as VaR (Value at Risk) and CaR (Capital at Risk) are used. They are measuring risk at the overall level of the bank.

Less experienced banks in this area are applying models that are being developed by large and more experienced banks in this area ( such as Citicorp, J.P.Morgan, Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank of America, Bankers Trust, USB; Deutche, Morgan Grenfell, etc.). In that respect, they are copying not only the models of the expe-rienced banks, but also they are trying to pull out positive elements, adjust them to their specific conditions and model them to their own needs providing simultane-ously information and strategic support which already exist in large systems and modern information technology. In that respect, smaller systems tend to implement their own information and technological solutions and methodologies ■

Risk monitoring systems in Montenegro have started recently. The reasons for this are more or less very well known to everyone. With the entrance of foreign capital and foreign banks to Montenegrin market, market game beca-me more dynamic, and methodologies and systems that have been applying in Western European countries for the last two decades started to apply even here. Domestic banks also started to apply orga-nizational schemes in accordance with Basel II and to establish departments (divisions/sectors) for risk monitoring as special organizational units. In that respect, the breakdowns of the balance sheet positions of the banks have also started in our country, monitoring simulta-neously the exposure to interest rate risk and influence of the changes in interest rates on business performances of the banks.

BANKING RISKS

Bulevar Sv Petra Cetinjskog 115, 81 000 PodgoricaTel: +382 (0)20 407 900

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90 banke kao i drugiReforme poreskog sistema, koje su otpočele 2001. godine donošenjem novih poreskih zakona, usaglašene sa poreskim pravom Evropske unije, stvorile su povoljan ambijent i ekonomske uslove za razvoj privrednog i finansijskog sektora u Crnoj Gori. To je omogućilo da se naše poresko zakonodavstvo učini efikasnijim, pravičnijim, transparentnijim, stabilnim i što jednostavnijim za primjenu

Dragan Vujošević, dipl. ecc. Samostalni savjetnik u ministarstvu finansija Vlade CG

Novi Zakon o bankama (‘’Službeni list CG’’, broj 17/08), koji je stupio

na snagu 19. marta 2008. godine, jasno je definisao pravni položaj banaka u cilju uspostavljanja i održavanja zdravog i sta-bilnog sistema koji obezbjeđuje zaštitu interesa deponenata i drugih povjerilaca. Odredbama ovog zakona, banka je prav-no lice i na nju se primjenjuju odredbe zakona kojim se utvrđuje pravni položaj privrednih društava. Iz ovakve zakonske regulative proizilazi da se na banke, kao akcionarska društva, u poreskom sistemu Crne Gore, primjenjuju odredbe poreskih zakona koje se odnose na pravna lica čime stiču svojstvo poreskog obveznika na na-čin i pod uslovima propisan Zakonom o poreskoj administraciji i Zakonom o po-rezu na dodatu vrijednost.

To znači, da banke, kao poreski obveznici, nakon dobijanja dozvole za rad od strane Centralne banke u skladu sa Zakonom o bankama i izvršene registracije u Centralni registar Privrednog suda (CRPS), imaju obavezu da se registruju kod nadležnog poreskog organa koji donosi rješenje o opštoj registraciji, kojim se banci dodje- ljuje poreski identifikacioni broj (PIB), pod uslovima propisanim Zakonom o poreskoj administraciji. Takođe, obaveza banke je da poreskom organu, u skladu sa Zakonom o porezu na dodatu vrijednost, podnese poresku prijavu za registraciju za porez na dodatu vrijednost, na osnovu koje po-reski organ donosi rješenje o registraciji i sticanju svojstva PDV obveznika.

POREZ NA DOhODAK fIZIČKIh LICAObaveza plaćanja poreza na dohodak fi-zičkih lica uređena je Zakonom o pore-zu na dohodak fizičkih lica (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 65/01...78/06) i podzakon-skim aktima za sprovođenje navedenog

zakona. Podzakonski akti za sprovođenje ovog zakona su: Uredba o načinu prera-čunavanja postojećih neto zarada u bruto zarade (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, broj 34/02); Pravilnik o obliku i sadržini godišnje pri-jave za obračunavanje i plaćanje poreza na dohodak fizičkih lica (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, broj 16/08); Pravilnik o razvrstavanju os-novnih sredstava po grupama i metodama za utvrđivanje amortizacije za obveznike koji ostvaruju prihode od samostalne dje-latnosti (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, broj 58/02); Pravilnik o paušalnom oporezivanju pri-hoda od samostalne djelatnosti (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, broj 3/05); Uputstvo o načinu ob-računavanja i plaćanja poreza i doprinosa na lična primanja po osnovu zaposlenja (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, broj 81/06).

