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Occupational Health and Safety in Germany:

A Risk-Based Approach?

Sarah Haunert

This dissertation is submitted as part of a MSc degree in Risk Analysis at King’s College London

August 2012

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Table of Contents

List of Figures ........................................................................................................................................... 5

Abbreviations............................................................................................................................................. 5

Abstract ....................................................................................................................................................... 7

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 7

Occupational Health and Safety in Germany: ................................................................................. 8

A Risk-based Approach? ........................................................................................................................ 8

CHAPTER 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 8

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review ....................................................................................................... 11

2.1. Defining Risk and Risk-based Regulation ................................................................................. 11

2.2. Risk-based Regulation: A Matter of Different Worldviews? .................................................. 12

CHAPTER 3: Methodology ................................................................................................................ 16

3.1. Methods .......................................................................................................................................... 16

3.2. Weaknesses and Potential Biases of the Methodology ............................................................ 17

CHAPTER 4 – Occupational Health and Safety in Germany .................................................. 19

4.1. Organisation and Structure .......................................................................................................... 19

4.4.1. EU Framework Directive ..................................................................................................... 19

4.4.2. Occupational Health and Safety Act .................................................................................. 19

4.4.3. Federalism .............................................................................................................................. 20

4.4.4. Dualism ................................................................................................................................... 21

4.2. OHS in Practice............................................................................................................................. 22

4.2.1. General Approach and Methods ......................................................................................... 22

4.3. Special Case of Carcinogenic Substances: The Risk Concept ................................................ 23

4.4. Tolerability of Risk Framework .................................................................................................. 26

CHAPTER 5: Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 29

5.1. Risk-based Approach ................................................................................................................... 29

5.1.1. Science-based Assessments .................................................................................................. 29

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5.1.2. Quantification of Risk .......................................................................................................... 29

5.1.3. Cost-Benefit Analysis ............................................................................................................ 30

5.2. Risk Acceptance ............................................................................................................................ 32

CHAPTER 6: Discussion .................................................................................................................... 34

6.1. To What Extent is Germany Risk-based? ................................................................................. 34

6.1.1. Hazard-based v. Risk-based Regulation ............................................................................. 34

6.2. Institutional Factors ...................................................................................................................... 36

6.2.1. Outcome-based v. Process-based ....................................................................................... 36

6.2.2. Other Shaping Factors and Shortcomings ........................................................................ 39

CHAPTER 7: Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 41

APPENDIX 1: Forms ........................................................................................................................... 42

Geography Research Screening Form ............................................................................................... 43

Ethical Approval Notification ............................................................................................................ 44

Geography Risk Assessment Form ................................................................................................... 46

APPENDIX 2: Codes for Interview Participants .......................................................................... 47

APPENDIX 3: Glossary ....................................................................................................................... 48

Reference List ......................................................................................................................................... 49

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List of Figures

Figure 1: Overview of the German OHS System ............................................................................... 22

Figure 2: The Risk Concept for Carcinogenic Substances ................................................................ 24

Figure 3: HSE’s ToR Framework ......................................................................................................... 26

Abbreviations

AGS Ausschuss für Gefahrstoffe (Committee on Hazardous Substances)

AGW Arbeitsplatzgrenzwerte (Occupational Exposure Limits)

ALARP As low as reasonably possible

ArbSchG Arbeitsschutzgesetz (Occupational Health and Safety Act)

ASiG Arbeitssicherheitgesetz (Safety at Work Act)

BAuA Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin (Federal Institute of Occupational Health and Safety)

BDA Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (Confederation of German Employers' Associations)

BMAS Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs)

CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis

DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (The Confederation of German Trade Unions)

DGUV Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung (German Statutory Accident Insurance)

EU European Union

EU-OSHA European Agency for Safety and Health at Work

GDA Gemeinsame Deutsche Arbeitsschutzstrategie (Joint German Occupational Safety and Health Strategy)

GefStoffV Gefahrstoffverordnung (Hazardous Substances Regulation)

HSE Health and Safety Executive

LASI Länderausschuss für Arbeitsschutz und Sicherheitstechnik (Commission for occupational safety and safety engineering of the federal states)

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LSV Landwirtschaftliche Sozialversicherung (Agricultural Social Insurance Fund)

MEL Maximum Exposure Limits

OES Occupational Exposure Standard

QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment

ToR Tolerability of Risk

TRK Technische Richtkonzentrationen (technical guidance concentrations)

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Abstract

Risk-based regulation is often hailed as leading to more efficiency and rationality by outlining the

limitations of state intervention and by allocating resources according to where probable damage

is the greatest. Due to this apparent appeal, many suggest that risk-based regulation has the

potential to turn into a universal and homogeneous form of governance. By focusing on

Germany’s occupational health and safety regime, this study attempts to challenge such

assumptions. It explores to what extent Germany’s OHS follows a risk-based approach. Drawing

on empirical research, the study shows how normative institutions shape the acceptance of risk-

based arguments in Germany.

Acknowledgements I am grateful to my supervisor Professor Henry Rothstein for his encouragement and his

guidance whilst undertaking the research. In addition, I am greatly indebted to all the

participants, for their enthusiasm in agreeing to participate in this study and for their valuable

insights and comments. Many thanks also go to my father for his invaluable support throughout

the project.

Sarah Haunert (1151941)

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Occupational Health and Safety in Germany:

A Risk-based Approach?

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Risk-based strategies have increasingly gained in popularity in a number of countries. They are

promoted as leading to greater efficiency in the management of resources and to increased

quality and rationality in regulation (Braithwaite et al., 2007). These risk-based approaches,

consist of a wide array of implementation and enforcement activities, thereby taking the form of

risk-based regulation. They involve different players, both private and public (Braithwaite et al.,

2007; Döhler & Wegrich, 2010). With the emergence of risk-based strategies we are also

witnessing the rise of the ‘regulatory state’, a new institutional and policy style, in which the

government interferes with social processes and corrects market failures so as to control and

minimise adverse consequences to health (Hood et al., 2001).

In its idealised form, risk-based regulation provides an evidence-based means of managing the

use of resources and it prioritises action towards the highest risks in a transparent, systematic and

defensible approach (Black & Baldwin, 2010). In this regard, the international ‘better regulation

movement’ seeks to establish an efficient use of resources to generate enhanced regulatory

performance, which recognises the complexity of modern risks and challenges thereby producing

‘better’ regulation (Döhler & Wegrich, 2010). The OECD, for example, claims that a risk-based

approach “can help to ensure that regulatory approaches are efficient, effective and account for

risk/risk trade-offs across policy objectives (…) [It] can improve the welfare of citizens by

providing better protection, more efficient government services and reduced costs for business”

(OECD, 2010, p. 11).


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In the UK, all those involved in regulatory affairs are required to develop and use risk-based

frameworks across all policy domains (Black & Baldwin, 2010). The UK is not the only country

to incorporate risk-based approaches. In other countries, such as the US, Australia, Canada, and

the Netherlands, risk has also turned into a central concept for organising regulatory endeavours

(Hutter, 2002). The seemingly universal interest in ‘rational’ risk-based approaches suggests that

there may be a convergence in the way governance problems are dealt with in different national

contexts. Effectively, efforts are increasingly made on the international level with the aim of

creating risk-based frameworks in order to govern harms of a cross-boundary nature (Rothstein

et al., 2011). Activities by organisations such as the EU and the OECD are cases in point (Hutter,

2006). It appears as if these efforts are built on the assumption that risk-based regulation offers a

set of common concepts, tools and approaches which can be readily applied within different

national regulatory institutions. However, ideas can often travel more easily than the content of

regulatory instruments and having the same idea does not necessarily mean that convergence will

occur (Radaelli, 2005).

Poles apart from risk being a universal form of governance, the interpretation of, the

understandings of, and the reactions to risk are shaped by institutional rules, contexts, tools and

cultures (Rothstein et al., 2011). The divergence in the adoption and implementation of risk-

based ideas represents the starting point of this study. Even though a broad range of studies

focus on risk-based regulation in the UK (Power, 1997; Hood et al., 2001; Rothstein, 2004;

Bartle, 2008), little research has been done on how risk-based strategies are implemented in other

European countries. Hence, there is a lack of evidence which could underline the assumption

that there exists variation in the adoption of risk-based strategies across different countries.

This study attempts to make a step towards filling this gap by focusing on risk-based regulation

in Germany. More specifically, departing from the core characteristics of risk-based regulation,

the study attempts to answer the following research question: to what extent does the

occupational health and safety (OHS) regime in Germany adopt risk-based strategies? In this

context, it attempts to show that there exists a variation in risk-based regulation between

different countries, which do not always apply the main characteristics of risk-based regulation

uniformly. The study’s second objective is to investigate the factors which shape the uptake of

risk-based arguments in Germany. Hence, it focuses on the way institutional structures shape

regulatory components, thereby influencing risk-based thinking and activities. Special attention is

given to how institutional normssuch expected standards of state behaviours, responsibilities

and objectivesdetermine regulatory action.


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The study opens with a literature review which outlines the theoretical framework (chapter 2).

This is followed by a description of the methodology in chapter 3 and a portrayal of the structure

of Germany’s occupational health and safety system in chapter 4. Chapter 4 also focuses on the

management of carcinogenic substances as this holds a special position within the German OHS.

This chapter also introduces the British Tolerability of Risk (ToR) framework, which serves as a

point of comparison to Germany’s approach with regards to carcinogenic substances. Based on

interviews with health and safety experts chapter 5 investigates the OHS regulation (chapter 5).

