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Offense-Defense and Arms ControlEdward L. RownyPublished online: 05 Jan 2010.

To cite this article: Edward L. Rowny (1987) Offense-Defense and Arms Control, The WashingtonQuarterly, 10:2, 3-12, DOI: 10.1080/01636608709450716

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Provocations A good journal should be a useful tool for

exploring timely issues in depth. R u t it must also provide some perspective, assisting its readers to step back and reflect on issues in their larger context. I his “Provocations” sec- tion has been established as a regular fcatiirc of The ?lrushing/on Qunrter-4 as a place for espe- cially stiniulating essays that help to remind 11s of the big picture.

1 hree topics much in the news these days are explored here. T h e chief arms control ad- viser to the president and the secretary of state, Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, helps to put the debate about the Strategic Defense Initiative, national security, and arms control goals into focus with a discussion of strategic defenses and offenses. Former Secretary of Energy and Defense Janies Schlesinger pro- vides an overview of the implications of the Re a g a n ad ni i n i s t ra ti o n ’ s fa 1 t c r i n g d e fe n s e buildup for U.S. national security and the long-term goals of U.S. strategy. I-Iarald I\ I a 1 nigrc n an a I )r ze s the ways i n M I h ic h tech no I - ogy influences international prosperity and dis- ciisses the growing gap between technological forces and economic policies made on a nar- rowly national basis.

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Offense-Defense and Arms Control

I N GREEK h,lYTHOLOGY, Neme- sis was the goddess of divine retribu- tion, the personification of an iniper- sonal force that would intervene to neutralize evil and preserve good in the world. But more darkly, she was also an instrument of vengeance. T h e sanctuary in which she lived was a meadow in the forest where no mortal could trespass. Any man arrogant enough to trespass the meadow would unleash cosmic destruction. T h u s she lay undisturbed lest mankind risk per- ishing.

Both visions of Nemesis continue to haunt Western strategy. O n the one hand, the threat of reciprocal nuclear vengeance between East and West has prevented nuclear war for over 40 years. Yet, on the other hand, the growing imbalance between 1: 4 astern and Western nuclear arsenals and our ability to check them have brought us to the very threshold of Nemesis' sanctuary. Indeed, an unfulfilled premise of the 1972 ABhl Treaty was that significant reductions in strategic ballistic missiles would occur. T h e

Edward L. Rowny is the special adviser to the president and the secretav of state for arms control matters. IIe has been directly involved in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union for over 12 years, including more than 2 years as head of the US. delega- tion to START. T h e views in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U S . government.

1979 S A L T I1 framework simply in- stitutionalized this deterioration.

The re are some who argue that moving beyond our current offense- reliant regime risks taunting Nemesis. The re are others who see just the op- posite. I hey have caught glimpses of technology which holds out the prom- ise of, once and for all, devaluing the most destabilizing of weapons-stra- tegic ballistic nuclear missiles. T h e s e weapons are the most destabilizing be- cause they are fast, cannot be recalled, and are hard-target killers. The i r value is such that they are most likely to be used first in a crisis. h.loreover, they are the ones in which the Soviets have invested the most. So far, w e have not been able to curb their growth. Even more ominous is a steady movement toward a Soviet heavy ICBh.1 force which could ultimately be capable of a decapitating first strike against U.S. counterforce targets. With greatly de- graded retaliatory forces and no de- fenses, U.S. cities would be hostage to a coup d e grace. In such a scenario, the attacker could achieve his war aims without risking unacceptable damage to himself. Yet, we have not really been able to find ways to insure our- selves against such a possibility. This paper explores the thesis that moving to a greater mix of offenses and de- fenses will enhance both arms control stability and crisis stability, and thus will no longer make strategic ballistic missiles a good investment.

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Our fundamental objective under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program is to seek better ways to ensure U.S. and allied security iising the increased contributions of defenses-defenses that threaten no ohe. Of course, while it is difficult to be certain of capabilities of potential systems based on technologies not yet developed, defenses based on the new tec ti nologies w e a re investigating would not have offensive roles. Presi- dent Ronald Reagan has personally as- sured General Secretary Mikhail Gor- bachev that we are not seeking to develop a first-strike capability through SDI; w e are researching de- fensive systems, not offensive weap- ons. \Ye d o not expect the Soviet Union to accept our assurances on faith alone; indeed, one of our objcc- tives in the U.S. Open Laboratories Initiative, which we have proposed in Gencva, is to allow Soviet scientists to see first-hand that on-going SDI re- search does not involve offensive wea po ns .