Obveznik poreza na dohodak fizičkih lica je rezidentno, odnosno nerezidentno fizičko lice koje ostvari oporezivi dohodak na teritoriji Crne Gore. Porezu na doho-dak fizičkih lica podliježu prihodi ostva-reni po osnovu ličnih primanja, imovine i imovinskih prava i kapitala. Pod ličnim primanjima smatraju se zarade i nakna-de zarada u skladu sa propisima kojima se uređuje radni odnos, druga primanja koja poslodavac isplaćuje zaposlenima kao i primanja utvrđena zakonom. Prihodi od imovine i imovinskih prava obuhvataju prihode ostvarene od izdavanja u zakup pokretne i nepokretne imovine, od ustu-panja autorskih prava i prava industrijske svojine i druga imovinska prava, dok se prihodima od kapitala smatraju prihodi od kamata, udjela u dobit koje ostvaruju članovi uprave i zaposleni u novcu ili ak-cijama i prihodi od korišćenja imovine i usluga od strane vlasnika i suvlasnika ka-pitala za njihove privatne potrebe. Banka, kao isplatilac navedenih primanja dužna je da obračunava, obustavlja i uplaćuje po-

rez na dohodak, prilikom svake isplate tih primanja, primjenom propisane poreske stope na poresku osnovicu.

Porez na dohodak fizičkih lica obraču-nava se po stopi od 15% za 2008. godinu, 12 % za 2009. godinu, a za 2010. godinu i dalje 9%.

porez na DobitObaveza plaćanja poreza na dobit prav-nih lica uvedena je Zakonom o porezu na dobit pravnih lica (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 65/01...40/08) i podzakonskim akti-ma za sprovođenje tog zakona. Za spro-vođenje ovog zakona donijeta su slijedeća podzakonska akta: Pravilnik o obliku i sadržini poreske prijave za utvrđivanje poreza na dobit pravnih lica (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, broj 6/06); Pravilnik o razvrs-tavanju osnovnih sredstava po grupama i metodama za utvrđivanje amortizacije (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, broj 28/02) i Pravilnik o korišćenju poreske olakšice po osnovu poreza na dobit pravnih lica u nedovolj-no razvijenim opštinama (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, broj 3/03).

Obveznik poreza na dobit pravnih lica je rezidentno, odnosno nerezidentno prav-no lice koje obavlja djelatnost radi sticanja dobiti, pa je, u smislu Zakona o porezu na dobit dužan, da za period za koji se obra-čunava porez na dobit, bez obzira da li ima iskazanu dobit ili gubitak u finansijskom izvještaju, nadležnom poreskom organu podnese poresku prijavu. Poreska prijava se podnosi u roku od 3 mjeseca od isteka perioda za koji se obračunava porez. Uz poresku prijavu poreski obveznik dostavl-ja i bilans uspjeha i bilans stanja, pripremljene u skladu sa Zakonom o računovod-stvu i reviziji.

Osnovicu poreza na dobit predstavlja oporeziva dobit poreskog obveznika. Za

BANKE U PORESKOM SISTEMU CRNE GORE


BANKS IN THE TAXATION SYSTEM OF MONTENEGRO

New Law on Banks (Official Gazette of Montenegro, no. 17/08) which entered

into force on March 19th 2008 clearly defi-ned actual position of banks with the aim of establishing and maintaining sound and stable system which ensures protection of the interests of depositors and other cre-ditors. Under provisions of this Law, Bank is a legal entity and provisions of the Law defining legal position of enterprises also apply to it. This legal framework means that banks, being stock companies, are governed by provisions of the taxation regulations re-lated to legal entities who acquire capacity of a taxpayer on terms and conditions defined in the Law on Tax Administration and Law on Value Added Tax.

