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BOOK IV

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

TITLE I — OBLIGATIONS

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to

give, to do or not to do.1

Concept of Obligations. — Evidently, the above definition of

an obligation is adopted from Sanchez Roman’s classic definition of

an obligation as “the juridical necessity to comply with a prestation.”2

Manresa, on the other hand, defines it as a “legal relation established

between one person and another, whereby the latter is bound to the

fulfillment of a prestation which the former may demand of him.’’3

It must be observed, however, that obligations may be either

civil or natural.4 A civil obligation is one which has a binding force inlaw, and which gives to the obligee or creditor the right of enforcing it

against the obligor or debtor in a court of justice. This is the obligation

which is defined in Art. 1156 of the Code. A natural obligation, on

the other hand, is one which cannot be enforced by action, but which

is binding on the party who makes it in conscience and according to

1New provision.24 Sanchez Roman 53.38 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 21.4 Art. 1423, Civil Code.


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the natural law.5 Thus, when an action has prescribed in accordance

with the statute of limitations, a natural obligation still subsists,

although the civil obligation is extinguished. This may be illustratedby the following example: If A has a right of action, evidenced by

a promissory note, to collect one thousand pesos from B, and such

promissory note prescribes after the expiration of ten years from

the time it accrues,6 although the latter is no longer bound to pay

the obligation in accordance with the statute of limitations, he is

still bound to pay in accordance with equity and natural law.7 It is,

therefore, clear that a civil obligation and a natural obligation may

be distinguished from each other as follows:

(1) A civil obligation is based on positive law, while a natural

obligation is based on equity and natural law; and

(2) The former is enforceable in courts of justice, while the

latter is not.8

Requisites of Obligations. — An obligation has four essential

requisites. They are:

(1) A juridical or legal tie, which binds the parties to the

obligation, and which may arise from either bilateral or unilateralacts of persons;

(2) An active subject known as the obligee or creditor, who

can demand the fulfillment of the obligation;

(3) A passive subject known as the obligor or debtor, against

whom the obligation is juridically demandable; and

(4) The fact, prestation or service which constitutes the object

of the obligation.9

The form in which the obligation is manifested is sometimes

added as a fifth requisite. As a general rule, however, it cannot be

considered as essential. Obligations arising from law, quasi-con-

tracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts do not

require any form whatsoever, yet there can be no question regard-

53 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 2394-2395.6 Art. 1144, Civil Code.7 Agoncillo vs. Javier, 38 Phil. 424; Villaroel vs. Estrada, 71 Phil. 40.8 Art. 1423, Civil Code.9Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Vol. 1, p. 13; 3 Castan, 7th Ed., p. 20.

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ing their validity or binding force. It is only in obligations arising

from certain contracts that it becomes essential. Thus, in a con-

tract involving a donation of personal property whose value exceedsP5,000.00, the law requires that the donation and the acceptance

shall be made in writing;10 in a contract of sale of a piece of land or

any interest therein through an agent, the law requires that the

authority of the latter shall be in writing;11 in a contract of simple

loan or mutuum, the law requires that any agreement with respect

to interest shall be expressly stipulated in writing;12 in a contract of

antichresis, the law requires that the amount of the principal and

of the interest shall be specified in writing;13 in a contract involving

a donation of immovable property, the law requires that the dona-tion shall be made in a public document, while the acceptance shall

be made either in the same deed of donation or in a separate public

document;14 in a contract of partnership where immovable property

or real rights are contributed to the common fund, the law requires

that the contract shall be in a public instrument to which an inven-

tory of the property or real rights, signed by the partners, must be

attached;15 in a contract of chattel mortgage, the law requires that

the personal property which is the subject matter of the contract

shall be recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register as a securityfor the performance of an obligation;16 and in a contract involving

the sale or transfer of large cattle, the law requires that the sale or

transfer shall be registered.17 Non-compliance with such formalities

would have the effect of rendering the contract or agreement void or

inexistent.

Classification of Obligations. — The following is the primary

classification of obligations under the Civil Code:

(1) Pure and conditional (Arts. 1179-1192).

(2) With a period (Arts. 1193-1198).

(3) Alternative and facultative (Arts. 1199-1206).

10 Art. 748, Civil Code.11 Art. 1874, Civil Code.12 Art. 1956, Civil Code.13 Art. 2134, Civil Code.14 Art. 749, Civil Code.15 Arts. 1771, 1773, Civil Code.16 Art. 2140, Civil Code.17Sec. 22, Act No. 1147; Art. 1581, Civil Code.

GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1156


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(4) Joint and solidary (Arts. 1207-1222).

(5) Divisible and indivisible (Arts. 1223-1225).(6) With a penal clause (Arts. 1226-1230).

There are, however, other classifications of a secondary char-

acter which can be gathered from scattered provisions of the Civil

Code, such as:

(1) Legal, conventional and penal;18

(2) Real and personal;19

(3) Determinate and generic;20

(4) Positive and negative;21

(5) Unilateral and bilateral;22

(6) Individual and collective;23

(7) Accessory and principal.24

The following, on the other hand, is the classification of

obligations according to Sanchez Roman:25

(1) As to juridical quality:

(a) Natural — when the obligation is in accordance with

natural law.

(b) Civil — when the obligation is in accordance with

positive law.

(c) Mixed — when the obligation is in accordance with

both natural and positive law.

18 Arts. 1158-1162, Civil Code.19 Arts. 1163-1168, Civil Code.20 Arts. 1163-1166, Civil Code.21 Arts. 1167-1168, Civil Code.22 Arts. 1169-1191, Civil Code.23 Arts. 1207, 1223, Civil Code.24 Arts. 1166, 1226, et seq., Civil Code.258 Sanchez Roman 20-40.