Finally, in chapter 6 the findings will be linked back to the theoretical framework in order to

answer the research questions.


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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review

2.1. Defining Risk and Risk-based Regulation

In its most simple definition risk is understood as the probability of bad outcome (Jasanoff,

1993). Closely linked to the concept of ‘risk’, is the one of ‘hazard’, which is defined as an

intrinsic property or condition that has the potential to cause harm or costs to human society

(Hood & Jones, 1996). Yet, the two concepts are not mutually exclusive. As such the UK Health

and Safety Executive (HSE) defines risk “as the chance that someone or something that is valued

will be adversely affected in a stipulated way by the hazard” (HSE, 2001, p. 16). According to

The Federal Institute of Occupational Health and Safety in Germany (Bundesagentur für

Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin, abbr. BAuA) (2010) risk represents the probability and the

severity of a hazard to cause potential harm. The two concepts are interlinked, especially in the

field of European occupational health and safety. The European Framework Directive

89/391/EEC requires employers to undertake and document risk assessments of which the

identification of hazards plays a crucial part.

The way regulation is enacted, will strongly depend on which of these two concepts is adhered

to. Hazard-based regulation, guided by a consideration of intrinsic hazard, does not utilise impact

assessments or exposure assessments, which include considerations of the likelihood and extent

of a hazard leading to harm (Nordlander et al., 2010; Löfstedt, 2011b). Without such an

assessment of actual risk, hazard-based regulation is accused of being precautionary as well as

inhibiting activities which do not carry risk and may even be beneficial for society and individuals

(Löfstedt, 2011a). Proponents of risk-based regulation claim that risk-based approaches are

evidence-based and that they can help to better understand actual risks of harm. Unlike hazard-

based approaches which only rely on the intrinsic property of an object or a substance to cause

harm, proponents of risk-based regulation argue that risk-approaches go a step further by

including assessments of likelihood (Nordlander et al., 2010). As such a risk-based approach

entails the use of technical risk-based tools and it is based on three core aspects: science-based

assessments and quantifications (‘objective’ risk calculations); cost-benefit analyses (expressing

probable damage by monetary units); and probability theory to reduce uncertainty, calculating

the probability that adverse events occur over a given period of time (like quantitative risk

assessments (QRA), which calculate the magnitude of potential harmful effects and the

probability of their occurrence) (Hutter, 2005; Renn; 1998).


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The three main elements of risk-based approaches are very contentious and are at the origin of

major debates within the governance field of risk regulation. The debates reflect competing

world-views (Hood & Jones, 1996) and indicate that there is no universal adoption of risk-based

approaches.

2.2. Risk-based Regulation: A Matter of Different Worldviews?

Central to contemporary reflections on governance is the question as to what principles should

govern the identification, measurement and regulation of risk (Hood et Jones, 1996). The

normative rationale for risk-based approaches rests on the idea that by setting priorities and

directing efforts to the highest risk, governance performance can be improved and resources

used more efficiently (Klinke & Renn, 2002; Black & Baldwin, 2010). The desired result of risk-

based governance is not to reduce all risks to zero, but to minimise them to an acceptable by

using risk management and cost-benefit analysis (Klinke & Renn, 2002). By designing risk

reduction policies according to the severity of potential harm, one avoids what Breyer (1993)

refers to as ‘tunnel vision’ (overregulation of small/trivial risks, often more harmful than useful),

random agenda selection (driven by personal interest rather than by rational appraisal), and

inconsistency of measures across government.

Risk tools have become attractive for regulatory agencies and governments in their efforts to

manage societal risks and to respond to potential criticism on the legitimacy of their actions

(Hutter, 2005). The potential for criticism and the increased public scrutiny have led to greater

accountability and transparency (Rothstein et al., 2011). Increased transparency and

accountability reveal the limitations of regulation. Certain degrees of regulatory failure become

acceptable because risk-based regulation is based on probabilities (not on certainties), thus

offering a justification in case of undesired outcomes (Rothstein et al., 2006). Yet, increased

public scrutiny can augment the potential for blame and can consequently lead to so-called

blame-games (Hood, 2002). In their attempt to shun blame, individual regulators or

organisations may resort to ‘defensive risk management’, which put emphasis on blame

avoidance, often to the detriment of attending to societal risks. What becomes evident from the

above accounts is that risk emerges as an organising principle for decision-making and strongly

influences regulatory activity (Rothstein et al., 2006).


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Nevertheless, despite the universal appeal of risk-based approaches, the adoption of risk-based

logics is institutionally shaped and varies not only between countries but even within regimes.

The European Union, for instance, does not present a united front with regards to risk

regulation; in some areas it is risk-based whereas in others it adopts a more hazard-based,

precautionary approach (Vogel, 2001; Nordlander et al., 2010). In some countries risk

considerations are confined to only a few policy domains. It even occurs that a same regulatory

regime encompasses different regulatory logics: for example, risk-based application may be used

to gather evidence, but policy-making and rule enforcement may follow different rationales

(Hood et al., 2001; Rothstein et al., 2011).

If we accept that institutions shape behaviour through the ‘logic of appropriateness’, whereby

members of an institution act in conformity to the norm of that institution, then they equally

shape the world views of the ones working within them (March & Olsen, 1984; Peter, 2005).

These worldviews are reflected in current debates about the principles of risk-based regulation,

namely cost-benefit analysis, the scientific assessments and representing risks as probabilities,

which are also referred to as technical risk tools.

Trying to assess the risk through scientific assessments is undertaken by most countries, and the

quarrels usually do not arise over differences in methodology, measurements or dose-response

functions, but over how to interpret the data and over whether or not to quantify it (Klinke &

Renn, 2002). QRA, which calculates the magnitude of a potential loss of a harmful event and the

probability of its occurrence, is celebrated by its proponents as the backbone of rational risk

management. Opponents question the rationality and objectivity of such quantifications. They

are sceptical of claims that one can quantify risks with high degrees of certainty and criticise such

statements for creating a false sense of security. Quantifications are based on simplistic models

and the inherent uncertainty makes it almost impossible to quantify risk (Hood & Jones, 1996).

They contend that such quantifications are influenced by value judgements of experts and are at

best only subjective approximations of reality, often different to actual experiences/outcomes

(Cohen, 1996; Jasanoff, 1993).

The results of QRA are used to inform the setting of standards, hence QRA plays an important

part in what Hood et al. (2001) term the ‘cost-benefit analysis culture’, in which additional safety

measures are weighted against potential benefits. Such balancing of costs is usually determined

through value-of-life calculations and it is claimed that it allows for an efficient allocation of

resources (Renn, 1991; Graham; 2008). The combination of QRA and CBA enables

governments to effectively prioritise actions and resources accordingly. Challenging voices claim


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that such an approach removes risk judgements from their social context (Horlick-Jones, 1996).

It is difficult to determine the costs of a specific risk, especially since the concept of risk is future

oriented. Moreover, the ones who incur the costs are often very different to the ones who reap

the benefits (Hunter & Fewtrell, 2001). Opponents to CBA thus claim that the determination of

cost-benefit trade-offs is essentially a political decision, which calls into questions the allegedly

objective nature of technical risk-based tools.

The question which arises is by what standards should one determine risks? In other words, what

are (un)acceptable risks or costs? Proponents of technical risk assessments hold that tools such

as CBA and QRA can help determine acceptable balances of harms (Horlick-Jones, 1996). Such

a quantitative perspective on risk redefines the goals of regulation from preventing harm to

defining acceptable levels of potential adverse effects (Rothstein et al., 2011). The simple

classification of risks into acceptable and unacceptable becomes insufficient. Such a

consideration implies the existence of an intermediate area, the tolerable area. Whereas

acceptable risks are defined as small and adequately controlled, tolerable risks are risks which are

tolerated in order to secure certain benefits (Rimington et al., 2003). Nevertheless, people will

have very different perceptions on what ‘acceptable’ and ‘tolerable’ risks are to them (Hunter &

Fewtrell, 2001) and ‘rational’ risk-based approaches are often counterintuitive to public

perceptions (Renn, 1991).

To take into account the plurality of risk acceptability, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in

the UK developed the tolerability of risk (ToR) framework which it set out in its landmark

document ‘The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations’ published in 1988 (HSE,

1988). HSE’s framework is guided by the ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) principle,

which combines cost-benefit considerations and technical feasibility in reducing risks (Fairman,

2007). The adoption of a principle like ALARP indicates the realisation that safety may come at

the expense of other goals (Horlick-Jones, 1996). Some people, however, oppose such trade-offs

and reject that risks to human life, organisations and the environment should be tolerated at all

(Hutter, 2005). Many authors highlight that decisions on the acceptability of risks are often

political in nature (Fairman, 2007; Hutter, 2005; Cohen, 1996; Le Guen, 2007) and emerge from

underlying processes of negotiation (Horlick-Jones, 1996), which are shaped by the worldviews

of the negotiators (Renn, 1998).

A few authors attempted to explain the variation in ideas about risk by grouping organisations

and societies according to common characteristics. Some scholars differentiate between two to

five different cultural groups, such as egalitarians, entrepreneurs or individualists, fatalists and


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hierarchists (Douglas, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990; Rayner & Cantor, 1987). Entrepreneurs for

instance are described as perceiving risk as an opportunity to stimulate innovation and to

increase the standard of living. They prefer analytical and rational methods to solve complex

problems and rely on cost-benefit analysis to legitimate and organise decision-making.