This means that banks, being taxpayers, ha-ving obtained the work permit by the Central Bank under the Law on Banks and registered with the Central Registry of Montenegro, shall register with the competent tax authority which issues decision on general registration where-by bank is allocated tax identification number (PIB ) on terms and conditions defined in the Law on Tax Administration. In addition, under the Law on Value Added Tax, the bank shall submit to the tax authority the tax return for registration for the value added tax based on which tax authority issues decision on regis-tration and acquisition of a taxpayer status.

the law on income oF phySical perSonSThe Law on Income of Physical Persons (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 65/01…78/06) and se-condary legislation for implementation of the said law govern the obligation of pa-yment of income tax by physical persons. Secondary legislation for implementation of this Law includes the following: Decree on the Methodology of Recalculating the Existing Net Earnings into Gross Earnings (Official

Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 34/02), Rulebook on the Form and Contents of an Annual Tax Return for Calculation and Payment of Income Tax of Physical Persons (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 16/08), Rulebook on Classification of Capital Assets by Groups and Methods for Establishing Depreciation for Taxpayers Generating Income from Private Business (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 58/02) Rulebook on Flat Rate Taxation of Incomes Generated by Private Business (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 3/05), Instruction on the Methodology of Calculation and Payment of Taxes and Benefits on Personal Earnings on grounds of Employment (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 81/06).

Taxpayer liable for payment of taxes on income of physical persons is a resident, or non-resident, physical person who has ge-nerated taxable income on the territory of Montenegro. The tax on income of physical persons is levied on revenues generated by personal earnings, property and property rights and capital. Personal earnings are consi-dered to be salaries and benefits to salaries in accordance with regulations governing labor relations, other earnings paid to employees by an employer and earnings defined by law. Revenues from property and property rights include revenues generated by rental of mo-vable and immovable property, assignment of copyrights, industrial property rights and other property rights, whereas revenues from capital are considered to be revenues genera-ted from interests, share in profits generated by members of the management and emplo-yees in monetary value or shares and revenu-es from the use of property and services by owners and co-owners of the capital for their private needs. The Bank, being a disburser of the said earnings is obliged to calculate, sus-pend and pay in the income tax during each

disbursement of the payments hereof, by using the prescribed tax rate on tax base.

Income tax of physical persons is calcu-lated at the rate equaling 15% in 2008, 12% in 2009 and 9% in 2010.

corporate proFit taxThe Law on Tax on Profit of Legal Persons (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 65/01…40/08) and rela-ted secondary legislation for implementa-tion of the said law govern the obligation of payment of the tax on profit by legal per-sons. The following secondary legislation has been adopted for implementation of the Law: The Rulebook on the Form and Contents of Tax Return for Establishing the Tax on Profit of Legal Entities (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 6/06), Rulebook on Classification of Capital Assets by Groups and Methods for Establishing Depreciation (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 28/02) and Rulebook on Tax Relief Based on Tax on Profit of Legal Entities in Underdeveloped Municipalities (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 3/03).

A taxpayer liable for payment of the tax on profit shall be a resident or non-resident le-gal person that carries out a business activity for profit, and it is therefore, under the Law on Tax on Profit of Legal Persons, obliged to submit the tax return to the responsible tax authority for a taxable period, regard-less of having stated either profit or loss in the financial statement. The tax return shall be submitted at the latest 3 months from the expiry of a taxable period. Attached to the tax return, the taxpayer also submits the Balance Sheet and Income Statement prepared in accordance with the Law on Accounting and Audit.

Taxable profit of the taxpayer constitutes the tax base. Taxable profit shall be determi-

banks like the othersReforms of the taxation system, that began in 2001 after passing of the taxation laws and are harmonised with the European Union taxation regulations, have created favourable environment and economic conditions for development of economic and financial sector in Montenegro. This made it possible for our taxation regulations to become more efficient, transparent, stable and as simplest as possible for implementation

Dragan Vujošević Bachelor of Arts in Economics, Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Finance of the Government of the Republic of Montenegro


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BANKE U PORESKOM SISTEMU CRNE GORE

utvrđivanje oporezive dobiti priznaju se prihodi i rashodi iskazani u bilansu uspjeha, prema računovodstvenim pro-pisima, korigovani na način predviđen Zakonom o porezu na dobit pravnih lica. Stopa poreza na dobit je proporcionalna i iznosi 9% od poreske osnovice (opore-zive dobiti).