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2. As to parties:

(a) Unilateral and bilateral — unilateral, where onlyone party is bound, and bilateral, where both parties are mu-

tually or reciprocally bound.

(b) Individual and collective — individual, where there

is only one obligor, and collective, where there are several ob-

ligors. The latter may be joint, when each obligor is liable only

for his proportionate share of the obligation, or solidary, when

each obligor may be held liable for the entire obligation.

3. As to object: (a) Determinate and generic — determinate, when the

object is specific; generic, when the object is designated by its

class or genus.

(b) Simple and multiple — simple, when there is only

one undertaking; multiple, when there are several undertak-

ings. Multiple obligations may be conjunctive, when all of the

undertakings are demandable at the same time, or distribu-

tive, when only one undertaking out of several is demandable.Distributive obligations, on the other hand, may be alterna-

tive, when the obligor is allowed to choose one out of several

obligations which may be due and demandable, or facultative,

when the obligor is allowed to substitute another obligation for

one which is due and demandable.

(c) Positive and negative — positive, when the obligor

is obliged to give or do something; negative, when the obligor

must refrain from giving or doing something.

(d) Real and personal — real, when the obligation con-

sists in giving something; personal, when the obligation con-

sists in doing or not doing something.

(e) Possible and impossible — possible, when the ob-

ligation is capable of fulfillment in nature as well as in law;

impossible, when the obligation is not capable of fulfillment

either in nature or in law.

(f) Divisible and indivisible — divisible, when the obli-gation is susceptible of partial performance; indivisible, when

the obligation is not susceptible of partial performance.



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(g) Principal and accessory — principal, when it is the

main undertaking; accessory, when it is merely an undertaking

to guarantee the fulfillment of the principal obligation.

4. As to perfection and extinguishment:

(a) Pure — when the obligation is not subject to any

condition or term and is immediately demandable.

(b) Conditional — when the obligation is subject to a

condition which may be suspensive, in which case the happen-

ing or fulfillment of the condition results in the birth of the

obligation, or resolutory, in which case the happening or ful-fillment of the condition results in the extinguishment of the

obligation.

(c) With a term or period (a plazo) — when the obligation

is subject to a term or period which may be suspensive or from

a day certain, in which case the obligation is demandable only

upon the expiration of the term, or resolutory or to a day certain,

in which case the obligation terminates upon the expiration of

the term.

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

1. Law;

2. Contracts;

3. Quasi-contracts;

4. Acts or omissions punished by law; and

5. Quasi-delicts.26

Sources of Obligations. — In Roman law, the sources of

obligations are: (1) contractu; (2) quasi-contractu; (3) male fi cio;

and (4) quasi-male fi cio.27 These sources are preserved in the Civil

Code with the addition of law or lege.28 The addition of lege as an

independent source of obligations, however, has been criticized as

theoretically erroneous. Thus, according to the Supreme Court:

26 Art. 1089, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.278 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 35.28 Art. 1157, Civil Code.

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“This enumeration of the sources of obligations supposes that

the quasi-contractual obligation and the obligation imposed by

law are of different types. The learned Italian jurist, Jorge Giorgi,criticizes this assumption and says that the classification embodied

in the Code is theoretically erroneous. His conclusion is that one

or the other of these categories should have been suppressed and

merged in the other. (Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Spanish

Ed., Vol. 5, Arts. 5, 7, 9) The validity of the criticism is, we think,

self-evident and it is of interest to note that the common law makes

no distinction between the two sources of liability. The obligations

which in the Code are indicated as quasi-contracts, as well as those

arising ex lege, are in the common law system merged into thecategory of obligations imposed by law, and all are denominated

implied contracts.’’29

Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not pre-

sumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in

special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the

precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what

has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.30

Obligations Arising from Law. — Unlike other obligations,

those derived from law can never be presumed. Consequently, only

those expressly determined in the Civil Code or in special laws are

demandable. These obligations shall be regulated by the precepts

of the law which establishes them, and as to what has not been

foreseen, by the provisions of Book IV of the Civil Code.31

How can we determine whether an obligation arises from

law or from some other source, such as a contract, quasi-contract,criminal offense or quasi-delict? It must be noted that in the birth or

generation of an obligation, there is always a concurrence between

the law which establishes or recognizes it and an act or condition

upon which the obligation is based or predicated. According to

Manresa, when the law establishes the obligation and the act or

condition upon which it is based is nothing more than a factor for

determining the moment when it becomes demandable, then the law

29Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182.30 Art. 1090, Spanish Civil Code.31 Art. 1158, Civil Code.



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itself is the source of the obligation; however, when the law merely

recognizes or acknowledges the existence of an obligation generated

by an act which may constitute a contract, quasi-contract, criminaloffense or quasi-delict and its only purpose is to regulate such

obligation, then the act itself is the source of the obligation and not

the law.32 Thus, if A loses a certain amount to B in a game of chance,

according to Art. 2014 of the Civil Code, the former may recover his

loss from the latter, with legal interest from the time he paid the

amount lost. It is evident that in this particular case the source of

the obligation of B to refund to A the amount which he had won from

the latter is not a contract, quasi-contract, criminal offense or quasi-

delict, but the law itself.33 The same can also be said with regard tothe obligation of the spouses to support each other,34 the obligations

of employers under the Labor Code,35 the obligations of the owners of

the dominant and servient estates in legal easements,36 and others

scattered in the Civil Code and in special laws.

Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the

force of law between the contracting parties and should be

complied with in good faith.37

Obligations Arising from Contracts. — A contract is a

meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself,

with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.38

As a rule, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that

moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what

has been expressly stipulated but also to all of the consequences

which according to their nature may be in keeping with good faith,

usage and law.39 These contracts are commonly called consensual

contracts. Once the contract is perfected, the valid contract has theforce of law binding the parties to comply therewith in good faith,

where neither one may renege therefrom without the consent of the

other. (Tiu Peck vs. CA 221 SCRA 618 [1993]) There are certain

328 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 48.33Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182.34 Art. 291, Civil Code; Pelayo vs. Lauron, 12 Phil. 453.35Bautista vs. Borromeo, 35 SCRA 119.36 Arts. 634, 687, Civil Code.37 Art. 1091, Spanish Civil Code, in modified form.38 Art. 1305, Civil Code.39 Art. 1315, Civil Code.

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contracts, however, called real contracts, such as deposit, pledge

and commodatum, which are not perfected until the delivery of the

object of the obligation.40 Whether the contract is consensual or real,the rule is that from the moment it is perfected, obligations which

may be either reciprocal or unilateral arise. Reciprocal obligations

are those where the parties are mutually or reciprocally obliged to

do or to give something; unilateral obligations, on the other hand,

are those where only one of the parties, the obligor, is obliged to do

or to give something.

Unlike other kinds of obligations, those arising from contracts

are governed primarily by the agreement of the contracting parties.This is clearly deducible not only from the nature of contracts, but

also from Art. 1169 of the Code which declares that such obligations

have the force of law between the contracting parties and should

be complied with in good faith. “Compliance in good faith’’ means

performance in accordance with the stipulations, clauses, terms

and conditions of the contract. Consequently, the Code recognizes

the right of such contracting parties to establish such stipulations,

clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided

they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order orpublic policy.41 Good faith must, therefore, be observed to prevent

one party from taking unfair advantage over the other party. In

the case of Royal Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 608

(1986), it was ruled that evasion by a party of legitimate obligations

after receiving the benefits under the contract would constitute

unjust enrichment on his part. However, in default of an agreement,

the rules found in the Civil Code regulating such obligations are

applicable.42

Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts

shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of

this Book.43

Obligations Arising from Quasi-Contracts. — Quasi-

contracts are those juridical relations arising from lawful, voluntary

40 Art. 1316, Civil Code.41 Art. 1306, Civil Code.42 Art. 1305, et seq., Civil Code.43New provision.



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and unilateral acts, by virtue of which the parties become bound

to each other, based on the principle that no one shall be unjustly

enriched or benefited at the expense of another.44 The most importantof these juridical relations which are recognized and regulated

by the Civil Code are negotiorum gestio45 and solutio indebiti.46

Negotiorum gestio is the juridical relation which arises whenever a

person voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the

business or property of another without any power or authority from

the latter.47 In this type of quasi-contract, once the gestor or of ficious

manager has assumed the agency or management of the business or

property, he shall be obliged to continue such agency or management

until the termination of the affair and its incidents,48 exercising such

rights and complying with such obligations as provided for in the

Code.49 Solutio indebiti, on the other hand, is the juridical relation

which arises whenever a person unduly delivers a thing through

mistake to another who has no right to demand it.50 In this type of

quasi-contract, once the delivery has been made, the person to whom

the delivery is unduly made shall have the obligation to return the

property delivered or the money paid.51

The Civil Code provides other instances of quasi-contract.Examples are those found in Articles 2159, 2164 to 2175.

In the case of Perez vs. Palomar, 2 Phil. 682, it was significantly

noted that in a quasi contract where no express consent is given by

the other party, the consent needed in a contract is provided by law

through presumption (presumptive consent). Presumptive consent

gives rise to multiple juridical relations resulting in obligations for

delivery of the thing and rendering of service.

Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from offenses shall

be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of

Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,

44 Art. 2142, Civil Code.45 Art. 2144, Civil Code.46 Art. 2154, Civil Code.47 Art. 2144, Civil Code.48 Ibid.49 Arts. 2144-2152, Civil Code.50 Art. 2154, Civil Code.51 Ibid.

Art. 1161


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Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of

this Book, regulating damages.52

Obligations Arising from Criminal Offenses. — As a rule,

every person liable for a felony is also civilly liable.53 This principle

is based on the fact that, generally, a crime has a dual aspect — the

criminal aspect and the civil aspect. Although these two aspects are

separate and distinct from each other in the sense that one affects

the social order and the other, private rights, so that the purpose of

the first is to punish or correct the offender, while the purpose of the

second is to repair the damages suffered by the aggrieved party, it

is evident that the basis of the civil liability is the criminal liabilityitself.

Please note, however, that there are offenses and special crimes

without civil liability. Examples are crimes of treason, rebellion,

illegal possession of firearm and gambling. But a person who is not

criminally liable may still be civilly liable.

Idem; Enforcement of civil liability. — In general and

prior to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000, the following

rules are observed in the enforcement or prosecution of civil liabilityarising from criminal offenses:

(1) Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a

criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil

liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with

the criminal action, unless the offended party (i) expressly waives

the civil action, or (ii) reserves his right to institute it separately, or

(iii) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

(2) Independent civil action. — In the cases provided in

Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,

an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the

criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the

pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved. Such

civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,

and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

52 Art. 1092, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.53 Art. 100, Revised Penal Code. This rule, however, is subject to the rules stated

in Arts. 101, 102 and 103, Revised Penal Code.



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(3) Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all casesnot included in the preceding rules, the following rules are observed:

(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the sameoffense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal

action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituteduntil final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

(b) If the civil action has been filed ahead of the criminalaction, and the criminal action is subsequently commenced, thecivil action shall be suspended in whatever stage before final judgment it may be found, until final judgment in criminal

action has been rendered. However, if no final judgmenthas been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, thesame may be consolidated with the criminal action uponapplication with the court trying the criminal action. If the

application is granted, the evidence prevented and admittedin the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproducedin the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission ofadditional evidence that any party may wish to present. In case

of consolidation, both the criminal and the civil action shall be

tried and decided jointly;

(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry withit extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from adeclaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civilmight arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to

the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in themanner provided by law against the person who may be liablefor restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for thedamage suffered.

Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule III of the Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure 2000, however, it is stated that except for civil actions

provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, thecivil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. The actioncontemplated, as pointed out by Justice Oscar Herrera in his

Treatise on Criminal Procedure, is a civil action arising from a crime

if reserved or filed separately and a criminal case is filed if it has to

be suspended to await final judgment in the criminal action.

The rule clarifies that, “During the pendency of the criminal

action, the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot

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be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended

shall not run.’’ Otherwise stated, the period of prescription of the

civil actions under Section 3 of the aforementioned rules shall not besuspended because they can be instituted separately. This refers to

civil actions arising from the offense charged which have not been

reserved or civil actions that have been filed ahead of the criminal

action but have been suspended. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise

on Historical Development and Highlights of Amendment of Rules

on Criminal Procedure, February 2001).

(4) Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment

rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liabilityis no bar to a criminal action.

(5) Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition

for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of

a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the of fice of

the fiscal (prosecutor) or the court conducting the preliminary

investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for

trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal

action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000

provides for the elements of a prejudicial question. They are: (a) the

previously instituted civil action which involves an issue similar or

intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal

action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or

not the criminal action may proceed.

Section 7 limits a prejudicial question to a “previously insti-

tuted civil action’’ in order to minimize possible abuses by the sub-

sequent filing of a civil action as an after thought for the purpose ofsuspending the criminal action. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise

on Criminal Procedure, February 2001)

At a glance, therefore, the following are the salient changes

brought about by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000,

as more specifically discussed hereunder by Justice Herrera in his

Treatise on Criminal Procedure:

a. The rule changes the 1985 rule as amended in 1988.

Under the 1985 Rule, the action for recovery of civil liabilityarising from crime including the civil liability under Articles

32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising



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from the same act or omission are deemed impliedly instituted

with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the

civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, orinstitutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from

the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal

unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his

right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action

prior to the criminal action.

b. Under the former rule, a waiver of any of three civil

actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the res-ervation of the right to file any of said civil actions separately

waives the others. This is no longer provided for. The reserva-

tion and waiver refers only to the civil action for the recovery

of civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not

include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and

2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same

act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even with-

out a reservation.

c. The rulings in Shafer vs. Judge, RTC of Olongapo

City, 167 SCRA 376, allowing a third-party complaint, and the

ruling in Javier vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA

376, as well as Cabaero vs. Cantos allowing a counterclaim are

no longer in force. Under the 2000 Rules, these pleadings are

no longer allowed. Any claim which could have been the subject

thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

d. The rule also incorporated Circular 57-97 on the

filing of actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22mandating the inclusion of the corresponding civil action for

which the filing fee shall be paid based on the amount of the

check involved. In other cases, no filing fees shall be required

for actual damages.

Idem; Id. — Effect of acquittal. — If the accused in a

criminal action is acquitted of the offense charged, can a civil action

for damages based on the same act or omission still be instituted?

This question requires a qualified answer. If the acquittal of theaccused is based on the ground that his guilt has not been proved

beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action to recover damages based

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on the same act or omission may still be instituted.54 In such case,

mere preponderance of evidence shall be suf ficient in order that

the plaintiff will be able to recover from the defendant.55 On theother hand, if the acquittal is based on the ground that he did not

commit the offense charged, or what amounts to the same thing, if

the acquittal proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that

the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the

subsequent institution of a civil action to recover damages is, as a

general rule, no longer possible.56

Idem; id. — Effect of independent civil actions. — As a

rule, the civil action to recover damages from the person criminallyliable is not independent from the criminal action. This is true even

where it has, to a certain extent, been separated by the injured

party from the criminal proceedings either by reserving his right to

file a separate civil action or by commencing the action to recover

damages ahead of the criminal action. In the first, the right to file a

civil action shall depend upon the result of the criminal action, while

in the second, once the criminal action is instituted, the action to

recover damages shall be suspended.57 There are, however, certain

exceptional cases or instances under the Civil Code where the civil

action to recover damages is entirely separate and independent from

the criminal action, although the act or omission which is the basis

thereof may be a criminal offense. They are: first, where the civil

action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission

complained of as a criminal offense or felony;58 and second, where the

law grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action

which is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.59 As

a matter of fact, we can even go to the extent of saying that thesecases or instances also constitute the exceptions to the rule that if

the accused in the criminal action is acquitted on the ground that he

did not commit the offense charged, the subsequent institution of a

civil action is no longer possible.

54 Art. 29, Civil Code.55 Ibid.56Sec. 3(c), Rule 111, New Rules of Court.57Sec. 3(b), Rule 111, New Rules of Court.58 Arts. 31, 177, Civil Code.59 Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code.



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With regard to the first, it must be noted that where the civil

action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission

complained of as a criminal offense or felony, such action mayproceed independently of the criminal action and regardless of the

result of the latter.60 It is evident that in such case the basis of the

civil action may be an obligation arising from the law, contract,

quasi-contract, or quasi-delict. Thus, a postmaster, who has been

charged criminally for malversation of government funds under

his custody, may still be made a defendant in a civil case for the

recovery of the funds, not on the ground of malversation, but on

the ground that under Sec. 633 of the Revised Administrative Code,

he can be held accountable therefor.61 The basis of the civil action

in such case is not the obligation arising from the criminal offense

of malversation, but the obligation arising from the law. Similarly,

if a passenger in a certain bus institutes a civil action to recover

damages from the operator of the bus line for injuries sustained in

an accident, such action is separate and distinct from the criminal

prosecution of the driver for criminal negligence and may, therefore,

be continued regardless of the result of the latter. Consequently,

he can still recover damages even if the driver is acquitted in thecriminal action, because it is clear that the action in such case is

based on culpa contractual and not on the act or omission of the

driver complained of as felony.62 The same principle is also applicable

if the offense charged constitutes what is known as culpa aquiliana

or quasi-delict under the Civil Code.63 In such case, the injured party

can always institute a civil action to recover damages independently

of the criminal action and regardless of the result of the latter. This

is so even granting that the accused is acquitted in the criminal

action either on the ground of reasonable doubt or on the groundthat he did not commit the offense charged. The reason for this is

that the basis of the civil action is no longer the criminal liability of

the defendant, but a quasi-delict or tort.64

60 Art. 31, Civil Code.61Tolentino vs. Carlos, 39 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 121.62San Pedro Bus Line vs. Navarro, 94 Phil. 840; Bernaldes vs. Bohol Land Trans.