From its inception, SDI has been a program open to continuous discussion by the media, the Congress, and the U.S. public. O u r open society ensures that our programs are consistent with their stated intentions. This is in con- trast to the USSR, where even the existence of a heavily funded strategic defense research program is denied. hloreover, creating effective defenses that could make ballistic missiles ob- solete would require systems highly optimized for this purpose, making them unsuitable for offensive pur- poses. Effective offensive weapons such as ballistic missiles already exist. T h e point of SDI is to find defenses against ballistic missiles, not to aug- ment their offensive capabilities. In short, we are not developing, under the guise of SDI, new offensive \\.cap-

ons; the defenses we are investigating would not have offensive roles; and the U.S. Open Laboratories Initiative would provide an opportunity for So- viet scientists to see these facts first- hand.

T h e momentum of this purpose is being given impctus by the participa- tion of scientists and industrialists, not only in the United States but in the United Kingdom, the Federal Repub- lic of Germany, Japan, Italy, and Is- rael. It is also, for the first time in modern history, an attempt to have strategy drive the development of technology. However, this will not be an easy task to accomplish. In addition to resistance from those who are com- fortable with the current offensive nu- clear strategy and are not convinced that an offense-defense mix will be more stable, there remain formidable problems. One is the unprcdictability of the rate at which technological in- novation will take place. Another is managing the transition to an offense- defense mix through the arms control process with the USSR. Yet another problem is managing this transition so that decoupling does not occur be- tween the United States and our NA'I'O and Asian allies.

In terms of technological innova- tion, it is likely that, no matter what the pace of breakthroughs, the United States will lead the Soviet Union in a number of key technological areas for the foreseeable future. In particular, this will include computers and their accompanying software. It will also in- clude electro-optical sensing, naviga- tion and guidance, microelectronics and integrated circuit manufacturing, robotics and machine intelligence, sig- nal processing, signature reduction, and telecommunications. Less clear, however, is the rate at which the United States can maintain a lead in

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Offense-Defense and Arms Control

materials, propulsion, radar sensing, and submarine detection. Neverthe- less, their nature and the rate at which these technologies advance will afford a wide, and perhaps surprising, range of offense-defense mixes. By the same token, some of these technologies have already matured, but have been waiting in institutional backwaters to be discovered. Cruise missiles are per- haps the classic example. T h e tech- nology involved in these had been around more than 20 years before they were discovered by the right parts of the bureaucracy.

A relatively quiet aspect of these developments is high technology in outer space, both for military and non- military purposes. Satellites have be- come an integral part of our terrestrial military operations. An attack on cer- tain classes of our satellites could make us vulnerable to a first strike. h,loreover, our economic well-being has become increasingly tied to satel- lites. However, in most cases, we have so far failed to take steps to protect these assets. 'I'his will have to be ad- dressed in any future offense-defense mix because both offense and defense rely on space-based assets. This could be done by hardening the satellites, by giving them the ability to evade attackers, or by stationing redundant ones in space. Alternativcly, we could plan on quickly replacing our lost sat- ellites or count on deterring attacks on our satellites with antisatellites of our own. Satellites might also be protected in part through arms control agree- ments. \\'hen all is said and done, no space asset can currently be protected from all possible threats. However, it is possible to defend space assets from enough difficult threats that it greatly complicates an attacker's plans. T h e Soviets have maintained for many years various operational capabilities

for attacking U.S. satellites. T h e s e in- clude an operational co-orbital inter- ceptor, nuclear-armed Galosh antibal- listic missiles designed to detonate in space, experimental ground-based las- ers; and electronic countermeasures. T h e development of means to ensure adequate satellite survivability is a prime example of strategy driving technology in the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Another tcchnological change now taking place is in the field of conven- tional weapons improvement. Better target acquisition, smart bombs, pre- cis io n munitions, shaped charges, self-forging projec- tiles, fuel-air explosives, stealth, and the like will improve the effectiveness of current conventional forces. Im- provement in tactical weapons will bring about changes in the offense- defense mix which are as yet highly unpredictable. T h e new SDI technol- ogies related to space-based defense, supplementing other technologies which apply to the sensible atmo- sphere (for purposes here defined as under 300,000 feet), can contribute to the development of tactical missile de- fense in Europe and Asia. NATO, for example, has no active defense against tactical ballistic missiles, and NATO nuclear and air defense forces are cur- rently vulnerable to a Soviet tactical ballistic missile attack. I emphasize the word active because many in NAI'O would argue that the harden- ing program N A T O undertook in the late 1970s affords at least some de- fense. However, this will have to be improved. As the Soviets deploy a new generation of shorter-range missiles, their ability to deliver conventional munitions deeper into Western Eu- rope will be enhanced. T h e Soviets are now replacing Frog and Scud mis- siles with SS-21s and SS-23s and up-

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grading the Scaleboard. An upgraded Patriot missile system would not pro- vide the layered antitactical ballistic missile capability necessary to defend against these.

