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U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

1999 NationalReport SeriesJuvenile Justice Bulletin

Shay Bilchik, Administrator

DECEMBER 1999

Juvenile Justice:A Century of Change

As theNationmoves intothe 21stcentury, thereduction

of juvenilecrime, vio-

lence, andvictimization

constitutes one ofthe most crucial chal-

lenges of the new mil-lennium. To meet that

challenge, reliable informa-tion is essential. Juvenile Offend-

ers and Victims: 1999 NationalReport offers a comprehensive

overview of these pervasive problemsand the response of the juvenile justice

system. The National Report bringstogether statistics from a variety of sources

on a wide array of topics, presenting theinformation in clear, nontechnical text

enhanced by more than 350 easy-to-readtables, graphs, and maps.

This Bulletin series is designed to give readersquick, focused access to some of the most critical

findings from the wealth of data in the National Report.Each Bulletin in the series highlights selected themesat the forefront of juvenile justice policymaking andextracts relevant National Report sections (includingselected graphs and tables).

Administrator’s MessageIn 1899, when the first proceeding of a juvenile courtconvened in Chicago, it is unlikely that those in thecourtroom were aware of the momentous impact oftheir actions. Yet, that beginning provided the foun-dation for how our Nation deals with juvenile offenders.A century ago, the focus of the juvenile justice systemwas on the juvenile offender—rather than the offense—and that remains largely true today. The juvenilecourt system is based on the principle that youth aredevelopmentally different from adults and more

amenable to intervention. At its best, the juvenilecourt balances rehabilitation and treatment withappropriate sanctions—including incarceration,when necessary.

The Illinois statute also gave the court jurisdictionover dependent, neglected, and delinquent children.This understanding of the link between child victim-ization, family disorder, and the potential for childvictims to become offenders without early andeffective intervention continues to be an importantpart of the juvenile court philosophy.

This Bulletin provides a thorough, easily understooddescription of the development of the juvenile justicesystem in the United States. It also uses the mostcurrent data available to look at where we are headed,and it examines the recent trend of transferring certainjuvenile cases to adult criminal court.

Contrary to what some people believe, today’s U.S.juvenile justice system is not an “easy out” that givesa meaningless slap on the wrist to violent youth. Noris it a breeding ground for gangs, drugs, and adultcrime. Instead, the juvenile justice system providesyouthful offenders and their victims with a compre-hensive, yet balanced approach to justice. Probation,treatment, and restitution are widely used. For mostjuveniles who enter the system, this approach works:54 percent of males and 73 percent of females neverreturn to juvenile court on a new referral.

Certainly, there are areas in the juvenile justice systemthat need improvement. For example, the systemneeds to prepare to handle more female offenders andoffenders under the age of 13, two groups whosenumbers are increasing. Still, the roots of the juvenilejustice system remain strong and need to be supportedby all those committed to improving the lives of ourchildren. At OJJDP, we intend to continue our effortsto strengthen the juvenile justice system and achievethe goals for which the juvenile court was firstestablished.

Shay BilchikAdministrator

2 1999 National Report Series

The juvenile justice system was founded on theconcept of rehabilitation through individualized justice

John Augustus—planting theseeds of juvenile probation(1847)

“I bailed nineteen boys, from 7 to 15years of age, and in bailing them itwas understood, and agreed by thecourt, that their cases should becontinued from term to term for sev-eral months, as a season of proba-tion; thus each month at the callingof the docket, I would appear incourt, make my report, and thus thecases would pass on for 5 or 6months. At the expiration of thisterm, twelve of the boys werebrought into court at one time, andthe scene formed a striking andhighly pleasing contrast with theirappearance when first arraigned.The judge expressed much plea-sure as well as surprise at their ap-pearance, and remarked, that theobject of law had been accom-plished and expressed his cordialapproval of my plan to save andreform.”

Early in U.S. history, childrenwho broke the law were treatedthe same as adult criminals

Throughout the late 18th century,“infants” below the age of reason(traditionally age 7) were presumedto be incapable of criminal intentand were, therefore, exempt fromprosecution and punishment. Chil-dren as young as 7, however, couldstand trial in criminal court for of-fenses committed and, if foundguilty, could be sentenced to prisonor even to death.

The 19th-century movement thatled to the establishment of the juve-nile court in the U.S. had its roots in16th-century European educational

reform movements. These earlier re-form movements changed the per-ception of children from one of mini-ature adults to one of persons withless than fully developed moral andcognitive capacities.

As early as 1825, the Society for thePrevention of Juvenile Delinquencywas advocating the separation of ju-venile and adult offenders. Soon, fa-cilities exclusively for juvenileswere established in most major cit-ies. By mid-century, these privatelyoperated youth “prisons” were un-der criticism for various abuses.Many States then took on the re-sponsibility of operating juvenilefacilities.

The first juvenile court in thiscountry was established in CookCounty, Illinois, in 1899

Illinois passed the Juvenile CourtAct of 1899, which established theNation’s first juvenile court. TheBritish doctrine of parens patriae(the State as parent) was the ratio-nale for the right of the State to in-tervene in the lives of children in amanner different from the way it in-tervenes in the lives of adults. Thedoctrine was interpreted to meanthat, because children were not offull legal capacity, the State had theinherent power and responsibilityto provide protection for childrenwhose natural parents were not pro-viding appropriate care or supervi-sion. A key element was the focuson the welfare of the child. Thus,the delinquent child was also seenas in need of the court’s benevolentintervention.

Juvenile courts flourished for thefirst half of the 20th century

By 1910, 32 States had establishedjuvenile courts and/or probationservices. By 1925, all but two Stateshad followed suit. Rather thanmerely punishing delinquents fortheir crimes, juvenile courts soughtto turn delinquents into productivecitizens—through treatment.

The mission to help children introuble was stated clearly in thelaws that established juvenilecourts. This benevolent mission ledto procedural and substantive dif-ferences between the juvenile andcriminal justice systems.

During the next 50 years, most juve-nile courts had exclusive originaljurisdiction over all youth under age18 who were charged with violatingcriminal laws. Only if the juvenilecourt waived its jurisdiction in acase could a child be transferred tocriminal court and tried as an adult.Transfer decisions were made on acase-by-case basis using a “bestinterests of the child and public”standard, and were thus within therealm of individualized justice.

The focus on offenders and notoffenses, on rehabilitation andnot punishment, had substantialprocedural impact

Unlike the criminal justice system,where district attorneys selectcases for trial, the juvenile courtcontrolled its own intake. And un-like criminal prosecutors, juvenilecourt intake considered extra-legalas well as legal factors in decidinghow to handle cases. Juvenile courtintake also had discretion to handlecases informally, bypassing judicialaction.

3December 1999

In the courtroom, juvenile courthearings were much less formalthan criminal court proceedings. Inthis benevolent court—with the ex-press purpose of protecting chil-dren—due process protections af-forded criminal defendants weredeemed unnecessary. In the early ju-venile courts, and even in some tothis day, attorneys for the State andthe youth are not considered essen-tial to the operation of the system,especially in less serious cases.

A range of dispositional options wasavailable to a judge wanting to helprehabilitate a child. Regardless of of-fense, outcomes ranging from warn-ings to probation supervision totraining school confinement couldbe part of the treatment plan.Dispositions were tailored to “thebest interests of the child.” Treat-ment lasted until the child was“cured” or became an adult (age21), whichever came first.