Co., 7 SCRA 276.63 Art. 2176, et seq., Civil Code.64 Art. 2177, Civil Code; Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607; Dyogi vs.

Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095; Calo vs. Peggy, 103 Phil. 1112; Stanvac vs. Tan, 107 Phil. 109.

Art. 1161


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With regard to the second, it must be observed that there are

five exceptional cases or instances, in addition to that which is stated

in Art. 31 of the New Civil Code, where the law itself expresslygrants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action which

is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. They

are: (1) interferences by public of ficers or employees or by private

individuals with civil rights and liberties,65 (2) defamation,66 (3)

fraud,67 (4) physical injuries,68 and (5) refusal or neglect of a city or

municipal police of ficer to render aid or protection in case of danger

to life or property.69 In all of these cases or instances, although the

act or omission may constitute a criminal offense in accordance

with our penal laws, the injured party may institute a civil actionto recover damages which is entirely separate and distinct from the

criminal action. Once the action is instituted, then it may proceed

independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a

preponderance of evidence.70

Idem; id.; id. — Effect of failure to make reservation. —

Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court states: “In the cases

provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate anddistinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured

party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided that the

right is reserved as required in the preceding section.’’ The insertion

in the foregoing provision of the phrase provided the right is reserved

as required in the preceding section, resulted in a debate among

academicians which lasted for more than twenty years.

Finally, interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court,

in Garcia vs. Florido,71 declared:

“As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent actcausing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime

or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual.

65 Art. 32, Civil Code.66 Art. 33, Civil Code.67 Ibid.68 Ibid.69 Art. 34, Civil Code.70 Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code.7152 SCRA 420. This case was also cited and quoted in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91

SCRA 113.



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OBLIGATIONS

The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter isa distinct and independent negligence, having always had its

own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of theview that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based

upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminalproceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result

of the latter. Hence, ‘the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with

reference to Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary

to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articleswere drafted and are intended to constitute as exceptions to

the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.

The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an

unauthorized amendment of substantive law.’ x x x’’

Again, in Abellana vs. Marabe,72 the Supreme Court declared:

“The restrictive interpretation x x x does not only result

in its emasculation but also gives rise to a serious constitutional

doubt. Article 33 is quite clear: ‘In case of x x x physical injuries,

a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from thecriminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil

action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,

and shall require only preponderance of evidence.’ That is asubstantive right not to be frittered away by a constructionthat would render it nugatory, if through oversight, the

offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for

damages in a civil suit. x x x The grant of power to this Court

both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charterdoes not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of

substantive right. It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to

avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as

would give rise to a constitutional doubt. x x x The law as an

instrument of social control will fail in its function if through aningenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm,

particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to

a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an allegedright.’’

Thus, in Elcano vs. Hill,73 where the first defendant had

been previously charged with the criminal offense of homicide and

subsequently acquitted on the ground that his act is not criminal,

7257 SCRA 106.7377 SCRA 98.

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because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with a mistake, the Supreme

Court held, despite the fact that the plaintiffs (who are the parents

of the alleged victim) failed to make a reservation of their rightto institute the civil action separately, that such acquittal of the

defendant in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability

for quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code; hence, that

acquittal is not a bar to the civil action against him. The same

ruling was applied in Mendoza vs. Arrieta.74 In effect, the procedural

requirement provided for in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules

of Court is not mandatory.

Removal of Reservation Requirement For IndependentCivil Actions

Accordingly, Section 2 of the New Rules of Court was likewise

amended to read as:

“SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.

— In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the

Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may

be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently

of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance ofevidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover

damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the

criminal action.’’ (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000).

Under the former rule, the foregoing actions may only be

allowed if there is a reservation, or were filed ahead of the criminal

action. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise on Criminal Procedure,

February 2001).

Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall

be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of the

Book, and by special laws.75

Obligations Arising from Quasi-Delicts. — As it is used

in this part of the Civil Code, the term “quasi-delicts”76 refers to all

of those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-

7491 SCRA 113.75 Art. 1093, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.76In Spanish law, “cuasi-delitos’’ is sometimes known as “culpa aquiliana’’ or

“culpa extra-contractual.’’



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OBLIGATIONS

contracts, or criminal offenses.77 Thus, using Art. 2176 of the Civil

Code and decided cases as bases or anchors, it may be defined as the

fault or negligence of a person, who, by his act or omission, connectedor unconnected with, but independent from, any contractual relation,

causes damage to another person. It is, therefore, the equivalent of

the term “tort” in Anglo-American law.78

Idem; Persons liable. — Obligations arising from quasi-

delicts are demandable not only from the person directly responsible

for the damage incurred,79 but also against the following:

(1) The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, themother, with respect to damages caused by the minor children who

live in their company;

(2) Guardians, with respect to damages caused by the minors

or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and who live

in their company;

(3) The owners and managers of an establishment or

enterprise, with respect to damages caused by their employees in

the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or onthe occasion of their functions;

(4) Employers with respect to damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their

assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any

business or industry;

(5) The State, when it acts through a special agent; but not

when the damage has been caused by the of ficial to whom the task

done properly pertains; and

(6) Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and

trades, with respect to damages caused by their pupils and students

or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.80

It must be noted, however, that the responsibility of the above

persons or entities shall cease if they can prove that they have

77Report of the Code Commission, p. 161.78See Elcano and Elcano vs. Hill and Hill, 77 SCRA 98.79 Art. 2176, Civil Code.80 Art. 2180, Civil Code.

