oakmont sunday symposium homeland security: enough already? mark a. randol

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Oakmont Sunday Symposium Homeland Security: Enough Already? Mark A. Randol

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Oakmont Sunday Symposium

Homeland Security:

Enough Already?

Mark A. Randol

“Remember the Good Ol’ Days?”

• Threats to one’s homeland were primarily of the military kind.

• One’s security was principally determined by how many of these you had….

Fortress America

“…All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth … could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years.”

Abraham Lincoln, 1838

The 9/11 Attacks

• Profoundly affected America’s view of the terrorism threat.

• Altered our approach to domestic law enforcement and intelligence.

• Led to intensified – and some believe – intrusive security measures.

Since 9/11…

• A vast new homeland security bureaucracy has been created.

• Over $1 trillion has been spent.

• The U.S. Intelligence Community has swelled in size and spending.

• Expanded intelligence and investigative authorities have been granted to the government.

• The FBI has been given significantly greater resources and the mission to preempt terrorism.

Since 9/11…

• All Americans – including young children and the elderly – are subject to increasingly intrusive security measures:

disclose personal information. remove belts and shoes. submit to revealing body scans or pat-down searches.

Today…

• Do we feel safer now than before 9/11? • Do we spend too much, too little, or just the right amount of money on homeland security?

• How effective have our homeland security dollars been spent?

Today…

• What are the impacts on our privacy and civil liberties of:

enhanced security measures? increased government authority to investigate and collect information about us?

• And finally, what is the current terrorist threat environment and has it changed?

Enough Already?

• Post-9/11 efforts and results

• Evolution of the terrorist threat

Focus on aviation

• Can we reduce spending without compromising our security?

Principal Post-9/11 Legislation

2001: Aviation and Transportation Security Act

2001: USA PATRIOT Act

2002: Homeland Security Act

2004: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act

Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001

• Created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

• Required the federalization of airline passenger and baggage screening (100% of checked baggage).

• Assigned TSA the mission to secure the entire U.S. transportation system – not just aviation.

Mass transit, rail, ferries, trucking, inter-city and school buses, and even pipelines.

USA PATRIOT Act of 2011

Uniting and Strengthening America by

Providing Appropriate Tools Required

to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism

USA PATRIOT Act of 2011

Greatly enhanced the government’s power to:

• Search telephone, Internet, and e-mail communications.

• Collect medical, financial, and other records.

“Roving” wiretaps “Sneak and peak” search warrants National Security Letters

USA PATRIOT Act of 2011

• Expanded the definition of terrorism.

• Expanded the Treasury Secretary’s authority to regulate financial transactions.

• Broadened the discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism-related acts.

• Dismantled “the Wall” between law enforcement and intelligence allowing broader information sharing.

Homeland Security Act of 2002

• Created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Prevent terrorism mission, but also prepare for, respond to, and recover from “All Hazards.” Office of Intelligence to support its activities.

• Consolidated and reorganized 22 agencies and placed them under the new DHS, among them TSA.

Example: Transferred most functions of U.S. Customs, the Border Patrol, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service into the new U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

• Biggest change to the U.S. Intelligence Community since the National Security Act of 1947.

Created the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

Authorized the National Counterterrorism Center.

• Implemented the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

• Required DHS to assume responsibility for pre-flight terrorism watch list checks (Secure Flight).

Post-9/11 Scorecard

• Few successful attacks against U.S. targets.

Fort Hood shooting – 13 killed

• Several plots detected and disrupted.

• Other plots not detected, but failed.

Current Threat

• Decline of al-Qaeda.

• Rise of the homegrown jihadist threat.

• The “Lone Wolf” challenge.

• Aviation still an attractive target.

Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta

“We’re within reach of strategically defeating Al Qaeda. The key is that, having gotten bin Laden, we’ve now identified some of the key leadership within Al Qaeda, both in Pakistan as well as Yemen and other areas.”

“If we can be successful at going after them, I think we can really undermine their ability to do any kind of planning, to be able to conduct any kind of attack. That’s why I think it’s within reach.”

Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper

“Terrorism will remain at the forefront of our national securitythreats in the coming year.”

“Al Qaeda continues to aspire to spectacular attacks.”

“In light of the loss of experienced personnel, we judge it will seek to augment sophisticated plots by increasing its operational tempo with smaller, simpler ones to demonstrate continued relevance to the global jihad.”

Secretary of Homeland SecurityJanet Napolitano

“One of the most striking elements of today’s threat picture is that plots to attack America increasingly involve American residents and citizens. We are now operating under the assumption, based on the latest intelligence and recent arrests, that individuals prepared to carry out terrorist attacks and acts of violence might be in the United States, and they could carry out acts of violence with little or no warning.”

Homegrown Terrorism

• 51 homegrown jihadist plots since 9/11.

• 30 of these plots since May 2009.

• 4 homegrown attacks since 9/11 including:

Major Nidal Hassan – 13 killed in his November 2009 shooting at Fort Hood.

The “Lone Wolf” Challenge

• Individuals who act alone.

• Difficult for intelligence and law enforcement officials to detect.

• However, they may lack the training and logistical support to conduct a major attack.

The “Lone Wolf” Challenge

• Anders Breivik. Shootings and bombing in Norway killing 77 – July 2011.

• Jared Loughner – Shooting in Tucson killing six and wounding Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords – January 2011.

• Kevin Harpham. Planted backpack bomb along MLK parade route in Spokane – January 2011.

• Each of the four successful post-9/11 homegrown jihadist attacks in the U.S. conducted by lone wolves.

The Threat to Civil Aviation

• Still a target of interest to terrorist groups.

• Consider four recent plots:

2006 Transatlantic Airliners Plot

Plot to detonate liquid explosives on 10airliners traveling from Britain to the U.S.and Canada.

2006 Transatlantic Airliners Plot

• Authorities arrest 25 suspects, mostly British Muslims, some of Pakistani descent.

• Detected in early stages of planning through extensive MI-5 surveillance and the help of an undercover agent that had penetrated the group.

• Eight suspects tried, six convicted.

2009 – The “Underwear Bomber”

Christmas Day 2009: 23-year-old Nigerian

student, Farouk Abdulmutallab, attempted to detonate an explosive device on Northwest Flight 253 flying from Amsterdam to Detroit.

2009 – The “Underwear Bomber”

• Device consisted of 80 grams of PETN, similar to one used in the August 2009 attempted assassination of Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef.

• That assassin also concealed his bomb in his underwear.

• Authorities believe device big enough to blow hole in side of the Airbus 300 aircraft.

2010 – Cargo Bombs from Yemen

• On October 29, 2010, two bombs planted in in printer cartridges were discovered in air cargo shipments sent from Yemen to an address in Chicago.

• One was removed from a UPS cargo plane at East Midlands Airport in the UK.

• The other was found on a FedEx plane in Dubai after it had flown on two passenger airliners.

2010 – Cargo Bombs from Yemen

• The sophisticated devices were believed to be the work of Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, who is also suspected of building the one carried by the “Underwear Bomber.”

• The two devices contained four times the explosive (300 and 400 grams of PETN) as the underwear bomb.

• The East Midlands device was timed to explode over Eastern Seaboard of the US.

2010 – Cargo Bombs from Yemen

2010 – Cargo Bombs from Yemen

2010 – Cargo Bombs from Yemen

2010 – Cargo Bombs from Yemen

• The bombing attacks were foiled thanks to a tip from Saudi intelligence which provided

the tracking numbers for the packages.

• Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the bombing attempts.

2011 – Domodedovo Airport Bombing

TSA Administrator, John Pistole

“It is clear that terroristintent to strike Americantargets has not diminished.”

“We have continued to watch the threat evolve from checked baggage to hand baggage to non-metallic devices hidden on the body to air cargo.”

TSA Administrator, John Pistole

“Non-metallic explosive devices are now the foremost threat to passenger airlines...”

Post-9/11 Aviation Security Measures

• Hardening of airliner cockpit doors.

• Greatly expanded Federal Air Marshal program.

• Increasingly rigorous pre-board passenger screening by Federal officers.