As pub lic confidence in thetreatment model waned, dueprocess pr otections wereintr oduced

In the 1950’s and 1960’s, many cameto question the ability of the juve-nile court to succeed in rehabilitat-ing delinquent youth. The treatmenttechniques available to juvenile jus-tice professionals never reached thedesired levels of effectiveness. Al-though the goal of rehabilitationthrough individualized justice—thebasic philosophy of the juvenile jus-tice system—was not in question,professionals were concerned aboutthe growing number of juvenilesinstitutionalized indefinitely in thename of treatment.

In a series of decisions beginning inthe 1960’s, the U.S. Supreme Courtrequired that juvenile courts be-come more formal—more like crimi-nal courts. Formal hearings werenow required in waiver situations,and delinquents facing possible con-finement were given protectionagainst self-incrimination and rightsto receive notice of the chargesagainst them, to present witnesses,to question witnesses, and to havean attorney. Proof “beyond a reason-able doubt” rather than merely “apreponderance of evidence” wasnow required for an adjudication.The Supreme Court, however, stillheld that there were enough “differ-ences of substance between thecriminal and juvenile courts . . . tohold that a jury is not required inthe latter.” (See Supreme Court deci-sions later in this Bulletin.)

Meanwhile Congress, in the JuvenileDelinquency Prevention and ControlAct of 1968, recommended that chil-dren charged with noncriminal (sta-tus) offenses be handled outsidethe court system. A few years later,

Some juvenile codes emphasiz e prevention and treatment goals,some stress punishment, but most seek a balanced appr oach

There is much variation in the wayState statutes define the purposes oftheir juvenile courts. Some declaretheir goals in exhaustive detail, evenlisting specific programs and sen-tencing options; others mention onlybroad aims. Most States seek to pro-tect the interests of the child, the fam-ily, the community, or a combinationof the three. Nearly all States also in-clude protections of the child’s consti-tutional and statutory rights. ManyStates have amended their purposeclauses, reflecting philosophical shiftsor changes in emphasis in the overallapproach to juvenile delinquency.

■ Several states have purposeclauses that are modeled on theone in the Standard JuvenileCourt Act. The Act was originallyissued in 1925, but the most influ-ential version was preparedin 1959. The declared purposewas that “each child coming with-in the jurisdiction of the courtshall receive...the care, guidance,and control that will conduce tohis welfare and the best interestof the state, and that when he isremoved from the control of hisparents the court shall secure forhim care as nearly as possible

equivalent to that which theyshould have given him.”

■ In several other States, the pur-pose clause is based on the lan-guage contained in the LegislativeGuide for Drafting Family and Ju-venile Court Acts, a publication is-sued in the late 1960’s. The Guidedeclares four purposes: (a) “toprovide for the care, protection,and wholesome mental andphysical development of children”involved with the juvenile court;(b) “to remove from children com-mitting delinquent acts the conse-quences of criminal behavior, andto substitute therefor a program ofsupervision, care and rehabilita-tion;” (c) to remove a child fromthe home “only when necessaryfor his welfare or in the interestsof public safety;” and (d) to assureall parties “their constitutional andother legal rights.”

■ As of the end of 1997 legisla-tive session, in 17 States, the ju-venile court purpose clause incor-porates the language of thebalanced and restorative justicephilosophy, emphasizing offenderaccountability, public safety, andcompetency development.

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Griffin’s Frequently asked questions: Juvenile court purposeclauses. State profiles [web site]. Pittsburgh, PA: NCJJ.


Congress passed the Juvenile Jus-tice and Delinquency Prevention Actof 1974, which as a condition forState participation in the FormulaGrants program required deinstitu-tionalization of status offenders andnonoffenders as well as the separa-tion of juvenile delinquents fromadult offenders. (In the 1980 amend-ments to the 1974 Act, Congressadded a requirement that juvenilesbe removed from adult jail andlockup facilities.) Community-basedprograms, diversion, and deinstitution-alization became the banners ofjuvenile justice policy in the 1970’s.

In the 1980’s, the pendulum beganto swing toward law and order

During the 1980’s, the public per-ceived that serious juvenile crimewas increasing and that the systemwas too lenient with offenders. Al-though there was substantialmisperception regarding increasesin juvenile crime, many States re-sponded by passing more punitivelaws. Some laws removed certainclasses of offenders from the juve-nile justice system and handledthem as adult criminals in criminalcourt. Others required the juvenilejustice system to be more like thecriminal justice system and to treatcertain classes of juvenile offendersas criminals but in juvenile court.

As a result, offenders charged withcertain offenses are excluded fromjuvenile court jurisdiction or facemandatory or automatic waiver tocriminal court. In some States, con-current jurisdiction provisions giveprosecutors the discretion to filecertain juvenile cases directly incriminal court rather than juvenilecourt. In some States, some adjudi-cated juvenile offenders face manda-tory sentences.

The core requirements of the Juvenile Justice and DelinquencyPrevention Act primarily address custody issues

The Juvenile Justice and DelinquencyPrevention Act of 1974, as amended,(the Act) establishes four custody-related requirements:

■ The “deinstitutionalization of statusoffenders and nonoffenders” require-ment (1974) specifies that juvenilesnot charged with acts that would becrimes for adults “shall not beplaced in secure detention facilitiesor secure correctional facilities.”

■ The “sight and sound separation”requirement (1974) specifies that,“juveniles alleged to be or found tobe delinquent and [status offend-ers and nonoffenders] shall not bedetained or confined in any institu-tion in which they have contactwith adult persons incarceratedbecause they have been convictedof a crime or are awaiting trial oncriminal charges.” This requiresthat juvenile and adult inmatescannot see each other and no con-versation between them is possible.

■ The “jail and lockup removal” re-quirement (1980) states that juve-niles shall not be detained or con-fined in adult jails or lockups.There are, however, several ex-ceptions to the jail and lockup re-moval requirement. Regulationsimplementing the Act exempt juve-niles held in secure adult facilitiesif the juvenile is being tried as acriminal for a felony or has beenconvicted as a criminal felon. Inaddition, there is a 6-hour graceperiod that allows adult jails andlockups to hold delinquents tempo-rarily until other arrangements canbe made. Jails and lockups in ruralareas may hold delinquents up to24 hours under certain conditions.Some jurisdictions have obtainedapproval for separate juvenile de-tention centers that are collocatedwith an adult jail or lockup facility.

■ The “disproportionate confinementof minority youth” requirement(1992) specifies that States deter-mine the existence and extent ofthe problem in their State and dem-onstrate efforts to reduce it where itexists.

Regulations effective December 10,1996, modify the Act’s requirements inseveral ways:

■ Clarify the sight and sound separa-tion requirement—in nonresidentialareas brief, accidental contact isnot a reportable violation.

■ Permit time-phased use of nonresi-dential areas for both juveniles andadults in collocated facilities.

■ Expand the 6-hour grace period toinclude 6 hours both before and af-ter court appearances.

■ Allow adjudicated delinquents to betransferred to adult institutions oncethey have reached the State’s ageof full criminal responsibility, wheresuch transfer is expressly autho-rized by State law.