Egalitarians on the other hand refuse to undertake trade-offs between risks and benefits no

matter how plausible and efficient such an approach may be. They usually seek to achieve high

levels of safety, are particularly concerned about equity and rely on consensual approach to

problem-solving (Renn, 1991; Renn, 1992; Hood, 1998; Lodge et al., 2010). Other authors

differentiate in their classifications between the groups who favour technical risk-based

approaches and the opponents of such approaches. Jasanoff (1993) distinguishes between

adherents to ‘soft’ or non-quantitative approaches and the adherents to ‘hard’ quantitative

methods. In a similar vein, Hood and Jones (1996) oppose quantificationism and qualitativism,

where proponents of the latter doctrine maintain that proper weight should be given to

unquantifiable factors in risk regulation.

These classifications and differentiations are meant to explain and map out the contours of the

risk debate, and should not be understood as reflections of reality. Only rarely would groups or

people perfectly fit into such classifications, usually more attenuated approaches adopted or even

hybrid attitudes can be observed (Hood, 1998). Moreover, regardless of the strategy or position

chosen, the aim is always to turn an unacceptable risk into an acceptable one. The following

sections will explore which of the above attitudes and strategy of risk can be found in Germany’s

occupational health and safety regime. This is preceded by a description of the methods used in

this study.


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CHAPTER 3: Methodology

3.1. Methods

The primary aim of this research consists of finding out to what extent the German occupational

health and safety regime follows a risk-based approach. The second aim is to explore how risk-

based arguments or practices are used within this regime and how institutional factors may shape

them. In order to understand how underlying processes shape the uptake of risk-based

approaches and thinking in Germany’s health and safety regime, a qualitative methodology was

chosen (Mayoux, 2005). Thus, data collection took the form of semi-structured interviews, which

were selected for flexibility and the ability to generate deeper meanings and raise issues which

may not have been anticipated by the researcher (Longhurst, 2003; Valentine, 1997).

The participants for this study were chosen according to their involvement and expertise in

German health and safety. The researcher made contact with the participants via email and

invited them to participate in the study. However, as it was difficult gain access to appropriate

participants, a snowballing technique was adopted. This technique refers to using one contact

who suggests another contact, who in turn can recommend a further contact. Such an approach

has the advantage of overcoming obstacles, such as a high refusal rate. It also helps the

researcher capture interviewees with particular fields of expertise and backgrounds (Valentine,

1997).

19 participants were interviewed and included two employees from Länder administrations and

one employee from a regional administration, one industry representative, an expert in

occupational hygiene, an employer’s representative, two employees from statutory accident

insurances, one consultant, one employees representative, two employees from federal agencies,

one government official, one person from a higher federal authority, one member of a federal

states committee, one member of a research association and a researcher at an non-governmental

research institute. Two British health and safety experts were jointly interviewed in order to

explore to what extent their rationalisations differ from the German ones. Participants were

assured that their names and the names of their respective work locations would remain

anonymous. The interviews were coded according to the participants’ professional roles (see

Appendix 2).

Initially, potential respondents were given the option to choose between face-to-face and

telephone interviews. As all of the initial respondents preferred the latter option, only telephone

interviews were conducted. Even though qualitative research often relies on face-to-face


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interviews, some studies have established that telephone interviews are equally suitable (Sturges

& Hanrahan, 2004; McCoyd & Kerson, 2006; Novick, 2008). They even have the added

advantage that both the interviewer and interviewee are in their familiar surroundings, which

increases comfort and ensures a more natural behaviour (McCoyd & Kerson, 2006). Moreover,

during telephone interviews people are more willing to disclose more sensitive information

(Opdenakker, 2006). Whereas some questions sought to obtain general information on how

occupational health and safety is organised and managed other questions encouraged participants

to express their own opinions and perspectives. The interview length averaged approximately 50

minutes, with the shortest lasting 30 minutes and a couple lasting over 60 minutes.

All of the recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. Two interviews were not recorded, but

instead notes were taken by the interviewer. Data analysis consisted in identifying common

themes and in comparing findings from interviews with existing literature on risk-based

regulation.

3.2. Weaknesses and Potential Biases of the Methodology

A common criticism of qualitatively based research is that it is not representative or generalizable

(Cloke et al., 2004). In this study this criticism is compounded by the relatively short sample size

of interviewees. It would have been beneficial to have had conducted more interviews, as this

would have allowed for a more in-depth understanding of people’s opinions on risk-based

regulation and how such opinions are reflected in practice. Yet, interviews are time consuming

with regards to preparation, transcription and analysis. The numbers of interviews were thus

restricted to what could be realised in the assigned time frame. Some shortcomings in the

methods and techniques employed can be identified.

Even though the snowballing technique overcame the obstacle of gaining access to potential

respondents, the technique involves a drawback. The aim of qualitative research methods is to

hear different accounts, meanings and perceptions so as to understand and find commonalities

in these differing ‘subjectivities’ (Mayoux, 2005). However, the snowball technique risks leading

to the recruitment of informants from a very narrow circle, due to people’s propensity to put the

researcher into contact with like-minded people (Cloke et al., 2004). It is possible that this has led

to a certain bias in responses. The researcher tried to mitigate this issue by using several initial

contact points (Valentine, 1997) and by trying to reach people without using the snowball

approach.


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A problem associated with the use of telephone interviews is that the interviewer cannot see the

interviewee. Hence body language, such as facial expressions or gestures which might have

provided additional information could not be used (Opdenakker, 2006). Next to losing non-

verbal data, the absence of visual cues can lead to difficulty in establishing a rapport or in

probing, and can lead to misinterpretation of responses (Novick, 2008). To some extent,

however, the voice and intonation of the interviewee can make up for the lack of visual cues and

can lessen the negative consequences arising from it.

All but one interview were conducted in German. Even though the researcher has a good

command of the German language, some terminology issues emerged. The issues were based on

difficulties of translation. The problem revolved around the distinction between ‘risk’ and

‘hazard’. ‘Hazard’ in German is often translated with Gefährdung. Yet, the risk assessment of

workplaces, which is a mandatory requirement in every EU member state, has been translated in

Germany into Gefährdungsbeurteilung. A literal translation of Gefährdungsbeurteilung into English

would be hazard assessment. This led to some confusion during the first interviews. Yet, after

having done more literature-based research and analysed the answers, it became clear how and

when the terms of ‘risk’ and ‘hazard’ are used in Germany’s occupational health and safety

regime and in following interviews this confusion could be overcome.


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CHAPTER 4 – Occupational Health and Safety in Germany

This chapter provides an overview of how the German occupational health and safety regime is

organised and structured. The OHS regime reflects a typical German administrative style,

including a complex mix of European legislation, federal legislation and enforcement activities

carried out by the Länder. The overview is followed by an account of how general areas of OHS

are regulated. Chapter 4 closes with an account of how hazardous substances and in particular

carcinogenic substances are regulated. The ‘Risk Concept’ (Risikokonzept) which is used to guide

decision-making on carcinogenic substances in Germany will be juxtaposed to the ‘Tolerability

of Risk’ framework (ToR) of the Health and Safety Executive in the UK so as to provide a

means of comparison and highlight major differences in risk-based regulation and thinking.

4.1. Organisation and Structure

4.4.1. EU Framework Directive

To date occupational health and safety is the only area of social policy where harmonisation of

law has occurred among member states of the European Union. With the adoption of the EU

Framework Directive 89/391/EEC many European countries, including Germany, experienced

a paradigm change with regards to health and safety (Larisch, 2009). The directive sought to

adopt a holistic approach in ensuring health and safety of workers at work. It contains principles

such as the prevention of risks, the protection of safety and health, the assessment of risks, the

elimination of risks or the training of workers (EU-OSHA, no date, a). Risk assessment is a vital

part of the EU’s ‘health and safety package’ and represents the cornerstone of the European

approach to improving health and safety at work. The 89/391 directive had to be transposed

into national law. Member states are free to introduce more stringent provisions to ensure

protection of their workers (EU-OSHA, no date, b). In Germany the directive has been

transposed into German legislation through the adoption of the German Occupational Health

and Safety Act (Arbeitsschutzgesetz, abbr. ArbSchG).

4.4.2. Occupational Health and Safety Act

The transpositions of the directive’s requirements led to a more comprehensive OHS legislation,

replacing many limited and diverse laws (Frick, 2004). Larisch refers to the Occupational Health

and Safety Act (Arbeitsschutzgesetz, abbr. ArbSchG) as the ‘constitution’ of German OHS

regulation (2009, p.36). Its objective consists in assuring and improving the protection of


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workers’ health and safety through targeted health and safety measures. With the transposition of

the EU directive, German OHS was extended to include small and very small businesses but also

public services. The Act sets out employers’ core duties, amongst which feature the execution

and documentation of risk assessments (Gefährdungsbeurteilung) (Larisch, 2009). The risk

assessment is intended to assist employers in their general duty of ensuring the safety and health

of workers and it should enable the employer to take necessary measures for guaranteeing the

safety and health of workers (EU-OSHA, no date, c). During the transposition of the EU

directive, special attention had to be given to both the principle of federalism and the dualism of

the OHS system.

4.4.3. Federalism

On national level (federal and Land level), health and safety legislation is decreed by the Bundestag

(the lower house of parliament) with the approval of the Bundesrat (the upper house of

parliament). Regulations on the other hand are enacted by the Bundesregierung (executive body) but

they also require approval of the Bundesrat before coming into effect. The Federal Ministry for

Labour and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, abbr. BMAS) prepares

bills and regulations usually in consultation with important stakeholders (Hotopp et al., 2008).