• Use of body scanners, explosive trace detection.

• Screening of checked baggage with explosive detection systems.

Post-9/11 Aviation Security Measures

• Checks of passengers and crews against terrorism watch lists and greatly enlarged “No Fly” and “Selectee” lists.

• Behavior Detection Officers

• Increased police and canine patrols of public areas of airport terminals.

• Restricted parking near airport terminals with increased enforcement.

Post-9/11 Aviation Security Measures

• Restrictions on the amount of liquids allowed in the cabin of the airliner.

• Reconciliation of ID cards with boarding passes.

• Restrict areas of terminal beyond screening checkpoint to passengers/staff only.

• Random additional screening at the gate.

• Security Questions (profiling) of passengers prior to boarding (international flights).

Post-9/11 Aviation Security Measures

• Designation of secure areas at airports:

Improved controls on doors and gates leading to secure areas.

Increased accountability for employee badges and credentials that provide access to secure areas.

Enforcement of procedures to prevent “piggybacking” through controlled access doors to secure areas.

Post-9/11 Aviation Security Measures

• The X-Factor:

Following the heroic example of the passengers on United Flight 93, it is now almost certain that if there is an attempted hijacking, the passengers will fight back.

Post-9/11 Aviation Security Measures

Post-9/11 Aviation Security Measures

Do all these measures provide genuine security or are they just “security theater?”

Security or Security Theater?

• Why does everyone have to endure the exact same level of screening?

• Does everyone pose a similar level of threat?

Security or Security Theater?

• Can Behavior Detection Officers really identify terrorists by brief observations of hundreds of passengers in a crowded airline terminal?

• Does DHS’ mobile “mal-intent” detection system (FAST – Future Attribute Screening Technology) really work?

Security or Security Theater?

• What ‘added security value’ do Federal Air Marshals provide?

Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Program Facts

• Although the number of air marshals in the FAM program is classified, it is believed to number something under 5,000.

• This size allows them to cover less than 1% of all commercial airline flights.

• Nevertheless, the FAM program costs nearly $1 billion – 18% of the TSA budget.

• Does not include the cost to airlines who provide 1st class seats at no charge to TSA.

Security Value of FAM Program

What is the risk today that a terrorist could hijack an aircraft and use it as a weapon like on 9/11?

Improvements in screening make it extremely unlikely that a terrorist could get on an airliner with a weapon.

But even if they did, there is less than 1 chance in 100 that Air Marshals would be on that flight.

Security Value of FAM Program

• But even without Air Marshals, if someone pulled a weapon in the cabin of an airliner, the aircraft’s hardened cockpit doors and the passenger “X-Factor,” would make it virtually impossible for them to commandeer the aircraft.

Security Value of FAM Program

• Recall TSA Administrator Pistole’s statement, “Non-metallic explosive devices are now the foremost threat to passenger airlines...”

• Air Marshals provide only armed security in the cabin of the aircraft. They do not screen for explosives and have no capability to detect or defend against a smuggled explosive device.

• Is the $1 billion FAM program a sensible expenditure of homeland security dollars?

The Security Challenge of the 21st Century

•Terrorism is a problem for all nations.

•Terrorist motivation cuts across the religious and ideological spectrum.

The Security Challenge of the 21st Century

All the military force in the world is of limited value against a highly-motivated enemy, who operate in small clandestine cells, and carry out well-planned terrorist operations –

– especially if they are willing to die during the attack.

The Security Challenge of the 21st Century

In spite of their best efforts, governments cannot prevent all terrorism all of the time.

— No more than they can prevent all crime all of the time.

The Security Challenge of the 21st Century

A goal of 100% security from terrorist attack is unrealistic and counterproductive because:

• The costs are astronomical.

• You will fail.

A Realistic Policy

What is achievable is a high level of security using sound risk management principles which balance cost against the consequence of occasional but inevitable failure.

A Realistic Policy

In other words, security can be:

• Cheap

• Effective

• Convenient

A Realistic Policy

PICK ANY TWO OF THE THREE:

• Cheap

• Effective

• Convenient

Which do you choose?