Prihodi ostvareni po osnovu dividendi i udjela u dobiti drugih pravnih lica ne uklju- čuju se u poresku osnovicu,ako je njihov isplatilac obveznik poreza na dobit. Za ove prihode plaća se porez po odbitku po stopi od 9%. Porez po odbitku, po istoj stopi, plaća se i na isplate izvršene po osnovu autorskih naknada, kapitalnih dobitaka, naknada po osnovu zakupnine nepokretnosti,naknada po osnovu konsalting usluga, usluga istra-živanja tržišta i revizorskih usluga, koje se isplaćuju nerezidentnom pravnom licu. Za izvršene isplate po osnovu kamata, plaća se porez po odbitku po stopi od 5%, dok se porez po odbitku ne plaća na dividen-de i udjele u dobiti koje su iskorišćene za uvećanje osnovnog kapitala poreskog obveznika.

Porez na dobit pravnih lica ne plaća Centralna banka Crne Gore.

Pravo na umanjenje poreske osnovice može se koristiti po osnovu zapošljavanja novih radnika i ulaganja u hartije od vrijednosti.

Banka je u obavezi da plaća porez na do-bit i na iznos prihoda po osnovu kapital-nog dobitka, ukoliko ga ostvari prodajom ili drugim prenosom uz naknadu zemljišta, građevinskih objekata, imovinskih prava, udjela u kapitalu i hartija od vrijednosti. Prihodi od kapitalnih dobitaka uključuju se u poresku osnovicu u godini u kojoj su ostvareni, u visini od 50%.

Gubici nastali iz poslovnih odnosa izu-zev onih iz kojih proizilaze kapitalni do-bici i gubici, mogu se prenositi na račun dobiti iz budućih obračunskih perioda, ali ne duže od pet godina.

Ukoliko poreski obveznik ostvari dobit izvan Crne Gore i plati porez na dobit u toj državi, tada se odobrava poreski kredit i to u visini poreza na dobit plaćenog u toj državi, s tim što poreski kredit ne može biti veći od iznosa koji bi se dobio primjenom važeće poreske stope koja se primjenjuje u Crnoj Gori.

Konačna obaveza po osnovu poreza na dobit iskazana u poreskoj prijavi plaća se u roku predviđenom za podnošenje pores-ke prijave. Mjesečna akontacija plaća se do kraja tekućeg mjeseca za prethodni mjesec u visini od 1/12 poreske obaveze iskazane u poreskoj prijavi.

porez na DoDatu vrijeDnoStJedan od najznačajnijih rezultata refor-me poreskog sistema je uvođenje pore-za na dodatu vrijednost (PDV) u naš po-reski sistem.

Sistem PDV-a je uređen Zakonom o porezu na dodatu vrijednost (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 65/01...4/06) i podzakon-skim aktima za sprovođenje tog zakona. Podzakonski akti za sprovođenje ovog zakona su: Pravilnik o primjeni Zakona o porezu na dodatu vrijednost (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 65/02...16/06); Pravilnik o utvrđi-vanju proizvoda i usluga koji se oporezu-ju po sniženoj stopi PDV (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 81/05... 10/06); Pravilnik o obli-ku i sadržini prijave za obračun poreza na dodatu vrijednost (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 79/05 i 28/06); Pravilnik o obliku i sadrži-ni prijave za registraciju obveznika poreza na dodatu vrijednost (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 6/06); Pravilnik o količini rashoda na koji se ne plaća porez na dodatu vrijednost (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 74/06); Pravilnik o upotrebi poreske registar kase i načinu evidentiranja prometa proizvoda, odnosno usluga preko te kase (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 25/03 i 62/04); Pravilnik o načinu ostva-rivanja prava na oslobađanje od plaćanja akcize i poreza na dodatu vrijednost za diplomatska i konzularna predstavništva i međunarodne organizacije (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 74/04); Uputstvo o načinu spro-vođenja postupka u vezi sa ostvarivanjem prava na oslobađanje od plaćanja poreza na dodatu vrijednost u slučajevima kada je to predviđeno međunarodnim spora-zumom, odnosno ugovorom (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 34/03).