The revised regulations offer flexibilityto States in carrying out the Act’s re-quirements. States must agree to com-ply with each requirement to receiveFormula Grants funds under the Act’sprovisions. States must submit plansoutlining their strategy for meeting therequirements and other statutory planrequirements. Noncompliance withcore requirements results in the loss of25% of the State’s annual FormulaGrants program allocation.

As of 1998, 55 of 57 eligible States andterritories are participating in the For-mula Grants program. Annual Statemonitoring reports show that the vastmajority are in compliance with the re-quirements, either reporting no viola-tions or meeting de minimis or othercompliance criteria.

5December 1999

From 1992 through 1997, legislatures in 47 States and the Districtof Columbia enacted laws that made their juvenile justice systemsmore punitive

Changes in Changes inState law or court rule* State law or court rule*

Alabama T C Montana T S CAlaska T C NebraskaArizona T S C Nevada T CArkansas T S C New Hampshire T S CCalifornia T C New Jersey S CColorado T S C New Mexico T S CConnecticut T S C New YorkDelaware T S C North Carolina T CD. of Columbia T S North Dakota T CFlorida T S C Ohio T S CGeorgia T S C Oklahoma T S CHawaii T C Oregon T S CIdaho T S C Pennsylvania T CIllinois T S C Rhode Island T S CIndiana T S C South Carolina T CIowa T S C South Dakota TKansas T S C Tennessee T S CKentucky T S C Texas T S CLouisiana T S C Utah T CMaine C VermontMaryland T C Virginia T S CMassachusetts T S C Washington T CMichigan S C West Virginia T CMinnesota T S C Wisconsin T S CMississippi T C Wyoming T CMissouri T S C

*T = Transfer provisions, S = Sentencing authority, C = Confidentiality

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Torbet et al.’s State responses to serious and violent juve-nile crime and Torbet and Szymanski’s State legislative responses to violent juvenile crime:1996–97 update.

The 1990’s have been a time ofunprecedented change as Statelegislatures crack down onjuvenile crime

Five areas of change have emergedas States passed laws designed tocrack down on juvenile crime. Theselaws generally involve expanded eli-gibility for criminal court processingand adult correctional sanctioningand reduced confidentiality protec-tions for a subset of juvenile offend-ers. Between 1992 and 1997, all butthree States changed laws in one ormore of the following areas:

■ Transfer provisions—Laws madeit easier to transfer juvenile of-fenders from the juvenile justicesystem to the criminal justicesystem (45 States).

■ Sentencing authority—Laws gavecriminal and juvenile courts ex-panded sentencing options (31States).

■ Confidentiality—Laws modifiedor removed traditional juvenilecourt confidentiality provisionsby making records and proceed-ings more open (47 States).

In addition to these areas, there waschange relating to:

■ Victims rights—Laws increasedthe role of victims of juvenilecrime in the juvenile justice pro-cess (22 States).

■ Correctional programming—Asa result of new transfer and sen-tencing laws, adult and juvenilecorrectional administrators de-veloped new programs.

The 1980’s and 1990’s have seen sig-nificant change in terms of treatingmore juvenile offenders as crimi-nals. Recently, States have been at-tempting to strike a balance in theirjuvenile justice systems among sys-

tem and offender accountability, of-fender competency development,and community protection. Juvenilecode purpose clauses also incorpo-rate restorative justice language (of-fenders repair the harm done to vic-tims and communities and acceptresponsibility for their criminal ac-tions). Many States have added tothe purpose clauses of their juvenilecodes phrases such as:

■ Hold juveniles accountable forcriminal behavior.

■ Provide effective deterrents.

■ Protect the public from criminalactivity.

■ Balance attention to offenders,victims, and the community.

■ Impose punishment consistentwith the seriousness of thecrime.


U.S. Supreme Court cases have had an impact on thecharacter and procedures of the juvenile justice system

The Supreme Court has made itsmark on juvenile justice

Issues arising from juvenile delin-quency proceedings rarely come be-fore the U.S. Supreme Court. Begin-ning in the late 1960’s, however, theCourt decided a series of landmarkcases that dramatically changed thecharacter and procedures of thejuvenile justice system.

Kent v. United States383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966)

In 1961, while on probation from anearlier case, Morris Kent, age 16,was charged with rape and robbery.Kent confessed to the offense aswell as to several similar incidents.Assuming that the District of Colum-bia juvenile court would considerwaiving jurisdiction to the adult sys-tem, Kent’s attorney filed a motionrequesting a hearing on the issue ofjurisdiction.

The juvenile court judge did notrule on this motion filed by Kent’sattorney. Instead, he entered a mo-tion stating that the court was waiv-ing jurisdiction after making a “fullinvestigation.” The judge did not de-scribe the investigation or thegrounds for the waiver. Kent wassubsequently found guilty in crim-inal court on six counts of house-breaking and robbery and sen-tenced to 30 to 90 years in prison.

Kent’s lawyer sought to have thecriminal indictment dismissed, argu-ing that the waiver had been invalid.He also appealed the waiver andfiled a writ of habeas corpus askingthe State to justify Kent’s detention.Appellate courts rejected both theappeal and the writ, refused to scru-tinize the judge’s “investigation,”and accepted the waiver as valid. Inappealing to the U.S. Supreme

Court, Kent’s attorney argued thatthe judge had not made a completeinvestigation and that Kent was de-nied constitutional rights simply be-cause he was a minor.

The Court ruled the waiver invalid,stating that Kent was entitled to ahearing that measured up to “the es-sentials of due process and fairtreatment,” that Kent’s counselshould have had access to allrecords involved in the waiver, andthat the judge should have provideda written statement of the reasonsfor waiver.

Technically, the Kent decision ap-plied only to D.C. courts, but its im-pact was more widespread. TheCourt raised a potential constitu-tional challenge to parens patriae asthe foundation of the juvenile court.In its past decisions, the Court hadinterpreted the equal protectionclause of the 14th amendment tomean that certain classes of peoplecould receive less due process if a“compensating benefit” came withthis lesser protection. In theory, thejuvenile court provided less dueprocess but a greater concern forthe interests of the juvenile. TheCourt referred to evidence that thiscompensating benefit may not existin reality and that juveniles may re-ceive the “worst of both worlds”—“neither the protection accorded toadults nor the solicitous care andregenerative treatment postulatedfor children.”

In re Gault387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967)

Gerald Gault, age 15, was on proba-tion in Arizona for a minor propertyoffense when, in 1964, he and afriend made a crank telephone callto an adult neighbor, asking her,“Are your cherries ripe today?” and

“Do you have big bombers?” Identi-fied by the neighbor, the youth werearrested and detained.

The victim did not appear at theadjudication hearing, and the courtnever resolved the issue of whetherGault made the “obscene” remarks.Gault was committed to a trainingschool for the period of his minor-ity. The maximum sentence for anadult would have been a $50 fine or2 months in jail.

An attorney obtained for Gault afterthe trial filed a writ of habeas cor-pus that was eventually heard bythe U.S. Supreme Court. The issuepresented in the case was thatGault’s constitutional rights (to no-tice of charges, counsel, questioningof witnesses, protection against self-incrimination, a transcript of theproceedings, and appellate review)were denied.