The advent of these new technolo- gies further promises that some stra- tegic missions currently assigned to nuclear forces could be turned over to non-nuclear weapons. One school of thought holds that non-nuclear weap- ons may be less escalatory than nuclear weapons because they cause less large- scale collateral damage. For example, a precision-guided conventional shaped-charge explosive or hypervel- ocity projectile may “bust” a missile silo just as well or better than a nuclear one, but with less collateral damage. This remains, however, the subject of some controversy. Conversely, some strategic assets are already being as- signed conventional-thcater missions. I3-52s have conducted operations to support conventional forces for many years. Two squadrons of B-52Gs are equipped with Harpoon antiship mis- siles for maritime support operations. Submarines are being equipped with conventional I y-a rmed . cruise missiles. As we move from “smart” to “bril- liant” munitions, the potential to at- tack strategic targets with conven- tional weapons will increase. This in itself should help drive nuclear inven- tories down. Thus , offensive forces may, in the future, include non-nu- clear strategic weapons. This becomes even more complex because the same technology which applies to non-nu- clear strategic offensive weapons can be applied to defense suppression.

Defense suppression is an area where conventional non-SDI-related high technology has much to offer. However, it is also the area that is driving the development of non-nu- clear offensive strategic weapons. The same high technology can contribute

to either offense or defense supprcs- sion, but not SDI. Indeed, it is pos- sible to have conventional weapons which approximate “zero CEI’” (cir- cular error probable) and thus become counterforce-capable. As such, they could perform missions that were once only in the realm of nuclear weapons. This may well have been why Gor- bachev espressed such anxiety in his January 15, 1986, statement about the development of conventional weapons of mass destruction. Let me reiterate that this includes smart bombs, cruise missiles, stealth, precision-guided mu- nitions (PGhls), and the like. Quite different technology is involved in de- fense against a ballistic missile attack. Indeed, SDI has been deliberately structured so that it will examine tech- nologies with no offensive potential and no capability against the territory of another country. Many of these, like charged particle beams and lasers of selected frequencies, cannot effcc- tively penetrate the atmosphere and therefore are incapable of being used to strike targets on or near the earth’s surface. Other technologies, while ca- pable of modification for capability against ground targets, would have a limited potential at best. Therefore, if they were deployed in a space-based defense, these technologies could not pose a militarily significant threat to any ground, sea, or air targets. This, by the way, stands in distinction to the Soviet AI3h.l and air defense system, which appears aimed solely at defend- ing against a ragged second strike.

One definition of defense suppres- sion is any means by which offensive forces can overcome defenses. This may include saturation, stealth, elec- tronic or infrared (IR) counterrnea- s u m against defense sensors, and hy- pervelocity. Offensive weapons integrating these means can be used in a precursor attack to destroy de-

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Offense-Defense and Arms Control

fenses (sometimes also referred to as the first phase of defense suppres- sion), enabling follow-on attacks by less sophisticated offensive weaponry. Some studies suggest that h y p e n d - ocity is the most efficient and cost- effective of the means outlined above and also, technologically, the most dif- ficult against which to develop effec- tive countermeasures.

In any event, defense suppression becomes of central importance in the offense-defense relationship because its effectiveness figures in a protracted conflict. Defenses, as mentioned above, can be overcome by saturation, stealth, electronics, and IR , or by es- tremely high speed. T h e s e means in- volve different high technologies than those being researched under SDI; they are all known to be feasible and all operate under 300,000 feet. We draw the line at 300,000 feet because anything above this would be a space asset. In a world of both offenses and defenses, suppression of defenses be- low 300,000 feet \vould be necessary to assure the success of a retaliatory strike and, most particularly, follow- on attacks. Ominously, these are mea- sures to which the Soviets have not devoted much attention. Indeed, there are those who argue that Soviet antiballistic missile and air defenses seem to be aimed solely at defending against a U.S. retaliatory force se- verely degraded by a Soviet first strike. Therefore, U.S. success in waging a prolonged campaign would depend heavily on defense suppres- sion. Although some of these technol- ogies have been on the shelf for quite a nfhile, we are only just now begin- ning to look coherently at their overall role in defense suppression.