Porez na dodatu vrijednost, kao opšti porez na potrošnju, obračunava se i plaća u svim fazama prometa oporezivih proizvo-da i usluga. PDV se obračunava i plaća po opštoj stopi od 17%, a za određene proizvo-de i usluge po sniženoj stopi od 7% i nultoj stopi - 0%. Zakon o PDV-u predviđa i od-ređena oslobađanja od plaćanja PDV-a na usluge od javnog interesa, kod uvoza kao i ostala oslobađanja. U ostala oslobađanja svrstane su, između ostalih, bankarske i finansijske usluge i to:

odobravanje i upravljanje (rukovanje) kreditima, kao i odobravanje i upravljanje garancijama, odnosno drugim oblicima osiguranja od strane kreditora;usluge u vezi sa upravljanjem (ruko-vanjem) depozitima, štednim ulozi-ma, bankarskim računima, obavljanjem platnog prometa, nalozima za isplatu (doznakama), unovčavanjem dospjelih (prispjelih) obaveza, čekova ili drugih

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instrumenata, osim naplate (utjerivanja) i otkupa dugova;promet, uključujući izdavanje novčanica (banknota) i kovanica, koje su zakonsko platežno sredstvo u nekoj državi, osim predmeta za zbirke (prim: numizmatič-kih zbirki); predmetima za zbirke se po ovoj tački smatraju zlatne i srebrne ko-vanice (kovani novac) kao i kovanice od drugog materijala, novčanice (bankno-te), koje nijesu u opticaju kao zakonsko sredstvo plaćanja i kovanice numizma-tičke vrijednosti;promet dionicama, odnosno udjelima u društvima, obveznicama i drugim harti-jama od vrijednosti, uključujući njihovo izdavanje, osim čuvanja (depozita) har-tija od vrijednosti; upravljanje investicionim fondovima.

Poresku osnovicu za obračun i plaćanje PDV-a čini naknada za isporučene pro-izvode i izvršene usluge u koju nije uklju-čen PDV. Poreski period predstavlja jedan kalendarski mjesec.

Prijava za obračun PDV-a podnosi se nad-ležnom poreskom organu do 15-og dana na-rednog mjeseca po isteku poreskog perioda, kada i dospijeva obaveza za plaćanje.

porez na promet nepokretnoStiZakonom o porezu na promet nepokretnosti (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 99/03 i 17/07) kao i Pravilnikom o obliku i sadržaju prijave poreza na promet nepokretnosti (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, broj 11/07), uređena su pitanja obaveze plaćanja poreza na promet nepok-retnosti na području Crne Gore.

Stopa poreza na promet nepokretnosti je 3% od poreske osnovice koja predstavlja tržišnu vrijednost nepokretnosti u trenut-ku njenog sticanja.

Porez se plaća u roku od 15 dana od dana dostavljanja rješenja o utvrđivanju poreske obaveze, od strane poreskog organa.

porez na nepokretnoStiOporezivanje nepokretnosti uređeno je Zakonom o porezu na nepokretnosti (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, broj 65/01) i Uredbom o bližim kriterijumima za određivanje tr-žišne vrijednosti nepokretnosti (‘’Službeni list RCG’’, br. 22/03...31/05).

Porez na nepokretnosti plaća vlasnik nepokretnosti.

Stopa poreza na nepokretnosti je pro-porcionalna i iznosi od 0,08% do 0,80% od tržišne vrijednosti nepokretnosti.

Porez na nepokretnosti se plaća u dvije jednake rate, od kojih prva dospijeva 30. juna, a druga 30 novembra godine za koju se porez utvrđuje.

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ned on the basis of incomes and expenditu-res stated in Income Statement, in line with the accounting regulations, and adjusted in the manner envisaged by the Law on Tax on Profit of Legal Entities. The rate of the profit tax is proportionate and amounts to 9% of the tax base (taxable profit).