These stakeholders include the federal states represented by the Länderausschuss für Arbeitsschutz

und Sicherheitstechnik (LASI), the umbrella organisation for trade unions (DGB), the umbrella

association of the employers (BDA), the umbrella associations of the accident insurance

institutions (DGUV and LSV), and professional associations (Fachverbände). The inclusion of

all these stakeholders exhibits the consensual style of decision-making in the German health and

safety system, where every crucial decision involves the participation of all major stakeholders.

The Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs is assisted in its general duties by the Federal Institute

of Occupational Health and Safety (BAuA, 2005).

Even though administrative arrangements may vary among the Länder, they all have to ensure

that national laws and provisions are upheld, in other words they act as oversight bodies for local

enforcement. In to order live up to this responsibility, each Land has its own state inspectorate

(Gewerbeaufsichtsamt). The specific duties of the inspectorates include monitoring whether

employers are compliant with the law, providing consultative services to employers to support

them in the implementation of necessary health and safety measures and in some cases they have

to intervene and impose necessary measures to safeguard employers’ health and safety (BAuA,

2005).


21

The federal system results in a very fragmented OHS structure on the Länder level. To counter

this situation a ‘coordination strategy’ was implemented, the so-called Joint German

Occupational Safety and Health Strategy (Gemeinsame Deutsche Arbeitsschutzstrategie, abbr.

GDA). The GDA is a type of operation, supported by the statutory insurance institutions, the

Bund (federal state) and the Länder. The objective of the GDA consists in reaching a more

coordinated approach in enforcing common health and safety goals and in improving the

coordination and cooperation between the inspectorates of the Länder and the statutory

insurance companies (BAuA, 2012a).

4.4.4. Dualism

The German occupational health and safety system rests on an essential principal, namely

dualism. The dualism refers to the two pillars of the system: the statutory occupational accident

insurance and the state-run system described above. The statutory insurance for OHS (in

German Unfallversicherungsträger or Berufsgenossenschaften) consists of insurance providers

for industry, providers for agriculture and providers for the public sector (BAuA, 2005). All

firms and public sector organisations are required to be member of one of these

Berufsgenossenschaften. This is to assure that all employees are covered by insurance in the event of

an occupational accident or occupational disease. As such statutory insurance is part of the social

law (Sozialrecht) and it is regulated by the Social Code VII (Sozialesgesetzbuch VII). Due to its

functions statutory insurance is considered to form part of OHS legislation and is often referred

to as autonomous OHS legislation (autonomes Arbeitsschutzrecht). It has the authority to issue

accident prevention regulations which require the approval of the Federal Ministry in

consultation with the competent authorities of the Länder. Next to providing rehabilitation and

compensation, prevention efforts also form part of the responsibility of statutory insurance

organisations (Larisch, 2009). The Berufsgenossenschaften, in a similar way as the inspectorates of the

Länder, provide consultative services to the insured and monitor businesses for compliance (see

Figure 1).


22

Figure 1: Overview of the German OHS System (Seidel et al., 2007)

4.2. OHS in Practice

4.2.1. General Approach and Methods

The primary aim of the German OHS is the prevention of accidents and occupational diseases

and the commitment of prevention is enshrined in several laws and regulations (Seidel et al.,

2007). The Gefährdungsbeurteilung (risk assessment) represents an integral part in realising the

obligation of systematic prevention. The execution of the risk assessment is the responsibility of

the employer, as the employers holds the duty of proof, meaning that he has to demonstrate that

all necessary and required safety measures have been implemented (Wegrich, 2010). The risk

assessment includes seven steps among which figure: (1) assignment of tasks, (2) identification of

hazards, (3) evaluation of risks, (4) deciding on measures, (5) evaluating the effectiveness of

measures, (6) implementation of measures and (7) reviewing the assessment and updating it if

Federal Occupational Health and Safety Law

of the Federal Republic and of the 16 Länder

Law-making

Federal State and Länder:

Acts, regulations, approval of accident prevention regulation

Monitoring

compliance with federal prescriptions through state-run

inspectorates or state-run departments for OHS

Occupational Health and Safety System in the Federal

Republic of Germany

Autonomous OHS legislation

of statutory insurance institutions

Law-making

agreement of accident prevention regulation during representative meetings of representatives of

statutory insurance organisations

Monitoring

compliance with accident prevention regulation through technical

inspectorates

Cooperation and exchange

of information

EU regulation

and directives


23

necessary (Kirchberg et al., 2010). These steps are based on common-sense, and are more

qualitative than quantitative. Since employers often lack the expertise to effectively implement

the diverse range requirements, they are obliged under the Safety at Work Act

(Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz, abbr. ASiG) to appoint occupational doctors and specialised personnel

who consult and support them with regards to OHS requirements (ASiG, 1973).

As mentioned above, Germany has translated risk assessment into Gefährdungsbeurteilung, which in

its literal translation means hazard assessment. The choice of terminology is likely to have

implications for how the assessment is enacted. Focusing on hazards, means that one’s acts and

measures are guided by the potential of harm. Such an approach requires attention to every

potential hazard with the aim of eliminating, to the extent possible, the hazard source (and thus

the risk) (Kirchberg et al., 2010). However, if one focuses on risks, such as is the case for instance

in the UK, the scope of action becomes more targeted. Actions are then guided by the likelihood

of a harm occurring, where the primary aim is not the elimination of every potential harm but

where the aim has been redefined in terms of reducing risks to acceptable levels. Intervention is

based on a prioritisation of risks, attending first to the highest risks (Black & Baldwin, 2010).

Some risks might be so low that no action is required (Nordlander et al., 2010). In the UK the

scope of action is further concentrated by the ALARP principle (Rimington et al., 2003). Chapter

6 will analyse this issue in greater depth.

With regards to carcinogenic substances, Germany has developed the so-called ‘Risk Concept’

(Risikokonzept), which as the term indicates focuses on risks.

4.3. Special Case of Carcinogenic Substances: The Risk Concept

In 2007 the Committee on Hazardous Substances (Ausschuss für Gefahrstoffe or AGS)a

honorary committee which advices the BMAS and in which social partners, the Länder

authorities, insurance organisations and ‘science’ is representedapproved a new concept to

assess and manage risks arising from occupations with carcinogenic substances. Whereas no-

effect limits can be determined for most non-carcinogenic substances, this is often not possible

for carcinogens. The AGW (Arbeitsplatzgrenzwerte) are health-based limit values, which regulate

non-carcinogenic substances. If these limits are met no health risks are expected. It is difficult to

derive such limits for carcinogens, especially for genotoxic carcinogens (BAuA, 2012b). To deal

with this challenge a Risk Concept has been introduced to replace the old concept based on


24

technical guidance concentrations (technische Richt-Konzentrationen, abbr. TRKs), which were

abolished with the adoption of the new hazardous substances regulation in 2005

(Gefahrstoffverordnung, abbr. GefStoffV) (Wriedt, 2008). The TRKs were determined in

accordance with the best available technology or state of the art and only marginally reflected

health criteria (Renn, 2010). They provided no information about the extent of the residual risk

or about the probability of incurring cancer through exposure at the workplace, thus they lacked

in transparency (Kalberlah et al., 2005).

The new concept, which is still in a trial period, attempts to address these shortcomings by

developing a unifying approach to govern risks of carcinogenic substances and to justify residual

risks. It attempts to increase transparency and to become more comprehensive by determining

general risk-based limits applicable to all carcinogenic substances. Accordingly, it is risk-based

and relies on quantitative risk assessments (Wriedt, 2008). The model is divided into three risk

zones: high risk (red zone), medium risk (yellow zone) and low risk (green zone) (see Figure 2).

Red: Stop! The health risk is no longer tolerable-use no longer allowed or strict exposure minimisation required

Tolerability Threshold 4 x 10-3

Yellow: Caution! health risk is undesirable-need to engage in active risk management

increasing health risk

Acceptability Threshold 4 x 10-4 (10-5 as of 2018)

Green: Go! Health risk is acceptable-due diligence remains

Figure 2: The Risk Concept for Carcinogenic Substances (BAuA, 2012b)


25

Any activity or practice giving rise to risks falling in that area have to be abandoned unless

measures can be taken to reduce the risk so that it falls into the medium risk zone. The limit

between the high and medium risk areas is referred to as tolerability risk. This tolerability

threshold is set at a risk of 4:103, meaning that statistically 4 in 1000 workers risk contracting

cancer over their working life (BAuA, 2012b).

Risks in the medium area are considered unacceptable, yet they are tolerated under the condition

that they are continually reduced, with the aim of eventually reaching the green area (Renn,

2010). The limit between the yellow and the green risk zones is the acceptability risk and

represents a risk of 4:104, which is a transitional limit and will be reduced to 4:105 by 2018

(Wriedt, 2008; BAuA, 2012b). Risks in the low area are comparable to everyday exposure to

general environmental pollution outside the workplace. Risks in the green area do not have to be

reduced but minimisation is still encouraged (Wriedt, 2008). The whole concept is dynamic in

that it requires employers to follow the obligation of minimisation by continually reducing risks

throughout the concept. It is also a prioritising system which starts with reducing the

concentrations in the red zone, then the yellow and finally (but not mandatory) reducing

concentrations in the green zone. Next to the minimisation employers have to follow the rule for

substitution, which means that whenever possible a hazardous substance should be replaced by a

substance with a lower hazard potential. The AGS has established a catalogue of measures as

guidance for employers, which follows a graded approach, requiring more stringent interventions

for higher risks (Renn, 2010).