The Court ruled that in hearingsthat could result in commitment toan institution, juveniles have theright to notice and counsel, to ques-tion witnesses, and to protectionagainst self-incrimination. The Courtdid not rule on a juvenile’s right toappellate review or transcripts, butencouraged the States to providethose rights.

The Court based its ruling on thefact that Gault was being punishedrather than helped by the juvenilecourt. The Court explicitly rejectedthe doctrine of parens patriae as thefounding principle of juvenile justice,describing the concept as murky andof dubious historical relevance. TheCourt concluded that the handlingof Gault’s case violated the dueprocess clause of the 14th amend-ment: “Juvenile court history hasagain demonstrated that unbridleddiscretion, however benevolently

7December 1999

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

Kent v. United States (1966) Courts must provide the “essentials of due process” in transferring juveniles to the adult system.

Breed v. Jones (1975) Waiver of a juvenile to criminal court following adjudication in juvenile court constitutes double jeopardy.

Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court (1977)

Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979) The press may report juvenile court proceedings under certain circumstances.

Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982)* Defendant’s youthful age should be considered a mitigating factor in deciding whether to apply the death penalty.

Schall v. Martin (1984) Preventive “pretrial” detention of juveniles is allowable under certain circumstances.

Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988)*

Stanford v. Kentucky (1989)* Minimum age for death penalty is set at 16.

In re Gault (1967) In hearings that could result in commitment to an institution, juveniles have four basic constitutional rights.

In re Winship (1970) In delinquency matters, the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) Jury trials are not constitutionally required in juvenile court hearings.

A series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions made juvenile courts more like criminal courts but maintainedsome important differences

motivated, is frequently a poor sub-stitute for principle and procedure.”

In re Winship397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970)

Samuel Winship, age 12, wascharged with stealing $112 from awoman’s purse in a store. A storeemployee claimed to have seenWinship running from the scene justbefore the woman noticed themoney was missing; others in thestore stated that the employee wasnot in a position to see the moneybeing taken.

Winship was adjudicated delinquentand committed to a training school.New York juvenile courts operatedunder the civil court standard of a“preponderance of evidence.” Thecourt agreed with Winship’s attor-ney that there was “reasonabledoubt” of Winship’s guilt, but basedits ruling on the “preponderance” ofevidence.

Upon appeal to the Supreme Court,the central issue in the case waswhether “proof beyond a reason-able doubt” should be consideredamong the “essentials of due pro-cess and fair treatment” requiredduring the adjudicatory stage of the

juvenile court process. The Courtrejected lower court arguments thatjuvenile courts were not required tooperate on the same standards asadult courts because juvenile courtswere designed to “save” rather thanto “punish” children. The Courtruled that the “reasonable doubt”standard should be required in alldelinquency adjudications.

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (1971)

Joseph McKeiver, age 16, wascharged with robbery, larceny, andreceiving stolen goods. He and 20 to30 other youth allegedly chased 3

*For discussion of death penalty case decisions, see page 211 of Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report.


youth and took 25 cents from them.McKeiver met with his attorney foronly a few minutes before his adju-dicatory hearing. At the hearing, hisattorney’s request for a jury trialwas denied by the court. He wassubsequently adjudicated andplaced on probation.

The State supreme court cited re-cent decisions of the U.S. SupremeCourt that had attempted to includemore due process in juvenile courtproceedings without eroding the es-sential benefits of the juvenile court.The State supreme court affirmedthe lower court, arguing that of alldue process rights, trial by jury ismost likely to “destroy the traditionalcharacter of juvenile proceedings.”

The U.S. Supreme Court found thatthe due process clause of the 14thamendment did not require jury tri-als in juvenile court. The impact ofthe Court’s Gault and Winship deci-sions was to enhance the accuracyof the juvenile court process in thefact-finding stage. In McKeiver, theCourt argued that juries are notknown to be more accurate thanjudges in the adjudication stage andcould be disruptive to the informalatmosphere of the juvenile court,tending to make it more adversarial.

Breed v. Jones421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779 (1975)

In 1970, Gary Jones, age 17, wascharged with armed robbery. Jonesappeared in Los Angeles juvenilecourt and was adjudicated delin-quent on the original charge andtwo other robberies.

At the dispositional hearing, thejudge waived jurisdiction over thecase to criminal court. Counsel forJones filed a writ of habeas corpus,arguing that the waiver to criminal

court violated the double jeopardyclause of the fifth amendment. Thecourt denied this petition, sayingthat Jones had not been tried twicebecause juvenile adjudication is nota “trial” and does not place a youthin jeopardy.

Upon appeal, the U.S. SupremeCourt ruled that an adjudication injuvenile court, in which a juvenile isfound to have violated a criminalstatute, is equivalent to a trial incriminal court. Thus, Jones hadbeen placed in double jeopardy. TheCourt also specified that jeopardyapplies at the adjudication hearingwhen evidence is first presented.Waiver cannot occur after jeopardyattaches.

Oklahoma Publishing Companyv. District Court in and forOklahoma City480 U.S. 308, 97 S.Ct. 1045 (1977)

The Oklahoma Publishing Companycase involved a court order prohib-iting the press from reporting thename and photograph of a youth in-volved in a juvenile court proceed-ing. The material in question wasobtained legally from a source out-side the court. The U.S. SupremeCourt found the court order to bean unconstitutional infringement onfreedom of the press.

Smith v. Daily Mail PublishingCompany443 U.S. 97, 99 S.Ct. 2667 (1979)

The Daily Mail case held that Statelaw cannot stop the press from pub-lishing a juvenile’s name that it ob-tained independently of the court.Although the decision did not holdthat the press should have accessto juvenile court files, it held that ifinformation regarding a juvenile

case is lawfully obtained by the me-dia, the first amendment interest ina free press takes precedence overthe interests in preserving the ano-nymity of juvenile defendants.

Schall v. Martin467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984)

Gregory Martin, age 14, was ar-rested in 1977 and charged with rob-bery, assault, and possession of aweapon. He and two other youth al-legedly hit a boy on the head with aloaded gun and stole his jacket andsneakers.

Martin was held pending adjudica-tion because the court found therewas a “serious risk” that he wouldcommit another crime if released.Martin’s attorney filed a habeas cor-pus action challenging the funda-mental fairness of preventive deten-tion. The lower appellate courtsreversed the juvenile court’s deten-tion order, arguing in part that pre-trial detention is essentially punish-ment because many juvenilesdetained before trial are releasedbefore, or immediately after,adjudication.

The U.S. Supreme Court upheld theconstitutionality of the preventivedetention statute. The Court statedthat preventive detention serves alegitimate State objective in protect-ing both the juvenile and societyfrom pretrial crime and is not in-tended to punish the juvenile. TheCourt found there were enough pro-cedures in place to protect juvenilesfrom wrongful deprivation of liberty.The protections were provided bynotice, a statement of the facts andreasons for detention, and a prob-able cause hearing within a shorttime. The Court also reasserted theparens patriae interests of the Statein promoting the welfare of children.

9December 1999

State statutes define who is under the jurisdiction ofjuvenile court

State statutes define age limitsfor the original jurisdiction of thejuvenile court

In most States, the juvenile courthas original jurisdiction over allyouth charged with a law violationwho were below the age of 18 at thetime of the offense, arrest, or refer-ral to court. Since 1975, four Stateshave changed their age criteria: Ala-bama increased its upper age from15 to 16 in 1976 and to 17 in 1977;Wyoming reduced its upper agefrom 18 to 17 in 1993; and NewHampshire and Wisconsin loweredtheir upper age from 17 to 16 in1996.