Revenues generated from dividends and share in profit of other legal persons are not included in the tax base if their disburser is a taxpayer of the tax on profit. Withholding tax at the 9% rate is payable for these profits. Withholding tax of the same rate is levied on payments made on the basis of royalties, ca-pital gains, fees for real estate lease, consul-ting fees, fees for market research services and audit services payable to a non-resident. Withholding tax on payments made on the basis of interests amounts to 5%, while wit-hholding tax is not levied on dividends and share in profit in order to increase initial ca-pital of a taxpayer.

The Central Bank of Montenegro is not liable for payment of the tax on profit.

The right to deduction of the tax base may be exercised in the event of employ-ment of new employees and investment in securities.

The Bank shall pay the tax on profit gene-rated from capital gains as well, if it genera-ted that profit by sale or other transfer with compensation of land, building constructions, property rights, equity interest and securities. Revenues from capital gains are included in the tax base of the year when they have been generated, in the amount of 50%.

Losses incurred in business relations, exc-luding those resulting in capital gains and losses, may be transferred forward to offset profit generated in future calculation peri-ods, but not exceeding five years.

For a taxpayer who generates profit out-side Montenegro and pays tax on profit in that country, a tax credit shall be approved in the amount of tax on profit paid in that country, where the tax credit may not exceed the amount calculated by application of the valid tax rate applicable in Montenegro.

Final obligation arising from the tax on profit stated in the tax return is payable wit-hin a period prescribed for submission of the tax return. Monthly advance payment shall be paid by the end of the current month for the previous month in the amount of 1/12 of the tax liability stated in the tax return.

value aDDeD taxOne of the most significant results of the taxation system reforms is introduction of the value added tax (VAT) into our taxati-on system.

The VAT system is governed by the Law on Value Added Tax (Official Gazette of Montenegro, no. 65/01…4/06) and secon-dary legislation for implementation of that law. Secondary legislation for implementa-tion of this Law includes the following: the Rulebook on Implementation of the Law on Value Added Tax (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 65/02…16/06), Rulebook on Establishing Goods and Services Taxable at the Lower VAT Rate (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, 81/05, 10/06), Rulebook on the Form and Contents of the Tax Return for Registration of VAT Taxpayers (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 6/06), Rulebook on the Amount of Expenditures for which Value Added Tax is not Payable (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 74/06), Rulebook on the Use of Tax Cash Register and Manner of Recording the Trade in Products and Services through that Register (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 25/03 and 62/04), Rulebook on the Manner of Exercise of Rights to Exemption from Payment of Excise and Value Added Tax for Diplomatic Missions and Consular Posts and International Organisations (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 74/04), Instruction on Conducting the Procedure re-lated to Exercise of the Rights to Exemption of Payment of Value Added Tax in Cases When it is Provided for by an International Treaty, or Agreement (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 34/03).

Value Added Tax, being general tax on consumption, is calculated and payable in all the phases of trade in taxable goods and services. VAT is calculated and paid at the general rate equaling 17%, while for some goods and services it is paid at lowered rate of 7% and zero rate - 0%. The Law on VAT also provides certain exemptions from VAT payment for services of public interest, im-port and other exemptions. Other exemptions include, among other things, the following bank and financial services:

approving and managing (handling) credits, and approving and managing guarantees that is other forms of credit insurance on the part of the lender services relating to the management (hand-ling) of deposits, savings, bank accounts, conducting payment transactions, trans-fer orders (remittances), executing due (overdue) liabilities, cashing checks or other instruments, except for collection (recovery) of debts and factoring transactions, including issuance of bank notes and coins, which are legal tender in any country, excluding collector items

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(for instance, numismatic collections); collector items, for the purpose of this provision, shall be considered to be co-ins of gold and silver (coins), coins made of some other material, bank notes not in use as legal tender, and coins with a nu-mismatic value.trade in share, that is equity interests in companies, bonds and other securities, including their issuance, except for safe-guarding (depositing) securitiesInvestment funds management

The tax base for calculation and payment of VAT comprises the fee for delivered go-ods and services, decreased by the VAT amount. Taxation period is one calendar month.

The tax return for assessment of VAT shall be submitted to the responsible tax authority no later than the 15th day of the following month after the elapse of the tax period, when payment liability is due.

immovable property taxThe Law on Immovable Property Tax (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 99/03 and 17/07) and the Rulebook on the Form and Contents of the Tax Return for Trade in Immovable Property (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 11/07) govern the obligations to pay taxes on trade in property in Montenegro territory.