Is it acceptable to expect someone to work in an environment which causes a cancer risk of 1 in

1000, or 1 in a 10 000? Such a question requires more than a purely scientific reply. In

determining the acceptance and tolerance level the AGS sought to reach a socio-political

consensus by involving relevant stakeholders such as employers and employees representatives

(Renn, 2010). The tolerability risk level was derived by comparing statistics of deadly

occupational accidents, by calculating the mean risk for such accidents. For the lower risk limit,

general life risk was used as a benchmark (Wriedt, 2008). To ensure transparency regarding the

occupational risks, employers are expected to communicate the respective risks and the required

measures to their employees (Renn, 2010). It is important to note that the concept is based on

calculations of individual risk and not population risk.1 The rationale for this approach rests on

1 Individual risk v. population risk: A risk of 4:1000 means that the risk for an individual to contract cancer is 0.004%. However, if 1000 people are exposed to a substance with that level of risk, it means that 4 of them will contract cancer. Thus from an economic perspective the impact or harm will be greater if many people are in contact with such a carcinogenic substance, as if it was only a rarely used chemical (Kalberlah et al., 2005).


26

the objective that the determined risk levels ‘imposed’ on an individual worker should be

determined independently of whether a substance is used in many workplaces or only in a few

ones (Kalberlah et al., 2005). Unlike its British counterpart, the Risk Concept excludes economic

considerations.

4.4. Tolerability of Risk Framework

The approach outlined by the British Tolerability of Risk concept is very similar to the German

Risk Concept. However, some crucial differences exist which will be developed in the following.

Unlike the German concept, the ToR concept is not restricted to carcinogenic substances, but

informs the Health and Safety Executive’s decision-making process regarding all the diverse

work environments it overseas (Bandle, 2007).

The ALARP principle represents an essential part in the HSE’s ToR concept (see figure 3).

Usually HSE relies on good practice, which is considered to be the minimum acceptable position

Figure 3: HSE’s ToR Framework (HSE, 1988, p. 8)

Unacceptable Region

Risk cannot be justified save in extraordinary circumstances

The ALARP or Tolerability region (risk is undertaken only if a benefit is desired)

Tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvements gained Tolerable if cost of reduction would significantly exceed improvements gained

Broadly acceptable region (No need for detailed working to demonstrate ALARP)

necessary to maintain assurance that risk remains at this level

Negligible risk


27

(Rimington et al., 2003). The aim consists in continuously improving good practice, especially in

the general region of tolerability. However, in doing so each new risk reduction measure has to

be subjected to the ALARP principle (Bandle, 2007). The ALARP principle implicitly recognises

that even after all practicable and reasonable precautions have been taken, there is still a certain

level of residual risk (Rimington et al., 2003). Yet, according to the rationale of the ALARP

principle residual risks in the tolerable region (see Figure 3) are only tolerable if further risk

reduction would be impracticable or if it was grossly disproportionate in effort, time or cost

(Topping, 2001).

This rationale indicates that cost-benefit analyses form an important part of the ALARP

principle. When undertaking risk reduction measures, there should be an explicit valuation of the

benefit of reducing the risk (HSE, 2001). Duty-holders are required to adopt ‘practicable’ control

measures and can only refrain from risk reduction measures if they can demonstrate that the cost

of doing so would be grossly disproportionate to the benefit achieved. However, the higher the

risk, or the closer it moves to the intolerable area, and the greater the disproportionality between

costs and benefits, the lesser inclined the HSE would be to recognise it as being ‘grossly

disproportionate’ (Bandle, 2007). Quantitative risk estimates are carried out to inform CBA by

determining the likelihood and the impact of a potential adverse event. The inclusion of CBA

and the calculation of probabilities stand in stark contrast to the German approach where such

computations are not undertaken.

With regards to the regulation of hazardous substances, ALARP and the related QRA and CBA

are also applied. The occupational exposure standard (OES) is like the AGW and represents only

a negligible risk. The maximum exposure limit (MEL) is set for substances for which a no-effect

level cannot be derived. They cannot be exceeded and are located in the upper boundary of the

tolerable region. Furthermore, exposure should be reduced so far as is reasonably practicable

(Topping, 2001).

In the UK, risk limits were established in a similar way than in Germany, involving the

comparison of risks, consideration of societal concerns and the involvement of relevant

stakeholders. Yet both countries came up with different risk limits. The upper limit in the ToR

concept, namely the one between the tolerable and the unacceptable region, differentiates

between the general population and workers. An annual risk of death to members of the public

in excess of 1:104 is regarded as intolerable, whereas for workers an occupational risk of death

exceeding 1:1000 is considered intolerable (HSE, 2001). Where the German concept does not

differentiate between the general public and employees, the HSE justifies this distinction by the


28

fact that the public include especially vulnerable members, and that workers usually voluntarily

take up an employment which they are adequately trained and receive contribution for

(Rimington et al., 2003). The lower boundary, the limit between the broadly acceptable and the

tolerable region represents a risk of death of 1:106. This represents a higher limit than the current

4:104 risk limit in Germany. Another difference which needs pointing out is that the risk in the

German concept is expressed in terms of cancer risk and not as risk of death used in the British

concept. The reason for this difference and how it compares to the German concept are

elaborated in chapter 6.

Although some similarities can be perceived, they are crucial differences between the two

concepts. These differences exhibit the extent to which the two countries differ in their

application of risk-based principles. In the next chapter the findings of the interviews will shed

light on the different rationales underlying the approaches and will specifically focus on the

German case.


29

CHAPTER 5: Analysis

This chapter outlines the findings of the interviews, which are analysed by drawing on the

literature presented in chapter 2. Respondents’ quotes will be used as much as possible to ensure

that the analysis is closely tied to the collected data. As the interviews were conducted in German

the quotes were translated into English by the researcher. The interviews are coded according to

the participants’ job roles (see Appendix 2).

5.1. Risk-based Approach

To recapitulate, risk-based approaches to regulation include three core components: science-

based assessments, cost-benefit analyses and quantitative risk assessments or the calculation of

risk probabilities. In the following section, each element will be separately analysed.

5.1.1. Science-based Assessments

The results suggest that Germany carries out scientific assessments in several areas such as

ergonomics, noise and most notably to determine exposure limits for hazardous substances (ER;

SAI1; HFA). The determination of health-based occupational exposure limits (AGW) on a

scientific basis has already been undertaken a few decades ago (LI1; HRA). An employee of a

federal higher authority (HFA) claimed that once exposure-risk-relationships (Expositions-

Risiko-Beziehungen) were undertaken it became apparent that previous exposure levels,

determined by technical guidance concentrations, were unacceptable for some carcinogenic

substances and exposed workers to intolerable risks. The same respondent mentioned that for

the Risk Concept exposure-risk-relationships have been calculated for 40 years of work life and 8

hours/day and remarked “this is very conservative, because who is working 40 hours a week

with carcinogenic substances and this for 8 consecutive hours?” Another respondent (IC)

claimed that “[such an exposure] does obviously not reflect reality”. This precautionary

approach at the scientific stage is also reflected in risk quantifications.

5.1.2. Quantification of Risk

Concerning the quantification of risks, respondents’ replies exhibited a high degree of

consistency. A general scepticism was expressed, for example:

“[Quantifications] are problematic and this is why people reveal a fundamental scepticism

towards them.” (R1)


30

“In Germany we only use risk quantifications for carcinogenic substances. I can tell you,

numbers are very uncertain (…). They seem precise, but whether they really reflect reality is

being questioned.” (HRA)

The risk quantifications which are part of the Risk Concept are the exception (IC). Even with

regards to the Risk Concept there is a general tendency towards avoiding the use of the risk

limits, and instead one prefers to mention the different colours of the model. Some respondents

stressed that the values of 4 in 103 and 4 in 104 do not represent reality and that safety factors had

been included in the calculations. Hence these numbers do not mean that necessarily four people

will contract cancer over the span of their working life. Consequently as an employee of a

statutory insurance (SAI1) stated “we do not wish to unsettle people with these numbers”.

A UK health and safety official (UKHS2) on the other hand explained that risk quantifications

form an essential but not exclusive part of the decision-making process regarding OHS

measures. The respondent conceded that other factors such as societal concern are also included,

turning the approach into a semi-qualitative one. An official of a Land inspectorate (LI1)

thought that the general approach to occupational risks in Germany was qualitative rather than

quantitative. This difference between the German and UK approach is reminiscent of the

distinction between quantificationists and qualificationists drawn by Hood and Jones (1996),

where Germany could be considered as more qualificationist and the UK as more

quantificationist.

A respondent from a federal committee (FC) said that because there are no thresholds for

carcinogenic substances, the OHS system is somewhat forced to adopt a risk-based approach.

Yet, he argued that such quantifications are not part of the German culture. An employer’s

representative (ER) argued in a similar vein and emphasised that trade-offs, such as represented

by risk quantifications of the Risk Concept “are contrary to our philosophy of our occupational

health and safety”. The averseness towards accepting trade-offs is also a major reason for

Germany’s OHS system to not engage into cost-benefit analyses.

5.1.3. Cost-Benefit Analysis

All respondents unanimously rejected the application of cost-benefit analyses. One respondent

said that CBA is a taboo in Germany (SAI1). Another respondent (FA1) exclaimed “I dread

CBA. You just can’t balance health against costs or any kind of benefit. This is related to the

passage of the Constitution which states that human dignity is inviolable, everyone has the right


31

to physical integrity. You can’t buy this physical integrity of someone regardless of the benefit”.