If research proves strategic defenses to be feasible, there will still be a need to manage jointly, through negotia- tions with the Soviets, the transition

from the current offensive strategy to one based on a more balanced offense- defense mix. If agreements lead to the drastic reduction of offensive nuclear weapons, greater demand will be put on the need to negotiate conventional arms control agreements, lest the world be made “safe for conventional warfare.” One might term these non- nu c I e a r , no n p ro 1 i fe ra t i o n agree ni e n t s . \Vi t ho 11 t s 11 c h agreements, t ti is m igli t be a world where the Soviets have the edge. At the same time, agreements in conventional forces will become more complex. In chis connection, the lack of success in the talks on Rlutual Balanced Force Reductions of conven- tional weapons, after more than a de- cade of negotiations, does little to in- spire confidence that the arms control process can provide the solution to this problem. .But beyond this, the tech- nological revolution i n conventional arms will also require arms control ne- gotiations covering strategic non-nu- clear offensive forces and defense suppression forces. Othenvise, we will have done nothing to prevent what some analysts term a “strategic free market,” a t least for offenses and de- fenses under 300,000 feet.

Further, should we reach agree- ments that do profoundly reduce of- fensive nuclear arsenals, this must be done in its interrelationship with con- ventional forces. For example, should we reach a point where the five nu- clear powers each have arsenals of only several hundred nuclear weapons, these weapons inherently become a secure reserve force for vital counter- value targets. This is because they would once again become the only weapons which could credibly threaten whole societies. T h e smaller thc arsenal becomes, the more seciirc it becomes because it is easier to de- fend and easier to conceal. Some an- alysts speculate that non-nuclear stra-

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tegic weapons could then become the strategic counterforce capability. In- deed, if nuclear weapons deter only the use of other nuclear weapons, then, according to this argument, one only needs a force of a relatively mod- est size to threaten the destruction of an entire society. An implication of this argument is that simply making drastic reductions in nuclear arse- nals-indeed, even doing away with them completely-will not lessen the prospect of a conventional counter- force arms race. Technology will sim- ply move in other directions. A per- su.asive cou n terargu men t, however, is that smart weapons will, in fact, deter other smart weapons, and that brilliant weapons will deter other brilliant weapons at all steps of the tactical- strategic con tinu um.

Yet another dimension to offense- defense weapons mixes relates in part to how w e choose offensive weapons and in part to SDI . In choosing offen- sive weapons, w e should not focus on the marginal contribution of a weapon to offensive capabilities. Rather, we must think in terms of contributions to overall stability. A mix of strategic and tactical nuclear and non-nuclear weapons is optimal only if it optimizes stability. Therefore, the issue that must be addressed in any weapons choice is its marginal contribution to stability. T h e other part of the ques- tion of offense-defense mixes has to do with managing the transition. T h e goal of managing the transition does not imply that the current situation is acceptably stable. I he reasons for which confidence in retaliation based on offensive nuclear forces began to break down in the United States have been explored in greater detail else- where. Suffice it to say that, in terms of managing any transition, there are good reasons why we should believe that ballistic missile defenses can im-

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prove stability. Among these is that if highly effective defenses prove to be feasible, they will help put a check on counterforce arms races (i.e., promote arms control stability). However, this will be a complex task. Along with whatever defensive changes the new technology may bring about, there will be a transition in the strategy of de- fending Europe and Asia quite aside from any transition with the Soviets which might be brought about through SDI.