The tax rate for trade in immovable proper-ty amounts to 3% of the tax base which repre-sents market value of the immovable property at the moment of its acquisition.

The tax is payable within 15 days from the day of submission of the decision on es-tablishment of tax liability by tax authority.

tax on immovable propertyTaxation of immovable property is gover-ned by the Law on Immovable Property Tax (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 65/01) and Decree on Closer Criteria for Establishment of the Market Value of Immovable Property (Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, no. 22/03…31/05).

Immovable property tax shall be paid by the owner of immovable property.

The tax rate applicable on immovable property is proportionate, ranging from 0,08% to 0,80% of the market value of im-movable property.

Immovable property tax is paid in two equal installments, of which the first is due on June 30th, and the second one on November 30th of the year for which the tax is calculated ■

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BANKS IN THE TAXATION SYSTEM OF MONTENEGRO


9�BANKARSKI POJMOVNIK(prema dr Ivu Perišinu)

BANKA – Međunarodni naziv za preduzeće koje se u svojoj glavnoj djelatnosti bavi uzimanjem i davanjem novčanih kre-dita. Izraz potiče od italijanske riječi banco koja znači banak, klupu ili tezgu na kojoj su prvobitni bankari (mjenjači) držali i izlagali razne vrste novca. U savremenim zakonodavstvima mnogih zemalja naziv banka je zaštićen i koncesioniran.

Prema različitim kriterijumima, banke se mogu razvrstati u više posebnih grupa. Po načinu kako dolaze do sredstava, razlikuju se emisione (centralne), depozitne, investicione i poslovne. Po poslovnom području, dijele se na lokalne, po-krajinske, zemaljske i svjetske. Dalje se mogu razlikovati: specijalizovane i univerzalne, javne i privatne, akcionarske, zadružne, itd.BANKARSKI SISTEM – Organizacija bankarstva u nekoj zemlji grupi zemalja ili u etapi razvoja u smislu strukture, funkcija, vlasništva i međusobne povezanosti banaka. U toku dugog istorijskog razvitka, bankarstvo se, pod uticajem društvenih i političkih promjena i potreba, razvijalo veoma različitim tempom i u različitim uslovima, što je dovelo do značajnih suštinskih i formalno-organizacionih razlika u bankarskim sistemima pojedinih zemalja.BANKOVNA KONTROLA – Može se shvatiti dvojako: 1. kao interna kontrola vlastitog poslovanja u samoj banci; 2. kao eksterna kontrola koju banke vrše u odnosu na druge orga-nizacije kao jednu od svojih funkcija.

Uobičajeno je da pri internoj kontroli razlikuje: kontrola ekonomičnosti rada, kontrola čuvanja novca i drugih vrijed-nosti i kontrola pravilnog poslovanja, odnosno knjiženja. Ovu kontrolu, po pravilu, treba da vrše sve banke. Što se tiče eks-terne kontrole, kao jedne od bankovnih funkcija, nju banke vrše u okviru svog djelovanja.BANKOVNE KRIZE – Stanje kod banaka kada one (u jednoj zemlji ili na širem području) nisu u mogućnosti da u datom trenutku udovoljavaju svojim obavezama.

Uzroci bankovne krize mogu da budu internog i ekster-nog porijekla, a po svojoj suštini često su veoma kompleksni. Bankovne krize rijetko se javljaju kao samostalan fenomen, već kao pratilac (a i kao izazivač) političkih, privrednih, odnosno novčanih kriza. U takvoj situaciji se, sa više ili manje uspjeha, preduzimaju odgovarajuće mjere, od kojih neke privremeno djeluju, a druge su mjere usmjerene na trajnije rezultate, od-nosno na sanaciju (npr. davanje specijalnih kredita za isplatu uloga, davanje specijalne pomoći za popunu istopljenog ka-pitala, preuzimanje teško naplative aktive uz odgovarajuću naknadu od strane posebnih institucija, a u vezi s tim i na-cionalizacija odnosnih banaka što, u izvjesnom smislu, ima karakter “socijalizacije bankovnih gubitaka”).BANKROT – Finasijski slom prvenstveno banke, ali i drugih preduzeća koja zbog lošeg poslovanja, špekulativnih poteza ili nepredvidivog obrta situacije dođu u stanje potpune plat-ne nesposobnosti.BIJEG KAPITALA – Naziv za izvor kapitala kojem nije uzrok plaćanje u vezi s međunarodnim prometom robe i usluga. Kapital bježi zbog straha za svoju sigurnost, često bez obzi-ra na rentabilnost njegovog ulaganja. Glavni su uzroci bijega kapitala: opšta politička nesigurnost u zemlji, izvjesne mjere privredne politike (npr. nacionalizacija), predstojeća devalva-cija ili znatna inflacija, previsoko oporezivanje i sl. (M.N.)