Many other interviewees referred to these lines in the German Constitution, for example:2

“The dignity of a person has to be protected. Yet, this is not guaranteed anymore if you follow a

CBA.” (EmR)

“The human dignity and integrity are anchored in our constitution. If harm occurs, this will

inevitably lead to costs. But what costs are we talking about? What benefit are we talking about?

We talk about constitutionally protected values and the question which arises under a CBA

perspective would be ‘who is more entitled to this constitutional protection?’“ (RI)

Linked to sections of the Constitution, claims were made which echoed an egalitarian notion. A

government official (GO) claimed with regards to the Risk Concept “CBA does not play any role

at all. We focus on the individual risk an employee is exposed to, and we do not differentiate

whether five or 50,000 employees work with a substance, but all substances are treated equally.”

One employees representative (EmR), comparing Germany to the UK, claimed that unlike

Germany the UK undertakes CBA, which is criticised by Germany, as it focuses on the collective

and not the individual risk. According to Renn (1991) egalitarians are very concerned about

equity and therefore refuse to undertake cost-benefit analyses, since such an aggregate approach

would not properly take into consideration the individual. Respondents’ rejection of CBA

corresponds to this egalitarian stance: they reject CBA because it entails trade-offs, which do not

sufficiently take into account the individual and which can lead to unequal outcomes.

Cost-benefit analysis is often claimed to be useful for the efficient allocation of resources

(Graham, 2008; Hood & Jones, 1996). A UK health and safety expert (UKHS2) claimed that

without calculating probabilities and applying CBA there is potential for a misallocation of

resources. The UK with its use of CBA and QRA would belong to what Renn (1991) calls the

‘entrepreneurs’, who focus technical methods to regulate risks. Nevertheless, OHS in Germany is

not devoid of any economic considerations. One industry representative (IR) said that if no

economic considerations were taken into account at all, one might as well try and set all

occupational limits to zero exposure. Yet, economic viability and technical feasibility form part

of decision-making processes, but this happens in a more informal, indirect way (LI1). Through

the consensual style of policy-making, industry participates in the decision-making processes, and

hence points attention to cost issues and technical feasibility. One respondent (EmR) explained

2 “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” (Basic Law, 1949, Art.1(1)). “Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity.(…)” (Basic Law, Art.2(2))


32

this situation by saying that during the discussions about the Risk Concept, industry wanted

lower risk limits and employees wanted higher ones. They then agreed on a compromise and

applied a temporary acceptability limit of 4 in 104, to be reduced to 105 by 2018.

Some respondents, mostly occupational health and safety officials (LO; LI1; FC) emphasised the

advantage of undertaking OHS measures. They said that employers are likely to reap economic

benefits and drive forward technical innovation if they invest in OHS. One respondent (FC)

mentioned that the statutory insurance bodies have developed a model which demonstrates that

if a company invests one Euro into OHS it is likely to receive 1.3 Euros in return.

The above findings indicate that, besides scientific assessments, Germany seems to be reluctant

to adopt CBA and QRA in its decision-making process on OHS. Even though the Risk Concept

is based on QRA and scientific assessments, it represents only an isolated case and was more a

measure of last resort for regulating substances for which no safety threshold can be established.

As the rigorous rejection of CBA and QRA imply, Germany does not accept trade-offs and

strives for a high level of safety. The next section explores how the existence of risks is,

nevertheless, justified and rationalised.

5.2. Risk Acceptance

Gathering from the respondents’ replies it appears that Germany’s OHS regime exhibits a very

low risk acceptance and willingness to engage in trade-offs, instead it strives for a high level of

safety. This is exemplified by a number of conditions. First, some respondents (OHE; SAI1;

EMR) mentioned that it is not uncommon for Germany to resort to ‘gold-plating’ with regards

to EU directives. This means that Germany often adopts more stringent measures in the context

of OHS than required by the EU. The rationale for this was simply that they felt that either EU

directives were not precise enough or that the occupational exposure limits were too low. Even

though respondents conceded that zero risk is essentially unattainable, one respondent (OHE)

pointed out that “the Germans tend to want zero risk, but that is not possible.” A researcher

(R2) confirmed this and said that Germany focuses on the absolute potential of harm. He

continued by saying that “in Germany we still tend to follow a zero-risk philosophy. The best is

to have no risk, whatever the costs”. Yet, this leads to a situation where residual risks have to be

justified or minimised if possible. If risks cannot be sufficiently minimised one has to resort to

the TOP-principle. According to this principle risks have to be reduced first by applying


33

technical measures, if these are insufficient organisational measures have to be taken and at the

very last come personal safety measures (SAI2).

With regards to the Risk Concept, which stands a bit in contradiction with the reluctance to

engage in risk trade-offs, the existence of residual risks, especially the ones in the yellow zone,

are justified by the obligation for minimisation (SAI1). One employee of a federal agency (FA1)

engaged in the elaboration of the concept claimed that the risks in the yellow zone can be

tolerated, because they do not represent a permanent condition, and at some point all exposures

have to be minimised to the level of acceptable risk.

A difference to the British ToR framework is that the German Risk Concept states the risk in

cancer rates and not in death rates. Two respondents gave very similar replies when asked why

cancer rates were expressed:

“OHS is primarily about prevention, i.e. it is about the prevention of diseases, that is the

argument for choosing cancer cases and not death cases.” (EmR)

“We want to prevent cancer cases. The benchmark is health and not life. Health should be

preserved, that means cancer cases have to be prevented and we do not want to tolerate that

someone falls ill with cancer...We don’t want to regulate survival, we want to regulate health.”

(FA1)

Their replies stress the aim of ensuring high levels of safety and the reluctance to accept any

risks. An interviewee from a higher federal authority (HFA) mentioned that at the beginning the

risk model was called ‘Risk Acceptance Concept’, because experts involved in its development

could not agree on an acceptability threshold. The interviewee said that in the end they wanted

to do away with the initial name because “the core of our model is not to accept risks but to

minimise them”. This anecdote shows that there is a clear refusal to accept any risks. A federal

agency official brought the issue to the point by saying “to use risk numbers does not mean that

one tolerates risks.”

The findings were poignant because a high level of consistency was revealed in the answers.

They show that Germany’s occupational health and safety regime rejects CBA and QRA and is

unwilling to accept any kind of risk. The question which arises is, to what extent then is

Germany risk-based? Another question which imposes itself is what are the factors which

influence and shape the views on risk-based approaches within the OHS regime? Respondents’


34

frequent reference to the German constitution provides a glimpse as to which shaping factors

are at work.

CHAPTER 6: Discussion

6.1. To What Extent is Germany Risk-based?

6.1.1. Hazard-based v. Risk-based Regulation

The findings reveal that there is a general disinclination in the German occupational health and

safety regime to undertake cost-benefit analyses and calculate risk probabilities. However, as

outlined in chapter 2, risk-based approaches start with assessing hazards to then determine the

likelihood of adverse events and their impact by applying probability calculations and CBA

(Nordlander et al., 2010; Hutter, 2005; Renn 1998). Germany quantifies risks only with regards to

the Risk Concept, but with a perceived reluctance and more as the result of a measure of last

resort. Without resorting to CBA and QRA the approach in Germany then mostly focuses on

hazards. The EU Directive requires that risk assessments are carried out in workplaces. Yet,

Germany translated risk assessment into Gefährdungsbeurteilung, which necessarily puts the

emphasis on Gefährdungen or hazards. Even though risk evaluations form part of the

Gefährdungsbeurteilung, according to a respondent (R1), they play only a subordinated role.

Due to the translation some inconsistency has been observed among the replies of the

participants, who confused hazard-based with risk-based. When asked whether they thought that

the OHS regulation was risk-based, many of them thought it was and mentioned that the

evaluation of risks was an important part of the Gefährdungsbeurteilung. Yet, when they explained

what the situation looked like in practice, it appeared to be more hazard-based. A respondent

from a statutory accident insurance organisation (SAI1) said that a Gefährdungsbeurteilung has to

look at all possible hazards, “essentially you have to tick [every hazard] off”. Another respondent

(GO) said that “you look at every possible activity and the risk evaluation which one has to do

for every activity only determines whether strict or less strict measures have to be taken.” The

respondent continued by saying that the risk evaluation is not used to prioritise certain activities,

because one cannot ignore less risky activities. Prioritising risks so as to determine the allocation

of resources is another crucial part of risk-based regulation (Klinke & Renn, 2002; Black &

Baldwin, 2010). The fact that Germany does not prioritise activities is another indication for its

focus on hazard-based approaches. As mentioned above (4.2.1.), focusing on hazards leads to a

more holistic, all-encompassing approach. The two previous quotes confirm this comprehensive

approach.


35

It appears as if risk has not been able to establish itself as a regulatory principle in the German

occupational health and safety regime. A researcher (R1) claimed that traditionally risk

assessments did not play a role in Germany and that the emphasis was on hazards. He felt that

even to this day a risk orientation had still not gained any ground. This is in line with Hutter’s

(2005) observation, that the language of risk is rarely used by German agencies. Yet, the

researcher (R1) thought that through the adoption of the EU Directive, risk has become a bit

more present within OHS awareness.