Oldest age for original juvenile court ju-risdiction in delinquency matters:

Age State15 Connecticut, New York, North

Carolina16 Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mas-

sachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,New Hampshire, South Carolina,Texas, Wisconsin

17 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkan-sas, California, Colorado, Dela-ware, District of Columbia,Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,New Jersey, New Mexico, NorthDakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,Vermont, Virginia, Washington,West Virginia, Wyoming

Many States have higher upper agesof juvenile court jurisdiction in sta-tus offense, abuse, neglect, or de-pendency matters—typicallythrough age 20.

In many States, the juvenile courthas original jurisdiction over young

adults who committed offenses whilejuveniles. Many States exclude mar-ried or otherwise emancipated juve-niles from juvenile court jurisdiction.

Many States have statutory excep-tions to basic age criteria. The ex-ceptions, related to the youth’s age,alleged offense, and/or prior courthistory, place certain youth underthe original jurisdiction of the crimi-nal court. In some States, a combi-nation of the youth’s age, offense,and prior record places the youthunder the original jurisdiction ofboth the juvenile and criminalcourts. In these situations where ju-venile and criminal courts have con-current jurisdiction, the prosecutorhas the authority to decide whichcourt will initially handle the case.

Statutes in 16 States determinethe lowest age of juvenile courtdelinquency jurisdiction

Youngest age for original juvenile courtjurisdiction in delinquency matters:

Age State 6 North Carolina 7 Maryland, Massachusetts,

New York 8 Arizona10 Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas,

Louisiana, Minnesota, Missis-sippi, Pennsylvania, South Da-kota, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin

In most States, juvenile courtauthority over a youth mayextend beyond the upper ageof original jurisdiction

Through extended jurisdictionmechanisms, legislatures enable thecourt to provide sanctions and ser-vices for a duration of time that is inthe best interests of the juvenile and

the public, even for older juvenileswho have reached the age at whichoriginal juvenile court jurisdictionends.

Oldest age over which the juvenilecourt may retain jurisdiction for disposi-tion purposes in delinquency matters:

Age State17 Arizona*, North Carolina18 Alaska, Iowa, Kentucky, Ne-

braska, Oklahoma, Tennessee19 Mississippi, North Dakota20 Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,

Delaware, District of Columbia,Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-land, Massachusetts, Michigan,Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada,New Hampshire, New Mexico,New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,Rhode Island, South Carolina,South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Ver-mont, Virginia, Washington, WestVirginia, Wyoming

22 Kansas24 California, Montana, Oregon, Wis-

consin** Colorado, Hawaii, New Jersey*Arizona statute extends jurisdiction throughage 20, but a 1979 State Supreme Court de-cision held that juvenile court jurisdiction ter-minates at age 18.

**Until the full term of the disposition order.

Note: Extended jurisdiction may be restrictedto certain offenses or juveniles.

In some States, the juvenile courtmay impose adult correctional sanc-tions on certain adjudicated delin-quents that extend the term of con-finement well beyond the upper ageof juvenile jurisdiction. Such sen-tencing options are included in theset of dispositional options knownas “blended sentencing.”


The juvenile justice system differs from the criminaljustice system, but there is common ground

The juvenile justice systemgrew out of the criminaljustice system

After working within the criminaljustice system, designers of thejuvenile justice system retainedmany of the components of thecriminal justice system as they con-structed a new process to respond

to delinquent youth. An understand-ing of what was retained and whatwas changed helps to make clearthe basic differences between thetwo systems as they exist today.

During its nearly 100-year history,the juvenile justice system in theU.S. has seen fundamental changesin certain aspects of process and

philosophy. Recently, there hasbeen some discussion about thepossibility of essentially mergingthe juvenile and criminal systems.An understanding of similarities anddifferences between the two sys-tems is valuable in assessing theimplications of the proposedchanges.

■ Youth behavior is malleable.

■ Rehabilitation is usually a viablegoal.

■ Youth are in families and notindependent.

Although the juvenile and criminal justice systems are more alike in some jurisdictions than in others,generalizations can be made about the distinctions between the two systems and about their commonground

Juvenile justice system Common ground Criminal justice system

■ Community protection is a primarygoal.

■ Law violators must be heldaccountable.

■ Constitutional rights apply.

■ Sanctions should be proportionalto the offense.

■ General deterrence works.

■ Rehabilitation is not a primarygoal.

Operating Assumptions

■ Many specific delinquency preven-tion activities (e.g., school, church,recreation) are used.

■ Prevention is intended to changeindividual behavior and is often fo-cused on reducing risk factors andincreasing protective factors in theindividual, family, andcommunity.

■ Specialized “juvenile” units areused.

■ Some additional behaviors areprohibited (truancy, running away,curfew violations).

■ Some limitations are placed onpublic access to information.

■ A significant number of youth arediverted away from the juvenilejustice system, often into alterna-tive programs.

■ Educational approaches are takento specific behaviors (drunk driv-ing, drug use).

■ Jurisdiction involves the full rangeof criminal behavior.

■ Constitutional and proceduralsafeguards exist.

■ Both reactive and proactive ap-proaches (targeted at offensetypes, neighborhoods, etc.) areused.

■ Community policing strategies areemployed.

■ Prevention activities are general-ized and are aimed at deterrence(e.g., Crime Watch).

■ Open public access to all informa-tion is required.

■ Law enforcement exercises dis-cretion to divert offenders out ofthe criminal justice system.

Prevention

Law Enforcement

11December 1999

■ In many instances, juvenile courtintake, not the prosecutor, decideswhat cases to file.

■ The decision to file a petition forcourt action is based on bothsocial and legal factors.

■ A significant portion of cases arediverted from formal caseprocessing.

■ Intake or the prosecutor divertscases from formal processing toservices operated by the juvenilecourt, prosecutor’s office, or out-side agencies.

■ Probable cause must beestablished.

■ The prosecutor acts on behalf ofthe State.

■ Plea bargaining is common.

■ The prosecution decision is basedlargely on legal facts.

■ Prosecution is valuable in buildinghistory for subsequent offenses.

■ Prosecution exercises discretionto withhold charges or divert of-fenders out of the criminal justicesystem.


Adjudication—Conviction

Detention—Jail/lockup

■ Juveniles may be detained for theirown protection or the community’sprotection.

■ Juveniles may not be confinedwith adults unless there is “sightand sound separation.”

■ Juvenile court proceedings are“quasi-civil” (not criminal) and maybe confidential.

■ If guilt is established, the youth isadjudicated delinquent regardlessof offense.

■ Right to jury trial is not afforded inall States.

■ Standard of “proof beyond a rea-sonable doubt” is required.

■ Rights to be represented by an at-torney, to confront witnesses, andto remain silent are afforded.

■ Appeals to a higher court areallowed.

■ Experimentation with specializedcourts (i.e., drug courts, guncourts) is under way.

■ Accused offenders may be held incustody to ensure their appear-ance in court.

■ Detention alternatives of home orelectronic detention are used.

■ Defendants have a constitutionalright to a jury trial.

■ Guilt must be established on indi-vidual offenses charged forconviction.

■ All proceedings are open.