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BANK – International term for a company whose main acti-vity is taking and granting loans. The term is derived from the Italian banco – meaning a counter, bench or stand where first bankers used to keep and display different sorts of mo-ney. The name is protected and conceded under contempo-rary legislation of a number of countries.

Banks may be categorized according to different criteria. According to the way they access funds, there are banks of issue (central), deposit, investment and commercial banks. According to the territory they cover, they may be local, regional, national and global. There are also specia-lized and universal banks, public and private, joint-stock, cooperative etc.BANKING SYSTEM – Organization of banking in a coun-try, group of countries or at a certain development stage, in the sense of structure, functions, holding and inter-relati-on between banks. Over the course of its long history, ban-king, influenced by social and political developments and needs, developed at a varying pace and in different conditi-ons, which resulted in considerable substantial and formal and organizational differences between banking systems of different countries. BANK CONTROL� – Understood as either internal con-trol of a bank’s internal operations, or external control of other organizations performed by banks as one of their functions.

Internal control usually differentiates between: control of business efficiency, control of safeguarding of money and other valuables and control of regular operation, that is bo-kkeping. All banks should perform this control. External control, as one the bank’s functions, is performed within the bank’s activity. BANK CRISIS� – Situation when banks (in one or more coun-tries) are unable to meet their obligations. Causes may be internal or external, and are often of a very complex nature. Bank crises rarely manifest as a single phenomenon; more frequently, they accompany (or generate) political, econo-mic, or monetary crises. Appropriate measures are under-taken in such instances, with varying success. Some of them have temporary effect, while others aim at accomplishing more durable results, that is rehabilitation (e.g. special lo-ans to repay deposit, special assistance to consolidate capi-tal, takeover of assets difficult to collect for an appropriate compensation by special institutions, and nationalization of the banks in question, which, in a sense, has the nature of “socialization of bank losses”).BANKRUPTCY� – Financial collapse primarily of banks, but also of other companies, that may become totally insol-vent due to poor operation, speculations or unforeseeab-le situation.CAPITAL FLIGHT� – A source of capital that is not caused by payment in relation to international movement of goods and services. Capital flight is seen due to concerns about safety, often regardless of the investment return. Main cau-ses of capital flight include: general political instability in a particular country, certain measures of economic policy (e.g.nationalization), imminent devaluation or high infla-tion, extremely high taxes etc. (M.N.)

GLOSSARY OF BANKING TERMS(According to Ivo Perišin, PhD)

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Anticipativna {tednja: Isplata kamate odmah po uplati i oročenju sredstavaRentna {tednja: nudi mjesečnu isplatu kamate tokomoročenog periodaFleksibilna {tednja: mogućnost oročenja od 1 do 9999 dana

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Vaši razlozi za štednju!

NLB ©tednja

www.montenegrobanka.com

NLB πtednja je uvijek pun {tedni pogodak:

Anticipativna {tednja: Isplata kamate odmah po uplati i oročenju sredstavaRentna {tednja: nudi mjesečnu isplatu kamate tokomoročenog periodaFleksibilna {tednja: mogućnost oročenja od 1 do 9999 dana

Medena {tednja: Neograni~en broj uplata uz premiju do 60%Dugoro~na {tednja: na period od 5 godina, sa najvišim kamatnim stopama tokom oročenja i najnižim kamatama za bonus kredit, po isteku oročenja

oktobar 2008 godina 1, broj 3 -...

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