Art. 1162


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observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent

damage.81

Idem; Requisites of liability. — In actions based on quasi-

delicts, before the person injured can recover damages from the

defendant, it is necessary that he must be able to prove the following

facts:

(1) The fault or negligence of the defendant;

(2) The damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and

(3) The relation of cause and effect between the fault or

negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by theplaintiff.82

Idem; Quasi-delicts and crimes. — Quasi-delicts and crimi-

nal offenses are sometimes dif ficult to distinguish from each other.

However, they may be distinguished from each other in the follow-

ing ways:

(1) Crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delicts are

only of private concern;

(2) The Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,

while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs

the damages incurred;

(3) Generally, there are two liabilities in crime: criminal and

civil. In quasi-delict, there is only civil liability; and

(4) Crimes are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the

former are punished only if there is a law clearly covering them,

while the latter include all acts in which any kind of fault ornegligence intervenes.83

Idem; Scope of quasi-delicts. — In Elcano vs. Hill (G.R. No.

L-24303, May 26, 1977), the Supreme Court held that quasi-delicts

include acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the

penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Using the exact language

of the Court, “it is ‘more congruent with the spirit of law, equity

and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress,’ to hold, as

81 Ibid.82Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co., 16 Phil. 8.83Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607.



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OBLIGATIONS

we do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence,

covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in

character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent.’’

The above pronouncement of the Supreme Court is

startling. It expands the coverage of quasi-delicts beyond what

was originally contemplated by the lawmaker.

Under the general plan of our law on obligations, the scope

of obligations arising from the law, contracts, quasi-contracts,

and acts or omissions punished by law is well-defined. Their

boundaries are clearly delineated and drawn with precision. It

is only with respect to obligations arising from quasi-delicts thatthere is a problem and this is natural because of the very nature

of such obligations. Under our system of liabilities, quasi-delicts

must necessarily be a sort of “dumping ground’’ or “garbage can’’for all kinds of actionable wrongs not falling within the purview

of the four sources of obligations. As we look at it, the original

plan envisaged by the lawmaker is as follows:

The coverage of quasi-delicts which do not overlap with

crimes under the Revised Penal Code and special laws (and

which we can very well call the general rule) are: first, negligentacts or omissions not punishable as criminal offenses; second,

intentional quasi-delicts or torts, such as those regulated by

Arts. 19, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28 and 1314 of the Civil Code; andthird, the so-called strict liability torts where there is neithernegligence nor intent to cause damage or injury, such as in the

case contemplated in Art. 23 of the Civil Code or in the case of

actionable nuisances under Arts. 694 and 705 of the Civil Code.

The coverage of quasi-delicts which overlap with acts

or omissions punishable under the Revised Penal Code (and

which we can very well call the exceptions) are: first, criminalnegligence; and second, acts or omissions punishable as crimesunder the Revised Penal Code but the Civil Code expressly

declares that the civil action arising therefrom is separate and

independent from the criminal action. (Arts. 31, 32, 33 and 34 of

the Civil Code)

We believe that the above arrangement was deliberately

planned. Thus, according to the Code Commission in its Report:“The Commission also thought of the possibility of adopting

the word ‘tort’ from Anglo-American law. But ‘tort’ under thatsystem is much broader than the Spanish-Philippine concept

of obligations arising from non-contractual negligence. ‘Tort’ in Anglo-American jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but

Art. 1162


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also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, falseimprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine

legal system, intentional and malicious acts are governed bythe Penal Code, although certain exceptions are made in the

Project.’’ (Report, pp. 161-162)

Idem; Character of remedy. — In Padua vs. Robles,84 in his

concurring opinion, Justice Barredo declared: “It is by now beyond

all cavil, as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a

negligent act, such as that committed in this case, gives rise to at

least two separate and independent liabilities, namely (1) the civil

liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liabilityarising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana.

These two concepts of faults are so distinct from each other that

exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other.

Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately

and independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the Civil

Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent

act or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts

awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect,

only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff had alreadybeen ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other case the

amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case

only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he had

already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not

recover anymore in the second case.’’

The above opinion was confirmed in Elcano vs. Hill.85 Thus,

according to the Supreme Court: “Consequently, a separate civil

action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not heis criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that

the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged criminally,

to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such

eventuality only to the bigger award of the two assuming that the

awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of

the civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers

exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised

Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered

8466 SCRA 485.8577 SCRA 98.



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OBLIGATIONS

as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by

a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has

not happened or has not been committed by the accused.”

However, in Mendoza vs. Arrieta,86 a more recent case, there was

a return to the old doctrine of selection of remedies. In this case, the

Supreme Court categorically held that since the offended or injured

party had chosen the remedy of proceeding under the Revised Penal

Code by allowing the civil action to be impliedly instituted in the

criminal action, and since the court had expressly declared that the

fact from which the civil liability did not exist, therefore, the civil

action for damages subsequently commenced by said injured partyagainst the defendant has already been extinguished in consonance

with Sec. 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. And even if plaintiff’s

cause of action against defendant is not ex-delicto, the end result

would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal

case that defendant’s acquittal was not based upon reasonable

doubt.

Thus, the problem is still very much with us. The debate rages

on.

Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario

73 Phil. 607

This case come up from the Court of Appeals which held

the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages forthe death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro

Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936,

on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal,there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate

Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided byPedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its

passengers, 16-year-old Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from

which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against

Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he wasconvicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one

year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court

in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a

separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals af firmed

8691 SCRA 113.

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the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. SeverinoGarcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March

7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance ofManila against Faustino Barredo as the sole proprietor of the

Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8,1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages

in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the

date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of

Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interestfrom the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that

Fontanilla’s negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was

driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to

Barredo’s responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:

“* * * It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla’s employer.

There is no proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father

of a family to prevent the damage. (See p. 22, appellant’s brief.)In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who

had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile

Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violations which appeared in

the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the publicand to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under

the provisions of Article 1903 of the Civil Code.’’

The main theory of the defense is that the liability ofFausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence,

his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil

action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable,

Barredo cannot be held responsible in this case. The petitioner’sbrief states on page 10:

“* * * The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is beingsued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father

of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanillato prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words,

the Court of Appeals insists on applying in this case Article1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in

Chapter 11, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes

said article inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a crime

as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 ofBook lV of the Civil Code, in precise words of Article 1903 of the

Civil Code itself, is applicable only to “those (obligations) arising

from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by

law.’ ’’ The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed

thus:



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OBLIGATIONS

“* * * We cannot agree to the defendant’s contention.The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is

not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor(the crime of Pedro Fontanilla), but an obligation imposed in

Article .1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in theselection or supervision of his servant or employee.”

Speaking through Justice Bocobo, the Supreme Court held:

“The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs

may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo,

thus making him primarily and directly responsible under

Article 1903 (now Art. 2180, New Civil Code) of the Civil Code asan employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that

Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code,

his (defendant’s) liability as an employer is only subsidiary,

according to said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been sued

in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To

decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has,

in the minds of many, confused and jumbled together delitos

and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or

negligence under Articles 1902-1910 (now Arts. 2176 to 2194,

New Civil Code) of the Civil Code.

“Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or

“culpa aquiliana’’ is a separate legal institution under the Civil

Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is

entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this

principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of the

Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers

may be safely anchored.

x x x “It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article.1902

of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver’s

negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1093 limits

cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions “not punishable by law.’’ But

inasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes

not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence,

the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code has

apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes

the “confusion worse confounded.’’ However, a closer study

shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligentacts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability

arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos

Art. 1162


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or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causingdamages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910

of the Civil Code.

x x x

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separateindividuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil

Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between

civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the

Penal Code) and responsibility for fault of negligence under

Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the samenegligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from

a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for

fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil

Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render

it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the

defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under

Article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked

should ordinarily be suf ficient to dispose of this case. Butinasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little

understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate

their foundations.

“Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in Article 366 punishes

not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold

that Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or

negligence not punished by law according to the literal import

of Article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa

aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual

life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through

any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have to

be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising

from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain

for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to

the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurdand anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,

disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit

that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law

to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancientorigin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or

cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in Articles

1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.



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OBLIGATIONS

“Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in

a civil case, preponderance of evidence is suf ficient to makethe defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of

criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonabledoubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In

such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible

in a civil action under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.

Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil

wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

“Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make de-

fendant’s liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver andexhaust his (the latter’s) property first, would be tantamount

to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome

method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy un-

der our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which

is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defen-

dant under Article. 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law

is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the

procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive

of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that profes-

sional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usuallydo not have suf ficient means with which to pay damages. Why,

then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through

this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?

In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and

facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

“At this juncture, it should be said that the primary

and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed

negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen

and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in

order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employerswho principally reap the profits resulting from the services of

these servants and employees. It is but right that they should

guarantee the latter’s careful conduct for the personal and

patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, “they

should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,

others for their poor selection and all for their negligence.” And

according to Manresa, “It is much more equitable and just that

such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director

who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not

upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection

and who used such employee because of his confidence in the

principal or director.” (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also

Art. 1162


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base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principleof representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos

says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before thirdpersons the employer and employee “vienen a ser como una sola

personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quienle emplea y utiliza” (“become as one personality by the merging

of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and

utilizes him.”) All these observations acquire a peculiar force

and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there isneed of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners

of motor vehicles.

“Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions ofboth the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which

has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres

already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character

and ef ficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grownup a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the

civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there

is another remedy, which is by invoking Articles 1902-1910 of

the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed byour laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and

nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on

culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual.

“In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals should be and is hereby af firmed, with costs against the

defendant-petitioner.’’

Elcano vs. Hill

77 SCRA 98

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First

Instance of Quezon City dismissing the complaint of plaintiffsfor recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,

married at the time of occurrence, and his father, defendant

Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,

for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, of whichwhen criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted

on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of

intent to kill, coupled with a mistake. According to the Supreme

Court, speaking through Justice Barredo:

“As We view the foregoing background of this case, the twodecisive issues presented for Our resolution are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the



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OBLIGATIONS

acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action forcivil liability was not reserved?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the

Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding theundisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of,

Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence

from his father, was already legally married?

“The first issue presents no more problem than the need

for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,

criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation

which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs.

Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on thebasis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature

of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and

mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of theSupreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and

earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can

result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also

under the Civil Code.

“Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon

a reading of x x x Garcia — that the concurrence of the PenalCode and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only

acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts — deeper

reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements

therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends tofault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to

the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,

supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent

act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force hereat the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations which

are derived from acts or omissions, in which fault or negligence,not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter

II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)’’ And it isprecisely the underlined qualification, “not punishable by law,’’

that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable

construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that

“killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life’’ hence, the rulingthat “(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother

and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and

such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito,

which is conserved and made enduring in Articles 1902 to 1910of the Spanish Civil Code.’’ And so, because Justice Bocobo was

Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original

text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code,

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which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses theterm, “not punishable by law,’’ thereby making it clear that the

concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal incharacter or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or

negligent. Thus, the corresponding provision to said Article 1093in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, “Obligations

derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions

of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book (on quasi-delicts), and by

special laws.’’ More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 ofthe new code provides:

“ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence

under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinctfrom the civil liability arising from negligence under the

Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages

twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.’’

According to the Code Commission: “The foregoing provi-

sion (Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so novel

or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal

and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal

law, while the latter is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of an-

cient origin, having always had its own foundation and indi-

viduality separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction

between criminal negligence and culpa extra-contractual or cu-

asi-delito has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court

of Spain and outstanding Spanish jurists. Therefore, under the

proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal

negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be

a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising

from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict

or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery.”

(Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.) Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally

refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice

Bocobo about construction that upholds “the spirit that giveth

life’’ rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of

the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And

considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of

the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and

independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in

character (under Articles .29 to 32) from the civil responsibility

arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised PenalCode, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and

3(c), Rule III, contemplate also the same separability, it is “more



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congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more

in harmony with modern progress,’’ to borrow the felicitous

relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Paci fi c Co., 7Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers

to “fault or negligence,’’ covers not only acts “not punishable by

law’’ but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional

and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action

lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is

criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided

that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged

also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would

be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the

two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In otherwords, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of

Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability

for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a

crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal

case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not

been committed, by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in

reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary

and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in

the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-

delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action

against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of

Reginald’s emancipation by marriage on the possible civil

liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion

that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free

from responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon

emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under

Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the

minor (child),” it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article

399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full

or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary

concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s

person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as

though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate

or encumber real property without the consent of his father ormother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with

the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.’’

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Now, under Article 2180, “The obligation imposed by Article2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,

but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thefather and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are

responsible for the damages caused by the minor children wholive in their company.’’ In the instant case, it is not controverted

that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and

getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in

question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient toand dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

“It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the

reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with theiroffending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of

the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent

them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand,the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minoremancipated by marriage may not nevertheless, sue or be suedwithout the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipationdoes not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or doany act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone elseinvites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of aminor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see toit that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to anylitigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerablefor the borrowing of money and alienation or encumbering ofreal property which cannot be done by their minor married child

without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

“Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 appliesto Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of

Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is

now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill hasbecome merely subsidiary to that of his son.

“WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and

the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with theforegoing opinion. Costs against appellees.’’

Mendoza vs. Arrieta

91 SCRA 113

The records show that a three-way vehicular accidentoccurred involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by

Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by Rodolfo

Salazar and a sand-and-gravel truck owned by Felipino Timbol



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and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of the mishap,two separate criminal actions for damage to property through

reckless imprudence were instituted. The first was institutedby Mendoza against Salazar, while the second was institutedby Salazar against Montoya. There was no reservation madeby both complainants of their right to institute a civil actionseparately. After hearing the two cases jointly, the courtrendered judgment acquitting Salazar on the ground that his jeep was bumped from behind by the truck causing it to collidewith the Mercedes Benz. Montoya, on the other hand, wasconvicted on the ground that his guilt was established beyondreasonable doubt. He was ordered to pay to Salazar the amount

of P972.50 for actual damages to the latter’s jeep. After thetermination of the criminal cases, Mendoza filed a civil case.against both Salazar and Timbol, either in the alternative orin solidum, for indemnification for damages. Upon motions ofboth defendants, the respondent court dismissed the case. Theplaintiff, as a consequence, went up to the Supreme Court bymeans of a petition for certiorari seeking a review of the ordersof dismissal. Speaking through Justice Herrera, the SupremeCourt held:

“We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated

September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner’s Complaint againsttruck-owner Timbol.

“In dismissing the complaint against the truck-owner,respondent Judge sustained Timbol’s allegations that the civilsuit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos.SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separatecivil case was made by petitioner and where the latter activelyparticipated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not

state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuchas petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the onesolely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.

“Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment toconstitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisitesmust concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must havebeen rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on themerits; and (4) there must be, between the first and secondactions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and

identity of cause of action.

“It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata

are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is

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no identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said

criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted fordamage to petitioner’s car but for damage to the jeep. Neitherwas truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as thetrial Court had put it “the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannotrecover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he(Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazarin Criminal Case No. SM-228.’’ And more importantly, in thecriminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of thecivil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is

based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article2176 of the Civil Code. As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.:

“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate theseparate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquilianaunder the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there isa distinction between civil liability arising from criminalnegligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibilityfor fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 ofthe Civil Code, and that the same negligent act mayproduce either a civil liability arising from a crime underthe Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault ornegligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.Still more concretely, the authorities above cited renderit inescapable to conclude that the employer, in this casethe defendant-petitioner, is primarily and directly liableunder Article 1903 of the Civil Code.”

“The petitioner’s cause of action against Timbol in the Civilcase is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in thecomplaint, to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along

MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned anddriven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner’s) lane andcollided with his car; that the sudden swerving of Salazar’s jeepwas caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of FreddieMontoya, Timbol’s employee, who was then driving a gravel-and-sand truck in the same direction as Salazar’s jeep; and that as aconsequence of the collision, petitioner’s car suffered extensivedamage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurredactual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney’sfees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action

must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff’s primary right, i.e., thathe is the owner of a Mercedes Benz; and (2) defendants’ delictor wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff’s primaryright, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner



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Salazar or of Timbol’s employee, Montoya, in driving the truck,causing Salazar’s jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner’s

car, were alleged in the Complaint.

“Consequently, petitioner’s cau

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