■ Accused individuals have the rightto apply for bond/bail release.

Intake—Prosecution


■ Decisions are influenced by cur-rent offense, offending history, andsocial factors.

■ Decisions hold offendersaccountable.

■ Decisions may give considerationto victims (e.g., restitution and “nocontact” orders).

■ Decisions may not be cruel orunusual.

■ Sentencing decisions are boundprimarily by the severity of the cur-rent offense and by the offender’scriminal history.

■ Sentencing philosophy is basedlargely on proportionality andpunishment.

■ Sentence is often determinate,based on offense.

■ Disposition decisions are basedon individual and social factors,offense severity, and youth’soffense history.

■ Dispositional philosophy includesa significant rehabilitationcomponent.

■ Many dispositional alternativesare operated by the juvenile court.

■ Dispositions cover a wide range ofcommunity-based and residentialservices.

■ Disposition orders may be di-rected to people other than the of-fender (e.g., parents).

■ Disposition may be indeterminate,based on progress demonstratedby the youth.


■ Function combines surveillanceand reintegration activities (e.g.,family, school, work).

■ The behavior of individuals re-leased from correctional settings ismonitored.

■ Violation of conditions can resultin reincarceration.

■ Function is primarily surveillanceand reporting to monitor illicitbehavior.

Disposition—Sentencing

Aftercare—Parole

13December 1999

All States allow juveniles to be tried as adults incriminal court under certain circumstances

Transferring juveniles to criminalcourt is not a new phenomenon

In some States, provisions that en-abled transfer of certain juveniles tocriminal court were in place beforethe 1920’s. Other States have per-mitted transfers since at least the1940’s. For many years, all Stateshave had at least one provision fortrying certain youth of juvenile ageas adults in criminal court. Suchprovisions are typically limited byage and offense criteria. Transfermechanisms vary regarding wherethe responsibility for transfer deci-sionmaking lies.

Transfer provisions fall into threegeneral categories:

Judicial waiver: The juvenile courtjudge has the authority to waive ju-venile court jurisdiction and trans-fer the case to criminal court. Statesmay use terms other than judicialwaiver. Some call the process certifi-cation, remand, or bind over forcriminal prosecution. Others trans-fer or decline rather than waivejurisdiction.

Concurrent jurisdiction: Original ju-risdiction for certain cases is sharedby both criminal and juvenilecourts, and the prosecutor has dis-cretion to file such cases in eithercourt. Transfer under concurrent ju-risdiction provisions is also knownas prosecutorial waiver, prosecutordiscretion, or direct file.

Statutory exclusion: State statuteexcludes certain juvenile offendersfrom juvenile court jurisdiction. Un-der statutory exclusion provisions,cases originate in criminal ratherthan juvenile court. Statutory exclu-sion is also known as legislativeexclusion.

■ In States with a combination of transfer mechanisms, the exclusion, mandatory waiver, or concur-rent jurisdiction provisions generally target the oldest juveniles and/or those charged with the mostserious offenses, while those charged with relatively less serious offenses and/or younger juve-niles may be eligible for discretionary waiver.

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Torbet and Szymanski’s State legislative responses to violent juve-nile crime: 1996–97 update.

Most States have a combination of transfer provisionsOnce an

adult/Judicial waiver Concurrent Statutory Reverse always an

Discretionary Presumptive Mandatory jurisdiction exclusion waiver adultTotal numberof States: 46 15 14 15 28 23 31

AlabamaAlaskaArizonaArkansasCaliforniaColoradoConnecticutDelawareDist. of ColumbiaFloridaGeorgiaHawaiiIdahoIllinoisIndianaIowaKansasKentuckyLouisianaMaineMarylandMassachusettsMichiganMinnesotaMississippiMissouriMontanaNebraskaNevadaNew HampshireNew JerseyNew MexicoNew YorkNorth CarolinaNorth DakotaOhioOklahomaOregonPennsylvaniaRhode IslandSouth CarolinaSouth DakotaTennesseeTexasUtahVermontVirginiaWashingtonWest VirginiaWisconsinWyoming


Many States have changed theboundaries of juvenile courtjurisdiction

Traditionally, discretionary judicialwaiver was the transfer mechanismon which most States relied. Begin-ning in the 1970’s and continuingthrough the present, however, Statelegislatures have increasinglymoved juvenile offenders into crimi-nal court based on age and/or of-fense seriousness, without the case-specific consideration offered bythe discretionary juvenile court ju-dicial waiver process.

State transfer provisions changedextensively in the 1990’s. From 1992through 1997, all but six States en-acted or expanded transfer provi-sions. An increasing number of Statelegislatures have enacted manda-tory waiver or exclusion statutes.Less common, then and now, areconcurrent jurisdiction provisions.

In most States, juvenilesconvicted in criminal courtcannot be tried in juvenile courtfor subsequent offenses

In 31 States, juveniles who havebeen tried as adults must be pros-ecuted in criminal court for any sub-sequent offenses. Nearly all of these

“once an adult/always an adult” pro-visions require that the youth musthave been convicted of the offensesthat triggered the initial criminalprosecution.

Judicial waiver is the mostcommon transfer provision

In all States except Nebraska, NewMexico, and New York, juvenilecourt judges may waive jurisdictionover certain cases and transferthem to criminal court. Such actionis usually in response to a requestby the prosecutor; in several States,however, juveniles or their parentsmay request judicial waiver. In mostStates, statutes limit waiver by ageand offense.

Waiver provisions vary in terms ofthe degree of decisionmaking flex-ibility allowed. Under some waiverprovisions, the decision is entirelydiscretionary. Under others, there isa rebuttable presumption in favor ofwaiver. Under others, waiver is man-datory once the juvenile court judgedetermines that certain statutorycriteria have been met. Mandatorywaiver provisions are distinguishedfrom statutory exclusion provisionsin that the case originates in juve-nile rather than criminal court.

Statutes establish waiver criteriaother than age and offense

In some States, waiver provisionstarget youth charged with offensesinvolving firearms or other weap-ons. Most State statutes also limitjudicial waiver to juveniles who are“no longer amenable to treatment.”The specific factors that determinelack of amenability vary, but typi-cally include the juvenile’s offensehistory and previous dispositionaloutcomes. Such amenability criteriaare generally not included in statu-tory exclusion or concurrent juris-diction provisions.

Many statutes instruct juvenilecourts to consider other factorswhen making waiver decisions, suchas the availability of dispositional al-ternatives for treating the juvenile,the time available for sanctions,public safety, and the best interestsof the child. The waiver processmust also adhere to certain consti-tutional principles of fairness (seeSupreme Court decisions earlier inthis Bulletin).