Mow and how quickly w e are able to solve the problems inherent in the defense of both countervalue and counterforce targets will continue to affect the mix of technologies used. T h e ability to thwart precursor attacks against space-based defenses is part of the technological problem. T h e rela- tion of countervalue targets to the de- fense of counterforce targets is an- other. For the strategic defense of a city to fail, the attacker needs to get only one warhead through. Th i s means that for each unit of defense, the attacker needs to' match it with only one unit of offense until the 1:l ratio is exceeded by one. If, however, the target is hidden or mobile, and the defense is preferential in nature, it would take a much more expensive barrage attack requiring many weap- ons to assure that a single target is destroyed. Hypothetically, such a bar- rage could be mounted with strategic nuclear weapons, strategic non-nu- clear weapons, or a combination of both. T h e point to be made here is that if a defense is able to stop missiles early in their flight, it by definition will be affording protection to both coun- tervalue and counterforce targets. Moreover, the better defenses become in defending a mix of countervalue and counterforce targets, the more un- certainty is created in the minds of attack planners. Indeed, a strong ar-

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gument can be made that uncertainty in the minds of attack planners is itself a significant component of deterrence. Unfortunately, possession of defenses by the attacker introduces uncertainty about the effectiveness of a retaliatory strike as well. T h e extent to which uncertainty that favors a second-strike force can be maintained with a small offensive retaliatory force (a minimum deterrent) coupled with defenses is also an interesting question in itself.

Moreover, the costs of destroying undefended targets also have near- term implications for our force mod- ernization. As an illustrative example, the key elements of the Scowcroft Commission’s blueprint for ballistic missile modernization called for the development of 100 M X Peacekeeper missiles coupled with the develop- ment of a new missile-the small ICBM. Th i s particular combination was designed to maintain a near-term capability to deter a first strike while creating a strong incentive for the So- viets to negotiate reductions in heavy ICBMs, where they have a decided advantage. As suggested above, there are economic considerations involved in this. By placing multiple reentry vehicles on a single missile, one can achieve the same military capability with a greatly reduced number of mis- siles, assuming they are capable of sur- viving a counterforce attack against them. As long as the small ICBh4 re- niains mobile, it becomes an ex- tremely costly target to attack. Th i s is because the only way to destroy a sin- gle missile whose exact location is un- known is to saturate the deployment area with attacking reentry vehicles. For a fixed deployment area, the num- ber of reentry vehicles needed to ac- complish this mission is a constant, regardless of the number of small ICBMs. Thus , a mobile “small Small 1CBR.I” force, or a small mobile nu-

clear force of any type, has much lev- erage in terms of cost-effectiveness. Yet, much of this leverage comes from mobility (or anything which makes the retaliatory force costly to overcome). T h e technological question, though, is whether sufficient missile mobility can be maintained with a small ICBM that has more than one warhead. Beyond this, a mixture of limited defenses and mobile retaliatory forces further com- plicates an attacker‘s plans. Th i s is be- cause such a mix continues to hold an opponent’s high-value targets a t risk while it makes counterforce attacks extreniely expensive. Some argue that such an offense-defense force mix is the most stable way to maintain de- terrence through the transition to com- pletely effective defenses.

What are the implications of all these technological changes on arms control? T h e problem of reducing stra- tegic nuclear offensive forces, al- though until now largely unsolved, is relatively manageable. Indeed, agree- ments reducing strategic nuclear forces can be reached if only the nec- essary political will is manifested. Ef- fective strategic defenses in them- selves should also provide a strong incentive to reduce ballistic missiles. While the protection of our space as- sets might be assisted by arms control, agreements may never be able to guar- antee fully their protection. This field of arms control needs to be developed. T h e transition from an offensive nu- clear to a strategic defensive environ- ment is currently being formulated. Finally, the nature of the arms control problem of jointly managing and con- trolling newly emerging, non-SDI high-technology conventional forces will be very complex and difficult. Thinking on how to deal with this problem has yet to begin.

All of this will occur against the backdrop of a need to maintain effec-

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Eduard L. Rowny

tive verification. As technology be- comes more complex, blurring militar- ily significant distinctions benveen tactical and strategic, conventional and nuclear, effective verification will be- come more difficult to achieve. How- ever, once again, technology may prove helpful. Great strides continue daily in such critical technology areas for arms control verification as com- puters, optics and electro-optics, radar and signal processing, acoustics, and the like. Although it has its pros and cons, perhaps the greatest verification measure of all, however, would be for the Soviets to follow our lead in areas such as on-site inspection. Histori- cally, however, the Soviets have re- sisted such notions.

In the final analysis, does moving beyond our current offense-reliant re- gime really taunt Nemesis? It does only if we believe offense-reliant arms control can indefinitely continue to provide us the security we seek. T h e events that have unfolded since 1972 undermine our confidence in this. However, this by no means signals an end to arms control or arms control agreements. On the contrary, as tech- nology is now allowed naturally to evolve, it will demand the efficient allocation of offense-defense re- sources. This in itself should be an incentive for the Soviets to institution- alize a dialogue with us.

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