To what extent does the EU impact Germany’s uptake of risk-based approaches? As Germany

has to transpose EU directives into national law, it is necessarily influenced by the stance the EU

adopts towards OHS. However, it is questionable whether the EU approach towards OHS will

influence Germany to become more risk-based. One respondent (FA2) claimed that with regards

to risk regulation “the EU does not represent a united front.” Another interviewee felt that

sometimes the EU is more risk-based and that sometimes it is more hazard-based. Nordlander et

al. (2010) observed that with regards to the regulation of chemicals, the EU regulates some areas

according to a hazard-based approach, while other areas such as medicinal products are regulated

following a risk-based basis. Vogel (2001) also claimed that the EU did not adopt a uniform

approach with regards to risk regulation. He felt that the precautionary principle strongly shaped

risk policies in Europe, but that paradoxically the principle coexisted with the execution of risk

assessments.

The precautionary principle, which allows policy-makers to take discretionary decisions in the

absence of scientific certainty in order to prevent harm, emerged from the German

Vorsorgeprinzip (precautionary principle) (Graham & Hsia, 2002). As the principle in the absence

of scientific certainty, it is considered to be hazard-based (Löfstedt, 2011b). Even though the

Vorsorgeprinzip originated as a principle of environmental law, it now permeates many fields of

social regulation (Rothstein et al., 2011). As such, the German OHS is also influenced by

precautionary thinking. A respondent from a federal authority with expertise in environmental

risks (FA1) said that the precautionary aspect is less pronounced in the German OHS, but that

the conservative risk limits of the Risk Concept include an element of precaution. Another

interviewee (GO), referring to the Gefährdungsbeurteilung, argued that prevention represented a

maxim. This maxim is also present in the duty of prevention of statutory insurance organisations,

which involves the use of all possible means to prevent occupational accidents and diseases

(Larisch, 2009). Even though the precautionary principle does not play an explicit role within

the OHS regime, one can still detect a precautionary approach in OHS decision-making.


36

Risk-based thinking seems to only play a subordinate role in German OHS, which predominately

concentrates on hazards. The approach adopted by Germany’s OHS regime appears more

qualitative than quantitative. A quantitative approach would imply making trade-offs between

risks and benefits and between different types of risks; yet this is unacceptable in Germany. A

few tentative explanations were provided to explain the focus on hazards. Yet, what are the

factors which render it so difficult for risk-based approaches to gain ground in Germany’s OHS

system? Why is there an aversion towards engaging in trade-offs? The next section attempts to

answer these questions by focusing on how institutional variables shape the uptake of risk-based

approaches in Germany.

6.2. Institutional Factors

6.2.1. Outcome-based v. Process-based

As already explored in the findings section, Germany’s OHS regime presents traits of

egalitarianism and it is rather qualificationist than quantitative. One characteristic of egalitarians

is that they want to ensure a high level of safety, even at the expense of economic efficiency.

Moreover, egalitarians attempt to adopt a holistic when solving problems and strongly rely on

cooperation and equity (Renn, 1991; Renn, 1998). These characteristics are found in the German

OHS, where the Gefährdungsbeurteilung adopts an all-encompassing approach and where decision-

making is consensus-based. Entrepreneurs on the other hand are more likely to put up with risks

from activities if these activities enable them to secure certain benefits. To address problems they

prefer to use technical methods and use cost-benefit rationalisations to guide decision-making

(Renn, 1991). They emphasise the collective and attempt to maximise outcomes. Unlike the

egalitarians, who are more focused on processes, entrepreneurs are more outcome-driven. With

its emphasis on risk-based approaches and the technical methods they entail, the UK would

belong in the camp of the entrepreneurs.

Another distinction than the one adopted by cultural theorists is proposed here, namely the

distinction between deontologists and utilitarians, whereby Germany would be defined as

deontological and the UK utilitarian. This distinction is chosen as it is more in line with the

collected data and because it better reflects the normative aspects which shape the application of

risk-based approaches in both countries. Utilitarianism holds that an act is morally right if and

only if it maximises the overall ‘good’. It is said to be a form of consequentialism, which

maintains that an act is morally right if it produces a good outcome. Utilitarianism is thus

outcome-based (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011). Deontological ethics on the other hand derive the

rightness or wrongness of an act more by the way that act has been performed, rather than by its


37

outcome. What makes an act right for deontologists is its conformity with a moral norm.

Deontological ethics is sometimes also described as duty-based ethics and is process-based

(Alexander, 2008). Unlike the utilitarian (or consequentialist) perspective, which focuses on the

collective, a deontological approach perceives the individual as an end in him or herself

(Gutmann, 2010).

Where can the deontological or process-based approach be detected in Germany’s OHS regime?

And how does it influence risk-based approaches? The frequent mention of provisions from the

constitution shows that constitutional norms in Germany are not just “a general framework

establishing a minimum consensus about certain principles” but they are “a political programme

containing particular substantive goals” (Dyson, 1980, p. 213). According to Gutmann (2010) the

dignity principle laid out by the first article (see footnote 2) has a structural function as it shapes

Germany’s legal system and discourse, but it also radically prohibits the quantification of rights

or a utilitarianism of rights since everyone should be guaranteed the right to dignity.3 This anti-

utilitarian position explains why quantification of risks and the CBA are unacceptable in

Germany. A respondent (EmR) expressed this anti-utilitarian approach by asking, “Does

utilitarianism focus on the right of individual integrity? I fear it doesn’t.” QRA and CBA are

outcome-based and focus on collectives, they are rejected by the dignity principle on the grounds

that they would lead to an objectification and sacrifice of some individuals. Additionally, the

constitution also focuses on the right to physical integrity, which has been mentioned by some

respondents (5.1.3.). From these constitutional rights derives the normative concept of duty of

protection (Schutzpflicht) (Huber, 2009). This protection duty of the state applies to individual

rights and not to the aggregate rights of a collective (Gutmann, 2010).

The duty of protection is visible in Germany’s high level of safety and in its focus on hazards,

which leads to an all-inclusive consideration of potential harms. If the individual’s integrity and

dignity is the benchmark for all action, then high safety standards in Germany’s OHS are a

necessary consequence. An interviewee’s (FA1) quote illustrates this focus on the individual “in

our basic law it states that everyone has the right to physical integrity. Consequently, if only one

person is affected you have to take measures”.

3 The deontological approach and its anti-utilitarian stance is exemplified by a legal decision taken by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2006 concerning the authorisation to bring down planes which have been seized by terrorists. The court revoked this authorisation, ruling that it was inconceivable to have a law which would allow the firing of a plane carrying innocent passengers. It argued that killing innocent people to save others, would violate the dignity principle and would strip passengers of their rights and would objectify them (Gutmann, 2010).


38

Due to the absence of a written constitution, the UK’s normative foundations are more flexible,

yet also more difficult to identify. The UK is often referred to as the regulatory state (Moran,

2001) which is to be understood as an interventionist state, or nanny state, which sets and

enforces rules of behaviour. It stands in contrast with other forms of state intervention, such as

public ownership, taxes and subsidies (Hood & Scott, 2000). Influenced by the neoliberal agenda

of the Thatcher years (Peck, 2001) and by the emergence of the New Public

Managementwhich applies business management strategies to the public sector to increase

cost-efficiencyBritain has moved from a “rules-based process driven tradition to a results-

based approach” (Hood and Scott, 2000, p. 15). Tightly linked to the New Public Management is

a shift towards greater accountability, which is reflected in what Power (1997) calls “audit

explosion”, namely the attempt by bureaucracies to record everything so as to legitimate their

actions.

The orientation towards economic efficiency is essentially outcome-based and shows that the

UK has traits of utilitarianism. This outcome-based orientation is present in the regulation of

occupational health and safety where, ALARP, QRA and CBA aim at maximising benefits for

society and of avoiding undue burdens with adverse economic consequences (HSE, 2001).

Another example of the outcome-based focus is apparent in the different tolerability thresholds

which have been set for workers and the general public. A British health and safety expert

(UKHS1) argued that this difference was justified by the compensation workers received for

taking the risk and by the fact that workers were aware of the risks. Such an outcome-based

argument would probably not be accepted in Germany, since it would entail a risk trade-off

which would ignore the equality of rights as set out by the constitution.

Looking at the different normative foundation in Germany and the UK and at their different

approaches towards risk, it becomes apparent that there is no universal uptake of risk-based

ideas. Indeed, the process-based approach in Germany and the focus on individual integrity and

dignity are difficult to reconcile with risk-based approaches. Moreover, the above account

illustrates how institutions shape the behaviour of their members. According to March and

Olsen (1984) people’s behaviour is shaped by the ‘logic of appropriateness’. The ‘logic of

appropriateness’ states that the values of an institution define what a person considers to be an

appropriate action for a certain situation. Behaviour of individuals thus conforms to the norms

of the institutions and their actions are aimed towards fulfilling the duties imposed by the

institutions (March & Olsen, 1984; Peters, 2005). With regards to Germany and the UK, risk

ideas are then shaped and influenced by institutional contexts. However, other institutional


39

variables are also said to shape the uptake of risk-based ideas in Germany. They will be briefly

explored in the following part.

6.2.2. Other Shaping Factors and Shortcomings

Krieger (2012) and Rothstein et al. (2011) mention other institutional variables as shaping factors

of risk-based approaches in Germany. As such they focus on procedural aspects of Germany’s

style of public administration. They argue that Germany’s legal foundations are characterised by

rigidity. According to them, German public administration is ‘juridified’, which fits uneasily with

risk-based approaches and their inherent uncertainties. Yet, no evidence was found in the

collected data of this study. Instead interviewees (LO; GO) mentioned that approaches including

risk considerations, such as the Risk Concept, are not formally codified, but are included in legal

ordinances or regulations (Verordnungen), which are developed by the executive. Usually, such

regulations are more flexible; they do not have to go through the parliamentary route and can be

passed faster than formal laws (Ossenbühl, 2007). Even though risk ideas may fit uneasily with

the rigid administrative law of Germany, regulations enacted by the executive can circumvent

this rigidity.