15December 1999

14NS

16

NS151415

14

14

10

15

13

14

16

16

16

NS

1513

NS14

1216

151514

14NS

NS

1414

NS

14

12

15

131414NS151416

NS

1414

N14

14 14 14 1414 14 14 1412 12

15 15 15 NS

13

14

NS

13

NS

14

14

NS

10

14NS

1314

1414

NS1517NS

NS

1014

NS14

14

NS

14

14

141314

1414

NS1517NS

NS

161014

NS14

15

NS

14

16

15

1610

NS14

NS

16

14

1514

14

14

14

NS14

14

14

16

14 14NS NS 16 16

NS

b

13

14

a

15

1514

b

b b

b

b

c c

14

14

14NS

NS NS

14

In most States, juvenile court judges can waive juvenile court jurisdiction over certain cases andtransfer them to criminal court

Minimum Judicial waiver offense and minimum age criteria, 1997age for Any Certain Certain Certain Certainjudicial criminal Certain Capital person property drug weapon

State waiver offense felonies crimes Murder offenses offenses offenses offenses

Alabama 14Alaska NSArizona NSArkansas 14California 14Colorado 12Connecticut 14Delaware NSDist. of Columbia NSFlorida 14Georgia 13Hawaii NSIdaho NSIllinois 13Indiana NSIowa 14Kansas 10Kentucky 14Louisiana 14Maine NSMaryland NSMichigan 14Minnesota 14Mississippi 13Missouri 12Montana NSNevada 14New Hampshire 13New Jersey 14North Carolina 13North Dakota 14Ohio 14Oklahoma NSOregon NSPennsylvania 14Rhode Island NSSouth Carolina NSSouth Dakota NSTennessee NSTexas 14Utah 14Vermont 10Virginia 14Washington NSWest Virginia NSWisconsin 14Wyoming 13

Examples: Alabama allows waiver for any delinquency (criminal) offense involving a juvenile age 14 or older. Arizona allows waiver for any ju-venile charged with a felony. New Jersey allows waiver for juveniles age 14 or older who are charged with murder or certain person, property,drug, or weapon offenses. In New Jersey, juveniles age 14 or older who have prior adjudications or convictions for certain offenses can bewaived regardless of the current offense.

Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenile maybe judicially waived to criminal court. “NS” indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified.aOnly if committed while escaping from specified juvenile facilities. bRequires prior adjudication(s) or conviction(s), which may becOnly if committed while in custody. required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type.

Sources: Authors’ adaptation of Griffin et al.’s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.


Few States allow prosecutorialdiscretion, but many juvenilesare tried as adults in this way

As of the end of the 1997 legislativesession, 15 States had concurrentjurisdiction provisions, which gaveboth juvenile court and criminalcourt original jurisdiction in certaincases. Thus, prosecutors have dis-cretion to file such cases in eithercourt.

State appellate courts have takenthe view that prosecutor discretion

is equivalent to the routine charg-ing decisions made in criminalcases. Thus, prosecutorial transferis considered an “executive func-tion,” which is not subject to judi-cial review and is not required tomeet the due process standardsestablished in Kent. Some States,however, have written prosecutorialtransfer guidelines.

Concurrent jurisdiction is typicallylimited by age and offense criteria.Often concurrent jurisdiction is lim-ited to cases involving serious, vio-

lent, or repeat crimes or offenses in-volving firearms or other weapons.Juvenile and criminal courts oftenalso share jurisdiction over minoroffenses such as traffic, watercraft,or local ordinance violations.

There are no national data at thepresent time on the number of juve-nile cases tried in criminal court un-der concurrent jurisdiction provi-sions. Florida alone reports anaverage of nearly 5,000 such trans-fers per year.

In States with concurrent jurisdiction, the prosecutor has discretion to file certain cases, generallyinvolving juveniles charged with serious offenses, in either criminal court or juvenile court

Minimum Concurrent jurisdiction offense and minimum age criteria, 1997age for Any Certain Certain Certain Certain

concurrent criminal Certain Capital person property drug weaponState jurisdiction offense felonies crimes Murder offenses offenses offenses offenses

Arizona 14

Arkansas 14

Colorado 14

Dist. of Columbia 16

Florida NS

Georgia NS

Louisiana 15

Massachusetts 14

Michigan 14

Montana 12

Nebraska NS

Oklahoma 15

Vermont 16

Virginia 14

Wyoming 14

Examples: In Arizona, prosecutors have discretion to file directly in criminal court those cases involving juveniles age 14 or older chargedwith certain felonies (defined in State statutes). In Florida, prosecutors may “direct file” cases involving juveniles age 16 or older chargedwith a misdemeanor (if they have a prior adjudication) or a felony offense, as well as those age 14 or older charged with murder or certainperson, property, or weapon offenses; no minimum age is specified for cases in which a grand jury indicts a juvenile for a capital offense.

Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenilemay be filed directly in criminal court. “NS” indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified.aApplies to misdemeanors and requires prior adjudication(s), which may be bRequires grand jury indictment. required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type. cApplies to misdemeanors.

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Griffin et al.’s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.

14 14 14

1414

NS 14

16

NS

14

14

16 NS

16

15

14

12

15

14

14

1416

14

14

1614

14

14

14

15 15 15

14 14

14 14 14

12 16 16 16

15 15 16 15

14

1417

14

16 a 16 b

c

17December 1999

Statutory exclusion accounts forthe largest number of juvenilestried as adults in criminal court

Legislatures “transfer” large num-bers of young offenders to criminalcourt by enacting statutes that ex-clude certain cases from juvenilecourt jurisdiction. As of the end ofthe 1997 legislative session, 28States had statutory exclusions. Al-though not typically thought of astransfers, large numbers of youthunder age 18 are tried as adults inthe 13 States where the upper age ofjuvenile court jurisdiction is 15 or16. If the 1.8 million 16- and 17-year-olds in these 13 States are referredto criminal court at the same ratethat 16- and 17-year-olds are re-ferred to juvenile court in otherStates, then as many as 218,000

cases involving youth under the ageof 18 could have faced trial in crimi-nal court in 1996 because the offend-ers were defined as adults underState laws.

Many States exclude certain seriousoffenses from juvenile court juris-diction. State laws typically also setage limits for excluded offenses.The offenses most often excludedare capital crimes and murders, andother serious offenses against per-sons. Some States exclude juvenilescharged with felonies if they haveprior felony adjudications or convic-tions. Minor offenses, such as traf-fic, watercraft, fish, or game viola-tions, are often excluded fromjuvenile court jurisdiction in Stateswhere they are not covered by con-current jurisdiction provisions.

Criminal courts may transfercases to juvenile court or orderjuvenile sanctions

Of the 35 States with statutory ex-clusion or concurrent jurisdictionprovisions, 20 also have provisionsfor transferring “excluded” or “di-rect filed” cases from criminal courtto juvenile court under certain cir-cumstances. This procedure issometimes referred to as “reverse”waiver or transfer. In some States,juveniles tried as adults in criminalcourt may be transferred to juvenilecourt for disposition. Some Statesallow juveniles tried as adults incriminal court to receive disposi-tions involving either criminal or ju-venile court sanctions, under whathave come to be known as “blendedsentencing” provisions.

In most States, no minimum age is specified in at least one judicial waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, orstatutory exclusion provision for transferring juveniles to criminal court

Minimum transfer age indicated in section(s) of juvenile code specifying transfer provisions, 1997

No minimum age 10 12 13 14 15

Alaska Nevada* Kansas Colorado Illinois Alabama New MexicoArizona Oklahoma* Vermont Missouri Mississippi ArkansasDelaware Oregon* Montana New Hampshire CaliforniaDist. of Columbia Pennsylvania New York ConnecticutFlorida Rhode Island North Carolina IowaGeorgia* South Carolina Wyoming KentuckyHawaii South Dakota LouisianaIdaho* Tennessee MassachusettsIndiana Washington* MichiganMaine West Virginia MinnesotaMaryland Wisconsin New JerseyNebraska North Dakota

OhioTexasUtahVirginia

*Other sections of State statute specify an age below which children cannot be tried in criminal court. This minimum age for criminal respon-sibility is 14 in Idaho, 12 in Georgia, 8 in Nevada and Washington, and 7 in Oklahoma. In Washington, 8- to 12-year-olds are presumed to beincapable of committing a crime. In Oklahoma, in cases involving 7- to 14-year-olds, the State must prove that at the time of the act, the childknew it was wrong.

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Griffin et al.’s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.


In States with statutory exclusion provisions, certain cases involving juveniles originate in criminalcourt rather than juvenile court

Minimum Statutory exclusion offense and minimum age criteria, 1997age for Any Certain Certain Certain Certain

statutory criminal Certain Capital person property drug weaponState exclusion offense felonies crimes Murder offenses offenses offenses offenses

Alabama 16

Alaska 16

Arizona 15

Delaware 15

Florida NS

Georgia 13

Idaho 14

Illinois 13

Indiana 16

Iowa 16

Louisiana 15

Maryland 14

Massachusetts 14

Minnesota 16

Mississippi 13

Montana 17

Nevada NS

New Mexico 15

New York 13

Oklahoma 13

Oregon 15

Pennsylvania NS

South Carolina 16

South Dakota 16

Utah 16

Vermont 14

Washington 16

Wisconsin NS

Examples: In Delaware, juveniles age 15 or older charged with certain felonies must be tried as adults. In Arizona, juveniles age 15 or oldermust be tried as adults if they are charged with murder or certain person offenses or they have prior felony adjudications and are charged witha felony.

Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenilemay be excluded from juvenile court. “NS” indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified.aRequires prior adjudication(s) or conviction(s), which may be required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type.bOnly escape or bail violation while subject to prosecution in criminal court. dRequires prior commitment in a secure facility.cRequires grand jury indictment. eOnly if charged while confined or on probation or parole.

Sources: Authors’ adaptation of Griffin et al.’s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.

10

16NS

16 16

14 14 14

16 16

16

16

15

15 15

13

13 14 14

15NS NS 16

17 17 17 17 17

13 13

16

14

14 16 16 16

15 15

16 16 16

16 16 16 16 16

15 13 15 15 15

14 14 14 14

13 13

NS NS15

15 15 15

16 16

16 16 16

a

a

a

d

b

c

a

e

NS

19December 1999

New laws have had a dramatic impact on sentencingfor serious or violent juvenile offenders

Blended sentencing options create a “middle ground” betweentraditional juvenile sanctions and adult sanctions

Blended sentencing option State

Juvenile-exclusive blend : The juvenile court may impose New Mexicoa sanction involving either the juvenile or adult correctionalsystems.

Juvenile-inclusive blend: The juvenile court may impose Connecticutboth juvenile and adult correctional sanctions. The adult Kansassanction is suspended pending a violation and revocation. Minnesota

Montana

Juvenile-contiguous blend: The juvenile court may Colorado1

impose a juvenile correctional sanction that may remain Massachusettsin force after the offender is beyond the age of the court’s Rhode Islandextended jurisdiction, at which point the offender may be South Carolinatransferred to the adult correctional system. Texas

Criminal-exclusive blend: The criminal court may impose Californiaa sanction involving either the juvenile or adult correctional Colorado2

systems. FloridaIdahoMichiganOklahomaVirginiaWest Virginia

Criminal-inclusive blend: The criminal court may impose Arkansasboth juvenile and adult correctional sanctions. The adult Iowasanction is suspended, but is reinstated if the terms of the Missourijuvenile sanction are violated and revoked. Virginia3

Note: Blends apply to a subset of juveniles specified by State statute.1Applies to those designated as “aggravated juvenile offenders.”2Applies to those designated as “youthful offenders.”3Applies to those designated as “violent juvenile felony offenders.”

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Torbet and Szymanski’s State legislative responses toviolent juvenile crime: 1996–97 update.

Juvenile

Juvenile court

Adult

or

Juvenile

Adult

andJuvenile court

Juvenile

Adult

andCriminal court

Juvenile

Criminal court

Adult

or

Juvenile court Juvenile Adult

A trend away from traditionaljuvenile dispositions is emerging

Juvenile court dispositions were tra-ditionally based on the offender’s in-dividual characteristics and situa-tion. Dispositions were frequentlyindeterminate and generally had re-habilitation as a primary goal. Asmany States have shifted the pur-pose of juvenile court away from re-habilitation and toward punishment,accountability, and public safety, theemerging trend is toward disposi-tions based more on the offensethan the offender. Offense-baseddispositions tend to be determinateand proportional to the offense; ret-ribution and deterrence replace re-habilitation as the primary goal.

Many State legislatures havechanged disposition andsentencing options

From 1992 through 1997, statutes re-quiring mandatory minimum peri-ods of incarceration for certain vio-lent or serious offenders were addedor modified in 16 States.

States have also raised the maxi-mum age of the juvenile court’s con-tinuing jurisdiction over juvenile of-fenders. Such laws allow juvenilecourts to order dispositions that ex-tend beyond the upper age of origi-nal jurisdiction, most often to age21. From 1992 through 1997, 17States extended their age limit fordelinquency dispositions.

Perhaps the most dramatic changewill result from “blended sentences.”Blended sentencing statutes, whichallow courts to impose juvenile and/or adult correctional sanctions oncertain young offenders, were inplace in 20 States at the end of 1997.

NCJ 178995

PRESORTED STANDARDPOSTAGE & FEES PAID

DOJ/OJJDPPERMIT NO. G–91

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Washington, DC 20531

Official BusinessPenalty for Private Use $300

Bulletin

SourcesInformation for this Bulletin was taken from chapter 4of Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 NationalReport. For a full listing of sources for this chapter,see page 109 of the National Report.

ResourcesAnswers to frequently asked questions about juvenilejustice statistics as well as periodic updates of datapresented in Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999National Report are available on the Internet in theOJJDP Statistical Briefing Book, which can be accessedthrough the OJJDP home page at www.ojjdp.ncjrs.orgthrough the JJ Facts & Figures prompt.

For information on OJJDPinitiatives related to the reductionof juvenile crime, violence, andvictimization, contact the JuvenileJustice Clearinghouse (JJC) atwww.ojjdp.ncjrs.org or call 800–638–8736.

AcknowledgmentsJuvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 NationalReport, from which this Bulletin is drawn, wasprepared by the National Center for Juvenile Jus-tice (NCJJ). The authors are Howard N. Snyder andMelissa Sickmund. The National Report benefitedfrom the assistance of many individuals in additionto the authors, including staff at NCJJ, the Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, andthe Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse.

Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of theauthors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies ofOJJDP or the U.S. Department of Justice.

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is a com-ponent of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes theBureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, theNational Institute of Justice, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

How To Get Your Free CopyJuvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report(NCJ 178257) is available online from the OJJDP Website (www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org) under the JJ Facts & Figuressection and the Publications section or can be orderedfrom OJJDP’s Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse. Send ane-mail to [email protected]; call 800–638–8736 (selectoption 2); or write to the Juvenile Justice Clearing-house, P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849–6000. Besure to ask for NCJ 178257.

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