Furthermore, Krieger (2012) and Rothstein et al. (2011) focus on structural characteristics in

Germany. Rothstein et al. (2011) claim that Germany’s fragmented and multi-level nature of

policy-making complicates risk-based decision-making; different views on how to apply risk-

based approaches and contradictory interests tend to clash. The interview data, on the other

hand, did not provide evidence for this claim. It demonstrated great consistency among

respondents’ replies, suggesting overall consent rather than disagreement concerning OHS

management. Moreover, the consensual style of decision-making helps to overcome

contradictory interests or at least it helps to reach compromises. Krieger (2012) mentions that

due to the fragmented nature of Germany’s polity, risk-based approaches are not needed as a

defensive strategy to deflect blame. He argues that in this complex web, responsibilities are

shared and accountability becomes fuzzy. The potential for public scrutiny and for blame

attribution to specific state actors is reduced. Even though this study lacks sufficient data to

properly assess Krieger’s claim, his account is likely to apply to Germany’s OHS regime. Risk-

based approaches as blame deflectors appear to be of little importance in the OHS regime, not

only because it is very fragmented but also because employers are the first ones to be held

responsible in the case of an accident.


40

Nevertheless, there is a need to explore the structural and procedural arguments in more depth

with regards to Germany’s OHS regime. Moreover, this study only focused on one regime,

namely occupational health and safety. Yet, the approach taken by Germany’s OHS system is not

necessarily adopted by other regimes, such as food safety or environmental protection.

According to Hood et al. (2001) differences in risk-based approaches can vary from one domain

to the other. Hence different regimes in Germany might follow a different approach towards

risk, which represents an avenue for further research.


41

CHAPTER 7: Conclusion

This study set out to analyse whether arguments about the universality of risk and risk-based

regulation hold. Focusing on Germany’s occupational health and safety regime it demonstrates

that risk in governance does not follow a universal pattern, but that risk ideas are used and

conceptualised in different ways due to certain institutional influences.

Whereas risk-based regulation has asserted itself in the UK, pervading almost every regulatory

domain (Black & Baldwin, 2010), Germany is not marked by such an all-encompassing

endorsement of risk-based regulation. Germany’s normative foundation, which is strongly

anchored in the principles enshrined in its constitution, strongly influences the uptake of risk-

based arguments. The focus on individual dignity and physical integrity as well as the duty of

protection conflict with conceptualisations of risk which contain uncertainties and probable

damage. Whereas the UK’s utilitarian features facilitate or even demand the adoption of risk-

based regulation, Germany’s essentially process-based focus is incompatible with outcome-based

risk tools such as CBA and QRA. Even though scientific assessments are undertaken, for

example to determine occupational exposure limits, cost-benefit analysis and probability

calculations are uncommon if not unacceptable. The trade-offs they include would violate the

principles of the constitution. Nevertheless, trade-offs are done, albeit in a more indirect fashion.

In the consensual tradition of decision-making trade-offs are reflected in adopted compromises,

yet they are not as explicit as in strictly risk-based approaches.

The Risk Concept relies on a partial conceptualisation of risk, namely on scientific assessments

and risk quantifications. Yet, this concept represents an exception and was adopted as there were

no better alternatives to managing risks from exposure to carcinogenic substances and the aim of

the concept is to eventually lead to acceptable exposure levels for all substances, thus ensuring

that the state complies with its duty of protection.

Finally, the assumed proliferation of universal risk ideas and approaches seems to be influenced

if not restricted by impervious institutional obstacles, which rely on their normative foundations

as benchmarks for governing risks. Yet, regardless of whether a risk-based approach is adopted

or not, every country aims at reaching acceptable levels of safety.


42

APPENDIX 1: Forms


43

Geography Research Screening Form


44

Ethical Approval Notification

From: [email protected]

Sent: 30 May 2012 16:24

To: Haunert, Sarah

Cc: Rothstein, Henry

Dear Sarah Haunert,

KCL/11-12_1107 MSc Risk Analysis

I am pleased to inform you that full approval for your project has been granted by the GGS

Research Ethics Panel. Any specific conditions of approval are laid out at the end of this email

which should be followed in addition to the standard terms and conditions of approval:

- Ethical approval is granted for a period of one year from the date of this email. You will not

receive a reminder that your approval is about to lapse so it is your responsibility to apply for an

extension prior to the project lapsing if you need one (see below for instructions).

- You should report any untoward events or unforeseen ethical problems arising from the

project to the panel Chairman within a week of the occurrence. Information about the panel may

be accessed at: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/ethics/applicants/sshl/panels/.

- If you wish to change your project or request an extension of approval you will need to

submit a new application with an attachment indicating the changes you want to make (a

proforma document to help you with this is available at:

http://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/ethics/applicants/modifications.html).

- All research should be conducted in accordance with the King's College London Guidelines

on Good Practice in Academic Research available at:

http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/index.php?id=247&searched=good+practice&advsea

rch=allwords&highlight=ajaxSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_highlight1+ajaxSearch_highlight2

If you require signed confirmation of your approval please forward this email to [email protected]

https://db3prd0310.outlook.com/owa/redir.aspx?C=nWeBE0SeLkSaasq5RIipsmIXhSRWWs8IX4pf2qheLNK0q5c86ZRx1YnaXvuF40YvQoMNP73c4YA.&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.kcl.ac.uk%2fresearch%2fethics%2fapplicants%2fsshl%2fpanels%2f

https://db3prd0310.outlook.com/owa/redir.aspx?C=nWeBE0SeLkSaasq5RIipsmIXhSRWWs8IX4pf2qheLNK0q5c86ZRx1YnaXvuF40YvQoMNP73c4YA.&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.kcl.ac.uk%2fresearch%2fethics%2fapplicants%2fmodifications.html

https://db3prd0310.outlook.com/owa/redir.aspx?C=nWeBE0SeLkSaasq5RIipsmIXhSRWWs8IX4pf2qheLNK0q5c86ZRx1YnaXvuF40YvQoMNP73c4YA.&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.kcl.ac.uk%2fcollege%2fpolicyzone%2findex.php%3fid%3d247%26searched%3dgood%2bpractice%26advsearch%3dallwords%26highlight%3dajaxSearch_highlight%2bajaxSearch_highlight1%2bajaxSearch_highlight2

https://db3prd0310.outlook.com/owa/redir.aspx?C=nWeBE0SeLkSaasq5RIipsmIXhSRWWs8IX4pf2qheLNK0q5c86ZRx1YnaXvuF40YvQoMNP73c4YA.&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.kcl.ac.uk%2fcollege%2fpolicyzone%2findex.php%3fid%3d247%26searched%3dgood%2bpractice%26advsearch%3dallwords%26highlight%3dajaxSearch_highlight%2bajaxSearch_highlight1%2bajaxSearch_highlight2


45

indicating why it is required and the address you would like it to be sent to.

Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to

time to ascertain the status of your research.

We wish you every success with this work.

With best wishes

Yours Sincerely,

GGS Reviewer

Conditions of approval (if blank there are no specific conditions):


46

Geography Risk Assessment Form


47

APPENDIX 2: Codes for Interview Participants

Interview Number Interviewee Job Role Code

1 Employee of Higher Federal Authority HFA

2 Researcher of Non-governmental Research

Institute R1

3 Employee of Statutory Accident Insurance

Organisation SAI1

4 Employee of Land Inspectorate LI1

5 Employee of Federal Agency FA1

6 Occupational Hygiene Expert OHE

7 Employer’s Representative ER

8 Employees Representative EmR

9 Employee of Federal Agency FA2

10 Regional Inspectorate RI

11 Government Official GO

12 Member of Federal Committee FC

13 Researcher of Research Association R2

14 Land Official LO

15 Independent Consultant IC

16 UK Health and Safety Expert UKHS1

17 UK Health and Safety Expert UKHS2

18 Industry Representative IR

19 Employee of Statutory Accident Insurance

Organisation SAI2


48

APPENDIX 3: Glossary

Arbeitsplatzgrenzwerte (AGW) Occupational Exposure Limits

Arbeitsschutzgesetz (ArbSchG) Occupational Health and Safety Act

Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz (ASiG) Safety at Work Act

Ausschuss für Gefahrstoffe (AGS) Committee on Hazardous Substances

Berufsgenossenschaften or Unfallversicherungsträger

Statutory Accident Insurance Organisations

Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (BMAS)

Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs

Bundesrat The upper house of parliament

Bundestag The lower house of parliament

Expositions-Risiko-Beziehungen Exposure-risk-relationships

Gefährdung Hazard

Gefährdungsbeurteilung Risk assessment (according to EU Directive); hazard assessment (literal translation)

Gefahrstoffverordnung (GeStoffV) Hazardous Substances Regulation

Gemeinsame Deutsche Arbeitsschutzstrategie (GDA)

Joint German Occupational Safety and Health Strategy

Land (singular); Länder (plural) The federal states in Germany

Länderausschuss für Arbeitsschutz und Sicherheitstechnik (LASI)

Commission for occupational safety and safety engineering of the federal states

Risikokonzept Risk Concept

Technische Richtkonzentrationen (TRK)

Technical guidance concentrations

Verordnungen Regulations or ordinances


49

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